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This is a most illuminating life-
storv of Chiana Kai-Shek, written bv
one who lias an intimate understand-
ing (d modern China and its great
leader. It deals with th(' ancestry of
the Chiang family and the childhood
of the bov, who, born oier 6o years
ago in a small town ol a remote part
of I'astern China, was destined to lead
a great nation ; the revolutionary
movement at the end of the Manchu
Dynasty and Chiang’s activities in it;
the obscure early days of the Republic
o( China vvhen all his friends were
killed or exiled; Ids work under Dr
Sun Vat-Sen in Canton; and finally his
military acliievements. llis visit to
Russia and his observations about the
Third International and the Red
Ai-my, the suppoit he ga\e to the
Chiiu'se Communists and the lirm
measures he later look against them,
are recorded with prevision but with-
out bias. His marriage to Soong Mei-
Ling, his New Idle Movement, his
attitude towards Japan, and his future
plans tor China are also discussed and
explained.
The materials used are mostly
taken trom his own writings, such
as the biograjihies of his grandfather
and of his mother, together with his
letters, diary, speeches, etc.
There are many portraits, together
with facsimiles and map-endpapers.
By the same Author
THE BRIDGE OF HEAVEN
LADY PRECIOUS STREAM
THE WESTERN CHAMBER
THE PROFESSOR FROM PEKING
MENCIUS WAS A BAD BOY
CHIANG KAI-SHEK S HOME, BROOKMOUTH, FENG HUA
The Life of
CHIANG KAI-SHEK
by
S. I. HSIUNG
Illustrated
f)
LONDON : PETER DAVIES
In Memory of
MY DEAR LEARNED MOTHER,
Who taught me to read
The Confucian Classics forty years ago
When I could understand only some
Appreciate even less
But had to recite them all
riRST PUBLISHED I948
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN FOR PETER DAVIES LIMITED AT
THE WINDMILL PRESS, KINGSWOOD, SURREY
CONTENTS
Preface
xii-xvii
The Life: Chapters I-X
1-360
Appendices:
I The New Life Movement
361-372
II Some Reflections on My Fiftieth
Birthday
573-378
III New Treaties, New Responsibilities
379-383
IV Presidential Speech
384-386
V Chronological Table
387-393
Main Documents Quoted
394
Index
395-398
ILLUSTRATIONS
His home, Brookmouth, Feng Hua Frontispiece
The Youth Facing Page 1 2
The Student 1 3
With his Mother 46
The Revolutionary 47
With Sun Yat-Sen on board Warship Yung Feng 78
rhe Young Soldier 79
Sun Yat-Sen’s Letter dated 21st November, 1922 142
Chiang Kai-Shek 143
Sun Yat-Sen’s Order appointing him President of
the Military Academy 174
A recent Portrait (i) 175
A recent Portrait (2) 238
With Madame Chiang and General Stihvell 239
Three Power Conference, November, 1943 ^7^
On his famous White Horse 271
With President Lin Sen and General Chang Chih
Chung 334
Family Group 335
Offices of Moral Endeavour, Nanking 366
A recent Portrait (1946) 367
Chiang Kai-Shek’s Handwriting Page 29
Elegy for Madame Chiang „ 137
Map of China before the War Front end-paper
Map of South China Back end-paper
vi
PREFACE
J OHN Masefield once said to a distinguished Chinese
soldier: ‘Why doesn’t Chiang Kai-Shek make himself
the Emperor of China . . .?’ Before the Poet Laureate
could finish his sentence, my friend exclaimed: ‘If he does,
I would be the first to fight against him! ’ And I should add
that the General is Chiang Kai-Shek’s most trusted and
loyal supporter. 1 can also assure all lovers of China and
admirers of Chiang Kai-Shek— and indeed John Masefield
is one— that this represents not only the mind of the
Chinese people, but also that of Chiang Kai-Shek him-
self: he would be the last man to think of making himself
an emperor.
Those who are accustomed to enjoy the advantages of
Democracy under a Monarchy must think the Chinese
people peculiar if not ludicrous. But for a country which
has recently got rid of its despotic ruler, even the title of
the Head of the State is important. Perhaps we are too
good Confucians to disregard the teaching that if the name
is not right, whatever you say is all wrong. I have, because
of this, given a little more space than necessary in this
book to Yuan Shih-Kai’s bid for the Dragon Throne. He
compares poorly with Coesar and Napoleon, who also
ended unhappily. The Chinese people always look for
precedents in history.
The writing of this biography has been almost entirely
a matter of compilation: to record and not to create being
the golden rule. The book is full of quotations. If any-
one complains of its lack of originality I hasten to claim
that all the quotations, except for the few which have
been duly acknowledged, are original translations which
vii
I have done especially for this book and are appearing in
print for the first time, and that they are in most cases
literal and in all cases faithful.
The material is all reliable, as the reader can easily find
out for himself. I should register here my gratitude and
admiration for the hero of this book who has graciously
allowed so many of his private letters— letters to him as
well as by him— to be made public. Without them I would
have been utterly unable to undertake this work: for I
consider them to be the most dependable source of the
truth. His speeches I have also made use of, but not to
the same extent as I have his letters. Speeches are com-
posed for public delivery, and are therefore less interest-
ing and revealing than private correspondence. Moreover,
most of them have official English translations and are
available both in America and England.
I have sometimes devoted a dozen pages to correspond-
ence which covered only a few days, whereas I have taken
a big stride over years when important events were fast
moving. That is also because some letters are more
interesting than others, and not because of their import-
ance, or of sufficiency or lack of material. In many cases
I have found it difficult to write more than I have done
when there were ample documents and other sources of
information. I always spend much more time and space
on events where material is scanty. For example, the
monumental work The Life of Mr Chiang by Mr Mao
consists of twenty volumes. The first volume covers thirty
years, the second three years and the last only one month.
The reader will find that I have almost done the opposite:
I have treated the early years in detail and after the time
when he became the unquestioned leader of China, I have
merely sketched the outline of the events in which he is
involved.
I cannot offer an adequate reason for this, not even a
feeble excuse to humour my reader. I stand to be con-
viii
demned for my snobbery. I delight in narrating the
steady rise of my hero until he reached the very top and
could not possibly rise any higher. After that my interest
rapidly decreases, and I cannot help it. But for my
defence 1 may say that, if space had allowed, I would have
described the Sian incident in greater detail. That, as is
very well known, was the day when my hero was plunged
into great danger and obscurity. I have not done so
simply for two reasons: first, the two generals who cap-
tured him have been silent and left us no documentary
material, and secondly, the available reports have been
most widely circulated. I hope my critics will not point
out that, in spite of his momentary setbacks, Chiang Kai-
Shek gained tremendous prestige on account of this inci-
dent.
Somewhere in the book I have mentioned the precaution
one should take against biased opinions on current events.
On many occasions, when I have compared material
gathered from two or three different sides, I found my
best policy was to remember the virtue of brevity. I have
tried to be very wary in offering my opinion on controver-
sial subjects, and I have said in the beginning of the book
that it is not my intention to criticise or praise anybody or
anything. However, should the reader find a word to have
slipped out here and there, he must accept my sincerest
apology and assurance that it was an oversight, and not
intentional.
Regarding the private life of the great man, I have been
asked to leave it out. Happily, I found it most convenient
to respect his wishes, as I did not have much material to
work on. His first marriage and its dissolution afford
little to write about. He wrote a brief separation note in
1921 and had a short divorce announcement published
in the newspapers in 1927, not long before his second
marriage took place. Even had I been urged to write
more, I could scarcely add anything to the mere entry in
the chronological table. As for his second marriage,
material there is in plenty, but again I find I can add
nothing to what I have written. For those who love
romance, there is Miss Emily Hahn’s book. The Soong
Sisters (published by Robert Hale, London) which will
give them every satisfaction.
Another book which will more than supplement what I
have left out is Mr Hollington Tong’s monumental work
entitled Chiang Kai-Shek: Soldier and Statesman (pub-
lished by Hurst & Blackett, London). There is much
documentary material in these two lengthy volumes, and
the reader who wishes to know more is advised to turn
to them. Mr Tong was a master in the Dragon River
School in the year 1905, when the future President of
China was for a very brief period a pupil there. That was
not their only association. When the Northern Punitive
Expedition of the Kuo Min Tang reached the Yangtze,
Mr Tong was a ‘newspaper man’. He met his pupil again
in Nanchang, and after a lapse of more than twenty years
his pupil had become the Commander-in-Chief of the
Expedition and the man of the hour. Later Mr Tong took
important Government jobs and was invited by his
former pupil to write the biography in English which
was ‘authorised’.
Besides this most useful book, there are quite a number
of biographies of Chiang Kai-Shek which go by one name
or another. On those I have seen I have no remarks to
make, and for those 1 have not yet seen I have the highest
esteem. In writing about the leader of present-day China
one could not avoid Chinese politics. That, I think, is the
most unenviable job in the world. Chinese politics interest
nobody except those who are involved in them. Besides
some old ‘China-hand’, few of the English-reading public
understand Chinese politics. Those who understand or are
interested prefer their own version and would never agree
with what others have written.
x
I have tried to write for the general public who do not
claim to specialise in Chinese politics. I have left out as
many proper names as I possibly could without spoiling
the coherence of the story. But the spelling of Chinese
names is my chief enemy. No uniformity in it at all!
There are two main kinds of spelling, neither of which I
can disregard: the old Post Office spelling, which is used for
such place names as Peking, Kiangsi and Canton, and the
Wade system in which names of persons are mostly spelt,
such as Yuan Shih-Kai, Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-
Wei. A third is sometimes unavoidable, the Cantonese
spelling which generally goes with such words as Sun
Yat-Sen, Sun Fo, and Chiang Kai-Shek. My rule is to
use the most popular forms, to whichever system they
may belong. If any Sinologue criticises me for not stick-
ing to the Wade, I ask him if he can say that ‘Sun Yat-Sen’
and ‘Peking’ are misspelt?
The Wade system has at least one drawback. A large
number of words are started with an ‘Hs’. My surname,
for instance. It is spelt ‘Hsiung’, and in Chinese it is pro-
nounced somewhat like ‘Shoong’. I have to say ‘H for
Harry, S for Sugar, I for India, U for Uncle, N for No-
body and G for George’ every time if I want to get it
right. Let the reader remember that for ‘Hs’ he may pro-
nounce ‘Sh’ and a great difficulty is thus avoided. Regard
‘Hsiang’ as ‘Shiang’ and ‘Hsu’ as ‘Shu’ and the trouble is
over.
The Chinese language is monosyllabic. We have no
words of two syllables. That is why ‘Kuomintang’ appears
as ‘Kuo Min Tang’ in this book. ‘Shanghai’ should be
‘Shang Hai’ and ‘Hongkong’ should be ‘Hong Kong’. As
people seem to dislike words of one syllable, many terms
and phrases which are composed of two or three words
have been joined together. The first time a place name
appears I divide it up into its original form by means of
a hyphen or hyphens; such as Che-Kiang, Wei-Hai-
xi
Wei, Ning-Po. This will be, I hope, of some help
to those who are not familiar with China. For all I
know, some people may think that ‘Kuomintang’ should
be pronounced with four syllables as ‘Ku-om-int-ang’ if
th^ do not know it is a three-syllable term.
I am afraid I have been trying to explain Chinese ways
and customs a little throughout the whole of the book. In
the eyes of a ‘China expert’ some remarks of mine will
seem quite unnecessary. But, as I have mentioned before,
I intend it to be read by those who do not regard them-
selves as ‘China experts’, for such persons are certainly
very rare, and, moreover, their opinions are generally too
specialised and profound to be useful to ordinary human
beings.
The writing of this book, light though it is, has involved
much more work than I had first thought. Many years
ago, when the name of Chiang Kai-Shek was still rather
unfamiliar to most people in England and America, I was
asked to write a biography to introduce him to his admirers
in the Western world. Quo Tai-Chi, then our Ambassador
in London, was interested to hear this, and very kindly
gave me material and advice. Since then many friends
and well-wishers have given me help. I want to record
my thanks to all of them whose names I cannot list here
but who have their place in my heart. However, I must
mention the great service my old school-mate and friend
General Kwei Yun-Chin rendered me. He obtained for
me some of the most valuable material and information,
and also furnished me with several photographs.
On the completition of this book I cannot help recall-
ing to mind my good old friend Quo Tai-Chi, the scholar-
diplomat. He was very successful in his mission in
London, which lasted nine years. He was then asked by
Chiang Kai-Shek— nay, requested again and again— to go
back to Chungking to take charge of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. I was afraid for him; he was also afraid
xii
for himself: the climate there would not suit him. I said
to some mutual friends that he could hardly fare half a
year in Chungking. After six months, he was no longer
the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I was sorry my predic-
tion had come true to the letter. He was forgotten for
several years, and only recently was appointed Head of
the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations. Again he
held the office for a very short time. Soon reports came
that he was slightly or very ill: his friends said he was
slightly ill, and those who were not his friends said he was
very ill. Evidently the weather in New York was too
much for him. He resigned. A few months ago he was
appointed Ambassador to one of those South American
States, where, I believe, the air is excellent, and where, I
hope, his health will improve rapidly.
I relate his career to indicate the changes of fortune
during the time that I have been working on this book. It
has been so with the fortunes of China: at first a country
for whom everyone had admiration and sympathy, and
later of whom almost everyone was saying they had heard
bad things. With Chiang Kai-Shek it has been very much
the same. He to whom the great statesmen in the West
used to refer as ‘that great Asiatic hero' has had ups and
downs in international politics. When his stock ran high,
he was addressed as the Generalissimo, and when his use-
fulness to them had declined a little he was Marshal Chiang
Kai-Shek. And when they decided to promote the Com-
munist representative in Chungking, Mr Chou En-Lai, to
be General Chou En-Lai, they also referred to him as
General Chiang Kai-Shek. Confucius's method is evidently
known all the world over.
I do not dare to follow such good examples. I have
refrained from adding any title to the great man. To me
he is so many-sided that to address him by one title is to
disregard his other activities. In one or two places in this
book, however, some of his prefixes have been retained
xiii
merely to indicate the way he was addressed in the original
sources from whence they have been indirectly quoted.
But in China he has been addressed as the Commander-in-
Chief, the Chairman, the President of the Council, the
Generalissimo or the Director-General. In mentioning
these, I have omitted the abusive titles hurled upon him
by his political enemies. They include Dictator, Butcher,
Aiurderer, ‘the Chinese Mussolini’, and even ‘the Chinese
Mihailovitch’. Throughout this book I have used no other
name or title than the plain Chiang Kai-Shek. In writing
about Confucius or Washington, do we need to add any-
thing else?
I should perhaps mention that his admirers in China
might think this lack of titles means disrespect. I assure
them it is quite the contrary. In Chinese publications it is
now the rule to leave an empty space before the name of
Chiang Kai-Shek. That is a traditional courtesy very much
observed before the Revolution. A space for your elders,
the starting of a new line for your parents and other
persons of great importance, and going outside the border
a few spaces for the Emperor or Empress. This had been
done away with by the Revolution, and now some people
want its return. At one time whenever a speaker mentioned
Chiang Kai-Shek in public, the entire audience would
stand to attention at the very word and would remain
standing until the speaker asked them to resume their seats.
But I wonder if the people who are so punctilious are
necessarily as respectful as they appear.
A dreadful thing which we have learned from Europe
and which still shows no signs of dying out is this slogan
business. These slogans are shouted—which is bad enough,
but I imagine they harm the shouters more than the hearers
—and further, they are put on posters or painted on the
walls, which is unbearable. But such slogans seldom pro-
duce any effect. Indeed, they often indicate the opposite
trend. Whenever we see or hear a slogan saying ‘Down
with Chiang Kai-Shek’ we know that he is doing extremely
well. And whenever we see or hear people shouting ‘Up
with Chiang Kai-Shek’, it definitely indicates that he is in
a precarious position. It is a pity that people have not
enough sense to see this and to do away with this dreadful
‘slogan business’ altogether.
As great men are bound to have ups and downs during
their lifetime, some people say they would be still greater
had they the sense to die slightly earher. For instance, had
Napoleon died before his Waterloo, Wilson before the
Paris Conference, Churchill before the General Election,
and Chiang Kai-Shek before the recall of Stilwell. No
doubt numerous cases could be raked up from history to
prove this point, but I do not agree. Napoleon would be
incomplete without his Waterloo, and Wilson lived solely
for his Peace Conference. As for Churchill and Chiang
Kai-Shek, both have accomplished great things in the past
and we do not know what the future has in store for them.
The kind of mishap which has befallen them was merely
a momentary slip, which may have created quite a stir at
the time but will soon lose its importance in comparison
with other things. The Stilwell case has already become
quite different from what it used to be. When the new
Burma Road was to be named, Chiang Kai-Shek christened
it the Stilwell Road.
Only three of my friends have read my manuscript
before it went into print, and I want to acknowledge their
very welcome suggestions. Bernard Martin, who was
engaged upon the writing of The Strain of Harwofiy:
Men and Women in the History of China, wanted to look
at it for his chapter on Chiang Kai-Shek, and found the
word ‘crazy’ (which I used to describe the boy Chiang
Kai-Shek in a quotation) not appropriate. He suggested
‘almost wild with excitement’. He said people might
wonder if ‘Chiang Kai-Shek in boyhood was a little un-
balanced in mind’. This was serious. I had a family con-
XV
ference about it with my children in Oxford, where two
of them were doing English Literature and one Modem
History: they all agreed with Bernard Martin that ‘crazy’
was not suitable but unanimously vetoed ‘excitement’. I
had to accept the verdict. However, they could not sub-
stitute a word themselves and reminded me that there was
always Bernard Shaw to whom I could turn when I was
in a dilemma. Promptly G.B.S. came to my rescue, as he
always did. He also agreed that ‘crazy’ was wrong and
said he would translate it ‘he could be quite ungovern-
able’. He added: ‘This does not suggest insanity, and does
suggest capacity for command.’ I finally translated the
sentence into: ‘He could be wild and ungovernable.’
Tsui Chi, the historian, read my manuscript while he
was convalescing in Margate. He made some suggestions
regarding my choice of words in translating Chinese temis
into English; the most happy alteration was ‘People’s Party’
for ‘Nationalists’ Party’, which had hitherto been exten-
sively used by other authors. It was explicit, simple
and faithful. I wonder why so many people prefer
‘Nationalists’? But to my friend and publisher, Peter
Davies, I am particularly grateful. He read the MS. most
carefully just before it went to press, and almost every
alteration he proposed was an improvement and was
adopted accordingly.
Since I have spent so many years in the writing of this
life, many things have happened during this time. The
Chinese Embassy in London has had three Ambassadors
and several missions have visited England. They have all,
almost without exception, been very helpful to me in
collecting material and information. Indeed, facilities have
been so generously given to me in all official quarters that
I must make it known that this is not an official book. It
is not even what one calls an ‘authorised biography’,
though the great man himself has been good enough to
give me permission to write it. I could not undertake to
xvi
write a biography without a perfectly free hand, and all
he has asked me is to leave out his private life. As I have
mentioned earlier, I have found it most convenient to
comply with his wish: it is what I had intended to do
even without his request. I hereby claim that I am solely
and entirely responsible for the book— all the opinions in
it except those from quotations are mine. But I request my
reader to take what I have written at its face value and not
to construe implications by reading between the lines.
And I do crave his indulgence.
S. I. Hsiung
Iffley Turn House ^ Oxford^ 1^48
xvii
I
I N preparing this Life of a celebrated son of China, the
humble author could not help feeling exalted. Yet often,
enough there have been times when he found himself in
one dilemma after another. It is not an easy undertaking
to write about a great contemporary who has a multitude
of friends and admirers as well as a host of critics and
enemies, many of whom are not only alive but also kick-
ing, and about events of which the right and the wrong
have only recently been disputed by people to such an
extent as to sacrifice their freedom or even their lives.
Remembering the difficulties Confucius must have had in
dealing with things which happened to kings and princes
of his time when drafting his Spring and Autunm
Chronicles, the present author, most humble though he
may be, feels a much happier man.
Confucius was, however, a master of the language with
which he wrote his book. His style was so subtle that it is
generally believed he could indicate his praise or criticism
by a single word. Lest readers think a single word means
a straightforward adjective such as good or bad, right or
wrong, an example or two is called for. The first entry
consists of six words about the Calendar, on wliich com-
mentators have written lengthy essays interpreting the
mind of Confucius. The very next entry reads: ‘In the
third moon, my Lord and I-Fu of Chu made an alliance
at Mieh.’ There appears no praise or criticism, one would
observe. But scholars who annotated the text said that in
calling him by his style ‘I-Fu’, and not by his official title
‘The Viscount of Chu’, Confucius acaially did praise him
I
for his being able to establish a good relationship with a
larger state and thus to allow his people to enjoy peace.
The third entry reads: ‘In the Summer, during the fifth
moon, the Earl of Cheng conquered Tuan at Yen.’ Poor
Earl of Cheng! His victory won him no laurels. On the
contrary, this simple record of his conquest became one
of the blackest in our history. To call him by his official
title ‘The Earl of Cheng’ was to ridicule him for not
having instructed his younger brother properly, said our
commentators. As Tuan did noi behave as a younger
brother, therefore, argued our scholars, he was not called
so. Even the word conquered, when applied to a quarrel
between two brothers, was a most disparaging choice. In
fact, so man; essays have been written to expound the
moral effect of this entry that it becomes obvious that
Chinese readers could read not only between the lines but
also between the words. It follows naturally that one
could fill up the space before and after each important
word with mischievous implications according to one’s
own imagination. The original text as written by Con-
fucius makes but a very slim book. Nowadays no reputable
edition of this classic runs to less than twenty volumes.
The humble author has never dared to compare himself
with the Sage. Neither does he expect his readers to be so
obliging as to write books for him. When he started to
learn to write in Chinese, he was taught to be comprehen-
sive in his choice of words so that the result sounded pro-
found and incomprehensible. Later on, when he began to
learn his English, he was warned against ambiguity. To be
explicit, or even laconic, but never ambiguous! This was
so repeatedly impressed on him by his teachers that he soon
formed the habit of preferring clarification to anything
else. If there was any space in his writing to be filled, he
was sure to fill it up himself before anybody else could
have the opportunity to do so.
His readers, therefore, can rest assured that their
collaboration will not be required. Moreover, they may
be relieved from anxiety in case they cannot quite decide
whether the author is praising or criticising someone: for
he considers it wrong to appoint himself the judge. To
praise or criticise is not his business. Besides, to spare his
readers the complications of various Chinese names, he
sticks to the iron rule of calling each person by only one
name. Chiang Kai-Shek is always Chiang Kai-Shek, and
nobody needs to look for his official title with which the
author might indicate criticism.
Chinese biographers and even historians like to add a
little extra colour in writing about the ancestors and birth
of their great met . In some cases such stories tend to be
legendary. They either credit them with fabulous pro-
genitors or decorate their birth scene with a couple of
dragons crouching in the court-yard. Regarding Chiang
Kai-Shek’s forefathers and birth such beautiful tales are
lacking. His ancestors, without exception, were all
ordinary human beings. In China there is no need to
commission a genealogist to trace one’s ancestors. Nearly
everyone could find all he wants to know in the family
clan book, which starts thousands of years ago and is
always brought up to date by the subscription of members
of the clan who can afford to give voluntarily.
The humble author has to ask his patient readers to
forgive him for devoting the whole of this chapter to
Chiang Kai-Shek’s forbears. Although he has no inclina-
tion to translate all the best biographies in the clan book
of the Chiang family of Feng Hua, which is comparable
in size with the Encyclopaedia BritannicUy there is good
reason for him to write at some length about Chiang Kai-
Shek’s grandparents and parents. In Confucian China
ancestors have been so important that the early Christian
missionaries, who found their work hampered by this
tradition, tended to be militant, starting their campaign
by pronouncing ancestor-worship as heathen barbarism.
3
That was why, after years of suppressed feeling, there
were so many supporters of the Boxers’ uprising. If it
could be appreciated how very much more important
ancestors are in China than in the Western world, it
would be seen how necessary it is for all proper Chinese
biographical works to begin not too far from the time of
the Creator P’an Ku, ‘when the sky and the earth were
like the white and the yolk of an egg’.
Readers who are anxious to proceed from the birth of
Chiang Kai-Shek can conveniently skip this chapter and
start from the next. But the reader who is not entirely
disinterested in the stalk from which Chiang Kai-Shek has
come, and who can read this book at his leisure, will per-
haps enjoy what is considered a traditional, though to some
probably a rather punctilious, preliminary of a proper
biography. To him the humble author ventures to offer
the following pages. However, he hopes he will be per-
mitted to whisper a word or two in the ear of the con-
noisseur: the Memoir of Chiang Kai-Shek’s mother and
that of his grandmother, both written by their devoted
and loving child, are specimens of excellent Chinese
biographical essays. He only regrets that, faithful though
he has been in his translation, much must have been lost
through his inadequate skill in this undertaking.
To begin from the very beginning, the present Chiang
family of Feng Hua is descended from the third son of the
Duke of Chou, a contemporary of Confucius. During the
Tang Dynasty, that is the yth to 9th century, the family
moved from the south coast of China to Feng Hua, a pros-
perous town near the east coast of Che-Kiang Province.
They came, not into the town where they now live, but
a little way off to a place called the Three Ridges. Here
they stayed until the 14th century. The first distinguished
member of the family, Chiang Chiin-Ming, was a scholar
in the reign of Emperor Shen Tsung of the Sung Dynasty
4
(a.d. 1068-1085). He memorialised the Throne about the
Party of Gentlemen and the Party of the Wicked. The
Imperial Court was astonished by his frankness and he was
given the post of Imperial Censor. His bluntness soon got
him into trouble. Because of his straightforward remon-
strance, he was to have been banished to the far distant
boundary regions. But in consideration of his aged mother,
to whom he showed great filial piety, he was pardoned
and pensioned off. He was posthumously honoured with
the title of Minister of Gold and Purple, and his tablet was
ordered to be put into the Temple of the Worthies of his
district, to receive sacrifices from posterity.
Both his elder brother Chiang Chiing-Feng and his son
Chiang Ch’ung were also brilliant scholars of that time,
and one after the other they passed the highest state
examination to become Advanced Scholars. This is the
highest honour a man of letters could receive and is some-
times compared to the degree of Doctor of Literature. In
some instances the recipient is called a Member of the
Forest of Ink, or an Imperial Academician. Such an
honour generally leads to an important official post, and
Chiang Ch’ung was soon appointed to a governorship. His
integrity was well known to his contemporaries. For when
his superior official tried to bribe him, with the promise of
a recommendation to the Throne for his promotion, to
take certain crooked measures beneficial to the influential
man, he burnt the letter in front of the messenger. Fie
later became a Minister in the Imperial Court.
Chiang Hsien, great-grandson of Chiang Ch’ung, passed
the highest state examination in the second year of the
reign of the Emperor Ning Tsung (A.D. 1 196) to become
an Advanced Scholar, and was eventually promoted to be
the President of the Board of Punishments. He retired
with the title of Grand Secretary of the Pavilion of
Treasured Literature. During his retirement he vowed
that he would never act against his conscience, never be
5
disloyal to his trust, never acquire rice-fields and never
buy a house. He styled himself with the nickname of the
Hermit of the Four Nevers.
In the later days of the Mongolian Dynasty of Yuan
(1264-1367) the family moved to that part of the country
where it is now settled. One of the ancestors of the
Chiangs made the choice because the place was, and still
is, really beautiful. With the waters of the Yen Brook
near-by, as calm as a mirror, and the Wu Mountain not
far off tucking it in like a pillow, no wonder it immedi-
ately captured his heart. In the market-place numerous
shops and stores are carefully arranged in rows as closely
together as the teeth of a comb. In the open country end-
less patches of rice-fields and water ponds divide it in
shapely squares. Such a piece of landscape is most lovely.
In the Chinese language the word landscape is made up of
the two characters ‘hills’ and ‘waters’, amongst which the
wise old man decided that his descendants could either
study the classics or plough their fields. Also they could
find happiness here by fishing, as well as by wood-cutting.
Their new home could, indeed, serve them equally well
should they choose to be merchants or to be recluses.
The English transcription of Chinese names is always
uninteresting, if not confusing. But in this case the mean-
ing of all the names concerned will somewhat compensate
for the monotony of the sound. The home of the Chiangs
is called Chi K’ou, and it means Brookmouth, as it stands
at the mouth of the Yen Brook. It is also called Wu Ling,
meaning Military Ridge, and belongs to the district of
Ch’in Hsiao, which means Filial Piety of Birds. Bearing
in mind Chiang Kai-Shek’s military career, and the
Chiangs’ well-known devotion to their parents, these
ancient names of their native place are most appropriate.
In later generations, the Chiangs followed their
ancestor’s instructions piously. Their motto was ‘Honour
your parents and elders, and work hard in the fields.’ For
6
over two and a half centuries not a single member of the
family took an official post under the Manchu regime, that
is from 1644 to 1911. The fact that none of the Chiangs
had ever acted as an official during the entire reign of the
Manchurian Dynasty shows that the Chiang family has
always been very patriotic. The Manchus, who came from
the north-east to overthrow the Ming Emperor and rule
over China, have been regarded by many as foreign in-
vaders. But they were soon absorbed by the Chinese,
whose language and customs they admired and adopted:
and now very few Manchus could be found in any part
of the country, including the portion of Manchuria from
whence they jfirst came. To-day the Manchurian language
hardly exists.
Nevertheless, the Chiangs thought it better to have
nothing to do with these foreign rulers. The paternal
grandfather of Chiang Kai-Shek, Chiang Yii-Piao, who
lived between the years 1814 and 1894, was a good
example. Although he was seventy-four years of age when
his grandson Chiang Kai-Shek was born, and he died at
the age of eighty-one, there existed during those very brief
years, between the elderly grandfather and the child, a
very close bond and tender affection. Twenty-five years
after his death his devoted grandson, then an officer in
the army, wrote a touching memoir about him. As it
throws some light on the early life of Chiang Kai-Shek
and also on the conditions of the Chiang family, a longish
quotation is not entirely out of place here:
‘Since our clan moved to live in Embroidery Brook, we
have for generations worked diligently in sowing and
ploughing. We observe propriety and humility very care-
fully, and not a single member of the family has ever
tried to become an official durinj? the three hundred years
of the Manchu regime. In my grandfather’s time he estab-
lished himself by commerce and became very wealthy in
7
the salt business. He had a kindly disposition. Iii dealing
with others he was always generous. But in bringing up
his children and grandchildren he was very strict. He
never wore silk and was a vegetarian. He was devoted to
the study of Buddhism and a great expert in various schools
of this religion. He copied in his own handwriting a
number of valuable Buddhist sutras, which unfortunately
must have been lost as they cannot now be found. He
had a wonderful physique, which indeed improved as he
grew older.
‘One day during the year before he passed away, he
took me into the bamboo grove deep in the mountain and
we rested for a while in the Buddhist Monastery, whercy
we read aloud the Holy Sutra and paid our respects to
Buddha. I was barely in my seventh year, and being very
happy I hopped and skipped when coming down the slip-
pery mountain slope. I missed my foothold and fell down
into the valley. The right side of my forehead was bruised
and badly cut. Blood came streaming out. My grandfather
was heartbroken to see me in such a state. As there was
nothing else he could do, he gathered some medicinal
herbs, with which he treated the wound. In a short time
the wound was healed, and by the time we got back my
mother scarcely noticed it. She was greatly astonished
when we told her of the serious condition in which I had
been.
‘As a boy I was more often unwell than not. My grand-
father always treated and nursed me. He was constantly
by my bedside. If the malady was serious he would keep
watch over me, never going to bed himself at night,
exactly as my mother now nurses and cares for my son
Wei-Kuo. Nearly all my ailments were healed by the
medical skill of my grandfather, a fact for which my
mother was very grateful and which she cannot forget
even to this day.
‘Embroidery Brook is an important thoroughfare in the
8
centre of the three neighbouring towns. To the north of
the Brook there is a convent called the Nunnery of
Military Ridge, where travellers from all the three towns
usually took a short rest. But there they could neither
obtain food when hungry nor drink when thirsty. See-
ing this, my grandfather provided free tea and food to re-
lieve their distress. This he continued to do for six or seven
years.
‘Whenever any of our relatives or friends could not
afford the expense of a proper wedding or funeral and
came to him for help, never had they to go away without
having their requests entirely satisfied. When there were
public works to be done in our part of the country, such
as the decoration of a temple, the rebuilding of the
Ancestral Hall, the paving of a road or the construction
of a dam, he was never stingy with his subscriptions. And
if his services were required in these public matters, he
would rush forward as if he were afraid that his presence
might be too late. It is believed that his devotion to
Buddhism was so deep that his love for humanity could
be seen everywhere and in everything he did.’
Of Chiang Kai-Shek’s paternal grandmother little record
is available. It is presumed that she died before her grand-
son was born. China has been a country of ancestor-
worshippers for many thousands of years. The first thing
a successful man does is to tell the world the illustrious
virtues of his forefathers. He relates the outstanding
qualities of his parents and describes the noble deeds of
his grandparents if he knows any of them. In some cases
he has to find out about them. But as there are clan books
in one’s family, this hardly presents any difficulty. The
fact that Chiang Kai-Shek has so far mentioned little about
his paternal grandmother indicates that he did not know
her well, and does not like to write about things of which
he is not quite sure.
9
Madame Wang, Chiang Kai-Shek’s grandmother on the
maternal side, lived until he was eighteen, and was the
guiding angel not only of her widowed daughter but also
of the young grandson. Of her he wrote his recollections:
‘Before I was nine years of age I became a fatherless
orphan. A year after that my younger brother died.
Though I was at that time a mere child and could not
entirely realise the painful state my mother was in, I can
never forget for a moment during the rest of my life some
of its aspects which were impressed on my young mind.
The desolate position of my mother and the wretched
condition of myself can be imagined by nobody else
except one person. This person was my maternal grand-
mother, Madame Wang of the Yao Family, who often
shared our house and always our sorrow, and comforted
us from morning till night.
‘My grandmother was the daughter of Mr Yao P’ei-
Sung of the Shen District. She married my grandfather,
Mr Wang P’in-Chai, and gave birth to my fourth uncle,
my fifth uncle and then my mother. My grandmother
had a very gentle and quiet nature and a mild and sym-
pathetic appearance. She was amiable and kind in dealing
with people, and managed her household with diligence
and frugality. In bringing up her sons and daughter she
had a way of her own, and she loved my mother and
myself with special tenderness.
‘Even in her advanced age my grandmother enjoyed
excellent health. Every year my mother used to invite
her to our house and she often stayed for a whole month.
During the holidays from my school I would come home
and wait upon my grandmother and my mother in the
Hall of Winter Sunshine, where I would read my books
aloud and my mother would work at her loom, while my
grandmother recited the Buddhist sutras. Even to-day
when I close my eyes I can see such a picture before me.
lO
and seem to be able to hear the mingled sound of the loom^
the Sanskrit, and my reading of the classics.
‘When I was in my thirteenth year I studied under
Mr Yao Tsung-Yuan, who held his school at my
maternal grandparents’ house. My grandmother con-
stantly examined my clothing to see if I was too cold or
too hot, carefully saw that I had the right food and drink,
and made sure that I was progressing satisfactorily with
my studies. She was most considerate and kind in inducing
me to study. That was why my mother had no worry
about me when she had to send her naughty and unfilial
son far away from his mother’s care.
‘There are quite a number of wise and good mothers,
most of them have confined their wisdom and goodness
to their sons or their sons’ sons, but few indeed who have
cared so much for the son of their daughter as my grand-
mother. Most people bring up their children hoping for
them to be rich and powerful so as to be a credit to their
father and grandfather, and to bring their family into
prominence, but few indeed instruct their child to be
virtuous and righteous and encourage him to serve
humanity in general, as did my grandmother!
‘My grandmother was born on the 8th day of the 5th
moon in the year of Ting Yu, the 17th of Emperor Tao
Kuang’s reign (June loth, 1837) and died on the 13th day
of the 3rd moon in the year of I-Tze, the 31st of Emperor
Kuang Hsu’s reign (April 17th, 1905). She was in the
sixty-ninth year of her life.
‘Aly mother wept bitterly when my grandmother died.
I was then in my nineteenth year. My mother several
times exclaimed to me when looking at me: “I am already
a widow and now my mother dies, so what is there worth
living for? The only reason that I should wait a little
while is that my son is not grown up yet.”
‘Alas, my mother, too, has been dead these twelve years.
While the instructions of my grandmother and my mother
II
are still fresh in my ears, I have not in the least improved
in virtue nor am I flourishing with achievements. The
affairs of the country are still in growing difficulties and
the hour of invasion of our land by foreigners is getting
nearer day by day. I am an unworthy son on whose
shoulders rests the trust of my party and country. The
safety of our whole nation is my sole responsibility. When
1 get up early at dawn or retire late at night, I think of
this. What shall I do to deserve all this and how shall 1
act in order to carry out what my grandmother taught
me? When I realise the seriousness of these matters, I
can seldom stop the tears from falling down my face and
wetting my clothes. I record this to warn myself against
any further procrastination while I am serving in the army.
This short sketch of my grandmother’s life is written
merely to recollect and describe her kindness to me.
‘Written on the 8th of November, the 21st year of the
Chinese Republic (1932), by her grandson Chiang Kai-
Shek.’
The humble author thought it necessary to translate and
quote in its entirety Chiang Kai-Shek’s memoir of his
maternal grandmother because the reader can see for him-
self how grateful Chiang Kai-Shek was to her for the
shaping of his character, for which she and his mother
were largely responsible. From his earliest childhood until
he determined to go abroad, he was constantly cared for
by Madame Wang, the sole comforter to the young
widowed mother and the fatherless child.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s maternal grandfather, who was born
in 1820, died in 1882, five years before the boy was bom.
But a few months before the above biography was written,
he composed a short essay on the old man whom he had
never seen. The material, he said, came from what he had
heard from his mother. It can easily be deduced from this
that out of his profound affection for his grandmother, he
12
I’HE YOUTH (aGKU 1 8 )
THE STUDENT (aGED 25)
thought it fit to write about her husband, though he had
to do so from second-hand infonnation. The essay begins
thus:
‘My maternal grandfather, Mr Wang P’in-Chai’s school-
name was Yu-Tze, and he belonged to Ko Brook in the
District of Shen. From his youth he was wise and studious,
and an expert in the classics, particularly The Book of
Odes and The Book of Rites. When he grew up he gave
up his literary career and travelled far away to the four
regions of the country. He was tall and big, and had a
majestic and dignified appearance. Such was his popularity
that no one in the neighbourhood, whether they knew him
personally or not, but would be able to tell at first sight
that he was the Mr Wang of Ko Brook.
‘After the fall of the T’ai Fing Kingdom, he felt heart-
broken at the submerging of the Chinese race, and became
constantly unhappy at his home. So he travelled to the
south of An-Hwei and west of Che-Kiang, and finally at
An-Chi and FIsiao-Feng he gathered together all those who
were displaced and homeless and started plantations and
farming. In a few years the rice-fields were increasing and
the estate became very rich. For scores of li [a li is about
a third of a mile] the property was all his. In the district
where his estate was situated he dredged the rivers, laid
out new roads, and trained the people to defend them-
selves. He trained them how to make war, secretly assign-
ing them military duties, rewarding them or imposing fines
upon them justly; there occurred no law-breaking and his
part of the country lived in peace— a fact which is talked
about even to this day.
‘Although he was rich, he lived a diligent and frugal
life, and brought up his children on strict principles of
propriety, righteousness, purity and honour, especially
paying attention to his daughters. My mother was well
versed in poetry and other literary subjects and an expert
at needlework, so she was the i favourite of her parents.
When she married and came to settle down in our family,
she managed the house according to my grandfather’s
method. After my father’s death, when I was in my ninth
year, my mother maintained our independence through-
out the hard-up years very well, and brought up his
orphans until they could establish themselves. It was
mostly because of my grandparents’ influence over her
that my mother was able to accomplish her difficult task.
‘In my childhood my mother once took out some
antique porcelain and jade objects and said to me: “These
are your grandfather’s heirlooms. He brought them from
places far away and gave them to nobody else but me, so
I have taken the greatest care to keep them safe.” She also
said to me: “Your grandfather was a devoted fisherman
and hunter. If he went out with a hook, never did he
come back without catching a fish, and if he went out
with bow and arrows, never did he come back without
carrying with him some game. Both in hunting with nets
and riding out in the fields his ability became better and
better with the advance of years. His wisdom and endow-
ments were far above those of ordinary men.”
‘During his later years he returned to spend his old age
in his own country. He opened his purse for the laying
of a highway from the Shen district to the town of Feng
Hua. He had to cut through forests, make a way through
mountains and villages and span rivers with bridges. From
its difficult beginning to the very end he sponsored the
work all by himself. Most people who are very good at
accumulating wealth do not generally know how to spend
it, so it is said that rich men are never benevolent. They
think that since their wealth has been acquired by them-
selves with great difficulty, it should be handed down to
their children. As these children of rich families have not
been brought up properly, we have to-day many proud
and lazy young people about. Our country becomes
14
weaker and the general population suffers on account of
them, and these people are incurable.
‘A man like my grandfather, who worked for society
as if he were working for himself, leading his village folk
as if he were leading an army, who was courageous in
doing whatever was right in spite of danger and difficul-
ties, and who, when he was not employed by the govern-
ment on important work, retired to instruct his own
relatives and children in propriety, righteousness, purity
and honour, can indeed be compared with the worthies
of ancient times. Since I was a child I have learned all
about his sayings and deeds from my mother.’
The rest of this biographical essay deals with Chiang’s
reason for writing it and also gives the dates of Mr Wang’s
birth and death, details of his first marriage, his children
by the first wife and their marriages, and those of his
second marriage. By comparing the dates it has been
observed that Mr Wang was seventeen years older than
his second wife— an extraordinary match in China.
Chiang Kai-Shek is a zealous patriot— a fact even the
bitterest of his enemies could not refute— and from the
above essay the reader can easily find out from whom he
inherited his patriotism. The T’ai P'ing Heavenly Kingdom
has always been known as the T’ai P’ing Rebellion.
Because millions of innocent people were slaughtered
through this civil war, the leaders have been generally
looked upon as bandit-chiefs. Chiang Kai-Shek was one
of the first to declare openly and in black and white that
one of his forefathers was at least a sympathiser of this
group of men, if not actually a member. With a touch of
romance, the author could conveniently draw a picture
of a Chinese Robin Hood, tall and majestic, dashing about
with his bow and arrows on a swift horse. He was
respected by a large following who looked up to him as
if he were their king. Wherever he went his word was law.
15
B
For those who like to be fashionable, the picture of Robin
Hood could be altered into something utterly modem. A
popular journalist would certainly say that Mr Wang,
grandfather of Chiang Kai-Shek, could rightly claim the
title of the first guerilla-warfare leader of China, and a
forerunner of the Chinese revolutionary force which
fought against and finally overthrew the Manchus.
Should the reader choose to think this way, he is per-
fectly at liberty to do so. But the humble author cannot
trust himself, in case he should be carried away by
imagination. He has decided to stick to the original and
have it translated literally, word for word. In rendering
it into English, he has taken only one liberty: he has
omitted the word 'late’ which preceded almost every
‘mother’, ‘father’, ‘grandfather’ and ‘grandmother’ in these
essays. To indicate a deceased relative, the word ‘late’ is
always used preceding the noun in the Chinese language,
but its repeated occurrence would annoy an English
reader.
It is very helpful to his biographers that Chiang Kai-
Shek has personally written about three of his four grand-
parents. Though they are all rather short sketches, they
greatly help the reader to piece together a picture of the
Chiangs’ family life before the boy was bom and in his
childhood days. In these three essays there are several
glimpses of Chiang’s mother, about whom, however, a
long quotation from her son’s writing is to come later.
As for his father, apart from the fact that he died before
Chiang Kai-Shek was nine years old, nothing about him
was mentioned in any of these writings. Nearly a quarter
of a century after the death of his father, Chiang Kai-Shek
asked a man of letters, who was also a very good friend of
his, to write an inscription for his father’s tombstone. It
is an excellent piece of writing, well worth translating and
quoting in full for its beautiful and original style, as well
as its subject;
i6
‘My friend Chiang Kai-Shek said to me: “When I was
in my ninth year my father died. It was more than twenty
years ago, but I have never forgotten for a moment the
words he said to us just before he passed away. When he
was dying my mother was by his bedside. Looldng at me
and my younger sister, my father addressed my elder
brother: ‘Your brother and sister are still young. After I
have gone your mother will be so afflicted by sorrow that
she will not know what to do. You are the eldest. Can
you be filial to your mother and look after your brother
and sister so as to set my mind at ease?’ My brother wiped
away his tears and said that it would be his duty to do so.
Then my father closed his eyes, to open them no more.
Alas! Alas!
‘ “My father had a very strict nature and a strong sense
of justice. In dealing with people he acted with sincerity.
His countenance was always dignified and he led a diligent
and frugal life. These principles he maintained all his life
and also trained us to follow them. When sending me off
to start my studies, he took me aside and instructed me:
‘From my youth I have followed the profession chosen
by our ancestors. I could not work for the State, but I
have endeavoured to promote education in our village and
district and to correct bad old customs. Now I can devote
all my energy to working for the welfare of our relatives
and kinsfolk so that they can live in peace and free from
any anxiety. You must concentrate your attention on
your studies, and if in future you can become useful to
society you will have made up to some extent what has
been my regret in life.’
‘ “In later years his love for my brother and me became
ever greater than before, and at the same time he became
even more strict in supervising our studies. Now that his
coffin is buried, I am still a man without any accomplish-
ment. But may I ask you to write an inscription?”
‘Ever since I made the acquaintance of Mr Chiang Kai-
17
Shek, I have been deeply impressed by his strong per-
sonality. Now that I have learned from him about his
honourable father’s life, I begin to realise from whence
came his calmness and thoughtfulness, his courage and
resolution. This request is a great honour which I dare
not refuse, therefore I write reverently.
‘His school name was Chao-Chung, and his style was
Su-An, and he always lived at Brookmouth of Feng Hua,
in the Province of Chekiang, trading in salt. During the
reigns of Tao Kuang (1821-1850) and Hsien Feng (1851-
1861) there was the revolution of the T’ai P'ing Heavenly
Kingdom, when the whole of Chekiang Province was
attacked and destroyed. Every profession was brought to
ruination, and the Chiang family, though in its heyday,
was no exception. At that time Su-An and his brother
were still youths in their teens. When the disturbance
gradually subsided a little, and he was older, Su-An, fol-
lowing his father’s instructions, revived his salt business.
With almost nothing to start on, he very rapidly got it
going again and in a few years he became as rich as before.
The prosperity of his business soon restored the prosperity
of his home town.
‘But the people of Embroidery Brook had one failing:
they liked to go to law. Once involved in it, they could
seldom get out. Su-An thought that was not the way to
determine what was right and what was wrong. When-
ever he met with people who wanted to go to law he
would do all he could to dissuade them. And when at last
he found out that the wronged party could not get justice
in any other way, he would give all the necessary money
to get a fair trial and to see that the wrong-doers were
punished. So lawsuits became fewer and fewer, and at last
people had almost no cause for litigation. After his death,
when there occurred a quarrel which had to be settled by
law, the elders of the country would invariably exclaim
to each other: “Had Mr Su-An been alive, it would not
18
have come to this!” This is indeed a clear proof that his
kindness and benevolence to his countrymen were long
and profound.
‘When he had made a success of his long-ruined salt
business, all his country-people realised that in him they
had a man of ability. Whenever there was anything of
importance to be decided, nothing would be done without
a final word from his lips. They had established a religious
society to the left of Embroidery Brook and called it the
Military Mountain Society. It had a large and pros-
perous estate in rice-fields, and the man in charge of the
Society made a good profit out of it, which all went into
his own pocket. In the end the funds of the Society be-
came so low that people thought the estate was unmanage-
able. But the elders of the country held a meeting, and
they resolved that no one but Su-An could put the whole
thing in order again. They insisted on asking him to be
the head of the Society. Such a request was put to him
three times, and three times he declined. At last they
moved the tablets of the deities of the Society to his house
and there religious sacrifices to these deities were offered
by the members. Not until he consented to be their head
would they move the tablets back. In the end he had to
undertake the work, and in a very few years the Society’s
property doubled its original value.
‘Whatever he did for his country and village was always
like that. The thing for which he worked most was the
free school. Scholars who were hard up and could not
afford to go to school were invariably helped by him, and
those whom he helped and who later became useful were
many.
‘It has been observed that nowadays people are generally
very thrifty in managing their own property, whereas in
managing public property they always find it decreasing.
The better ones prefer to maintain their integrity and are
careful to shun public work: they will do nothing for
19
others. Therefore we usually find that any public work
belonging to a whole village or town is left unattended to.
Such a trend becomes general and the country con-
sequently becomes crippled. Confucius said: “If you see
what is right and don’t do it, you are a man without
courage.” A man like Su-An was a man of courage
indeed!
‘What a modest man he was! In his instructions to his
son he seemed to be dissatisfied with himself. But he
need not have been so. Those who have done all they
could do personally have no reason for regret about the
work which did not come their way. The merits they
achieved will accumulate, to appear later on, and perhaps
indirectly. Now Chiang Kai-Shek has helped our Presi-
dent, Sun Yat-Sen, to bring light to China. His ideas and
his work have attracted the attention of the whole world,
and he is a very studious scholar. He has more than ful-
filled his father’s ambition.
‘Su-An died on the 5th day of the 7th moon, seventeen
years before the establishment of the Chinese Republic
(August 24th, 1895), in the fifty-fourth year of his life.
He first married a lady of the Hsu family who died after
giving binh to a son, Hsi-Hou, and a daughter, Sui-Chun.
He then married a lady of the Sun family, who died with-
out issue. Lastly he married a lady of the Wang family,
who gave birth to two sons, Kai-Shek and Sui-Chin, and
two daughters, Sui-Lien and Sui-Chu. Hsi-Hou is a dis-
tinguished scholar of his district, and Kai-Shek a major-
general in the army. Sui-Chun has married Sung Shih-
Chang of the same district, and Sui-Lien has married Chu
Chih-San, also of the same district. Sui-Chin and Sui-Chu
unfortunately both died young. He had three grandsons:
Kuo-Ping, Chin-Kuo and Wei-Kuo, who all showed early
signs of scholarship. After they had buried their father at
the top of the right side of the Peach Mountain, to the
north of the village of Embroidery Brook, on the 3 ist day
20
of March in the second year of the Chinese Republic
(1913), Hsi-Hou and Kai-Shek asked me to write an
inscription for the gravestone. The inscription is as
follows:
'‘His avibition was to help the state ^
His be?ievole7ice still reimins in the conntry.
His S 071 , who has inherited his virtue,
Has achieved greater brillmice than his a^icestors.
A pme tree lives but a hundred years,
But his spirit mid purity prevail ]or evermore,
‘Written in the month of August in the 7th year of the
Chinese Republic (1918) by Chu Ta-Fu.’
It should be noted that in the year 1918 when this was
written Chiang Kai-Shek was still a major-general in the
Cantonese army. Although this sounds a high rank, the
position was by no means an important or enviable one.
At that time, the Central Government of the Chinese
Republic was still in Peking in the north, and in the hands
of what were known as the War Lords. The Cantonese
army was formed in the extreme south under the supreme
command of Sun Yat-Sen, and it was against the Northern
Government, who had greater military and financial sup-
port than Sun Yat-Sen. This little army was poorly
equipped and badly paid, if paid at all. It had to fight
incessantly against almost everybody around for its mere
existence. Major-General Chiang Kai-Shek was not then
an august personage whom everybody tended to flatter in
extravagant terms, therefore this biographical sketch may
be reasonably accepted.
As Chiang Yu-Piao, the grandfather, died when Chiang
Kai-Shek was seven, and Chiang Su-An, the father, died
the next year, the boy's upbringing was entirely in his
mother’s hands. Madame Chiang must have been a re-
markable woman, one would think, and there seems no
doubt that she was. People writing about her or her son
generally compare her with the mother of Mencius, the
most celebrated good and wise mother in Chinese history.
But the proper thing to do is to translate word for word
and in its entirety what her son wrote about her when she
died in 1921:
‘My mother came from the Wang family and her
honourable name was Tsai Yii. She was the daughter of
Mr Wang Yu-Tze of Ko Brook in the district of Shen.
When she was twenty-three, she came to our home to
marry my father, Su-An. A year later I was born. In my
childhood I was often ill and on many occasions the illness
was dangerous and critical. But as soon as I was recovered,
I would play about as gaily as ever, hopping and skipping
all day long. I was, therefore, frequently exposed to the
risk of being drowned or burnt to death, or else severely
cut or wounded. My poor kind mother’s anxiety over me
doubled that of other mothers.
‘In my sixth year I went to school, but was much
naughtier than before. My mother had, on the one hand,
to teach and persuade me to study, and on the other hand
she had to use the birch repeatedly in order not to spoil
me. In the year of I-Wei (1895), unfortunately, my father
forsook us for good, and every duty of our household,
within and without, fell solely on the shoulders of one
person: my mother. To make things worse, several calami-
ties came upon us one after another. Death and trouble
arrived alternately. My mother had to smother her
mournful feelings to bear these hardships. It was most
pitiable to see her suffer, and to-day I simply dare not
recollect those heart-breaking days.
‘When I went out to study under a new teacher in my
thirteenth year, my mother said to me with tears in her
eyes: “Since your father’s death I have suffered endless
22
hardships to enable you to continue your studies. I do not
wish you to obtain by this means an influential official
post, nor to acquire a great deal of wealth. All I hope of
you is that you should serve your country well and re-
spect yourself. I shall be content if you can maintain the
good reputation of our ancestors.’’ This was, indeed, what
she often taught me when we were alone at home.
‘During the last days of the Manchu regime, the
intellectuals of the whole country raised the cry that to
save the state from ruination one must go abroad to study.
When I was in my eighteenth year, my ambition was to
sail eastwards to Japan in order to study military science.
There were many who tried to stop me from going, but
my mother greatly approved my resolution. She raised
the passage money and other necessary expenses, and
strongly urged me to start my long journey. After that
she had to work much harder than she had ever done
before, so that with scraping and saving she could send
me the money for my tuition.
‘In the year of Hsin Hai (1911) the People’s Army
started the Revolution. I led my men against the Manchu
government between Shanghai and Hangchow. Most of
my relatives and kinsfolk, hearing of my part in the
revolution, were astonished and frightened and even
turned pale. But my mother only said: “This is a man
doing his duty to his country. If he has to die, he dies.
I can bear it.” Later on, when the news of my victory
came, my relatives and friends were overjoyed and started
to congratulate each other, but my mother not only re-
ceived the news without excitement, but also sent me
frequent letters warning me to be cautious and not to let
my success go too much to my head.
‘After the Republic had been established and I was
entrusted with the work of training new soldiers in
Shanghai, I planned to invite her to stay with me in
Shanghai so that I could discharge a little ot my filial duty
to her, but she only consented to come for ten days. On
her departure, she instructed me as follows:
‘ “You must never for a moment forget the hard things
you have gone through. And above all, you must act
with the greatest discretion and do all you can for your
country. If you can only maintain all the merits accumu-
lated by our ancestors, and will not be the one to spoil it
all, then I shall feel much more comfortable at home
in obscurity than with you among the comforts of
Shanghai.”
‘When she went home, she continued to be a vegetarian
and to wear no silk. When she was not reading the
Buddhist sutras, she was working at her loom: these were
the only two things the sound of which one could hear
coming out of the house. In her countenance no one could
detect any sign of pride or joy. And for this she was
respected all the more by our relatives and neighbours.
‘In the year of Kwei-Chu (1913) our righteous army
was defeated, and I had to fly for my life overseas. While
all our relatives and friends were alarmed and dis-
heartened, and thought that some great calamity was
coming, my mother went on with her work as calmly
as usual. While abroad, because of the shortage of money
both for public use and for my private needs, I sometimes
wrote to her for help. Some of her timid friends, fearing
that this might compromise her, advised her to ignore my
letters and have nothing to do with me, but my mother
said resolutely:
‘ “Is there a mother in the world who would blankly
ignore the urgent need of her son when he was in danger?
If I have no son, of what use is it for me to keep the estate
to be inherited by my descendants?”
‘For years she never once refused my financial calls
upon her when I was an exile. During these years there
were times once or twice when a grasping official was in
our district, and came to know about her help to me.
H
When he tried to threaten and blackmail her, my mother
simply ignored him, and he could do nothing to her.
‘For over twenty years she kept her eternal fast on
vegetables and her worship of Buddha. As she grew older
she became more religious. People observed that her
pious devotion to Buddhism was the reason why she could
live so calmly and at ease through all her extraordinary
hardships, and also be so pure and simple, so kind and
virtuous. She could recite fluently and explain the mean-
ing of the Suramgama Sutra, the Vimalakirti-Nirdesa
Sutra, the Vajracchedika-Pranaparamita Sutra and the
Avalokitesvara Sutra. She also had a profound know-
ledge of the various schools of thought of this religion.
Whenever I went home to visit her, she would always
teach me about Buddhism. She explained everything to
me untiringly and her instructions were crystal clear and
in minute detail. In recent years I have sometimes dabbled
a little in the philosophy of nature and the logic of the
Sung dynasty scholars, and have occasionally discussed
problems about Buddhism. Such studies were entirely
inspired by the teachings of my mother.
‘My mother’s nature had always been kind and benevo-
lent. Whoever in our country and village became an
orphan and helpless, she never once failed to relieve and
comfort him. But to those relatives who were lazy and
neglected their work and came to her for loans, she would
refuse their requests with clear-cut words, not even show-
ing them any sympathy. She was especially interested in
the public works of our district. Of all the bridges,
ferries, roads and pavilions within twenty li of the Mili-
tary Ridge, my mother built eighty or ninety per cent.
Even at the moment when she was lying ill in bed, she
subscribed an immense sum of money to the public
hospital of Fang Bridge, built the pavilion of Motherly
Qouds in the Sandy Plain of a Thousand Feet and the
Free Tea Pavilion of the Military Ridge. The only wish
25
she expressed just before she passed away was to give half
of the money she left to establish a free school, so that all
the children of the district who could not afford to study
should have the opportunity of being educated. This is
but an example of her devotion to works of public
welfare.
‘From her childhood my mother was well known in her
village and neighbourhood for her intellect and wisdom.
Neither in her studies nor her needlework were any of
her sisters as good as she was, and so her parents loved her
much more than they did the others. Her marriage to
my father was his third, following the death of his first
two wives from the Hsu and Sun families. My elder sister
Sui-Chun and my elder brother Hsi-Hou were children of
the first wife, but my mother nursed and taught them and
brought them up exactly as if they were her own. Even
their marriages she considered as her sole responsibility.
‘Three years after my mother gave me birth, my
younger sister Sui-Lien was born, and three years after
that my third sister Sui-Chu was bom, who unfortunately
died young. My younger brother Sui-Chin was born
three years after my sister Sui-Chu’s birth. Being the
youngest of our generation and also endowed with such
extremely good looks, which none of the others of us
had, he was my mother’s favourite. After the death of
my father, my mother divided up the estate, which was
allotted to us three male heirs. Because my elder brother
was the son of the first wife, he was given the biggest
share. Less than two years after this, my younger brother
Sui-Chin died. My mother mourned bitterly over his death,
and both mentally and physically she suffered intensely.
Since then she has centred all her hopes on me, hoping
anxiously that I should make a name for myself.
‘Alas! I have been without the guidance of my father
for twenty-six years. I have always tried to avoid going
astray, and fortunately neither my elder brother nor my-
26
self have been entirely forsaken by the worthy and
honourable men of our time. This good fortune of ours
has been wholly due to my mother’s careful and strict
instructions.
‘Alas! my mother endured thirty-sLx years of hardship.
She swallowed much bitterness and never refused any
kind of toil, all for her unfilial son, who, she hoped, would
establish himself. But I was not worthy of her. Not only
have I been unable to achieve deeds of virtue or do work
of importance so as to fulfil my mother’s ambition for
me, but I have also failed utterly in the filial duty of a son
to look after his mother’s health constantly and in making
her happy even for a single day. On the contrary, she
has been allowed to drag on with some kind of serious
illness for over ten years. Recently she has suffered from
a weak heart, and during the past two months it has some-
times taken a turn for the better and at other times for the
worse. At last, at the hour of the Dragon (about 8 a.m.)
on the 14th of June in the Tenth year of the Chinese
Republic (1921), she left her unfilial children, to come
back no more. This was the fifty-eighth year of her life.
Alas! alas! Unfilial though I am, I know that my sin is
as great as the Heavens, and were I to die a hundred
deaths I could never redeem it. The grey sky has existed
for an eternity, but how can it be as long as my sorrow!
I have herein reverently stated some of her feminine
virtues, but they do not represent one ten-thousandth
part of what she possessed.
‘Written in tears in the tenth year of the Chinese
Republic by the orphaned and mourning son, Chiang
Kai-Shek.’
This touching pen-portrait gives the reader a vivid
picture of an excellent housewife and sagacious mother.
Chiang Kai-Shek was most unfortunate in losing the
27
guidance of both his father and grandfather at a tender
age, but how extremely fortunate he was to have such a
capable and wise mother! As his younger brother died
very early, Chiang Kai-Shek could practically be com
sidered as an only son. A young and widowed mother
usually spoils her only son, but Madame Chiang, accord-
ing to the above essay, acted in the most commendable
manner. Some people hold that a man’s future is mainly
shaped during his youth, and even if that is not entirely
true, Chiang Kai-Shek certainly has had, thanks to his
mother, a very good foundation.
As in the case of his maternal grandparents, the age of
Chiang Kai-Shek’s parents also differed greatly. Madame
Chiang was her husband’s junior by as many as twenty-
two years, and as he died comparatively young, but a few
years over fifty, they had lived together in wedlock for
only nine years when she found herself a widow at the
early age of thirty-one. And till death a widow she
remained for nearly thirty years.
Of the four pieces written by Chiang Kai-Shek himself,
his portraits of his grandmother and his mother read the
most vividly: they were written with affection, whereas
his memoirs of his menfolk were written with respect and
filial piety. The former, it could be said, with the heart,
and the latter with the mind. The author finds that to
paraphrase them would not do them justice, and he has
tried his best to retain their original form as closely as
possible.
From the foregoing five biographical sketches the
reader will gather that the Chiangs came from a well-to-do
and respectable family in a remote part near the east coa.st
of Southern China. They are generous and full of public
spirit. They have a strong sense of justice but have pre-
ferred to have nothing to do with the Manchu rulers.
They have been men of influence, but have led a simple
life of frugality and diligence. They have had great
28
admiration for scholarship, and brought up their children
with strict discipline. They were always a loving family,
and have taken pride in this. Their women, also, have
been as judicious, courageous and energetic as the men-
folk. They have borne almost unbearable hardships with
remarkable will-power.
CHIANG KAI-SHEK’s HANDWRITING
29
II
I N the year 1887, about a quarter of a century before
Sun Yat-Sen’s revolution which established the Chinese
Republic, the Manchu Emperor nominally ruling over
China was a boy of barely sixteen. His regal title was
Kuang Hsu, and it was the thirteenth year of his so-called
reign. The power behind the throne was his august aunt,
the tyrannical Empress Tzu Hsi, the Motherly and
Auspicious. To say she was the power behind the throne
is, in her case, a grossly insulting understatement. For
twenty-seven years, ever since her husband Emperor
Hsien Feng died suddenly in 1861, she had held the power
of the Empire in her small, exquisite but deadly hands. On
the untimely and mysterious death of her son Emperor
Tung Chih in 1875, she put her baby nephew on the
throne, to the astonishment of everybody. And later on,
in 1881, she disposed of her co-regent, the Empress Tzu
An, the Motherly and Restful, who was foolish and rash
enough to stand in her way.
Though the T’ai P’ing Revolution was subdued by
some of her abler Chinese generals, the foreigners across
the ocean were still her great anxiety. Having once been
forced by them to flee to Jehol, where her Emperor hus-
band died, she was further mortified by having to give
the Liu Chiu Islands to the Japanese, Annam to the
French, and Burma to the English. Even the people of
such a small country as Portugal were insolent to her.
They wanted Macao, which she generously gave to them
in that year.
Everywhere there was a feeling of apprehension and
restlessness. While the conservatives were bemoaning the
passing away of the golden age, the intellectuals were
30
beginning to think of reform, and the reckless few were
even planning a revolution. Sun Yat-Sen, then a young
student of twenty-one, studying under James Cantlie in
the medical college of Alice Memorial Hospital in Hong-
Kong, was starting a secret political society with some of
his friends. They had not quite decided by what name
they should call their new organisation.
It was in this thirteenth year of the Emperor Kuang
Hsu, in the ninth moon, on the fifteenth day and at the
hour of ram— which, to transfer into Western order and
translate into the Western calendar, is about two o’clock
in the afternoon on the 31st of October, 1887— when
Chiang Kai-Shek was born in his ancestral house behind
the salt shop with the signboard of Jade Serenity, in Mili-
tary Ridge, a small town about a hundred miles south of
Shanghai. The grandfather was immensely pleased with
this increase of family and chose for the newly-born baby
the name Sui-Yuan, meaning Auspicious and Original.
As that name did not stick to him very long, he will be
hereafter referred to throughout this book as Chiang Kai-
Shek, which name he afterwards adopted. Although this
baby was the second son and the third child of Chiang
Su-An, the new arrival was the first bom of his mother,
who had been married only a little more than a year.
The boy Chiang Kai-Shek was somewhat of a problem
child. During the next few years he gave his family end-
less trouble. At the age of three he one day thought of
making an important discovery. He decided, it is re-
corded, to find out how far down was his tummy. To
carry out his experiment without the help of modem
scientific instruments, he had to use a chopstick to see if
it would reach the bottom of his digestive organ. In a
well-to-do family like that of the Chiangs, chopsticks arc
made either of ivory or silver. They are about the size
of a very thin pencil and generally seven or eight inches
in length. They are fairly heavy and very slippery. For
31
a child of Chiang’s tender age such an article is extremely
difficult to manage. As he did not wish to have an
assistant for his experiment, he had to do it furtively. For-
mnately the chopstick was very obliging; it readily con-
sented to slip down his throat, but once inside it had no
further regard for orders and simply refused to come out
again.
