| Title & Author | Abstract | |
|---|---|---|
| 3(59) | REASONING AGENTS IN A DYNAMIC WORLD: THE FRAME PROBLEM
[JAI Press 1991, Greenwich CT, 289 pages, ISBN 1-55938-082-9] Precis of Hayes and Ford (eds) on Frame-Problem Patrick J. Hayes Beckman Institute 405 North Mathews Avenue Urbana IL 61801 Kenneth M. Ford [email protected] |
Abstract:
What happens when one picks up a brick? Any child knows
that the brick is now held in the air, there is one fewer object on
the ground, and THAT'S ALL. For over twenty years it has been
astonishingly hard to make a computer draw this conclusion. This
"frame problem" is symptomatic of a host of problems in how to
properly represent common knowledge about everyday actions. The
papers in this volume discuss some of these problems, develop
approaches to solving them, or draw philosophical conclusions from
them.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 3(60) | THE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE FRAME PROBLEM
Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem J. van Brakel Department of Philosophy University of Utrecht P.O. Box 80.126 3508 TC Utrecht (Netherlands) telephone -31.3402.43912 telefax -31.30.532816 [email protected] |
Abstract:
This is primarily a critical discussion of Ford & Hayes
(1991; for PSYCOLOQUY Summary, see Hayes 1992), taking into account
other recent literature on the frame problem. [References to
chapters and pages in the Ford & Hayes volume are given in square
brackets.]
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 3(62) | FRAMING IS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
Commentary on Ford & Hayes on Frame Problem Walter J. Freeman MCB LSA 129 Division of Neurobiology University of California Berkeley CA 94720 [email protected] |
Abstract:
It appears that Hayes's premises are that the primitive
reasoning of a child suffices for framing and that the superior
reasoning of a highly educated adult should do better. This does
not nesessarily follow, however, since, paraphrasing from Neumann
(1958), brains do logic poorly, and logical devices do framing
poorly. Framing is the natural outcome of the dynamic process by
which meaning is created in the forebrain under the influence of
sensory flow, past experience embedded in synaptic change, and the
immediacy of impending action and expected reward.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(14) | VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION APPEARS TO BE INCOHERENT
Commentary on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem James H. Fetzer Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota Duluth, MN 55812 [email protected] |
Abstract:
Van Brakel's position appears to be incoherent. His
argument is logically inconsistent; second, in denying my position,
he denies his own; and, third, what he maintains is impossible is
actually possible. Van Brakel's stance is thus invalid on logical,
semantical and empirical grounds.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(21) | EFFECTIVE DESCRIPTIONS NEED NOT BE COMPLETE
Reply to Van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Pat Hayes Beckman Institute University of Illinois Urbana IL 61801 Ken Ford Institute for Human & Machine Cognition University of West Florida Pensacola FL 32514 [email protected] [email protected] |
Abstract:
One can approach van Brakel's (1992) review of Ford &
Hayes (1991) in two different ways: as a scholarly critique of the
frame problem (FP) in general, or as an argument that traditional
AI is inadequate to handle a new fundamental problem that he dubs
the "problem of complete description" (PCD). We respond on both of
these levels.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(22) | PROBLEMS WITH FRAMES
Reply to Freeman on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Pat Hayes Beckman Institute University of Illinois Urbana IL 61801 Ken Ford Institute for Human & Machine Cognition University of West Florida Pensacola, FL 32514 [email protected] [email protected] |
Abstract:
It is clear that Freeman (1992) has not read the book
itself, but is only responding to the summary of it that appeared
in PSYCOLOQUY (Hayes 1992) he therefore appears to miss the point
in several respects.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(23) | UNJUSTIFIED COHERENCE.
Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem J. van Brakel Department of Philosophy University of Utrecht P.O. Box 80.126 3508 TC Utrecht (Netherlands) [email protected] |
Abstract:
Fetzer's position exemplifies a case of unjustified
coherence. He straight-jackets all words and concepts in
decontextualised idiosyncratic definitions. This is of little
relevance for real-world problems such as the frame problem.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(24) | VAN BRAKEL'S POSITION IS PERFECTLY COHERENT
Commentary on Fetzer on van Brakel on Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Rick Grush Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92037 [email protected] |
Abstract:
Fetzer's reasons for disputing van Brakel's (1992)
position are based on misunderstanding of van Brakel's arguments.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(25) | THE CHANGING SCENE
Book Review of Ford & Hayes on the Frame Problem Robert A. Morris Computer Science Department Florida Institute of Technology Melbourne, FL 32901 [email protected] |
Abstract:
This volume is a useful guides to recent advances in AI
and cognitive science towards a satisfactory solution to the frame
problem. Being an original collection, many of the contributions
further the advance of research in this area. In addition, many of
the articles point the way for the reader interested in exploring
broader foundational issues.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(33) | PHILOSOPHY UNFRAMED
Reply to Van Brakel, Grush, and Morris on Frame Problem James H. Fetzer Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota Duluth, MN 55812 [email protected] |
Abstract:
Van Brakel (1993), Grush (1993), and Morris (1993)
dispute the analysis of the frame problem which is advanced in
Fetzer (1991a) and (1991b). I suggest that the frame problem can
best be understood as a special case of the problem of induction.
Those who persist in maintaining that the frame problem is
exclusively a problem of representation miss the point that without
a solution to the problem of change even the availability of a
representation scheme serves no suitable purpose because there is
no solution to the problem of change to represent. And those who
persist in maintaining that the frame problem is one of "common
sense" rather than one of scientific knowledge need to understand
that changes in the world come about as a causal consequence of the
operation of natural laws, the objects of scientific discovery. The
resources "common sense" provides are not adequate to the problem.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(34) | PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS: THE FRAME PROBLEM AS A SYMPTOM OF THE SYMBOL GROUNDING PROBLEM
Commentary on Van Brakel & Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on the Frame-Problem Stevan Harnad Laboratoire Cognition et Mouvement URA CNRS 1166 I.B.H.O.P. Universite d'Aix Marseille II 13388 Marseille cedex 13, France 33-91-66-00-69 [email protected] |
Abstract:
There arrear to be both ecumenical and hegemonic
sentiments in the air. One solution is "scaling up", that more and
more ungrounded sentences, pushing the frame's limits wider and
wider, will eventually shrink the remaining "frame problems" to
only those that we, the interpreters, are also prone to. So we will
either not notice them or cease to regard them as evidence that
there is something wrong with this kind of model in the first
place, however, I think the reason the frame problem keeps rearing
its head is because there is something intrinsically wrong with an
ungrounded symbolic approach to modeling the mind. Knowledge cannot
be "framed" with symbols alone. I believe a better candidate
solution happens to be to try to ground a system's internal symbols
in its robotic capacity to discriminate, manipulate, categorize,
name, describe, and discourse coherently about the objects, events
and states of affairs that its symbols are systematically
interpretable as being about indistinguishabley from the way we
(humans) do it. In short, symbolic capacities are to be grounded in
robotic capacities.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |
| 4(42) | MODELING OUR ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENCE, NOT GOD'S
Reply to Fetzer on Ford & Hayes on Frame Problem Patrick J. Hayes Beckman Institute University of Illinois Urbana, Il 61801 Kenneth M. Ford Institute for Human & Machine Cognition University of West Florida Pensacola, FL 32514 [email protected] [email protected] |
Abstract:
Fetzer misunderstands our use of the term "frame
problem", taking the term to refer to, contrary to the original
definition (McCarthy, 1963), a larger problem of change, which is
an instance of the classical problem of induction.
Keywords: Frame-problem, artificial intelligence, temporal logics, independent persistence, attention, Hume, dynamic frames, qualification problem. |