A doctor had to be sent for to extract the chopstick and
revive the child, who, after having made strenuous efforts
to get the obstinate chopstick out in vain, had become un-
conscious. Early the next day his grandfather, having
had no encouraging news about him, came to his bedside
and asked:
‘Has my grandson become dumb?’
‘Grandson can talk! Not dumb at all!’ replied the boy,
jumping up in high spirits.
In the winter of the following year he had another mis-
adventure. There was a large jar under the eaves of his
house, half-full of water. One cold morning he was over-
joyed to see that the water was frozen. The ice looked
like a huge round mirror, and he wanted to get it out to
play with. The edge of the jar was high, and a boy of
four could not very easily reach the ice with his hands.
He had to climb up and balance himself on the edge of
the jar. He became top-heavy and in a second had toppled
over. In South China the ice seldom becomes thick.
Having broken the ice by his fall, he found himself
immersed in the water head downwards with his feet kick-
ing in the air. It was with great difficulty that he at last
struggled out of the water, after having drunk plenty of
it, and by that time he could scarcely hold out any longer.
A narrow escape indeed!
But that was not all. The brook was but a few paces
from his door. In warm and fine weather a dip in it was
most enjoyable, and such a temptation the boy could
never resist. For a child of under five, swimming in the
32
brook was a dangerous undertaking. While he was having
the time of his life in the water, twice the torrents, rush-
ing down into the brook from the mountain, forced him
out of his depth, and twice he was rescued in the nick of
time from drowning.
His mother, at that time, had her hands more than full.
As is stated in one of the biographies, a girl was born to
her three years after Chiang Kai-Shek’s arrival. Besides
having this infant at her breast, she was soon to have
another daughter, who died very young. She was worried
about her naughty boy, and so, with the permission of her
father-in-law and the approval of her husband, she
engaged a tutor to start schooling him at home in the
spring of 1892.
Beginning to learn to read and write at the age of four
years and a few months is perhaps a little too early. There
is no record of his academic accomplishments for the next
year or two, until 1894, ’when it is said he finished the
Confucian classics The Great Learning and The Middle
Way—t\\t latter title sometimes translated as The Golden
Mean. To spend more than two years over a small book
the text of which is but some six thousand words seems
rather slow going, and a little explanation is needed here.
These two works, which generally compose a single slim
book, are in classical style. Rarely could a boy in his early
teens really understand their meaning. But they are the
first two volumes of the famous Four Books of the Con-
fucian Classics, which are invariably imposed upon any
youthful beginner who is intended for a scholastic career.
It was no wonder that it took Chiang Kai-Shek more than
two years to read them and that during the studying of
them he changed his tutor again and again. However,
these two years or so were spent with great profit. He
learnt a lot at this time, and even to this day he is wont to
quote from these two classics for the benefit of his
followers.
33
While he was making very little headway in his studies,
he made good progress in his activities outside the school-
room. The game he liked best was playing soldiers with
his companions in the neighbourhood. He was always the
commander-in-chief, training the others and organising
them for battle. The home-made weapons, wooden
swords and spears, he was quite good in handling, and his
playmates were only too anxious to follow his lead. It
has also been recorded that ever since his childhood
he has been quite a good public speaker. During these
years, while he should have devoted most of his time
to learning the classics with his tutors, he spent a large
part of it mounting on a platform and addressing his play-
mates. What he talked about is very vaguely stated. Tell-
ing stories or else merely talking nonsense, wrote Mr Mao,
at one time his tutor. He did not pay much attention to
what his pupil liked to say to his fellow truants, but men-
tioned that the boy’s art of public speaking excelled almost
that of a professional story-teller: he was very eloquent
on all subjects and extremely free with his gestures. His
audience was, as •a rule, spellbound, even when nobody
could comprehend what he was talking about.
The year 1894 is important in the life of Chiang Kai-
Shek for several reasons. Not only was it the year in
which he finished his first book, but also when he lost the
care and guidance of his kindly grandfather. Moreover,
two important historical events happened in that year.
Civil strife started in Korea, where both China and Japan
sent their armies, and this led to the first Sino-Japanese
conflict, a conflict which continued on and off for half a
century. The other epoch-making event was the establish-
ment in Honolulu of the Resurgent China Society— Hsing
Chung Hui— by Sun Yat-Sen. This Society later became
the People’s Party— Kuo Min Tang— of which Chiang
Kai-Shek is to-day the Director-General.
In the year following, 1895, another misfortune fell on
34
the Chiang family. Chiang Su-An, Chiang Kai-Shek’s
father, died, comparatively young— still in his early fifties.
From now on the up-bringing of the boy was entirely
in his mother’s hands. There is an old saying in China to
the effect that until his father is dead the son will not be
wise. How much truth there is in the proverb it is diffi-
cult to say. But in the case of Chiang Kai-Shek, the year
in which his father died was a notable turning-point.
Instead of piling up more mischievous records, Chiang
Kai-Shek was credited that year with completion of the
two remaining classics of the series, The Analects of Con-
fucius, which is in two volumes and much more than three
times the length of the first two combined; and The Say-
ings of Mencius, which is roughly twice the length of
The Analects,
It will be noticed that Chiang Kai-Shek studied his
Four Books in their orthodox order. Such order was
arrived at simply by measuring their respective lengths:
the shorter ones first and the longest last. No doubt it
was thought that the early completion of a short book
might encourage the disheartened young scholar to tackle
the longer ones. Unfortunately for the student, the
shorter the book, the more difficult it is. While the
longest, The Sayings of Mencius, is full of interesting,
witty and even humorous parables, dialogues and discus-
sions, many of which the youthful reader could under-
stand and enjoy. The Analects of Confucius is slightly
on the heavy side, with a great deal of purely moral
instruction which tends to be dull and even obscure, while
the two shortest books. The Great Learning and The
Middle Way are almost entirely composed of abstract
philosophical teachings, nine-tenths of which are utterly
wasted on a child.
For this reason some teachers reverse the orthodox
order of the books: they teach their pupils Mencius first,
Confucius second, and last of all the two short ones. It
35
may take longer for a child to learn Mencius, but the result
is generally more satisfactory. He can at least appreciate
some of it. Also there are plucky people who leave out
The Great Learning and The Middle Way. This un-
orthodox action is highly commendable though not fre-
quently adopted. As a student probably will read The
Book of Rites on completion of the Four Books, it is
superfluous for him to study these two short books which
are only two chapters taken from T he Book of Rites. But
most teachers like to have the satisfaction of seeing their
pupils complete the entire series of the Four Books in case
they do not go on with the other classics.
To be able to complete the Four Books before he was
nine, Chiang Kai-Shek must have been an extremely
clever and studious child. Yet in the authorised Chinese
biography of him no such indication is to be found. It
merely says that he finished reading the Four Books and
that Mr Jen, his tutor, was extremely strict in supervising
his pupil’s studies.
After the Four Books, a Chinese scholar tackles the
Five Canons. They are: The Book of Odes, The Book of
Ancient History, The Book of Changes, The Spring and
Autumn Clnonicles and The Book of Rites. These five
works, together with the above-mentioned four, comprise
theNine Major Classics, most of which are believed to have
been written or compiled by Confucius or his followers.
From 1896 to 1903, that is from Chiang Kai-Shek’s
ninth year until he was sixteen, he studied these five im-
portant Confucian Canons. Again, he followed the
orthodox order carefully: The Book of Odes he read first
of all. This is a book of songs and ballads, many of them
sung and composed by the common people all over the
country at or before the time of Confucius. The Sage
collected and selected three hundred and eleven from
them to be handed down to posterity, but only three
36
hundred and five have been preserved. Like all other Con-
fucian Classics, this book has also been greatly enlarged
with wishful annotations by fastidious scholars and
philosophers of later generations, who insisted that even
the simplest of the love songs was undoubtedly allegorical,
that loyalty and statecraft were the disguised themes of
nearly all the ballads, and that the gentle lover referred
to in them was the King and the doting maid his minister.
As such a theory has been generally accepted for ages,
this collection of ancient songs and ballads eventually
became a handbook for potential statesmen. All the old-
fashioned students in China who wanted to pass their
state examinations so as to be appointed government
officials made a point of learning it by heart. After cen-
turies of study, these three hundred and five old songs
and ballads naturally found their way into every book and
indeed every essay written by prominent scholars. So
many literary allusions have been formed around these
songs that it is now impossible to read and understand any-
thing without first acquiring a good knowledge of the
original songs and their accepted though misleading inter-
pretations.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s new tutor who taught him this im-
portant book was a rather stiff scholar; for together they
spent a much longer time over it than one would think
necessary. He was also a very painstaking teacher, who,
in spite of his pupil’s slow progress, was well pleased with
the boy’s studies. For three and a half years he taught him,
besides these ancient songs and ballads, how to read
classical prose. After Chiang Kai-Shek had read and
learned this important Confucian Classic he was able,
according to the belief of pedantic scholars, to express
his emotions, to observe other people’s feelings, to mix in
society and air his grievances, to serve his parents at home
or his master in distant quarters, and also ‘to know a great
many of the names of birds, beasts, herbs and trees’.
37
Therefore the tutor thought the time had come for him
to start composing essays in the traditional style; hence
he had to study numerous prose works which would be
useful as models.
An occasion soon came for Chiang Kai-Shek to voice
his feelings by trying essay writing. His younger brother,
who was very clever, good-looking, and dearly-loved by
all the members of the family, had died at the age of three.
His mother was heart-broken. While he was in an
emotional mood, the youthful Chiang Kai-Shek wrote his
first essay. The dedication of his earliest literary work to
his younger brother was not a passing fancy. Many years
after this, when he was married and his first-born, a son,
came into the world, Chiang Kai-Shek announced that
the boy was to be considered as the adopted son and heir
of his late younger brother, whose lineage was thus kept
continuous in the clan book.
At the age of ten, Chiang Kai-Shek began to take up
his duties as an active member of his family. His mother
taught him for the first time to take part in sacrificial and
other kinds of ceremonies. She would say to him: ‘Be
graceful in your movements. In getting up or bowing
down when you are paying your respects be sure that
there is rhythm, and that every move of your hand or foot
is in harmony with the music that is being played on such
occasions. You must never forget this, my son.’
His mother was generous and hospitable, and she taught
her boy to be so also. As soon as he started to act as host
at functions where guests were entertained, he would look
after them until they had drunk almost to intoxication.
At a social party in China, it is considered good manners
for the guest to be what is called ‘guest-like’, that is, not
to drink or eat much however much inclined to do so. A
good host has to be persuasive. Chiang Kai-Shek from his
boyhood was a good host. In his early teens he used to
urge his guests to eat heartily and to eat the best. Should
38
one of them try to take food inferior to the delicacies pro-
vided, he would prevent the guest’s chopsticks from
touching the inferior dishes, or else would order the
servants to take them away so that only the best food was
left on the table. It was his habit also to see that every
article in the guest-room was the best in the house.
His tutor, besides teaching him the moral conduct of
the Confucian school, also imparted to him the knowledge
of the modern world. In one of his discourses, he talked
about the democracy of the United States of America.
When he mentioned that the President of the United
States was no more than a public servant, who was not
followed wherever he went by a big retinue like that of
a great official of China, all his listeners except Chiang
were astonished. Chiang, who was then only ten, said;
‘The President is a citizen just as any other man, therefore
there isn’t much difference between them. What is
there, then, to be astonished about?’ No wonder the tutor
once said to Chiang’s mother: ‘Your son’s nature and
wisdom are above those of other children. He is sure to
be a great man in the future. Heaven is going to reward
you as you richly deserve.’
His next tutor, who taught him The Book of Ancient
History^ was also impressed by his cleverness. As Chiang
Kai-Shek was now living at his maternal grandmother’s
house, he used to tell Chiang’s uncles: ‘Your nephew has
extraordinary understanding. If he is thoroughly educated
and well brought up, there is no limit to his future.’
It was under this tutor that he began to write poetry.
One of his first compositions was on ‘Bamboos.’ He
wrote:
^Ahiindcmt bamboos come into vieav on the mountain^
Creating an atmosphere of caolness in these Summer
days*
which his tutor liked and praised very much.
39
He spent a year on The Book of Ancient History^ and
next year he went to another place near-by to study
The Book of Changes under another tutor. This was in
the year 1900, when the boy was approaching his four-
teenth year. Previously when he had left his mother to
go and study it was to live under the roof of his grand-
mother, who could look after him as his mother did. But
now he was really going away from home, and on his
departure his mother said to him:
‘A young man travelling from home must be extremely
cautious in every situation. All the time he must beware,
lest some accident happen. It is more important to avoid
risks and danger than to find luck. You must always
remember this, my son.’
On this mystic classic T he Book of Changes Chiang also
spent a year. But during this period he had a certain
number of holidays, which he spent at home with his
mother. He liked to help her in her daily work: when
she was cooking, he would make and look after the fire;
when she was tidying the rooms he would make the beds;
when she was attending the silk-worms he would gather
mulberry leaves or do garden work. They enjoyed their
manual labour, wearing coarse dress and eating coarse
food without feeling the least discomfort.
In 1901 he went to another place and a new tutor to
study the enlarged text of The Spring and Autimm
Chronicles^ and to write discursive historical essays.
Though he finished this classical history in a year, he spent
a good part of the next year in reviewing it under another
teacher, Mr Mao, who had a school not very far from
Chiang’s home. More than thirty years after this, Mr Mao
compiled a very detailed biography of his distinguished
pupil. This consists of twenty volumes, and has been a
great help to the humble author in the earlier part of his
present work.
40
Besides reviewing The Spring md Autmnn Chronicles,
about which much has been written earlier in this
biography, Mr Mao also supervised Chiang Kai-Shek in
reading and punctuating The Chronicle Outline of the
General Mirror, a complete history of China from the
earliest times. In the summer of this year, that is 1902,
Chiang went for the first as well as the last time to attend
the state examination. Mr Mao does not say whether his
pupil was succesful or not, but merely records ‘he went
to the examination to satisfy his curiosity, and was dis-
gusted by the cruel and humiliating regulations of the
Examination Flail.’ He further says that soon his pupil
was delighted to hear of the abolition of this examination
system and of the foundation of schools where teaching
was carried out according to new methods.
Of Chiang Kai-Shek’s school days Mr Mao has written
this curious paragraph:
‘At play, he would regard the classroom as his stage and
all his schoolmates as his toys: he could be wild and un-
governable. But when he was at his desk, reading or hold-
ing his pen trying to think, then even a hundred voices
around him could not distract him from his concentra-
tion. His periods of quietude and outburst sometimes
occurred within a few minutes of each other: one would
think he had two different personalities. I was greatly
puzzled by him.’
He was with Mr Mao for a year. In 1903 he again
moved to another place. This time it was to enter the
Phoenix Mountain School in the city, where, in accord-
ance with the new method of education, he was taught for
the first time English and arithmetic. However, in those
early days Chinese classics and history were still the major
subjects, and he finished his Book of Rites under a
prominent member of the Imperial Academy.
Having completed the Four Books and Five Canons
a Chinese student is considered to have built a sound
41
foundation for his learning. In the following year, 1904,
Chiang Kai-Shek left the Phoenix Mountain School to
study under a famous scholar and thinker, Mr Ku Ching-
Lien, who was lecturing in the Pavilion of Literature in
the northern part of the city. In later years Chiang Kai-
Shek used to say: ‘Abundant are our books, extensive and
profound are our arts and learning. That I can dabble a
little in them, and know how to read those books and find
my way in them I owe all to one man, Mr Ku, who did
it single-handed.’
Besides instructing Chiang in his classical studies, Mr
Ku also instructed him to read the works of the ancient
philosophers. The Art of War, a military classic written
by Sun Tze, a famous general who lived shortly after
Confucius, and the writings of Tseng Kuo-Fan, the
scholar-general who quelled the T’ai P’ing Revolution, are
the two important works which he studied under Mr Ku
at this time, and which proved to be very useful to him
for the rest of his life. Mr Ku was not only a thinker and
a philosopher, but also a very practical man, who could
tell whether his pupils would have a future or not. Of
his pupil he was very fond. His advice to him M^as that he
should be prepared to serve and defend his country. ‘A
young man like you,’ he said, ‘who wants to achieve great
things must acquire new knowledge. The best way is to
go abroad and study in foreign countries.’
Mr Ku also saw in his pupil a revolutionary and patriot.
He often discussed with Chiang Kai-Shek affairs of state.
Of Sun Yat-Sen, the Chinese revolutionary leader, Mr
Ku told his student a great deal, and he noticed that
whenever he was talking about this ‘rebel’, the young man
was entranced. Chiang was particularly excited when he
heard that in 1896, when Sun was in London, the Chinese
Embassy serving under the Manchus kidnapped and im-
prisoned him. It was through the help of his English
friend, James Cantlie, who arranged legal assistance for
42
him, that he was at last set free. Since then, Chiang Kai-
Shek has had a great respect for England, where both
Government and the common people observe their laws.
It was during those years that Chiang Kai-Shek started
to become politically conscious. No wonder! Mr Ku
was one factor; but the prevailing cause was that during
those years so many important historical events took place
in China. After being defeated by Japan in 1894, China
was forced to conclude, in the following year, a very
harsh peace treaty with her exacting victor, surrendering
the island of Formosa and agreeing to many outrageous
demands on her territories and national rights. The whole
country cried aloud in protest, but this produced little
effect. While Sun Yat-Sen and his followers were organis-
ing the Resurgent China Society for revolution, which
they attempted in the Autumn of 1895, but which failed,
a number of the moderate intelligentsia worked for a
general reform movement. In 1898, the Reformers
succeeded in getting the young Emperor, Kuang Hsu,
to issue a hundred and more high-sounding edicts, which
amounted to nothing. The stumbling-block in the path
of the Reformers was the Empress Dowager.
When the European powers saw that China was utterly
unable to defend herself against a force which was only
comparatively modernised, they lost no time in starting to
fish in troubled waters. Russia started the ball rolling by
making claims on railway rights in Manchuria, and in
1896 she forced China to sign what was officially called
an agreement, in which she made China give her certain
rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway. In 1897, France
claimed mining and other rights in many parts of South
China. Germany had her eyes on North China; in
November of the same year she seized Tsing-Tao and the
Bay of Kiao-Chou. In 1898 Russia went further inland
and obtained a lease of Darien and Port Arthur. France
43
now seized Kuang-Chou Wan (the Bay of Canton), while
Great Britain made China lease to her Kow-Loon and
Wei-Hai-Wei. During those years the European Powers
acted as though they were looting a house on fire: all
they needed to do was to help themselves, but they must
be very quick about it.
Those who believed in the General Reform Movement
thought the Reformers could work miracles. It was
rather disappointing to realise that the issuing of reform
edicts was one thing, while saving the country from ruina-
tion was another. Not only were the Reformers utterly
unable to work miracles, but they were also powerless to
resist the overbearing Empress Dowager, who arrested the
Emperor and beheaded six of their leaders.
Her crushing of the Reform Movement was un-
doubtedly a selfish act— she wanted no interference by
the Emperor and his Reformers— but it would be wrong
to think that it was an unpatriotic one. On the contrary,
she was so patriotic that she thought if she could defeat
all the foreigners in the world with one blow, China
would resume her position as the top nation once more.
In 1899, the Northern province of Shan-Tung, where
the Germans had murdered a number of people and had
seized Tsing-Tao and Kiao-Chou, there started an ex-
tremely patriotic society called the Righteous Har-
monious Boxers. Though they were ignorant and super-
stitious, they were fanatically patriotic. Their slogan was
‘Help Manchus exterminate foreigners’.
Such a slogan was half the battle: it soon won the
approval of the Empress Dowager and the unthinking
masses. But there it ended, and ended in a disastrous way.
To use a multitude of ill-equipped and untrained rabble
against a modern force, however small, was to court
calamity. When they outnumbered the foreigners many
times they easily won the first half of the battle, but when
the foreigners brought in their reinforcements Peking fell
44
with hardly a struggle. The Empress Dowager and the
Court had to flee. With their army in the Imperial Palace,
the Allied Powers could comfortably dictate their terms
for a Peace Treaty. It was not how much they should
ask, but how much China could pay. After careful con-
sultation with experts, who said that she could not possibly
pay more than three hundred million, the sum fixed for
indemnity was four hundred and fifty million ounces of
silver. As she could not pay cash, it was arranged for her
to pay this in instalments spread over thirty-nine years,
with interest at four per cent, this bringing the total to
just under a thousand million.
The percentage figures obtained by various countries
were as follows:
Russia
- 29^
Germany
- 20^/0
France
- ^ 5-7 Sfo
England
- 11.25%
Japan -
- 7.1%
America
- 7 - 3^0
Italy - - -
- 5 - 9 %
Belgium
1 .9%
Austria
0.9%
Other Countries -
0.3%
It must be pointed out here that America was the first
country to waive the indemnity, which she asked China to
use for educational purposes. A college was therefore
established, and the graduates of this College were sent
to American Universities under the benefit of this fund.
The harshest part of the terms was not the indemnity,
but the rights the Powers obtained to station their armies
in a number of places near the Capital and in other
strategical regions. Because of this an aggressor would
have no difficulty in occupying Peking, aswasdone in 1937.
After the Boxer uprising and the subsequent Peace
45
Treaty, more people in China began to see that Sun Yat-
Sen was right. To save the country, the government of
the Manchus must go. The Empress Dowager and her
ministers noticed this tendency, and they became more
cautious and did their best to suppress the Revolution
which was brewing everywhere, especially in the South.
In 1904 Japan invaded Manchuria, which is Chinese
territory, to attack the Russian forces which had marched
into Manchuria in spite of protest, and the famous Russo-
Japanese war was fought on Chinese ground. In 1905 th
Russian forces were defeated and China was made to agree
to the transfer to Japan of all the rights which Russia had
obtained from China in the Manchurian provinces. The
Empress Dowager saw that the whole country knew that
the Government of the time was not good enough to cope
with the new situation, and soon she issued an Imperial
Edict to tell the people that preparations were being made
for a Constitutional Government.
It was in the early part of 1905, when Japan was still
fighting hard with Russia, that the youthful Chiang Kai-
Shek decided to go to Japan to study military science. He
had recently left Mr Ku to enter the Dragon River Middle
School in the same city. In this school he had stayed but
three months when he sailed for Japan. As his father and
grandfather had not wanted to go into the Civil Service,
although they were good scholars, neither did Chiang Kai-
Shek intend to serve the Manchu Government when he
decided to become a soldier. Years later, when he was
studying in a military school in Japan, he composed a
poem to send to a cousin of his, with these two concluding
lines:
'To bring a new dawn to our beloved celestial land
is to fulfil my duty;
The aim of my eastward voyage is far from seeking
military honours^
46
THE REVOLUTIONARY (aGED 30J
Very few records have been preserved about his brief
stay in the Dragon River Middle School. Mr Hollington
Tong, who wrote a detailed biography of him, was at that
time teaching English in this school, and they occupied
rooms on the same floor of the school building. He says;
‘Chiang Kai-Shek was an early riser, and after his
matutinal ablutions it was his custom to stand erect on
the verandah in front of his bedroom for half an hour.
During this time his lips were compressed, his features
were set in determination and he stood with his arms
firmly folded. It is, of course, impossible to say definitely
what thoughts filled his mind at such times, but it was
fairly obvious that he was thinking of his future. In fact,
it is clear from his own diary that during those few months
at the School he was formulating plans to go to Japan to
study military science in order the better to equip him-
self for a career which was to be wholly dedicated to the
nation.’
Mr Tong also mentions that his pupil spent other times
of the day away from the crowd in order to meditate by
himself. To quote Mr Tong again: ‘Perhaps it should be
noted that at this time a certain aloofness— that has often
since been mistaken for pride— manifested itself. Although
he was ready to join in any game in which physical fitness
was a requisite— he ran third in a race at the first inter-
school athletic meeting in Ning-Po— he was averse to
spending his time in empty talk. Often, while others were
engaging themselves in the “tremendous trifles” that pre-
occupy schoolboys, he wandered away by himself and
was evidently ruminating deeply.’
Over what did Chiang Kai-Shek ruminate? Mr Tong
suggests that he was thinking of his future. But it would
be more correct to say ^the future’ instead of ‘his future’.
Because there was another thing which made a deep
impression on Mr Tong: the avidity with which Chiang
Kai-Shek seized upon the newspapers as they arrived from
47
c
Shanghai. In those early days of the century not many
copies of newspapers managed to penetrate into such
interior districts as Feng Hua, for the simple reason that
there was not a great demand for them. But in a little
reading-room assigned to the scholars of this School,
Chiang Kai-Shek was always the first to get hold of them
and he spent a lot of his time over them. Mr Tong says
that to his recollection no one was so keen to learn about
the march of events in the outside world as Chiang Kai-
Shek, who to this day is still an insatiable newspaper
reader, feeling that it is an important part of his duty to
keep himself well informed of happenings and develop-
ments in China as well as in other parts of the world.
There were three reasons for Chiang Kai-Shek’s sudden
determination to leave the Dragon River Middle School.
The first was, as stated earlier in this book, the advice of
his former tutor, the patriotic Mr Ku, who said that in
order to achieve great things he must acquire new know-
ledge, and the best way was to go abroad and study in
foreign countries. The second was evidently that, since he
had been reading newspapers diligently, he had come to
know the critical condition China was in and was con-
firmed in the general belief that she was heading for ruin
at the hands of blundering Manchu rulers. He must pre-
pare to join those who were planning a revolution. And
lastly, there came upon him an outrageous happening.
A certain citizen of his native place failed to pay his rice
tax and was nowhere to be found. The authorities served
a writ on the whole neighbourhood in order to collect the
money from the man’s neighbours, among whom were the
family of Chiang Kai-Shek. Seeing that the head of the
family was a helpless widow, the officials knew that a little
more easy money could be squeezed out of them by
frightening them. They arrested Chiang Kai-Shek and
brought him to the Magistrate’s Court, where they
threatened to imprison him if he did not agree at once
48
to pay what they asked. Madame Chiang considered it a
great insult to the family to have her son treated thus, and
Chiang Kai-Shek himself said afterwards that this was the
first spark which kindled his revolutionary fire. To clear
the country of such ruffianly rulers he must go to Japan to
join the followers of Sun Yat-Sen.
In this decision he must have been quite outspoken, for
many of his kinsfolk and relatives soon knew about his
aim of going abroad and came to dissuade him. But he was
not to be dissuaded. To put a stop to all this inter-
ference he did a daring thing, which indicated that he
had destroyed his bridges behind him: he cut off his queue
and entrusted it to a friend to take home. The country
people were annoyed as well as frightened. Ever since
the Manchus came into China in the seventeenth century
it had been proclaimed all over the country that every
man must shave his forehead and keep a queue on his
crown. By cutting it off, Chiang Kai-Shek had committed
an offence against the law. It was a thing which those law-
abiding people had never heard of. Nevertheless, this
drastic step immediately produced its intended effect.
Nobody tried to stop him any more. As far as they were
concerned, the farther he went the better.
It was at such times that Madame Chiang showed the
world of what stuff she was made. While a soft-hearted
mother would hardly have allowed her fatherless only son
to leave her to go far away, she, as soon as she saw that he
had good reasons for taking this determined step, raised
the necessary money for him to go. Thus, in May of 1905,
her beloved son Chiang Kai-Shek went to Japan, and that
was only a month after the death of her mother.
On his arrival in Japan, Chiang Kai-Shek made inquiries
about his prospective matriculation into some military
academy. But, alas, he was disappointed! Japan had
previously agreed with China to take precautionary
49
measures regarding the training of military students. In
order to prevent dangerous revolutionaries getting into
such schools, they would only admit those who were sent
over by the Chinese Board of War. No private student
could possibly hope to get into any of them. It might well
be said that these measures were specially introduced to
bar such people as Chiang Kai-Shek.
Though this trip did not fulfil his heart’s desire, it was
very fruitful in one respect: he met, in Tokyo, Chen Chi-
Mei, the greatest follower of Sun Yat-Sen, and through
him he came to know a number of revolutionaries. This
was, in fact, his first actual contact with the great move-
ment which later on became his life’s work. About this
great revolutionary, Chen Chi-Mei, more will be written
in the next chapter, because he and Chiang Kai-Shek soon
became sworn brothers and life-long friends, until 1916,
when Chen Chi-Mei was assassinated by Yuan Shih-Kai,
the foremost of China’s war-lords, who crowned himself
the new Emperor of China and reigned about three
months.
During his short stay in Tokyo, Chiang Kai-Shek went
to study the Japanese language at the Saika Gakyo. This
also served him extremely well at a critical point, which
will be related in its proper place.
While Chiang Kai-Shek was wandering in the wilder-
ness, it was again Madame Chiang who showed determina-
tion. She saw that it was not good enough for her son to
linger on in Tokyo if he could not get the education he
wanted, so she summoned him home in the following
winter on the pretext that she needed his help to marry
off her young daughter. In those early days a wedding
or a funeral was a most important event in a good respect-
able family. Chiang Kai-Shek could not possibly refuse
his mother’s summons and had to bid his revolutionary
friends a temporary farewell, promising that he would
come back to join them again, and perhaps soon.
50
A good story-teller would find this the most convenient
time to describe the first meeting of Chiang Kai-Shek and
Sun Yat-Sen. It might not be true, but it would be very
convincing. Sun Yat-Sen had gone to Europe early in the
spring of 1905, his aim being to recruit members for his
revolutionary society among Chinese students studying in
various countries. He wanted to reorganise his Resurgent
China Society; he had his first meeting in Brussels, where
he gave a lecture on the Three Principles of the People,
and more than thirty members were sworn in. The second
meeting was held in Berlin, where he secured a further
twenty odd members, and in Paris he gathered more than
ten followers at his third meeting. In July he arrived at
Tokyo, and on Sunday, July 30th, the historical prepara-
tory meeting of the new Tung Meng Hui or The China
Union took place, and several hundred members were
enlisted representing people of every province of China
except those of Kan-Su. This was not because of a lack of
patriotism among men of that province, but for the simple
reason that there was not a single Kansu student in Japan.
On August 20th the Inaugural Meeting was held, and Sun
Yat-Sen was elected the Leader. As the China Union later
on became Kuo Min Tang or the People’s Party, of
which Chiang Kai-Shek is the leader, and as in 1905 he
had just got to Tokyo hoping to join Sun Yat-Sen’s move-
ment, nothing would fit in better than to say that these
two leaders met then and there.
But Chiang Kai-Shek did not join the China Union
until much later. It is very difficult to believe that he
would not have joined the Union if he had had a personal
contact with the magnetic Sun Yat-Sen at this time.
On his return to China, he found that the Pao-Ting
Military Academy, established by the Board of War, was
recruiting students all over China through competitive
examination. From the province of Chekiang sixty
51
students were to be selected. When he went to put his
name down, he learned that there were over a thousand
candidates, and of the sixty vacancies forty-six had already
been allocated to persons put up by various influential
officials of military organisations, leaving only fourteen
vacancies to be filled. The chances were roughly a hun-
dred to one. However, he was not disheartened, and he
passed his examination successfully. When he went to
Paoting he had to pass a further entrance examina-
tion. He was not well, suffering most probably from
the common malady of a stranger in a strange land.
Southerners sometimes do not feel fit when they first
come in contact with the climate of the North. This is
generally called ‘not being agreeable with the water and
earth of the place’. But in spite of indisposition he did
very well at this second examination, and early in 1906
was admitted into the Academy.
The entrance into the Military Academy was indeed
the beginning of the realisation of his ambition, and he
ought to have been very happy there. Unfortunately, in
this Academy the distinction between the Manchus, who
came mostly without going through competitive examina-
tions, and the sons of Han, that is, people of the eighteen
provinces of Interior China, was marked. The Manchus
considered themselves the unquestionable ruling class, and
naturally did not want the ruled classes to share their
privileges. But what Chiang Kai-Shek suffered from
most was not this class distinction: the fact that he was
the only one in his company to be without a queue made
all the people look upon him as a rebel. Because of this
he had to be particularly careful in his conduct.
One day, during a lecture on hygiene, the instructor,
who was a Japanese, putting a lump of earth on the desk,
said: ‘This little lump of earth, roughly about a cubic inch,
could contain as much as four hundred million germs.’
Japan had just defeated Russia and acquired from her
52
all her special privileges in China, whom she had also
defeated a few years before. She was also one of the
victors in 1 900 when the Allied Powers marched into and
occupied Peking. That nearly every Japanese felt very
superior, and even more so when he met with the people
of China, was an undeniable fact. This Japanese instructor,
though he was paid to work in a Chinese school, was no
exception. When he happened to mention the round
number of four hundred millions something suddenly
came to his proud mind. He added: ‘This lump of earth
could be compared with China, whose population is four
hundred million— the exact number of germs which could
live in this lump of earth.’
While the Japanese instructor was enjoying his insult-
ing joke on his students, Chiang Kai-Shek, bursting with
indignation, rushed forward to stand in front of the desk.
He divided the little lump of earth into eight equal parts
and, staring angrily at the lecturer, asked: ‘Japan has a
population of fifty millions. Could they be compared with
fifty million germs which could live on one-eighth of this
lump of earth?’ The Japanese instructor was for the
moment bereft of speech, but he quickly recovered his
arrogance and shouted at Chiang, pointing at his short
hair: ‘Are you a member of the revolutionary society?’
Chiang was not frightened and protested: ‘I’m asking you
whether my comparison was right or not. Let us not talk
about anything beside the point.’ As the Japanese could
not find a good reply, he went immediately to report this
act of insubordination to the Chancellor, requesting him
to deal with it sternly. According to the regulations of
discipline in this military school, an act of insubordination
against instructors was a serious offence. To be expelled
and sent home was to be treated leniently, otherwise the
offender would be arrested and court-martialled. But the
Chancellor saw that the Japanese instructor was much
more to blame than Chiang, so he merely ordered the
53
Director of the Academy to give the offender a disci-
plinary talk, after which the incident was considered
closed.
Towards the end of 1906 the Board of War decided to
select a number of students from the Academy to be sent
over to Japan to study military science. The selection was
to be done by a competitive examination, but Chiang was
not allowed to sit for it because he did not belong to the
section in which the Japanese language was one of the
major subjects of study. Chiang was not to be put off so
easily. He petitioned the Chancellor in a long letter, say-
ing that he fully appreciated the sagacious decision of the
authorities not to include students who had not studied
the Japanese language, but that he had been once to Japan
and had made a conscientious study of the language. This
petition had been sent in some time ago, but no reply had
come up to the day before the examination was to take
place. He had given up hope. But towards midnight a
messenger, holding a lantern, came to his room with an
order from the Chancellor. He was awakened from his
dreams to learn that he was to be allowed to sit for the
examination the next day. He was overjoyed, and scored
a success in every subject of the examination. By the
following Spring his ambition was to be really fulfilled.
He was to sail to Japan to study military science at long
last.
No exact dates for his departure from Paoting Military
Academy and his entrance into Shinbo Gakyo, the Pre-
paratory Military Academy in Tokyo, are known. It is
merely recorded that the examination was held at Paoting
Academy at the end of 1906 and that Chiang Kai-Shek
was admitted into the Tokyo Academy in the Spring of
1907. As this was his second trip to Japan, and as in those
days no passport or visa, or any kind of formalities were
needed for Chinese nationals going to Japan, it can be
54
assumed that nothing could or would hold Chiang Kai-
Shek back for a day from his urgent desire to join his
revolutionary friends in Tokyo.
As Sun Yat-Sen had gone in March to Annam to re-
start his active attempts to overthrow the Manchus, it is
assumed that Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Tokyo some time
before Sun Yat-Sen’s departure, and that it was then when
the two first met, with the result that Chiang became Sun’s
most devoted follower. Also it is on record that at this
time Chen Chi-Mei initiated Chiang Kai-Shek into the
China Union. Since then Chiang’s work has been entirely
in accordance with the Three Principles of the People as
laid down by Sun. While Chiang’s activities for the next
few years were confined to two places, Tokyo and
Shanghai, Sun was obliged to leave Japan under pressure
from the Japanese Government, who granted the request
of the Manchus because they agreed that Sun was pro-
moting revolution and gathering a big following in Japan.
From then onwards he made Hongkong his headquarters,
and for a number of years was unable to set foot either in
Japan or in Shanghai.
Sun Yat-Sen claimed, in the year 1921, that he had by
then enjoyed Chiang’s friendship for over ten years. Thus
it is clear that they must have met for the first time either
in 1905, when Chiang first went to Japan, or else in 1907,
when he went there a second time. As Sun was recruiting
members for his China Union on a large scale in 1905 and
Chiang did not join it in that year but in 1907, it seems to
the author that the later date is more probable.
From the Spring of 1907, when Chiang entered the
Preparatory Military Academy in Tokyo, to the Winter
of 1909 when he finished his course, he led a very busy
life. Sun Yat-Sen had started seven abortive revolutions
in various parts of North China, and many ardent fol-
lowers had sacrificed their lives. On many an occasion
Chiang had offered to take an active part, but it was the
unanimous decision of the party that they must keep him,
having this marvellous opportunity of being trained to be
a military leader, to finish his training in preparation for
more important events.
Every Summer, during the long vacation, he made it a
rule to go home and spend a little time with his dear
mother. In his journey to and from home he had to pass
Shanghai, where he would stay for quite a while. After
Tokyo and Hongkong, this was the most suitable place for
revolutionary activities. There was usually a large number
of rebels here planning to start an outbreak somewhere,
or else coming from attempts that had failed and hiding
here in the International Settlement where the Imperial
Government could not touch them. He liked to join them
in their discussions of their future work, or in finding ways
and means of liberating those who had been imprisoned.
He helped them to raise money and to recruit new
members, and was very glad to be able to do some
practical work.
During term time, besides being busy with his studies
and training, his spare time was entirely spent in seeing
and exchanging ideas with his fellow revolutionaries. On
Sundays, when he had the whole day off from school, he
held regular secret meetings with them, when they could
discuss their future plans in detail and at leisure.
In November, 1908, both the Empress Dowager Tzu
Hsi and the Emperor Kuang Hsu died. Before her death
the Empress Dowager had put upon the throne her sister’s
grandson, Henry Pu-Yi, whose reigning title was Hsuan
Tung, and who later became the puppet Emperor of the
Japanese-created ‘Manchukuo’. She had also nominated as
Prince Regent her sister’s second son, the new Emperor’s
father. The Prince Regent, however, must refer all matters
of State to the new Empress Dowager, who was the
daughter of Tzu Hsi’s brother. Many people believed that
56
Tzu Hsi, knowing that she would not live much longer,
feared that the Emperor Kuang Hsu would undo what she
had done once she was gone, and so she immediately
ordered the Emperor to be poisoned. She wanted to keep
everything nicely in the family.
At the end of November 1909, Chiang Kai-Shek
graduated from the Preparatory Military Academy, but
before he could be admitted into the Military University
he had to enter the army to get practical experience in the
rank and file. He was sent to Takada to join the 19th Field
Artillery Regiment, which belonged to the 13th Division
of the Japanese Army. The Commander of the Division
was the famous ‘Long Beard General’ Nagaoka, and the
commanding officer of the Regiment, which was also
known as the Takada Regiment because of the place
where it was stationed, was Colonel Flimatsu.
When Chiang Kai-Shek left the Academy and joined
the Takada Regiment it was the beginning of 1910 and
the weather was bitterly cold. He had to get up very
early to groom his horse before he went to his morning
drill. And in the evening, after his strenuous training in
the open for the whole day, he had to work in his own
quarters as hard as any new private of the Japanese Army.
He took up his duties with clenched teeth and, if not
exactly with alacrity, certainly with high spirits. ‘In days
to come,’ he used to remark to his companions, ‘the hard-
ships on the battlefield will be much more severe than this.
One must get used to it. There is nothing unbearable.’
He was in the Japanese Army for a year and a half.
While he was utterly unknown to the world nobody took
any notice of him. Such has always been the case with the
great men in history. But one day, when it was suddenly
realised that the leader of a quarter of the world’s popula-
tion had years ago been a humble soldier under their
command, they began at once to write memoirs about
him. In a special article published years later in the Tokyo
57
Asahi Shimbun, or Tokyo Rising Sun Nev)s, General
Nagaoka, the retired Commander of the 13th Division,
tried to recall to his mind what kind of a man Chiang
Kai-Shek was while under his command. He confessed
candidly that he knew the Chinese leader only super-
ficially, and it seemed to him that at that time he ‘could
see nothing special about the young man’. He asked him-
self: ‘How could such a youth, who seemed exactly like
any other ordinary man, become such a great person?’
He tried to find the answer, and had to think hard and
long, but alas, in vain. He then asked the commanding
officer of the Takada Regiment, Colonel Himatsu, whose
remark was almost identical with that of the General him-
self: ‘This Mr Chiang I do remember. But certainly I
never thought that such a man would in future become
a great historical figure.’
But the General would not give it up. He wanted all
the more now to find out the secret of Chiang’s success,
and a benevolent Providence seldom lets a determined
seeker of truth go unrewarded. At length the old General
believed that he himself had made the important dis-
covery. A part of his Memoir is worth quoting:
‘I made the discovery by accident later on.
‘Two years ago, in 1927, Mr Chiang was for the
moment disappointed' on the political stage and prepared
to travel abroad. He came to Japan, which he knew so
intimately. On the very evening of his arrival in Tokyo
(October 23rd, 1927) he rang me up from the Imperial
Hotel saying: “Your Excellency my divisional com-
mander, I ought to come at once to pay my respects to
you. But I am slightly unwell and have to go to Unzen
[a famous Spa in Japan] to take a short rest. As soon as
I’m better, I’ll come to call upon you. Please convey also
my respectful greetings to my regimental commander.
Colonel Himatsu.”
58
‘A few days later Mr Chiang came back from Unzen.
So I invited Mr Himatsu and Mr Chiang to have a very
intimate tea-party— just the three of us— at my house.
‘This time, when I set eyes on Mr Chiang again, he was
quite different from what he used to be. He was dressed
in a faultless tail coat. If you looked at him casually you
would say he was a dashing young diplomat rather than
a great soldier or statesman. To be slightly flippant, you
would say he looked somewhat like a smart film star.
During our conversation he kept addressing me with
“Your Excellency my Divisional Commander” and Mr
Himatsu with “Regimental Commander”. Of course Mr
Chiang knew very well that I was no longer a divisional
commander, but he insisted on calling me so. I think he
had not forgotten his Takada days.
‘This gradually brought those former days back into my
memory and soon I got used to his addressing me as “Your
Excellency”, in the same way as my addressing him as
‘When he was about to return, he wrote a panel
specially for me with these four characters: “Never
neglect Master’s instructions”, and signed it with his
name. Up to the present I have helped quite a large
number of Chinese students. But so far there hasn’t been
a single one of them who, like Mr Chiang, forever bears
in mind what little help he had from others. I then re-
flected that, although Mr Chiang wasn’t particularly dis-
tinguished when he was a student, his success to-day was
probably because of his possession of such a virtue.
‘In 1927 when Mr Chiang came to Japan, it was just at
a moment of disappointment. But even at that time he was
full of great ambitions and high hopes, waiting for an
opportunity to arise again.
‘For Mr Chiang, who is never disloyal nor ungrateful,
I must forever show my respect.’
The author has no inclination to comment on these
59
typical remarks of the Japanese general. It is quite evident
that neither the General nor the Colonel knew a great man
when they saw one, but they knew it immediately they
had been told by others, and the old soldier was very
anxious to make up for his earlier negligence.
It is not to be expected that in the army a general or
even a colonel would really notice a young cadet. The
self-imposed task of General Nagaoka is quite superfluous.
For a more detailed and illuminating description of
Chiang’s Takada days one naturally looks to his sergeant,
assistant-instructor Shimoda, who, strange to relate, was
fairly familiar with the young cadet. After Chiang Kai-
Shek had been the de facto head of the state in China for
many years, the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, or Tokyo
Daily N(nus, published on January 9th, 1936, an inter-
view with Sergeant Shimoda. Again it proved to be a
rather disappointing article. Both the sergeant and the
reporter filled up the space with material of little interest.
The article started with a statement that in the early
Spring of 1910 a small number of Chinese cadets were sent
to the 1 9th Regiment, that he. Sergeant Shimoda, had been
there for three years, and that he was put in charge of
these Chinese cadets.
He further stated that he had been selected to assist
their chief instructor. Lieutenant Naito, and had had
frequent contact with these Chinese cadets. Like the
others, he had not taken any special notice of Chiang Kai-
Shek, who was to be the Commander-in-Chief of all the
Forces of China; but he observed that all these ChinCvSe
young men were cultured people and were very keen on
learning the general constmction of the field-gun and its
various accessories. In fact they were so much so that they
put the sergeant into a very awkward position by asking
him incessantly for detailed explanations and he had to
borrow from Chief Instructor Naito, and study by
night, the literature in which were the description and
60
explanation of some three hundred and fifty accessory
articles of the field-gun. Sergeant Shimoda recorded this
incident with considerable pride: he said that he had
answered their questions one by one to their complete
satisfaction, and that he had never once revealed to any
of them the slightest military secret of Japan.
Among those young Chinese cadets he particularly
liked a man called Yen Chu-Chin, whose greatest accom-
plishment, according to the sergeant, was ‘his ability to
sing fluently even the folk-songs of Japan’. As for Chiang
Kai-Shek, he didn’t think much of him. Chiang Kai-Shek
was usually silent and ‘there was nothing in him to attract
anyone’s attention’. The only thing remarkable in him, said
the sergeant, was ‘his impressive and forbidding expression,
which would instantly come upon his face when he was
ordered to clean the stables’. But in the Army, orders
arc orders; he had to do as he was told. To show he was
a strict disciplinarian the sergeant cited as an example that
when he was drilling them in running, and when all of
them had been running briskly until they were dog-tired,
he still shouted at them fiercely and said they were utterly
good-for-nothing.
Regarding Chiang Kai-Shek’s revolutionary activities,
the sergeant had a less than hazy idea. He was not quite
sure whether both Mr Chiang and Mr Yen, his favourite,
were among those who supported or opposed Dr Sun
Yat-Sen’s revolutionary work, which, according to him,
‘started not long afterwards’. But he remembered clearly
that one day Mr Chiang ‘suddenly received a telegram’
and ‘instantly asked for permanent leave’, and ‘on that
very night left the place where he was receiving his
training’.
After this, he stated, he received two letters written to
him by Mr Chiang, addressing him as ‘my strict sergeant’,
and for more than twenty years he had heard no more
from him. It was only because he saw the name of Chiang
6i
Kai-Shek appearing everywhere nowadays that he began
to remember the young cadet. Chiang’s rise to such an
unexpectedly high position had moved him, and he
exclaimed: ‘To think that formerly we used to go to
have refreshment together! I was his superior officer at
that time and so there was no difficulty between us when-
ever I wanted to see him. Now that he has become the
chief player in the drama of Sino-Japanese problems to
be enacted on the International stage, I am really deeply
moved with feeling!’
Though these two articles show what kind of men they
have in the Japanese Army, they reveal little of Chiang’s
life in Japan. The reader will have to be content with
such scanty material of his Takada days, which came to
an abrupt end in the Autumn of 1911, when the Chinese
Revolution finally succeeded in Wu-Chang and soon
spread all over the country. Since then, Chiang Kai-Shek,
who had been trained and was waiting for such an out-
break, has become indispensable to his motherland.
62
Ill
Y uan Shih-Kai, who had promised to support Emperor
Kuang Hsu’s reforms, betrayed his royal master at the
critical moment, and so in 1898 the Emperor was
imprisoned and the Reform Movement collapsed. Such
a treacherous act could neither be forgiven nor forgotten.
The poor Emperor used to draw a large tortoise— a creature
symbolic of the greatest contempt in China— and write the
name of Yuan Shih-Kai on it. He would then stick it on
the wall and shoot at it with a toy bow and arrows. After
that he would take it down, cut it into small pieces and
throw them away. But as long as the Empress Dowager
Tzu Hsi was living, Yuan was safe. The helpless Emperor
couldn’t really do anything against him.
In 1908, when the Empress Dowager was seriously ill
and it seemed as if the Emperor might come into power
again. Yuan’s fate hung on a thread. But, very luckily for
him, he came through safely. The Emperor died suddenly
and mysteriously almost simultaneously with his august
Aunt. When the Emperor realised that he was breathing
his last, he struggled to take hold of a brush-pen and
succeeded in writing a not quite complete message express-
ing his hatred of Yuan Shih-Kai. With the passing away
of the old Empress Dowager, Yuan’s star fell abruptly.
The newly appointed Prince Regent had no love for the
soldier-statesman. Respecting the wishes of his late royal
brother he ordered, in the name of the new Emperor, the
immediate degradation of Yuan Shih-Kai, who had, said
the Regent, a very serious foot disease and consequently
was not fit to hold any military post. Yuan had to hurry
back to his native place to live in retirement.
But his political career was far from ended. The New
Army, which had been equipped with modern arms, had
been trained by him and was still commanded mostly by
his followers. It was scattered all over the country and
proved to be very useful to him in 1911, when his star
was to rise once more.
Up to the Autumn of 1911 Sun Yat-Sen and the
members of his China Union or Resurgent China Society
had planned and carried out no less than ten unsuccessful
revolutions in various parts of South China. Consequently
many lives had been lost and financial support was urgently
needed. When the eleventh and final attempt was made
in the city of Wuchang on October loth, Sun himself was
travelling in America, trying to raise money and enlist
supporters. Some days before the outbreak he received a
cable from his followers in Wuchang. As he had not his
code-book with him, and had not expected they would
start so soon, he kept the cablegram uncoded until he
could get access to the secret book ten days later. Even
after he had learnt the contents of the cable he did not
dream it was the eve of the successful revolution. For the
telegram asked for money for the impending outbreak,
and money he had none. But a bomb exploded by accident
in the secret headquarters of the China Union situated in
the Russian Concession of Han-Kow on October 9th, and
the members had to strike at once. So Sun Yat-Sen first
heard the good news through American newspapers.
From coast to coast every paper was reporting the
sensational news that Wuchang was occupied by
Revolutionaries.
Chiang Kai-Shek was also taken by surprise. He was
home on a short leave in the Summer of 1911, when he
spent some time in Shanghai, hoping to organise an out-
break in either the Province of Kiang-Su or in Chekiang,
his native Province. In planning this he was working with
his sworn brother Chen Chi-Mei, who had by this time
64
come back to China and made his headquarters in Shanghai,
But things did not turn out as they had hoped and soon
Chiang’s leave was drawing to its close. He had to go back
to his barracks in Takada in September, and in less than a
month came the overwhelming news that the Chinese
Revolution had already started successfully in Wuchang.
That Chiang Kai-Shek left Japan immediately and
arrived in Shanghai in the latter part of October to join
Chen Chi-Mei there is no doubt.
However, there are two different records existing about
his departure from Japan. The first is by his official
biographers, who more or less agreed that he obtained a
very short leave— some put it as 48 hours— from his regi-
ment, and that he changed into civilian clothes and sailed
for China. One said he embarked at Tokyo where he
obtained his passage money, and the other said he sailed
from Nagasaki. It was even stated that he sent back to
his regimental headquarters his military uniform, together
with his sword, by parcel post.
That finishing touch is so convincing and interesting
that it renders this story most acceptable. But there is a
second version: both General Nagaoka and Sergeant
Shimoda in their articles about Chiang Kai-Shek profess
that his departure was no secret. The Sergeant said, as will
be remembered, that Chiang Kai-Shek ‘asked for per-
manent leave’ when ‘one day he suddenly received a tele-
gram’. The General’s description of the departure was
more detailed. It runs thus:
‘When the New Army in Wuchang under the com-
mand of Li Yuan-Hung started the great Revolution in
China in 191 1, it was October, and in Takada heavy snow
had already fallen. When Mr Chiang and his friends heard
that fighting was fierce in their native country, they
wanted to go back in a great hurry, and so we held a
farewell feast for them. At the table of the feast I said:
65
‘ “If all of you are not wine drinkers, you may drink
water. In Japan a Bushido Knight who drinks water at a
farewell shows that he is determined not to come back
alive.”
‘One by one I offered them water; and when Mr
Chiang’s turn came he finished his cup of water at one
gulp, and said to me:
‘ “Your Excellency, I will most certainly dedicate my
life to it.”
‘When Mr Chiang was saying this, the expression on his
face showed his excitement and determination. But I never
thought that this Mr Chiang would later on become such
a great man.’
On his arrival at Shanghai, Chiang Kai-Shek was at once
entrusted by Chen Chi-Mei with the task of bringing the
Province of Chekiangr over to the side of the Revolution
O
It was Chiang’s own Province: he ought to know the
place and many of its men, especially those in the New
Army. Chiang went to Ilang-Chow, the provincial scat ol
Chekiang, where, thanks to his earlier work, he was abk
to enlist the promised support of the men of the New
Army which was stationed there: the 8ist and 82nd Regi-
ments. They were waiting eagerly for a signal and a leac
to start.
Back to Shanghai went Chiang again, to report it
person to Chen Chi-Mei how things stood in Elangchow
and also to collect some brave men who would go witl
him to his native Province to ‘set it free’. Having recruitec
and formed a company of ‘dare-to-die’ vanguards number
ing a hundred strong, he rushed once more to Hangchov
with his men. Shanghai raised its revolutionary flag anc
proclaimed its independence from the Manchu regime 01
November 3rd, and Chen Chi-Mei was elected the Com
mander-in-Chief of the People’s Army in Shanghai. Oi
the 5th, at two o’clock in the morning, Chiang Kai-Shek
66
with his company of ‘dare-to-die’ vanguards, set out to
attack the Governor’s yamen from his hide-out, which
was none other than the Feng Hua Guild Hostel— Feng
Hua, as the reader may remember, is Chiang Kai-Shek’s
own district.
This was Chiang Kai-Shek’s first experience of going
into battle. He was twenty-four and he had with him but
a handful of ill-equipped and mostly untrained men. He
was to fight against the pick of the Governor of Chekiang’s
well-equipped troops, who must have outnumbered his by
ten or even twenty to one. Moreover, it would not be a
surprise attack. For twenty-five days since the Wuchang
outbreak every Governor in the Empire had been pre-
paring for his defence. As it was a matter of life and death
for him, he would leave no stone unturned to see that
severe punishment was given to those who came. The
ycmmi would be well fortified with several defence lines,
and the attackers would have to fight in exposed positions.
The defenders had cannon carefully placed in strategic
positions and the attackers had but small arms and hand-
grenades, which could be used only at very close quarters.
Such were the odds against him when for the first time
in his life he went into battle. But on the other hand, he
and his comrades knew that they were fighting for a cause
for which they had worked for years and in support of
which they had tlie whole nation behind them. It was the
time for one to disregard utterly the principles laid down
in The Art of War and hope for the best.
It was under such conditions that Chiang Kai-Shek and
his ‘dare-to-die’ vanguards stormed the Governor’s yamen
with hand-grenades. Soon after they had started the
assault they were reinforced by the 3rd Battalion of the
82nd Regiment of the New Army, who had promptly
kept their promise. The fighting was brisk but brief.
Early in the morning they broke into the building and
captured Tseng Yuen, the Manchu Governor, alive.
67
When the head of the Province became their prisoner,
the rest was easy. The 8ist Regiment, divided into two
forces, attacked the Provincial Munition Store House and
the Garrison-General’s Headquarters, both of which
they soon took. The only substantial resistance they
encountered was when they brought their forces to face
the encampment of the Banner Men. These Manchu
soldiers defended themselves vigorously until late in the
afternoon, when, realising that all was lost, they capitu-
lated. Because of their brave resistance they were leniently
treated, and most of them were enlisted and reorganised
into the People’s Army to fight with the Revolutionaries
against their former master. With the surrender of the
garrison force of the Banner Men, the Province of
Chekiang now came under the flag of Revolution.
As soon as order had been restored in Hangchow,
Chiang Kai-Shek hurried back to Shanghai again to help
Chen Chi-Mei to take over other parts of Kiangsu
Province. A regiment of infantrymen was immediately
recruited to be trained under Chiang’s command, and this
was called the 5th Regiment of the Shanghai Army, which
later on became the 93rd Regiment of the Chinese Army.
Excellent and important service had been rendered by
Chiang Kai-Shek to the Revolution. His handful of ‘dare-
to-die’ vanguards was the key to the success of the
Independence of Chekiang Province, and the early
declaration of independence by various Provinces was
the key to the success of the whole Revolution. As Sun
Yat-Sen said himself when commenting on the success of
this 1911 Revolution, it was not the result of work done
by any one man or group of men, but was achieved by the
unanimous aim of the entire nation, who had set their
minds on seeing it through. Within forty days from the
outbreak of the Revolution in Wuchang, no less than
seventeen Provinces had declared their independence from
68
the Manchu regime and their adherence to the New
Republic which was not yet estabhshed.
It must be remembered that the China Union which
started the Revolution was a very impoverished organisa-
tion. It had no money except occasional donations from
its supporters abroad, and those had always been dependent
upon Sun Yat-Sen’s eloquence. Once the Revolution had
begun and was spreading on a big scale, an enormous
amount of money was needed to keep it going. At the
time. Sun Yat-Sen was unable to get hold of any sub-
stantial sums of money. Indeed, when he arrived in
Shanghai at Christmas, all his followers were hoping
eagerly that he had brought with him a fortune or even
many fortunes. He was actually penniless, but he knew
how to answer the Press when they asked him whether he
had brought with him any money. He said he had brought
with him something far more important than money: the
Spirit of Revolution!
Years later, when the Chinese Republic was in the state
of chaos which naturally follows a revolution in any
country, and when Sun Yat-Sen often had to go from
one place to another, his critics used to say that he was
not a practical revolutionary but merely an idealist. How
wrong they were! They never realised that to be a really
good practical revolutionary one needed high ideals.
Especially at the time when funds were low it was such
a spirit which kept the morale high.
Madame Chiang, the widowed mother of an only son,
was a model to women of her time. When Chiang Kai-
Shek came to Hangchow and was about to go into battle,
he sent a letter of farewell to his mother and his half-
brother, telling them that he had sworn to give his life to
the Revolution, and asking his mother to forgive his
negligence of his filial duties, and also to give full instruc-
tions about the disposal of his personal and family affairs
in case he was killed. After receiving this touching letter,
69
his mother sent to him in Hangchow this message by a
member of her family: ‘To die or not, do as your duty
calls, and never worry about things at home.’
It is more than probable that our earlier historians who
wrote about the 1 9 1 1 Revolution have tended to neglect
Chiang Kai-Shek’s share, just as later ones tended to
exaggerate it. At the time of this Revolution, he was a
young man of barely twenty-four and had been a member
of the China Union for four years. He had many seniors
both in age and in rank. Those who had taken part in
previous attempts were naturally enjoying the privileges.
Moreover, there were quite a number of men of influence
who, because of their important positions in the old re-
gime, figured very prominently in history though they had
joined the Revolution at the eleventh or even the thirteenth
hour. More than one Governor of the Manchurian
Dynasty became a Military Governor of the Province
of the Republic by merely changing into a new unifonn.
Mere words on paper mattered little to Chiang Kai-
Shek. He used to say: ‘At that time I had only two aims
for the Revolution: first, I wanted to bring down the
Manchus and to restore our China, and secondly to free
the common people from their sufferings. No other
thoughts of any kind were in my mind.’
Ku Nai-Ping, who commanded the 82 nd Regiment, the
3rd Battalion of which reinforced the ‘dare-to-die’ van-
guards in their attack on the Governor’s ycmen^ wrote a
book called The Record of the Independence of Chekimg.
He described the fighting in Hangchow fully, and singled
out Chiang Kai-Shek as the hero of the day. He said that
the overthrow of the old regime in Chekiang was chiefly
the work of Chiang Kai-Shek. But when Chiang received
a presentation copy of the book, he wrote a correcting
letter to the author. He told Ku that he did not covet
honours for himself and that in future editions full justice
should be done to some other comrades of the company
70
of ‘dare-to-die’ vanguards whom Ku had not mentioned in
his record.
When nearly all the New Armies stationed throughout
the Empire joined the Revolution, the Manchu Court was
disheartened. The young Empress Dowager Lung Yu, in
consultation with her brother-in-law the Prince Regent,
decided to reinstate Yuan Shih-Kai, and he was immedi-
ately appointed Viceroy of Hu-Peh and Hu-Nan. The
New Army had been trained by him, and they thought that
he could restore their former efficiency. But Yuan was a
cunning fox. He saw the helpless state of the widow and
her child. He insisted that his non-existent foot disease
was still very serious and that he could not receive the
Imperial favour by coming to Peking.
The Court was frightened and had to eat humble pie.
The Prince Regent, who had formerly dismissed Yuan,
had to retire and Yuan was appointed Commander-in-
Chief of all the Imperial Forces and also elected as the
Prime Minister of the first Cabinet with real power.
Furthermore, he asked for and received ample funds from
the Manchu Princes and Princesses and other noblemen
who, willingly or unwillingly, had to contribute, as the
Imperial Treasury was empty.
Once he had obtained power and money, Yuan made a
show of fighting. But the Imperial Court soon saw that
they had ‘led a wolf into their house’ to protect them. He
ordered his generals, headed by Tuan Chi-Jui, to send
him a telegram which was signed by forty-eight high-
ranking commanding officers who were supposed to be
fighting for the Manchus. In the telegram they said that
they were commanding and also representing a total of
more than a hundred and forty thousand men and that
they didn’t want to fight any more. They were all in
favour of establishing a Republic, and should the Manchu
Court fail to agree, they would lead their men to
71
the Capital to explain in person the importance of the
issue.
In the meantime he sent a representative to negotiate
peace terms with the Revolutionaries. Because of the lack
of a leader in their uprising in Wuchang, the Revolu-
tionaries had had to drag out a most amiable Colonel of
the New Army to be their figure-head, against his own
will. Li Yuan-Hung, nicknamed ‘Li, the Buddha’, knew
he was no match for the powerful Yuan Shih-Kai. It was
agreed that if Yuan could make the Manchu Emperor
abdicate in favour of a Republic, Yuan could name his
price. But Yuan was very modest: he only wanted to be
the President. All would have been well for Yuan and Li
had not Sun Yat-Sen arrived at this critical moment. He
was the leader of the Revolution, for which he had worked
ever since he was a youth. On his arrival he was elected
by the representatives of seventeen provinces, with a
majority or sixteen to one, to be the first Provisional Presi-
dent, to be installed on January ist, 1912, in Nanking, the
new Capital. (Nanking means South Capital, while Peking
means North Capital.)
This was an unexpected blow to Yuan Shih-Kai. He
went back on his promise and started to say that his repre-
sentative was acting beyond his authority. He even went
so far as to say that he was not quite sure what kind of
government would really suit China, and at any rate he
would not hear of the existence of a Provisional Govern-
ment in Nanking.
But Sun Yat-Sen knew what was wrong. Yuan was
assured by him that as soon as the Emperor abdicated he
would resign in favour of Yuan. But he had doubts about
Yuan’s bona fides in supporting the Republic. If Yuan
would guarantee that. Sun would not stand in the way.
Yuan promised, and memorialised the Throne with this
threat: ‘Had the King of France, at the time of the French
Revolution, followed sagacious advice, it would never
72
have happened that every single descendant of Louis had
perished.’
This was enough to frighten any woman. The last
Imperial Conference almost resembled a funeral. The
Empress Dowager sobbed and her tears flowed, all the
Princes and Ministers wept loud and long. Finally the
Empress Dowager said to the Emperor: ‘The fact that you
are still alive to-day is entirely due to the excellent services
of your great Minister Yuan’, and she ordered the Emperor
to come down from his Imperial Throne to thank the great
Minister Yuan. The great Minister Yuan, trembling and
knocking his head on the ground, refused to be thanked
and, keeping his head down and weeping, was unable to
raise his face.
The Abdication Edict was issued on February 12th, and
in it the Empress Dowager not only agreed to the establish-
ment of a Chinese Republic, but also recommended that
Yuan Shih-Kai be given plenipotentiary powers to form a
new Government. Sun Yat-Sen kept his word and, resign-
ing punctually, nominated Yuan as his successor. The
seventeen representatives went to vote again and Yuan was
elected Provisional President unanimously.
While Yuan was grasping position and power, Chiang
Kai-Shek gave up his command and sailed for Japan once
more. His reply to Mr Ku Nai-Ping’s letter contained
these words: ‘ITc time of destruction is ended and the
work of reconstruction is beginning. Well do I know
myself that my knowledge and ability are not sufficient
for such tasks and so I have sailed eastwards to continue
my former studies. How kind of you to say I do not stay
to enjoy the fruits of my success! When I hear this, I feel
rather uneasy about it.’
Once in Japan, Chiang resumed his military studies and
worked doubly hard. Besides studying, he also edited and
published a magazine called The Voice of the Army^ to
73
which he made regular contributions. The leading article
he wrote for the first issue has now become an historical
document of considerable importance, and it starts with
his proposal for a World Utopia:
‘The world to-day is a place in which we must be armed
to maintain peace. If all the nations would only put
humanity before everything else and realise that inter-
national conflict would bring human beings great suffering
and that aggression is not right, then instead of maintain-
ing a balance of power, there would be a universal
commonwealth, uniting all the five continents without
dividing them into various foreign countries. When we
have established a World-Republic comprising people of
the yellow, white, red and black races, we shall only need
a police force to maintain interior order in those united
states, and that would be sufficient to keep trouble away.
A central government could be created to deal with
greater matters, and should there arise disputes between
the states, they could go to the Central Government for
justice, when right and wrong would be declared. Land
and sea defences would therefore be unnecessary, and the
huge expenses for maintaining armed forces could be used
in promoting industry. If this could be done and last from
one generation to numerous generations, and the universal
commonwealth could be maintained forever, then there
would never be wars and the people would never see
horrible calamities. Would not that be the glorious day
for which we all hoped and prayed, the realisation of what
the German philosopher Kant and the English philosopher
Bentham had been advocating?’
He was no dreamer. He fully realised that such a
proposal would not be adopted under present circum-
stances. He then gave a shrewd analysis of the world
situation in general and pointed out that China, with her
74
very long coastline in the Pacific, was the focus of inter-
national struggle. Of the powers who wanted to set their
feet in the Orient he singled out Japan as ‘three islands in
East Asia, with their Bushido spirit and little but crafty
tricks, which have been forging ahead to wrestle with the
Great Empires for a leading position in the world’. He
said that trouble was already brewing in the Orient and
might arrive in the twinkling of an eye. To avoid being
swallowed up by her powerful enemies, China must pre-
pare to defend herself.
He explained that the Revolution which had taken place
recently was not merely an interior affair. The Manchus,
who had to give away the Bay of Kiao-Chou, Port Arthur,
the Bay of Dairen and Port Wei-Hai-VVei through their
incompetence both in civil and military government, had
practically surrendered all our strategical points to foreign
countries. Such a move left us in a very dangerous posi-
tion. That was why we had to sacrifice our lives to bring
about the Revolution and establish a powerful republic.
That being done, we could prepare ourselves in order to
deal with those foreign powers who were aggressive, and
before we could deal with those countries we must first
pay attention to our military strength, without which no
fair treaty could be concluded with other nations.
He advocated the following six measures: to promote
military interest among the common people ; to popularise
military science; to discuss the conscription law; to plan
national defences; to subsidise military education; and to
investigate the military conditions of other countries.
He concluded the essay with a warning that we must
prepare for the rainy day while the sun was still shining.
During the years 1912 and 1913 he wrote a great number
of articles on current events in China, and occasionally
about world affairs. When Outer Mongolia was induced
by Russia to sever its relations with the Central Govern-
ment of China, he wrote “Proposal for Making War with
75
Mongolia’', citing the case of the Russo-Japanese War and
estimating the conditions of a possible Sino-Russian War.
He also wrote “Fundamental Solution of the Mongolian
and Tibetan Problem”, in which he pointed out that to
fight for Mongolia was better than to fight for Tibet, and
to appease Britain was better than to appease Russia.
Because of the mutinies of men in Peking and other places,
he wrote “Post-War Military Management” and “Problems
of Military and Civil Government”. In the latter he
pointed out the danger of allowing the Military Governor
of a Province to hold concurrently the civil governorship.
He said that it was most important that the Central
Government alone should be trusted with full military
power, otherwise ambitious governors would bring the
country into constant trouble. When the Balkan States
were in danger of conflict he wrote “War in the Balkans
and its Influence on China and her Diplomacy”.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s stay in Japan was cut short because
he was soon called back to Shanghai for a second revolu-
tion. Yuan Shi-Kai, the Provisional President, began to
act in his own way without any regard to democratic
principles. His cabinet consisted of eleven members, five
of them, including the Prime Minister, were Sun Yat-Sen’s
followers and China Union men. Chen Chi-Mei was given
the post of Minister of Industry and Commerce, but he
refused to work with Yuan. Sung Chiao-Jen, another
brilliant China Union member, was Minister of Agricul-
ture and Forestry, and he was the first to find Yuan out
and he left Peking after a very brief association with the
new Government. Soon all the members of the Cabinet
who were China Union men found it impossible to work
with Yuan, and they resigned en bloc.
In the Provisional Parliament the China Union held a
majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses. When
Yuan found that sometimes they would not pass the
76
measures which he desired, he just over-ruled their
decision and did as he pleased. He wanted money
urgently, and in spite of the New Constitution by which
he had sworn to abide and which proscribed that Parlia-
ment’s consent was essential for any loan, he borrowed
twenty-five million pounds sterling from an international
financial organisation called the Consortium. This body
was formed originally by bankers of six powers: America,
England, France, Germany, Russia and Japan. Wilson,
then President of the United States, did not approve of
the loan and so the American group withdrew from it.
Sung Chiao-Jen was one of the ardent opposers of the
loan as well as one of the most active members of the China
Union, which by this time had been reorganised into a
political party known as the Kuo Min Tang, or The
People’s Party. In March, 1913, he was assassinated by
ruffians, who were later on discovered to be in Yuan’s
service. In April Sun Yat-Sen said openly to Yuan in a
telegram: ‘You are betraying the country. I must now
oppose you in the same way as I did the Manchu Dynasty.’
In May, Sun telegraphed Yuan to ask him to resign, which,
of course, the latter would not think of doing. In July,
Sun, in a circular telegram to all the Provincial Governors
throughout the country, asked them to denounce and fight
against Yuan.
While a number of Sun’s followers in Parliament did
not want to start a civil war, Chen Chi-Mei and Chiang
Kai-Shek prepared for action in Shanghai. Having arrived
secretly in Shanghai from Japan, Chiang became chief-of-
staff to Chen, who was made by Sun Yat-Sen the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Shanghai Anti-Yuan Forces. Now
Shanghai had been in the hands of Yuan’s men for a long
time, and Chiang hoped to take the Arsenal first, which
was guarded by the 93rd Regiment. It will be remem-
bered that the 93rd Regiment was originally the 5th Regi-
ment of the Shanghai Army formed and commanded by
77
Chiang himself in 1911. There were in it still many men
who had been under Chiang and who might come over
to him when he raised the call.
The Garrison Commander was a stout supporter of
Yuan, and he had taken precautionary measures. He
moved the 93rd Regiment away from the Arsenal and
stationed his own safety guards there. The Navy officers
in Shanghai were also heavily bribed by this able hench-
man of Yuan. While they had declared they would sup-
port Chen and Chiang in their anti-Yuan movement on
the one hand, they received the bribe eagerly and waited
for the turn of the tide.
On the night of the 22nd July a hurriedly made-up
force attacked the Arsenal. It was ill-prepared and ill-
equipped, and so, after a few fierce but unsuccessful
assaults, had to retreat. The Navy sat tight. Although
they were on the river near-by, and if they had helped,
Chen and Chiang would have succeeded, they had no
intention of giving the support which they had promised.
Still, battles continued until the 28th, when Chen and
Chiang’s men were gathered near the place to which the
93rd Regiment had recently been moved. Here, with
their men and ammunition rapidly decreasing, they
decided to make a last stand against their ever-increasing
enemy, who had been able to get reinforcements from
other places during the course of the fighting. At night-
fall Chiang tried to steal into the headquarters of the 93rd
Regiment to enlist their help, but the Garrison Com-
mander’s safety guards had already sent their advance
sentinels all around the place, and Chiang was promptly
caught by one of the sentinels.
The author regrets that it could not be determined how
Chiang got free, for in the official biography it was merely
stated that he ‘got away by a trick and very luckily
reached the Headquarters of the Regiment’. Here he
found that the new Regimental Commander had already
78
THE YOUNG SOLDIER
become a faithful follower of Yuan and, hiding away,
would not see him. Chiang had to take matters into his
own hands, and he asked various captains to summon their
men to hear his harangue. He was a very eloquent speaker
and his cause was good, so a battalion was immediately
formed which rushed to the rescue of Chen’s dwindling
army.
Reinforced by such a strong body of men, the followers
of Chen and Chiang advanced to attack the Arsenal once
more. Fighting became extremely fierce and casualties
were heavy on both sides. While the defenders held out
with determination, the attackers proceeded with such un-
relenting vigour that the Commander of the Battalion was
killed in action. In the meantime the Navy continued to
maintain their neutrality, but one of the warships turned
her searchlights on the battlefield, which actually helped
the defenders. This so enraged the attackers that they
fired at her and put her searchlights out of action. When
the other warships saw the insurgent army attack them,
they all started to bombard Chen and Chiang’s men, who
suffered very heavily. But they maintained their grasp
until midday next day, when their ammunition began to
run short. By nightfall the defenders launched their
counter-attack successfully, and Chen and Chiang had to
fall back.
By the following morning they had to retreat to the
north of Shanghai, where they met a combined force of
merchant corps and foreigners from the settlements, who
were all siding with Yuan. They were then disarmed by
these people and the uprising against Yuan Shih-Kai in
Shanghai thus ended. Chiang Kai-Shek went to Nanking
and found that there, too, the attempt had been unsuccess-
ful. This forced him to return the following day.
Not only had Chiang Kai-Shek failed in his rising
against Yuan, but also the other leaders in various provinces
79
D
who had risen for the Second Revolution were defeated
by Yuan’s armies. Sun Yat-Sen was compelled to flee to
Japan, where Chiang Kai-Shek also went. With all those
who had actually fought against him gone, Yuan Shih-
Kai forced Parliament to elect him, on October 6th, 1913,
the First President, for hitherto he had only been Pro-
visional President, and on the following day Li Yuan-
Hung, the Buddha, was made Vice-President. As the Kuo
Min Tang still had a majority in Parliament, though most
of its radical members were gone. Yuan had to prepare
thoroughly. At first he arrested a few members of Parlia-
ment because he said they were connected with the rebel-
lion in the South. These arrests, together with some
voluntary departures, were still not enough to reduce the
majority into a minority. Therefore, on the day of his
election, he hired several thousand so-called ‘citizens’ to
hold a mass meeting outside the Parliament House,
clamouring that unless Yuan Shih-Kai, ‘the idol of the
nation’, was elected President not a single member would
be allowed to leave the premises.
The members were not entirely intimidated. Twice
they went to the poll, and twice Yuan did not secure
sufficient votes to meet the requirements, though nobody
else had got as many votes as he had. At nightfall, while
the hired ‘citizens’ were still surrounding the House,
clamouring for Yuan’s election, it was announced that
according to a proviso in the election regulations the
members must choose either of the two candidates who
polled most as President. As Yuan and Li the Buddha
were the two who polled most they had to choose between
these two. When finally at 10 p.m. Yuan was returned as
President, the crowd outside broke into loud applause and
dispersed to let out the members, who had been kept in
the House from 8 a.m. When they went the next day to
elect the Vice-President, not a single ‘citizen’ bothered to
come near the House.
80
Having been elected President, Yuan had no further
use for Parliament. He first announced on November 4th
the dissolution of the Kuo Min Tang, together with an
order that Kuo Min Tang members were disqualified from
Parliament. With several hundred members disqualified,
Parliament could never form a quorum, and so, on
January loth, 1914, Yuan ordered the suspension of the
authority of Parliament. It was then quite clear that Chen
Chi-Mei, Chiang Kai-Shek and all the other radical
members of Kuo Min Tang were right: they ought not
to have tried to accommodate Yuan, but should have
fought him with a united effort in the beginning. Now
things were more difficult than before.
In the Summer of 1914 Chiang Kai-Shek came back to
China secretly to start another uprising against Yuan in
Shanghai. He had made a fairly complete plan to occupy
all the strategically important points around Shanghai and
part of the coast. But the Garrison Commander who had
defeated him less than a year before got to know of it
through his extensive secret service. On the 30th May
Chiang’s headquarters were raided, and then they pro-
ceeded to search for Chiang himself. He was visiting a
friend and, finding the place empty, left the house after
having sat there awaiting his comrades for some time.
While he was waiting in the house a spy noticed him and
hurried along to repoa to the Garrison Commander. At
once soldiers and police came in force and surrounded the
house to search for him. When he returned to the place
after a short visit to another friend near-by, he saw from
a distance that it was full of his enemies looking for him.
He went away, not without a chuckle to himself.
He went back to Japan, and from there he travelled to
Manchuria. For Chen Chi-Mei and Sun Yat-Sen had
heard through a follower that the armies in the Provinces
of Ki-Rin and Hei-Lung-Kiang were ready to rise against
Yuan and were only waiting for a leader to start. On
81
arriving at Harbin in the early Autumn, Chiang Kai-Shek
found, to his great disappointment, that the report was
entirely without foundation. The man who had made the
false report to Sun Yat-Sen was merely trying to obtain
money. Soon war started in Europe, and Chiang Kai-Shek
returned to Tokyo to join Sun Yat-Sen.
While he was an exile in Japan, Chiang found a little
time to study again. He read our philosophical classics
and important works on military science. He examined
his moral conduct very carefully and started to write his
diary. He formed the habit of reviewing his thought and
work of the day and putting down in his diary what mis-
takes he had committed. A famous philosopher once
wrote that he began to see that he could not redress what
had already passed, and always felt that he was wrong
yesterday. Chiang went further. He thought that he had
been wrong yesterday, but that even to-day he might still
not be right. He must continue to search for the truth and
never be content with his endeavours.
In 1915, Yuan, fully satisfied that he could do whatever
he liked, began to take steps to crown himself the new
Emperor of China, breaking his Inaugural Oath to main-
tain the Chinese Republic when he took office as Presi-
dent. He ordered a number of his henchmen to publicise
the idea that Monarchy was the most suitable system for
governing China and that Yuan was the best man.
In the meantime, Japan entered the war on the side of
the Allies, and attacked the small German force in Shan-
tung. She occupied Tsing-Tao and the Bay of Kiao-Chou,
and decided not only to stay there but to extend further
inland into Shantung and other parts of China. Knowing
that China could not expect any other power to help her
because they were all busy fighting in Europe, she
demanded special privileges and rights in Shantung and
Manchuria, mining rights in Central China, also that China
82
must not lease any port to another country, and that she
must engage Japanese advisers to work in her financial and
military organisations.
These outrageous demands were presented to Yuan in
secret, and, hardly to be believed, the request that the
whole matter should be negotiated in secret was agreed
to by Yuan and his ministers. For months negotiations
went on secretly, until rumours got around, and Japan
had the audacity to blame China for the leakage. As Yuan
was hoping to become Emperor, an early recognition by
a friendly power would be very helpful. So, when Japan
finally sent an ultimatum on May 7th, 1915, pressing for
the acceptance of her infamous Twenty-one Demands,
Yuan accepted them on May 9th, the day after which the
ultimatum would expire.
Yuan went on to organise what he believed to be legal
bodies to promote his coronation. At last he had a People’s
Representatives Convention held, and the job was so
thoroughly done that in December, 1915, when these
1,993 People’s Representatives voted, the result was 1,993
votes returned in favour of changing the government into
a Constitutional Monarchy, and that those 1,993 voters
unanimously recommended Yuan Shih-Kai as Emperor.
But he was modest. When he received their petition
he issued an order saying: ‘Since the Convention has
unanimously decided to adopt a Constitutional Alonarchy
system, there is no further place for me, the President, to
discuss it. But the recommendation has shocked me to an
indescribable extent. Fleaven creates the people and
appoints their Idngs. The Aiandate of Heaven could never
be altered. But only he who has great merit and profound
virtue could receive such an appointment. I, the President,
have been in Government service for thirty years, and
though I have experienced repeatedly extraordinary
changes, I have achieved scarcely anything. The Republic
has been in existence for four years, during which period
83
I have had numerous hardships and feel that I have com-
mitted many blunders. While I have hardly any time to
remedy my past errors, how can I be credited with merit? ’
He even mentioned that if he were to be crowned, he
would have a guilty conscience when he thought of his
abdicated Emperor. He also mentioned that he could not
go back on the oath which he took to support the Republic
when he was sworn in as President.
But he also remembered that he promised before the
world to do his utmost for the welfare of his country and
people in spite of whatever should happen to himself, or
whether he should be praised or censured. In short, he
was prepared to sacrifice himself for his country. As for
the Recommendation, he hoped the Representatives would
not force him to do what he didn’t want to do. ‘Please re-
consider the matter very carefully,’ he concluded, ‘and
recommend someone else.’ And to show his determination
not to accept the offer, he returned the Petition to the
senders together with this order.
A second petition, in which long lists of Yuan’s achieve-
ments and merits were listed in extraordinarily flattering
terms, was immediately sent to him. The petitioners
argued that while the people wanted a Republic the Presi-
dent’s oath was valid, but when they wished for a
Monarchy, the President immediately became non-
existent and of course his oath was revoked. The responsi-
bility was on the shoulders of the people. It had nothing
to do with Yuan Shih-Kai, their ‘Emperor’!
The petition was signed by the Representative-in-Chief
on behalf of the Convention, and the last part read: ‘In
short, you, our Emperor, have great merits and extensive
virtues. Your reputation and good faith have ever been
widely known. You are the only man in China: you can-
not put away your duty to be taken up by anyone else.
The Benevolent Heaven favours and blesses you. The
hearts of millions and billions of people go to you. You
84
must not delay; the Mandate of Heaven too long. The
common people must not be without their Emperor too
long. Pray try your best not to be too modest and look
at things clearly in their right perspective. Don’t follow
the ceremonious way of politeness and humility which
would leave the precious will of Providence forever un-
fulfilled. Issue an Edict immediately and let the whole
world be told. When you have mounted your throne and
assumed your office, the hungry and thirsty desire of your
subjects even in the remotest parts beyond the seas will be
satisfied, and the auspicious and great foundation for ten
thousand years of our Chinese Empire will be firmly laid.
Signed by the Representative-in-Chief, while he is over-
whelmed with joy, excitement, earnest expectancy and
urgent anxiety.’
The counting of votes, the sending in of the Petition
and Yuan Shih-Kai’s first rejection were all done in the
space of one day. And the second Petition, part of which
has just been quoted, was presented to him on the same
evening. On the following day he had to accept it re-
luctantly: ‘Recommended by millions and billions, I feel
my responsibility is very heavy. How can a man of my
humble virtue and meagre ability shoulder it? As the
people’s directive becomes more strict and their wish more
acute, it has made me utterly unable to explain my diffi-
culties or to evade the call.’ The very next day an order
was issued in which it was said: ‘The change of the system
of government is the wish of the people. Should there be
trouble-makers trying to spread rumours and foment
agitation, they will be punished sternly according to law.’
The Vice-President Li, the Buddha, was made the
Prince of Military Righteousness, and the enthronement
took place on January ist, 1916, amidst the loud acclama-
tion of the newly ennobled men in Peking, but also amidst
the fireworks which broke out all over the country. One
Province after another declared independence, and Yuan
85
Shih-Kai was dismayed to find his military strength begin
to dwindle and then to collapse.
Chiang Kai-Shek came back to Shanghai from Japan in
the autumn of 1915, and he and Chen Chi-Mei discussed
how they should attack. As the able Garrison Commander
had defeated them twice before, it was decided that he
must be removed first. On November loth bombs and
pistols were used in an attack on him, and he was instantly
killed. With the most shrewd enemy leader gone, they
started a general rising on the evening of December 5th.
There were several warships stationed in the Whampoo
River at the time and all the captains were on shore that
evening giving a feast to the local authorities. The captain
of the cruiser Chao Ho and some of her crew were with
Chen and Chiang. Yang Hu, an ardent member of Kuo
Min Tang and a good friend of Chiang’s, leading some
thirty men, sailed in a small boat to tackle this cruiser.
Another sectional leader, with little more than two hun-
dred comrades, attacked the Police Headquarters. Two
other small forces were dispatched to occupy the Bureau
of Works, the Electric Plant and the Telephone Office.
Chiang and Chen left their secret headquarters in the
French Concession for the Chinese City when the guns on
the cruiser Chao Ho were roaring with fury. They
thought all would be well. As they hurried southwards,
they perceived that the numbers of their men were fast
dwindling. When they arrived at the gate of the Bureau
of Works, they found they were the only survivors and,
what was worse, the guns of the cruiser Chao Ho were by
then silenced by their enemies. In the distance Yuan’s
soldiers sprang up rapidly and their numbers continued
to increase. Luckily it was fairly dark, and they could not
distinguish Chiang and Chen. Soon two other cruisers
opened fire on the remaining forces on Chiang’s side. They
had failed to capture the Police Headquarters and their re-
86
inforcements had also been intercepted and could not
reach them in time.
It was now obvious that the cruiser Chao Ho had been
captured by the enemy and soon they learnt that all their
forces were defeated. In the river outside the Bureau of
Works a small boat was anchored. Chiang and Chen
jumped into the boat and sailed through the enemy fire
towards the Bund of the French Concession. Leaving the
boat, they went to their secret headquarters, where they
met a few comrades who were discussing the possibilities
of occupying another cruiser, the Yin Jut, and making
fresh attacks on other less heavily defended points.
Suddenly police and detectives of the French Con-
cession broke into the building and started to arrest the
inmates. Chen Kuo-Fu, Chen Chi-Mei’s nephew, pur-
posely protested against his arrest in an extraordinarily
loud voice, making sure that it was quite audible to his
uncle, Chiang, and other comrades who were upstairs.
Chen and Chiang had to climb over to the next building
and from there Chiang dragged Chen to hide in his,
Chiang’s, private apartment, because Chen’s residence was
next to the headquarters and might also be raided by the
French police.
Chiang was seriously affected by this failure, and soon
had to take to his bed. Madame Chiang, having heard of
her son’s dangerous adventure, his defeat and eventually
his illness, came to Shanghai to nurse him in spite of strong
attempts at dissuasion by her friends and relatives. She
knew when her son most needed her comfort and care,
her sympathy and encouragement.
Chiang’s courageous uprising in Shanghai, though itself
a failure, inspired many other uprisings all over the
country. On December 25th the Province of Yun-Nan
declared its independence. A New Army was formed
with the sole purpose of protecting the Chinese Republic
from the throne-snatcher Yuan Shih-Kai. Yuan, with his
87 D*
recent success in Shanghai fresh in his mind, sent an army
immediately to conquer his opponents.
As soon as he was well enough to resume his activities,
Chiang, taking Yang Hu as his lieutenant and a small body
of men, launched a surprise attack on the Kiang Yin
Fortress, which stood in a strategical position on the south
bank of the Yangtze River between Shanghai and Nan-
king. He and his followers fought the defenders fiercely
and the fortress soon surrendered. He reorganised the
surrendered soldiers as part of his own army and held the
fortress against Yuan’s reinforcements for five days until
almost all his original officers and men had been disabled.
When the newly surrendered men saw Chiang’s strength
was rapidly weakening, they broke out into a mutiny, and
the remaining faithful comrades had to escape as best they
could. Chiang did not want to give up the place for which
he had fought so hard; he intended to use it as a base for
further ana bigger operations along the Yangtze Valley.
But by midnight on the fifth day he was the only man left
guarding the fortress. Two loyal soldiers came back to
him and entreated him to go: ‘The fortress is actually
empty. Please go away immediately.’ Their advice was at
last followed, and they guided him out of the surrounded
place into safety. Once out of danger he returned to
Shanghai.
But Yuan’s local victory over Chiang Kai-Shek could
not possibly counterbalance uprisings on a much bigger
scale which started in other places, more or less at the
same time as Chiang’s efforts. In the Spring of 1916, after
Yuan had satisfied his ambition to crown himself the
Emperor of China, the Provinces of Kwei-Chow, Kwang-
Si, Kwang-Tung, Hu-Nan, Kiang-Su, Che-Kiang, Shan-
Tung, An-Hwei, Sze-Chuan, and Shen-Si, following the
example of Yun-Nan, declared their independence one by
one. The fact that in some of the Provinces the heads
were formerly Yuan’s supporters had disheartened the old
88
schemer. Telegram after telegram arrived at his Imperial
Palace denouncing him for his treachery, and Yuan was
compelled to climb down from his Throne.
Having squandered his loan of twenty-five million
pounds in wasteful wars against his opposers, and having
made many eneinies out of his one-time friends, Yuan had,
after all, to take off his coveted Imperial crown and dragon
robe. That was on the 22nd March, 1916, only eighty-
one days after his coronation. He tried to be very oblig-
ing. Since people did not want him to be their Emperor,
he said, very well, they must have their way, and he would
condescend to become their President once more.
Unfortunately the people who had rebelled could not
appreciate Yuan’s condescension. Those who had declared
their independence continued to do so as time passed, and
more followed. There were, of course, a few of his former
subordinates who remained fairly loyal to him and sup-
ported him in his new proposal that he should remain as
President. But most of them did so in a half-hearted
fashion. They did not want to offend those powerful
military leaders whose cry was ‘Yuan must go’.
At last two of his most ardent supporters, the military
governors of Szechuan and of Hunan, deserted his cause
and declared their independence. This was indeed a mortal
blow. He could not get over it and soon took to his bed,
from which he never got up. He died on June 6th, 1916.
Shortly before he died. Yuan had accomplished one
revengeful act. The insolence of those powerful military
governors who had huge armies behind them he had to
bear by swallowing his pride. As for such reckless rebels
as Chen Chi-Mei and Chiang Kai-Shek, however, who had
been an eternal headache to him, he was determined to
get rid of them by hook or by crook. Though he could
do nothing to the treacherous war-lords, he was full of
ways and means of punishing those penniless revolu-
89
tionaries. He could ill afford to send large armies to fight
his powerful foes, but he was rich enough to buy assassins.
And in this he was an expert.
On the 1 8th May, 1916, Chen Chi-Mei was lured to
visit a friend’s house, where Yuan’s hirelings shot him in
cold blood. Next on the list was Chiang Kai-Shek. Had
Yuan lived a little longer it is quite probable that Chiang
would have been his next victim.
How much Chen’s death moved Chiang could be seen
in the prose elegy which the latter composed to be used
as a sacrificial oration addressed to his deceased friend. It
runs as follows:
'On the twentieth day of the month of May in the fifth
year of the Chinese Republic (1916), I, your younger
sworn brother Chiang Kai-Shek, offer this sacrifice to
you, the spirit of the late Chen Chi-Mei, with these
words.
‘Alas! From now on where can be found a man who
knows me so well and loves me so profoundly as you did?
From the year of Ting Wei (1907) to the present time
ten years have gone by. What has been the cause for
which we jointly worked? Hasn’t it been the cause of
our country on which our safety depended? What has
been our oath to each other? Hasn’t it been an oath that
we would live or die together?
‘To-day one of us is dead while the other lives and the
country is still in a state of confusion. I have not acted
according to our oath. You who are dead have attained
greatness and righteousness, and can look back on your
life with satisfaction. And should I, who want to be faith-
ful and keep my word, be afraid to die?
‘Alas! Great hardship is only beginning to come, and
our chief enemy is still unslaughtered. To fulfil the ambi-
tion of the dead is the responsibility of the living; to com-
plete the task of the dead is the duty of the living. Only
90
when the living does not die can the dead have his work
carried on as if he were living. The unfulfilled wish of
the dead will be fulfilled by the living and the unfinished
task of the dead will be finished by the living. Until they
have been fulfilled and accomplished, I will neither stop
nor die, but go on and on. This I promise you as I
promised you “to be another you if you died” when we
bade each other farewell in Japan last Spring. I will keep
my promise.
‘Alas! When I reflect on bygone days I find they were
full of sorrow with little joy, plenty of worry and even
more regrets. Before the year of Hsin Hai (1911) we
planned to capture Chekiang and Kwangtung. Nothing
was accomplished, while hardships befell us more and
more. As we grew to understand each other more day by
day we could hardly distinguish which was I and which
were you. After that year calamity and trouble following
each other came to us: and a hundred unimaginable things
happened to us. Had we not been so intimate with one
another we could hardly have helped being separated by
our enemies. After the shattering defeat of the year of
Kwei Chu (1913) how many people were left who would
follow you wherever you went and never forsake you
from morning till evening?
‘Now that you are gone forever, who is there besides
myself to continue your work without changing the aim
you had originally in your mind? How about those who
used to flatter you when you were influential and tried
to get rid of and slander me? How about those who now
feel happy at your misfortune, and were jealous of you
and sarcastic to you? Are these people your true or false
friends? Are they right or wrong? I do not mind that
you believed their lies about me when you were living.
All I want is that I should have a clear conscience after
you are dead.
‘Alas! I had no chance to open my mind to you. The
91
treacherous found their opportunity and my good advice
was overlooked. The result was the present tragedy. Oh,
woeful and sorrowful is the day! From now on there will
be no one to teach me, encourage me, love me and help
me; to share my comfort, my risks, my happiness, my
hardships, my thoughts and my aspirations!
‘All is lost! When I feel such loneliness, what have I
to say? The path of the world is rugged, and the mind
of men is dangerous. When I look ahead, and when 1
reflect on the past, I shudder but can do nothing. Your
parents, with their grey hair, are still living, while your
children are still young and have barely left the arms of
their mother. I shall look after the elderly people and sup-
port the young ones and shall always keep you in my
thoughts.
‘Oh, you Spirit! If you are here, do come and partake
of my offerings.’
This valuable document is most illuminating. It shows
what a true and loyal friend Chiang Kai-Shek is. His
devotion to his deceased friend is really touching. As the
years went by, it was proved that Chiang kept his promise
to the letter. Chen Chi-Mei’s two able nephews, Chen
Kuo-Fu and Chen Li-Fu, are to this day Chiang Kai-Shek’s
most trusted as'sociates.
Yet by examining the elegy carefully it can be seen that
Chiang indicated that Chen had been acting against his
good counsel in the later days. Had he listened to
Chiang’s advice it seems probable that Chen would not
have been lured into a death-trap. Although there had
been this slightly jarring note in their great friendship
Chiang always speaks of his deceased friend in the highest
terms of esteem. Once he wrote about friendship to Sun
Yat-Sen, whom he served with unbounded devotion, and
in the letter he candidly told Sun that although he served
him with the same devotion he had had for Chen, Sun did
92
not treat him as Chen did. After this frank discussion,
Sun soon remedied his negligence.
The death of Chen Chi-Mei was not only a great blow
to Chiang Kai-Shek, but also an irreparable loss to Sun
Yat-Sen and the Kuo Min Tang. Chen had always been
one of its most active and loyal supporters, and after May,
1916, Chiang Kai-Shek had to perform his duty to the
party single-handed, while hitherto he had always had the
guidance of his inseparable sworn-brother.
In June, 1916, Chiang was sent to Shantung, where
more than two divisions of revolutionary men had been
formed into what was called the Chinese Revolutionary
North-East Army, and responsible leaders were urgently
needed. Sun Yat-Sen ordered Chu Cheng, an old par-
tisan, to be Commander-in-Chief, and Chiang Kai-Shek
Chief-of-Staff. When Chiang arrived there he found
there was a chief Aide-de-Camp who had already taken
everything into his own hands. Without authority from
his superiors, he had reorganised the army into two divi-
sions and a brigade and had commissioned two Divisional-
Commanders and a Brigadier-General, as well as all the
other officers for the whole army from among his personal
friends. There was hardly any discipline in the army and
the men only knew that there was the Aide-de-Camp,
being hardly aware of the existence of the Commander-in-
Chief.
In spite of this, Chiang did his best to bring things into
order. To matters great and small he attended personally
and worked on undismayed, until Chu Cheng, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, thinking it utterly impossible to succeed
with such a thoroughly disorganised army and resigning
his post, left for Peking. It was then that Hsu Chung-
Chih, another faithful Kuo Min Tang supporter, was
appointed as acting Commander-in-Chief. The name of
Hsu Chung-Chih is mentioned here because during this
brief period he and Chiang worked together in perfect
93
harmony, and this marked the beginning of a long and
devoted friendship, which will be dealt with in the next
chapter.
When Hsu Chung-Chih took over the post of Com-
mander-in-Chief of this Chinese Revolutionary North-
East Army, he conferred with Chiang Kai-Shek about the
true condition of their army, and it was immediately
decided that the best course would be to recommend to
Sun Yat-Sen its dissolution. This was accordingly done,
and Chiang went to Peking to observe the political situa-
tion in the capital. There he stayed until the autumn,
when he returned to Shanghai once more.
With the death of Chen Chi-Mci ended Chiang Kai-
Shek’s activities in and around Shanghai. With his associa-
tion with Hsu Chung-Chih, Chiang started a new series
of military operations in the southern provinces of Kwang-
tung and Fu-Kien, following a very brief preliminary in
the Northern Province of Shantung.
94
IV
O NE dies, and a hundred difficulties are consequently
solved,’ says a Chinese proverb. When the whole
country was rising to denounce Yuan Shih-Kai and he was
most reluctant to go, his sudden death on June 6th, 1916,
seemed to be the best solution. And on the very next day
following his death, Vice-President Li, the Buddha, be-
came the President according to the Provisional Constitu-
tion. Everything seemed to proceed smoothly at first; Sun-
Yat-Sen sent a circular telegram to all the military leaders
asking them to withdraw their armies, and those provinces
which had declared their independence soon announced
its cancellation. Moreover, Sun Yat-Scn wired Li Yuan-
Hung, the new President, to ask him to respect the Con-
stitution and reassemble the Parliament. This Li Yuan-
Hung did immediately.
Although Yuan Shih-Kai was gone he had left behind
him his influence: the War Lords. As it has been pointed
out, many of his followers later on turned against him.
That means that many former followers of his remained
to be powerful after his death. Moreover, the Kuo Min
Tang, after having been persecuted by Yuan for years,
and after its repeated failures in its risings against Yuan,
was by then a very weak political party. Some members
had gone over to other parties and many had died. As for
the rest, only a small portion remained faithful to Sun
Yat-Sen, while a considerable portion had reorganised into
‘The Association for the Discussion of European Affairs,’
supporting a new leader whose name was Chen Chun-
Hsuan, and who was a Kwangsi man.
All the War Lords, most of whom had been Yuan Shih-
95
Kai’s subordinates or colleagues, modelled themselves
after their dead leader. They understood only one thing:
military strength; and they were most selfish and ruthless.
Li, the Buddha, was of course no match for them, yet he
had the two strongest of them at his door. Feng Kuo-
Chang, the Vice-President, and Tuan Chi-Jui, the Prime
Minister, had been Yuan’s most powerful supporters.
They considered the President quite superfluous, while
Li couldn’t take action without their consent or approval.
In the later part of 1916 and during the years immedi-
ately following, the whole country was in a state of chaos.
The Central Government in Peking existed in name only.
The Military Governors fought each other whenever
they liked, and whoever succeeded in driving away his
opponent was rewarded with his opponent’s territory and
possessions. Not only was the reassembled Parliament un-
lawfully dissolved in June, 1917, but also the abdicated
boy Emperor was restored for a few days in July, to be
driven away again by Tuan Chi-Jui and his associates.
Li Yuan-Hung was not wrongfully nicknamed the
Buddha; his rightful place should have been in a niche in
a temple. The general who restored Flenry Pu-Yi was
not so generous as Yuan Shih-Kai. Only a dukedom was
granted to Li, the Buddha, who, however, did not accept
the honour. When the Republic was established for the
third time after this brief Restoration they did not want
such an imbecile figure-head at all, and the Vice-President,
Feng Kuo-Chang, who had hitherto been the Military
Governor of the Kiangsu Province, succeeded him as
Acting President. The other War Lord, Tuan Chi-Jui,
however, remained Prime Minister, a post which he had
held four times before, once under Li, the Buddha, and
three times under Yuan Shih-Kai.
Immediately after the unlawful dissolution of the Parlia-
ment, Sun Yat-Sen, supported by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the Minister of the Navy— both were Kuo Min
Tang members and both left the Cabinet when the Parlia-
ment was dissolved— sailed to Canton with all the warships
of the First Fleet, and on July 22nd sent out a circular
telegram to the whole country to announce his determina-
tion to ‘Protect the Constitution’. In August there were
four Provinces which had declared their independence
from the Peking Government: Kweichow, Kwangtung,
Kwangsi and Szechuan; and the Members of Parliament
who left Peking to come to Canton numbered a hundred
and thirty strong.
An Emergency Meeting was held by the Members of
Parliament in Canton on August 25th, and Sun Yat-Sen
was elected Generalissimo of the Chinese Army and Navy,
and head of a new Government which was in opposition
to the one in Peking.
Although Chiang Kai-Shek was at the time in Shanghai,
he sent on September 20th to the new Government in
Canton a carefully worked-out plan for a proposed
Northern Punitive Expedition. First he analysed the
military strength of the enemy, the armies under Tuan
Chi-Jui and Feng Kuo-Chang, and then gave a rough esti-
mate of generals and their forces in the South whom Sun
might hope to muster under him. Next he mapped out
the expedition route to be followed, and suggested that
the plan should be carried out in two steps: the first step
was to tackle, together with the Navy, the Provinces south
of the Yangtze River, and the second step was, after the
occupation of all the territories along the Yangtze River,
to reinforce themselves with men and materials and to
proceed north, with Peking as the goal.
In such early days this plan sounded like a day-dream.
Nobody would have thought that in less than ten years
it would be put into operation successfully, with the man
who drafted it as Commander-in-Chief.
Ten days after he had submitted his first plan he pre-
sented a second one, on October ist. This time he was less
97
ambitious. It was a proposal for attacking the two Mari-
time Provinces immediately north-east of Kwangtung:
Fukien and Chekiang. Though it was a trifle premature,
it was not very long afterwards partially adopted, and
within a year Chiang Kai-Shek had the great pleasure of
seeing himself one of the sub-commanders of such an
expeditionary force.
It happened that most of Sun Yat-Sen’s collaborators
in Canton were Kwangsi men. After they had welcomed
him to form this new Government to protect the Con-
stitution, they found out very soon that they would like
him better if he could be persuaded to leave Canton and
that the farther he went the better.
In November, 1917, Sun Yat-Sen and other Cantonese
succeeded in organising a small Cantonese Army of
twenty battalions, and the command of this force was
given to Chen Chiung-Ming, of whom more will be
related later. Under him were two vice-commanders; one
was Hsu Chung-Chih who had been in Shantung with
Chiang Kai-Shek, and the other was Teng Keng. The
Kwangsi military leaders had allowed the formation of
this Cantonese Army on the express condition that it must
leave Canton on its Fukien expedition immediately.
On March 3rd, 1918, Chiang Kai-Shek left Shanghai for
Canton after he had received a telegram from Sun Yat-
Sen urging him to go south to join the newly-formed
army. When he arrived at Canton he spent several days
with Sun Yat-Sen in discussing political and military
matters. It was a precarious time for Sun and his
followers, for the Peking Government had sent out two
expeditionary forces, one into Hunan and the other into
Kianfi^si, both with Kwangtung as their objective. In
Canton itself considerable forces of Kwangsi troops were
stationed and they were decidedly hostile to Sun’s Can-
tonese Army. Chen Chiung-Ming, the Commander-in-
98
Chief of the army, had his headquarters in Swatow, a
coastal town near to Fukien, and more than two hundred
miles east of Canton. From Canton Chiang Kai-Shek went
to Swatow to see Chen Chiung-Ming and his Chief-of-
Staff Teng Keng, and on March 15th was given the post
of Head of the Field Operations Department.
As soon as he had taken up his job, Chiang set out for
a tour of the district where future operations were to take
place. First he went north-east to the coastal town of
Ung-Kung, about fifty miles away, where a detachment of
their forces was stationed, and then to the important town
of Chao-Chow, which is about twenty miles almost due
north of Swatow. From there he went towards the border
of Fukien, to Sam-Ho-Pa, their chief base of supply, a little
less than a hundred miles north of Chaochow. From Sam-
hopa he went farther north to Tsung-Kow, where the re-
serves were, and lastly to Chcn-Ping, about forty miles
north-west of Tsungkow, also very near to the Kwang-
tung-Fukien border. The tour lasted about two weeks.
In the Staff Conference held soon after his tour of
inspection Chiang proposed that, to facilitate their opera-
tions, the General Headquarters should be moved to the
small town of Samhopa, where the base of supply was.
This was opposed by everybody present, who would not
hear of leaving a big coastal town for a tiny place in the
interior and much nearer to their enemy. He had to
explain patiently to them that in the impending general
attack it would be an excellent place to concentrate their
forces, with the Southern coast as their right wing, and
their detachment forces in the North as the left wing,
his proposal was at last adopted.
In the beginning of May, he went to Tsunghow again
to make preparations for the attack, after which he re-
turned to Samhopa, where the Headquarters had now
moved. As their forces scattered over other parts of
Kwangtung might be easily wiped out by their potential
99
enemy, the Kwangsi troops, this general attack on Fukien
furnished a good excuse for moving them eastwards, to
be concentrated near the border. Hsu Chung-Chih, com-
manding officer of the left wing at Chenping, was the first
to force his way into Fukien, where he defeated the ist
Brigade of the Fukien Army and occupied the town of
Wu-Ping, about a hundred miles north of his original base.
From Wuping this detachment of the Cantonese Army,
after pausing a moment awaiting fresh supplies, turned
eastwards to form the left half of a pincer movement. In
a fortnight Hsu and his men occupied the town of Shang-
Hang, which is about forty miles away.
This initial good news of the Cantonese Army’s victory
was sadly counter-balanced by two pieces of bad news.
The first was that the Extraordinary Parliament at Canton,
under the influence of the Kwangsi leaders, had decided
to reorganise the Generalissimo’s Headquarters into a
formal Military Government, to be controlled by a Com-
mission of seven political directors. Sun Yat-Sen, instead
of being the head of the Organisation, was now elected
one of the seven. The elected Chairman of the Commis-
sion was Chen Chun-Hsuan, the leader of the Kwangsi
clique of the Kuo Min Tang, about whom mention was
made at the beginning of this chapter. The other news
was even worse. The Peking Government, having heard
of the organisation of the new Cantonese Army, had now
appointed Li Hou-Chi, Military Governor of Fukien, to
be the C^mmander-in-Chief to lead a joint force of
Chekiang and Fukien troops to attack Kwangtung. The
First Division of the Chekiang Army, whose commander
was Li Hou-Chi’s second in command, was rushing his
men south into Fukien.
At the end of May, Sun Yat-Sen left Canton for Sam-
hopa. Chiang Kai-Shek went to the quayside to meet
him and was deeply touched to see how worry had aged
his leader. Indeed, Sun looked so worn out that Chiang
lOO
shed tears of compassion. They had much to tell each
other, and though military affairs were quickly on the
move, and Chiang soon had to go out on duty, they talked
at Headquarters deep into the night. Chiang then went
north-eastwards to Tai-Pu,- a town about twenty miles
away, and from there he went twenty miles farther north
to Yung-Ting, a town inside the Fukien border. Men on
both sides were fighting hard for the place and Chiang’s
personal instructions to the Battalion Commander enabled
him to take this strategical point on the following morning.
Chiang found time to hurry back to Sun with the good
news, and Sun began to beam with joy when he heard
Chiang’s first-hand report. They continued to discuss
military defence measures until June ist, when Sun bade
him farewell and left for Shanghai.
The month of June was a month of setbacks. The right
wing, under the command of Teng Keng, lost the coastal
town of Ungking, and within three days Jao-Ping, a town
about twenty miles north of it, also fell to the enemy. As
Jaoping is not very far short of fifty miles south of Sam-
hopa, their Headquarters, the loss was very serious. The
enemy was now threatening their central and main
column. By the end of June the position of the Cantonese
Army was so precarious that Sun Yat-Sen sent them a tele-
gram from Shanghai, which can be interpreted as follows:
‘To Commander-in-Chief Chen Chiung-Ming and to be
forwarded to my Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek:
‘Chang Hwei-Chih’s large army has arrived in Kiangsi;
expected to attack Kwangtung soon. Also there is a
Northern Army of 2,000 men going to Swatow by sea
to be landed there to reinforce Lung. Li Hou-Chi’s
[Governor of Fukien] army in Fukien is increasing
rapidly. Several secret agencies of our party in Fukien
have been discovered and raided. Chao-ChowandKa-Ying
lOI
[about sixty miles north of Chaochow] are threatened
from north and east by Li and Chang. No defence will
be possible along the coast. We are surrounded on three
sides and our position is extremely dangerous. If we could
risk an attack now, we still have hopes of survival, other-
wise we are sure to be besieged. To defend by attacking
raises our morale, inspires support and disheartens foe. A
small advance would bring wonderful results; otherwise
we shall lose the confidence of our men, discourage our
supporters and bring up the enemy’s morale. Our men
must win the battle as they cannot afford to lose; the
ground we occupy is only good for advance, but no good
for retreat. We’ll not survive a defeat. Hoping all my
Elder Brothers consider this quickly,
'Sun Yat-Sen.’
In the beginning of July the Cantonese Anny was still
withdrawing to shorten its defence line. Chiang Kai-Shek
saw that the original plan was no good and offered a
revised plan of operations. It was a detailed plan of six
thousand words and there were many drastic measures in
it. Such a plan easily frightened the Commanders. It was
not adopted, and before the end of the month came, Taipu,
their last stronghold just before their Headquarters in
Samhopa, passed into the enemy’s hands after they had lost
Yungting. The central column now fell back on Sam-
hopa. As all the officers and men were at a loss to decide
what to do, Chen Chiung-Ming gave Chiang Kai-Shek
full power to act in order to save the situation.
That marked the turning of the tide. In the beginning
of August, Taipu was recaptured and then Yungting. Hsu
Chung-Chih and his men in the left wing also counter-
attacked and recaptured Shanghang. At the end of the
month, thanks to Chiang’s command, the Cantonese Army
was more than fifty miles inside Fukien, their left wing
having occupied Lung-Yen, east and slightly north of
102
Shanghang, and their right wing having occupied the im-
portant prefecture city of Chang-Chow, very near to the
coastal town of Amoy.
Thirteen years after this battle, Chiang reviewed his
plans of operation. Here is what he wrote, having studied
them again after this long interval:
‘At that time I was the head of Field Operations Depart-
ment of the Cantonese Army and had drafted operation
plans for the expedition. The first stage of operations
started with our main force advancing from the left: from
Chenping and Tsungkow to attack Shanghang and Yung-
ting. It was to press the enemy from mountainous ground
on the left side to the right side towards the coast and also
to threaten his supply base behind him.
‘Before we started, we decided to move the Head-
quarters of the Cantonese Army to Samhopa. At the time
when the left wing occupied Shanghang and Yungting, it
advanced rapidly, as if a knife were splitting bamboos.
But the right wing lost Ungking, and had even given up
Swatow. I had to wire Teng Keng to stop him, and per-
suaded him to return quickly to Swatow.
‘Just as I thought, the enemy did not dare to enter
Swatow, and thus the base of the Cantonese was luckily
saved. Then men from the left wing were shifted to rein-
force the right wing. But our left wing was unexpectedly
counter-attacked by the enemy and Yungting fell into his
hands. So I drafted the revised plan for the second stage
of operations at a time before Taipu was lost, hoping to
concentrate our strength in the right wing for an attack.
‘It happened that Taipu was lost at this lime, and the
enemy was approaching Samhopa, while all those at Head-
quarters were preparing to withdraw and then Chen
Chiung-Ming found his hands as good as tied, not know-
ing what to do. I forced them not to retreat and altered
the plan of operations. The main forces of the right wing
103
were immediately shifted to the centre to launch a
counter-attack on Taipu. For three days and three nights
I did not sleep, and went to the front to give instructions.
Luckily the battle brought us a decisive victory, but it
also made the other officers jealous of me. When I reflect
on it to-day, I still feel the pain remain in my heart.
‘May, 1931.’
Chiang Kai-Shek’s personal attendance at the front had
proved a great asset to the Cantonese Army. In all the im-
portant battles during these two last months it was always
he who went forward to supervise personally the emplace-
ment of guns, after which they never failed to hit their
targets. People began to think that he was almost a
god, but he merely said that he had been trained in the
artillery.
The month of September brought in some important
changes. In the Peking Government Feng Kuo-Chang’s
term as acting President ended, and PIsu Shih-Chang, also
a close friend of the late Yuan Shih-Kai, was elected to
fill his place. Tuan Chi-Jui, who had been called back to
the office of Prime Minister for the sixth time by Feng
Kuo-Chang in March, after his resignation in the previous
November, resigned for the last time. As Shu was a
civilian while Tuan was a soldier, this change considerably
altered the attitude of the Northern Government, which
had been always very militant towards the South.
Another great change happened in Russia. Imperial
Russia was by now gone forever, and in her place sprang
up the Bolsheviki. At a time when all the other nations
in the world looked upon Lenin with hostile eyes. Sun
Yat-Sen was one of the first to send him a cable of con-
gratulation on the success of the Revolution. This was a
memorable event in the history of Sino-Russian relations.
But the change in the Cantonese Army which was fight-
104
ing in Fukien Province concerns the reader most. Hsu
Chung-Chih, who had been doing remarkably well when
leading the 2nd Detachment of the Cantonese Army, was
now promoted to be the Commanding Officer of the
Second Army of Cantonese Forces. This was because,
with the reorganisation of their men and the prisoners who
joined them, the original Cantonese Army had to be ex-
tended into two armies. Who could be more suitable to
fill the vacancy left by Hsu Chung-Chih than his good
friend Chiang Kai-Shek? On September 26th, 1918,
Chiang was made Commander of the Second Detachment,
which consisted of four battalions, roughly a little more
than a thousand officers and men. Though it was a small
force, it was well-seasoned, for Hsu had led it through
many defeats, but through many more victories. The
Headquarters of this Command was situated at Chang-Tai,
a city about ten miles north of Changchow, on the other
side of the Kui-Lung River,
The condition of the Cantonese Forces in Southern
Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung at the time when Chiang
Kai-Shek was given the command of the Second Detach-
ment can be gathered from a letter written to Sun Yat-
Sen by Shao Yuan-Chung on October ist, 1918. Shao
was a veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang, and became
later on the chief compiler of the Party History. Flis
loyalty to Sun and Chiang was well known. He was the
only important official who was killed in the cotip (Tetat
at Sian in December, 1936.
Shao reported that he arrived at Changchow in late
September. Chen Chiung-Ming he met at Headquarters,
and learnt that Hsu Chung-Chih was directing operations
at the front and Chiang Kai-Shek was at Charigtai prepar-
ing troops to reinforce Hsu’s men. Shao then told Sun
about his visit to Hsu at the front on the preceding day
when he had given to Hsu both Sun’s letter and message. ‘I
told him,’ the letter went on, ‘that the reason why our
105
party could not put into practice our principles was that
we had no military strength, nor a place for a base. Now
our only hope was either Fukien or Szechuan, where our
comrades were fighting, especially Fukien with its coast.
If the latter came into the possession of our party, it would
enormously help our diplomatic relations and also our
intercourse with overseas comrades. We must form our
plans very carefully, protect our gains desperately, never
letting them go again easily.
‘Hsu Chung-Chih told me,’ Shao continued, ‘that the
greatest difficulty we suffered in this war was lack of arms.
Luckily since the beginning of hostilities we had captured
altogether from the enemy more than two thousand rifles
and several million cartridges. So at present what we were
using were once entirely the Northern Army’s property.
He hoped that you would contrive to buy more ammuni-
tions.’ Shao reported that Hsu also had captured nearly
two thousand men, and Chen more than a thousand. With
sixteen battalions at the front, FIsu Chung-Chih was wait-
ing for the arrival of sufficient ammunition for a decisive
battle. He added that of the captured cartridges only
those of suitable size could be used, while the others had
to be sent to Taipu, where a factory had been erected to
remake them, and a large supply of such products was
expected to arrive any day.
The last part of this long letter was as follows: ‘Both
Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-Chih were unable to
write to you personally because they were at the front,
so they have asked me to write this to you. I have nothing
to do here because Chen Chiung-Ming has a very mixed
staff under him. Moreover he has no organisation. Every
clerk is directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief.
Everything goes on in its own way, there is no co-ordina-
tion. A newcomer could not help him at all. So I will wait
until Hsu Chung-Chih has solved his problem at the front
and is going to the Provincial Capital, where I can help
io6
him, as we suit each other better. At present I have to stay
at Chen Chiung-Ming’s place temporarily. If you have
any instructions for Hsu Chung-Chih, Chiang Kai-Shek
or me, please get Chu Ta-Fu to write to me and Til pass
them on.’
No comment is needed upon this document, but the
remarks about Chen Chiung-Aiing in the last part of the
letter were an early indication of the important develop-
ment which was to come.
Hsu Chung-Chih’s subsequent bid to take Foo-Chow,
the provincial capital, very nearly succeeded. It fell short
in its last stage, and he had to be content with his progress
so far. In November his Headquarters were at Sien-Yu,
about eighty miles from Foochow. This is roughly half-
way between Changchow and Foochow. Chiang Kai-
Shek and his detachment also fought northwards, and after
he had met and conferred with Hsu Chung-Chih at Sienyu
towards the end of November, he decided in December
to attack Yung-Tai, a strategical town about fifty miles
north of Sienyu and forty miles south of Foochow.
The December weather in this part of China was tricky,
and Chiang Kai-Shek, unaccustomed to the Fukien
climate, fell ill. A4any of his men were in the same
condition. However, they managed to forge ahead and,
chasing their enemy all the time, arrived outside the city
of Yungtai on December yth. It was at this juncture that
Chiang Kai-Shek received the order to cease fire from
his Commander-in-Chief. He was heartbroken, and ex-
claimed that with a small army deep in the enemy’s terri-
tory he and his men had suffered innumerable hardships
and a third of them were ill, while dead and wounded
were scattered everywhere; how could he have the heart
to stop when success was assured!
Chiang Kai-Shek recorded this battle fairly in detail
when he had a little time to spare early the following year.
He described his difficult progress during the first fort-
107
night, when he and his men had advanced about seven
hundred li along a zigzag and rugged road and succeeded
in getting into communication with Hsu Chung-Chih’s
Army once more. They encamped on the night of the
7th a few miles away from the city of Yungtai, their
encampment being opposite that of their enemy.
‘On the 8th, at dawn,’ continues the record, ‘we renewed
our attack. The Northern Army, after having resisted for
a few hours, saw that they could not hold out any longer.
So they retreated again to make a last stand on a piece
of high ground very near to the city of Yungtai, and there
they defended this strategical position. My detachment
followed in their wake, attacking all the time, and reached
the city. Commander Chu’s men tackled the enemy’s
front. Commander Liang’s men his right side and the
Fukien People’s Army, to help us, went around to attack
his left side. Besieging and assaulting our enemy on three
sides, we advanced as if a knife were slitting bamboos.
When the enemy realised his hopeless position, he retreated
late on the 8th, making good his escape by night, but in
disorder. The Cantonese Army, on the same night, went
into the city to restore order.’
Chiang went on to say that both Commander Liang and
Commander Chu, leading their men, continued to chase
and attack the enemy to a place only sixty li from the pro-
vincial capital, which they could easily have captured had
they not been stopped by the order to cease fire. The
record says: ‘Since the order had arrived, we could not
plan to advance. According to instructions received, we
stayed in our positions to show good faith on our part.
In the meantime I sent an official letter to Li Hou-Chi
[the Military Governor of Fukien] to tell him of the
cease fire order and ask him whether he would observe it
exactly like the Cantonese Army and remain in his posi-
tion.
‘In Li’s reply he promised unreservedly to agree to what
108
I said, and even added: ‘‘I have already wired to Changf-
chow to negotiate direct with Commander-in-Chief
Chen/’ The Cantonese Army, thinking that since the
enemy had agreed to a truce they could go back and re-
main at their position, did not take advantage of their
recent victory to attack the provincial capital. While
they on their part acted in good faith, Li acted utterly
without honesty and showed no regard for his promise.
Taking advantage of the cease fire order, which had
slowed down our advance, he secretly ordered his men
to counter-attack us on the 15th.’
Chiang Kai-Shek said that Li was secretly in touch with
one of the Fukien Brigadiers who had previously sur-
rendered with his men and sworn allegiance to the
Cantonese Army, and that Li succeeded in persuading this
Brigadier to change sides again. With five thousand
infantrymen and a battalion of artillery gathered from the
vicinity of Foochow, the Brigadier marched stealthily
towards Yungtai. ‘Burning houses and murdering inno-
cent people all the way merely to give vent to his venge-
ance and to fan his anger, he attacked with all his strength
on our detachment of about a thousand men. Our front-
line defenders were luckily not caught unawares, and
resisted the intruders determinedly until the afternoon. I
realised that we had been deceived when Liang and Chu
and other sections withdrew without my orders. At about
4 p.m., the enemy’s bullets came heavily into the city and
I knew there were hardly any men left at the front. When
the enemy had forced his way into the city, I had to fight
my way out by myself.’ Chiang’s conclusion was that
he had learnt a bitter lesson from this costly experience:
a small solitary army fighting deep in the enemy’s regions
must never stop short before reaching the final stage of
its operational plan; he had also learnt never to expect a
treacherous enemy to keep his promise.
Soon after this forced retreat, Chiang received a letter
109
from his Commander-in-Chief in reply to Chiang’s com-
plaint about this matter. Unfortunately Chiang's letter
to Chen Chiung-Ming has been lost, but the answer throws
some light on the situation at that time:
‘To Commander Chiang Kai-Shek—
‘I have received your letter and am very grateful to you
for your concern about the general situation and your
attention to military affairs. As to those which have to
be improved and prepared immediately, I will do as you
suggest; but those which are difficult to put into practice
at present will have to be left until the general situation
becomes slightly better . . .
‘As for the failure to reach our destination during this
campaign, it was not because of your mismanagement nor
of the soldiers’ inefficiency. It had a variety of important
reasons: fighting had nothing to do with it.
‘Though we have to retreat for the time being, that is
doing no harm to our reputation, nor does it influence our
situation. On the contrary, with such an experience we
shall be profited in the future. It is indeed no loss, and
I hope you will not bear in mind a little victory or failure.
Moreover, our army had already occupied Yungtai and
was near to and threatening Foochow. Both the Northern
and Southern Governments know that we withdrew
because we had been deceived. Nobody can regard it
as a failure. In short, what really matters to us does not
depend upon our victory or failure in this Fukien cam-
paign of to-day. It entirely depends on whether we can
succeed is converging and nursing our strength for future
use. That will be the day when you can do so much for
your country, your party and your friends, while to-day
is of no consequence . .
Chen Chiung-Ming wrote this on January 15th, 1919.
From this letter it can be seen that the Commander-in-
1 10
Chief had something up his sleeve, and he had to do his
best to coax his subordinates to remain silent.
It will be remembered that the European war ended in
November, 1918, and the Peking Government, with Hsu
Shih-Chang newly elected as the President, tried to get rid
of the Southern Government in a peaceful way. Follow-
ing the truce in Fukien, peace delegates from the Northern
and Southern Governments met in Shanghai, but the gap
was too wide and both sides held out. In 1919 at the Peace
Conference, China, represented by a delegation from the
Peking Government, was expected to hand over part of
Shantung to Japan because at the beginning of the war
Japan had wrested it from Germany. As China was also
one of the victorious Allies, such an unfair proposal at
once aroused the indignation of the people everywhere in
the country. At a mass meeting in Peking on May 4th,
the students led a demonstration against the Government,
and when some of these students were arrested the whole
country started strikes and other forms of protest to show
that public opinion was entirely against the Government’s
secret diplomacy. Sun Yat-Sen now declared that the old
Parliament ought to be reassembled. If that was done it
would mean the dissolution of the Peking Government
altogether. So the peace talks in Shanghai reached a
deadlock.
The refusal of China to sign the Peace Treaty in Paris
did not have any effect in Europe. All the other nations,
ignoring the protest of China, did what they liked or what
they were told to do. People say that so long as there is
general agreement, minor differences can be ignored. In
China, although agreement between the Northern and
Southern Governments could not be reached, the Can-
tonese and Fukien armies found that they could conclude
a partial peace in their provinces. Chen Chiung-Ming,
Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army, and Li
III E
Hou-Chi, Military Governor of Fukien, found that the
general disagreement could be ignored so long as the two
of them could arrive at partial agreement.
This gave Chiang Kai-Shek a moment of respite. Early
in 1919 he obtained leave to go home to see his mother,
and also to spend some time with Sun Yat-Sen, who was
still an exile in Shanghai. When the Cantonese Army was
not fighting, Chiang, finding his services not required, re-
signed so that he was free to travel about for a little. He
even thought that his Second Detachment could be
abolished, so as to save money. He wrote two long letters
to Teng Keng, who was the Chief-of-Staff in the Can-
tonese Army, to give his reasons for his resignation. He
knew that Chen Chiung-Ming would not let him go, so
he appealed to Teng Keng, who was more sympathetic.
From Shanghai he went to Japan and stayed there for a
few weeks to visit a number of friends.
By this time Chen Chiung-Ming had reorganised the
Cantonese Army into a force of more than ten brigades,
and had appointed a number of his personal friends as
Brigadiers and Regimental Commanders without due con-
sideration of their military merits. It became obvious that
he didn’t like Hsu Chung-Chih, who with Chiang Kai-
Shek had played the most important part in the Fukien
campaign. Chen Chiung-Ming, however, seemed to value
Chiang Kai-Shek’s services very highly. Once he wrote
that he would rather lose a hundred battles than lose one
Chiang Kai-Shek. In December, 1919, he sent a special
messenger to Shanghai to meet Chiang on his return from
Japan and to urge him to join the Cantonese Army again.
In the letter which the messenger took to Chiang, Chen
said that single-handed he was utterly unable to do what
he wanted, and was hoping anxiously for Chiang’s return
to Changchow to assist him. Chiang’s return, he said,
would at least rejuvenate a part of the Cantonese Army,
and in due course get it extended to become the main body
of his force for the protection and development of the
place which it occupied. The last part of the letter was a
threat, which threat he did not carry out:
. If you, my Elder Brother [meaning Chiang Kai-
Shek], will come, we’ll be able to re-form the Cantonese
x\rmy and, in the near future, a great and everlasting
foundation can be built in Fukien. Otherwise I, because
of the lack of capable men ready to co-operate with me,
will find it impossible to do my duty to the country. And
then the only course left open to me will be to try and
preserve my integrity by myself in retirement and
obscurity. I cannot tell you in this letter all I want to
say, which will be conveyed to you in person by the
messenger. Wishing you well in your temporary
residence, your younger brother Chen Chiung-Ming.
December 5th.’
Even such a letter did not produce an immediate effect.
Though Chiang Kai-Shek visited Chen Chiung-Ming’s
headquarters several times, he did not really join the
Army again until Sun Yat-Sen and a number of his old
friends urged him to do so in September, 1920. Sun Yat-
Sen, who had been more or less pushed out of Canton by
the Kwangsi War Lords, very much wanted Chen Chiung-
Ming to fight back to Canton. Now that the Cantonese
Army had concluded a temporary peace treaty with the
Military Governor of Fukien, who would help Chen
Chiung-Ming with ammunition if he would attack the
Kwangsi troops. Sun Yat-Sen thought that Chen Chiung-
Ming would need but little persuasion from him. But
Chen Chiung-Ming was biding his time. As he had said
to Chiang Kai-Shek, he wanted to build a great and solid
foundation first. Indeed, he would have remained inactive
had it not been that the Kwangsi War Lords in Canton,
finding that the Northern Armies were themselves busily
occupied in fighting and would not be able to come south
for some time, took the opportunity to prepare an all-out
drive eastwards to annihilate the Cantonese Army. It was
only then that Chen Chiung-Ming acted; he was not really
obeying the orders of Sun Yat-Sen.
In September, Chu Ta-Fu, the classical scholar who was
a trusted follower of Sun Yat-Sen as well as a good friend
of Chiang Kai-Shek, succeeded in persuading the men in
the Humen Fort at the mouth of Pearl River to declare
their independence from the military authorities in Canton.
The Humen Fort is very near to Canton and occupies a
strategically important position in the water route to
Hongkong. The Kwangsi War Lords did their utmost,
and finally succeeded in getting the soldiers in the Fort
to change sides once more. Chu Ta-Fu, who was in the
Fort, was therefore murdered by the soldiers whom he
thought were still on his side.
This treacherous act hastened Chiang’s decision. He
left Shanghai immediately, first going to Hongkong,
where Chu Ta-Fu’s coffin was, to pay homage to his dead
friend. After that he sailed to Swatow to present his plan
of operations for the Canton Campaign. His good friend
Hsu Chung-Chih, leading the Second Army, was fighting
in the North to form the right wing, and on November 6th
Chiang Kai-Shek was at the front with Hsu Chung-Chih’s
men going into action. FIsu was overjoyed to hear that
Chiang was with him, and at once telegraphed Chiang to
join him. Ten days after Chiang’s arrival at the front,
Hsu’s troops occupied Ho-Yun, an important city a little
more than a hundred miles north-east of Canton. It was
then when the two friends met again, and they spent a
whole day together discussing plans for the campaign. On
the following day Chiang presented a second plan of
operations, and within a week the Cantonese Army
attacked and took the stronghold of Wai-Chow, a city
which later on became very famous because Chen Chiung-
Ming kept it as his headquarters for many years and it
withstood numerous determined attacks.
1 14
On October 24th, two days after the occupation of
Waichow, Chiang Kai-Shek drafted his third operational
plan, and on the same day the leader of the Kwangsi clique,
Chen Chun-Hsuan, sent out a circular telegram to say that
he was no longer the Head of the Military Government,
and fled to Shanghai. But that did not stop Chiang Kai-
Shek from carrying out his operational plan. There were
still large numbers of Kwangsi troops scattered about, and
the Cantonese Army proceeded in every direction in hot
pursuit of the enemy. Another two days afterwards the
Military leader of all the Kwangsi forces announced that
he was taking all his men back to the Province of Kwangsi,
leaving the affairs of the Kwangtung Province to be settled
by the Central Government in Peking.
This was the last sting he left behind to do some mis-
chief when the time came. Although there was still much
mopping-up fighting to be done, the whole of the Kwang-
tung Province became the property of the Cantonese
Army. Chiang Kai-Shek found his services unwanted, and
left Canton for Shanghai early in November. By now it
was no longer a secret that he could not work with Chen
Chiung-Ming.
His uncompromising spirit troubled Sun Yat-Sen. Just
before Chiang Kai-Shek went back to Shanghai he received
a letter from his leader asking him to try his best to co-
operate with Chen Chiung-Ming:
‘To my dear Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,
‘When my elder brother Chen Chiung-Ming fought
back to Canton, he was using all his strength to serve our
party and our country. We, on our part, are using all our
strength to help him. With only one aim and of only one
mind, our co-operation cannot be compared with any
ordinary temporary alliance. I do hope my elder brother
Chen Chiung-Ming will act as Huang Hsing did before
1912, and as Chen Chi-Mei did after 1913; and I trust him
exactly as I did Huang Hsing and Chen Chi-Mei at those
times. All I ask of him is that he will uphold my principles
and my policy, that is to obey my democratic faith for
which I have worked for these thirty years. Am I a tyrant
who is pleased only when obeyed blindly? You, my elder
brother, having worked with Chen Chi-Mei the longest,
should know how I trusted him. Please tell my elder
brother Chen Chiung-Ming what is in my mind.
‘The sudden and tragic death of Chu Ta-Fu is a loss to
me comparable to that of my right or left hand. When I
look among the members of our party I find very few who
are experts in war and also loyal. Only you, my elder
brother, are with us, you, whose courage and sincerity
are equal to those of Chu Ta-Fu, and your knowledge of
war is even better than his. But you have a very fiery
temper, and your hatred of mediocrity is too excessive.
And so it often leads to quarrelling and difficulty in co-
operating. As you are shouldering the great and heavy
responsibility of our party, you should sacrifice your high
ideals a fittle and try to compromise. This is merely for
the sake of our party and has nothing to do with your
personal principles. Would you, my elder brother, agree
with this? Or wouldn’t you?
‘Sun Yat-Sen.’
This letter from Sun Yat-Sen was not entirely without
effect. It stopped Chiang Kai-Shek from leaving Chen
Chiung-Ming for seven days. It was only when Canton
was occupied and Chen Chiung-Ming thought he had no
further use for Chiang so that he could wholly disregard
Chiang’s operational plans, that Chiang decided to go
away. In his farewell letter to the Commander-in-Chief
he said that it was time for him to retire when he found
he was neither trusted by his superiors nor obeyed by his
subordinates.
Regarding Chen’s abandonment of his operational plans,
1 16
Chiang was bitterly disappointed and hurt: ‘You, my Com-
niander-in-Chief, are an expert in strategy and also full of
experience; if you had not been ill-advised you would
never have done this; if you trusted me, you would never
have done this. Even if those who were marching forward
with their men at the front had a little common sense, they
would not have done this. They should have followed the
right direction and corrected the wrong one; that is the
way to help and co-operate. I cannot bear those whose
minds are full of jealousy and prejudice and those who
have no regard for the co-ordination of the whole plan,
nor any concern about the success or failure of the entire
campaign. I am straightforward and would rather die
fighting. I dare not act contrary to my conscience. I
came at your call this time really because of the death of
Chu Ta-Fu. That made me fight side by side with you
against one common enemy. Also because of the eternally
unsettled condition of the Province of Kwangtung, I
determined to sacrifice my own views to follow those of
others. I regarded it as my duty to our party. For the
sake of loyalty and public spirit, I came forward without
the least selfish thought . .
It made him very angry to realise that the best chance
of wiping out the enemy had been lost through not follow-
ing his instructions, on selfish grounds. Therefore he had
to act against the wishes of Sun Yat-Sen and go back at
once.
When Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at Shanghai he went
immediately to call upon Sun Yat-Sen, to explain his
failure to comply with his wishes, and to report the latest
condition in Kwangtung. Soon he found that he was not
the only one to leave Canton for Shanghai. Hsu Chung-
Chih had also found it impossible to work with Chen
Chiung-Ming and had followed in the wake of Chiang.
Now that the Kwangtung Province was clear of the
117
hostile army, Son Yat-Sen soon ended his exile by setting
out to Canton to resume his duty at the head of the
Military Government. He urged Chiang Kai-Shek and
Hsu Chung-Chih to go with him, but in vain. Chiang Kai-
Shek went back to his native province, while Hsu Chung-
Chih remained for some time in Shanghai.
Chiang Kai-Shek, with his fighting records of the
Fukien Campaign and his recent success against the
Kwangsi forces, had by now become generally known
as the best strategist in the Cantonese Army. His retire-
ment was considered a great loss to the cause of the party,
and numerous friends and comrades wrote appealing
letters, sent entreating telegrams, and even came in person
to his home to beg him to go out again. He was so deter-
mined not to compromise that he quarrelled with one of
his best friends, Tai Chi-Tao, also a veteran member of
the Kuo Min Tang and a devoted follower of Sun Yat-
Sen.
In the last days of 1920, Tai Chi-Tao, who had also left
Canton and Chen Chiung-Ming because of some differ-
ence of opinion, thought that the time was opportune for
them both to go back to Canton and help Sun Yat-Sen,
and came to Chiang Kai-Shek’s home to persuade him to
change his mind. No description of the meeting is avail-
able, but the correspondence between them following this
meeting is most revealing. As the letters are of great
interest in more ways than one, they are translated and
quoted at length here. The first letter is dated January 5th,
1921. It is a comparatively short apologetic note from
Chiang Kai-Shek to Tai Chi-Tao:
‘The other day, when the trouble started, you, my Elder
Brother, seemed to me to be very stern both in your voice
and colour: I could not get a word in edgeways, and so felt
it unbearable. You, my Elder Brother, have always had a
great affection for me, that I know. Generally, whenever
118
you have persuaded me to do or dissuaded me from doing
something, I have never failed to follow your advice.
‘But I have a bad temper and am usually lacking in good
manners. When I think that I am over-patient with you,
my Elder Brother, after having had enough of your anger,
I become unconsciously rude, bursting out all at once. At
a time when we are enduring the same hardships, and vow-
ing that we shall face good or bad fortune unflinchingly
together, I feel most ashamed of myself after careful reflec-
tion. I know myself that I have been ridiculous. When a
man has been so lacking in self-control and so rude, how
can he have the face to see his good teacher and beneficial
friend again? So I enclose a copy of Marquis Tseng’s
letter to his younger brother, reproaching him about his
quarrel with a friend, which I think could be used with
great profit as a mirror for both of us. If our friendship
is going to be still improved after this, then it is a blessing
in disguise. I do hope you will forgive my misbehaviour
and never be stingy in giving me your instructions, which
I shall consider I am most lucky to receive.’
To this letter Tai Chi-Tao answered as follows:
‘My dear Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,
‘I have read your kind letter. On that day I do not
know myself how it happened that I offended you, my
Elder Brother. For you, my Elder Brother, I have nothing
except a heart full of sincerity. Even my persuasions for
you to go to Canton were prompted half by duty and half
by my concern for your personal advantage. When I met
with your fury without apparent reason, I felt most de-
jected. I blamed myself for messing things up, and my
heart was still aching when I was sailing home in my
boat . . .
‘Your sphere of work, my Elder Brother, is active
service of a responsible nature. To shut your gates and
1 19 B*
live inside your home is to care for nobody but yourself.
The other day you said: “To urge me to go out and work
is to urge me to shorten my life.” When I heard this re-
mark, I felt sore ; because I myself was actually worried
at the thought. The old proverb says: “Rivers and moun-
tains change, but men’s nature doesn’t.” You, my Elder
Brother, are extremely self-willed to an almost incorrigible
extent. Whenever you are disappointed at some trifle, you
let your anger go unchecked. In dealing with people in
that way, you run the grave danger of courting calamity ;
or at least you will find it most damaging to your career.
‘The present day is quite different from ancient times.
Where could be found a minister of remonstrance who
looks after everything you do from day to day? Even if
there was such a man, how could he be certain that you
would follow his advice? When a man has left his home
ten thousand H behind him and is shouldering the responsi-
bility of affairs of State, anything the least expected ma^'
happen to him. If you, my Elder Brother, cannot bear
things with fortitude and hold firm, setting your mind on
the way of the golden mean and peacefulness, and reflect-
ing on these things three times a day, how can I, who am
not without affection for you, dare to persuade you to go
out and work? During the recent years I have desperately
and repeatedly urged you to go to Kwangtung, and 1
believe 1 loved you much that I did so. But the other day
when I heard what you said, and on which I reflected once
and again, the result was that I dare not urge you any
longer. That was also because I loved you much. Your
letter indicates that I was angry with you. I have nothing
but love for you. That love may take the form of heart-
ache but never anger. As for my advice to you, patience
and fortitude, the way of the golden mean and peaceful-
ness, these are the proper ways of conduct even if you are
going to stay at home; to members of your family and
your servants, your townsmen and friends, you must all
120
the more control your temper, never using a harsh word
when things happen contrary to your wish , , .
‘You, my Elder Brother, must reflect that the work of
the Master [meaning Sun Yat-Sen] is going steadily to-
wards success. From the day when he started the Revolu-
tion, the progress of the spreading of his principles in
China has probably been quicker than that of any revolu-
tionary doctrines of other nations. Now, what is the
Master’s strong point? Both Chang Ching-Kiang and I,
your younger brother, think faithfulness, kindness and
peacefulness are his important strong points. We have
never seen the Master do to others what he would not like
done to himself, nor bear enmity towards someone who
has offended him personally. And his dislike of putting
people to death cannot be equalled by anybody in the
political world in this or any other country. The way of
the golden mean and peacefulness are probably in his
nature. As for the greatness of his wisdom, knowledge
and thought, they are his ways and means of cultivating
the greatness of his character: they are not part of his
character.
‘Many of us spend most of our time with him, but not
many can see and appreciate this, and indeed few could
follow his example in it. Chu Ta-Fu was an outstanding
character among us, but he was fundamentally different
from the Master in this. I, your younger brother, can see
and appreciate it immensely, but could not attain one tenth
of the Master’s virtue and fortitude. Not that I do not
wish to follow his example; I really have not got it in my
nature. But I do wish that I and you, my Elder Brother,
will endeavour to follow his example.
‘To-day I have received a letter from Chu Cheng to say
that the Master has sent yet another telegram to urge you
to go to him. Hu Han-Min has written three times to give
you his best wishes. That shows great affection for you,
not wishing you harm, and you must not neglect nor for-
I2I
get it. This letter cannot express adequately my feelings, I
only ask you to forgive my simpleness and give heed to
what I said.
Tour Younger Brother, Tai Chi-Tao. January 14th.’
On January 20th, Chiang Kai-Shek wrote an equally
long letter:
‘In your instructions of the 14th, every word is moving
and powerful. After reading it, I was on the verge of
tears, and didn’t know what to think. There are in it one
or two phrases which seem to be scolding me, but still they
are a good warning to me. I think the best thing about the
Master’s friendship is his straightforwardness. People
respect his dignity and are grateful for his kindness. That
of Chang Ching-Kiang is that he never utters a sarcastic
word. People who have offended him would thus feel
ashamed of themselves.
‘You, my Elder Brother, are expecting too much from
your friends; also you are too sharp in your reproach and
not generous enough; that is where you cannot quite reach
the height of the Master and Chang Ching-Kiang. But
for me, so great is your love and so deep is your concern
that our friendship far surpasses that which the Alaster or
Chang Ching-Kiang has for me. Although I treat you as
my fearful friend and beneficial teacher, my respect and
fear for you have never reached those I have for the
Master and Chang Ching-Kiang. That is because our age
is about the same, and we have been too familiar for so
long and so I am quite used to your reproaches. Also it
is largely due to your marked prejudice and sentimentality
and the sharpness of your words.
‘In Kwangtung Province there is a trend by itself, and
a man like the Master, who treats people with sincerity,
could not be found. The complications of the situation
there, my Elder Brother, you could not comprehend. As
122
for their treatment of me, they throw me over when they
don’t need me and beckon me to go back when they do.
How can I bear such kind of treatment? Am I too narrow-
minded? Perhaps. Although we shouldn’t feel swelled-
headed, neither should we consider ourselves as dirt. To
be snobbish, so as to frequent the doors of those who are
in power? To be greedy for position so as to ask for pity
from those heartless acquaintances? Would that be the
proper thing for us to do who want all the comrades to
hold up their heads?
‘You, my Elder 13rother, once told me that Chen Chi-
Mei was jealous of you, and so you two did not get on
well. You would not like to translate Japanese things for
him. If someone had forced you to work with Chen Chi-
Mei, I know you would have protested and thought it
would not do. To-day your forcing me to work with
Chen Chiung-Ming is exactly the same. Aren’t you strict
with others, whilst being generous with yourself? Should
we change places, you would hardly know what to think.
Therefore I ask you, my Elder Brother, to forgive me as
much as you can.
‘In your letter it is said that I considered your urging
me to go out and work was to urge me to shorten my life.
This is a mistake, or a misunderstanding. I only said that
I had a bad temper, unsuitable for society; I must leave
my friends, to live alone in the mountains or wilderness,
in which case perhaps I might live longer. I said this be-
cause I, remembering your constant advice, blamed my-
self for offending people on account of my temper, and
not blaming you for urging me. I only feared the con-
sequences of my going. I did not say that I would never
go. In short, I do not wish to live selfishly in comfort and
ease, nor to separate myself from the world. Though it is
true that I fear people’s jealous tongues and want to avoid
people’s enmity, it is not true that I prefer to live cowardly
rather than to die courageously. Tasks which lead to a
123
dear-cut and fundamental solution I will undertake with
pleasure; work which lacks reality and will not produce
any effect I decline to do.
‘The trouble with me in society is that I go to extremes.
I have lifelong sworn fast friends but no ordinary boon
companions or social acquaintances. The same principle
apphes to my words as well as to my actions. This nature
of mine never changes, as the old proverb says, while rivers
and mountains may do so. Instruction from my old pals
and advice from my friends are as welcome to me as re-
freshing songs sung by birds: I am only too anxious to hear
them. You help my work and improve my knowledge,
for which I value you, but these are of secondary import-
ance to me. To supervise and reproach me frankly and to
lead me to the right constantly and forcibly; these are the
things for which I could not be without you for a moment.
I’m sure you, my Elder Brother, will not be offended by
my bad manners, but will wish me to accomplish my work
one day. I hope you, my Elder Brother, will never be tired
of giving me advice, but be as exacting with me as the
Master or Chang Ching-Kiang. Then I may be able to
change my nature a little and enter the way of righteous-
ness. A man’s strong points and weaknesses are largely
formed from his environment; it is not utterly impossible
that his nature should change a little.
‘My going to Kwangtung is entirely dependent upon a
definite date for the mobilisation of the Cantonese Army
against the Kwangsi Province. I wonder whether I and
you, my Elder Brother, will be travelling together? The
fact that I have decided to take this trip to Canton
certainly shows that I respect other people’s opinions and
utterly disregard my own. My words carry so little
weight that I am most ashamed of myself. I enclose my
reply to the Master’s telegram; please glance over it.’
The telegram referred to was an answer to the fourth
124
telegram sent by Sun Yat-Sen within two months; it reads:
‘You, Sir, have arrived at Canton for fifty days, but not a
single order has been issued for mobilisation. That is why
I am writing. As soon as the day for starting the campaign
is fixed I will come to serve you without waiting for your
call. Signed, Chiang Kai-Shek.’
It is quite clear that Chiane Kai-Shek would no longer
work with Chen Chiung-Ming when he saw that Chen had
no wish to put the Kwangsi troops entirely out of action.
There is but one deduction from Chen’s attitude: he
wanted to make use of these troops himself secretly and
personally, and therefore he was not really serving Sun
Yat-Sen and the Kuo Min Tang. Unless Chen Chiung-
Ming agreed to fight the Kwangsi forces earnestly, by
which he would show he was not plotting against Sun
Yat-Sen, Chiang Kai-Shek would have nothing to do with
him.
Whether Sun Yat-Sen and his other followers did not
hold Chiang’s opinion about Chen Chiung-Ming at that
time, or whether they were anxious to compromise in
order to get a foothold in Kwangtung first, it is difficult
to say. But Sun Yat-Sen and the rest of the Kuo Min
Tang men seemed to be too ready to overlook Chen
Chiung-Ming’s dark intentions and all joined in urging
Chiang to co-operate. Had Chiang Kai-Shek refused to
work with Chen Chiung-Ming solely because the latter
was a potential enemy of the Kuo Min Tang, the issue
would have been a fundamental one and nobody would
have been able to urge him to compromise. But, as can be
seen, Chiang also had a personal dislike for Chen, just as
he always had such a dislike for all those whose characters
are questionable. As the case stood, those who had set
their minds to compromise with Chen Chiung-Ming had
ample reason to urge Chiang to forget his personal differ-
ence and work for the common cause. They were wrong;
125
but Chiang Kai-Shek’s position made him unable to insist
on the others taking his own view. The above exchange
of letters between Chiang Kai-Shek and Tai Chi-Tao has
made it fairly clear that it is very easy to overshadow a
great issue with a personal one.
Strong-willed as he was, Chiang Kai-Shek was finally
coaxed and forced to go to Canton. He did not entirely
believe that Chen had changed, but he had to go there to
find out whether there was a possibility that circumstances
could prevent Chen from playing the traitor. At this
critical moment, Chen Chiung-Ming sent him a telegram
entreating him to go back. Mere words did not matter
much, but the message informed him of practical steps
already taken, which seemed most reassuring. First it said
that preparations for the Kwangsi Campaign wxre now
completed. Secondly, that Hsu Chung-Chih, who had
already gone back to Canton, was to be appointed the
General Commanding Officer of the Campaign, ranking
second only to Chen himself, and the detailed distribution
of all the Cantonese forces for the Campaign was given.
Lastly, ‘the commanding officer of the central column and
main force could be entrusted to nobody else but you, my
Elder Brother. After we have conquered Kwangsi we will
be able to think of the Yangtze Valley. The future of the
Revolution is full of hope, and I entreat you earnestly to
come to Canton. Please answer me first.’ Though this
telegram was dated January 15th, 1921, it took several
days to reach Chiang Kai-Shek, who replied on the 21st
by a telegram as well as a long letter presenting an opera-
tional plan for the campaign.
In both messages, Chiang suggested that before plans
were made for the Yangtze Valley, Szechuan must be sub-
dued immediatelv after the conquest of Kw^angsi. The
entire force should be divided into four equal parts, two
for the Kwangsi Campaign, one for defence against
possible invasion by Northern troops from Hunan, and
126
the rest as reserves. He promised to come and help Chen
in a private capacity, and would not accept the official
position, for which he recommended a sectional com-
mander whom he knew Chen would trust.
Even after he had decided to join Chen Chiung-Ming
again, Chiang was most reluctant to go. This attitude is
bluntly stated in his letter to his old friend Chang Ching-
Kiang, another veteran member of the Kuo Min Tang, for
whom he had great respect as described in his second
letter to Tai Chi-Tao. Chiang Kai-Shek told Chang
Ching-Kiang: . . My going to Canton this time is
really forced by the Master’s orders. It is clearly known
that the place is not suitable for me to stay long, that the
work is utterly impossible for our party to carry out, yet
I am unreasonably made to follow them. This is indeed a
most unfortunate thing which preys on my mind in-
cessantly, and so I dare to reveal it frankly to you . .
He. also asked Chang to tell Sun Yat-Sen that he was going
there ‘on a private and friendly visit, merely to help them
to supervise the operations of war, and could not accept
any official commission. Please send him a reply telegram
on my behalf, and put it in such a nice way as not to hurt
his feelings.’
At the same time Chiang Kai-Shek also presented a
three-year military plan to Sun Yat-Sen and all his other
colleagues. It was a rough scheme for building a founda-
tion to start the long hoped-for Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion, and was divided into nine sections. Section One deals
with general strategy. First they should attack Kwangsi
and next Szechuan. They should proceed from the West
and make peace on the East, maintaining friendly relations
with Fukien and Chekiang in order to gain their support
when marching northwards. Section Two is a project for
training and completing a well-prepared force of ten
divisions and fourteen ‘mixed brigades’, besides the stand-
ing armed men policing the south-western provinces
127
which were their base. A division is roughly a little more
than ten thousand men, while a ‘mixed brigade’ is slightly
less, but also complete in itself, just like a division with
Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers and Transport
troops.
Expeditionary routes are dealt with in Section Three.
One force starts from Szechuan towards Shensi; another
goes straight northwards via Hupeh along the Peking-
Hankow line; a third moves from the south-east to follow
the route of the Tientsin-Pukow railway, while a sea route
is to be taken by another force to attack Chin-Wan-Tao,
a coastal town about two hundred miles from Peking.
Section Four is devoted to the problem of Szechuan, and
Sections Five, Six and Seven deal with finance, army
system and diplomatic policy respectively. Section Eight
projects an arsenal which could produce a hundred rifles
a day, four field-guns a month, etc., while Section Nine
proposes the completion of the Hankow-Canton railway
within two years.
Subsequent events proved that this plan had not been
adopted. Though the Kwangsi campaign was carried out
swiftly and successfully according to the final operational
plan which Chiang Kai-Shek was going to Canton to pre-
pare very soon, drastic changes had to be made to meet
emergencies created by Chen Chiung-Ming. Not only
had the Northern Punitive Expedition to be abandoned
for a few years, but also Sun Yat-Sen and most of his loyal
followers had to flee to Shanghai, where they lived as
exiles once more, waiting for another chance to go back
to Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek’s disagreement with Chen
Chiung-Ming was sadly justified as shown in the next
chapter.
128
V
T rue to his promise, Chiang Kai-Shek went to Canton to
join Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming in February,
1921, and found the situation there even worse than he
had thought. It was in June, 1918, when Sun Yat-Sen had
to leave Canton to live in Shanghai as an exile and for two
and a half years Chen Chiung-Ming had been acting
independently. Chen Chiung-Ming had begun his career
as the hard-pressed commander of the newly-formed small
Cantonese Force which consisted of a few thousand men,
badly trained, badly equipped and badly paid, and had
been compelled to fight incessantly between two power-
ful enemies. Thanks to his friends Teng Keng, Hsu Chung-
Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek, this army was successful in
both of its campaigns, and by the beginning of 1921 he
had become the dominating personality in the South, with
a huge army of several divisions under his command.
Flaving been the despotic head of the army for so long,
he found the return of Sun Yat-Sen, who came as his over-
lord, quite unbearable.
Not only had success turned his head, but also his
friends and well-wishers— or people who professed to be
so— wanted him ‘to assert himself, as they cleverly put it.
The Peking Government wanted to get rid of Sun Yat-
Sen and his Kuo Min Tang, and if they could do so by
using Chen Chiung-Ming as their instrument they would
not concern themselves whether or not Chen Chiung-Ming
was actually one of their followers.
For years the Peking Government had had to respect
the ‘law of military natural selection’ which was very much
practised by the military governors all over the country.
129
These War Lords were actually independent of the Peking
Government, but seldom openly declared their independ-
ence. Should any of them become less powerful, or one
of their subordinates become more powerful than his
master, the master was always driven away by the new
War Lord. Obeying this law of military natural selection,
the Peking Government instantly conferred upon the
usurper titles and honours which his late master had hither-
to enjoyed, by issuing an official order praising him and
reproaching the defeated Governor. Peking had become
so dependable in obliging the latest usurper that he no
longer needed to appoint himself Governor or order his
henchmen to send to Peking a recommendation or petition.
In the case of Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming the
situation was slightly different. First of all, neither Sun
Yat-Sen nor Chen Chiung-Ming had been originally
appointed by Peking. But still, since Chen Chiung-Ming
had become so powerful, it would be a pity if Peking did
not avail themselves of this opportunity to promote the
popular law of ‘militaiy natural selection’ in Kwangtung.
Alter all, Peking was always obliged to confirm what had
already been accomplished; it would be very nice for them
to be original for once by promoting this natural selective
change of the head of the government in Canton.
Such was the position in Kwangtung after the Cantonese
Army had driven out the Kwangsi War Lords and when
Sun Yat-Sen had re-established his Military Government.
During the time when Chen Chiung-Ming was struggling
against heavy odds and therefore loyal to Sun Yat-Sen and
the Party, Chiang Kai-Shek and his friends helped him
with all their strength because they believed they were
fighting for a common cause. They had got on fairly well.
But when the outlook began to improve, their Commander-
in-Chief became more difficult to serve. Naturally those
who worked more closely with him felt the gradual change
earlier than others, and Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-
130
Chih tried to break away from him. But those who did not
feel the change could not be expected to appreciate this,
and sooner or later both Chiang Kai-Shek and Hsu Chung-
Chih were forced to come back.
In the early days of 1921, Chen Chiung-Ming’s attitude
was not yet apparent. Chiang Kai-Shek did not like the man
but had to hope for the best. He believed that the only
chance was in continuing to attack the Kwangsi troops to
the bitter end and occupying the whole of the Province of
Kwangsi. He told Teng Keng, the Chief of Staff in the
Cantonese Army, that ‘the only way out is the Kwangsi
Campaign. To expand outwards would enable us to unite
within ourselves. Our foundation in Kwangtung would
thus be firm and solid. The quicker we start, the better for
us, whereas a day’s delay means a day’s harm done.’
But his observation in Canton soon told him that there
was already some land of rupture between Sun Yat-Sen
and Chen Chiung-iMing. The Military Government was
hard up, and the Corps Diplomatique in China, recognising
only the Peking Government, refused Sun Yat-Sen’s re-
quest to deal with him about Customs money. Sun Yat-
Sen thought that, in order to put himself on an equal foot-
ing with Hsu Shih-Chang, the President of the Peking
Government, a formal government should be established
so that a President could be elected and installed. Chen
Chiung-Ming, having already been influenced by Peking,
now indicated that he thought all those supporters of the
Peking Government who opposed Sun Yat-Sen’s proposal
were right.
Chen Chiung-Ming’s opposition to Sun Yat-Sen was
carried on, however, behind his back, and with friction
of such a serious nature between the leader and his most
powerful supporter, nobody dared to mention the matter
in public. Chiang Kai-Shek alone found it to be too
dangerous to keep dark, and on March 5th he wrote a
frank letter to Sun Yat-Sen. First he mentioned his illness
which had kept him in bed for a few days, then he told
Sun Yat-Sen of his trip to Canton to map out with Chen
Chiung-Ming and Hsu Chung-Chih the final detailed plan
of the Kwangsi Campaign, to which he was gratified to see
that they both had agreed.
‘But at present,’ Chiang Kai-Shek went on, ‘there is
something which has made my heart sink heavily. I can
hardly bear to speak out and yet I cannot possibly keep
silent. It is the question of the election of the President.
Formerly, because of the fact that there were so many
different opinions, a great deal of misunderstanding was
created, and it was only removed after repeated explana-
tions. To-day the time is not yet ripe, and our foundation
is far from solid. The Kwangsi enemy is still at large and
the South-West unconquered. Not only is Parliament
still unratified, but also the members are insufficient to
form a quorum. Therefore I think that the election of
the President should be postponed so as to give due con-
siderations to opinions from every quarter.’
By the words ‘every quarter’ he meant the Army of
which Chen Chiung-Ming was the head. And to avoid
mentioning directly Chen Chiung-Ming, he then named
his best friend, Hsu Chung-Chih, who ranked in the army
only second to Chen Chiung-Ming and was more devoted
to Sun Yat-Sen than to his Commander-in-Chief: ‘I have
also discussed this very minutely with Hsu Chung-Chih,
who said that as a member of the Party he had to obey
and could offer no dissension. But considering it in a
practical way and weighing its advantages and dis-
advantages, he thought everything would proceed more
easily and steadily if the election of the President could
be held after the appointment of the Generalissimo which
was to follow the conquest of Kwangsi, This is what Hsu
Chung-Chih said to me and for me only, and in turn I
say it to you, my Master, and for you only, and I trust
132
you will not think from these words that Hsu Chung-
Chih is also one of those who oppose you.’
After this he pointed out that it would be unwise to
think that the prompt election of the President would
improve their diplomatic relations and put them on an
equal footing with the Peking Government. According
to his observation, it would not. Looking back over the
history of their Party, he found all the failures were due
to paying too much attention to diplomatic relations. In
both their risings, against Yuan Shih-Kai in 1913 and
against the Kwangsi clique in 1916, they had thought that
Japan would help them, but actually she had helped Yuan
Shih-Kai and the Kwangsi leader instead. Their party was
suppressed and finally defeated. And in 1918, when Sun
Yat-Sen came South with the Navy, the situation seemed
to be quite good. Again, they depended upon the help
of America, which they thought could not fail. But differ-
ences arose among themselves, and England helped their
enemy while America looked on. Could they still rely
upon their diplomatic relations?
Next, he cited the foreign relations of the newly
formed Soviet Russia as a good example. He said the
Powers were doing their utmost to suppress Soviet Russia.
First they used military power; then economic embargo;
and lastly the anti-Soviet State of Poland. Why had not
Soviet Russia failed? Because she was united within her-
self and therefore strong enough to withstand all this. If
we could follow the good example of Russia, and see to
the uniting of ourselves in interior affairs, we could
actually afford to forget about our diplomatic relations.
The last part of this long letter is as follows:
‘When we are solid within ourselves we can, of course,
extend to other territories. After the subduing of the
Kwangsi rebels, we could perhaps go forward from the
north-east to attack the capital of our enemy. The unifica-
non of the whole of China is not a difficult task. If differ-
ences of opinion are intensified after the election of the
President, and we are divided within ourselves, the south-
east will desert us rapidly and we shall find ourselves con-
fronted with the same pitfalls as we were in 1918. How,
then, could we hope to compete with the Peking Govern-
ment?
‘I have recently heard that Peking is waiting anxiously
for the election of the President in the South. They will
use this as a pretext to raise the slogan of “Down with
Sun Yat-Sen”. Though this is not entirely believable, we
must bear it in mind; for it is worth while to pay atten-
tion to it. As for the present situation in Canton, you, my
Master, can only hope for Chen Chiung-Ming not to do
things which are outside his authority, and to pursue the
same aim as you do yourself. If you hope for him to take
your orders at the critical moment, and to respect the
Party enough to defend it against its foe, you will find he
is not the man. 1 do pray you to lead him to the right
path by some pleasant way. I have ventured to reveal to
you my innermost thoughts and beg you to give them
your sympathetic observation.’
By the same pitfalls as 1918, Chiang meant the incident
when Sun Yat-Sen had to leave Canton and flee to Shang-
hai in exile. His remark about Chen Chiung-Ming was
clear-cut and to the point. Nobody else would have been
so outspoken at a time when the parting of the ways
between Sun Yat-Sen and Chen Chiung-Ming was only
beginning. Only a trusted follower of the former and an
intimate associate of the latter could possibly have reached
this conclusion and made such an observation. It was a
very timely warning, and it is a pity that Sun Yat-Sen
did not pay much heed to it. However, Chen Chiung-
Ming was still biding his time, and nothing extraordinary
happened until after their campaign into Kwangsi.
134
Neither did Sun Yat-Sen pay much attention to the
early part of this letter. Sun Yat-Sen was a man of great
determination. When he had set his mind on doing some-
thing, no one could possibly dissuade him from doing it.
So an extraordinary joint Session of both Houses of Parlia-
ment was held in Canton early in April, 1921, when resolu-
tions were passed for forming a proper Government of
the Chinese Republic in place of the temporary Military
one, and Sun Yat-Sen was elected with a majority of 213
to 9, as the Extraordinary President of this Government.
Fireworks immediately broke out following this election:
all the Military Governors who supported the Peking
Government sent out telegrams denouncing Sun Yat-Sen.
Chen Chiung-Ming moved slightly farther away, and
Chiang Kai-S^liek said nothing.
On May 5th, Sun Yat-Sen took office and formed a new
Government. At the end of the month, following the
operational plans made by Chiang Kai-Shek in consulta-
tion with Chen Chiung-Ming and Hsu Chung-Chih, Sun
Yat-Sen ordered the Cantonese Army to march towards
Kwangsi by several routes. This was a very short cam-
paign, and it will be dealt with here very briefly: for
Chiang Kai-Shek did not personally fight in it as he did
in the two previous ones. Though he would have liked
to supervise the carrying out of his operational plans, there
were several reasons for his absence, most of which the
reader can easily see. But the chief one was that on
June 14th his mother, Madame Chiang, died at home.
In China the death of one’s father or mother requires a
mourning period of three years. In Imperial days, a
government official had to retire from his office during
the entire period in order to enable him to keep company
with the coffin. Since the Republic this custom has not
been so piously observed. But still, as Chiang Kai-Shek
was the only son— of his mother though not of his father—
he had to remain at home to see to the funeral and sacri-
135
fices as required in a good family. The fact that even tc
this day most people observe the rule that orphans shal
not cut their hair or shave their beards from the day oi
their bereavement until the day of the funeral, or for sever
weeks, shows that the period for the orphan to remain ai
home is still considerable.
Chiang Kai-Shek is well known for his filial piety
From the biographical essay which he wrote at the tim(
of his mother’s death, and which has been quoted in ful
at the beginning of this book, the reader can imagine wha
a great blow it was to the mourning son. In spite of th(
urgent need of him by his comrades in the Kwangsi cam
paign, he could not have the heart to leave the duties o
an orphan unattended to. Sun Yat-Sen and many othe:
friends sent numerous telegrams and letters of condolenc(
to him and in each of these there was always a request fo:
him to go to Kwangtung to help them. Though he die
not remain at home all the while until the funeral tool
place in November, his visits to Sun Yat-Sen in Kwang
tung and later on in Kwangsi when they had conquerec
it, were all short and made only when it was though
absolutely necessary.
Madame Chiang’s funeral service was attended by ;
large number of Chiang Kai-Shek’s friends. These in
eluded Tai Chi-Tao, who, it will be remembered, ha(
only very recently exchanged such long and interestinj
letters with him, and Chu Cheng, who was the firs
Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary North-Eas
Army in Shantung in 1916. Sun Yat-Sen could no
possibly leave his duties at that critical moment, and so h
sent, as his deputy, Chen Kuo-Fu, who is the nephew o
Chiang Kai-Shek’s deceased sworn brother Chen Chi
Mei. Chen Kuo-Fu, on behalf of Sun Yat-Sen, offered
special service to the spirit of Madame Chiang, and durinj
the ceremony the following elegy was read:
136
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ELEGY FOR MADAME CHIANG BY SUN YAT-SEN
‘Alas! I, Sun Yat-Sen, have been associated with your
honourable son for over ten years. Together we have
endured innumerable hardships. Through matters of life
and death we have gone side by side like two arms on the
same body, or two horses hitched to the same chariot.
From morning till evening we seldom left each other.
Thus I have learned a little about Madame’s illustrious
feminine virtues. In your early years, Madame, you met
with much misfortune, but with kindness, diligence and
hardship you have brought up the orphans left behind
(by your deceased husband). You have cultivated and
educated them well, and to-day they have all become
models to our scholars and ladies, with remarkable dignity
and striking personality.
‘To Kai-Shek you gave more care and love than
ordinary mothers would have done, and you supervised
his studies just like a strict teacher. As if training a steed
which could run for a thousand // without stopping, you
kept him from wasting his energies in useless exertions,
so that when he encounters extreme danger and faces
great risks where success or failure are touch and go, his
presence of mind never forsakes him and is equal to any
situation. He passes through any crisis as freely as a flow-
ing river and as steadily as a great mountain.
‘In ancient times there was Madame Liu of the Tang
Dynasty. She encouraged her son, who later became a
great scholar, to study by giving him pills made of bear’s
gall. There was Madame O-Yang of the Sung Dynasty.
She taught her son, who also became a great scholar later
on, to read by writing on the ground with a reed-brush.
I have only heard about such people but have never seen
them. When I at last met Kai-Shek, reflecting on his pro-
found culture and godly breeding, I began to realise that
even those people of ancient times might not be compar-
able with someone who lived in the present day.
‘Now that we have been lucky enough to see you in the
138
present day, you have not been spared to live to the age
of eighty or ninety, to be an everlasting good model to the
feminine world: this is not only a loss for which your
honourable children will mouni, but it is also something
for which the whole world will sob aloud when they hear
of it. Alas, alas! Do partake of my offerings!’
To return to the Kwangsi campaign: following the
marching of the Cantonese Army towards the Province,
the Kwangsi troops turned back towards Kwangtung
once more, and the two armies met and engaged in the
middle of June. The Cantonese Army was victorious in
all its attacks and by the beginning of July the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the right wing of the Kwangsi troops,
a man by the name of Shen Hung-Ying, surrendered to
the Cantonese Army with a force of forty-two battalions.
He sent out a circular telegram to say that henceforward
he was independent of the Kwangsi clique, having joined
hands with the Cantonese Army. By the middle of July
the leaders of the Kwangsi Army left Nan-Ning, the
provincial capital, which was soon occupied by Chen
Chiung-Ming. The newly surrendered Shen Hung-Ying
and his forces availed themselves of this opporuinity to
occupy the strategical town of Kwei-Lin, which is an
important city on the main road leading from Kwangsi
to Hunan. Chen Chiung-Ming did not like Shen Hung-
Ying, who seemed to take too much for granted, and at
the beginning of August Chen Chiung-Ming ordered two
of his subordinate forces to drive away Shen Hung-Ying
and his men, who had to flee towards the Hunan border.
With this rapid conquest of Kwangsi, Chen Chiung-
Ming felt himself practically the military leader of the
two Southern provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi.
Besides being the Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese
Army, he had been appointed Governor of Kwangtung
in November, 1920, when he had fought back into
139
Canton. In May of the following year, upon taking up
the Extraordinary Presidency, Sun Yat-Sen had appointed
him the Minister of War and also Minister of Interior
Affairs. Soon after his successful entry into Nanning, the
capital of Kwangsi, he was also given the post of Director-
General for the Reconstruction of Kwangsi. All these
posts given to Chen Chiung-Ming were held by him
concurrently.
This kind of loading him with honours and positions
was in reality to buy Chen Chiung-Ming’s loyalty.
Evidently Sun Yat-Sen had by now realised that he was
not to be trusted, and that Chiang Kai-Shek’s advice
ought to have been followed. But there was still this
important difference between Sun Yat-Sen’s opinion and
that of Chiang Kai-Shek: while Sun Yat-Sen thought that
high position would keep Chen Chiung-Ming quiet,
Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to take every precaution, as such
a man as Chen Chiung-Ming might do anything.
The Peking Government found this the best time to
intensify their rebellion-promoting. Under the nominal
presidency of Hsu Shih-Chang, the War Lords in power
were Tsao Kun, Military Governor of Chihli, the Metro-
politan Province, and Wu Pei-Fu, Inspector of Forces in
Hunan and Hupeh, They were the leaders of the Chihli
Military clique who had, with the help of the Manchurian
Army, defeated Tuan Chi-Jiii and his followers in a civil
war in North China in July of the previous year (1920).
It was Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-Fu’s ardent hope to see a
civil war break out in Kwangtung between Sun Yat-Sen
and Chen Chiung-Ming. Soon after Sun Yat-Sen had
assumed the office of Extraordinary President, the Peking
Government issued an official order to punish the rebels
in the South, but they promised to appoint Chen Chiung-
Ming Inspector of Forces in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, a
post equivalent to a viceroyship. Such a move by the
Peking Government was plain-speaking: it said: ‘I know
140
you do not like Sun Yat-Sen; neither do I, and if you can
get rid of him you are my best friend. I give you my
blessing in advance.’
The reader may well ask: Why should Chen Chiung-
Ming covet the post of Inspector of Forces in those two
provinces whilst he was virtually head in this area, already
holding concurrently a number of very high-sounding
positions? The reason was this: as long as Sun Yat-Sen
was there, Chen Chiung-Ming could only play second
fiddle. But if he could get rid of Sun Yat-Sen he would
actually be the independent head of the South, for the
Peking Government existed in name only. That is why
he preferred a bird in the bush rather than several in hand.
In China one of the golden rules for an employer is
‘never suspect the man you employ and never employ the
man you suspect’. Although it is essential that the two
clauses should go together, hand-in-hand, Sun Yat-Sen
seemed to remember only the first, and Chiang Kai-Shek
the second. Rather than to doubt Chen Chiung-Ming’s
loyalty and take precautionary measures against a possible
rebellion, Sun decided to leave Chen Chiung-Ming a free
hand in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, he himself going away
to start the long hoped-for Northern Punitive Expedition.
By the end of 1921 the situation in Kwangtung and
Kwangsi was going from bad to worse. Chiang Kai-Shek,
who first saw the menace of Chen Chiung-Ming in
Kwangtung but thought that all would be well if the
Kwangsi campaign could be conducted successfully, was
utterly mistaken. After the conquest of Kwangsi, Chen
Chiung-Ming and his followers became more powerful
and uncontrollable than ever before. Sun Yat-Sen and
those who were very keen on compromising with Chen
Chiung-Ming were also entirely mistaken. Their urgent
desire to establish a revolutionary base in the extreme
south had to be politely abandoned by embarking on the
premature Northern Punitive Expedition in order to
141
leave Chen Chiung-Ming sole leader in Kwangtung and
Kwangsi.
Although he was still in the mourning period for his
deceased mother, Chiang Kai-Shek became slightly more
active towards the end of 1921. In November, when Sun
Yat-Sen had decided to start his Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion from Kwangsi through Hunan, he sent another tele-
gram to Chiang Kai-Shek to enlist his help. In this
telegram Sun Yat-Sen asked him to moderate his mourn-
ing for his mother and hurry to Kwangsi ‘to help in every-
thing’. And ‘help in everything’ he did: in Chen Chiung-
Ming’s fighting back to Canton, in the planning of the
Kwangsi Campaign, and later on in the preparation of the
Northern Punitive Expedition, Chiang Kai-Shek helped
as a free-lance, without asking for any important position
either in the army or the government.
Thus, in the early part of 1922, he spent some time in
Kweilin with Sun Yat-Sen and Hsu Chung-Chih discuss-
ing the grand strategy of the Punitive Expedition. While
most of the rest thought Chen Chiung-Ming could be
trusted if he was left behind with the run of two provinces
to himself, Chiang Kai-Shek was not happy about this
arrangement. The portion of the Cantonese Army which
remained loyal to Sun Yat-Sen, and which undertook to
fight northwards through Hunan from Kweilin, made
very little headway. Two reasons for this were given by
Sun Yat-Sen: the first was that ‘Chen Chiung-Ming in-
duced the authorities in Hunan to put many obstacles in
our way, thus preventing us from going forward; most
of his telegrams and correspondence referring to this have
been captured by me’; the second was that Chen Chiung-
Ming, who had promised to supply the Expeditionary
force with money and munitions, did not do so. ‘Since
the marching orders were given,’ continued Sun Yat-Sen,
‘as many as thirteen brigades have taken part. But neither
142
SUN YAl'-SEN S LETTER TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK DATED I ITU NOVEMBER, 19-'^
(pp. I Go -1 62)
CHIANG KAI-SHEK
ari^ expenses nor ammunition have ever been supplied.’
Teng Keng, the Chief of Staff of the Cantonese Army,
was acting as liaison officer between Sun Yat-Sen’s Expedi-
tionary force and Chen Chiung-Ming’s force at the home
front. He had to see that supplies of money and ammuni-
tion came forward regularly. In March he was assassinated
at the railway station in Canton, and it was immediately
acclaimed that this was arranged by Chen Chiung-Ming.
An Emergency Conference was held at the General Head-
quarters in Kweilin. When Chiang Kai-Shek, who was
still there, proposed that the Expeditionary forces should
be withdrawn and sent to Canton to clear up and stabilise
the home front, it was agreed that the force was to be
moved home secretly and that the Northern Punitive
Expedition was to be carried out not through Hunan but
through Kiangsi; for this change of route necessitated the
army passing Canton.
To move an army of some thirteen brigades in secret is
almost impossible. It was quite astonishing that Chen
Chiung-Mmg only leamt of this when it was too late to
stop it. When the Expeditionary force arrived in Kwang-
tung in April, Sun promptly received Chen Chiung-
Ming’s telegram of resignation. All Chen Chiung-Ming’s
forces were still in Kwangsi, so he thought it wise to resign
and go to Waichow, a famous stronghold which he kept
for several years. Sun Yat-Sen received Chen Chiung-
Ming’s resignation from his posts of Commander-in-Chief
of the Cantonese Army and Governor of Kwangtung with
approval. As for his resignation from the post of Minister
of War, Sun Yat-Sen refused this, and said that he wanted
him to continue to serve. Chen Chiung-Ming, of course,
did not agree, and stayed in Waichow. It will be remem-
bered that there are still two posts unaccounted for; those
of Minister of Interior Affairs and Director for the Re-
construction of Kwangsi.
What kind of a part Chiang Kai-Shek played in this
143 ir
change the reader can easily imagine. It is on record that
he left Kweilin early in April, and when Sun Yat-Sen
arrived at Chaoching, about a hundred and fifty miles due
west of Canton, towards the end of that month, Chiang
Kai-Shek was there to meet him and to give him a per-
sonal report. It was on that day that Chen Chiung-Ming’s
resignation was accepted. The author of a standard
Political History of China said in his text that Chiang Kai-
Shek wanted to attack Waichow immediately, to remove
Chen Chiung-Ming, after which the army could be turned
back to wipe out Chen’s forces in Kwangsi, now under
the sub-command of Yeh Chu. The Northern Expedition
was to be carried out after that. But Sun Yat-Sen thought
otherwise, because Chen had not yet openly opposed him
and also the forces in Kwangsi were his brothers-in-arms
and had fought side by side with him for years, so he
wished to keep them. Furthermore, the Manchurian
Military clique and the Chihli Military clique had by that
time started their civil war in the North. It had been pre-
viously arranged that the Northern Punitive Expedition
from the South should be timed simultaneously with the
Manchurian attack from the North. If this Expedition
were to be postponed until Chen’s army was put out of
action, the opportunity would be lost. Therefore, so long
as Chen would renounce his political authority in Kwang-
tung and be no longer an obstacle to the Northern Puni-
tive Expedition on the home front, he was to be let alone.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s proposal was thus not adopted.
After Chen Chiung-Ming’s resignation, Chiang Kai-
Shek and Sun Yat-Sen had two more rendezvous to dis-
cuss military matters. The first was held near Canton and
the other in Canton, both taking place at the end of April.
It has not been recorded what they talked about, nor is it
known what was decided, but two important things
occurred immediately afterwards. The first was that
144
Chiang left Canton for home on the very night after the
conference at which he ‘was so touched by Sun Yat-Sen’s
words that he shed tears’; and the second was that he
wrote a letter to Chen Chiung-Ming when sailing home.
This was the last letter which passed between them. As
they had worked together for several years through thick
and thin, they were quite familiar with each other. ‘In
cutting up a friendship, a gentleman will not use bad
language;’ this proverb Chiang Kai-Shek quoted when he
wrote about Chen Chiung-Ming’s rebellion later on. So
in his last appeal to his erring friend he was frank but not
harsh. Bearing in mind that it was written at a time when
he had proposed to attack him in order to remove him,
the reader will find it extremely mild and considerate.
The letter began with an expression of regret at the
hopelessness of the situation. He said he had actually
called upon Chen, but found he had already left for
Waichow. After it had been decided to transfer their
army from attacking through Hunan to pass through
Canton on their way to invade Kiangsi, he had intended
to explain the matter, after which it would not have been
too late for Chen to decide whether to resign or not. Even
after Chen’s resignation, if he had gone to Wu-Chow or
Chao-Ching to see Sun Yat-Sen and have a frank discus-
sion, some arrangement could perhaps still have been
made. Since Chiang had found on his arrival in Canton
that Chen had left, that indicated that all had passed the
hope of mediation. That was the parting of their ways:
he would go his own way and would not bother to hear
any more of the complications of the situation. For the
sake of their past friendship, he ardently advised Chen to
retire for good, or at least for the time being.
He further said that it was difficult not to mix public
affairs with personal feelings, nor former times with later
days. ‘It was not only for a day or two,’ he continued,
‘that we shared hardships and calamities. Though we are
145
a thousand miles from each other, I feel I am only a few
feet from you and that we are in each other’s presence.
Therefore I venture to speak straightforwardly to you,
concealing nothing. I think if you tend to be over-egotis-
tical, the future will become darker and darker. No
matter what may be the practical result (of this conflict),
both parties are bound to suffer heavy damage, and the
calamities will simply be unthinkable. Ultimately the
outcome will be this: if you are defeated, you are done
for, wasting your good name of former days for nothing.
And even if you win, people will condemn you as having
been severe with your comrades in arms. Your spiritual
suffering will be even greater than that of those whom
you have defeated.’
His final advice was that Chen ‘could ill afford not to
declare openly his attitude, nor to disregard Sun Yat-
Sen’s opinions.’ He even offered to come out again, in
spite of the fact that the mourning period for his deceased
mother had not yet expired, in order to help him and do
his bidding if Chen would believe in what he said and
follow but one or two parts of his advice. ‘Don’t listen
to the ill words of the mean and don’t fall into the traps
of the wicked. Obey Sun Yat-Sen, our Master, and help
him in his Northern Punitive Expedition.’
To this letter Chen Chiung-Ming made no reply. It
would have been foolish of Chiang Kai-Shek to expect a
favourable reply. Chen Chiung-Ming’s silence and his
preparations for civil war did not surprise him, but the
neglect of precautions on the part of Sun Yat-Sen did
alarm him. His proposal for the change of the expedi-
tionary route was mainly to enable the loyal troops to
get back to Canton for the benefit of checking Chen
Chiung-Ming’s impending rebellion, but after he had gone
away, Sun Yat-Sen and his followers thought that since
Chen had resigned they could go on with their Punitive
Expedition through Kiangsi. In the course of the next
146
few weeks he sent a number of urgent telegrams and
letters to Hsu Chung-Chih and other friends who were
with Sun Yat-Sen, urging them to strike first as a preven-
tive measure, but, alas, without avail. Sun Yat-Sen was
immovable in his decision to push North first and in his
belief that Chen Chiung-Ming would not dare to raise
arms against his chief.
Sun Yat-Sen did not want to delay his northward march,
because the situation in Peking was developing rapidly.
The Manchurian Army which had helped the Chihli
Military clique to defeat Tuan Chi-Jui’s followers, now
quarrelled with their former comrades in arms. General
Chang Tso-Lin, who later became Marshal Chang, and
father of the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang of the
Sian coup, brought his men from Manchuria into China-
proper to be near the capital to fight Tsao Kun, Military
Governor of Chihli, and his lieutenant Wu Pei-Fu, the
famous scholar-general. War near Peking started at the
end of April, and Sun Yat-Sen, regretting that he had
already lost much time in having to change his route,
hurried forward with his army towards the Kiangsi
border.
Yeh Chu, Chen Chiung-Ming’s lieutenant, brought up
more than fifty battalions from Kwangsi into Kwangtung.
His intentions were obvious. But Hsu Chung-Chih’s
reply, dated May 3rd, 1922, to Chiang Kai-Shek’s tele-
grams and letters reads as follows: ‘My Elder Brother Kai-
Shek, your letters and telegrams have been presented to
the Master to read. The General Headquarters will arrive
at Shiu-Chow on the 6th and I will be there earlier. Two
regiments of the first and second divisions will both be
in the Northern Punitive Expedition, for which various
forces are gradually concentrating. The Navy has been
brought over. . . . Chen Chiung-Ming had indicated that
he will not resign his post of War Minister; also he has
asked us to make arrangements for his troops which are
H7
coming back from the capital of Kwangsi. If we assign
them the duty of maintaining peace on the Kwangtung
and Kwangsi border, they should be quite safe. The
Master and we, your younger brothers, hope very much
you will come back soon.’ And to Chiang Kai-Shek’s
despair, Sun Yat-Sen acted exactly as the letter indicated.
Chen Chiung-Ming was appointed Director of Military
Affairs of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, maintaining his post
as War Minister, while all his army, under the command
of his lieutenant Yeh Chu, streamed into and around
Canton, following the departure of Sun Yat-Sen’s loyal
men for the Punitive Expedition.
In the North, Chang Tso-Lin’s Manchurian Army was
defeated by the Chihli troops before Sun Yat-Sen’s Expe-
dition started in the South, and then Chen Chiung-Ming
decided to demand power. He ordered Yeh Chu and the
other officers of his anny to petition Sun Yat-Sen to rein-
state him as Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army
and also as Military Governor of the Kwangtung Pro-
vince. Such an act could not be tolerated by Chiang Kai-
Shek, though Sun Yat-Sen still preferred to concentrate
his attention in fighting northwards. By the end of May
Chiang Kai-Shek was so bursting with fury that he sent
a number of telegrams to various loyal supporters of Sun
Yat-Sen, urging an attack on Chen Chiung-Ming’s forces
under Yeh Chu. Liao Chung-Kai, a most trustworthy
follower of Sun Yat-Sen and an intimate friend of Chiang-
Kai-Shek, replied with a telegram dated May 31st and a
letter dated June ist. Unfortunately none of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s telegrams can now be found, but Liao’s replies
clearly indicate what was the original request.
The telegram can be interpreted as follows:— ‘To my
Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek: Your telegram received
and understood. Unless rebellion actually broke out in
Canton, to call back our forces from the front would
148
never be allowed under any circumstances. Troops under
the command of either Liang or Huang positively do not
wish to see such a move; and if the Second Army (under
Hsu Chung-Chih) does this singly, disregarding the
others, it will surely be opposed by all the rest. What we
hope for at present is to win our battles against the enemy
outside our province and be calm and steady within our
own province so that troubles can be avoided without
letting them became apparent. There are the Navy and
three divisions in the provincial capital; the wretches
surely would not dare to rise rashly. You, my Elder
Brother, ought to come soon and go to the front immedi-
ately to help Hsu Chung-Chih. How can you bear to
leave Hsu Chung-Chih and the rest of us to suffer all the
hardship? How could you! Liao Chung-Kai. May
31st.’
On the following day he wrote Chiang Kai-Shek a
letter which gave a more detailed picture of the conditions
at home:
‘My Elder Brother Chiang Kai-Shek,
‘I have come back from Shiuchow and have read your
telegram. I reply as follows:
‘i. So-and-So’s troops [meaning Yeh Chu’s] have come
to Canton. Except that he has telegraphed a petition to
ask for the reinstatement of So-and-So [meaning Chen
Chiung-Ming] as the Chief of the Cantonese Army, no
other action has yet been taken.
‘2. Chen Chiung-Ming has repeatedly refused to accept
any post connected with the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion. When Ma Chun-Wu [Governor of Kwangsi] came
to report about the troubles in Kwangsi, he seemed to be
willing to take the responsibility. The Master has ordered
him, following the example of last year, to suppress the
bandits in that province in his capacity as War Minister.
‘3. Chen Chiung-Ming has promised to come either to
149
Canton or Chaoching, and to order So-and-So’s troops
[meaning Yeh Chu’s] to go back to their original stations.
‘4. If So-and-So’s troops gradually leave Canton, all is
well. Otherwise what you suggested in your telegram
will be the unavoidable measure to be taken in an emer-
gency. Our foundation is at the front where someone
who could look after the whole plan and pay equal atten-
tion to both the battlefield and the home front is wanted.
I do hope you will set out this very day. Please tarry no
more. . . .
Liao Chung-Kai salutes you. June ist.’
According to these two messages, the situation in
Canton seemed to be fairly calm. And to allay the fears
and misgivings of the general public, as well as the army,
Sun Yat-Sen decided to go back and stay at the President’s
Residency in Canton with no more than a handful of
guards. He arrived in Canton on June ist, and sent a
telegram to Chiang Kai-Shek urging him to come South
‘as soon as a boat is available’. However, Chiang Kai-Shek
still wanted to remove Chen Chiung-Ming’s forces first.
Again he sent an urgent letter begging Hsu Chung-Chih
to strike at once. He said that even if Chen Chiung-Ming
and his followers retreated and compromised, Hsu must
bring his army home to solve the fundamental problem
in Canton, otherwise peace and safety could not be
obtained at any cost. ‘When we have fallen into their
trap, our party is finished and our army is gone. You must
never consider the matter closed when they have com-
promised a little.’ He then worked out the way to tackle
the forces in Canton, after which large-scale operations
were to be carried out in attacking Waichow, Chen
Chiung Ming’s stronghold. ‘If we could strike before
they do so, no matter whether their main force is con-
centrated in the East or in Canton, it will not be difficult
to wipe them out. Otherwise, because of our hesitation,
150
procrastination or forbearance, we will find our hands tied
and it will be too late to save ourselves from destruction.
How I wish what I predict would not prove to be
right!’
Again and again he explained to Hsu the importance of
preserving Kwangtung as the base of the revolution. He
would rather sacrifice Kwangsi to keep Kwangtung. The
last part of this long letter is as follows: ‘Whatever
happens, to act quickly will produce only a little trouble,
whereas to tarry will result in great calamity and even in
a state of utter hopelessness. On all my suggestions I hope
you will act with your excellent decision, and also please
give me an answer. Although I, your younger brother,
am still observing the period of mourning at home, my
mind is greatly disturbed. Even as 1 am writing this letter
to you, I am feeling terribly agitated.’
But Hsu Chung-Chih’s army forged northwards and on
June 13th captured the city of Kan-Chow within the
border of Kiangsi Province. Some of Sun Yat-Sen’s
followers believed that if the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion failed, Chen Chiung-Ming’s men would rebel, but if
the Expedition were successful he would be quiet. And
three days after this major victory they were proved mis-
taken, when Chen’s forces attacked the President’s Resi-
dency in Canton at three o’clock in the morning.
Of the story describing this sensational incident there
are several versions, and a fairly detailed one was written
by Chiang Kai-Shek. Beginning from the eve of the out-
break and continuing until after Sun Yat-Sen’s arrival in
Shanghai, it covers a period of sixty-two days and is com-
posed of more than 13,500 words. It is too long to be
quoted here and, as Chiang Kai-Shek was not with Sun
Yat-Sen in the early part of this adventure, a brief sum-
mary will suffice.
On June 15th, 1922, at a secret conference, Yeh Chu
r'
showed a telegraphic order from Chen Chiung-Ming to
the officers of the Cantonese Army in and near the pro-
vincial capital, commanding them to besiege and attack
the President’s Residency in Canton. Late in the night,
loyal supporters of Sun Yat-Sen informed him of this and
advised him to escape, as nearly all his troops were then
fighting in Kiangsi, hundreds of miles away from him.
But he refused to move, saying it was his duty to stick
to his post. Early in the morning of the i6th, when it
was apparent that his presence there could not stave off
the rebellion, he was forced by his staff to escape to the
headquarters of the Navy. Such a place could hardly
withstand an attack by the large numbers of the rebellious
forces, and so he went on board the warship Chu Yu^
which, together with six other gunboats, made several
attacks on the rebellious soldiers on shore from the middle
of the river.
On the 1 8th, Sun Yat-Sen managed to send someone
to telegraph Chiang Kai-Shek, who was still in his home
town, to come to his rescue. He must have received this
message the very next day, for on the 20th he set out
for Shanghai and thence for Hongkong. On the 29th he
arrived by boat and went on board the warship Yimg
Feng to meet Sun Yat-Sen, who had a few days previously
moved from the Chu Yu to the Yung Feng, And from
that time on he kept company with Sun Yat-Sen and
helped him for more than forty days in this gunboat. To
commemorate this historic event, the Yung Feng was later
on renamed the Chung Shmi^ because Sun Yat-Sen’s other
name was Sun Chung-Shan.
On account of their neglect of Chiang Kai-Shek’s
advice, the situation of Sun Yat-Sen and his followers who
were in Canton at the time of the rebellion was deplor-
able. Some died, some were imprisoned and some escaped.
Sun Yat-Sen himself was practically reduced to the state
of a refugee with but a handful of loyal sailors in the few
152
warships which managed to get away from the shore.
Before the outbreak of the rebellion he had been deter-
mined not to turn back his faithful army from the
Northern Punitive Expedition, and now he had to follow
Chiang Kai-Shek’s advice to recall his men, but, alas, too
late. When Chiang Kai-Shek boarded the Yung Feng to
be with his Master, the two looked at each other and for
a short while could find no words to express their mutual
feelings. But when at least they started to exchange news,
they had so much to tell each other that they conversed
until late in the night.
Very soon all the remaining loyal troops on shore were
either wiped out or overpowered by Chen Chiung-Ming’s
forces. Following this, the men in the forts had to sur-
render, and Chiang Kai-Shek, who had been ordered by
Sun Yat-Sen to take command of the small fleet of seven
gunboats, decided to move farther up the river for safety.
Having left the danger zone near the two main forts, they
had to pass through the range of the guns from a third
fort called Che Wai. It took twenty minutes to get
through, and Chiang Kai-Shek, after having got Sun Yat-
Sen to take cover on a lower deck, went to take up his
position on the bridge during this fateful voyage. The
whole fleet steamed along, attacking the fort furiously,
and furiously the guns from the fort answered shot for
shot, concentrating their aim on the Yung Feng. Six hits
were scored on this small gunboat, which was severely
shaken but managed to escape serious damage. At the
height of the attack Chiang Kai-Shek was advised to take
cover, but he would not leave the bridge. As soon as he
saw the danger was past he was congratulated by all his
comrades.
This temporary escape from danger led them nowhere.
Imprisoned in their ships. Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-
Shek waited anxiously for news of the returning army.
Not only did this army make very little progress on their
153
home journey, but also a division among them went over
to Chen Chiung-Ming’s side. Towards the end of July,
the expeditionary force found their position extremely
difficult and had to start a fighting retreat, and at the
beginning of August even that became impossible as they
had nowhere to retreat to. Their bases was lost to Chen
Chiung-Ming’s men, and their newly-conquered strong-
hold Kanchow was retaken by their Northern enemy.
They had to withdraw towards the border of Fukien,
hoping they would not meet with any obstacles there.
On August 7th this bad news reached the gunboats.
Chiang Kai-Shek, who acted as military adviser to Sun
Yat-Sen, reviewed the situation coolly: Shiuchow, their
original military base, was now in the hands of the rebels;
Kanchow was lost to the Northerners; a division of their
men had just gone over to their enemy; their men could
not possibly get to Canton for some time. So it was clear
to him that Sun Yat-Sen’s staying near Canton could
serve no useful purpose. It did keep the morale of the
soldiers and civilians very high, but in the present circum-
stances everything was against them and it was senseless
to stay there any longer. They had to get away while
there was still a chance of doing so. He therefore advised
Sun Yat-Sen to leave the vicinity of Canton and try to
find somewhere else for a fresh start. On August 9th, by
arrangement with the British Consul-General, H.M.S.
Moorhen escorted them to Hongkong, and on the follow-
ing day they boarded the s.s. Empress of Russia for
Shanghai, where they arrived safely on the 14th.
Although the whole rebellion was conducted by Chen
Chiung-Ming, he kept up the pretence, even after its out-
break, that he knew nothing about these doings of his
subordinates since he had retired from active service.
While Yeh Chu, his lieutenant, after having bombarded
the President’s Residency, wired the whole country de-
manding the immediate resignation of Sun Yat-Sen, Chen
154
Chiung-Ming sent the following telegram to his Master
who was imprisoned on the gunboat:
‘To Mr President:
‘Since the affairs of state have come to this, how my
heart aches! Though I have retired, I cannot escape the
blame. When I received your Excellency’s orders of the
1 6th, the coup in the capital had already started and it was
too late for remedy. For several days past I have thought
hard and can find no way out. I only realise that I have
followed you for over ten years through thick and thin
and have never for a moment thought of disloyalty. How
could I know that after I had resigned from military
responsibility I alone would still be held responsible for
this coup} When a man is in such a state, pitiable indeed
is he! I now only ask for a directive to be followed so as
to avoid the troops for the Northern Expedition slaughter-
ing each other— for the sake of humanity and peace.
Hardships are ahead of our country, there will be many
days for me to render you service to repay your kind-
ness.’
Soon after he had sent Sun Yat-Sen this message he
threw off his disguise. Seeing that he had successfully
defeated all those who were opposed to him, he went back
to Canton and re-assumed the title of Commander-in-
Chief of the Cantonese Army. While he was enjoying his
triumph to his heart’s content, his Master, Sun Yat-Sen,
once more became an exile in Shanghai, and wrote:
‘I have been leading my comrades in the struggle for
the establishment of a Republic for nearly thirty years,
during which time we have risked death in our ups and
downs on numerous occasions. But not once before have
we been so disastrously defeated as this time. In all our
former failures there has always been one thing in
common, though from different causes: that is, that we
were defeated by our enemy. But in this defeat we had
already conquered our enemy and in his place came Chen
155
Chiung-Ming, a man whom I had been protecting and
nursing for over ten years, and whose deliberate treachery
and ruthlessness even an enemy could not bear to per-
form. This is not only a calamity to the nation but also a
black spot on humanity and morality. . .
It must be observed that before this rebellion, the
respective positions held by Chen Chiung-Ming and
Chiang Kai-Shek were scarcely comparable. Chen
Chiung-Ming was one of the few veteran members of the
Kuo Min Tang whose revolutionary records dated back
to Sun Yat-Sen’s early attempts in Canton. He had been
without question the most important military man in the
Cantonese Government. Chiang Kai-Shek, on the other
hand, had been but a brilliant young strategist whose
assistance was always welcomed by the higher-ups of the
army. As has been shown, his presence or absence made
little difference to the major moves of the Military
Government. Now, with this rebellion, it was proved that
not only was Chiang Kai-Shek the only man whose deci-
sions they ought to have followed promptly, but also at
the critical moment, when everyone had to flee in his own
way for dear life, here was the only loyal follower who
rushed into the fire, away from security, to be at his
Master’s side. In the preface Sun Yat-Sen wrote to
Chiang Kai-Shek’s record of the rebellion, he said:
‘When the traitor Chen started his rebellion, Kai-Shek
came to Kwangtung to join us in our trouble. He boarded
my gunboat and waited upon me every day. Whatever he
planned mostly proved right, and he enjoyed sharing his
fate with me and the officers and ratings of the Navy. As
for this record, it is most probably a true one. And it
barely covers the important facts, leaving out details
which could hardly be put into writing. I do not attach
much importance to the complimentary terms in which it
was written, but I hope my countrymen will see the
sincerity of the task. I lacked the vision to see through
156
the man and was too late to nip the treacherous scheme
in the bud. In the end it has been proved that I have
nursed the rebellion and left behind me this confusion, the
flame of which is still burning furiously. Therefore it
should be understood that this essay is a record of my
blunder. Furthermore, it will show the world the public
spirit and self-sacrifice of our Navy and the officers and
men of our Northern Punitive Expedition. . .
On their arrival at Shanghai, Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang
Kai-Shek were greeted by most of their comrades who
had come to this port for safety. Many members of Parlia-
ment frequented Sun Yat-Sen’s private residence, where
Chiang Kai-Shek stayed and worked for some time until
he was ordered by his doctor to take a rest. He went
home for his convalescence but very soon his mind was
busy again. He kept up a communication with Sun Yat-
Sen and the faithful comrades who were in Shanghai and
advised them to try to get into either Fukien or Kwangsi
before mustering the Cantonese Army to fight back into
Kwangtung. He also proposed some changes in regula-
tions of the Kuo Min Tang. These regulations, he said,
‘would, if not changed, make it difficult to improve our
party activities. We should avail ourselves of this oppor-
tunity to correct our mistakes and try to enlist all those
youths who are full of promise. Only this would greatly
increase the strength of the Party.' He also paid special
attention to public opinion. ‘If we had an organisation
for publicity, it would strengthen our party to some ex-
tent. Now that we have lost our military power, we shall
be in an ever more difficult position if we do not pay
special attention to public opinion.’
In that he was quite right. Both Chen Chiung-Ming
and the Northern War Lords had been creating public
opinion against Sun Yat-Sen and his government. They
said that Sun Yat-Sen established his government in
Canton chiefly because the one in Peking headed by Hsu
H7
Shih-Chang was illegal. In June, 1922, when the Chihli
War Lords had defeated the Manchurian forces, they
forced Hsu Shih-Chang to resign his Presidency and
dragged out Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha, once more to
be the puppet President. Their excuse was that Li, the
Buddha, was the legal President but had been unlawfully
driven away. Li, the Buddha, immediately recalled the
old Parliament, which had been elected in 1913 and dis-
solved in 1917, and then Chen Chiung-Ming’s henchmen
and the Northern War Lords demanded Sun Yat-Sen’s
resignation. Sun Yat-Sen, they said, was no longer justi-
fied in keeping in being a second government in Canton,
once the President and the Parliament formerly elected
according to the constitution were restored in Peking.
Since Sun Yat-Sen did not resign, Chen Chiung-Ming
found a few people to support him in his rebellion.
But very soon people began to see that Chen Chiung-
Ming was doing it merely for personal gain, especially
those who were in Kwangtung, for he was a grasping man
and a bad ruler. A few weeks after Sun Yat-Sen’s fall,
the forces around Kwangtung felt their loss and began to
send representatives to Shanghai to reassure him of their
allegiance. In October the loyal men of the Cantonese
forces under Hsu Chung-Chi, who had escaped into
Fukien, fighting jointly with a local force, occupied
Foochow. With this victory it was found possible to ex-
tend and reorganise the Cantonese forces into three
armies. Sun Yat-Sen appointed Hsu Chung-Chih to be
the Commander-in-Chief. The post of his Chief-of-Staff
was of course given to Chiang Kai-Shek, who went to
Fukien immediately to take up his duties, for this new
Cantonese Army was ready to fight back to Canton.
For the next few months Chiang Kai-Shek was busily
engaged in strenuous and difficult work in Fukien. He
helped his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih in all kinds of
administrative matters in the Army, and drafted the opera-
158
tional plan which they hoped to put into practice very
soon. He prepared the speediest possible routes of supply,
which he found ‘extremely difficult’ owing to the dis-
organisation of communication between Fukien and
Kwantung because of the recent fighting. He gave
advanced directions to various company commanders
about the impending march. He also went out on behalf
of Sun Yat-Sen to see various sections of the Amiy, to
give them the Master’s message of thanks and encourage-
ment, especially those who had been wounded in the
previous fighting.
At this time he recorded in his diary such an entry as
the following: ‘This time the responsibility of fighting
the rebels and slaughtering the traitors to revenge the
treacherous deeds they have done to us I will shoulder
myself, single-handed if needs be. Should this inspire
jealousy or create misunderstanding, I am willing to take
it, no matter how difficult it may be nor how many friends
I shall offend. I will not stop until the aim is achieved.’
But in spite of this resolution, there occurred some com-
plicated difficulty. In the troublesome work of reorganis-
ing the Army, the Commander of the First Army
quarrelled with Hsu Chung-Chih. In the end Chiang
Kai-Shek found that the only solution was for him to
accompany the Commander to Shanghai. That one of the
two quarrelling parties should go to maintain peace was
quite understandable. But why Chiang Kai-Shek had to
escort him it is impossible to find out. Sun Yat-Sen, on
hearing of this, immediately sent a wire to him to say that
since Hsu Chung-Chih and he had been entrusted with
the important responsibility of fighting back to Canton to
punish traitors, he must never lay down this burden what-
ever happened.
Just before he was leaving Foochow for Shanghai with
the Commander of the First Army, Sun Yat-Sen’s letter
arrived, and it is quoted in full here because it not only
159
explains their position at this time, but also refers to
Russia and the Communist party:
‘My dear Elder Brother Kai-Shek,
‘I have just seen your letter to Hu Han-Min and Wang
Ching-Wei in which you said “if there is no progress at
all within ten days then there is nothing for it . . etc.
Pooh! What rubbish you talk! Since I could not go to
Fukien myself, I have entrusted you with the responsi-
bility of punishing the traitors. How could you so
hurriedly think of giving it up like that?
‘Things do not happen as we wish eight or nine times
out of ten. To ensure success, it always depends upon
your fortitude and persistence, your disregard of jealousy
and hard work. If you do not wish to do it when there
is no progress within ten days, then you will never suc-
ceed in doing anything. As you said in the letter: “Tze
Ying [the Commander in question] will come to Shanghai;
this trouble is over;” that shows the greatest difficulty has
already been solved and this is wonderful progress. What
does it matter if there are still some small difficulties?
‘Even though we have made no progress, the enemy is
losing ground every day. For instance, his officers and
men are beginning to see light; his unification is gradually
dissolving; the people in Kwangtung are hating him more
and more, and thinking of us more and more. These things
are our progress day by day, though we cannot see it.
Therefore if we can only hold firm, that is progress. So
I do hope you, my Elder Brother, will not give up. We
must accomplish our aim of vanquishing Chen.
‘You had hopes for the West. Recently I have felt the
same here, and now the thing is well in hand. But it is
very complicated, ten or even a hundred times more so
than in Fukien. No wonder all the comrades of our
country went to their capital in high spirits, to come back
dejected. Luckily I have found the way, and we are
i6o
coming nearer together every day. But fundamentally
we must have a base to rely upon, and then we can make
use of it. If we have nothing at all ourselves, we will not
be able to do anything, even though we were as agreeable
to their principles as the Communist youth of our
country. That is why the people in that capital have been
urging the Communists to join the Kuo Min Tang. We
know we must have a foundation first, and to get that we
must recover Kwangtung. After recovering Kwangtung
we shall be able to unify all the south-west. With these
south-western provinces as our foundation, we could do
a great deal.
‘That was also why the Revolution in Turkey suc-
ceeded. And whether your former hope will succeed is
entirely dependent upon Foochow. If you could advance
and vanquish the traitors in Canton, nothing could be
better. Otherwise if you could only hold firm in Foo-
chow, this would also be a step forward. So long as we
have Foochow we have a foundation for both diplomatic
as well as interior activities. If we haven’t this, we are
nothing more than exiles in foreign concessions. How
could we carry any weight? Therefore the longer you
can stay in the Army on my behalf, the higher goes my
prestige. I do hope you will stay for my sake, and never
quit because of lack of progress.
‘Don’t you, my Elder Brother, remember the days when
we were in the gunboat? All day long we could only
sleep and eat, hoping to hear good news. What progress
could we have at that time? But it proved very important
all over the world that we stayed. Now I am moving
things outwards, and you and others are in Foochow as
my backing. With this backing, my plans are progressing
every day. It may turn out that before you can recapture
Canton my plan will succeed. You never can tell! So
whatever difficulties you meet, whatever hardships you
suffer, do stay in the Army as long as I am struggling here,
i6i
Only by doing this can we succeed. The progress here
cannot be conveyed on paper with ink. Liao Chung-Kai
[who brought this letter to Chiang Kai-Shek] will be able
to tell you a little. In short, we haven’t had such a won-
derful opportunity for more than ten years. We must
each of us fight in our own way, never to rest for a single
minute, so that the sacrifice of our martyrs and the hopes
of our countrymen are not in vain. Remember this a
thousand and even ten thousand times.’
This letter had the desired effect. Although Chiang
Kai-Shek had to go to Shanghai with the outgoing Com-
mander, he soon returned to Foochow. At the end of
December Sun Yat-Sen, after having succeeded in getting
the Yunnan Army and the Kwangsi Army to operate at
the same time, wired Chiang Kai-Shek to move the Can-
tonese Army southwards to attack Swatow. He said that
the Northern War Lords were sending a large army to
attack the Cantonese forces from Fukien and Kiangsi.
Their only hope of survival depended upon their success-
ful campaign into Kwangtung.
In January, 1923, under the combined pressure of Sun
Yat-Sen’s supporters, Chen Chiung-Ming was compelled
to flee to his old stronghold of Waichow from Canton,
into which place the Kwangsi forces entered first. The
commander of this section of the Kwangsi Army was Shen
Hung-Ying, who, it will be remembered, surrendered to
the Cantonese side during the Kwangsi campaign, and had
to escape into Hunan because Chen Chiung-Ming pressed
on and would not receive his surrender. Because of this
he and his men readily fought Chen Chiung-Ming when
Sun Yat-Sen sent word to them. The Yunnan Army
also did well, as both these two forces were much nearer
to Canton than the Cantonese Army was. Besides, the
Northern forces had started their Fukien Campaign. Hsu
Chung-Chih’s men were required to help the new Fukien
162
Military Governor to defend him against this invasion and
so ^vere left far behind. At that time Swatow and the rest
of Eastern Kwangtnng was still in the hands of Chen
Chiung-Ming’s men. But the Garrison Commander in
Swatow, who had led his men in the bombardment of the
President’s Residency in the Rebellion, now pretended to
declare his independence from Chen Chiung-Ming and to
welcome the return of Sun Yat-Sen and Hsu Chung-Chih.
It seemed that all was well.
Chiang Kai-Shek thought it was time for him to take
a much needed rest. He was suffering from eye trouble
and went to Shanghai for treatment. From Shanghai, he
returned to his home. Sun Yat-Sen now prepared to go
back to Canton, and Chiang Kai-Shek wrote to Liao
Chung-Kai a very long letter which he asked Liao to show
to the Master if it met with Liao’s approval. He predicted
that there would be troubles coming in the future, but
Sun Yat-Sen might be able to patch things up by promot-
ing co-ordination among the forces from the various
provinces. What concerned him most was the Party and
its principles. He suggested that in order to strengthen
the Party principles it would be better to keep the
partisans from occupying administrative posts in the
provincial Government. He thought that after having
put the Party principles into practice for ten or twenty
years, good results would naturally follow.
By the end of January, things began to go wrong. Shen
Hung-Ying, one of the commanders of the Kwangsi
Army, had no respect for either Sun Yat-Sen or the Kuo
Min Tang. He fought for Sun Yat-Sen simply because
he had nowhere to go to, and wanted to take his revenge
on Chen Chiung-Ming. Now that he was in Canton, he
tried to arrest the other commanders and drive away the
Kuo Min Tang leaders who had come back to the capital.
Chiang Kai-Shek was worried and wrote immediately to
Wang Ching-Wei, the veteran party man who was to go
163
back to Canton with Sun Yat-Sen. He suggested that this
Shen Hung-Ying should be punished first, and regretted
that he could not come to Shanghai himself, as his eye
trouble was now very serious. Wang Ching-Wei replied
to say that eye trouble must not be overlooked and that
Shanghai was the place for treatment by specialists. If
neglected the defect might become a cause of regret for
the rest of his life. Although to live in the country was
suitable for convalescence, no good doctor could be found
there. He urged Chiang Kai-Shek to come to Shanghai.
As for an attack on Shen Hung-Ying, the Master had
agreed to this. But because of lack of preparation, they
had to wait a little before they could start.
In the beginning of February Chiang Kai-Shek received
a wire from his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih, who was still
in Fukien but was on the point of going into Kwangtung.
He asked Chiang Kai-Shek about his eyes and invited him
to go to the south of Fukien to discuss their plan of march-
ing to Canton. Chiang Kai-Shek’s reply began thus:
‘My eye trouble has become more severe and I can
scarcely write. The Master planned to start on the 14th
for Canton and Wang Ching-Wei left here to-day. I
came to Shanghai yesterday, but am going home to-
morrow because Shanghai is not the place for con-
valescence.’ Regarding the invitation, he said: ‘I, your
younger brother, have a bad temper and am not good
enough to help you, but more than enough to ruin your
work. Always I have been undeservedly loved by my
comrades, and also I have presumed to consider myself
their life-long friend. Though my late kind mother has
left this world, I dare not stay idle by keeping the whole
period of mourning, for fear of being ungrateful to my
friends. Formerly, because the traitor Chen was not gone,
I had to shoulder responsibility. Now since he has gone, I
can rest a little. Besides, I have come out several times,
164
and each time I have failed in everything. It has only led
to displaying my shortcomings, and has not helped in the
least with our party or our country. If I still do not realise
my mistakes and endeavour to conceal my drawbacks, I
am afraid I would get you into trouble. That is why I
cannot obey your order after careful and repeated con-
sideration.’ He then told Hsu Chung-Chih not to trust
the commander who was in Swatow and had just left
Chen Chiung-Ming’s side. He said; ‘Whatever be the
case, wherever be the place, that man would never have
any good will for us. If we do not get at him, he will
get at us. That is why I am worried, and I’m sure you’ll
be prepared.’
As soon as he got back to his home he wired and wrote
to Sun Yat-Sen and his friends in Shanghai to dissuade Sun
Yat-Sen from going to Canton so soon. By now he was
convinced that Shen Hung-Ying could not be trusted any
longer. But he was too late. Sun Yat-Sen left Shanghai
on the 15 th and arrived at Canton on the 21st, and on
that day he resumed his authority as Generalissimo, and
the headquarters of the Generalissimo was again estab-
lished. Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Chief of Staff at
the headquarters and was urged to come to Canton to take
up his duties immediately.
Chiang Kai-Shek was very reluctant to go to Canton.
First, his eyes were still not well, and secondly he would
have offended his old friend Hsu Chung-Chih, whose
invitation he had just refused, if he now accepted another
invitation with alacrity. But he was very much concerned
about the situation in Kwangtung as well as about Hsu
Chung-Chih’s forces on the Fukien border. In the month
of March he had sent several long letters to Hsu Chung-
Chih giving him advice in detail about military plans for
the Cantonese Army’s homeward march. He was most
anxious to get Hsu Chung-Chih’s forces back to Canton
165
to protect Sun Yat-Sen against Shen Hung-Ying’s impend-
ing outbreak. He predicted that Chen Chiung-Ming’s re-
maining forces would be on the attack once more, but
that would happen a little later. The most urgent call
was to prepare for the treacherous outbreak of Shen
Hung-Ying, who was a menace on the doorstep.
Li, the Buddha, the nominal President of the Peking
Government, issued an order on March 20th appointing
Shen Hung-Ying the Military Governor of the Province
of Kwangtung. Looking back, the reader will remember
that the last Military Governor of Kwangtung appointed
by the Northern Government was driven out by the
Cantonese Army in October, 1920. At that time the flee-
ing Governor sent out a circular telegram to say that he
was leaving the affairs of Kwangtung to be settled by the
Central Government. After a lapse of two and a half
years, it is strange that the Peking Government suddenly
remembered this request and appointed a new Governor.
It was again the doing of the War Lords Wu Pei-Fu and
Tsao Kun, who, after their failure in bolstering up Chen
Chiung-Ming to oust Sun Yat-Sen, now wanted to use
Shen Hung-Ying as their instrument. Li, the Buddha,
being a very good-natured man, was a perfect puppet.
By the end of March Hsu Chung-Chih’s forces were
making their way slowly towards Canton from southern
Fukien. He sent a wire to Chiang Kai-Shek, who was still
at home, to ask him how his eyes were getting on and to
urge him to hurry to Canton, where his presence was
greatly needed by Sun Yat-Sen. Chiang Kai-Shek, in
reply, sent a long telegram on April 17th to Hsu Chung-
Chih, advising him to dash back with his men to Canton,
avoiding, as best he could, fighting on the way with Chen
Chiung-Ming’s followers, who were in Swatow and the
surrounding district. He said that the remnants of Chen
Chiung-Ming’s army in East Kwangtung were but a
nuisance on a small scale, but Shen Hung-Ying’s men in
166
and near the capital, who were the confederates of the
Northern War Lords, were a fatal malady near the heart.
The Peking Government was now depending upon Shen
Hung-Ying’s and not on Chen Chiung-Ming’s troops to
make trouble in Kwangtung. He calculated that if they
could do away with the menace of Shen Hung-Ying and
make Canton a base of safety once more, it was quite
possible that East Kwangtung would be subdued in peace.
Even if they had to have recourse to military strength, it
would then be much easier to accomplish. He added that
he would start as soon as he received a confirming wire
from Hsu Chung-Chih.
He arrived in Canton on April 20th and found that he
had come in the nick of time. Shen Hung-Ying had just
assumed his office of Military Governor of Kwangtung
appointed by the Peking Government, and started to
attack the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Yunnan forces, who was loyal to Sun Yat-Sen. This
situation was in many respect similar to that ten months
ago, except that Sun Yat-Sen had learnt by experience
and was fully prepared to meet the emergency. As
Generalissimo he had mustered all the loyal forces in and
around the city together, and went about superintending
personally their counter-attack with the Commander-in-
Chief of the Yunnan forces. Chiang Kai-Shek promptly
took up his duties as the Chief of Staff to the Generalis-
simo, and wherever Sun Yat-Sen went, Chiang Kai-Shek
was alwavs by his side.
Chen Chiung-Ming’s forces found this the best time to
revive their trouble-making and started to attack Hsu
Chung-Chih’s Cantonese forces in East Kwangtung. It
was hoped that the Cantonese Army would be in or near
Canton before the outbreak, but Shen Hung-Ying would
not wait and did not wait. As Chen Chiung-Ming’s men
were delaying Hsu Chung-Chih’s progress, Sun Yat-Sen
and Chiang Kai-Shek found themselves in a rather pre-
167
carious position in and around Canton. They had to do
whatever they could with men from the Yunnan forces
and also from a small part of the Kwangsi troops under
another leader, a rival of Shen Hung-Ying.
From April to July Chiang Kai-Shek was the sole
military adviser to Sun Yat-Sen, on whose behalf he went
to various conferences with all the generals and com-
manders who were supporting the Generalissimo and
fighting the rebels. During these months there were many
ups and downs, and without a single regiment of his own
he managed to get Shen Hung-Ying, the nearest of his
enemies, out of the vicinity of the capital, and succeeded
to a certain extent in co-ordinating the various factors of
the very complicated forces now converging in Kwang-
tung. When Hsu Chung-Chih’s forces were getting
nearer to Canton and after he had conferred with his old
friend on several occasions about the long-drawn-out war,
Chiang Kai-Shek was allowed to relinquish his military
duties and to be entrusted with an important task, the
effects of which have puzzled and arc still puzzling the
whole world.
VI
T sarist Russia’s policy towards China was most aggres-
sive, Following the Boxer’s uprising in Peking in 1900,
by far the largest share of the indemnity to be paid by
China to the victors was demanded and grabbed by Russia.
In fact, her share was bigger than those of France and
England put together, and about a third of the total which
was divided between a dozen nations. It can be imagined
what a pleasant surprise it was to the Chinese people to
see that the newly established Soviet Russia extended a
friendly hand to them! In July, 1919, while the whole
nation was still indignant at the Paris Peace Treaty under
which China was ordered to hand over to Japan special
rights and territories, Leo Karakhan, Deputy People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, issued a manifesto to the
Chinese people promising to return to China all territories
and concessions in Treaty Ports wrongfully taken from
her, to restore to her the control of the Chinese Eastern
Railway, to waive Russia’s share of the Boxer Indemnity,
to give up the rights of extra-territoriality of Russians in
China, and to surrender all other special privileges con-
trary to the principle of the equality of nations.
After more than half a century’s incessant greedy
exploitation of China by Japan and the Western Powers,
no wonder the Chinese people began to respect and
admire the new Russia, of which the European people
spoke with disgust and horror. The younger generation
in China, especially the college students in Peking and
other cities, started to read and translate anything written
by Russians and about Russia. How representative of the
people was the Peking Government could easily be
169
assessed, when Lenin sent his envoy to the Northern
Capital and the high officials of cabinet rank considered
it hardly respectable to be seen with the Bolshevik
messenger. During those days it seemed that, in Peldng
as well as in other capitals, people wanted to know who
was your father before accepting your gift, even though
the gift might be your own former property.
Adolph Joffe was probably a very able diplomat, but
more probably his father was a nobody. When he was
sent to Peking in August, 1922, by Lenin (whose father,
if such a person had existed at all, was definitely nobody)
to negotiate for a fair treaty between Russia and China
on the basis of the Manifesto issued by Karakhan in 1919,
the high officials scarcely liked to look at him. It is true
that the Corps Diploimtique in Peldng was disgusted at
the arrival of such a comrade and brought pressure to bear
on the Chinese authorities, but that only showed them to
be the more cowardly. The Powers had good reasons for
alienating the ^Bolshies’. By befriending Soviet Russia
they had nothing to gain and everything to lose. Besides,
the late Tsar was a cousin of most of the monarchs in
Europe, and he and his family had been murdered in cold
blood by the ‘Reds’. But how about China? In accepting
the friendship of Soviet Russia, China had nothing to lose
and everything to gain. And Nicholas II could not
possibly have been related to anyone in China!
Besides, Joffe had arrived at a very bad time. The Chihli
War Lords, Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-Fu, had just driven
away FIsu Shih-Chang in whose place they had installed
Li Yuan-Hung, the Buddha, as their puppet and interim
President. As they were very anxious and busily prepar-
ing to induce Tsao Kun, who was the leader of the Chihli
clique, to take over the Presidency, so they had to be
extremely obliging to all the other diplomats in Peking,
who openly declared that they were outraged by the
arrival of this intruder. Of course these War Lords always
170
put their personal and private interests above the national
interest, and would have received Joffe royally if Lenin’s
offer had been of special value to the Chihli clique.
The author has often wondered why Soviet Russia
should have approached the Peking Government which,
in the eyes of a revolutionary, was utterly reactionary,
instead of Sun Yat-Sen’s revolutionary government. Turn-
ing back to September, 1918, the reader will find that Sun
Yat-Sen had sent a message of congratulation to Lenin on
the success of the Russian Revolution, at a moment when
the head of no other government would have soiled his
lips with the word ‘Bolsheviki’. The general opinion is
that the Peking Government was the one recognised by
the Powers, was nearer to Siberia and also in control of
the Chinese Eastern Railway; but it is difficult to accept
that as a sufficient answer.
It would have been extremely interesting, and sub-
sequent events would be entirely unpredictable, if the
Peking Government had readily joined hands with Soviet
Russia. Where would Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek
have come in? What would have happened to the Kuo
Min Tang? Affairs in China, and indeed in the whole Far
East, would have been quite different from what they are
now if Peking had not treated Joffe coldly. But in the
Autumn of 1922, when he was knocking at the doors of
the Peking Government with a gift parcel under his arm,
he knocked in vain. Those doors were shut in his face. The
only people who welcomed him cordially were the college
students and other intellectuals. The Chancellor of Peking
University thanked him in public for the generous offer
from Russia to help China to expel foreign Imperialism
out of China, and the Chancellor was a veteran member
of the Kuo Min Tang. It was obvious to Joffe where he
should go after having his offer turned down by the
Peking Government.
On August 30th, 1922,, when Sun Yat-Sen was still
a refugee in Shanghai from Chen Chiung-Ming’s re-
bellion, Chiang Kai-Shek received a letter from the
Master urging him to go to Shanghai. In the letter Sun
Yat-Sen said that both the provinces of Hunan and Fukien
were possibilities for military action in favour of the Kuo
Min Tang. Their hopes seemed much more likely to
succeed in Hunan than in Fukien. In fact, he was expect-
ing the news of successes in that province to arrive any
day. Later on, as the reader has seen, events proved
slightly different than those hoped for. Hsu Chung-Chih
got into Foochow, the provincial capital of Fukien, in a
few weeks’ time, while Hunan remained unapproachable.
The last part of this letter seems to be referring to Joffe.
It goes on as follows:
‘. . . As for that certain matter, a special representative
has recently arrived with a letter asking me questions
about affairs in general in the Far East and the solution
of these problems. I have answered each and all of his
questions. Now that we have exchanged correspondence
with each other, all matters will be easy to discuss. He
had, travelling with him, a military attache whom I have
asked him to send to Shanghai first, so that I can ask him
about military affairs in detail. I think he should arrive
soon. . . ’
No further information was available about this
military attache, but Liao Chung-Kai, the trusted friend
of Chiang Kai-Shek and loyal follower of Sun Yat-Sen,
discussed many problems, military matters included, in a
famous spa in Japan where Joffe had to go for treatment
because of failing health following the failure of his
mission to Peking. Together they spent about a month
in Japan, and upon Liao Chung-Kai’s return to Shanghai
in November, he was sent to Foochow with Sun Yat-Sen’s
long letter to stop Chiang Kai-Shek leaving Fukien. The
later portion of the letter mentioned vaguely their con-
172
tact with Moscow, and this was quoted in full towards
the end of my last cliapter.
It must be noted here that directly after the First World
War the names of Germany and Russia were in bad odour
with most people for quite a long time. Far-sighted states-
men knew the importance of an early resumption of
diplomatic relations with these two countries. But, act-
ing against public opinion, they had to set about this
discreetly. Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek, as can be
seen from this correspondence, were conducting their
negotiations with Soviet Russia with the greatest discre-
tion. As no other name except that of Liao Chung-Kai
was mentioned in connection with this matter, it can be
assumed they were the few people who first decided to
pursue this policy, and successfully kept it to themselves.
But during the rebellion of Chen Chiung-Ming, when
Sun Yat-Sen had to leave the President’s Residency in a
great hurry, he left behind certain papers, among which
was a letter showing his desire to enter into negotiations
with Germany and Russia.
As his enemy had been moving heaven and earth to
create public opinion against him, such a letter was
wonderful material and difficult to come by. It was
immediately translated into English and published in a
Hongkong newspaper which was very anxious to help
Chen Chiung-Ming’s good work. Chiang Kai-Shek,
shortly after reading this news, which soon spread all over
China, wrote a fiery rejoinder to Chen Chiung-Ming's
accusation. After scolding him for his treacherous re-
bellion, he defended Sun Yat-Sen’s diplomatic move as
follows:
‘After the World War, to resume diplomatic relations
with Russia and Germany, and to try and find what could
be done by way of mutual help, has been the endeavour
of all the countries such as England, America, France,
Italy and Japan. How could we alone afford to be left in
173
a state of isolation by not trying to resume good relation-
ship with these two countries? As for keeping this matter
a secret, that is but the accepted practice in international
diplomacy. Furthermore, this letter of the President was
merely a proposal still in the stage of consultation between
two comrades. How could it be used to accuse and malign
the President?
‘Since the publication of this letter, all intelligent people
in China and abroad are agreed that this policy would be
a necessary move, and foreigners have even thought that
the President’s diplomacy was more far-sighted than that
of others. They expressed admiration, rather than a feel-
ing of jealousy that China should possess such a great
statesman. Indeed, the publication of the letter has added
to the many crimes committed by Chen Chiung-Ming,
trying to murder the President, yet another one, that of
trying to ingratiate foreign countries by betraying his
own country . . .’
Chiang Kai-Shek’s argument was sound, but his remarks
about public opinion both in China and abroad were more
instructive than reliable. The fact that Sun Yat-Sen had
to keep secret his meeting with Joffe, and that on most
occasions negotiations were carried on indirectly, indi-
cated that he was afraid of provoking blind censure by
the general public. It was after very careful discussion
and consideration that mutual agreement between Soviet
Russia, represented by Adolph Joffe, and the Chinese
Revolutionary Government, represented by Sun Yat-Sen,
was finally reached. And on January 26th, ,1923, the Sun-
Joffe Manifesto was issued. In order to give the lie to
those who said that Sun Yat-Sen had sold his Party to the
Communists, the most important part of the document
may be quoted as follows;
‘Dr Sun Yat-Sen holds that the Communistic order, or
even the Soviet system, cannot actually be introduced into
China because there do not exist the conditions for
174
A RECENT PORTRAIT (l)
the successful establishment of either Communism or
Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr Joffe, who
is further of opinion that China’s paramount and most
pressing problem is to achieve national unification and to
attain lull national independence; and regarding this great
task he has assured Dr Sun Yat-Sen that China has the
warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count
on the support of Russia.’
The other points in this manifesto are Joffe’s confirma-
tion of Russia’s offer to give up all the rights and privileges
obtained by Tsarist Russia by unfair treaties (the original
term is ‘unequal treaties’); and proposals for a conference
about the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the
promise by Russia not to encourage secession of Outer
Mongolia from China, On the other hand, Sun Yat-Sen
consented that to prevent White Russians from attacking
Soviet Russia the Red Axmy could stay in Outer Mongolia
while the Peking Government was unable to prevent it.
Nobody could say that this arrangement was not
advantageous to China. It was in fact the nucleus of the
first fair treaty— or equal treaty, as it is called by most
people— China had ever been offered. It is sheer preju-
dice to say that Sun Yat-Sen, on the advice of Chiang
Kai-Shek, sold himself to Communism when he was driven
away by Chen Chiung-Ming. It was through Chen
Chiung-Ming’s own efforts that the world learnt that
Sun Yat-Sen had been planning to resume diplomatic
relations with Russia and Germany, and the final agree-
ment was reached after Chen Chiung-Ming had been
driven out of Canton. And it was put down in black and
white that ‘the Communistic order or even the Soviet
system cannot actually be introduced into China’.
It was on this kind of understanding that Chiang Kai-
Shek was sent to Russia at the head of a delegation called
‘Dr Sun Yat-Sen’s Mission to Soviet Russia’. Its aim was
175
G
‘to pay a goodwill call and study the political conditions
and party organisation of Soviet Russia.’ The delegation
started from Shanghai in August by a boat going north,
and crossed the frontier into Siberia at the station of
Man-Chou-Li, or Lupin as it is now called, towards the
end of that month. At that time, it is interesting to note,
there were only a thousand families inhabiting the place,
roughly half of them Chinese and half Russian. An
inspection was carried out of every train arriving here,
and all had to change as the coaches did not pass through.
Chiang Kai-Shek and the rest of the delegation were con-
ducted to see the actual frontier, and they were surprised
to find that it was a long and narrow strip of road with
no sentinels on either side to guard it, which anyone could
cross and recross with entire freedom.
Chiang Kai-Shek and his companions continued their
travels without incident until six days prior to their arrival
at Moscow, when a thorough examination of their luggage
was made. It was noticed that the landscape, streets, shops
and houses began to look European only when within an
hour and a half of Moscow. Chiang Kai-Shek arrived at
Moscow at the beginning of September, and except for
paying a short visit to Leningrad (still called Petrograd at
that time) he spent three months almost entirely in
Moscow, attending various organisations to study them
and calling on a number of people who were connected
with China. His greatest regret was that Lenin, being
very ill, could not see him.
The first important man he met in Russia was Chicherin,
the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Besides their
discussion of Communist Party and Kuo Min Tang
matters, Chiang Kai-Shek tried very hard to impress upon
him that the Chinese people were very much concerned
about Russian activities in Outer Mongolia. He also met
and talked with Kalinin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and other
prominent leaders of Soviet Russia at that time. Of
176
Kalinin, the Chairman of the Soviet, he recorded in his
diary: ‘An honest and sincere peasant who, when asked
about important affairs outside Russia, did not know how
to answer. What a parliamentarian for a country ruled
by peasants!’ The entry about Trotsky in his diary was:
‘The essential qualifications of a revolutionary are patience
and activity ; the lack of either would never do. This was
also his farewell advice to me.’ As Trotsky was still an
important man in Russia then, he also wrote to him about
the importance of restoring Outer Mongolia to China.
He had an interview with the Secretary-in-Chief of the
Communist Party, which lasted more than two hours. The
things he jotted down after this interview were: ‘Three
reasons for the success of the Russian Revoution: i. The
workers knew the necessity of the Revolution; 2, the
peasants wanted to have a share in the land; and 3, the
hundred and fifty different races in Russia were given
the right of self-government and to join the Soviet Union.
Also three drawbacks: i, after the confiscation of
factories, no managers could be found; 2, when all small
factories were taken over by the State, the effect of the
monopoly was too severe; 3, the distribution of profit was
difficult.’ Another entry reads as follows: ‘Latest condi-
tion of reconstruction: i, extensive compulsory education
for children; 2, military training for all workers; 3, small
factories on lease to private persons.’
The next person he went to see was the Director-
General of Military Training. From him Chiang Kai-
Shek learned a great deal about the formation of the Red
Army and the political side of it run by representatives
from the Party. And for a practical demonstration, he
went to study the working of the Party men in the Army.
He found that in the 144th Regiment of Infantry of the
Red Army the Commanding Officer was in charge of only
military direction. As for political and spiritual training
and lectures on general knowledge, etc., this was entirely
177
done by Party representatives. The respective duty and
authority of the officer and the Party representative was
clearly divided, and the system worked very well. His
meeting with the People’s Commissar of Education gave
him these notes: 'The tendency of Russian Education:
I, Uniformity of educational system; 2, increase of
technical schools; 3, getting near to real life; 4, paying
special attention to workers’ schools; 5, abolition of
religion; 6, co-education; and 7, students administer
schools.’ *
Besides studying the Red Army, Navy and Air Force,
he also went around to see various places in order to gain
some knowledge of the social services, and the activities
and organisation of the Communist Party. During his stay
in Russia he saw several typical mass meetings, in one of
which there were no less than two hundred and twenty
thousand people taking part. He also attended a number
of small committee meetings and discussion groups, as well
as official receptions and banquets followed by theatrical
performances. He also examined the industrial and agri-
cultural organisations and visited several villages outside
Moscow. And he read Karl Marx’s Das Kapital while he
was in the Red capital. He remarked that the first half of
this work seemed heavy and made him wish to give it up,
but the second half was both profound and entrancing.
He had a very pleasant surprise and two most un-
pleasant shocks in Russia. He saw at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs three letters written by Sun Yat-Sen, one
to Lenin, one to Trotsky and one to Chicherin. In all of
them Sun Yat-Sen mentioned him and spoke of him very
highly. As for shocks, the first was on the day following
his speech on the Histor)'' of the Chinese Revolutionary
Party on October loth, the national day of the Chinese
Republic, when some Chinese students criticised his
speech as hero-worship. When he heard this he felt very
sorry for these young men who did not know the import-
178
ance of respecting the leader of their own country. The
other shock was when he read the Resolution about the
Kuo Min Tang passed by the Third International. After
he had read it over, he exclaimed angrily: ‘Pooh! Look at
what it says! To be so ignorant of a friendly Party! How
could it be the centre of world revolution?’
He left Moscow on November 29th, 1923, the next day
after he had read the Resolution. When he was on board
a steamer, three days before his arrival at Shanghai, he
read a document to be presented to Sun Yat-Sen and pre-
pared by the Chinese students in Russia. He found in it
the sentence: ‘There are many loyal ministers around you,
but very few real comrades.’ This remark made him more
angry than before, and he predicted that since the younger
generation had been so much misled by prejudice, it was
most probable that there would be trouble for the party in
the days ahead.
He reached Shanghai on December 15th and hurried
home to offer a religious ceremony to his late mother.
Before the end of the year he received a telegram from
Sun Yat-Sen urging him to return to Canton at once,
which he did very soon. This read:
‘To my Elder Brother Kai-Shek,
‘You have on your shoulders an extremely heavy
responsibility from this trip. Please come to Canton
immediately to report all matters, and plan in detail the
scheme for Sino-Russian co-operation. Your opinion,
which we respect, about the political situation and your
proposals we want to discuss with you in person. Also,
please get my two Elder Brothers Chang Ching-Kiang and
Tai Chi-Tao to come together with you. There is
important business to be discussed.
‘Sun Yat-Sen, Dec. 24th, 1923.’
Before Chiang Kai-Shek went abroad there had been a
179
radical change in Peking which must be recorded. In
June, 1923, the Chihli Military clique, having no further
use for the interim Government, made rapid arrangements
to drive away their puppet President Li Yuan-Hung, the
Buddha. Soldiers and policemen were ordered to hold a
mass meeting, after which they were told to go to the
Presidential Residence to ask the President for the back
pay which the Government owed them. Furthermore, a
large number of loafers and ruffians were engaged to
demonstrate against the President. To everybody’s sur-
prise, Li the Buddha was not easily intimidated into giving
up his job. He held firm for a while and had, at last, to be
got rid of by force.
After he was gone, the politicians who supported the
Chihli Military clique began their preparations for elect-
ing Tsao Kun to be the President. In July many Members
of Parliament who did not wish to collaborate with the
Chihli clique left Peking for Shanghai, where more than
a hundred of them held a meeting to denounce these War
Lords. But in September over four hundred Members who
had remained in Peking tried to elect Tsao Kun as Presi-
dent. At first, however, they quarrelled, and the election
was not carried through. But finally, on October 5th,
Tsao Kun was elected to the office he coveted by a
majority of 480 against Sun Yat-Sen’s 33 votes. Tsao Kun
had paid five thousand dollars for each vote, and quite a
few Members had been lured back by this bribe. It was
interesting to find that Sun Yat-Sen was so popular as to
get 33 votes from such a Parliament. Other runners-up
included Tuan Chi-jui who got three votes : Chen Chiung-
Ming, two votes; Wang Ching-Wei and Chang Tso-Lin,
one vote each. A notorious bandit leader whose name was
very much in the news got one vote, and there was also a
ballot paper on which the figure of five thousand dollars
was written instead of the name of the candidate.
This bribing of Members of Parliament to vote for Tsao
180
Kun was an open secret. Several days before the election
a member had reported this criminal proceeding to the
local Public Prosecutor of Peking, demanding a trial. He
not only provided the Prosecutor with the necessary
proofs, but also reproduced by photography a cheque
used for bribery and other documents, and had them pub-
lished in the newspapers. In spite of this the election went
off smoothly. Furthermore, these bribed members passed,
three days after the election, a hurriedly drafted new
Constitution for the Chinese Republic. Needless to say,
both the Members of Parliament in Shanghai and the
Government in Canton telegraphed the whole country
to condemn such actions in Peking as illegal and out-
rageous.
On account of his bad health, Joffe had been recalled
in July, 1923, and Leo Karakhan was sent to Peking as
the Representative-in-Chief of Soviet Russia in the Far
East. Soviet Russia did not want to miss anything. Whilst
they were negotiating with Sun Yat-Sen and his govern-
ment in Canton, they also wanted to get the Peking
Government to accept Karakhan as the Soviet Envoy
accredited to China. Through the deft diplomacy of
Wellington Koo, who was Foreign Minister in the
Peking Government at that time, Karakhan was later on
accepted as the first Ambassador to China, and arrange-
ments for returning the Chinese Eastern Railways to
China, as well as the giving up by Soviet Russia of her
special privileges in China were completed.
While Chiang Kai-Shek was still in Moscow, Soviet
Russia sent another man to Canton. Though this man did
not come as an official envoy from Russia, his work in
China was at least equally important, if not more so to
that of Karakhan. He was Michael Borodin, whose
original name was Grusenberg, or Berg as he was known
in America where he received his education. Before
coming to China he had been sent by the Third Inter-
181
national, first to Mexico, and then to Scotland, to promote
revolution, and lastly to Turkey, where he acted as adviser
to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Sun Yat-Sen made him his
adviser in December, 1923.
Since Tsao Kun had become President in Peking by
bribery. Sun Yat-Sen had redoubled his efforts to consoli-
date his foundations in order to expand northwards.
People began to realise that the so-called Republican
Government in Peking was going from bad to worse, and
that the only hope rested with Sun Yat-Sen and his party.
There was, therefore, an urgent demand to rejuvenate this
party, and it was decided that Russia could be used to a
large extent as a good example. Their advice and help
were welcomed, and the pohcy of allowing Communists
to become members of the Kuo Min Tang was decided
upon.
The First Congress of the Kuo Min Tang was held in
Canton in January, 1924, a few days after Chiang Kai-
Shek’s arrival, and it was on this important occasion when
the resolution that a Kuo Min Tang Army should be
organised and a Military Academy established was passed.
On January 24th, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed chair-
man of the Preparation Committee of this Academy. On
February 3rd he was also appointed a member of the Mili-
tary Council of the Headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang.
And on May 3rd, when the School was established, he was
appointed President of the Military Academy.
The original name of this institution was ‘The Military
Cadets’ School’ and as it was situated on the Island of
Wham-Poa, it was later known as the Whampoa Military
Academy. The island of Whampoa is only forty li (or
fourteen miles) from Canton, and can easily be reached
in an hour by .steam-launch. On this island is the Chang-
Chow Fort, and later on Chiang Kai-Shek was also
appointed Commander of the Fort. Formerly there had
182
been two schools, the buildings of which were still stand-
ing. They were the Kwangtung Provincial Military
School and the Kwantung Provincial Naval School. By
using these two buildings it was possible to start the new
academy almost instantly.
Chiang Kai-Shek was given a free hand in planning,
starting and running the Academy. At first he intended to
take about 320 students, and these were distributed in the
following proportions: 15 young officers to be selected
from each of the five armies of Kwangtung, Yunnan,
Kwangsi, Hunan and Honan; 10 or 12 from each province,
and 20 from among the children of the martyrs of the Kuo
Min Tang. But when the examination took place it was
found that there were far more candidates than were
expected. For instance, for the Province of Kwangtung
only 1 2 students were to be enrolled, but there came more
than 1,200. So it was decided to enrol 500 students in
all. As most of the candidates were well educated young
men, the competitive entrance examination they took was
pretty stiff. The papers they had to do included Chinese
essay writing, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigono-
metry, etc.
The Government in Canton at that time was very hard
up, but they managed to spare 186,600 Chinese silver
dollars for the initial expenses to start the Academy.
Towards the regular monthly allowance several organisa-
tions besides the Provincial Treasury were called upon to
contribute, and for the first few months the grant the
Academy received was 30,000 dollars monthly. At that
time a Chinese dollar was worth about two shillings, but
its purchasing power in China was much greater than two
shillings in England, and though these figures do not
sound very impressive, it was actually very generous on
the part of the Government. When later on the Treasury
was in a better position the allowance was increased
accordingly.
183
G
There is convincing evidence that Chiang Kai-Shek
planned the Academy entirely by himself. In a letter
he wrote during his absence to the other member of the
Preparation Committee he said: . As for the regula-
tions, etc., which I, your younger brother, had formerly
drafted, such as the length of time for graduation, curri-
culum, salaries for teachers and officers, and pay and
Mtions for the cadets, and also the selection and examina-
tion of the officers, please go ahead exactly as they were
planned. There is no need to change them. If you think
some of them are unsuitable it will not be too late to alter
them as may be necessary from time to time when the
School is started. In our work we must have a fixed idea;
and once it is fixed, we must not alter it at random; there
may be some small points not exactly as anticipated, but
we must follow the fixed plan. For instance, the length
of time allowed for graduation is a vital point — very im-
portant to the future of the student. Once it is fixed at
six months, to alter it into a year would upset all our plans,
including the curriculum and budgets, etc. How could we
do this lightly?’
He then went on to assign the various members of the
committee to their specific duties and concluded; ‘. . . I
hope all my Elder Brothers will attend to their duties more
and make suggestions less. Otherwise it will hamper our
progress. When I am in Canton, we can discuss your
suggestions; but during my absence, though you could
propose and discuss them, important alterations adopted
would be criticised by others as unauthorised. As we are
no mere acquaintances it is only right that I should speak
plainly to you. In our work we suffer from lack of
experience and knowledge. So we have to think over and
consider everything before we do it. We must not follow
free advice too readily and discard our decided plans. We
should not be moved even by the force of the tumbling
mountain or upheaval of the ocean, once our plan has
184
been reached by careful consideraiton. We, who are
young and inexperienced, should be more careful than
others. If we change our decided plans whenever we see
something new, we will be falling into the mistake of
embracing misleading advice. As I know we are not such
irresponsible people, we should watch and encourage each
other and hope to achieve success.’
It can be deduced from the above letter that the
Academy was planned and run by Chiang Kai-Shek
single-handed: those who helped him in his work had to
take his orders. He engaged a number of Red Army
officers to be instructors at the Academy and among them
was General Bluecher, who later became the commander-
in-chief of the Far East Red Army. When General
Bluecher was in China, his name was Galens and he served
as Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chief-of-Staff. The period of train-
ing in his school was short, being only six months, but it
was extremely intensive. The curriculum was more than
full. Besides all kinds of military science, the student had
to study a number of subjects on political science, in
addition to most strenuous daily physical and military
drilling. And, above all, lectures on the history and prin-
ciples of the Kuo Min Tang were given by veteran
members of the Party. That was because the primary aim
of this institute was not only to train good soldiers but
also to cultivate staunch supporters of the Party.
On May 5th, 1924, the first set of 500 students entered
the School, and on June i6th the formal opening ceremony
took place, when Sun Yat-Sen, accompanied by all the
leading figures of the Government, the Army and the
Party, attended. On this important occasion the Party
Leader said to the cadets: ‘The foundation for our
Republic scarcely exists. The reason is a simple one: our
Revolution has been carried on by the struggles of a revolu-
tionary party but not by a revolutionary army. Because
of the lack of a revolutionary army, the Republic has been
185
mismanaged by War Lords and Bureaucrats. Our Revolu-
tion will never succeed if this continues. With the estab-
lishment of this School a new hope is born to us to-day.
From now onwards a new era has begun for our Revolu-
tion. This School is the basis of the Revolutionary Army,
of which you students form the nucleus.’
That, indeed, marked the turning point of the Kuo Min
Tang and also of Chiang Kai-Shek’s life. It was notice-
able that hitherto he had not figured too prominently in
the Party, though his position in the Army had risen to
certain heights. But even in this sphere there were certain
commanders-in-chief whose importance the Party had to
respect. And in years to come, so long as the Party had
to depend upon any kind of support from commanders-
in-chief with huge armies behind them— many of whom
were no better than soldiers of fortune who might one day
choose to make use of and humour the Kuo Min Tang—
both the Party and Chiang Kai-Shek never knew where
they actually stood. This little body of 500 cadets was
the first stone in building the foundations of a mighty
power. Since only six months were required to complete
this training, numerous cadets could be prepared for active
service in a comparatively short time to form a Party
Army. That is why within a few years the new Revolu-
tionary Army, with Chiang Kai-Shek as Commander-in-
Chief, was able to start its ultimately successful Northern
Punitive Expedition.
As has been mentioned a few pages back, the Kuo Min
Tang held its first National Congress in January, 1924,
when Chiang Kai-Shek had just returned to Canton from
Moscow. The Congress was attended by 165 delegates
from various branches of the Party all over the country,
including some from abroad. Formally, the meeting was
called to announce, ratify and carry out of the reforma-
tion of the Kuo Min Tang. In reality it was to pull the
186
Party together by making it a public political organisa-
tion, also to be as democratic as possible, and to admit
those members of the Chinese Communist Party who
wished to join. It was only after this Congress that the
principles of the Kuo Min Tang were made pubhc and
accessible to all those who were interested.
From January, 1924, onwards. Sun Yat-Sen began a
series of lectures on his Three Principles of the People,
of which Chiang Kai-Shek has been the most powerful
supporter. Lincoln’s words: ‘Government of the people,
for the people and by the people’ when rendered into
Chinese became: ‘The People are to have, the People are
to control, and the People are to enjoy.’ Basing his ideas
on this, Sun Yat-Sen expounded them in the form known
in China as ‘San Min Chu I’, or ‘The Three Principles of
the People’. The first is Min Tsu, literally People’s Race,
and can be roughly translated as National Solidarity; the
second, Min Ch’iian, literally People’s Rights, means prac-
tically Democracy; the third, Min Sheng, literally People’s
Livelihood, has been translated as Social Welfare or
Socialism, and Sun Yat-Sen himself went so far as to say
it was nothing short of Communism.
These lectures were taken down by stenographers as
they were delivered and after having been revised by Sun
Yat-Sen were subsequently published. And it was high
time that this should be done. First of all, a political pro-
gramme was urgently needed for the Kuo Min Tang, now
that the Communists had come out into the open and
many of them had also joined the Kuo Min Tang.
Secondly, Sun Yat-Sen’s health was failing rapidly. He
had a serious breakdown in May after he had finished
speaking on his second Principle. In August he was
sufficiently recovered to go on with his third and last
Principle. But by the end of that month, when he had
only finished four of his six lectures on the subject, unex-
pected trouble was started by the Merchants’ Corps of
187
Ginton and he had to give up his talks to look after mili-
tary affairs. After that important matters developed
rapidly, and he had to go to Peking, hoping to call his
long-hoped-for People’s Convention. But in March, 1925,
he died in the Northern Capital, leaving his work not
entirely finished.
The part which Chiang Kai-Shek played in this re-
organisation of the Kuo Min Tang was undoubtedly im-
portant. He was one of the few supporters of the approach
to Soviet Russia and he defended Sun Yat-Sen’s diplomatic
move when others attacked it. He headed the Sun Yat-
Sen Mission to Russia, and co-ordinated the newly-
engaged Russian advisers and staff-officers with their
Cantonese opposite numbers. But it cannot be too em-
phatically stressed that Chiang Kai-Shek never has been,
nor ever will be, a purely ‘Party man’. His activities have
always been chiefly with military affairs. And, as the con-
dition of the various armies in Kwangtung was extremely
complicated, a man without a large body of troops under
his command would have found it very difficult to do any-
thing. Therefore Chiang Kai-Shek was given the unique
job of founding a new Revolutionary Army, a force that
would fight not for any individual leader but for the ideas
of the Kuo Min Tang. Hence the establishment of the
Whampoa Military Academy.
For many years past Sun Yat-Sen had always assigned
work connected with the Party to three close followers.
One was Liao Chung-Kai, with whom Chiang Kai-Shek
had communicated on a number of occasions and who had
gone to Japan not long before this to spend a month there
with Joffe, to discuss the co-operation of China with
Russia. The other two were Wang Ching-Wei and Hu
Han-Min, and it is necessary to introduce these men
properly here.
Wang Ching-Wei’s name can be remembered in connec-
tion with the Japanese sponsored government in Nanking
188
established during the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945. He
was the first puppet President. To give the devil his due,
he had been until then an ardent revolutionary, ever since
1910, when he attempted to assassinate the Manchu Prince
Regent in Peking. He was sentenced to life imprisonment,
but thanks to the success of the 1911 Revolution, he was
freed and instantly became a national figure to follow Sun
Yat-Sen and later acted as a kind of private secretary to
the Leader. In 1925, when Sun Yat-Sen died in Peking,
it was Wang Ching-Wei, who drafted and copied the
Leader’s famous Will, because both Hu Han-Min and Liao
Chung-Kai were in the South. Since Wang Ching-Wei’s
betrayal of his country, many patriotic members of the
Party have suggested that this Will should be discarded.
As, however, it embodied the idea of Sun Yat-Sen’s life-
long work, it had already become an important historical
document and could not be cast away and forgotten.
Wang Ching-Wei was the junior member of this trio.
He had SO far represented, together with Liao Chung-Kai
who was his senior in age as well as in his standing in the
Party, the more radical and advanced elements of the Kuo
Min Tang. On the other hand, Hu Han-Min was a
veteran member of the Party and also a classical scholar.
His revolutionary record dated back to the days when Sun
Yat-Sen and his followers were still trying to collect sup-
porters everywhere for a rising. As editor of a newspaper
in Hongkong he did much for the Revolution, and was
elected Military Governor of the Kwangtung Province
soon after Canton had declared its independence from
the Manchu Government in 1911 and the original
Governor of the old regime had fled.
When Chiang Kai-Shek and Chen Chi-Mei were fight-
ing against Yuan Shih-Kai’s forces in Shanghai, Hu Han-
Min promptly announced his opposition to the Peking
Government. Like Chiang Kai-Shek and Chen Chi-Mei,
he was defeated by Yuan Shih-Kai’s men and had to leave
189
Canton, where he joined Sun Yat-Sen again when they
went back in 1917, and he was then re-installed as the Pro-
vincial Governor. He had followed Sun Yat-Sen through
thick and thin, and very few followers were as loyal as
he was. By attending on the Master for many years, he
became his most intimate and trusted disciple and acted as
his confidential secretary. He generally associated him-
self with the older members of the Party and represented
the moderate and even the conservative elements of the
Kuo Min Tang.
That both Liao Chung-Kai and Chiang Kai-Shek
enjoyed Sun Yat-Sen’s confidence in his earlier secret
negotiations with Soviet Russia there is ample evidence.
When the policy was finally decided and made public
there was little or no opposition from within the Party
at first. What was the attitude of Wang Ching-Wei and
Hu Han-Min can be guessed from their usual inclinations:
Wang Ching-Wei was fairly warm and Hu Han-Min
rather cold. That was why Chiang Kai-Shek, who was
very enthusiastic, had been let into the inner circle and
entrusted with the Mission to Russia. His venture into
party politics marked an important turning-point in his
life; for party politics is party politics all the world over,
no matter whether there is only one party, or two or
several, and he was primarily a soldier.
When Sun Yat-Sen met Joffe and they issued their mani-
festo, it was only an overture. Chiang Kai-Shek’s mission
to Moscow also was not a decisive step either. In reality
it was Great Britain who drove the Kuo Min Tang into
the arms of Soviet Russia.
After his return to Canton, Sun Yat-Sen found his
Government was in greater need of money than ever
before. Chen Chiung-Ming had left him penniless, and
now with several large mercenary armies which had
fought to reinstall him in Canton, to be rewarded and paid
190
regularly, Sun Yat-Sen was in a desperate position. One
of the sources of finance was the Customs in Canton, but
owing to the Republic’s faithful observance of treaties
made by the Manchu regime with Foreign Powers, all the
Customs were controlled by the Creditor-Powers of
China. Under the Peace Treaties signed after the Boxers’
War, China was to pay an indemnity of £900,000,000.
This debt, and later on other debts incurred by the Peking
Government, was to be paid chiefly through China’s
customs revenue, and any surplus from the fixed rate
was to be handed over to the Chinese Government in
Peking.
Thus the surplus from the Canton Customs House had
hitherto been sent to the Peking Government, and it was
now a rather ironical situation that the Peking Govern-
ment should be using the money from Canton to pay the
soldiers who were trying to turn out Sun Yat-Sen’s
Government, while Sun Yat-Sen himself was in urgent
need of money to pay the armies which were serving him
and his Government. It was natural that Sun Yat-Sen
should think it fair to approach the diplomatic bodies and
ask them to pass through the usual channels what was due
to be paid on the Boxers’ Indemnity debt, but to hand
over the surplus from Canton Customs’ to his Government
instead of sending it to his enemies. He first made this
request in the Spring of 1923, and having been flatly re-
fused he declared in December that he would seize and
keep the Canton surplus by force.
On December 7th, 1923, the Powers, headed by Great
Britain gathered an international naval force of seventeen
warships along the shores of Canton to intimidate Sun Yat-
Sen. The Commander-in-Chief of the British Fleet, China
Station, the late Admiral Leveson, went to Canton to
superintend the demonstration personally and the occa-
sion was truly international, as the flags of many countries
were flying on these ships: British, American, French,
[91
Japanese, and even a Portuguese flag were seen on a vessel
which should rightly belong to the British Museum.
Immediately after the demonstration, Sun Yat-Sen
ordered his Foreign Minister to bring to him representa-
tives of Reuters and other members of the Press, and
openly declared to them that since his repeated requests
to Britain and America for sympathy had failed, as shown
by this display of naval force, he would turn to Russia for
help.
But that was only a threat. He was still hoping that he
could do business with Britain and America. Firstly, if he
had really been proceeding to obtain help from Russia,
he need not have shouted so loudly. He would certainly
have set about it as quietly as possible, as was shown later.
Secondly, in January, 1924, when the First National Con-
gress was sitting, the Labour Party was victorious in the
general election in Britain. Sun Yat-Sen, on behalf of Kuo
Min Tang, sent his congratulations to Ramsay MacDonald.
If he had not wished to promote good relations with
Britain, why should he have risked being snubbed, which
indeed proved to be the case? His congratulatory telegram
was not even acknowledged by a secretary of the new
Prime Minister of Great Britain.
On the very next day news came that Lenin was dead.
The Congress was adjourned for five minutes to indicate
its respect for the deceased revolutionary leader and its
sympathy with the Russian people. Soon a telegram was
received, sent by A 4 . Chicherin, the Russian Foreign Com-
missar, to express how much the Russians had appreciated
this gesture. These two little incidents helped Sun Yat-
Sen and his followers very much to decide which way to
turn.
Since the Kuo Min Tang had decided to go ‘left’ and
approach Soviet Russia, Sun Yat-Sen wanted to start with
a clean slate, by enlisting the services of a large number
192
of new people with ‘left’ tendencies, and by dropping
old members of the Party who leaned towards the ‘right’.
There were sweeping changes, and early in March, 1924,
Chiang Kai-Shek wrote a very long letter to Sun Yat-Sen
criticising many of Sun’s false steps. He thought Sun Yat-
Sen had been rather rash and said that ‘this is only a period
of transition in which not all the old members and per-
sonalities should be wiped out, even though the new in-
fluence will be greatly extended and increased in the near
future. At present the new influence has not yet increased.
What is more, it is not quite certain whether it will be a
success or a failure. How then can we have no regard
whatever for the old measures and personalities? ’
He further told Sun Yat-Sen candidly that there were
few followers who were really loyal to their common
cause. Most of them were unreliable flatterers and oppor-
tunists. But, he asked, wasn’t there anyone who was
straight and who had a good character? After he had
related many past histories of their association, he recom-
mended Hu Han-Min, the conservative partisan, whom
Sun Yat-Sen wanted to drop because of the change of
Party policy.
‘I often reflect that among the comrades of our Party
there are only a few who possess both learning and
courage as well as good character. We could not find
many like Hu Han-Min, a man knowing thoroughly the
history of our Party and able to co-ordinate all the factions
within it. Why don’t you, my Master, let him follow
you and be at your side to assist you? Do you, my Master,
really think that he is a bookworm and consequently use-
less? But is there in our Party a man of letters who is not
somewhat of a bookworm? Do you think that he has been
responsible for the Party affairs for so long and has been
so high-handed that he may rebel as did the traitor Chen?
Then I must ask you, my Master, to remember what I
used to say: the traitor Chen was sure to betray you, and
193
you will believe that I am right to-day when I say that
Hu Han-Min can be trusted. If you, my Master, fear that
his brother may hinder him both in public and private
affairs, surely his brother could be asked to go far away
from him.’
Chiang Kai-Shek’s remark about Hu Han-Min’s brother
was prophetic: for in the following year Hu Han-Min was
implicated in a criminal case when his brother was found
to be one of the promoters of the assassination of Liao
Chung-Kai, the extreme ‘leftist’ in the Party. In other
ways this letter served its purpose, and Hu Han-Min,
though Sun Yat-Sen no longer entrusted him with Party
affairs concerning the new measures of the reorganised
Kuo Min Tang, remained an important figure around the
Leader.
In October, when the Merchants’ Corps of Canton was
about to strike a death-blow to Sun Yat-Sen, it was decided
that with the advice of Borodin a Revolutionary Council
should be formed to deal with important matters in an
emergency. Chiang Kai-Shek wrote the following letter
to Sun Yat-Sen:
‘To my Master:
‘To-day adviser Borodin came to the Academy to dis-
cuss with me the possible members of the Revolutionary
Council, and indicated that he very much did not want
Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei to be included. To
have such an idea he really cannot know our Party. I
think that Hu Han-Min, because of his strong prejudice,
would be difficult to work with, and so could be excluded.
But to wish to exclude Wang Ching-Wei as well is impos-
sible to understand. I hesitate to agree to this. Not only
would such a step put obstacles in our way, but it would
invite trouble immediately. He thouejht that the exclusion
of Hu and Wang would avoid complication, but in reality
it would increase complications. There is no need to fear
that they would dissent from our resolutions and hamper
194
their execution: for you, my Master, have the final decision
which cannot be vetoed by any member. Then why
should we oust these two people? I think it would be
better to include the names of Hu Han-Min and Wang
Ching-Wei in the Council. If they withdraw voluntarily,
that would be a different matter. But Hu and Wang must
be on our list, otherwise we had better postpone the
organisation of it. I wait anxiously for your clear judg-
ment and reply. Chiang Kai-Shek.’
Sun Yat-Sen, however, remained firm in his reply:
‘The Revolutionary Council must be organised at once
to meet all kinds of emergencies. To exclude Hu Han-
Min and Wang Ching-Wei is quite in order. We must
follow the Russian pattern in our Revolution to-day. Hu
Han-Min has lost confidence in this, and his non-participa-
tion will help us, whilst his participation would create
many obstacles. It hurts both ways, and we must not
be polite. Neither i§ Wang Ching-Wei a revolution-
ary of the Russian style. We can do without him.
From now on if our Party doesn’t follow the Russian
model we will never succeed, and both Hu Han-Min and
and Wang Ching-Wei will not condescend to follow it.
Besides, they are both good at compromise, but no good
at dravStic change. To maintain the present insipid condi-
tion, with these two people, is easy. If we want to create
a new order, they are not the men for it. To use people
according to their specialities brings advantage to both
the men and their work. If we mix the men, both will
suffer.
‘We have left Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei to
maintain and co-ordinate the present conditions. When
today such conditions can no longer be maintained,
and the whole order is about to collapse, we must “use a
sharp knife and chop the confused hemp”: to succeed or
to fail we do not care. The Revolutionary Council is the
organisation for such a measure. It would not suit Hu
195
Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei. We must take separate
roads to do our work and must not make do with mud
and water. This is my reply.’
The forming of the Revolutionary Council was
announced on the following day, with Sun Yat-Sen as the
President, who appointed six plenipotentiary commissars.
They appeared in the list in this order: i, Hsu Chung-
Chih, Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese Army; 2,
Liao Chung-Kai, the Leftist: 3, Wang Ching-Wei (!);
4, Chiang Kai-Shek; 5, Eugene Chen, the Diplomat; 5,
Tan Ping-Shan, representing the Communists.
So Sun Yat-sen had to yield to Chiang Kai-Shek and
Wang Ching-Wei was included in this authoritative
organisation. Later events proved that Wang Ching-Wei
had for a considerable length of time ser\^ed the new cause
quite well. As for Hu Han-Min, although he was not a
commissar in this new Council, he continued to hold a
very high position at the Headquarters of the General-
issimo.
Whether Chiang Kai-Shek’s dabbling in party politics
has done him good or harm it is difficult to say. Although
it is perfectly true that during the nine months from
January to October, 1924, his prestige had greatly in-
creased, it must be remembered that this was largely due to
his founding and running the Military Academy. By that
time the second batch of cadets, which numbered over
1,000, was under training. The staff officer of former days
was now the most reliable supporter of the Party, with a
solid force behind him. He was no longer a man to be
trifled with. Those who were loyal to the Party looked
m to him as the only possible saviour of the Kuo Min
Tang, and those soldiers of fortune who had no love for
the Party considered him as the sole obstacle in their way.
All eyes were turned on him.
As all kinds of responsibilities began to be heaped upon
196
his shoulders, Chiang Kai-Shek, besides doing all he could
to build up the Whampoa Military Academy into the
most important institution in the new Government, went
all out to co-ordinate the various mercenary forces which
had driven away Chen Chiung-Ming and were now
stationed in and around Canton. At the moment the two
outstanding trouble-makers were the Yunnanese Army
under the command of General Yang Hsi-Min and the
Kwangsi Army under the command of General Liu Chen-
Huan. Being the first to enter the Provincial Capital in
their expedition against Chen Chiung-Ming, they con-
sidered themselves the greatest benefactors to Sun Yat-Sen
and his followers and entitled to reap as rich a reward as
they could lay their hand on. And as a rule people who
consider themselves benefactors are idle and greedy.
In May, 1924, in a circular telegram to all the officers
of the Cantonese Army, Chiang Kai-Shek said: ‘. . . It is
now a year and a half since the return to Canton of our
Generalissimo (Sun Yat-Sen). We have, under the direct
control of our Central Government (the Cantonese
Government), no less than 100,000 soldiers. But the
traitor Chen is still at bay, just as bad as before; and the
people in Kwangtung are suffering more and more. Is it
because our friendly forces are tired and weak that they
cannot wipe out a small army of 30,000 rebels with their
100,000 men? No. It is really because suspicion and
jealousy are rife and there is no co-ordination among them.
When various forces are not united even in spirit, not only
can they never defeat their enemy, but also they will be
defeated by him . .
With tens of thousands of idle and greedy benefactors
about, the Province of Kwangtung suffered greatly
during the years 1923 and 1924 when every financial
resource was thoroughly squeezed. The commanders of
the above-mentioned armies appointed numerous revenue
collectors and district governors to extract money from
197
the people, and Sun Yat-Sen’s Government was left in a
poverty-stricken state. That was why Sun Yat-Sen
wanted to keep the Customs surplus. As the Powers were
most ruthless in dealing with his threat to take over the
Customs by force, Sun Yat-Sen had to turn to Soviet
Russia, who was most anxious to help him.
In those early days Sun Yat-Sen’s policy of ‘co-operat-
ing with Soviet Russia and tolerating the Communists’
was naturally not at all popular. The word ‘Bolsheviki’
inspired instant horror in China, just as it did elsewhere.
Sun Yat-Sen had to declaim over and over again that
Communism was not suitable for China and that his own
doctrine of the People’s Livelihood was as good as any
fashionable ‘ism’.
Chiang Kai-Shek, his trusted lieutenant in their secret
negotiations with Soviet Russia as well as his personal
representative in China’s first goodwill mission to Soviet
Russia, was assigned yet another thankless job, that of co-
operating all the so-called friendly armies who rivalled
each other in grabbing for money. Whereas the former
undertaking was bound to receive criticism from all
quarters except a very few, the latter was an attempt to
achieve the impossible. Yet untiringly Chiang Kai-Shek
worked on, and it can be said that he accomplished what
no other person could possibly have done: he kept them
from quarrelling openly with each other, from rebelling
against the Government, and, when such a rebellion was
no longer preventable, he cut the Gordian knot in the
nick of time. Soon after the death of Sun Yat-Sen in the
Spring of 1926, when he found that both the Yunnanese
and Kwangsi armies were communicating with Chen
Chiung-Ming, he attacked them with his Students’
Army, aided by Hsu Chung-Chih’s Cantonese Army.
His dealing with the Communists was a much more
complicated job, and what he did with them was more
open to controversy. As later chapters will be greatly
198
concerned with this subject, suffice it here to deal with
the matter very briefly, merely to maintain a record of
the main events in their chronological order.
The announcement of the admission of Chinese Com-
munists into the Kuo Min Tang was made in January,
1924, and on June ist the Central Executive Committee
received the first petition for an order of censure on the
Communist members. The petition was sent in by a few
prominent men who were on the Executive Committee
of the Cantonese City Branch of the Kuo Min Tang.
Eighteen days after this, three of the five members of the
Central Supervisory Committee, the highest supervising
body of the Party, proposed such a vote of censure.
Chiang Kai-Shek was one of the very few who realised
that at this critical moment their ranks must be closed
and that members of the Kuo Min Tang must fight hand-
in-hand with Communists against their common enemy.
On June 29th, eleven days after the proposal for a vote
of censure was made, in a public speech he made at his
Military Academy, he praised loudly the Russian Com-
munist Party and their members. He said: . . Members
of the Russian Communist Party^are willing to work under
any land of hardship, whilst members of our Kuo Min
Tang are not. Russian Communists are willing to work
for the welfare of their country and the common people,
not solely for their own private interest. They let others
have power and advantage whilst they themselves do their
duty. Those who formerly were opposed to this Party
are now no longer so. Not only do they support this
Party but also they want to join it . . .’
Later, he allowed his cadets who were Communists to
form a Union of Military Youth, and non-Communists to
form the Sun Yat-Sen Society. The primary purpose of
these two organisations was to discuss and exchange
revolutionary ideas of the respective parties. It was also
hoped that they would promote mutual understanding
199
and goodwill. It was only when, much later on, he con-
sidered that the Communists were trying to undermine
the Kuo Min Tang, that he ordered the Communists to
withdraw from the Army and to disband their Union.
In the meantime the Society was also ordered to be
dissolved.
As he was getting to be more and more important, and
was a stout supporter of Sun Yat-Sen’s policy regarding
the Communists, Chiang Kai-Shek gradually became Sun
Yat-Sen’s most reliable man in dealing with all the anti-
Communistic forces in Canton. It is ironical to observe
that the merchants of the Kwangtung Province, and those
in Canton particularly, who suffered the heaviest on
account of the greed of the mercenary armies of Yunnan
and Kwangsi, should join hands with their oppressors in
their anti-Communistic and, in a larger sense, anti-Sun
Yat-Sen Government movement.
In May, 1924, the Merchants of Canton threatened to
call a general strike should the hard-up Government levy
a new tax on them, who considered themselves already
over-taxed. The fact that their burden had largely been
imposed upon them by the Yunnanese and Kwangsi
Armies made no difference to their strong anti-Govern-
mcnt attitude. On top of this business people hated Com-
munists like poison, and Sun Yat-Sen and his followers
were the patrons of the Communists in China.
In August and September, with the help of the leaders
of the Yunnanese Army, and, as accused by the Kuo Min
Tang, abetted by Chen Chiung-Ming and representatives
of British Imperialism in Hongkong, the Merchants’ Corps
planned to arm their men with nine thousand rifles which
they intended to smuggle into Canton for a rising against
the Government. When Sun Yat-Sen learned that such a
plot was afoot, and furthermore that a licence allowing a
Norwegian vessel to ship the arms into Canton had already
200 '
been obtained under some false pretence by the Merchants’
Corps, he had to turn to Chiang Kai-Shek for immediate
action.
He had chosen the right man. Chiang Kai-Shek did not
like the mercenary forces, neither did he approve any anti-
Communistic measures. Furthermore, he was already
known for his integrity and would never compromise, so
he could be trusted with those precious arms, and once
they were in his keeping nothing would induce him to
let them go again. With swift measures he seized the
Norwegian vessel and had the dangerous cargo unloaded,
storing them in the Military Academy.
The Merchants’ Corps wailed and proclaimed this an
outrage, whilst the Yunnanese Commander-in-Chief tried
his best to negotiate for their release. Strong measures and
soft means were used alternately by the conspirators, but
Chiang Kai-Shek was unmoved. The Merchants’ threat
to call a general strike was at last carried out, but it only
met with his order declaring martial law to ensure
safety.
While this trouble was going on in Canton, the
Northern Government in Peking was also shaking. The
Military Governor in Chekiang had started to fight
against forces around him sent by Peking. Chang Tso-
Lin, the War Lord in Manchuria, was also preparing his
forces for an attack on the Peking Government. Sun Yat-
Sen, who had already denounced Tsao Kun, the President
in Peking who had secured his position by bribing the
Members of Parliament, wanted very much to join in
the general uprising by starting his long waited-for
Northern Punitive Expedition. So it was arranged,
through the mediation of the Yunnanese Commander-in-
Chief, that the Government was to release the arms to the
Merchants on condition that they paid a fine of a million
dollars to help the Government to start the Punitive
Expedition. Later the million dollars was reduced to half
201
a million, and still later a further reduction of three
hundred thousand was allowed.
Chiang Kai-Shek stood firm. He would not trust the
Merchants. Neither did Sun Yat-Sen trust them, but he
had his reasons for compromise. The Government had
received a letter from the British Consulate-General in
Canton saying that if the Chinese Army fired on the
Merchants, the British Navy would bombard the Chinese
Army, and so on September 9th Sun Yat-Sen wrote to
Chiang Kai-Shek:
‘Kwangtung is now a place of death, the causes of
which are three. The first is the pressure of the British.
If the strike is to go on, disorder is sure to take place, and
the target of the British warships is my Headquarters, also
our gunboat Yung Feng and the Whampoa Military
Academy. Within a few score of minutes they’ll be
ashes. We have no power whatever to resist. We might
luckily avoid it this time, but it may occur again any time.
This is the first point. The second is the counter-offensive
by our enemy in the East River [Chen Chiung-Ming].
Now he is starting. If this develops we don’t know what
will be the result. The third is the disobedience and greed
of our friendly armies [of Yunnan and Kwangsi]. They
have committed all sorts of crimes and laid the blame on
us. It also will mean our death.
‘With these three causes we could not stay here for a
moment longer. We must discard everything to find a
new way of life. Now the best way is the Northern
Punitive Expedition. Besides, the Army from Manchuria
is planning to come inside the Great Wall. The army in
Chekiang can maintain its own ground and the people
want to overthrow Tsao. Near Wu-Chang and Han-Kow
there are armies who will support us. For these reasons
we must resolve to fight forward on our long trail. To
use battlefields as our training school will yield wonder-
ful results. Comrades of our Party must not hesitate.’
202
Chiang Kai-Shek did not hesitate. On the contrary, he
decided at once to keep Canton at all costs. Sun Yat-Sen
was also obstinate and moved his headquarters from
Canton to Shiuchow, leading away his own Guards, the
small Air Force, a Kiangsi Army, a Hunanese Army, a
new Yunnanese Army and a Honanese Army. Chiang
Kai-Shek and his students were left behind in the island
of Whampoa, actually surrounded by the unfriendly
forces of Kwangsi and Yunnan. Hu Han-Min, the con-
servative comrade, was ordered to be the acting Generalis-
simo during Sun Yat-Sen’s absence, and he and Chiang
Kai-Shek were to deal with the Merchants and other
opposition elements in Canton.
After Sun Yat-Sen’s departure with his forces, the situa-
tion in Canton rapidly became worse. By October Chiang
Kai-Shek realised that danger was imminent and urged
Sun Yat-Sen again and again to send him reinforcements.
On October 9th, the eve of the Merchants’ outbreak. Sun
Yat-Sen answered his repeated calls with this telegram in
secret code:
1 have received both your letters. According to my
calculation, it may not be so critical. But since my coming
to Shiuchow I have decided to break my kettles and sink
my boats, concentrating on the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion. Now that you feel the dangers in Canton so much,
I hope you’ll leave the isolated island of Whampoa and
come at once to Shiuchow with all the arms and ammuni-
tion, together with the students, to risk everything on this
Punitive Expedition. Act immediately when this telegram
reaches you, and you must not be reluctant to go. I will
never go back to relieve Canton. Decide instantly and
hesitate no more.’
Once more Chiang Kai-Shek refused to leave. His reply
insisted on Sun Yat-Sen’s early return:
‘Your instructions received. The rebel army and the
203
treacherous Merchants are united and more outrageous
than before. Danger will come upon our Academy in
Whampoa any moment. I have determined to defend this
isolated island till death, and now await your early return
with your army to relieve us. We would never give up
our base, without which our Party would lose its founda-
tion forever. If we hold it for a few days, or if the rebels
do not dare to attack us in a day or two, then our army
ought to be ready to launch a counter-offensive. If we
can pass through this crisis, it will be plain sailing ahead.
With the arms we now possess, we could train a good
brigade in three months’ time. They will be our founda-
tion, with which we can wipe out all our enemies and
make Canton a safe and solid base for the Revolution. I
will not go away a step from here, and I earnestly entreat
you to return soon. To-day is the key to our success or
failure.’
Regarding the arms confiscated from the Merchants’
Corps, Chiang Kai-Shek stated in this message that it
would be best to give them to Hsu Chung-Chih. He did
not want to bargain with the Merchants, who now only
offered two hundred thousand dollars as a loan instead of
a million as a fine for their release. Neither did he agree
to distribute them to various armies, which was bound to
create jealousy. As he had new arms for the training of a
revolutionary army, he did not want to keep those inferior
ones in his Academy to render it a target to those greedy
commanders.
But both Sun Yat-Sen and Hu Han-Min, who was act-
ing for the Leader in Canton, agreed to the Merchants’
terms. As part of the two hundred thousand dollars loan
was paid, an order from Sun Yat-Sen and a letter from
Hu Han-Min were given to Chiang Kai-Shek to release the
arms. Chiang Kai-Shek had to obey, though reluctantly.
As soon as some arms were handed over to the Merchants,
they started a quarrel with the soldiers. On the occasion
204
of the Republic Festival (which is on October loth, or the
Double Tenth as October is the tenth month of the year),
several soldiers were shot and killed by the Merchants.
Therefore the Revolutionary Committee was formed the
next day and there was no further chance for compromise.
Sun Yat-Sen finally decided to back Chiang Kai-Shek’s
method for dealing with the Merchants.
On the 13 th, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Head of
the Training Department in the Headquarters of the
Cantonese Army, and on the following day all the loyal
forces, including part of the Guards in the Generalis-
simo’s Headquarters, Voluntary Troops, Workers’ Corps,
Peasants’ Corps, a detachment of Armoured Cars, were
placed under Chiang Kai-Shek’s command. With this
rather haphazard mixed force, which was given the high-
sounding name of the Allied Army, combined with his
Cadets, a part of the Cantonese Army and a further force
of three thousand reinforcements from Shiuchow, he
started his attack on the Merchants’ Corps.
Chen Chiung-Ming’s forces were lurking near the City.
But when they started what they thought to be their well-
timed offensive, they found Chiang Kai-Shek had taken
every precaution. So the trouble with the Merchants
Corps was speedily settled, and after two days’ street
fighting the Corps capitulated and were disarmed. On
October 17th the strike in Canton ended and on the fol-
lowing day peace came back to the Provincial Capital.
This was Chiang Kai-Shek’s first decisive victory over
enemy forces as well as over internal opposition.
In the North the Peking Government won a first round
victory by defeating the Chekiang forces in a fortnight.
In fact, the Chihli Military Machine under the scholar-
general Wu Pei-Fu was so effective that the Chekiang
rising was subdued a few days after the Manchurian Army
started its march South. Because of the Merchants’ Corps
205
incident and lack of money, Sun Yat-Sen’s Northern
Expedition was very much delayed. Before the armies
from Kwangtung could really start on their way North,
Wu Pei-Fu had sent several formidable divisions of chosen
men to counter-attack the Manchurian Army, which was
still on the first stage of its way.
But towards the end of October Feng Yu-Hsiang, later
well known as the Christian General, who was then a
divisional commander under Wu Pei-Fu and was to fight
against the Manchurian Army, suddenly turned back to
march into Peking. He said he was thoroughly tired of
being instrumental in endless civil wars and now wanted
to ‘maintain peace in full armour’. Fie ordered Tsao Kun,
the bribing President, to go, and also drove out the ex-
Emperor Henry Pu-Yi, who, it was rumoured, was trying
to promote a second Restoration. Tuan Chi-Jui, the
powerful War Lord who had been Prime Minister in
Peking on several occasions, was invited by all the minor
War Lords to take over the Government.
At the beginning of the conp d'etat, Feng Yu-Hsiang
wanted to get all the political leaders to co-operate. Be-
sides Tuan Chi-Jui, he had also invited Chang Tso-Lin
from Manchuria and Sun Yat-Sen from Kwangtung
before establishing himself firmly in Peking. Tuan Chi-
Jui also joined in the invitation. Sun Yat-Sen, who realised
that his Northern Expedition had a long way to go, went
back to Canton on October 30th and held a conference
with his followers at his headquarters. It was decided that
he, as the leader of the most progressive political party in
China, should go to Peking to probe the possibility of
forming a real democratic government. On November 3rd
he went to the Whampoa Military Academy to bid fare-
well to the students and, after having appointed Hu Han-
Min his Deputy to stay in Canton and General Tan Yen-
Kai, a classical scholar and commander-in-chief of the
Hunanese Army, as the over-all Commander-in-Chief of
206
the Northern Punitive Expeditionary Force, he left
Canton with Wang Ching-Wei and about twenty others
for Peking.
The aim of Sun Yat-Sen and his Kuo Min Tang can
now be boiled down to two points: first, to sweep away
all the War Lords, and second, to cancel all the unfair
treaties forced upon China by the Powers. As he was now
invited to join other political leaders to work out a national
plan, his latest proposal was to call a National Assembly,
to which representatives of every organisation, political
or otherwise, should be invited. As I'uan Chi-Jui was the
greatest of all the War Lords and of a dictatorial disposi-
tion, he was the last man in the world to welcome Sun
Yat-Sen and his pohtical programme. He would not wait
for Sun Yat-Sen, and went to Peking to take up his post
on the same day that Sun Yat-Sen left Shanghai for
Tientsin.
By this time members of the Kuo Min Tang and of
the Chinese Communist Party were spread all over the
country, and Sun Yat-Sen’s stock among the youn^^er
generation, especially the students and intellectuals, was
extremely high. Tuan Chi-Jui and other politicians might
dislike him, but the reception he had at all the places he
passed was overwhelming. When he reached Tientsin he
was refused admittance into the French Concession by the
French authorities there. After his meeting with Chang
Tso-Lin, the Manchurian War Lord, this Northern soldier
said frankly to Wang Ching-Wei:
‘I thought Mr Sun was a very difficult man, but to-day
I found him to be a very kind gentleman. But all the
Ministers accredited to Peking do not like him, probably
because he co-operates with Russia. Could you tell him
that if he would give up his co-operation with Russia, I,
Chang Tso-Lin, would guarantee that all the Ministers
would be nice to him?’
Sun Yat-Sen’s health was failing, and he took to his bed
207
H
whilst in Tientsin. With undespairing determination he
struggled to leave his sick-bed for Peking on New Year’s
Eve, hoping he could achieve something. But while Sun
Yat-Sen was claiming the abolition of unfair treaties, Tuan
Chi-Jui, in order to induce the Corps Diplomatique to
recognise his position, had already accepted their memo-
randum to respect those very unfair treaties. After linger-
ing in bed for over two months, while realising that he
had travelled North in vain, he died on March 12th, 1925,
to the sorrow of practically the whole nation.
208
VII
I N years to come there will be historians who will say that
Chiang Kai-Shek was extremely successful in dealing with
military affairs, while others will hold the opposite view.
The argument for the former is that he conquered each
and all those who fought against him and his cause; whilst
that for the latter is that to have to fight against one’s sub-
ordinates or associates is not the hall-mark of a military
leader. In his political activities the position is exactly the
same. After his dabbling in party politics he soon turned
into a fully-fledged statesman, before the Kuo Min Tang
and the Chinese Communist Party started to cut each
other’s throats, and for the past decade he can be rightly
considered as the most important statesman in China or
even in the Far East.
To begin from the early days of the Kuo Min Tang-
Communist conflict, the reader will find that Chiang Kai-
Shek was always on the side of the Communists. Or to be
exact, he was only ‘not on the side of the anti-Communists’.
He was one of the promotors of Chinese-Soviet good
relations, and was even an ardent supporter of Sun Yat-
Sen’s co-operation with Soviet Russian policy. To do him
justice, he admired the Soviet system from afar but never
liked Communism, especially when some tovctrich wanted
to apply it to China. To co-operate with Soviet Russia is
one thing, and to like the Communist Party or the Com-
munists is altogether another thing.
In leading the Sun Yat-Sen good-will mission to Russia,
he went there not as a converted believer in Communism
209
but as an interested observer. His stay there was to have
been much longer than it was, but he cut it short for a
number of reasons, among which his disappointment with
some of the things he saw and met was an important one.
On March 14th, 1924, which was barely three months
after his return from Russia and before he had done any-
thing practical in the way of fostering the newly estab-
lished good-relationship between the two countries, he
wrote a very long letter to his best friend Liao Chung-
Kai, who, it will be remembered, was the most ardent
supporter of the policy of co-operation with Soviet Russia.
The later part of this letter records his innermost feelings
about the Communists he met in Russia. A faithful word-
for-word translation will throw much light on the subject,
as it is believed that this is the first time it has appeared in
English and not many people have seen or read the
original. In place of a footnote, it may be here pointed
out that at the time when Chiang Kai-Shek was in Russia,
Trotsky, and not Stalin, was at the head of the Party
machine, Lenin being seriously ill and a dying man. The
following is the last part of the letter:
‘. . . There is another matter which I want to tell you,
my Elder Brother, frankly: that is the question of our atti-
tude towards the Russian Party. In this question we must
separate the practical from the theoretical. We cannot
disregard the practical side of it simply because we can
believe it theoretically. From my observation, the Russian
Party is lacking in sincerity. Even when I told you, my
Elder Brother, that only thirty per cent of what the
Russians said was believable, it was said only because you,
my Elder Brother, were so enthusiastic in believing the
Russians that I had not the heart to disappoint you
altogether. Regarding their respect for Mr Sun per-
sonally, they are not Russian Communists but inter-
national partisans. As for those of our country who are
210
in Russia, they have nothing except slander and suspicion
for Mr Sun.
‘The sole aim of the Russian Party is to make the
Chinese Communist Party its legitimate heir. They do
not believe that our Party could co-operate with them to
the last, helping each other to achieve success. As regards
their policy in China, they want to make Manchuria,
Mongolia, the Mohamedan Province and Tibet each a
part of their Soviet, and even as to China Proper they arc
not without the wish to put their fingers in.
‘It is not reasonable to expect success by depending on
others whilst you are unable to stand up for yourself.
Those countrymen of ours have been insufficiently
educated and are hoping for such success. They hope
other people will act for them in executing the will of
Heaven, and they obey other people as if obeying their
God. Is that reasonable?
‘What they call “Internationalism” and “World Revolu-
tion” are nothing but Kaiser Imperialism. They have only
given it a new name and made it puzzling to distinguish
one from the other. Russians, as well as the English,
French, Americans and Japanese, it seems to me, all have
it in their minds to promote the interest of their own
respective countries at the cost of other nations. One of
them ridiculing the others about this is, as Mencius said,
just like a man who had run only fifty paces ridiculing
those who had run a hundred paces for having run at
all.
‘You, my Elder Brother, mentioned that our Chinese
representative was always unlucky, and cited a certain Mr
Chang as an example. This is far from the case and quite
incomparable. The reason is that those Chinese worship
only foreigners and have no regard for the great character
of our own people. For instance, some of our Chinese
Communists who are in Russia always scold other people
as slaves of America, of England and of Japan, never realis-
21 I
ing that they themselves have already completely become
slaves of Russia. If you, my Elder Brother, still do not
believe my words, and will not examine things carefully
at all, you will perhaps some day fall.
‘Our Party sent me to Russia; I have spent half a year
of my time and more than ten thousand dollars in money
there. It cannot be said that the matter has been treated
lightly. But to my report on this trip, as to what I saw and
heard, not the slightest attention has been paid. At this I
should feel ashamed of myself; people have completely
lost their faith in me and my reputation is now sweeping
the ground. I really ought to lay the blame on myself.
‘But I feel my conduct in Russia was impeccable.
Neither did I do anything injurious to our Party. Once
when I was being forced to join the Communist Party and
I refused by saying I must obtain Mr Sun’s permission first,
I was ridiculed as being loyal to an individual. I know
such is my nature and cannot avoid being ridiculed by
others. But a man who is loyal to his master has the virtue
of loving his compatriots and serving his country well,
whereas a traitor to China and a slave to foreigners is
betraying his country and ruining his compatriots. I’d
rather be looked down upon as a loyal subject than
honoured as a slave of foreigners, and hope you, my Elder
Brother, will join me in maintaining such an aspiration.
‘I used to blame my comrades for hesitating to speak
out candidly, in consequence of which a hundred mis-
takes came out and thus no remedy could be effected. In
my observation of things, I think I do not look at them
subjectively. Neither do I try to be polite, nor view them
with prejudice. But one doesn’t know oneself. In the
eyes of others I may be wrong in my observations and not
fair in my judgments. This I do not know. Whether I
am right or wrong, whether my observation is good or
bad, I entirely trust you, my Elder Brother, whose view
is final. All I want is to clear my conscience. Though this
212
letter is extremely long, it has not exhausted what is in my
mind. Though I am not dead, I really want you, my Elder
Brother, to consider this letter as the posthumous words
of a dead friend.’
The reader is asked to bear this letter in mind when he
reads later on of Chiang Kai-Shek’s actions concerning the
Communists. When the Chinese Communists were first
allowed to join the Kuo Min Tang, the membership of the
Communist Party was extremely small and they did not
carry great weight anywhere. They did not have any part
of China as their territory, nor an independent army of
their own. No doubt people at that time thought that to
allow a very small party to join a much larger party was
somewhat like France allowing Monaco to join the
Republic. Mao Tse-Tung, the powerful Communist
leader in China to-day, was made only a Reserve Member
of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo Min
Tang, that is, he had at least twenty-four Full Members
of this Committee as his seniors. And among the seven-
teen Reserve Members his name appeared eleventh.
Among the twenty-four Full Members only three were
Communists; later on one left the Communist Party after
much drastic activity and the other was sentenced and
hanged in Peking by Chang Tso-Lin, the War Lord from
Manchuria. Chou En-Lai, the Communist representative
in Chungking and Nanking, was much later recommended
by Chiang Kai-Shek to be appointed a military judge in
his army. He was not on any of the Central Committees.
In spite of repeated opposition by various influential
people in the Party and the Government, the Communists
were given vital work in the army, the reason for this
being that the new army to be formed by Chiang Kai-
Shek with his cadets was to be modelled after the Red
Army. Russian staflf officers, advisers and instructors were
engaged and much had to be learnt from them.
The trouble over the arms secretly bought by the
Merchants’ Corps in Canton before a licence was obtained,
was the very first concrete anti-Communist measure taken
by the combined forces of various haters of Communism.
It is alleged that the British Imperialists in Hongkong were
the chief string-pullers. In view of the naval demonstra-
tion of December 5th, 1923, and the letter to the Govern-
ment in Canton sent by the British Consul-General on
August 27th, 1924, such an accusation cannot easily be
denied. But within the rank and file of the Cantonese
Regime there were the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Com-
manders who were only too ready to fish in troubled
waters, and also those die-hard conservatives who from
the very first had hated the Communists more than poison.
Though the rising would mean the overthrow of the com-
plete Cantonese regime, those who only wanted to get rid
of the Communists thought it advisable to join in as a pro-
test against the Government’s erring policy.
Chiang Kai-Shek played the most important part in
handling this difficult situation, and, for good or evil, was
afterwards considered the chief enemy of all the anti-
Communist forces. Luckily such a situation suited his
purposes, for in the later part of 1924 he was busily
engaged in organising the Revolutionary Army or the
Party Army with his graduated cadets as officers, and the
Communists and pro-Communists represented the most
enterprising and energetic elements of the time. They all
flocked together under him and he had the pick of them
in his service.
This new army started as a Training Corps, and besides
ordinary military officers, such as corporals and lieu-
tenants, captains and majors, there was in each unit a
Party Representative, and in larger units there were
Political Departments, each with a head and a small staff.
These officials looked after the social welfare of the
soldiers and imparted to them political knowledge. They
214
also acted temporarily in the absence of commanding
officers or when the commanding officers were killed or
disabled in battle.
At the beginning a considerable number of such posts
in Chiang Kai-Shek’s Army were filled by Kuo Min Tang
members who were also Communists, for the simple reason
that their political knowledge was, on the average, greater
than most others’, and it was necessary for them to know
a little about international affairs. It seemed to work very
smoothly this way, and the reader will be interested to
learn that Chou En-Lai, who was a military judge at first,
was later on, in September, 1925, recommended by Chiang
Kai-Shek for the appointment of head of the Political
Department attached to the First Army, that is, Chiang
Kai-Shek’s original Revolutionary Army.
The speedy conquest of the Merchants’ Corps in Canton
was the first test of the efficiency of Chiang Kai-Shek’s
cadets, and the Government and Chiang Kai-Shek had
good cause to be satisfied with them. At that time the
second batch of cadets was already in training, and very
soon the third and fourth batches, each much larger in
numbers than the previous ones, were admitted before
their predecessors had finished their course of training.
By January, 1926, some 5,540 cadets had matriculated,
and they formed the Spartan wall for the Kuo Min
Tang.
Four months after this first test, Chiang Kai-Shek
decided that it was time for his cadets to tackle something
bigger. Chen Chiung-Ming’s rebellious forces had been a
constant menace to Canton, and Chiang Kai-Shek had
always been anxious to wipe them out. Hitherto he had
had no troops of his own and now that there was the
Training Corps he considered it best to strike as early as
possible. So on February ist, 1925, while Sun Yat-Sen was
still ill in bed in Peking, he led his Training Corps, which
at that moment comprised only two regiments, about
three thousand men, including the five hundred first batch
cadets, to join the East River Expedition.
This expedition was launched at the time the bigger
one, the Northern Punitive Expedition under the com-
mand of Tan Yen-Kai, was suffering local defeats and
could not spare its men to be sent home to help. Hsu
Chung-Chih, Commander of the Cantonese Army, who
held a much higher position than that of Chiang Kai-Shek,
was nominally conducting the campaign. The two
‘friendly’ armies, those of Yunnan and Kwangsi, were
also partially mobilised. As only a part of Hsu Chung-
Chih’s Cantonese Army was joining this Expedition, the
Training Corps had to bear the brunt of the fighting.
On February 15th a decisive battle was fought in the
strategical town of Tam-Shui, which is about twenty miles
south of Waichow, the enemy’s headquarters. Brisk fight-
ing took place for a day and a night when the two regi-
ments of the Training Corps stormed and occupied the
city. On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek, who was
directing the engagement, said in a speech to his officers
and men:
‘. . . The defeat of the enemy at Tamshui was due to
your brave forward rush. With but two thousand Revolu-
tionary soldiers we have defeated five or six thousand of
the enemy. We have captured more than two thousand
officers and men as our prisoners. We have captured more
than a thousand rifles. Such a good report, when it reaches
our Generalissimo, will certainly make him overjoyed . . .’
Hu Han-Min, the acting Generalissimo, sent him the
following telegram:
‘To my Elder Brother Kai-Shek,
‘I have received Commander-in-Chief Hsu’s victorious
report and your telegram to the Master dated the i6th,
and am extremely glad to know that owing to the loyalty
and courage of our officers and men our army has defeated
216
the powerful enemy, of whom many were killed or cap-
tured. Above all, the discipline and bravery of the Train-
ing Corps have filled everybody with astonishment. As
their period of training has not been long and has yet
yielded such good results, it all shows that the doctrine
of our Party has been greatly helpful, and also proves that
you, my Elder Brother, have trained them well. Now that
the strength of the rebels has been reduced by half, we
can count the days before the East River is cleared of
them. 1 venture to congratulate our Party in advance. The
Master is pleased with the victorious news of the past few
days and his spirits are high. He specially asks me to con-
vey to you his approval and appreciation. Han-Min, 19th.’
In the middle of March another fierce battle was fought
in which a little over a thousand men of the Training
Corps routed more than ten thousand of the enemy. But
a heavy price had to be paid for this victory. Chiang Kai-
Shek later wrote: ‘Soldiers who fell in battle or were
totally disabled amounted to more than six hundred. Or
the five hundred students of the first batch who went to
the campaign with me, and the three hundred comrades
of the Training Corps, almost a third have died or been
wounded. When I speak or think of this, how my heart
hurts me!’
Though battles had been won, and though many dis-
tricts had been reoccupied, the campaign was not com-
pletely successful. The enemy was only half-broken when
news of the death of Sun Yat-Sen reached them. It was
now realised that their victories had been so costly because
the ‘friendly’ armies of Yunnan and Kwangsi were not
really friendly. In fact, these forces were almost as
friendly to the enemy as to the Government. With the
death of the great Leader, the Military Governor of the
Province of Yunnan, who had once been appointed by
Sun Yat-Sen as the Deputy Generalissimo, wanted to pro-
217
niote himself to be the Generalissimo. This proposal in-
^nsified the confusion in the Cantonese Government and
the Commanders of the Yunnanese and Kwangsi Armies
thought it was time for them to rebel against the Southern
Regime openly.
Chiang Kai-Shek was always the first to make drastic
moves. At a conference with Hsu Chung-Chih, while
Chiang Kai-Shek was anxious to plan the building of a
bigger Revolutionary Army to deal with those opposing
the Government, Hsu Chung-Chih was nagging him in
order to secure favourable positions for his own followers.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s temper could hardly be checked and
Hsu Chung-Chih realised his mistake, saying: ‘This cam-
paign against the rebels has been entirely dependent on the
determined action of your Military Academy. Without
you, my Elder Brother, how could the Regime in Canton
have been saved?’ He immediately promised to let Chiang
Kai-Shek train six more regiments.
It was late in May when Wang Ching-Wei returned to
Canton from Peking. He and Liao Chung-Kai came to
Chiang Kai-Shek’s headquarters of this campaign, and they
finally decided to give up the present undertaking in
order to stamp out troubles brewing in Canton. In
this important Conference a new Yunnanese military
leader. General Chu Pei-Teh, who later on became Chiang
Kai-Shek’s lifelong friend and supporter, and the Russian
Chief-of-Staff General Galens, who had just come from
Canton with General Chu Pei-Teh, both supported
Chiang Kai-Shek’s proposal to fight back to Canton as
warmly as did Wang Ching-Wei and Liao Chung-Kai.
They discussed the homeward campaign in detail from
early evening until one o’clock in the morning. Chiang
Kai-Shek was nominated to be the chief Commanding
Officer of the campaign. Though he was worried by his
new responsibility and could not sleep at all, he said cheer-
fully when he was seeing his friends off on the following
218
afternoon: ‘All I want is 8,000 rifles, with which I under-
take to wipe out all the reactionary forces in Canton. The
rest of the Army may remain at their stations.’
On May 20th, 1925, at a dinner-party given to all the
officers of the Revolutionary Army and the Guards,
Chiang Kai-Shek said: ‘Our Master struggled for forty
years for the liberty of all the Chinese people, indeed all
the people in the world, and all he got was the little place
of Canton. With this place as a base, he hoped, revolu-
tionary work could be done in co-operation with all the
oppressed people in the world. If this base of the Revolu-
tionary Government is occupied by reactionary forces,
all the work done during the lifetime of our Master will
have been in vain. And all our deceased comrades will
have sacrified their lives in vain. So, if we want to go
on with the work left to us by our Master, we must first
of all protect the base of the Revolutionary Government.
This homeward campaign is more serious than that of the
East River. But no matter how powerful is our enemy,
we cannot call ourselves revolutionaries if we cannot take
back our base. After we have reached Canton we will
re-form our policy, bring the control of finance under one
Government, reorganise our army and put our revolu-
tionary doctrine into practice. . .
At the beginning of June Chiang Kai-Shek led his
troops on the march towards Canton. The workers on
the railways in and near Canton went on strike in
sympathy with the returning army and the Yunnanese
and Kwangsi Commanders, being unable to move their
forces rapidly enough to meet the emergency, were
utterly at a loss to know what to do. On June 12th,
Chiang Kai-Shek entered Canton with his men and was
appointed Commander of the Safe Guards around Can-
ton. As only a part of the defeated anuies surrendered
and a smaller part were killed, the majority had to run
away. Some were scattered about near the Capital, and
219
the Commander of the Safe Guards was kept busy in
mopping them up.
With the successful conclusion of this homecoming
campaign the authorities in Canton now felt safe, and
decided to organise the Government in a more stately and
solid form. The Central Executive Committee was made
the highest body in the Government, and the General-
issimo’s headquarters, which used to be the Revolutionary
Government, was reorganised into a formal National
Government. The various armies under different names
were to be called the National Revolutionary Army.
Plans for reorganising the army and for managing finance
were all made. On July ist, 1925, a State Council of six-
teen members was elected, and also a new Military
Council. Wang Ching-Wei was the chairman of both,
whilst Chiang Kai-Shek remained a member of the latter.
It was then that a complete military plan, including the
forming of seven armies for the purpose of the long-
cherished Northern Punitive Expedition, a Navy and an
Air Force, the establishment of arsenals and the develop-
ment of heavy industries, was presented to the State
Council by Chiang Kai-Shek. It had been drafted some
time previously, but because of the Sha-Kee Massacre, or
so-called incident (as the British did not like the word
massacre), which happened on June 23rd, he examined the
financial aspects, and, finding that Kwangtung could have
an income for forty million dollars a year, he asked that
his plan be adopted. It would cost roughly half of the
possible income.
The Shakee Massacre was a sequel to the Nanking Road
Massacre (or ‘incident’ as again preferred by the British)
which happened in Shanghai on May 30th, 1925. After
Communism came into China, strikes began in a number
of places. One broke out among the workers on the
Peking-Hankow Railway, and Wu Pei-Fu ordered his
220
soldiers to shoot the demonstrators. Another broke out
in Shanghai among the workers in the cotton mills, and
when during their parade on the main road of the Inter-
national Settlement trouble started between the demon-
strators and the British police, the policemen shot into the
crowd and killed many people.
The Shakee Massacre resulted directly from a demon-
stration in Canton to register public opinion against the
Shanghai tragedy. While a procession of sixty thousand
people was passing near Sha-Meen (the British Concession
separated only by a narrow canal from Shakee, part of the
mainland of Canton) intensive shooting started. Both
sides accused the other as being the one who opened fire
first. It is not for the humble author to judge the case
here, but at least three things clearly indicate who was the
guilty party. Firstly, only one Frenchman was killed, one
Englishman and three or four foreigners were wounded
on the Shameen side, whereas about sixty workers,
ordinary people and cadets were killed and nearly two
hundred Chinese were wounded on the Shakee side.
Secondly, a French gunboat moored near the place bom-
barded the crowd and British machine-gun fire continued
for some time. Lastly, while the Chinese called it a
massacre, the British said it was a mere incident.
That the Communists and the Kuo Min Tang people
hated the British in Canton and Hongkong, and that the
British in those two places returned the compliment, with
compound interest, there is no doubt. The naval demon-
stration in 1923 was only a beginning, to be followed later
by several real bombardments on the innocent masses,
which shows that the Europeans in China considered the
lives of the Chinese, whom they called ‘the natives’, as
dirt cheap, and the life of one European as worth more
than a hundred of the Chinese. It was lucky for the
Chinese that the British Consul-General did not carry out
his ultimatum of August, 1924, when he told the Canton
221
authorities that the British Navy would bombard the
Chinese Army. It was lucky for the Europeans that only
one Frenchman was killed when serious hostilities started
after so many innocent Chinese had been massacred. It
was not a miracle that the Chinese, with more than eight
hundred fully-equipped cadets and many thousand well-
seasoned soldiers in the parade, did not choose to answer
shot with shot. It was because they had no intention of
starting a war if they could possibly avoid it, however
great the provocation might be. It clearly showed that
one side was touchy and nervous and wanted to teach the
other side a lesson, knowing full well that no matter how
many people they might kill, the other side was not in a
position to risk a war; whereas the other side, conscious
of their inferior military strength, could still control them-
selves. If a demonstration in Liverpool resulted in an
exchange of fire between a foreign warship in the harbour
and the British demonstrators, and if one foreigner on
board was killed where about sixty Englishmen were
killed and some two hundred people on shore were
wounded, what would be the consequences?
These tragedies in Shanghai and Shakee, though no
English lives were lost, did harm to the English people
in the East. They made almost every Chinese begin to
see how cold-bloodedly cruel these people could be.
Large-scale strikes started in the British concessions of
Canton and Shanghai and also in Hongkong. This was a
golden opportunity for Communist propaganda, and the
recruiting commission of the Communist Party had a very
busy time. Naturally people accused the Russians in
China and said that they created these regrettable
tragedies. Borodin, the Russian political adviser in Canton,
said very wittily: ‘We did not make May 30th, it was
made for us.’
Chiang Kai-Shek was in his Academy at Whampoa at
the time of the Shakee Massacre, and when he heard the
222
report over the telephone tears rolled down his face. He
went into conference with all the other leaders of the
Government until one o’clock the next morning, and in
the evening he harangued all the soldiers in the city. He
explained to them the situation and ordered them to bear
this with unprecedented fortitude, as they must not fall
into the trap the British had set for them. They must go
on with their revolutionary programme. But this tragedy
no doubt made him believe all the more that China must
co-operate with Soviet Russia even at a very high cost.
Consequently for a long time after this he did his best to
accommodate the Russians and the Chinese Communists,
though he never liked them much. It is quite true to say
that had there been no Shanghai Massacre nor a Shakee
Massacre, Chiang Kai-Shek would have broken off rela-
tions with his Russian advisers and Chinese Communists
much earlier. And had they been persecuted much
earlier, the Chinese Communists might not have been able
to wield such a big influence in China to-day. In the spirit
of Comrade Borodin, the Third International should
decorate the British Police Inspector of Shanghai and the
Commander of the British force at Canton, for their excel-
lent service to Comrilunism.
Many writers in China said that after the death of Sun
Yat-Sen, Borodin was left as dictator in Canton. Such was
far from being the case. In fact, when the formal
National Government was established in place of the
Generalissimo’s Headquarters in Canton, the right wing
of the Kuo Min Tang was having a much bigger say in
everything and everywhere than before. First of all, no
Communist was elected to the State Counc’!. which was
composed of sixteen members of the Kuo Min Tang, and
of tne five members of the Standing Committee Wang
Ching-Wei was the only one with leftist tendencies at
that time. Hu Han-Min, the extreme right-wing leader,
was an important member of the Standing Committee of
the State Council, as well as of the newly re-organised
Military Council. Besides holding these two high posi-
tions, he was made the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
It was mentioned in the last chapter that there were
three party men who had followed Sun Yat-Sen very long
and closely: Hu Han-Min, Wang Ching-Wei and Liao
Chung-Kai. Besides these three there was Chiang Kai-
Shek. After Chen Chiung-Ming’s rebellion, Chiang Kai-
Shek’s relations with his Party Leader became much more
intimate, and when the important decision to co-operate
with Soviet Russia was to be made, Chiang Kai-Shek was
one of the very few whom Sun Yat-Sen trusted. The
establishing of the Whampoa Military Academy, and
later on the forming of a Party Army jfrom the Training
Corps, greatly increased Chiang Kai-Shek’s prestige.
After the death of Sun Yat-Sen it was very difficult to
choose a man to step into the shoes of the deceased Leader.
Wang Ching-Wei, though he was younger than either
Hu Han-Min or Liao Chung-Kai, was chosen as the chair-
man of the State Council and of the Military Council
because on the one hand he could be accepted by the con-
servatives, and on the other he himself was leaning
towards the left, much more so since he had gone to
Peking with Sun Yat-Sen, having been at his side nearly
all the time until the Leader passed away. If it had not
been that Hu Han-Min was too much to the right and
Liao Chung-Kai too much to the left, Wang Ching-Wei
would not have been put forward. Besides these people,
there was also a very much respected veteran member of
the Party: Chang Ching-Kiang, who, however, would not
and actually could not accept any responsible position
because of his health.
Putting these Party men aside, let us examine the mili-
tary men. Soldiers of fortune who had to be humoured
in the days when Sun Yat-Sen was depending upon their
224
support were gone. Chiang Kai-Shek was now the most
staunch supporter of the Government and had been for
the past few years closely connected with the inner circle
of the Party and the Government. But he was very
young, still in his late thirties, and he had Hsu Chung-
Chih above him. In the army rank is very important, and
whatever happened, Hsu Chung-Chih would always be
higher in rank than Chiang Kai-Shek.
The new Military Council was composed of eight
members. Four civilians from the Government headed
the list, appearing in this order: Wang Ching-Wei, Hu
Han-Min, Liao Chung-Kai and C. C. Wu, formerly
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The four soldiers were Chu
Pei-Teh, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Yunnanese
Army, Tan Yen-Kai, Commander-in-Chief of the
Hunanese Army, Hsu Chung-Chih, Commander-in-Chief
of the Cantonese Army, and Chiang Kai-Shek. The in-
clusion of the four civilians in the Military Council is quite
understandable. The first three were the most important
figures of the day, and they could not possibly be excluded
from any responsible organisation. The fourth, C. C.
Wu, was the able and learned son of the late Wu Ting-
Fang, Sun Yat-Sen’s old friend and colleague. He had
studied law in America and England and was called to
the Bar before he went back to China to enter the Diplo-
matic Service. It was evident that, following the Shakee
Massacre, it would be better to have on the Military
Council a diplomat who could understand English
law.
It is not very far wide of the mark to say that the eight
members of the Military Council were all that mattered
in the new Government. And among these eight people
C. C. Wu was the least important because he had been
included only as a legal adviser. Chu Pei-Teh and Tan
Yen-Kai, Commanders-in-Chief of the Yunnanese and
Hunanese Armies respectively, were fairly newcomers
225
and they were honoured with such high positions simply
because of their armies. Actually the remaining five, with
their long association with Sun Yat-Sen and the Party,
were the ruling power of the Southern regime. Although
Chiang Kai-Shek was the youngest of the five, the other
four could not do without him.
With the supreme Leader gone, friction soon became
serious between the left and right wings. Liao Chung-Kai,
the extreme leftist, was misunderstood by the conserva-
tives, who suspected him of being a Communist. As his
influence and power became greater and greater, his
enemies plotted to assassinate him. This they carried out
on August 2oth, 1925. He was shot when he went to
attend the Central Executive Committee meeting and died
of his wounds at the Medical College of Canton Univer-
sity shortly afterwards on the same day.
On one of the assassins a licence allowing the bearer to
carry firearms was found, and from this licence the
plotters were easily traced. They were very important
men, one a high-ranking officer in the Cantonese Army
and another none other than the brother of Hu Han-Min
about whom Chiang Kai-Shek had written in his letter
to Sun Yat-Sen. But there were still bigger names con-
nected with this plot and they were in touch with the
British Imperialists in Hongkong. In view of the import-
ance of the matter, a combined meeting of the Central
Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, the State
Council and the Military Council was held and a Special
Committee with a Big Three was formed to meet the
emergency. The Big Three were Wang Ching-Wei, Hsu
Chung-Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek, and they were to have
unlimited power in dealing with political and military
matters.
In his capacity as Commander of the Safe Guards
around Canton, Chiang Kai-Shek sent out part of the
226
Fourth and Fifth Regiments of the Training Corps to
arrest the plotters and disarm their forces. In the head-
quarters of the Cantonese Army documents revealing a
conspiracy to overthrow the present Government and
appoint the plotters to be Commander-in-Chief, Civil
Governor and to other high posts, were captured.
As Liao Chung-Kai had been the Party Representative
of both the Whampoa Military Academy and the Revolu-
tionary Army, which for a time was also called the Party
Army and was formed from the Training Corps, a
memorial service was held by the men and officers of this
army. At this service Chiang Kai-Shek said: ‘The death
of our Party Representative Liao was entirely due to a
plot hatched jointly by the Imperialists and the Re-
actionaries. We must know that those who struck at our
Party Representative Liao did not aim at him alone. They
really wanted to annihilate us, the Party Army. . . .’
On September ist, 1925, the Special Committee met for
the eighth time within twelve days and at the meeting it
was resolved that the finance of the Province was to be
brought under a single united control, for which a super-
visory committee was to be formed to see that revenue
and other income was handed over to the Government,
if necessary by force; that the East River Expedition was
to be resumed, and that Hu Han-Min was to be sent
abroad.
A few words of explanation are needed regarding these
three resolutions of the Special Committee. Firstly, the
finances of the Government had always been a headache.
For years military authorities had been in the habit of
collecting revenue for the Government and keeping it
for their own expenses. Liao Chung-Kai had been the
Minister of Finance for the past few years, and he had
tried very hard to unite the control of finance under this
Ministry. Chiang Kai-Shek had been his most ardent sup-
porter. Indeed, he criticised Liao Chung-Kai very
227
severely when, earlier, Liao had had to compromise
because the mercenary commanders were utterly uncon-
trollable. The adoption of the first resolution was mainly
due to Chiang Kai-Shek’s urging.
As for the second resolution, this was a point on which
Hsu Chung-Chih and Chiang Kai-Shek had quarrelled.
Earlier in the year, when they had found out that the
Yunnanese and Kwangsi Annies were playing false, it had
been decided to suspend the East River Expedition in
order to clear the traitors out of Canton. In the mean-
time Hsu Chung-Chih had concluded a temporary truce
with Chen Chiung-Ming’s lieutenants, to the utter
astonishment of Chiang Kai-Shek. He had frankly
advised Hsu Chung-Chih not to do this, but without suc-
cess. Only a little over a month before this he had written
a long letter to Hsu Chung-Chih proposing a number of
reforms for the Army and at the end of it he said:
. . Yet 1 have another thing to say: Chen Chiung-
Ming and his company are rebels against the Party and
the country. Their sins are well known. As they have no
intention of repenting they will be our undoing in the
future if we forgive them and if they pretend to submit
to us. Since they could betray our Aiaster, why could
not they betray you? At the very beginning of our re-
form of the Army we must clearly cut off all the bad
things so as not to leave them to spread into an uncon-
trollable state. . .
Unfortunately Hsu Chung-Chih had ignored this
advice. Now that a political crisis had arisen in Canton,
Chen Chiung-Ming’s men were getting ready to make
trouble once more: hence this resolution.
The third resolution does not require much explana-
tion. Since Hu Han-Min’s brother was one of the plotters
and had made good his escape before measures could be
taken against him, it had been suspected that Hu Han-
Min was in sympathy with his brother. Besides, it was
228
well known that he belonged to the extreme right wing,
and it was thought that his absence for a little while from
Canton would do much good both to himself and the
Government. Moreover, he was a very hot-tempered man
and had recently quarrelled with Hsu Chung-Chih. They
were scarcely on speaking terms. It was finally decided
that Hu Han-Min was to be appointed a Special Envoy
to Russia, and for this he sailed in a Russian ship from
Canton towards the end of September.
About the same time the Goverment found out that
Hsu Chung-Chih’s Army had become thoroughly in-
efficient. With the East River Expedition soon to be re-
sumed, the Government could ill afford to feed a large
army of some fifteen thousand men who did not want to
help. Not only had some of its officers been in the plot
against the Government and for the assassination of Liao
Chung-Kai, but also, some of them were still communi-
cating with Chen Chiung-Ming. So, on September 21st,
1925, Hsu Chung-Chih was dismissed from his office of
Minister of War and relieved of his command of the
Cantonese Army.
With the departure of Hu Han-Min and Hsu Chung-
Chih and the death of Liao Chung-Kai, the Government
and the Party had to depend upon the two younger men:
Wang Ching-Wei who was then forty-one, and Chiang
Kai-Shek who was thirty-eight.
The resumed East River Expedition started early in
October, 1925. By that time the forces in Kwangtung
had been reorganised into five armies. The Revolutionary
Party Army was to be the First Revolutionary Army,
with Chiang Kai-Shek as the Commander. The Hunanese
Army was the Second, and its Commander was Tan Yen-
Kai. The newly -reorganised Yunnanese Army was the
Third, and Chu Pei-Teh was the Commander. The re-
organised Cantonese Army was the Fourth, and Li Chi-
229
Shen was the new Commander. The Volunteer Army was
the Fifth, with Li Fu-Lin as its Commander. Besides these
five armies, there were some miscellaneous troops which
remained independent under separate commands but
under the supreme control of the Military Council.
Pan of the First Army, the Fourth Army and some of
the miscellaneous troops took part in this Expedition, and
Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed the Chief Commander.
Since all the undesirable forces had been weeded out, the
progress of this campaign was extraordinarily rapid.
Within ten days Waichow, the enemy’s stronghold, was
stormed and taken and on November 6th, 1925, Chiang
Kai-Shek sent out a circular telegram to announce his com-
plete victory:
‘When I received the order to fight eastwards, I had
the good fortune to have under me a united force of
officers and men and the support and co-operation of the
common people. It is now only a month since we started
on the 6th of last month, but we have captured from the
enemy over six thousand rifles, seven field guns, more
than thirty machine-guns and over six thousand prisoners.
All the famous cities dong the East River have been recap-
tured one by one, and our forces have reached as far as
Chaochow and Kaying. To-day we are in Swatow,
having covered a distance of over six hundred li from our
starting-point. The common people from all four direc-
tions have come out in crowds to see us and welcome us
with food and drink. . . .’
In conducting this campaign, full use had been made of
the Party Representatives and members of the Political
Department in the Army. Not only had they looked after
the welfare of their soldiers but they had also served as
a land of liaison office between the troops and the people.
Chiang Kai-Shek had this report announced:
‘In this Expedition there have been Party Representa-
tives and political officers attached to every group of the
230
forces. They have supervised the commanders and their
men, and have explained to them our Party principles, so
the men have fought very bravely. Wherever they went
they have arranged social meetings, attended by both the
troops and the people. Entertainments have been pro-
vided, the aims of the campaign announced and slogans
given to the public. As the purpose of our revolution has
been made known to them, all the people have been will-
ing to co-operate with us. On the eve of our arrival at
a place, rice has always been prepared, pigs killed, and
vegetables unearthed from their own gardens to be pre-
sented to us. All along the route of the campaign chairs
have been provided for us to sit on and rest and tea offered
to quench our thirst. Such things are entirely due to our
publicity work and the good conduct and discipline of
our men. They have never employed forced labour nor
driven hard bargains when buying from the people.’
But Chiang Kai-Shek was a very exacting commander.
In spite of this good report and satisfactory results, he con-
sidered the Party Representatives and political officers of
his Army had not done their duty well. It was his first
big unhampered expedition, and the forces taking part
had been chosen by himself; so he looked for perfection.
After the successful conclusion of this campaign, he
wrote a letter to Chou En-Lai, the Communist, who had
been appointed at the beginning of the Expedition as
Deputy Representative for the First Division of the First
Army. This is quoted here because it indirectly explains
the work of a Party Representative and political officer:
‘The Party office in all regiments exists in name only.
Party activities are lacking in spirit. Recently numerous
complaints have been received from the soldiers and a
number of the cases I saw myself. The worst was that
of a sergeant putting filth into a soldier’s mouth. There
have been many cases of severe beating and excessive
scolding. Soldiers suffering from cold and hunger are a
common occurrence. The barracks are badly managed
and public health is entirely overlooked. There are cap-
tains who squeeze the pay of dismissed soldiers. Such bad
things are happening quite often. Fundamentally it is
because the regimental Party Officers are not active. They
have had insufficient training and organisation and spent
most of their time in the battlefield. I do not blame
them.
‘But Party work should go on at full speed during the
war just as in peace time. Now that there is no fighting,
start to reform the regimental Party Offices of the First
Division. Let the soldiers express their views with com-
plete freedom and report their hardships. Their superior
officers must not victimise them. If this is done the
soldiers, though hard up and uncomfortable, will have a
slightly better life and higher spirits. This is the respon-
sibility of the Party Representatives of all ranks. Should
the Army officers prevent the Party Representatives from
doing their duty this should be reported frankly, other-
wise the Party Representatives themselves are to blame.
We are working for a Revolution. If we do not start it
by improving the life of the soldiers, all slogans of reform-
ing and improving society are but empty words. No good
results can be expected. Intensive work must be done
about the small committee meetings in the regiments and
companies of the First Division. You must supervise the
work to see it is put into practice. We hope the First
Division will set a good example to all the other divisions.
Only then will the name of the Revolutionary Party
Army be true and the Revolution succeed. . . .’
What was worrying Chiang Kai-Shek was but the
general practice in the armies of all the War Lords.
Nobody had ever worried themselves about such trifles.
They seemed to be quite all right. They fought each
other for their own interest; some won while others lost
these wars, with soldiers leading this kind of wretched
life. To win or lose depended chiefly upon how strong
was your army. When both sides were equally strong it
was a matter of chance. Why should they bother? But
Chiang Kai-Shek had learnt his lesson from the Red Army.
Sun Yat-Sen’s very words were that a single soldier of the
Revolutionary Army was as good as ten of the War Lords.
Such a remark was no exaggeration. In this campaign
Chiang Kai-Shek found that in several engagements he
was victorious with a single battalion, fighting against
four or five thousand enemies. With such fine soldiers
fighting under him no wonder he was always victorious
and no wonder he took the greatest care to improve their
life in barracks.
Another thing of which he was proud was the good
conduct of his soldiers. He said to his men: ‘In this war,
all the men in the various regiments of the First Division,
no matter whether they are officers or soldiers, have borne
extreme hardship admirably. Sometimes, because the
movement of our army has been so rapid, food supplies
from behind the lines have not followed as quickly as was
expected, and bedding has not been prepared in time.
But all our brethren bore it with fortitude. They would
rather suffer hunger and cold themselves than trouble the
people for a bit of straw or a block of wood. That was why
wherever our army went, it was heartily welcomed by
all the people. This achievement of our army is much
better than all the victories we have won. I, as the head
of the First Army, am extremely satisfied with officers
and men of all ranks, and I have the greatest respect
and love for them for this. . . .’
Credit must be given to the commander who knows, on
the one hand, how to encourage his men for their good
conduct, and on the other hand tries his best to redress
their sufferings and prevent their recurrence. This East
River Expedition was a dress-rehearsal for the whole
233
Northern Punitive Expedition, so Chiang Kai-Shek
wanted to go all out to make it perfect.
The general situation in the North since Sun Yat-Sen’s
trip to Peking must occupy a little space here. Tuan Chi-
Jui, having been made Chief Executive to take over the
Government of Tsao Kun, had no use for Sun Yat-Sen
or his Kuo Min Tang. Being the greatest living War Lord,
he acted true to tradition. Any minor War Lord who
would offer him lip-service was his man and would be
rewarded with any position he could grasp for himself
by military force. To Sun Yat-Sen’s proposal for calling
a National Assembly he agreed, merely to humour him
and his immense following. He modified it into a
utterly undemocratic gathering, all the participants being
appointed by himself. Sun Yat-Sen on his death-bed
asked his followers not to attend such an Assembly and his
dying wish was readily respected by all the Kuo Min Tang
members, even those of the right wing.
Tuan Chi-Jui’s government could be nothing but
another failure. War Lords in most parts of the country
redoubled their efforts and fought each other to grasp
positions which they knew the Central Government in
Peking would immediately ratify and approve. Feng Yu-
Hsiang, the Christian General, who imprisoned Tsao Kun
and promoted the said new Government, was dis-
appointed, and soon had to retire whilst the man whom
he had helped to become the Chief Executive remained
in office much longer, to be finally driven away in April,
1926, by Chang Tso-Lin, the War Lord from Manchuria.
During this period of confused fighting, Wu Pei-Fu lost
his foothold in the North and tried to establish himself
in Central China, where the minor War Lords had great
respect for him.
The fighting between the various forces in East China
produced a new major War Lord. Sun Chuan-Fang, a
234
general originally belonging to the Manchurian Army,
now became fully fledged and established himself as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces of the Five
South-eastern Provinces by defeating several minor War
Lords of that neighbourhood. The five provinces are
Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Chekiang and Fukien. This
meant that the National Government in Canton now had
to face a new hostile neighbour on its north-east.
It was Chiang Kai-Shek’s firm belief that the enemy
outside, however strong, was easy to defeat, but a traitor
inside, or even disunity among comrades, was much more
dangerous. His consistent policy had been to deal with
trouble inside first. When Sun Yat-Sen wanted to start
the Northern Punitive Expeditions, Chiang Kai-Shek
wanted to wipe out the treacherous enemies in or near
Canton first. That was why, instead of joining Sun
Yat-Sen’s Northern Expedition, he was always for turn-
ing back to attack the trouble-makers at home first.
Now that the last of these, Chen Chiung-Ming, had been
swept away from the East River, he was ready to go on
the war-path for the North.
But disunity within the Party had already started. The
most serious break after the assassination of Liao Chung-
Kai was cooked up in Peking whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was
fighting Chen Chiung-Ming’s remaining forces in the
eastern part of Kwangtung. On November 3rd, 1925, a
number of ‘old comrades’— such being the collective name
of some veteran members of the Kuo Min Tang— held a
secret conference in a temple in the Western Hills out-
side Peking. They had chosen this place because Sun Yat-
Sen’s coffin was temporarily resting there, and a confer-
ence in front of the remains of their deceased Leader
indicated its solemnity and also their loyalty.
Those who attended this meeting were extreme right-
wing members of the Central Committees of the Kuo
Min Tang who were in Peking, and afterwards they
235
were known as ‘Western Hills Conference Members’.
In this conference the following resolutions were passed:
1. That the highest political organisation existing and
functioning in Canton be abolished;
2. That all the Communists who are in the Kuo Min
Tang be expelled ;
3. That Borodin, the political adviser, and all the other
Russian military advisers be dismissed;
4. That there should be sweeping changes regarding
the regulations for the next National Congress of the
Kuo Ming Tang; and
5. That the seat of the Central Committees office be
moved from Canton to Shanghai.
Such a move was not to be compared with the assassina-
tion of a pro-Communist comrade. It was the formal
beginning of a split inside the Party. But the number of
members who attended this meeting was not enough to
form a quorum for a legal committee meeting and so was
denounced by the Members in Canton. However, this
splitting movement spread rapidly, and all the right-wing
members in Canton began to get together for collective
anti-Communist activities. Chiang Kai-Shek, who con-
sidered such a movement most injurious to the Party,
was disconcerted to find that even within his Military
Academy, and also among his own troops, the First
Revolutionary Army, partisans started to accuse each
other, one saying the other was disloyal, whilst the other
said his accuser was reactionary.
Since his plunge into Party politics, Chiang Kai-Shek
had been trying his best to co-ordinate the right and left
wings of the Kuo Min Tang. In those early days the Com-
munists and their sympathisers were in the minority.
Chiang Kai-Shek supported them because they needed
support badly. At the time of the assassination of Liao
Chung-Kai the left-wing members were disheartened.
Some prepared to flee, because they heard one of the rc-
236
actionary generals had declared openly that all those who
were pro-Communist should be done away with just as
they had done away with Liao Chung-Kai. At the time,
without Chiang Kai-Shek’s prompt and stem action, the
left wing would have ceased to exist.
There are authors who have said that when in January,
1924, the Communists were first allowed to join the Kuo
Alin Tang, some of them became heads of Ministries in
the Canton Government. That was a translation blunder.
The Chinese word ‘pu’ is used to denote a Ministry in the
sense of a State Department, as well as a Bureau or a
Department of any organisation. There were only three
Ministries in the National Government during the first
few years. The Minister of War was Hsu Chung-Chih
until he left Canton in 1925. The Minister of Finance was
Liao Chung-Kai until he was killed in 1925; and later
T. V. Soong, Madame Sun Yat-Sen’s brother, was
appointed to this post. The post of Minister of Foreign
Affairs had been held by Hu Han-Min, Wang Ching-
Wei, Eugen Chen, and C. C. Wu. No Communist was
ever appointed to any of these posts.
But there are many departments or bureaus belonging
to the Headquarters of the Kuo Min Tang. In 1924
several departments had Communists as heads. Tan Ping-
Shan, representing the Communists at the Revolutionary
Council, was given the post of Head of the Organisation
Department. Another department looks after publicity
and should be translated Propaganda Department. Though
it is known in London as the Chinese Ministry of
Information, the translator was merely using an English
stock-name of a Government Ministry for a Party
organisation, because the word Propaganda had become
associated with Goebbels. Mao Tse-Tung, now the Com-
munist leader in China, was the acting head of this depart-
ment for a time. Besides these two, four other depart-
ments, Labour, Peasants, Youth and Women’s, were
237
headed by Communists. It was in 1946 when two depart-
ments, those of Propaganda and Social Affairs, were
moved over from the Party organisation into the Cabinet:
one became a Ministry and the other a Bureau.
The Communist influence in the Kuo Min Tang can
be easily assessed by quoting this passage from Chiang
Kai-Shek’s answer to the Western Hills Conference, of
which he greatly disapproved: ‘They announced that four
members of the Central Executive Committee who were
Communists should be expelled. There are twenty-four
members in the Central Executive Committee, and only
four of them belong to the Communist Party. That shows
a ratio of six to one. If we still fear that the Communists
will slowly gobble us up, we indeed have no self-respect
and no confidence in ourselves!’
The Second National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang
was held in Canton in January, 1926. Wang Ching-Wei
made a political report to the Assembly and Chiang Kai-
Shek was asked to give a military report. This he gave to
the Assembly in full detail. Towards the end of his speech
he told them what was their actual military strength and
what it could do. He said:
‘At present the Revolutionary Army completely under
the Government consists of eighty-five thousand men.
They have among them sixty thousand rifles. They could
be mobilised by a single order from the Government.
Their pay is provided for in the Budget. Their treatment
has been improved. Besides these men there are six thou-
sand military students in several schools. They are as good
as a division. If we exert ourselves a little more and
organise them carefully, we will find that it is not diffi-
cult to use the strength of our Party to unite China . . .’
When he said this he knew that the long-awaited
Northern Punitive Expedition was in sight, but little did
he think that it would be ready to start within six months.
238
WITH MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND GENERAL STILWELL
AT H.q. MAYMYO, BURMA
*
In a proposal for a further improvement of the soldiers'
treatment he said: ‘The foundation of Revolution is get-
ting firmer and firmer. We are soon going to feed our
horses and sharpen our weapons to unite the whole
country. The encouragement of the idea that a Revolu-
tionary soldier is willing to die for his cause on the battle-
field entirely depends on what this Congress is going to
do.’ He said that a soldier’s pay was from nine to eleven
dollars a month, while an officer received from a hundred
and sixty to four or even five hundred. The difference
was too great. It was hardly fair. He proposed an increase
of several dollars to the soldier’s monthly pay, and also
paying them in silver dollars or notes instead of in dimes
or double dimes, as the latter suffered a discount of nearly
twenty per cent.
In a formal plan which he submitted to the Military
Council a few days later, he proposed not only ( i ) a rise
in their pay, but also (2) to provide them with a
sufficiency of winter clothes, (3) adequate health and
medical supplies, (4) better and healthier barracks,
(5) entertainments and handicraft workshops to pass
their spare time, (6) to reduce the mechanised physical
training, and (7) to decrease the required number of years
of their service.
It was at the Second Congress that he was elected a
member of the Central Executive Committee. This con-
sisted of thirty-six members, twelve more than before, and
included several Communists as well as a few ardent anti-
Communist ‘old comrades’. At the first meeting of the
Committee he was elected a member of the Standing Com-
mittee, which consisted of nine members, including Wang
Ching-Wei, who was the chairman, Hu Han-Min, Tan
Yen-Kai, Commander of the Second Revolutionary Army,
Tan Ping-Shan and Lin Chu-Han, both of whom were
Communists. It must be mentioned here that at this time
a sixth Revolutionary Army was formed under the com-
239 I
mand of Cheng Chien, and on the same day Chiang Kai-
Shek was allowed to resign his command of the First
Revolutionary Army. Ho Yin-Ching, who was the com-
mander of the First Division, was promoted to succeed
Chiang Kai-Shek as Commander of the First Revolu-
tionary Army. On February ist, 1926, that is, the follow-
ing day, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed Superintendent-
General of all the Revolutionary Armies.
As Chiang Kai-Shek became more important in the
Party, he found his position also more. difficult than before
and had to be more careful in telling people what he
thought of them. Before he was elected a member of the
Central Executive Committee he told the ‘Old Comrades’
frankly what harm they were doing to their cause. Now
it was entirely his work to conciliate those right-wing
members who came to Canton to rake up trouble, and
those Leftists and Communists who would have liked to
quarrel with the ‘old comrades’. It was a thankless job,
and in the long run a fruitless job. How much he liked
it could be seen when later on he wrote: ‘Political life
makes a man lead a dog’s life. To be in such circumstances
one would never have thought possible! Where is
morality? Where is friendship?’
Soon after the conclusion of the Second National Con-
gress, Borodin, the Russian adviser, went North to see
Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, in order to bring
him over to the side of the Kuo Min Tang. His departure
from Canton led to more misunderstandings between the
Communists and the anti-Communists. Two Russian
advisers whom Chiang Kai-Shek had to meet very
frequently after Borodin’s absence constantly proposed
things which made him unhappy. An early entry in his
diary about these two advisers reads: ‘I offer them
sincerity. They return deceit. It is impossible to work
together with them.’ A later one reads: ‘My Russian
240
sional commander, and recorded that ‘the Chief Russian
Adviser and his companions were shocked because they
were using this commander as their tool to commit an out-
rage and to upset the revolutionary influence of the Party,
but failed to do so.’ On the following morning he went to
see Wang Ching-Wei, who was the Chairman of the
Central Executive Committee as well as of the Political
Council and the Military Council, to report important
business. He also discussed with Wang Ching-Wei what
he thought right to be done with the chief Russian adviser.
He thought the adviser was ‘high-handed and contradic-
tory’ in his political advice. ‘If he was not dismissed, not
only would he do harm to the Party and the country, but
also he would have a bad influence on the relationship
between China and Russia.’ However, he presumed that
what the adviser did was ‘this man’s personal action, and
could never be the intention of the authorities of Soviet
Russia.’
On February 28th he recorded that he had ‘a slightly
calmer day’ and for the first time for many days he had
a restful night. ‘But,’ he continued, ‘an unexpected thing
suddenly happened and there was no way out.’ He said
to himself that he ‘had to do it by force, otherwise un-
thinkable damage would be done to the Party and the
country.’ At the beginning of March his position was
worse. He said: ‘With a single spear on a solitary horse,
with a tiger coming in front and a wolf behind. I’m in a
critical position to-day. My Master and the Martyrs of
the Party in Heaven, have pity on me and protect me.
Prevent me from falling into a hopeless doom.’ By the
middle of that month he recorded that ‘the hardships he
had suffered he could not and would not describe’, and
that ‘they were such that one would never dream of them.
They were not different from what Buddha suffered in
Hell.’
On March 20th, 1926, he said: ‘If I had no resolution
242
sional commander, and recorded that ‘the Chief Russian
Adviser and his companions were shocked because they
were using this commander as their tool to commit an out-
rage and to upset the revolutionary influence of the Party,
but failed to do so.’ On the following morning he went to
see Wang Ching-Wei, who was the Chairman of the
Central Executive Committee as well as of the Political
Council and the Military Council, to report important
business. He also discussed with Wang Ching-Wei what
he thought right to be done with the chief Russian adviser.
He thought the adviser was ‘high-handed and contradic-
tory’ in his political advice. ‘If he was not dismissed, not
only would he do harm to the Party and the country, but
also he would have a bad influence on the relationship
between China and Russia.’ However, he presumed that
what the adviser did was ‘this man’s personal action, and
could never be the intention of the authorities of Soviet
Russia.’
On February 28th he recorded that he had ‘a slightly
calmer day’ and for the first time for many days he had
a restful night. ‘But,’ he continued, ‘an unexpected thing
suddenly happened and there was no way out.’ He said
to himself that he ‘had to do it by force, otherwise un-
thinkable damage would be done to the Party and the
country.’ At the beginning of March his position was
worse. He said: ‘With a single spear on a solitary horse,
with a tiger coming in front and a wolf behind, I’m in a
critical position to-day. My Master and the Martyrs of
the Party in Heaven, have pity on me and protect me.
Prevent me from falling into a hopeless doom.’ By the
middle of that month he recorded that ‘the hardships he
had suffered he could not and would not describe’, and
that ‘they were such that one would never dream of them.
They were not different from what Buddha suffered in
Hell.’
On March 20th, 1926, he said: ‘If I had no resolution
242
to-day, how could I save our Party and show my gratitude
to our Master?’ At dawn martial law was declared in
Canton, and he arrested the acting Chief of the Navy
Office, who was also the captain of the gunboat Chung
Shan, the historical vessel originally called the Yung Feng,
when Sun Yat-Sen and Chiang Kai-Shek had stayed on
board for many days during the rebellion of Chen Chiung-
Ming. He also arrested many Party Representatives of the
various armies and besieged the office of the Strike Com-
mittee, disarming the guards of this organisation.
Regarding the Russians, he disarmed the guards and
kept watch over their residence, but they were free to
move about. For on the same evening, some came to him
to protest against such treatment and he disanned their
anger by ‘apologising to them with an amiable counten-
ance’. On the 22nd, a Russian counsellor came to ask him
whether these actions were taken against individuals or
against Russia. His reply ‘against individuals’ softened the
Russian, who said: ‘Just that sentence has set my mind
greatly at ease. I will order the adviser to leave Canton
for Russia.’
A meeting of the Political Council was held on that day
and it was resolved at this meeting that the Russian
advisers were to be disengaged, and that undisciplined
officers in the army were to be court-martialled. In the
afternoon Chiang Kai-Shek discussed with the various
Commanders of the Army the stern measures taken against
these Russian advisers and Communists, and they all
heartily supported what he had done. He exclaimed:
‘Those who had been opposed to such actions of mine
before the event regarded my words as gospel after the
event. How quickly people’s minds change!’
This is what is known as ‘the March 20th Incident’ or
‘The Gunboat Chung Shan Case’. At a farewell dinner-
party given to the retired Party Representatives and Com-
243
munists who were officers in the First Army, Chiang Kai-
Shek tried his best to explain what had happened on that
critical day. But he candidly said that the political com-
phcations could only be borne out by various documents
which would be made public after his death. As these
revealing documents have not yet been made pubhc, it
can only be presumed that Chiang Kai-Shek arrested these
Communists promptly as a precautionary measure, and it
is believed that he acted in the nick of time, for he said it
was rumoured that the gunboat Chtmg Shan was waiting
to capture him and ship him off to Russia at the orders
of some Russian advisers.
What kind of a part Wang Ching-Wei played in this
can only be guessed. On March 8th, that is twelve days
before the incident, Chiang Kai-Shek decided to discuss
the important directive of revolution with him and told
him that ‘The actual authority of revolution must not fall
into the hands of foreigners. Even in the co-operation
with the Third International, certain lines must be drawn.
Independence must not be sacrificed.’ And to this Wang
Ching-Wei agreed entirely. On the 14th, that is only six
days before the incident, Chiang Kai-Shek recorded that
‘from Wang Ching- Wei’s words I gathered that he had
hinted to me to leave Canton. He must have heard things
said against me to such an extent that it is now impossible
to change his mind.’
He went to see Wang Ching-Wei on March 19th and
20th; but on the day following the incident, he wanted to
draft a letter to Wang Ching-Wei and could not do so;
he said: ‘As I do not want to be hypocritical to my friend,
nor can I empty my sincere mind to him, I have thought
hard and found it difficult to put it down with my pen.’
Towards evening he went to call upon his sick friend—
for Wang Ching-Wei was suffering from diabetes— and
found that his anger had not yet abated. Two days later
he heard that Wang Ching-Wei was preparing to go away
244
for medical treatment, and he said: ‘Yesterday all the
resolutions passed at the Political Council were done
according to his wishes. He ought to raise no objection.
Why should he still act thus?’
On March 25th, Wang Ching-Wei’s whereabouts were
unknown. Later on Chiang Kai-Shek read a letter written
to Chang Ching-Kiang by Wang Ching-Wei, in which he
said that 1 have been suspected and disliked, so I will
never bear political responsibility any more.’ In May,
soon after Hu Han-Min’s return from Russia, Wang
Ching-Wei left China for France, where he stayed for
some time. Although Chiang Kai-Shek did not bear him
malice, Wang Ching-Wei felt greatly hurt. When later
on Chiang Kai-Shek, directly and indirectly, entreated
him to come back and share the responsibility of the
Government with him, he remained unconciliated.
If the reader thinks that the measures taken against the
Russians and the Communists on March 20th would at
once conciliate Chiang Kai-Shek with Hu Flan-Min and
the extreme right-wing, he is mistaken. Chiang Kai-
Shek emphasised that he did it against certain individuals—
though a very large number of individuals— and the
incident must not be interpreted as a break with Soviet
Russia nor a departure from the policy of ‘tolerating the
Communists’. He repeatedly told his students and soldiers
that they must not show any disrespect for the retired
comrades, and also warned the right-wing members that
the Western Hills Conference was still a mistake. But
alas, these words fell on deaf ears! Enmity between the
two sections continued to mount higher and higher, until
at last they did not hesitate to cut each other’s throats.
In a letter of advice addressed to his students after the
incident, Chiang Kai-Shek said: ‘Our Master thought that
to accommodate the Communists was one of the principles
of our Revolution. I also think that the Revolutionary
front will not be united if we do not accommodate the
245
Communists.’ He added that was why he had never failed
to exert all his energy to support and help the Communists
and consolidate the revolutionary foundation of his
Military Academy, and to obviate the differences between
Communists and non-Communists.
Furthermore, he said: 1 venture to tell my school-
fellows frankly; I do not wish to cause any difficulty to
those of them who have retired from the Army and I
cannot bear to cause a permanent split between school-
fellows of my Military Academy.’ And on the other hand,
he said to them these very stem words: ‘I hope that
my school-fellows who have left the Army will slander
our Master no more, but that they will work for the
realisation of the Three Principles of the People. Bear in
mind .the motto of our school: Don’t bear malice; don’t
seek for revenge ; don’t despair. With love and sincerity
forget your former differences and become loving school-
fellows again . . .’ He then warned them: ‘If you feel
that from henceforth you are in a position comparable to
riding on a tiger, and that you cannot get down without
being killed, then one side would think of nothing but
how to be revenged, and the other side of how to prevent
revenge, and one side becomes water whilst the other side
becomes fire, or one side is ice whilst the other is coal. You
will never bear the existence of each other again and in
the end both will be extinguished.’
Early in April he made a detailed proposal to the
Government to start the Northern Punitive Expedition
within three months, to reorganise the Army and the
Party, in which precautionary measures were suggested
to prevent the Communists from over-ruling the wishes
of the pure Kuo Min Tang members. On May 14th, when
Borodin had come back from Russia, he discussed with him
the new agreement between the Communists and the Kuo
Min Tang. Borodin made objections to his proposals and
he explained carefully, adding: ‘Though these measures are
246
harsh, a large party must prevent itself from being ruined
by allowing a smaller one to undermine it from inside.
Since the late Master’s policy was to unite people of all
classes in a common struggle, I do not wish to disobey his
orders by splitting the Party, and I have borne the pain
in my heart until to-day.’
On the following day he took the chair at an emergency
meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo
Min Tang, and it was resolved that (i) the Communist
Party must order its members not to attack Sun Yat-Sen
and his Three Principles of the People, that (2) the Com-
munist Party must give the chairman of the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang the list of Com-
munist members who were in the Kuo Min Tang, and
( 3 ) that those who held membership of both Parties were
not eligible to be heads of departments of the Kuo Min
Tang; that (4) pure members of Kuo Min Tang must not
organise meetings other than those allowed by the Party;
that (5) members of Kuo Min Tang must not promote
political activities without the order of the Highest
Authority of the Party; that (6) the Chinese Communist
Party and the Third International must inform a joint
committee, to be composed of Communists and Kuo Min
Tang members, of their orders to Chinese Communists
who were also members of Kuo Min Tang; that
(7) members of Kuo Min Tang must not join the Com-
munist Party without obtaining permission to withdraw
first from Kuo Min Tang; and that (8) members who dis-
obeyed these rules would be expelled from the Party.
After this decisive meeting, complicated quarrels
temporarily abated. Preparations for the Northern Puni-
tive Expedition, which had been so much opposed by the
Soviet advisers, went ahead in full swing. Tan Ping-Shan,
the head of the Organisation Department, handed over his
office to Chiang Kai-Shek, and Mao Tse-Tung, the acting
Head of the Propaganda Department, handed his to Ku
247
I
Meng-Yu. Many Soviet advisers had already been sent
away with a farewell banquet, and Communists with-
drawn from the Army were given other jobs. The two
conflicting parties and wings abode by an armed truce,
and on June 5th, 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion, with eight armies under his command, the latest addi-
tion being the forces of Tang Sheng-Chih, a military
leader in Hunan with a large army of his own. Tang
Sheng-Chih was made Commander of the Eighth Army.
The departure of Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min,
who stayed in Canton only for a few days and went away
to Shanghai, left Chiang Kai-Shek the sole leader in the
field. He was elected a member of the State Council,
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and Chair-
man of the Military Council. He was also the head of the
Organisation Department and of the Military People’s
Department of the headquarters of Kuo Min Tang. So
by the time the Northern Punitive Expedition started he
was not only at the head of the Revolutionary Army, but
also head and shoulders over all the rest in all the political
and Party organisations in Canton.
248
VIII
W HEN Chiang Kai-Shek was sworn in as the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion on the Parade Ground in Canton on July 9th, 1926,
the ceremony was attended by all the dignitaries of the
Government and of the Party and a crowd of fifty thou-
sand people. However, such a big crowd would be quite
insignificant compared with the soldiers now under his
command. He had under him eight armies which con-
sisted of more than twenty divisions, and the number of
officers and men who took orders from him was roughly
a hundred thousand. But such a formidable force had a
much more formidable task ahead waiting to be accom-
plished: to unite China by defeating the War Lords all
over the country. The total number of soldiers under these
War Lords was over a million. They outnumbered Chiang
Kai-Shek’s Revolutionary Army by more than ten to one.
The three major War Lords in China at this time were
Chang Tso-Lin of North China, Wu Pei-Fu of Central
China, and Sun Chuan-Fang of the Five South-Eastern
Provinces. Marshal Chang Tso-Lin had recently come to
Tientsin and Peking from Manchuria to take over the
Central Government from Tuan Chi-Jui, the Chief Execu-
tive. He did not like either the title of President or Chief
Executive, so he was soon to be installed as the Marshal
of the An Kuo Chun, or the Peaceful National Army,
which consisted of about 300,000 men.
Wu Pei-Fu, the Scholar-General, had by now become
reconciled with the Manchurian War Lord. So his master,
the bribing President Tsao Kun, was released by Chang
249
Tso-Lin’s men on the simple condition that he renounced
his illegal Presidency. Wu Pei-Fu gathered his forces in
Central China and had under his control Honan, Hupeh
and the Northern part of Hunan which was fighting
against the Southern part. He also had about 300,000 men
under his command, whilst Sun Chuan-Fang, the Com-
mander of the Allied Forces of the Five South-Eastern
Provinces, could muster a little more than 200,000. Be-
sides these forces, there were about 300,000 men scattered
all over the country, mostly in border provinces such as
Yunnan, Szechuan and other places.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s successful campaign starting from
July, 1927, will be treated very briefly here, as this book
must not turn into a history of Kuo Min Tang’s Northern
Punitive Expedition. Between July ist, when he
mobilised his armies, and July 27th, when he left Canton
himself with his staff officers and a few Russian advisers
for the North, he made public a number of messages,
declarations, and telegrams addressed to his officers, his
men, the Chinese who were overseas, the people of the
Province of Kwangtung and of the whole nation.
He told his officers and men that they were now fight-
ing for the people, to unite China so that a strong nation
could be established, strong enough to defend herself
against aggressors. They were the people’s army, and so
they must not cause inconvenience to the common people.
In his manifesto to the people of the whole nation he said
that he was fighting to relieve them from their distress
and would never cease until he had driven away the
Imperialists and their tools— that is, the War Lords— and
that he hoped the people would co-operate with his
soldiers in their common task of fighting against foreign
aggressors.
To fight against the whole country and almost against
the whole world, Chiang Kai-Shek’s army of a hundred
thousand men was indeed a very small one. Putting the
250
rest aside, he decided first what was to be done with the
three major War Lords. A classical strategist has said:
‘Befriend those afar and attack those near.’ So Chiang
Kai-Shek adopted this strategy: ‘Attack Wu Pei-Fu,
humour Sun Chuan-Fang, and forget Chang Tso-Lin.’
But while he was marshalling his forces to enter Hunan
to fight Wu Pei-Fu’s men, Sun Chuan-Fang started to raid
the branch offices and arrest members of the Kuo Min
Tang in his Provinces. Chiang Kai-Shek had to pretend
that he did not know about these events, and continued
to exchange polite telegrams in classical style with Sun
Chuan-Fang, both assuring each other that if one did not
attack the other first, the other would never do anything
to mar their excellent friendship.
The progress of Chiang Kai-Shek’s Expedition was ex-
tremely rapid. The newly re-organised Eighth Army,
with fresh reinforcements from Kwangtung and Kwangsi,
part of the Fourth and Seventh Armies, started a counter-
offensive and recaptured Chang-Sha, the capital of Hunan,
on July 1 2th, 1926, a fortnight before Chiang Kai-Shek
left Canton. Before the end of August the entire Province
of Hunan was almost clear of the enemy and brisk fight-
ing was going on for Hupeh. A decisive battle was fought
between Wu Pei-Fu’s crack divisions and the pick of the
Revolutionary Army in the last days of August, when the
Northern Forces were severely beaten. By this time
Chiang Kai-Shek had moved his headquarters to Yo-Chow,
a town on the northern border of Hunan and only some
sixty miles from the place where this big battle was raging
and a little over a hundred miles from the triple city of
Wu-Han, which is composed of Han-Kow, Han-Yang
and Wu-Chang.
Wu Pei-Fu was supervising this important battle him-
self. He and his generals were directing operations from
Hsien-Ning, only a few miles north of the battlefield.
After four days and four nights of intensive fighting in
251
which both sides suffered heavy losses, the Northerners
withdrew hurriedly into Wuchang, the capital of Hupeh
Province. Chiang Kai-Shek’s Revolutionary Army fol-
lowed them in hot pursuit and took the city of Hanyang
on September yth. After occupying this city, they
crossed the river to take Hankow, whilst a part of their
men besieged the more than twenty thousand Northerners
in Wuchang. On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek
came near to the city of Wuchang and demanded that
the besieged generals should surrender within twenty-four
hours. But the Northerners fought on obstinately and the
city was besieged for more than a month before it was
taken.
As victory after victory was won by the Revolutionary
Army, Chiang Kai-Shek had a busy time receiving the
surrenders of the enemy and also offers of co-operation
from neutral generals. When he started his Expedition
he had, as will be remembered, about a hundred thousand
men in eight armies. Within five months he had under
him 264,000 men in two hundred regiments. As many
of the newly-surrendered military leaders had to be re-
warded with the rank of a general and the title of com-
mander of an army though they might only have a few
regiments under them, the number of so-called Revolu-
tionary Armies was more than thirty. When representa-
tives from the War Lords of Szechuan came to him to
ask for appointments, he exclaimed: ‘Everywhere they
want to surrender to me. Their only fear is that I may
not permit them to capitulate. They are willing either
to become satellites or to play fast and loose with both
sides merely to save their skins. All of them are oppor-
tunists.’
A few words should be said here about what was
believed to be the invincibility of Chiang Kai-Shek’s
Revolutionary Army. As the reader will have seen, they
252
were mainly improvised forces with not very long train-
ing, having been only recently reorganised. Not many
of them were experienced fighters, and most of them were
leaving their warmer homes for a much colder zone. How
was it that they fought so well, won so many victories
and advanced so rapidly? There are several reasons.
The chief reason is that whilst the enemy was fighting
for his personal interest, Chiang Kai-Shek was fighting
for the political programme of the Kuo Min Tang. Since
the Chinese Republic was established in 1911 the country
had suffered from civil wars for fifteen years and the result
was that a number of War Lords had been created. That
all the Chinese people, including their own soldiers, hated
these War Lords is beyond doubt. Sun Yat-Scn, with his
Kuo Ming Tang, had offered to the people a political pro-
gramme which, if opportunity were given for it to be put
into practice, would give peace and prosperity to all. It
was for this idea that the Revolutionary soldiers were will-
ing to give their lives and the common people are willing
to render any help necessary.
Another reason is that Chiang Kai-Shek’s armies were
staffed by specially-trained officers, all of them members
of Kuo Min Tang— though there were still some Com-
munists whose political beliefs had not been made known
to the authorities— and they were the first officers to see
that the common people were not inconvenienced by their
arrival.
With the troops of the War Lords, three things hap-
pened wherever they went when they were good enough
not to loot their town. First they would summon the
heads of the local Chamber of Commerce, that is, the
richest people of the place, and demand that they should
give Voluntarily’ two or three months’ pay for all the
soldiers they had under their command. They had merely
to say that in order to keep them from looting the soldiers
must be paid at once and what they asked was always
253
forthcoming. The second blessing the people enjoyed on
the arrival of the troops was that a large number of big
private houses would have to be vacated for them to
occupy. If you did not pack up at once, they would pack
up for you and they would do it on the principle that
packers were keepers. The third was that the troops
always depended upon the civilians for their transport.
They generally asked the local authorities to provide them
with a certain number of labourers— who had to be paid by
the local authorities— and in return they promised not to
conscript forced labour by arresting any able-bodied men
they saw in the streets.
But on arrival at each city, Chiang Kai-Shek’s army
officers— Party Representatives and members of the
political departments attached to the Army— announced
that they would not ask for the soldiers’ pay from the local
people, that they would not occupy any private build-
ings and that they would not conscript forced labour.
The Cantonese Government had budgeted for all these
things and the soldiers always crowded into temples and
empty public buildings rather than cause the civilians any
inconvenience. Such conduct touched the hearts of the
people who had suffered so much during the past fifteen
years. They often gave generously towards the soldiers’
comforts.
The work done by the political workers of the Revolu-
tionary Army was modelled on that done in the Red
Army. Chiang Kai-Shek himself said candidly that he
had copied the Russian system very extensively, and he
still had a small number of Russian advisers with him.
So as soon as the political workers arrived, public meet-
ings were organised and held, in which publicity for the
Revolutionary Army was spread between entertainments.
People in China had never had such an experience before
and wherever the men of the Revolutionary Anny came,
they were always welcomed and loved.
254
There was another factor in the success of the Revolu-
tionary Army. Since Sun Yat-Sen’s trip to Peking, and
later his death there, nearly all the younger people
throughout the country had looked up to him as the
saviour of China. The Communists in those early days,
it must be frankly recorded, worked hand-in-hand with
the members of the Kuo Ming Tang. They made people
realise that unless the Revolutionary cause, for which
Chiang Kai-Shek and his men were fighting, was sup-
ported by all so that it prevailed, their beloved country
would soon be ruined by the War Lords.
Though Chiang Kai-Shek had started to take very stem
measures against the Communists in March, 1928, the re-
action of the Communists could not come into effect
during the first few months of the Northern Punitive
Expedition. First of all, Chiang Kai-Shek declared his
action was not a break with the Communists as a body,
but was taken against a number of individuals. How true
this was had still to be seen. The Communists among
members of the Kuo Min Tang were a minority, and
when they started to work against the Kuo Min Tang
they worked against heavy odds. After all they had
praised and co-operated with the Kuo Min Tang for over
two years, and now they found it difficult to undo what
had been done. It was not easy to convince the general
public, when they had to take back everything they had
been saying for the past two years.
If the Communists were undermining the Kuo Min
Tang— and certainly they thought they had good reason
for doing so after Chiang Kai-Shek had openly sup-
pressed them— they were doing it on the sly and had to
be very cautious. All the measures recommended and
taken by Chiang Kai-Shek against the Communists were
declared openly. They might sound cruel and unjust but
they had the advantage of having official sanction. Even
if such actions did sow the seeds of enmity and bloodshed,
255
the result could not come out at once. What they were
reaping now was still mostly the good work done by the
co-operation of the Communists.
Moreover, Chiang Kai-Shek was an ideal idol for the
common people. Since the death of Sun Yat-Sen, people
had been wondering whom they could now worship. Hu
Han-Min was a rather narrow-minded politician, caring
very little what others thought of him. Wang Ching-Wei
was much better but could not be compared with a soldier
whose fight against Chen Chiung-Ming and other re-
actionary generals had won him many laurels. And he
was a model general. He dressed very simply, wearing
nothing ostentatious as the War Lords liked to do. People
could see him any day, walking among his men in an
ordinary cotton uniform and straw sandals. He did not
drink, he did not smoke— he doesn’t even to this day. And
he always had nice things to say to the common people.
That is why, wherever he went, thousands of people lined
the streets, waiting hours for a glimpse of him and to cheer
him. What a contrast to the War Lords, who had to clear
the streets and place sentinels there to keep the people
away hours before making their rare appearance.
After Chiang Kai-Shek had consolidated his position
in Hunan and Hupeh, and when Wu Pei-Fu had fled
further north to trv to get Chang Tso-Lin’s Manchurian
Army to help him, Chiang Kai-Shek’s friendship with Sun
Chuan-Fang, the Commander-in-Chief of the Five South-
Eastern Provinces, began to deteriorate rapidly. Formerly
they had addressed each other by their first names and
called each other 'my dear Fdder brother’. Now their
language had to be quite different. The old policy of
humouring Sun Chuan-Fang was no longer practicable.
In the beginning of September, 1926, Sun Chuan-Fang,
after sending an ultimatum demanding Chiang Kai-Shek’s
withdrawal with all his men into Kwangtung within
256
twenty-four hours, said in a circular telegram addressed
to the whole country: 'Chiang Kai-Shek, a nobody from
some remote water-side, has no right to impose himself
on the ranks of the army. Falsely flying the flag of Sun
Yat-Sen, he is really acting according to the policy of
Lenin.’ After accusing him of having spread Bolshevism
and started aggression in his defence lines, Sun Chuan-
Fang ranted on: ‘Such actions indicate that he does not
realise his own shortcomings nor his weakness. He has
dared to be the aggressor, the destroyer of peace. His sin
is so great as to have no limit and incurs the anger of both
God and men.’
Chiang Kai-Shek, after answering back by saying that
Sun Chuan-Fang’s ‘plan to do harm to Hunan and Kwang-
tung is as clear as if it were transparent in his lungs and
heart’, and that he was deceiving himself as well as cheat-
ing others, said also in a circular telegram addressed to
the whole country: ‘This man Sun had taken a mean
advantage in occupying Kiangsu and Chekiang during the
past year and still will not check his ambition. Falsely
saying he is protecting his regions and maintaining peace
for his people, he is actually aggressive and causing trouble
to the people.’
The gage having been thrown, Chiang Kai-Shek super-
vised personally his attack into Kiangsi. Sun Chuan-Fang
had had a little more time to prepare than had Wu Pei-Fu,
and had probably learned a good deal during the past few
months. He stood the onslaught better than Wu Pei-Fu,
though by now Chiang Kai-Shek’s Revolutionary Armies
had increased greatly in numbers. Perhaps as their
quantity increased, the quality decreased. From the be-
ginning of September they fought on, until two and a
half months later the Province of Kiangsi was clear of Sun
Chuan-Fang’s troops.
The attack on Fukien began in the early part of
October, and by the end of November that Province was
257
occupied by Chiang Kai-Shek’s men. As for Chekiang,
Chiang Kai-Shek’s native Province, prolonged fighting
took place there, and Sun Chuan-Fang had several minor
successes. But in the middle of February, 1927, it also
became the property of the Revolutionary Army. With
three sides in the south surrounded by the enemy, the
Province of Anhwei fell in March, when the Military
Governor, formerly under Sun Chuan-Fang, decided to
throw in his lot with Chiang Kai-Shek and become the
Commander of the Thirty-Seventh Revolutionary Army.
Nanking and Shanghai, the two important cities of the
Province of Kiangsu, the last of Sun Chuan-Fang’s Five
South-Eastern Provinces, fell to Chiang Kai-Shek’s men
towards the end of March, and the Commander-in-Chief
War Lord had to fly northwards with his routed armies.
Before these five South-Eastern Provinces came into
Chiang Kai-Shek’s hands, Chang Tso-Lin had begun to
realise that the Revolutionaries had little love for him. His
predecessor, the foremost War Lord Tuan Chi-Jui, was
actually driven away by the combined subterranean forces
of the Communists and the Kuo Min Tang. In order to
consolidate his position inside the Great Wall, he mar-
shalled all his forces in the North and undertook to help
both Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Fang in their common
fight against the ‘Bolsheviks’. On December ist, 1926,
when he assumed his duty as Marshal of the An Kuo
Chun, he tried to secure the support of the people by
appealing to their patriotism.
In a manifesto to the people denouncing the Revolution
he said: ‘We have in our country some ambitious and
crafty bandits, who pick up what other people have
already spat out, and spread Bolshevism. They agitate the
young students and rash scoundrels, to ruin our country
by preaching the unsuitable doctrine of Communism.
They use as their instruments the numerous poverty-
stricken people, and they appeal to the mob-psychology
258
of the rabble of society. They shout “Down with the
War Lords” and “Down with the Imperialists” but their
deeds are just as bad. What they write on their banners
is a hypocritical mask. Plow can they do anything to
benefit our people and nation? Formerly there was the
traitor Shih Ching-Tang, who joined a foreign race to
ruin his own country. He called himself the foreigner’s
son and was condemned through the ages. Feng Yu-
Hsiang and Chiang Kai-Shek are invading their own
country by obtaining foreign help. What is the differ-
ence between them and the traitor Shih Ching-Tang? As
for Chiang Kai-Shek, who submitted meekly to the direc-
tions of Borodin, he is even worse than the traitor Shih
Ching-Tang.’
And so Chiang Kai-Shek’s policy of ‘Forget Chang Tso-
Lin’ didn’t last long. Manchurian soldiers were sent to the
south-east to help Sun Chuan-Fang, and after their defeat
he started to march straight to the South by way of Honan
to tackle the ‘Bolsheviks’. But the generals under Wu Pei-
Fu would not trust him, and so the Manchurian and Chihli
forces had to fight it out in Northern Honan first. By the
time Chang Tso-Lin’s forces had defeated the Chihli
generals and were in contact with the Revolutionary
Army, the Northerners were far away from their base
and fairly tired from their strenuous and incessant fight-
ing.
Chang Tso-Lin had ample proof for denouncing the
Southerners as Bolsheviks. The reader will remember that
when Sun Yat-Sen went North, this Manchurian War
Lord met him in Tientsin and wanted him to give up his
policy of co-operating with Soviet Russia. Sun Yat-Sen
died in Peking in 1925, and that was the time when the
Chinese Communist Party and the Kuo Min Tang were
most popular in the North. In a memorial service to the
dead leader of the Kuo Min Tang, attended by a large
259
mass of people in the Central Park, Tuan Chi-Jui, as head
of the Government, had to be present. But the people
knew him to be the enemy of Sun Yat-Sen who wanted
to get rid of the influence of the Western Powers in
China, and Tuan Chi-Jui had submitted to their demand
readily. They wanted to attack him when he came to the
service. His secret police reported what was waiting for
him and he saved his skin at the eleventh hour.
Historians could hardly ask for more interesting
material about this service. Tuan Chi-Jui had announced
that he was coming, and was actually taking a special bath
as required according to our tradition. It was when he
was dressing that he decided to stay away. His official
excuse was that after the bath his feet had swollen and his
boots become too small for him. Of course he could not
come barefooted.
Tuan Chi-Jui’s alleged swollen feet saved him from the
angry mob in Peking, but political mobs started to figure
prominently in China from henceforth. As described in
the previous chapter, in May there was the Nanking Road
Massacre in Shanghai, when scores of innocent people
were killed by British policemen. In June there was
the Shakee Massacre, when scores of innocent people were
killed by British soldiers and Freiich marines. In March,
1926, an angry crowd organised by the Communists and
Kuo /Mill Tang in Peking was fired on by the Guards of
Tuan Chi-Jui. As the chairman of this mass meeting was
Hsu Chien, President of the Sino-Russian University, a
fiery pro-Communist member of the Central Executive
Committee of the Kuo Min Tang, it is believed that the
Communists were the instigators of this massacre.
In March, 1926, whilst the Communists and members
of the Kuo Min Tang had started to quarrel seriously, and
Chiang Kai-Shek had taken decisive steps against those
Communists whom he believed to be working against him
or his Party, the members of both parties were still difii-
260
cult to distinguish from each other. As both parties were
subject to suppression in the North where the War Lords
ruled, they had to work in secret and help each other
like people in the same boat during a storm. Such condi-
tions continued until the two parties were officially separ-
ated in August, 1927.
When Chang Tso-Lin came into Peking he was more
severe than Tuan Chi-Jui towards the Communists and
Kuo Min Tang members, whom he called in general ‘the
Party people’, as to him they were not different from each
other. After he had issued his manifesto denouncing
Chiang Kai-Shek and Feng Yu-Hsiang as Bolsheviks, he
ordered the police to search for the Party people. They
found that there were ten thousand Kuo Min Tang
members and between six and seven hundred Communists
among the students in Peking. On March 20th, 1927, they
started to arrest them, and on April 4th, they went into
the Russian Embassy, their barracks, their bank and the
offices of the Chinese Eastern Railways to arrest Professor
Li Ta-Chao, the head of the Communists in Nordi China,
and sixty others. Fire then broke out in the rooms of the
Soviet Military Attache, but the Chinese police were
quick to put it out. I hey captured a great quantity of
documents, arms and banners, which all went to prove
that the Russians in Peking were promoting rebellion
against the Peking Government.
At this time the Minister of Foreign Affairs under
Chang Tso-Lin was Wellington Koo, who was also acting
as Prime Minister. Being a very able and distinguished
diplomat, he answered the angry protests from the Soviet
Government with perfect calm. He merely announced
that since the Russians had abused their diplomatic privi-
lege by using their Embassy to harbour rebellion, the
Chinese Government was to sever diplomatic relations
with the Soviet at once, and he ignored any protests from
the Russian charge-d" affaires and from Moscow. The
261
Party people who had been arrested were committed for
trial, and twenty of them, including Li Ta-Chao, who was,
by the way, also a member of the Central Executive Com-
mittee of the Kuo Min Tang, were condemned and hung
for high treason on April 28th, 1927.
To return to Chiang Kai-Shek in the South and bring
the reader back to the end of August, 1926, when Chiang
Kai-Shek was still fighting Wu Pci-Fu in Hunan. Whilst
all their enemies regarded the Kuo Min Tang and the
Communist Party as one body, Chiang Kai-Shek sent the
following telegram to the Central Committee of his Party
in Canton:
‘I have just read, in No. 161 of the Guide (the Com-
munist Weekly) an article by Chen Tu-Hsiu on Our
Goverment’s Northern Punitive Expedition. He has
opposed our Party’s Expedition and tried to hinder our
National Revolution. Chen Tu-Hsiu is the head of the
Chinese Communist Party. The Guide Weekly is the
official organ of their Party. The Communist Party
should be responsible for what is said in this article. Such
an opinion is plainly meant to destroy the spirit of co-
operation between the two parties at this critical hour. It
has far-reaching influence. I dare not remain silent any
longer. We must ask the Central Executive Committee
of the Chinese Communist Party to give a responsible
reply in order to avoid misunderstanding.’
An entry on the last day of August, 1926, in his diary,
was about a telegram sent to Borodin which he had just
read. He said: ‘Borodin and those people try to stop the
progress of our Revolutionary Army. They never relax
for a moment in their endeavour to prevent our Northern
Punitive Expedition from becoming a success. Alas! Our
Master died suddenly and left his work behind to those
of us who did not die and who find it full of difficulties
and thorns.’
262
In the middle of September Feng Yu-Hsiang, the
Christian General, came back from Russia and took up his
duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Kuo Ming
Chun, or National People’s Army. In his declaration he
said he had come back from Russia to answer the call
of Sun Yat-Sen’s Principles. He started to attack troops
in the North-west of China which belonged to generals
who were supporting Wu Pei-Fu. Chiang Kai-Shek was
very glad to have a brother-in-arms at last. That was why
Chang Tso-Lin put the names of Chiang Kai-Shek and
Feng Yu-Hsiang together. -
At the end of this month Chiang Kai-Shek received a
letter from Wang Ching-Wei to say that there was no
difference beuveen them about what happened in March.
Chiang Kai-Shek was even more ready than his friend
to let bygones be bygones and answered the letter at once.
He asked Wang Ching-Wei to come out of his retirement
to take charge of Party affairs. He said: ‘My strength is
little and my ability is thin. I cannot look after political
affairs as well [ as the army ] . All I care for is the interests
of our country and our Party. If anything will benefit
our Revolution, I am all for it, even if I do not like it,
or if I think it wrong.’
On October 3rd, 1926, he sent this telegram to Wang
Ching-Wei: ‘ 1 , your younger brother, am not educated
and have no manners, so have offended you. I have just
received your instructions, which are full of self-suppres-
sion and sincerity, and when I read them, I perspired all
the more with shame. To achieve the ultimate aim of our
Party there is no hope if you, my Elder Brother, and I,
your younger brother, do not co-operate to the end with-
out any differences.
‘You, my Elder lirother, left everything behind without
even casting a look at me, your younger brother, and
the result has been that I have gone through all these diffi-
culties single-handed. You, my Elder Brother, could
263
throw away honours and positions, but could you shrink
from responsibility? And friendship? I have borne it all
this time, and now you surely can see my foolish devo-
tion to you and know that I have nothing but friendship
for you. I have specially asked my two Elder Brothers,
Chang Ching-Kiang and Li Shih-Tseng, to try to per-
suade you to come home and also to tell you personally
what is in my mind. I entreat you to return with them
and to shoulder with us this most great and difficult
responsibility, so that I, your younger brother, can follow
your directions and will nq§ commit blunders to harm
our Party and our country. 1 pray for your return most
earnestly.’
But Wang Ching-Wci remained abroad for six months
more. When he came back in April, 1927, he started
almost immediately to attack Chiang Kai-Shek. The first
few words he wrote and which were reproduced every-
where were: ‘The Revolution will never succeed without
striking down Chiang Kai-Shek first.’
The anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement was probably
st'cU'ted by the Communists, but more than probably it was
largely carried out by members of the Kuo Min Tang
who considered themselves more revolutionary than their
comrades, and also by those whom he thought to be his
friends and followers. Had he not been thinking that
Wang Ching-AVci was his friend, he would certainly not
have sent two old comrades to France with the letter
quoted above to urge him to come back. Had he known
only a part of the things Wang Ching-Wei was going to do
to him and to the country, he would, instead of welcoming
him, have shot him, and that, whether ‘constitutional’ or
‘dictatorial’, would have been a good job, too— very good
for himself and for the country. As the reader knows,
Wang Ching-Wei not only promoted several civil wars
against Chiang Kai-Shek, but also became the Chinese
264
Quisling— indeed, a forerunner of the actual Quisling— and
died a Japanese puppet.
Two other ardent pioneers of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek
movement were also non-Communists in the beginning.
One was Hsu Chicn, President of the Sino-Russian
University, of whom more anon, and the other was Teng
Yen- Fa, whom Chiang Kai-Shek considered as his
protege. He took Teng Yen-Ta under him in the early
days of the establishment of the Whampoa Military
Academy, and since then he had always had him doing
some important and confidential work for him. At the
time of the Northern Punitive Fxpedition, he was in
charge of the General Political Department of the
Revolutionary Army. While Chiang Kai-SIiek was with
the army in the fighting areas, 'Feng Yen-Ta stayed in
Wuchang and acted actually as his agent.
In November, 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek asked the
authorities in Canton to move their headquarters to
Wuchang, a more desirable scat for the Government than
Canton. Before the more important members of the
Government moved to this city, a number of pro-
Communist members, together with Borodin, were there
to organise a combined Committee of the State Council
and the Central Executive Committee. On December
1 3th, 1926, the organisation held its first meeting in
Wuchang and voted themselves to be the temporary
highest authority of the Party and the Ciovemment.
Borodin and several Communists were present and Hsu
Chien was elected chairman. After that, Wuchang
became the centre of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement.
On December 22 nd, (ihiang Kai-Shek sent to Teng
Yen-Ta this telegram, which is of great interest in more
ways than one:
‘Recently printed matter issued by the General Political
Department must have escaped your attention because
you have been over-busy with work. Such adverse pub-
265
licity does harm to our Army, to myself and to our
Whampoa Military Academy. But that is nothing com-
pared with the harm it does to the future of the Revolu-
tion. I hope you’ll dismiss the acting head of the Publicity
Section and never employ him in any of our Revolu-
tionary Armies. . . .’
This message shows that official organs in Wucliang
had already started their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek publicity,
and also that Chiang Kai-Shek was very generous to Teng
Yen-Ta. But Teng Yen-Ta continued his work in attack-
ing Chiang Kai-Shek, who, strange to observe, continued
to forgive him for several more months, until at last
Teng Yen-Ta formally joined the new Government in
Wuchang, which ordered the dismissal of Chiang Kai-
Shek from all his offices and expelled him from the Party.
Moreover, a price of two hundred and fifty thousand taels
of silver was offered by this Government for the capture
of Chiang Kai-Shek, or one hundred thousand for his
assassination. As later events revealed, Chiang Kai-Shek
was neither captured nor killed by the Wuchang people,
but Teng Yen-Ta was arrested by Chiang Kai-Shek and
imprisoned for some time, being at last shot after a court-
martial.
This combined Committee, with Hsu Chien as chair-
man and a number of Communists and pro-Communists,
intensified their anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement in
Wuchang, Hankow and Hanyang, which now went by
the name of Wuhan. From December, 1926, to March,
1927, whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was busily occupied in
fighting against the War Lords, he found that most of the
younger members of his Party who were under the in-
fluence of Wuhan began to call him War Lord, Dictator,
and other much worse names. His portrait, which used
to decorate walls and banners as the saviour of the people,
now had two companions: they invariably put the Kaiser
on one side and Mussolini on the other. It must be re-
266
mcmbered that in 1926 and 19^7 name of Hitler was
still unheard of in China, otherwise the Kaiser would not
have been so honoured.
The members of the Central Committee in Wuhan
were gradually reinforced by more Communist and pro-
Communist members and Reserve members. They were
preparing to hold a general meeting there and those who
did not like their policy of pro-Communism and anti-
Chiang Kai-Shek did not want to join. When the meet-
ing was held in the early days of /March, not only the Con-
servative members but also Chiang Kai-Shek himself
refused to attend.
Such being the case, the result can easily be conjectured.
They re-organised the State Council, the Political Council
and the Military Council, and needless to say the com-
bined forces of pro-Communists and Communists secured
a majority in all of them. Chiang Kai-Shek had been a
member of the first and chairman of both the second and
the last Council. Now he was pushed out of the first and
the second altogether and was only a member of the
Presidium of the last. Suffice it to say that Teng Yen-Ta
was a member of almost every committee or council, and
of several presidiums or standing committees, whilst Hsu
Chien had his finger in every important pie.
Chiang Kai-Shek had been deprived of every position
except that of Commander-in-Chief, but the power of this
had been greatly reduced. One of the few resolutions
passed was that ‘the Commander-in-Chief is just a member
of the Military Council. Orders for mobilisation must
first be passed by a majority vote at the Military Council
and further sanctioned by the Central Executive Com-
mittee before being put into the hands of the Commander-
in-Chief, who may then issue the orders.’
An order issued to all the Members of the Kuo Min
Tang by this meeting said that . . Since the Northern
Punitive Expedition has started, all the military, political
267
and party affairs have been concentrated in the hands of
an individual. This has meant all the more that the
political administration could not be directed by the Party
but only by military organisations. Such a system has
many defects. Not only does it protect all those useless
and rotten elements of the Party, but it also leads into the
Party all the bureaucrats, crafty merchants and other
opportunists. So it has produced an individual dictator
and military autocracy. . . .’
The above quotation sounds rather strange. But that
is exactly how it is in the original Chinese. It was written
in the most fashionable style of the period and all the so-
called ‘political writing’ was done in that way. In trans-
lating it into English, the humble author is utterly unable
to preserve its original style.
While the non-combatants were busily engaged in
intrigues in Wuhan, heavy fighting was taking place in
the East. Chiang Kai-Shek had his headquarters in Nan-
chang, and when Nanking and Shanghai fell into the hands
of his troops he hurried to Shanghai. At the time of the
occupation of Nanking by the Revolutionary Army, a
few foreigners were killed, some say by the fleeing and
looting soldiers of the North, and some say by Com-
munists who wanted to create chaos for the Kuo Alin
Tang. Before order was restored, British and American
warships moored in the river outside Nanking bombarded
the city and killed many innocent people as a reprisal.
It sounds horrible and almost unbelievable today, but it
happened at the time when Chinese cities constantly
suffered such treatment from foreign warships which
enjoyed freedom to sail into any part of China, accord-
ing to the treaties China was made to sign after she was
defeated during the last days of the Alanchu Dynasty.
Happily the commanders of the Revolutionary Army
arrived on the scene in Nanking promptly. They shot
268
the looters and escorted the remaining foreigners to the
warships. Later on the matter was settled amicably
between China and the Powers concerned.
Rushing to Shanghai at the end of March, Chiang Kai-
Shek took every precaution to avoid unnecessary blood-
shed. But it was a difficult time. Tension was high.
Slogans of ‘Down with Imperialists’ and ‘Drive away all
Foreigners’ had been shouted too often and too loudly to
be checked easily. Whilst the Communists and their
organised labour bodies were very anxious to have a go
at the Imperialists and their compradors in the Inter-
national Settlement, foreign forces were guarding the
Concessions jealously with machine-guns behind sandbags
and barbed wire.
Such was the situation which confronted Chiang Kai-
Shek when he arrived at Shanghai. Looking around,
what could he see elsewhere? In Wuhan, where the new
Government was, there were people who had by now
put everything aside in order to concentrate their energy
in finishing him. In the North the three War Lords,
Chang Tso-Lin, Sun Chuan-Fang and Wu Pei-Fu were
moving heaven and earth to wipe him and his forces out.
From among his loyal supporters, many were slipping
away, some of their own free will, some, no doubt, from
intimidation by the Communists.
The reader will remember that six months before this
Chiang Kai-Shek had written a letter and sent two of his
best friends to Wang Ching-Wei to entreat him to come
back and take Party affairs off his hands. Wang Ching-
Wei now arrived at Shanghai from France on April ist,
1927. How eagerly everybody was waiting for him!
History sometimes so completely repeats itself. In 1911
when the Wuchang Government and the Shanghai-
Nanking Government could not get together, the arrival
of Sun Yat-Sen from Europe was just as eagerly awaited.
However, Wang Ching-Wei was not such an unselfish
269
man as was Sun Yat-Sen. Although Chiang Kai-Shek
regarded him as a godsend, and readily agreed with all
the other members of the Central Executive and Super-
visory Committee to hand over to him all the affairs of
the Party, Wang Ching-Wei played them false. After
having issued a joint manifesto with Chen Tu-Hsui, the
head of the Chinese Communist Party, in which they said
that ‘what China needs is the establishment of a demo-
cratic dictatorship to deal with the reactionaries: this is
a dictatorship of all the suppressed classes combined
together and not a proletarian dictatorship’, he told his
Kuo Min Tang comrades in Shanghai who wanted to hold
a meeting of the Central Committee in Nanking on
April 15th that he would be there. But he slipped away
to Wuhan and the next they heard of him was when
he shouted aloud: ‘Down with Chiang Kai-Shek the
Dictator.’
He was not the only man shouting. Both Hsu Chien
and Teng Yen-Ta had been shouting the same thing. And
at numerous mass meetings large crowds were led to shout
it by these two and many other revolutionary leaders.
When the humble author uses the word ‘shout’, not only
does he mean shouting as a figure of speech, but he is also
recording literally what was happening in those days.
These leaders actually led the masses in shouting at the
tops of their voices at public meetings until they were
hoarse. It was said that was the proper thing to do, as the
revolutionaries did it in Russia! Certainly it was one of
the most democratic rights the people enjoyed in those
days: all they needed was to have a leader on the platform
to direct them.
On April 12th, 1927, three days before the Central
Committee met in Nanking, Chiang Kai-Shek started to
disarm the Communists and their labour organisations.
They had been restive and it was touch and go. The side
which struck first would be open to criticism, but practical
270
( row n Copyrif’ht
THRKE-POWKR CONFERENCE IN NORTH AFRICA, NOVEMBER 1 943
THE GENERALISSIMO, PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND MR WINSTON CHURCHILL
people preferred to be criticised rather than be stricken.
In Shanghai and in the East, it was Chiang Kai-Shek and
his followers who won the day. But in Wuhan and then
Changsha it was the Communists and their associates who
had the upper hand. On April 25th, the first big official
anti-Chiang Kai-Shek mass meeting took place in
Wuchang, and it was reported that about three hundred
thousand people attended. It was a fiery meeting in which
feelings ran high. But nevertheless it was harmless. As
the attack of three hundred thousand people was con-
centrated on one man who was far away from them, all
they could do was to shout themselves hoarse. But in
Shanghai and Foochow, Chiang Kai-Shek and his sup-
porters did not do much shouting. They were more
practical. They arrested those whom they thought dan-
gerous and had them tried and shot. After that Wuhan
and Nanking became deadly enemies and were at war
with each other.
After Wang Ching- Wei’s departure from Shanghai for
Wuhan, the anti-Communist members of Kuo Min Tang,
including Hu Han-Min, gathered around Chiang Kai-
Shek and organised a National Government in Nanking
on April i8th, 1927. An Army and Navy Conference—
for the Chinese Navy had by now declared its allegiance
to the Kuo Min Tang— was held six days later, on
April 24th, and it was decided to continue the Northern
Punitive Expedition. Large armies continued to push for-
ward towards the north of Kiangsu, and in June some of
Chiang Kai-Shek’s supporters occupied Hsu-Chow, an
important junction where the North-South Railway (the
Tientsin-Pukow line) and the East-West Railway (the
Lung-Hai line) cross each other.
In the meantime generals supporting the Wuhan
Government also occupied Cheng-Chow, a railway
junction in Honan. As both the Wuhan and Nanking
271
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Governments were fighting North, both of them were
open to the attack of their interior enemy. Sup-
porters of Chiang Kai-Shek in Szechuan could not fight
the Northerners, so they marched eastwards to attack
Wuhan. Wuhan had to withdraw its forces from Honan
to ward off the attack. In the east, some of the supporters
of Wuhan were marching fast eastwards, ready to attack
Nanking. Chiang Kai-Shek had to shift a part of his
Expeditionary Army from the North to defend his
capital. So by June the Northern Punitive Expedition
was practically at a standstill, and civil war between two
factions of the Kuo Min Tang was on its way.
It was then that Feng Yii-Hsiang intervened. Because
of the occupation of Chengchow and Hsuchow by the
Southerners, he called two meetings separately. First he
met Wang Ching-Wei and all the Wuhan leaders on
June loth at Chengchow. These people had sadly dis-
covered, only ten days previously, that the Third Inter-
national wanted the Kuo Min Tang to submit to the
Chinese Communist Party. Another envoy from Moscow,
the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, had arrived at Wuhan,
and he, unlike the crafty Borodin, showed a telegram to
Wang Ching-Wei telling him that the Third International
wanted to take the Chinese Revolution into their own
hands. They had no further use for the Kuo Min Tang.
At the Conference at Chengchow, Wang Ching-Wei and
his friends readily agreed to Feng Yu-Hsiang’s mediation
and decided to expel the Communists. It was very late,
but not too late.
Nine days later Feng Yu-Hsiang met Chiang Kai-Shek,
Hu Han-Min and other Nanking members at Hanchow.
Here again all agreed to Feng Yu-Hsiang’s mediation, and
declared that their unchanging aim was to wipe away the
War Lords who were the instruments of the Imperialists.
So Feng Yu-Hsiang had Borodin, who had been the power
behind the Government in Wuhan, conducted back to
272
Russia, and the Wuhan Government started to expel the
Communists on July 15th.
At this exit of Borodin a few words about him and his
work in China will be allowed- He was far from being a
monster, as many gossipers said he was. Quiet, self-
possessed and intelligent, he was a most agreeable com-
panion. In the early days of the reorganisation of the Kuo
Min Tang, his advice had been of great service. It was
only when orders from Moscow became totally un-
palatable to the Kuo Min Tang that people found him
difficult. About Chiang Kai-Shek he said to a journalist,
when everyone in Wuhan was wanting to kill Chiang Kai-
Shek: ‘He and I were friends from the very first day we
met at Canton, four years ago, and I am not going to
abuse him in any way. 1 am convinced that he is honest
in his fight for the nationalist cause, but he is not enough
of a personality to carry his work through alone, to take
upon himself the gigantic task of liberating and recon-
structing China and the Chinese Constitution, and he is
surrounded by men whose interests arc altogether selfish;
they arc just wanting to further their own personal
plans.’
To do him justice, this passage is considerably to his
credit. Few people in Wuhan at that time would have
owned that Chiang Kai-Shek was honest, nor would they
have called him their friend and refrained from abusing
him. Even his remark about the selfish people who were
surrounding Chiang Kai-Shek is true to this day.
By this time the Chinese Communists felt themselves
to be in a very bad way. From the early days when they
were welcomed to Canton, their sponsors and friends left
them one by one as time passed. They had now to take
matters into their own hands, and they started drastic
activities in Hunan and Kwangtung. On July 31st, after
they had been driven out of Hupeh and Hunan, they took
Nanchang, the capital of Kiangsi, and established a
273
Revolutionary Council, but had to flee almost at once
when the Kuo Min Tang armies came to attack them.
From henceforth the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist
Party were at war with each other, and killed each other
whenever they had a chance to do so. The Chinese had
never suffered religious massacres as did the Europeans in
centuries past. But now, in the twentieth century, they
were, since the split between these two parties, subjected
to many wholesale political massacres.
It is rather strange to observe that though the Wuhan
Government had realised their mistake in putting them-
selves into the hands of the Communists and acting as
their tool for several months, they did not now rush into
the arms of Nanking and be reconciled at once. But
political differences are difficult to define and heal up.
The Eastern Punitive Expedition continued to push for-
ward, threatening Nanking. People in Wuhan, under the
leadership of VVang Ching-Wei, continued to shout:
‘Down with the Dictator Chiang Kai-Shek!’ It was Wang
Ching- Wei’s saying at that time that they were ‘struggling
between two enemies’. By the two enemies he meant the
Communists and Chiang Kai-Shek. Evidently he must
have been too much occupied with these two enemies of
liis to remember his chief enemy, the War Lords, whom
he now left unchecked in the North. Luckily the Man-
churian Army in Honan, as was pointed out earlier, had
been engaged in fighting Wu Pei-Fu’s men, who had no
use for their so-called collaboration, and so people in
Wuhan began to forget about them.
But in Nanking the situation was slightly different.
Here they had to light the Communists; they had to fight
the once pro-Communist but now anti-Communist left-
wing forces; and in the North their enemy Sun Chuan-
Fang, who did not fight the Manchurian Army as did Wu
Pei-Fu’s generals, availed himself of this opportunity to
274
stage a counter-offensive with the help of Chang Tso-Lin’s
men. Finding that, after he had withdrawn from the
Northern front part of his forces in order to check the
Eastern Punitive Expedition, he was now left with in-
sufficient strength to ward off this powerful counter-
offensive, Chiang Kai-Shek had to beat a quick retreat.
In a short time he had to give up nearly all the ground he
had won on the northern side of the Yangtze River.
Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian General, who had been
very active as a go-between trying to bring Wuhan and
Nanking together by having a conference with the
Wuhan leaders in Chengchow and another with Chiang
Kai-Shek in Ilsuchow, now proposed a third conference
in An-King so that the two parties could meet each other
half-way, because Wuhan members refused to go any-
where under the rule of Nanking, and Nanking members
would not think of going to anywhere within the influence
of Wuhan.
Let the reader put himself in the place of Chiang Kai-
Shek and reflect for a moment on what had been happen-
ing during these past few months and what he ought to do
under the present circumstances. Was it not ridiculous
that they still had to meet each other on neutral ground
to discuss possible co-operation, or more probably non-
co-operation? They had no further quarrel about the
Communists, whom even Wuhan now realised to be their
common enemy. What then was it that they had been
quarrelling about? It all boiled down to this: that there
was one man who was in the way, and that was he him-
self. If he went into retirement there would not be any
further need for the people to shout ‘Down with Chiang
Kai-Shek’. Putting aside the question of who was right
and who was wrong, the simple fact remained that whilst
he was the Commander-in-Chief there was no hope for
the success of the Northern Punitive Expedition; for the
forces under Wuhan would not fight the Northerners as
they were marching eastwards against him, and his own
forces couldn’t, as they had to ward off the attack from
Wuhan. It was plain what he ought to do.
On August 13th, 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek announced his
resignation and issued a long declaration to air his feelings,
which he had had in mind for a long time. He gave an
historical review of his work up to the time of the forma-
tion of the Wuhan regime, and then said:
‘The Communists hiding in our Party became jealous of
the progress of our Revolution. Following the instructions
of Borodin at a time when our comrades in Wuhan and in
Nanchang were temporarily separated, they made up all
sorts of malignant lies, saying I was a “War Lord” and
“Dictator”. They wanted to defeat me directly and defeat
our Revolution indirectly. ... At the time when our
comrades in uniform were fighting hard in Chekiang and
Kiangsu, our Party organisation in Wuhan was seized by
Communists. Pay for the soldiers was stopped, and also
munitions for the war. We were endangered in a hundred
ways. I had to bear them all in silence. Not that I did
not think of resigning; I did, and repeatedly. But I could
not bear to leave my men of the front line in the lurch.
Overcoming every hardship, I struggled on to consolidate
our position in Kiangsu and Anhwei.
‘After my capture of Nanking and Shanghai, the Com-
munists, finding their tricks didn’t work, proceeded to
incite the mob to create diplomatic trouble and misled
the workers to organise disturbances behind the fighting
lines. As their outrageous deeds became more apparent,
public anger became more acute. Loyal comrades rose to
protect our Party by clearing it of the Communists.
Following the resolutions of our Central Supervisory
Committee, a Central Government was established in
Nanking as desired by our late Master. It was hoped that
our comrades who had been delayed in Wuhan would
come and join us as they had promised, and unite once
276
more to go on with our great task. But such an oppor-
tunity did not arrive and we waited for their presence in
vain.
‘Since then our Party and our Army have been virtually
divided, and the doomed life of the War Lords has been
allowed to linger on temporarily. The eyes and ears of
the common people have l3egun to lose their clearness and
sharpness. For three or four months the advance of the
Northern Expedition has merely reached the border of
Shantung. Why is it that we had pushed forward so
quickly? And why is it that we now ^ .orward so
slowly? Think quietly and reflect carefully, the reason
is easy to understand.
‘I have been constantly thinking of resigning my duties
by finding as my reason one of my many blunders. But
in looking back I wonder what would have happened if
I had given up my command at the time when Shanghai
and Nanking had just been taken and slanders and abuse
had been heaped upon me? The outrageous acts of the
Communists in Hunan, Kwaiigtung and Kiangsi during
the past few months arc clear indications of what would
have happened. Putting aside the question of what would
have become of our military, financial and diplomatic
policies, our Party would have suffered in the following
order. First, our soul would have been lost, merely our
corpse would have been left behind. Then stars would
have moved their positions and things would have been
exchanged with each other. I am afraid that even the
name of the Kuo Min Tang would long have ceased to
exist. Then there would have been no opportunity left
for the people in Wuhan to rise leisurely to drive away
the Communists . .
In this declaration he had three wishes: i, that the
comrades in Wuhan should join those in Nanking and
work together; 2 , that the uniformed comrades in Hunan,
Hupeh and Kiangsi should resume their Northern Puni-
277
tive Expedition in order to complete the Revolution;
3, that the Communists in Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi
should be thoroughly got rid of. Although he had re-
signed all his official posts, he, as a member of the Kuo
Min Tang and as a citizen of China, would still do all his
duty towards his Party and country, and ‘as long as I have
a single breath left, I will never relax in this determination
of mine’.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s resignation was the best and only
solution. When the situation had reached such a dead-
lock, his move was a very wise step. The Wuhan people
could not possibly find another excuse for bickering any
more, lliere were critics of Chiang Kai-Shek who said
that in view of his coming back again a few months later
his resignation was only ‘a retreat in order to advance’.
But the humble author holds the view that in such a case
it was an even wiser step to take. The Northern Expedi-
tion had to be finished, and nobody knew more clearly
than Chiang Kai-Shek that among the generals of the
South it was impossible to find another man to step into
his shoes. The longest way round is often the shortest
way home.
After Chiane^ Kai-Shek’s resignation, Feng Yu-Hsiang’s
proposed conference in Anking became immediately
superfluous. But Hu Han-Min and the other leaders in
Nanking who had been in negotiation with Wuhan, now
being fed up with the whole situation, aired their pre-
viously concealed feelings by sending the following tele-
gram to the go-between. It is one of the best specimens
of the Chinese ironical essay, and the ridiculous situation
had inspired the writer to compose a little mastei'piece.
No doubt much of its biting wit will be lost through trans-
lation, but it is well worth quoting in full. A little foot-
note is needed here to say that the word ‘Conference’ in
Chinese is made of two verbs, ‘to meet’ and ‘to discuss’,
or two nouns, ‘meeting’ and ‘discussion’. It was most
278
probably drafted by Wu Chih-Hui, a witty and humorous
scholar. Here is the telegram:
^To Cornrnander-in-Chicf Feng, Chengchow.
‘When we received your telegram dated August nth,
asking us to meet in Anking, we agreed gladly. When we
sent you the reply on the evening of the 12 th, our Elder
Brother Kai-Shek was getting into his train for Shanghai.
We showed him the draft of the reply and he smiled and
signed his name at once. Who would have thought that
the news of our Elder Brother Kai-Shek’s resignation
would be announced on the morning of the 13th? We
went to Shanghai to get him back ; but when we reached
there, he had gone to Ningpo. In the Spring of last year
Li Shih-Tseng and Wu Chih-Hui went to the North to
get you back and you had left for Mongolia. They missed
you only by a few hours. The Sun moves exactly as fast
as it always does. In a moment it has disappeared. We
are unhappv now exactly as we were last year.
‘Some friends showed us the Declaration, and also told
us that our Elder Brother Kai-Shek had been working on
it for days past. Even at the time when he went into the
train he had showed it to all his uniformed subordinates,
the only people to whom he didn’t show it were his friends
in long gowns. Since we have read it, we feel extremely
happy. When we must have recourse to “discussions” and
they must be done at “meetings”, and furthermore these
“meetings” must take place at Anking which doesn’t
belong to either of the parties, it means obviously there
are still numerous small incomprehensible misunderstand-
ings between both parties. To achieve unity, both parties
have to yield eventually to each other. Since we had, the
one sooner and the other later, been regretting and weep-
ing over our blunder of accommodating the Communists,
we should race each other this time to make personal self-
sacrifice. Though we are confident that we will yield to
279
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the other party at the conference table, how much better
is our Elder Brother Kai-Shek, who has yielded so easily
and so fundamentally!
‘Ever since the Communists started their troubles, we
cannot deny that we both have been very weak in our
restraint. On the walls of Nanking tattered posters for
attacking Wang Ching-Wei can still be seen; and from
Wuhan fresh telegrams denouncing Chiang Kai-Shek are
still coming. That shows the authorities of both sides
were unable to control their followers. Even when we
were preparing to maintain our amiable countenance and
bow respectfully to each other to reveal our innermost
feelings, one side could not help stopping its Northern
Punitive Expedition, whilst the other side was unable to
refrain from raising banners to go on with its Eastern
Punitive Expedition. Jade and silk— offerings of peace,
together with swords and spears— instruments of war, are
to be used alternately and simultaneously. Isn’t this to be
a laughing-stock for the whole world?
‘And so he who is riding a horse has no need to look for
a horse, but he who wants the water to cool can easily
pull out the faggots from under the boiler. If whichever
side is to be sacrificed, then there is no need to “meet”
and there is nothing to “discuss”. Everything is com-
pletely solved. We your younger brothers, had not com-
prehended this in the first instance, and we therefore are
far behind our Elder Brother Kai-Shek. That is why we
instantly decided to turn back from our trip to Anking
and are going back each to his own home. One is finished,
a hundred arc finished!
‘To be pro-Communist or anti-Communist, both sides
have learnt their lesson by costly experience. Neither side
is choosing the good from the bad, but considering those
who follow them as praiseworthy. There are signs that
their separate policies are already drifting farther apart
from each other. If they pretend to be united in appear-
280
ance but are actually disunited in spirit, concentrating
solely on grasping for leadership and on defending their
own crafty doctrine, and if they continue to fight each
other in secret on account of their unwilling union, then
the damage done to the Party and to the country will be
far heavier than before. “At ease” is the order of the day;
won’t you kindly forgive us and not think of us as
“deserters”? A single pillar is strong enough to support
the heavens. Our hope rests upon you.
‘Your younger brothers, Hu Han-Min, Chang Ching-
Kiang, Tsai Yuan-Pei, Li Shih-Tseng and Wu Chih-Hui
salute you. August 14th, 1927.’
As Chiang Kai-Shek went to his home in Feng Hua
from Ningpo and then sailed for Japan in October, events
in Nanking and Wuhan continued to worsen. As can
easily be seen from the above telegram, discord rang
loudly among the Kuo Min Tang leaders. Neither Wang
Ching~Wei nor Hu Han-Min would shoulder the revSponsi-
bility of the Government in Nanking at this critical hour
and a special Council had to be formed as the temporary
highest organ to direct the affairs of the State.
Chiang Kai-Shek left Nanking on August 12th. After
the Commandcr-in-Chief’s resignation, the Revolutionary
Army in the north of Kiangsu was left without a leader.
They retreated under the pressure of Sun Chuan-Fang’s
reinforced army to Pu-Kow, which is on the north bank of
the Yangtze River opposite Nanking. The following
week saw the repeated defeat of the Revolutionary Army
near this capital. Luckily the First Army under Flo Ying-
Ching— Chiang Kai-Shek’s original army— and the Seventh
Army under the Kwangsi leader Li Tsung-Jen, staged a
counter-offensive in the last days of August and success-
fully drove away the Northern Army, which suffered
very heavy losses.
Though Nanking was by now fairly safe, the new
281
generals in the Revolutionary Army, knowing there was
no strong man above, began to do whatever they liked.
Their behaviour differed little from that of the Northern
War Lords, for indeed many were War Lords only
recently reorganised as commanders in the Revolutionary
Army. Some commanders originally from Canton also
followed suit, and in the later part of 1927, while Chiang
Kai-Shek was not in power in Nanking, civil war broke
out in many places. First there was the Hunanese Army
trying to attack Nanking in October and November, and
then there was the Cantonese Army attacking the Kwangsi
Army in Canton in November.
On top of these troubles, the Communists broke out in
Canton in December. A Soviet Government was formed
in this provincial capital of Kwangtung where numerous
people were killed and more than a dozen fires raged.
They occupied the city only for a few days. When the
Kuo Min Tang Army fought back with reinforcements,
many more people were killed. It is believed that within
these few days several thousand lives were lost.
Towards the end of December, fighting again broke
out around Canton when one Cantonese general did not
like another. Spasmodic fighting went on for over a
month when the Communists rose again and occupied the
two seaside towns of Hai-Fung and Luk-Fung. Burning
and killing were even more extensive than before and the
Kuo Min Tang Army dealt with them also very ruthlessly
this time.
Chiang Kai-Shek could not be spared. People all over
the country cried aloud for his return. Fie came back
from Japan in November, 1927, and was married to Soong
Mei-Ling, sister of Madame Sun Yat-Sen and T. V. Soong
the Minister of Finance, in December. On the New
Year’s Day of 1928, the National Government in Nanking
sent him a telegram requesting him to resume his duties
as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army and
282
to continue his Northern Punitive Expedition. Two days
later he was elected a member of the State Council and
went to Nanking on January 4th, 1928. His return to
office pulled the Government together, and it was re-
organised in February during a combined conference of
the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees. All
the Communist members were expelled from these com-
mittees at this conference and China since then has been
governed by a system called one-party tutelage until a
constitution should be adopted. This was done in 1947.
IX
O UR sage Mencius said that it would be better to have
no history at all than to believe it entirely. Such a
remark may be applied to quite a number of books, especi-
ally those written about debatable events by authors who
are directly or indirectly connected with them.
Numerous books, pamphlets and periodical articles have
been written about Chinese politics in which Chiang Kai-
Shek figures prominently. Most of those written by
Europeans and Americans often present a rather super-
ficial view, as the Chinese political background is always
too complicated and difficult for outsiders to understand.
I'hose written by participants of our internal struggles are
seldom free from prejudice. Chiang Kai-Shek might
easily claim to be the man who has the largest amount of
adulatory as well as abusive literature written about him.
In dealing with subsequent events an independent
biographer of Chiang Kai-Shek could not possibly sift
his available material too carefully. The humble author
has to crave the indulgence of his readers if they find him
over-stressing the virtue of brevity when writing about
the latest vears of this biography. Apart from material
which is not vet available but which is indispensable in
making a full and true picture of Chiang Kai-Shek’s life,
those writings already published by his followers as well
as by his enemies have to be examined and compared dis-
passionately. Much of this material has to be modified
from time to time and some has to be discarded altogether.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s drastic measures taken against the
Chinese Communists, which were to be much more intensi-
284
fied as time went on and as the counter-measures adopted
by the Communists became more desperate, have been
severely condemned by writers with left tendencies, or
even by those of liberal mind. Whilst on the other hand,
right-wing authors have always been loud in their praise
for his timely action to save civilisation from the Bolshe-
viks. It is unnecessary to advise a sagacious reader to
accept views from either extreme with reserve. But biased
writings have never ceased to flow from the two sides and
an innocent reader constantly runs the risk of being mis-
informed.
A good example is his second marriage, which his
enemies declared was one of convenience. At first this
seemed to be plausible and even convincing; and for a
number of years many people were made to believe it to
be the truth. At the time of this marriage Chiang Kai-
Shek was but a newly self-made man, while the Soong
family had good, established connections: Madame Sun
Yat-Sen’s prestige was very high; H. H. Kung and T. V.
Soong were both very influential among the members of
the Government. Moreover, circumstances favoured the
rumour-mongers. Chiang Kai-Shek had two sons before
he married Soong Mei-Ling, but no child came from his
second marriage. Further argument for such a rumour
was that he scarcely spent any time with his newly-
wedded wife before he left her to lead a vigorous military
life once more. It seemed quite logical to think that he
married her in order to resume his position as the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the army.
From 1927 onwards such a rumour was persistent. It
would have gone on for ever had it not happened that in
1936 Madame Chiang Kai-Shek flew to Sian to join her
husband, who had been imprisoned by pro-Communist
generals. The fact that she was willing to sacrifice every-
thing she had to be with him gave the lie to those who pro-
fessed it was a loveless match. However, this episode will
285
be dealt with in its proper place later on. Suffice it to say
here that many falsehoods have been refuted by time.
On December ist, 1927, when Chiang Kai-Shek and
Soong Mei-Ling were married, he made a public declara-
tion that after their wedding they would dedicate their
united strength to the work of the Revolution. Though
it is rather unusual to have such a public announcement at
one’s wedding, subsequent events proved that it was not
merely an empty promise. Chiang Kai-Shek went to
Nanking to take up his duties almost immediately and in
February, 1928, at the combined conference of the Central
E.xecutive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuo Min
Tang, he was re-elected a member of the Presidium of the
Executive Committee of the Kuo Min Tang and the Chair-
man of the Military Council. It is interesting to note that
the first preparatory meeting for this combined confer-
ence had been held at his private residence in Shanghai on
December 3rd, 1927, two days after his wedding.
He presided over most sessions of this combined con-
ference when Mao I'sc-Tung, among other Communists,
was officially expelled from the Kuo Min Tang. But the
most important business of this meeting was the resolu-
tion for the continuance of the war against the North and
it was carried unanimously. It read: ‘Concentrate all the
strength of the Revolution and accomplish the Northern
Punitive Expedition at the given time.’ On Febniary 9th,
two days after the close of the meeting, Chiang Kai-Shek
went to Hsuchow to review the troops and hold military
conferences.
All the revolutionarv' forces were now reorganised and
they comprised four army groups each consisting of seven
to fifteen armies. Besides being the over-all commander-
in-chief of the total forces, Chiang Kai-Shek also led the
First Army Group, whilst Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian
General, led the Second, and Yen Hsi-Shan, the Military
286
Governor of the Northern Province of Shansi ever since
the Revolution in 1911, led the Third. A Fourth Group
led by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kwangsi comrade Li Tsung-
Jen served as reserves.
After this reorganisation of the forces, Chiang Kai-Shek
gave the order for a general offensive in the beginning of
April. The grand strategy was to attack Shantung from
Kiangsu with Chiang Kai-Shek’s First Army Group,
whilst Chihli was to be attacked from the south by Feng
Yu-Hsiang’s Second Group in Honan and from the wes't
by Yen Hsi-Shan’s Third Group in Shansi. The biggest
and strongest group was that led by Chiang Kai-Shek. It
fought northwards against Sun Chuan-Fang’s forces and
reached and occupied Fsi-Nan, the capital of Shantung, at
the end of April, which was twenty-one days from the
time of beginning this renewed campaign.
Chiang Kai-Shek made haste and was in the city of
Tsinan on May ist, but two days later the Japanese, who
had marshalled a large force near the provincial capital on
the pretext that they had to protect their nationals, started
to attack the Revolutionary Army.
It will be remembered that in 1919 Japan was given
the privileged rights which Germany, before the war, had
enjoyed in Shantung, Though China refused to sign the
Peace Treaty which gave this little present to Japan, Japan
always regarded Shantung as her sphere of influence. As
foreign powers could station their armies in all the treaty
ports of China, Japan took advantage of this and tried to
stop the Revolutionary Army from passing through
Tsinan. That is why Chiang Kai-Shek suddenly found
his men attacked by the Japanese within Chinese territory.
Japanese atrocities, with which the whole world later on
became well acquainted, were committed unashamedly in
this place. The Chinese diplomatic official Tsai Kung-
Shih who represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Nanking, and sixteen members of his staff, were murdered
287
in cold blood in their office in Tsinan after having had
their noses and ears cut off by Japanese soldiers. When
later on Chiang Kai-Shek asked Huang Fu, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, to meet the Japanese commanding
officer in this city to negotiate for a peaceful settlement,
the Minister was arrested and forced to sign a paper saying
that it was the Chinese and not the Japanese who started
this ‘Tsinan Incident’.
For several days Japanese machine-guns and cannons
were kept bombarding the Chinese soldiers and civilians
in the city, whilst Chiang Kai-Shek was trying his best to
avoid a serious clash with Japan. He had, at last, to order
the evacution of the city and its adjoining district. He
realised that he was not prepared to meet so formidable a
foe. His forces had been deployed to finish the Northern
Punitive Expedition. This provocative diversion, if not
speedily and amicably avoided, would bring his work to
ruin. As the Japanese utterly refused to parley with him,
he withdrew his men from this route and hurried on to
the other one himself to direct operations from Honan.
Towards the end of May he went from FIsuchow to
Chengchow to meet Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian
General, and in the last days of the same month he went
to Shih-Chia-Chuan to meet Yen Hsi-Shan as the Third
Army Group was entering the Province of Chihli from
Shansi at this important railway junction. By this time
Chiang Kai-Shek’s prestige in the army was extremely
high. His mere name was enough to inspire his men to
win decisive victories. Soldiers who had been retreating
at uncontrollable speed the previous evening would
advance courageously the very next day after they had
surrendered to him and been reorganised into the
Revolutionary Army. As the numbers of the War Lords’
soldiers decreased rapidly, those of Chiang Kai-Shek in-
creased by leaps and bounds. By the beginning of June
his two strong enemies, Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Fang,
288
had practically lost every inch of ground which they had
hitherto occupied, and his last and most powerful foe, the
Manchurian War Lord Chang Tso-Lin, was hurriedly
preparing to evacuate Peking peacefully,
Japan, who intended to stop Chiang Kai-Shek from
marching northwards into Peking by creating the ‘Tsinan
Incident’, was utterly disappointed to find the War Lords
could not hold their positions in spite of her undisguised
interference. She began to lose her confidence in these
War Lords and to take matters into her own hands. This
her commanders did in their own way. Marshal Chang
Tso-Lin with almost all his staff left Peking on June 3rd,
1928, after he had sent out a circular telegram to announce
the withdrawal of his forces from inside the Great Wall.
When his train reached a point where the Peking--
Moukden line crosses the Southern Manchuria line and
where the Japanese had their troops stationed, well placed
and controlled bombs exploded on the bridge of the
Southern Manchuria line above the coach in which was
Chang Tso-Lin. Being less than a mile from the city of
Moukden, he was immediately taken to his headquarters
though already mortally wounded. Knowing what the
Japanese intended to do, his staff, together with his son
Chang Hsueh-Liang, later known as the Young Marshal
who figured prominently in the Sian coup of December,
1936, decided not to announce the old Marshal’s death
until every precaution had been taken in their quarters to
defend them against a possible Japanese attack.
It is pointed out by observers that Marshal Chang Tso-
Lin’s death at the hands of the Japanese was a case of reap-
ing what he had sown. He was very friendly with Japan,
partly because he had to be, as Manchuria was half over-
run with Japanese, and partly because he had been depend-
ing upon her for military and material help. It is also quite
true that the Japanese inervention in Tsinan was through
289
his diplomatic manoeuvre: for Japan later on declared that
she had been urged to intervene by Chang Tso-Lin’s
representative.
However, his son, the Young Marshal, could now
plainly see that they had been playing with fire. Instead
of allying himself with Japan to fight against Chiang Kai-
Shek, he decided to reverse his father’s policy by resisting
Japan and making overtures to the Nanking Government.
For this purpose he sent four representatives to Peking to
negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek, and on July ist, 1928,
he issued a declaration to say that he had given orders to
all his troops to withdraw to Manchuria and he hoped that
his friends who were in power would also conclude their
military affairs.
By this time it could be said that the Northern Punitive
Expedition had come to its successful end: all the War
Lords had been vanquished and almost the entire country,
except for the far remote regions, had been conquered.
Chiang Kai-Shek, when he arrived triumphantly in Peking,
felt that he had achieved what his late master Sun Yat-Sen
had started but not finished. It was then that Peking,
which means Northern Capital, was made to resume its
ancient name of Peiping, which means Northern Peace.
Moreover, the Province of Chihli, which means Metro-
politan Province, was renamed Hopeh, which means North
of the Yellow River. Nanking, which means the Southern
Capital, is the place where Sun Yat-Sen originally estab-
lished the Central Government.
When Sun Yat-Sen died in Peking in 1925, his coffin
was taken to the Temple of Green Cloud on the West
Hill just outside the city, and there the remains of the
Father of the Chinese Republic had reposed for more than
three years. The first thing Chiang Kai-Shek did when he
came to Peking was to perform the solemn ceremony of
visiting the coffin. When he and the three other military
leaders, Feng Yu-Hsiang, Yen Hsi-Shen and Li Tsung-
290
Jen, made this sacred pilgrimage to the West Hill and
stood with their uncovered heads bowed in front of the
coffin, Chiang Kai-Shek’s tears rained down his cheeks
and soon he broke into uncontrollable sobs. He had so
many things about which he wished he could talk with
his deceased Master. And, furthermore, so many difficul-
ties had already sprung up at this moment when he
thought he had accomplished the almost impossible task
of conquering and unifying the whole country.
After the Communists had been expelled from the Party
and the Government, and after the War Lords had been
conquered, the very first troubles which Chiang Kai-Shek
had to face were those presented by the military leaders
who had helped him in performing the two above-
mentioned tasks. When Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young
Marshal, approached him for a peaceful setdement about
Manchuria, Chiang Kai-Shek found that some of his
brothers-at-arms immediately became very jealous. To
avoid a direct clash, he returned to Nanking and laid the
matter before the next combined Conference of the
Central Executive and Supervisory Committee of the Kuo
Min Tang which was held in August, 1928. As neither
Feng Yu-Hsiang nor Yen Hsi-Shan were yet members of
these committees, their presence at this conference was
more or less a gesture of courtesy graciously granted to
them by the Party. Chiang Kai-Shek was the one who
had the biggest say in it.
Besides the military leaders whom Chiang Kai-Shek had
to humour as Sun Yat-Sen had done in the days of the
Cantonese Government, the ‘Party men’ of the extreme
left and the extreme right continued to worry him with
their violent clashes with each other. Within the Kuo
Min Tang there were always some leftists who sym-
pathised with the Communists and maintained that their
leader Sun Yat-Sen wanted to collaborate with Russia
291
and tolerate the Communists. Also there were some right-
wing members who considered anyone a traitor to the
Party if he did not hate the Communists as blindly as they
did. It was between these two extremes that Chiang Kai-
Shek had to choose a middle way. In October, 1928,
whilst the two extremes were still intriguing against each
other, he was nominated and installed as the Chairman of
the State Council of the Government.
Wang Ching-Wei had been for years leading the leftists
of the Kuo Min Tang, constantly heckling Chiang Kai-
Shek. As he was using the Communists as his political
instrument he often got himself into trouble. In the
Summer of 1927, when the Communists under the Wu-
Han Government became uncontrollable, he had, to use
his own words, ‘to fight between two attacks’, those of
the Communists and of Chiang Kai-Shek. At the end of
the same year and in January, 1929, when the Communists
in Canton nearly broke out in open revolt after he had
been shielding his pro-Cominunist followers, he was
singled out for abuse by the Communists and condemned
by all those who did not like the Communists.
Chiang Kai-Shek courted his support when early in
1927 Wu-Han and Nanking were starting to fight each
other. He betrayed Chiang Kai-Shek by promising to
parley but secretly going over to Wu-Han to lead the
anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement. When Chiang Kai-Shek
approached him a second time after the Wu-Han Govern-
ment had joined Nanking, Wang Ching-Wei began to be
unpopular and unable to co-operate. He sailed for Europe.
That was in the last days of 1927.
The leader of the right wing of the Kuo Min Tang, Hu
Han-Min, since the Northern Punitive Expedition had
revealed that Chiang Kai-Shek had become the chief
enemy of the Communists, had forgotten his differences
with Chiang Kai-Shek and done his best to support the
Nanking regime. Except for a short trip abroad in the
292
early part of 1928, he had been Chiang Kai-Shek’s chief
supporter during those troublesome years. In 1929 and
1930, when Chiang Kai-Shek was the Chairman of the
State Council of the National Government, a large number
of Party men, with the help of various disappointed
military leaders, joined forces in secret to oust Chiang
Kai-Shek. The support of Hu Han-Min and his followers
was very useful.
Wang Ching-Wei restarted the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek
campaign by sending a long telegram to denounce the
Third National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang, which
was held in Nanking in March, 1929; and in April and
July Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan respectively re-
signed their duties and announced their retirement. In the
following October Wang Ching-Wei came back from
France to intensify the new anti-Chiang Kai-Shek move-
ment and a number of active generals started to fight
against the Central Government forces.
The Third National Congress of the Kuo Min Tang
was a stormy one. Although it was Chiang Kai-Shek’s
intention to bring the right and left together, the result
was that the two extremes became farther apart. The
resolution to reinstate the membership of the expelled ‘Old
Comrades’ was most unwelcome to the leftists. And a
mere vote of censure on Wang Ching-Wei without expell-
ing him was considered too compromising by the right
wing. A number of radical members walked out during
the session. Those who tried to please everybody seldom
pleased anybody.
But Chiang Kai-Shek, with the support of Hu Han-
Min, managed to bring the Congress into as satisfactory a
state as seemed possible. They thought that Wang Ching-
Wei, Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan could be
placated by making them members of the Central Execu-
tive Committee. But, as mentioned before, none of them
was at all placated. One after another they all declared
293
that they would have nothing to do with the Nanlcing
Government of which Chiang Kai-Shek was elected the
Chairman.
Wang Ching-Wei’s telegram sent in March, though it
did not point out the name of Chiang Kai-Shek, was a
direct attack on him and his regime. It was written in
carefully chosen words but nobody could fail to under-
stand what and whom it attacked. It is true that Feng Yu-
Hsiang, when he announced his retirement in April, was
more outspoken, and that Yen Hsi-Shan, when he resigned
all his posts following his conference with Feng Yu-
Hsiang in June, exchanged many long telegrams with
Chiang Kai-Shek denouncing his actions and policies; but
these telegrams produced little effect. Chiang Kai-Shek is
a man who prefers actions to words, and has accomplished
much by swift action. With Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen
Hsi-Shan, however, Chiang Kai-Shek made many excep-
tions. In February, 1930, some twenty long telegrams
were exchanged between Yen Hsi-Shan and Chiang Kai-
Shek. Ihe use of the classical style in Chinese telegrams
usually meant a great saving of words; but in such cases
it was the reverse. They were, of course, drafted by their
literary secretaries, who must have had the time of their
lives.
Wang Ching-Wei’s telegram in A'larch was the most
important of its kind, and also the forerunner of many
more fierce ones. In September, 1929, he came back from
abroad and started to denounce Chiang Kai-Shek as a
traitor. As Wang Ching-Wei proved himself to be the
arch-traitor of the country by going over to Japan when
she invaded China, it will not be considered object-
ionable to quote the telegram which he circulated on
September 24th, 1929, upon his return from Europe. It
runs as follows;
‘The leader of our Party, Sun Yat-Sen, on seeing the
rapid decline of our country and the increasing troubles
294
falling on our people, promoted the principles of saving
our country on the basis of revolutionary policies. To put
these policies and principles into practice, we must do our
utmost to sweep away obstacles. Therefore, in the Declara-
tion of the Northern Punitive Expedition it was said that
our aim was not only to destroy Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-
Fu, but also to see that never would any successors to
these War Lords spring up again. It certainly does not
allow an ambitious and crafty fellow going under the
faked name of Revolution to grasp power for his personal
gain.
'But Chiang Kai-Shek, since the establishment of the
Central Government in Nanking, thought he could pursue
his private interest now that the highest authority was in
his hands. His despotic ambition became unchecked. He
went on to rebel against the Revolution, to forsake the
common people, to break the Party Regulations and to
fake the Congress. His wicked relatives and personal
friends were given all the important official posts. He
levied heavy and unreasonable taxes on the people, who
consequently starved and died whilst wandering the roads.
All his doings were aimed at his personal interest. He con-
sidered the nation as his private property. To spare your
life or kill you, this entirely depended upon his pleasure
or displeasure. The life of a human being was as light to
him as a feather.
‘Adoreover, pretending that it was for the maintenance
of the nation’s honesty, he gave away many sovereign
rights of our country. He called it by the high-sounding
name of “construction” whilst he squandered huge sums
of money from the national treasury. He betrayed his
country in settling the tragic case of Tsinan, thus making
the Province of Shantung another Southern Alanchuria.
He promised the Japanese to pay them back the debts
which the War Lords contracted: a thing even the worst
of our politicians refused to do. To recount all his sins
295
and wickedness is impossible. Any one of these misdeeds
is sufficient to ruin a nation.
‘Our comrades in arms, some of whom had been follow-
ing our late Leader for years and many of whom are firm
believers in his doctrines, vowing to sacrifice their lives
for the Party and the country, have long been regarding
Chiang Kai-Shek as the common enemy and are deter-
mined to deal with him sternly. As soon as this declara-
tion reaches them, they ought to raise arms to wipe away
this rebel. To save our country from annihilation and
help people from drowning and burning, both our Party
and country are depending upon these comrades.’
This telegram was signed by AVang Ching-Wei together
with eleven of his followers who were all members of the
Central Executive Committee elected at the Second
National Congress. It was to give sanction to a fiery
general who had been Wang Ching-Wei’s ardent follower
and was now rebelling against Chiang Kai-Shek for the
third time.
With the agitation of the politicians and generals who
had failed to obtain favourable positions in the Nanking
Government, the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek movement was
extensively revived. He who used to receive telegrams
from various generals all over the country begging him
to accept their surrender, now received nearly as many
messages, some from those very people, demanding his
resignation if not his life. The only difference— and a most
important one— was that whilst the surrenders came almost
all at the same time, the rebellions breaking out against
him took place at quite convenient interv^als: convenient
in allowing him to devote his whole time to dealing with
them one by one. Modem historians have said that had
all those who wanted to oust Chiang Kai-Shek struck at
the same time, they could easily have knocked out twenty
Chiang Kai-Sheks. But each waited to start at his own
time and Chiang Kai-Shek, whilst dealing sternly with
296
one of them, always did his best to humour all the
others.
It is a common saying in China that after a man has
been in charge of his family affairs for three years, even
his dog will hate him. Though many partisans and generals
started to revolt against Chiang Kai-Shek long before he
had been Chairman of the State Council for three years,
he had been the actual head of the whole regime since
very shortly after the death of Sun Yat-Sen. The drastic
measures he took against the other military leaders whom
he believed to be obstacles against the Northern Punitive
Expedition, and the things he did against the Communists
and their sympathisers, created so many enemies for him
that attacks rained on him whenever there could be found
a pretext and someone to give a lead. Fortunately for him,
most of these attacks were nothing but empty words.
An interesting example was the telegram sent to him in
December, 1929, by his old friend General Hsu Chung-
Chih, under whom he had fought in earlier days, and
whom he disarmed and forced to retire just before he
started to push northwards. Having been silent for four
years and seeing that so many people were now condemn-
ing Chiang Kai-Shek, he sent his old colleague the follow-
ing sugar-coated bitter pill:
‘My dear Younger Brother,
‘I recollect that more than ten years ago I, your Elder
Brother, and you, my Younger Brother, followed our
Master working for the Revolution. We risked our lives
and were prepared to die for it. Because of our indomit-
able spirit, we endeavoured to achieve success to a certain
point. Unfortunately our Master died, and we wept and
with tears in our eyes had to redirect our army to come
back to quell the disturbance in Kwangtung, thus estab-
lishing the National Government in Canton.
‘From henceforth I could take a little rest, and so I
297
handed over the whole aniiy to you, my Younger Brother.
You led the forces to start the Northern Punitive Expedi-
tion and thanks to the blessing of our Master who is in
Heaven and also to the help given by the common people
and our comrades all over the country, the unification of
our country was at last achieved. It could not be said that
you, my Younger Brother, had no merit in its achieve-
ment.
‘But during the past years Party affairs have become
confused and split, administration has become corrupt and
bad. You, mv Younger Brother, thus made yourself the
target of all the arrows. Those who used to call them-
selves your subordinates and supporters have changed as
one man to oppose you, my Younger Brother. According
to the theory of censure as laid down by Confucius in his
book Spring and Autiinm Chronicles in which the worthy
man alone was blamed, you, my Younger Brother, cannot
really be excused from this responsibility.
‘Reflect yourself, my Younger Brother, in the quietness
of night, the proper coui'se to take is to confess your mis-
takes and censure yourself in order to maintain peace in
the country. For yourself, my Younger Brother, this will
be an honourable way out: and for the people all over the
country it will be a great blessing. Ask yourself, my
Younger Brother, could you at this time get out of the
difficulties which are surrounding you from the four direc-
tions? Rather than put yourself into danger it is far better
to clear yourself and give peace to the country. Which
course is advantageous and which harmful? Which is
important and which slight? I do hope you, my Younger
Brother, will consider and reconsider it calmly and
dispassionately.
‘Hsu Chung-Chih. December 6.’
The generals whom he had offended had always been
the most powerful elements of the continuous anti-Chiang
298
Kai-Shek movement, because the dissatisfied politicians he
could easily disregard as they had no military strength.
Even the Communists, before they formed their indepen-
dent army, had been much more barkers than biters.
Among the generals, those who had retired and no longer
maintained relationship with their men were also fairly
easy to deal with. It was only those who could not be dis-
missed, or those who remained the leaders of their men
though saying they had gone into retirement, that Chiang
Kai-Shek had to fight or humour as best he could. And
these amounted to quite a number, especially after the
Demobilisation Conference in 1929.
After the death of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin in Man-
churia, his son, the Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang,
became a most powerful man in the North. As the co-
operation of the other powerful generals in the North
seemed to be doubtful, Chiang Kai-Shek decided to
appease the Young Marshal rather than condemn him as
the new War Lord of Manchuria and fight to finish him.
The argument for such a step was that Chiang Kai-Shek
wanted to avoid unnecessary bloodshed if the unification
of the country could possibly be bought in peace. But
those who were against him exclaimed that it was out-
rageous to make the Young Marshal a member of the
State Council of the National Government, which was
done in October, 1928, not very long after the Old
Marshal had put so many members of the Kuo Min Tang
to death.
But Chiang Kai-Shek acted as he did swiftly. And he
was well satisfied with the results. In spite of no uncertain
pressure from Japan brought to bear against his going over
to the side of Kuo Min Tang, the Young Marshal, together
with his satellite War Lords in the Four North-Eastern
Provinces, that is Manchuria and Jehol, formally declared
their conversion to the Three Principles of the People and
allegiance to the National Government in Nanking in the
299
last days of 1928. The old national flag of five colours
was pulled down and the new flag of a white sun against
a blue sky with a red background was hoisted up. On the
New Year’s Day of 1929, Kuo Min Tang branch offices
were established in Moukden.
The successful conclusion of the Northern Punitive
Expedition made the Demobilisation Conference a neces-
sity. Few generals wanted to decrease their men and con-
sequently their power, but they had no excuse. On
January ist, 1929, when the Conference held its inaugural
meeting in Nanking, it was attended by a host of military
and Party leaders, including Chiang Kai-Shek, Feng Yu-
Hsiang, Yen Hsi-Shen and Li Tsung-Jen. Chiang Kai-
Shek was elected the Chairman of the Council and each
Commandcr-in-Chief was assigned a specific duty to per-
form. The Conference lasted a little over three weeks and
on August I St of the same year a meeting was called to
put the demobilisation into execution. It is interesting to
note that on this occasion, except for Chiang Kai-Shek
himself, none of the Commanders-in-Chief were present.
It had been resolved that out of several million soldiers
only a standing army of sixty-five divisions was to be
maintained, each division to be cut down to eleven thou-
sand officers and men. Besides the generals who were all
directly concerned with the cut, T. V. Soong, the Minister
of Finance at that time, was also highly dissatisfied. He
resigned his post saying that he could not provide the
monev needed for the demobilisation.
A few of the most important resolutions passed at this
meeting are worthy of recording. During the period of
demobilisation all the civil service workers were to receive
only eighty per cent of their pay, the remaining twenty
per cent being contributed to the demobilisation ex-
penses. Chairmen of Provincial Governments were not
allowed to hold their military commands concurrently.
Divisional Commanders were not allowed to take up civil
300
posts. Revenues and taxes hitherto held up by the army
should be handed over to the Central Government. Such
measures made Chiang Kai-Shek most unpopular. The
conference was not a failure: it was a disaster!
Those were the most troublesome years for him. Now
the Province of Hunan revolted, then the Province of
Hupeh rebelled against him, and shortly afterwards the
Province of Kwangsi declared its independence from the
Central Government. One province rose soon after the
other had been conquered. I'here w ere also clashes with
the Russians in the North and, furthermore, the Com-
munists broke loose in the city of Changsha. They occu-
pied this provincial seat for several days whilst numerous
people were killed. There were mutinies and minor out-
breaks by similar groups, too, some taking place quite near
the new capital of Nanking. A hundred and one things
unpleasant to him occurred around him, and everybody
said that if he would go everything would be all right.
But he would not go. He attended to them one by one
without losing heart. To be the Chairman of the State
Council, in other words the Head of the Government, was
not a very enviable job. As General Hsu Chung-Chih
said, he had become the target of all the arrows in the
country. Luckily for him, the arrows were not discharged
at him all at the same time. That aflforded him the neces-
sary breathing-space.
But in the latter part of 1930 quite a number of arrows,
and very strong ones, too, combined their forces to point
at him. This was the so-called ‘Enlarged Conference of
the Kuo Min Tang’ held in Peiping, with Wang Ching-
Wei as the chairman, and with two commanders-in-chief,
Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, as its military sup-
porters. It was the most formidable threat to Chiang Kai-
Shek’s authority, for it consisted of the largest number of
dissatisfied politicians and soldiers gathered together in one
place and at one time, and the area under the control of
301
the soldiers concerned extended to several provinces along
the valley of the Yellow River— Shansi, Hopeh, Honan and
Shantung.
Whilst dispatching his forces to fight the followers of
Feng Yu“Hsiang in Honan and Shantung, Chiang Kai-
Shek sent agents to the North to urge the Young Marshal
to prove his allegiance which had been given to the Central
Government. If Chang Hsueh-Liang could attack the
‘Enlarged Conference’ forces from the North, the success
would be as sure as ‘catching a turtle in an urn’. How-
ever, the other side was not unaware of this. They too sent
their envoys with money and promises to angle for the
Young Marshal, whose stock shot up like a bolt. He was
at that time only thirty years old.
That the Young Marshal would prefer to throw in his
lot with Chiang Kai-Shek rather than with the other side
was easy to understand. Two years previously, when the
Young Marshal was approaching Nanking to be appeased,
most of the other generals had been jealous. The Party
men were scandalised when they were made to agree to
nominate him a member of the State Council. But they
had to put up with it, for Chiang Kia-Shek was his backer.
Now he did not need to think twice before he decided
which side he should help. The fact that Chiang Kai-
Shek’s presents and promises were better than those of the
other side did not matter much.
Thus the new anti-Chiang Kai-Shek Government was
established at nine o’clock on the morning of the 9th of
September, which is the 9th month of the year, in 1930,
which was the 19th year of the Chinese Republic, only
to be dissolved within ten days when the Young Marshal
telegraphed his support for Chiang Kai-Shek and moved
his forces inside the Great Wall once more. It was a pitv
that, in spite of the new Government having chosen the
auspicious hour when the figure nine occurred four times
in order to wish it to be long-lasting, it should be so short-
302
lived. The word nine in Chinese reads the same as the
word long-lasting.
The Young Marshal had no need to fight. He occupied
Peiping peacefully, as the forces of Yen Hsi-Shan saw it
was useless to resist. By doing a good turn to the man who
had made him a member of the State Council, the Young
Marshal had added another province— Hopeh— to his terri-
tory and another high office to those he already held— the
Vice-Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, Navy
and Air Force.
If we look at Chiang Kai-Shek’s balance-sheet at this
stage, we find he was not doing so well but had managed
to recover some of his heavy losses. Wang Ching-Wei
was by now an outspoken enemy, and as substitute for
him, Hu Han-Min was holding the Party together in Nan-
king. The Communists were all against him, but nearly
all the anti-Communists, including some of the ‘Old
Comrades’ who belonged to the ‘West Hill Conference’,
were supporting him. Feng Yu-Hsiang, the Christian
General, and Yen Hsi-Shan had openly fought against
him, but for the loss of these two great military leaders
he now had the co-operation of the Young Marshal with
all his satellite generals in Manchuria.
There was another general who gained an exalted posi-
tion during this campaign against Feng Yu-Hsiang and
Yen Hsi-Shan. He was the other leading character in
the Sian coup, General Yang Hu-Cheng. Although
Yen FIsi-Shan’s forces beat a quick retreat when they
heard of the Young Marshal’s marching-orders, Feng Yu-
Hsiang’s army was still resisting the troops in Flonan sent
by the Central Government. After some fierce fighting
the rebels slowly gave way, and Yang Hu-Cheng, who had
taken the important junction of Lo-Yang, was made the
Commander-in-Chief of the Shensi Relief Campaign. He
fought westwards and occupied Sian, the capital of the
303 L
province of Shensi. He was thus appointed the Chairman
of this Provincial Government, and this post was later re-
named Pacification Commissioner of Shensi. At that time
neither he nor the Young Marshal had the slightest com-
munistic aspirations.
With the failure of the ‘Enlarged Conference’, the
country entered into a very brief period of peace, and
Chiang Kai-Shek thought it suitable to call the long-
promised People’s Convention and to adopt the Provisional
Constitution. Regarding this, Hu Han-Min could not
see eye to eye with him and before the People’s Conven-
tion was called, Hu Han-Min resigned all his government
and Party posts and stayed in the capital not doing any-
thing. As it was said that Hu Han-Min was held by Chiang
Kai-Shek under house arrest, so an official statement was
issued. It said that theoretically no member of the Revolu-
tionary Party might enjoy absolute freedom of personal
movement. As responsible political leaders, once they
had resigned, invariably went to foreign settlements at
Shanghai or Tientsin or to Elongkong to incite and fan
disorders, China had been having incessant civil strife. ‘For
the sake of the public and in his own interest, therefore,
we are devising measures to preserve him from ruin. In
the opinion of the Government and of Hu Han-Min him-
self, it is best that he should not leave Nanking.’
The People’s Convention was held in Nanking on
March 5th, 1931, and was attended by more than four
hundred delegates coming from every province and over
forty members of the Central Executive and Supervisory
Committeces of the Kuo Min Tang. Chiang Kai-Shek
made the opening speech and presented the meeting with
the Provisional Constitution. It could not be denied that
that was a considerable achievement for Chiang Kai-Shek,
but he must have missed some of his old and good friends.
Neither Wang Ching-Wei nor Hu Han-Min was there
and the two other Commanders-in-Chief, Feng Yu-Hsiang
304
and Yen Hsi-Shan were in the black boolcs. Chang
Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, who had hurried South
specially for this important convention, was a poor sub-
stitute. His prestige might be very high in Manchuria and
his authority unquestionable in the North, where his
satellites were, but Chiang Kai-Shek seemed to be his only
supporter in the South.
The dismissal or retirement of the two generals, Feng
Yu-Hsiang and Yen Hsi-Shan, and the two Party leaders,
Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, created great unrest
among the other generals and politicians. Anti-Chiang
Kai-Snek movements spread secretly, and in Central and
South China revolt t)roke out. In Canton, where Chiang
Kai-Shek had started his career, a number of Party men,
with the support of the local general, openly demanded
his resignation. They repeated what many people had
said before: that Chiang Kai-Shek was the man responsible
for all the confusion in the country and that his retirement
would bring peace on earth immediately. Among the
many things of which he had been accused were his having
given authority to various Communists, his employing in
the Goverment enemies of the Party and his imprisoning
of Hu Han-Min. As usual, Wang Ching-Wei was one of
the chief string-pullers, and the demand was counter-
signed, curiously enough by some leftists as well as by
right-wing members of the Central Committee.
Whilst asking the Young Marshal to help him in defeat-
ing quickly the uprising by a follower of Feng Yu-Hsiang
in Central China, Chiang Kai-Shek told the rebels in
Canton that he was willing to discuss with them what was
best to be done. The rebellion in Central China was put
down in a few days, but the Cantonese revolt became
more serious when some of the troops of its neighbouring
province of Kwangsi joined it. In the meantime the
Chinese Communists were establishing themselves in the
305
interior parts of Kiangsi where they had engaged a large
number of Chiang Kai-Shek’s crack troops. Nothing
pleased the Communists more than the Cantonese revolt.
It was at this critical time, whilst both sides thought
fighting was inevitable, that Japan invaded Manchuria.
On September 1 8, 1931, exactly a year aftQr Chang Hsueh-
Liang, the Young Marshal, had moved his troops inside
the Great Wall to help Chiang Kai-Shek in spite of
Japanese opposition, Japan created the ‘Moukden Incident’
by starting to attack the Chinese garrison in the city and to
occupy the whole Province. Chang Hsueh-Liang was in
Tientsin, and most of his troops were in Hopeh. Being
unprepared for such a large-scale attack, the local garrison
could scarcely do anything to stop the enemy.
Chiang Kai-Shek received the news calmly. He immedi-
ately issued a message to the nation. In this message he
urged every man and woman, and every political group
without exception, to rally to the Central Government.
There was but one China, he said, and it could have only
one national representation. In the meantime, knowing
better than anyone else that China was too weak to fight
her powerful neighbour, he appealed to the League of
Nations, the old international organisation which was
established after the First World War to prevent a second
world war. He believed that justice could be done and
asked the Chinese people to wait for action by the League
of Nations. Little did he realise that the League of
Nations was about as good as Westminster Abbey— merely
a resting-place for great statesmen. Nobody there would
like or was able to do anything, even should the Heavens
fall. People in China believe that the inactivity of the
League of Nations towards Japan’s aggression in China
was an encouragement for Italy and for Germany.
His call to end internal dissension also fell upon deaf
ears. The South continued to bicker and the Communists
in the interior showed no signs of co-operation. Ambi-
306
tious politicians still proclaimed that Chiang Kai-Shek
must go. But he would leave no stone unturned before
he gave up. He got Hu Han-Min to negotiate with the
Southerners, and Wang Ching-Wei and his followers came
to Shanghai for a peace conference. However, peace was
far off. Nothing could be agreed between Chiang Kai-
Shek and his opposers. It was after the failure of this
peace conference in Shanghai that the Fourth National
Congress was called to reorganise the Government. Even
this party meeting was a chaotic one. Instead of one Con-
gress three were held. One was held at Nanking; where
most of the members attended. A second was held in
Canton, to which Chiang Kai-Shek's enemies had hoped
that both Hu Han-Min and Wang Ching-Wei would
come: but they hoped in vain. Soon some of them left
Canton for Shanghai to hold a third Congress.
In the meantime, the students all over the country began
to feel restless. They journeyed to Nanking from various
cities to petition in person to the Government demanding
the declaration of war on Japan. Knowing better than
anyone else that China could not meet Japan in arms
at that time, Chiang Kai-Shek had to reassure the students
that he would do everything he could for his country and
to command them to go back to their studies instead of
creating trouble for the Government. By that time the
actions of those patriotic youths had become quite uncon-
trollable. He had to be very stem in dealing with them
and it was an extremely unpopular action at that critical
hour. Of course his political enemies supported the
students’ actions and made capital out of the incident.
On December 15th, 1931, Chiang Kai-Shek announced
his resignation from all his official posts. As was expected,
his resignation was accepted with alacrity. Immediately
following this a large number of Cabinet Ministers also
tendered their resignations, all of which, except two, were
307
rejected. Lin Sen, an elderly member of the Central
Supervisory Committe, was elected the Acting Chairman
of the State Council, and later on he was made Chairman, a
post which he held for more than ten years with continued
success till he died in 1943.
After having led a busy life for some years, Chiang Kai-
Shek found this sudden relief most enjoyable. He went
back to his native district of Feng Hua and took a most
desired rest among the beautiful hills near his home. As
he was lingering there in appreciation of the scenic beauty
of this secluded spot, great difficulties began to descend
upon the shoulders of the new office-holders. Whilst Nan-
king was still in confusion following the un-co-operative
Congresses of the Party, the Japanese consolidated their
gains in the North and prepared a further assault in the
South by reinforcing their troops in Shanghai. It was
soon apparent that not only was foreign aggression in-
sTifficient to incite the quarrelsome military leaders and
politicians to be patriotic enough to cease attacking each
other, but also that the resignation of their chief enemy,
Chiang Kai-Shek, would not satisfy their endless demands.
On top of this hopeless situation, the Communists in the
interior continued to fight against the government
troops.
It was in the early days of 1932 when the Government
thought that they could not manage without the guidance
of their old leader. At an emergency meeting in Nanking
the new members of the Government decided that Lin
Sen, the Chairman of the State Council, and Sun Fo, son
of Sun Yat-Sen and President of the Executive Yuan,
should petition Chiang Kai-Shek to come out of retire-
ment at once. Wang Ching-Wei, who was not a member
of the Government, also realised that Chiang Kai-Shek
was the man to steer China through her present trouble.
He was convalescing in a Shanghai hospital, but he decided
to disregard the advice of his doctors and go to Hangchow
308
to meet the man with whom he had quarrelled for many
years.
Wang Ching-Wei’s giving up of his personal differences
encouraged Chiang Kai-Shek, and their co-operation
heartened those who were already in despair. For several
days they talked things over in the beautiful city of West
Lake, and towards the end of January, 1932, when Japan
was pouring men and arms into the International Settle-
ment of Shanghai, a part of which was controlled by her,
the two leaders of the Kuo Min Tang made their way to
Nanking. Besides his military duties which he consented
to resume because of Japanese invasion, Chiang Kai-Shek
took up no administrative post. Wang Ching-Wei, how-
ever, was made President of the Executive Yuan, the
equivalent of the premiership, which Sun Fo gave up in
his favour.
This time, Chiang Kai-Shek found the general situation
of the country much worse than it had been in 1927 after
his first resignation. In 1928 he had no difficulty in lead-
ing his victorious army to unify China. But now Japan
had already started her ‘disguised war’, as Lord Lytton
very tactfully called it, in Manchuria, and was on the
point of starting her undisguised war in Shanghai. With
a part of his troops to check rebellious generals, another
part to keep the Communists from extending their area,
he had to find a third to meet the Japanese invasion in the
South. Knowing that with so many generals opposing
him he could not muster enough military strength to
ward off the Japanese onslaught, he still had to proclaim
to the country that he would not compromise.
On January 28th, 1932, a few days after his return to
Nanking, Japan attacked the Chinese garrison in Shanghai
without the slightest provocation. The 19th Route Army
which was stationed there defended its position heroically,
and the 87th and 88th Divisions of the Central Fifth Army
were also sent by Chiang Kai-Shek to the front to help
309
the defence. The Government, under the threat of
Japanese gunfire, had to be moved to Lo-Yang where an
emergency conference was held, and it is tragic to record
that in the debate on the Japanese question, the civilian
delegates voted for war whilst the military men voted for
a truce. The soldiers knew where they were.
After a month’s magnificent resistance the Chinese
troops had to be withdrawn, and a tolerable truce was
signed on March 4th. That such a truce was most un-
popular with the Chinese people is perfectly understand-
able; in fact Quo Tai-Chi, the Chinese delegate who
signed the truce, was mobbed by the students and had
to be detained in hospital. Chiang Kai-Shek, Commander-
in-Chief and Chairman of the Military Council, did not
receive any physical attack on this matter. But the
reader can readily imagine what those days had meant to
him.
Alas, that was not the end, but only the beginning!
Whilst the whole country was still furious at this truce,
Japan ordered her puppet, Henry Pu-Yi, who had abdi-
cated after the 191 1 Revolution, to be installed as Emperor
of Manchuria, which she renamed ‘Manchukuo’ and
declared it an independent state. It can easily be imagined
what a state of mind Chiang Kai-Shek was in at that time.
Was it possible for the successful Commander-in-Chief of
the Northern Punitive Expedition to bear this with forti-
tude and wait until the country was prepared? Or should
he disregard reality and declare a hopeless war on Japan?
It required super-human strength to swallow this great
insult whilst the whole country was cr).hng out for war.
But he chose to act against popular sentiment and took
the whole responsibility upon his own broad shoulders.
Protesting loudly that China would never recognise the
bogus ‘Manchukuo’, he ignored its existence and went on
with his preparations. In December, 1932, when he was
satisfied that Japan was concentrating her activities in the
310
Noah, he moved the Government back to Nanking.
But Japan would not stop in Manchuria. Early in 1933
she marched southwards, threatened Peiping and Tientsin
and invaded Jehol. Chiang Kai-Shek had to hurry North
to Paoting, where, it will be remembered, he attended his
first military school when a boy, and direct a defensive
war with a certain degree of success. After a local victory
when the Japanese believed that the roads southwards
were well foaified, he quickly agreed to another truce—
the Tangku truce— in May, to buy a further lease of time.
Again it was obvious that this was not a popular move;
his personal prestige suffered severely, but he did not care.
He felt he must do what was best for the country.
Perhaps the greatest Commander-in-Chief and Prime
Minister in Chinese history was Chu-Ke Liang of the
Three Kingdoms, who lived from 18 1 to 234 a.d. His
most important and urgent task was a Northern Punitive
Expedition against his chief enemy the Kingdom of Wei,
but he decided to conquer a barbarian chieftain in the
South within his own territory before he embarked on his
main undertaking. This chieftain had a large following
of barbarian tribesmen who would fight on until the last
one fell. Chu-Ke Liang had to spend a fairly long time
on his southern campaign and to capture the chieftain
seven times before the barbarian finally acknowledged
defeat and vowed that he would not revolt again.
‘Peace at home before fighting invaders’ was Chiang
Kai-Shek’s slogan when he marshalled his forces to sup-
press the Communists in the Yangtze Valley. During the
past few years there had been several serious uprisings in
the interior provinces. With the coming of the Japanese
invasion of Chinese territories, to which part of her crack
troops had to be sent, the Chinese Soviet regions had ex-
tended to the four provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan
and Hupeh with its capital in Jui-Kin, a secluded city on
the mountainous south-eastern border of Kiangsi. Taldng
the ancient Prime Minister as his model, Chiang Kai-Shek
concluded those truces with Japan as best he could, in
order to concentrate on wiping away hindrances to his
later work. But the Communists proved to be much more
unconquerable than the barbarian chieftain.
His long-drawn-out anti-Communist campaign was a
very costly one in more senses than one. Money, man-
power and prestige suffered as the campaign went on year
after year without much apparent success: whilst he was
engaged with the Communists in a tight grip, ambitious
generals and politicians availed themselves of the oppor-
tunity to intrigue and revolt, with high-sounding declara-
tions saying that they wanted to fight the Japanese in-
vaders but had been kept from doing so by Chiang Kai-
Shek. These revolts could always count upon the support
of a small fraction of the people who were either simple
enough to believe them or else had crafty schemes of their
own. To both of these Chiang Kai-Shek was the stum-
bling-block to the highway of patriotism.
Receiving such insults with forbearance and shoulder-
ing a heavy responsibility, Chiang Kai-Shek made his
headquarters more or less in the Province of Kiangsi to
conduct his anti-Communist campaign. To emphasise the
fact that the Communists were behaving savagely in the
area they occupied, the campaign was officially called
‘Red Bandits Suppression’, and members or followers of
the Chinese Communist party were called Red or Com-
munist Bandits. Formerly it had been the Communists
who used the foulest terms in attacking him, but now the
tables were turned on them. Anti-Communist literature
was encouraged and even sponsored by the Government,
and violent attacks on the Reds could be found in all kinds
of publications. The anti-Red publicity might not be so
thorough as that of the anti-Chiang Kai-Shek, but it was
much more extensive.
31^
During the years of the anti-Red campaign there was
one thing which is most interesting to note: that was the
resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia in
1933. It will be remembered that after the discovery of
the fact that the Soviet Consulate had helped the Com-
munist uprisings in Canton in 1927-28, China broke off
diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. A few years
later the forces of both countries clashed on the Northern
Manchurian border and relations became more strained.
It was a great surprise to most people that Chiang Kai-
Shek should choose to resume relations with Soviet Russia,
whilst doing his utmost to wipe out the Communists in
Kiangsi.
Because of the announcement of the retirement from
public life of the Christian General Feng Yu-Hsiang, and
later the establishment of a ‘People’s Government’ in
Fukien by some ambitious generals and politicians, Chiang
Kai-Shek did not make much headway in his anti-Red
Campaign in the year 1933. But in the following year
there was much to record. The ‘People’s Government’
in Fukien was speedily defeated and he went to Chekiang
in February to see that the Provincial Government was in
good order. He then went to Nanchang, the capital of
Kiangsi, in which province he spent most of his time in
1934. He was there when he declared, in a proclamation
to the people of the Communist-infested province, that ‘for
the past year, because of raising armies to suppress several
revolts, the Communist-bandits have availed themselves of
this opportunity to extend the confusion and the trouble
has been infected into three provinces. For the last few
months their ferocious flame has become higher than ever.
Having forced more people to join them, they invaded
cities and occupied districts. The villages they passed
through became flooded with blood. Male or female, old
or young, they massacred them all. The damage they did
through burning or plundering amounts to thousands of
313
millions. They committed what human beings could not
bear to commit. For two hundred years never have things
as atrocious as this happened. To mention it makes my
heart ache and to think of it makes my hair stand up.’
In the Autumn he was gratified to see the capture of the
Chinese Soviet capital, Juikin. The Reds retreated to
Fukien and elsewhere. Kiangsi was almost cleared of
Communists. Though this was but a partial success as
there were still large numbers of Communists scattered
about, it was a good occasion to celebrate a much needed
victory. It was said that by taking up arms to attack their
opponents the Communists believed that ‘might is right.’
Their defeat by Chiang Kai-Shek’s campaign was therefore
used to illustrate to the public that ‘right is might’. Whilst
he fully realised that there was a long way to go in getting
rid of the Communists, he gave the widest publicity to this
early celebration of his triumph.
As has been mentioned before, there were critics who
attacked him for his policy of fighting the Communists
who were his own countrymen whilst patching-up a tem-
porary peace with foreign invaders, and his prestige
suffered a little on account of this plausible attack. To
show that the people were all on his side, Chiang Kai-Shek
said in a public statement on this occasion that in his
opinion, instead of celebrating the anti-Red victory, the
celebration should be for the victory of the Chinese
people. He maintained that it was through the co-opera-
tion of the people and soldiers that the suppression of the
Red Bandits had been a success. If the people would sup-
port the Government whole-heartedly in domestic and
diplomatic issues, he was sure that the national programme
would be a complete success. To say that the victory
belonged to the people was not sheer modesty: it was good
statesmanship.
There was another thing which he did in 1934 worth
3H
mentioning here. Whilst he was in the Province of Fukien
he happened to meet with a boy scarcely ten years old
with a cigarette in his mouth, walking in the street of a
small town. This little incident had greatly disturbed him.
He went to seek out the boy’s parents and asked them to
pay a little more attention to this child. Because he had
seen quite a lot of things like this among^the people, he
thought the only way to awaken them was to initiate the
New Life Movement. This he did in the Spring of 1934
in Nanchang, the provincial seat of Kiangsi, when the in-
augural meeting was attended by thousands of students
and others. Subsequent meetings to popularise the Move-
ment were held in all the chief cities of China and soon it
became a national affair. Many people hailed it as if it
were a new religion and regarded it as the only means to
deliver the masses from the bad ways into which they had
fallen during the past twenty or thirty years.
Though the New Life Movement was meant to rejuven-
ate China, it was a revival of ancient tradition. The teach-
ings of Confucius are the rudiments of Chiang Kai-Shek’s
Movement. The four important commandments are 7 /, f,
lien and chHb\ which mean literally good manners, right
conduct, honesty and pride. As there is an essay on the
Movement published by Chiang Kai-Shek, of which later
on an official translation was made by Madame Chiang
Kai-Shek, suffice it here to say that the Movement was
organised to remind the people that the old virtues were
as good as, if not better than, the new. Since the Revolu-
tion had practically preached the doctrine of knocking
down all the old institutions, it was high time to point out
to the misled masses that there were certain fundamentals
which remained untouchable. As this essay is not too long,
and preaches these virtues in a very clear and practical
way, it is included in this volume as Appendix I.
The reader who has time to glance over Appendix I will
find it interesting to learn that there were some people
3L^
in China who could even criticise Chiang Kai-Shek for
his endeavour to lead the masses to practise those simple
vutues. Their reasons were that he had overdone it; in some
cases the supporters of this Movement had been doing so
in an ostentatious manner; and that the social conditions
in China needed improvement, which should be carried
out by the governing rather than the governed classes.
They said that the first thing to be done was for the
Government to enable all the people to earn their living;
the next thing was to increase their chances of living a
slightly better life; and only the last thing was to preach
to them how to live a new life. It was also attacked as
being a political movement: it had been organised and
spread through political machinery. The critics, some of
whom were educationists, maintained that it should be
conducted as an educational movement.
In point of fact, China would have fared better during
the war and in the year immediately after the war if the
preachings of the New Life Movement could have been
thoroughly and extensively put into practice. As punctu-
ality, frugality and industry were among its teachings,
nothing could be more urgently needed for the recovery
of the wounded and bleeding country. Some of the tradi-
tional virtues had been misrepresented and abused, and
they were easily turned into red-tape and hypocrisy. The
New Life Movement gave them an overhaul. When they
were re-examined and re-affirmed the efficiency of the
whole country would increase greatly.
Somewhat similar to the New Life Movement was the
Society of Moral Endeavour which Chiang Kai-Shek
established for his soldiers. Members of this society lived
on much more puritan principles. They must not smoke,
drink intoxicants nor indulge in any luxurious habits. In
China, the institution known as The Young Men’s
Christian Association holds more or less these same prin-
ciples. The new society founded by Chiang Kai-Shek for
316
his soldiers was extremely broad-minded in its religious
aspects and so could include all men no matter what their
beliefs were. As soldiering has always been associated with
loose living, the Society of Moral Endeavour was an
original and praiseworthy organisation.
Whilst the Communists in the interior were only parti-
ally subdued, the Mongolians, prompted by Japan, started
a revolt in the North, making the situation in the provinces
of Hopeh and Shansi very critical. In order to strengthen
the defensive power of these places, Chiang Kai-Shek
tom-ed the border regions of the north-west in 1934. In
a vast country like China to go from the south-east to the
north-west would require a fairly lengthy period of time
if it were done by land and river. As his presence could
not be long spared from the capital and other parts where
the anti-Red Campaign was still going on, he embarked
on a series of long-distance flights.
In 1935 the Communists moved hurriedly westwards,
and Chiang Kai-Shek, now used to long flights, toured
the south-west by air. The provinces in this remote part
had for years been somewhat out of touch with the
Central Government. He inspected most of the public
services and reorganised some of the important local
governments and introduced a number of reforms. The
great provinces of Yunnan and Szechuan had always been
neglected by the rest of the country, but he at once saw
the potential part which they could play in the case of
an emergency. It was to these provinces that he paid most
of his attention. The land, especially in Szechuan, is rich
and the scenery beautiful, and he established on the
picturesque O-Mei mountain the training camps for
officials whom he wanted trained to meet any emergency.
The Communists had by now been driven out of the
south-west Province of Kwei- Chow. During the course of
the following year, that is in 1936, they began to move
317
further and further north, flying across the large pasture
lands and deserted plains after having suffered severe
losses. By the later part of 1936, their numbers had been
greatly reduced and they could hardly manage to live in
the newly-found hide-outs in the Province of Shensi when
they had to escape from Shansi. The much-criticised anti-
Red Campaign had been going on for many years, and
it was at last drawng near to its successful conclusion.
Now the dangerous Communist forces had been brought
to bay in an isolated comer. They were watched by
General Yang Hu-Cheng, the Pacification Commissioner
of Shensi, and the Young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang,
the combined forces of these two generals greatly out-
numbering those of the Communists.
Towards the end of 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek was again
touring the north-west by air. He was inspecting those
regions for two reasons: firstly, he was co-ordinating the
Government forces in the neighbouring provinces for a
final onslaught against the Communists, and secondly, he
had to see about the defence against the Japanese, who
had invaded the Province of Char-Har in the previous year
and were now spreading their influence in the whole of
North China.
On October 31st of that year it was his forty-ninth
birthday. According to Chinese custom this was an im-
portant occasion because it marked the entry into his
fiftieth year. The whole country was preparing a nation-
wide celebration. On account of his great interest in
air-power, all his well-wishers, who were numerous, sub-
scribed voluntarily to buy a number of aircraft to be
presented to the State to commemorate his birthday.
Whilst Lin Sen, the President, and some two hundred
thousand people were watching the sixty-eight presenta-
tion aeroplanes soaring into the air to form two characters
representing his name, he was far away in Lo-Yang see-
ing to the defence of North China against Japanese attacks
318
and to the preparation of the final offensive against the
Communists. He was, however, deeply touched by the
good wishes of his friends. He issued a general message
to thank all those who had contributed to the subscrip-
tion for buying the aeroplanes and also circulated a touch-
ing tribute to his mother entitled 'Some Reflections on
my Fiftieth Birthday’. As this essay gives the reader many
glimpses into his life and thought, and as there is an
official translation, it is included in this book as Appendix
II.
A very brief perusal of this essay will convince the
reader that Chiang Kai-Shek is a very patriotic citizen as
well as a filial son. Instead of recounting his achievements
on the threshold of fifty, he modestly relates what his
mother had hoped he would do and what difficult times
he, his mother and the country had had and would be
having. He says, between the lines, that to drive away
the Japanese invaders would be his sole aim: a thing which
he owed to himself, his mother and his fellow-country-
men who had been so overwhelmingly kind to him. With
Japan’s foot of invasion virtually inside our door, he could
not speak more plainly than he had done. The fact that
a small foundation for a National Air Force was formed on
this convenient occasion alone shows what was the most
urgent need at that time and how carefully he had to go
about it in order not to give the enemy an excuse to start
a full-scale war at once. As the whole world knows, Japan
threw off all her disguises and invaded China Proper about
eight months after this.
319
C HIANG Kai-Shek’s anti-Communist campaign was a
prelude to the defensive war against Japanese aggres-
sion. His ‘home front first’ policy had not been so popular
as he thought. As soon as the Communist troubles in the
interior seemed to decrease, arm-chair strategists in China
began to clamour for a reversal of the policy and they were
much more critical of Chiang Kai-Shek than those who
attacked Churchill when they had urged in vain for an
early Second Front in Europe in the last World War.
Looking at the issue without bias, one could understand
their passionate demand for converging all the nation’s
strength on the important task of recovering the nation’s
sovereignty. The Communist disturbances had always
been local and only those who suffered knew what they
meant. On the other hand, a foreign invasion is always
the thing to stir up the whole country no matter how
remote one may live from the territory of aggression; and
Japan had been adding injury to insult in China ever since
1894.
By the end of 1936, with Japanese forces spreading over
a wide area in North China, the feeling of the country
had reached boiling-point. Patriotic people, especially the
intelligent class, were determined rather to fight and
vanquish with honour than to submit to the enemy with-
out a struggle. The Communists’ threat had diminished
almost to zero and it was the opinion of some people that
if Japan was not resisted now it would never be done.
But Chiang Kai-Shek seemed to be still of a different
opinion. A year previously, at the Fifth National Con-
320
gress of the Kuo Min Tang which was called in November,
1935, the statement on his foreign policy was like this;
‘Whilst the hope of peace has not entirely gone, we will
not abandon our hope of peace. Whilst the last stage call-
ing for sacrifice has not yet arrived, we will not lightly
talk about sacrifice. However, to maintain peace we have
to draw the line somewhere; and as for sacrifice, we have
resolved to do that to the bitter end. With the resolution
of sacrifice to the bitter end in mind, we will still do our
best to work for peace.’
Though this statement given by the responsible head
of the Chinese Army could scarcely be criticised in face
of the delicate condition of Sino-Japanese relations, the
militant patriots read it as a sign of compromise without
honour. At first it had been almost entirely civilians who
wanted war with Japan at any cost, but by now quite a
number of soldiers of all ranks, getting tired of the end-
less anti-Communist campaign, began to feel the same.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s political enemies found it a good chance
to marshal their strength at this moment, and there was
organised in China the People’s United Front, the slogan
of which was the uniting of people of ‘left’ tendencies in
an effort to resist Japan. The consequence of starting a
new political party in a country under one-party rule can
easily be imagined, apart from the fact that the new party’s
aim was to oppose the existing one. There were mass
meetings followed by arrests of ringleaders, and finally
general suppression of the new party and widespread dis-
content. Most people called Chiang Kai-Shek a dictator.
In the year 1936 all the dictators were doing well, not,
of course, counting Stalin as one. The first requirement
of a dictator is that he must be the absolute head of a
totalitarian State, which we have always been assured that
Stalin is not. Furthermore, the term dictator is now associ-
ated with reactionaries, and we all know that whatever
Stalin opposes becomes automatically reactionary. Bur
321
Hitler, head of Nazi Germany, and Mussolini, head of
Fascist Italy, could find for themselves no excuses. How-
ever, they cared little what people called them as long as
they could dictate to their heart’s content. Hitler’s
demand for lebensrmvi extended to the territories of
most of his neighbours, and Mussolini’s claim for re-
adjustment of colonies took the shape of the invasion of
Abyssinia. The dictators had been so successful that they
seemed to be the vogue of the day.
As the left-wing politicians, who were the implacable
enemies of Hitler at that time, were forming their
united front in Europe, those in China also began to be
active. They made use of the patriotic feelings of some
of the leading generals, who had been ordered by Chiang
Kai-Shek to nght the Communists instead of the Japanese.
Yang Hu-Cheng, Pacification Commissioner of Shensi,
became an ardent supporter of the Chinese People’s United
Front, which attacked Chiang Kai-Shek’s policy, and
Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, with his Man-
churian officers and men were even more ready to join
the new movement. As was revealed later, he thought
they might make him the new leader and national hero.
So numerous supporters of the People’s United Front
flocked to where he was. This led to the coup of Sian in
December, 1936.
For this incident of world-wide interest the only
documentary material available is two publications: one
written by Chiang Kai-Shek himself, and the other by
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, both published soon after
Chiang Kai-Shek’s release by the pro-Communist generals.
These two generals themselves, however, left us no
written record. Chiang Kai-Shek’s publication is called
A Fortnight in Sim, and consists of extracts from his
diary with a few words of introduction and a longish
epilogue in the form of a disciplinary lecture on the two
322
rebels. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek’s piece is called ‘Sian:
A Coup d^Etat, being a supplemental explanation of her
husband’s record. As can be easily understood, these were
widely circulated in China: so many people wanted to
know about the happenings in Sian at first-hand, and a
great number of copies of the English version, which was
quite faithfully and carefully done, found their way into
the hands of the English-reading public. Suffice it here,
therefore, to give a brief outline and a few quotations.
In November, 1936, Mongolian troops, prompted by
the Japanese, invaded the Province of Suiyan. Chiang
Kai-Shek flew to Loyang, and later visited Tai-Yuan, the
capital of Shansi Province, and Tsinan, the capital of
Shantung Province, to confer with military leaders about
the defence of North China. On December 3rd Chang
Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, flew to Loyang to see
Chiang Kai-Shek and to ask him to go to Sian, saying that
the military vsituation there needed his personal attention.
On the following day Chiang Kai-Shek flew to Sian with
only a handful of his followers and stayed at his temporary
headquarters called Hua Tsing Chih, which means the
Flower Purity Pond, a royal pleasure-garden built at the
foot of Li Shan or the Black Horse A 4 ountain when Sian
was the capital in ancient times. It is just over ten miles
to the east of Sian and, except for a few shops outside its
surrounding wall, the place is utterly isolated.
Knowing that some officers and men of both the Man-
churian Army and the Shensi Army were not keen on
fighting the Communists, whose propaganda had been
vepy effective because of Japanese aggressive actions in
the North, Chiang Kai-Shek did his best to impress upon
them that the Red Bandits must be wiped out first. Out-
wardly they dare not show any sign of disobedience, and
he thought all was well. But on the 1 2th, at half-past five
in the morning, when he was, as usual, getting up and
dressing after his physical exercises in bed, he heard a gun
323
go off, the sound coming from outside the gate of his head-
quarters. A second shot was followed by heavy firing as
he sent his men to see what was the matter, and soon he
was told that mutinous soldiers were trying to storm his
headquarters, but had been temporarily driven back by his
few bodyguards. As they were greatly outnumbered, he
was urged to leave at once. The back of the building was
not being attacked, according to telephone reports, so he
was requested to go up the Black Horse Mountain through
the back gate.
‘What do the mutinous soldiers look like?’ he asked.
‘Wearing fur hats, they are all Manchurian officers and
men,’ was the reply.
At that time Chiang Kai-Shek still thought it was only
a small part of the soldiers who had mutinied. If he could
get over to the other side of the mountain and wait until
daybreak, the trouble would quieten down. The back gate
was locked and in getting over the wall in the dark he fell
into the moat and could scarcely walk. When he managed
to reach a small temple, some guards who were waiting
there helped him to climb up the mountain for half an
hour until they were near the top of the ridge. Then shots
rained upon them from all sides and all the guards were
killed. Chiang Kai-Shek now realised that it was not a
local mutiny, but that the entire Manchurian Army was
revolting against him. He decided to go back to his head-
quarters to see what could be done. As he hurried down
the mountain, he fell into a small cave. He tried once and
again to get up, but his efforts were in vain. By then the
day had begun to break, and he could see from where he
was concealed that troops were everywhere below the
Black Horse Mountain.
His personal guards were still defending his head-
quarters, and machine-guns, hand-grenades and even
artillery were being used by the rebels to attack them.
This lasted for about half an hour, then all became silent
3H
again; evidently all the defenders had been killed or over-
powered. That was about half-past nine in the morning.
Rebelling soldiers were about looking for him, and he saw
them pass by his cave twice without finding him. Then
suddenly he heard soldiers arguing, and one of them said:
‘There is a man in civilian dress. Perhaps he is the
Generalissimo.’ Another said: ‘Give him a shot first and
see what happens,’ and a third shouted to stop him, saying:
‘Stop your nonsense!’ Chiang Kai-Shek raised his voice
and said:
‘I am Generalissimo Chiang, you must not be disrespect-
ful. If you regard me as your prisoner you had better
shoot me at once, but don’t subject me to the slightest
indignity!’
The rebelling soldiers said they would not dare to do
such a thing, and fired into the air three times, shouting at
the top of their voices: ‘Generalissimo Chiang is here!’
Their commander soon came; kneeling down and with
tears in his eyes, he respectfully requested Chiang Kai-
Shek to go down the hill where a car was waiting to take
him into the city of Sian, his headquarters being in a state
of confusion. He was conducted to the New City Build-
ing, the office of General Yang Hu-Cheng, the Pacifica-
tion Commissioner of Shensi. Yang Hu-Cheng was not
there, but soon Chang Hsueh-Liang came, standing with
his hands at his sides and very respectful to Chiang Kai-
Shek who, however, did not return his courtesies but
asked:
‘Did you know beforehand about to-day’s affair?’
‘No,’ was the reply.
‘Since you did not know about this affair, you should
see that I return to Nanking or Loyang at once. Then it
may not be difficult to settle this.’
‘Though I did not know about the developments, I have
some proposals which I wish to lay before your Excellency
the Generalissimo.’
325
Hearing that he was still addressed as the Generalissimo,
Chiang Kai-Shek told Chang Hsueh-Liang that the orders
of the Generalissimo must be obeyed. After some fruit-
less arguments Chang Hsueh-Liang said:
‘I am not the only one who is responsible for affairs
here: there are many people who are in it. What I have
just initiated and done should be referred to the people
for their verdict. If the people support what we propose,
it proves we are representing the common will of the
people and your Excellency will realise that our action is
not wrong. We’ll request your Excellency to retire and
let us do the work. If public opinion does not approve it,
then I shall admit my mistake and request your Excellency
to resume your work. From first to last I believe I have
not acted against your Excellency’s teachings. Please,
your Excellency, don’t be angry, and consider the matter
carefully.’
These words clearly indicated that the Young Marshal
was hoping that with the support of the People’s United
Front he would be made the leader of the new movement
and head of a coalition government. Chiang Kai-Shek
would not hear of this and determined to die rather than
give consent. He simply refused to hear what proposals
the rebels were making. But Chang Hsueh-Liang and
Yang Hu-Cheng, together with their subordinate generals
and commanders, sent out a circular telegram to Nanking
and all the public offices and newspapers throughout the
whole country, announcing that they had been viewing
the Government’s policy with misgivings, that it was high
time to start a national campaign of resistance, that they
could no longer sit idle, being compelled to give their last
advice to the Generalissimo, for whose safety, however,
they would assume responsibility, and that they hoped
this eight-point programme would be adopted. These are
the eight points:
326
1. Reorganise the Government to admit people of
every party and clique to save the country;
2. Stop all the civil wars;
3. Release at once patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai;
4. Release all political prisoners;
5. Safeguard the people’s liberty to hold meetings and
organise associations;
6. Give a free hand to people’s patriotic movements;
7. Carry out Sun Yat-Sen’s political will;
8. Convocate at once the National Salvation Con-
ference.
And in order to make their demands more impressive,
they included the names of a large number of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s followers whom they had captured in Sian as
signatories to this telegram.
While their chief prisoner remained obstinate, the
whole country was bewildered and horrified. Instead of
unanimous support, for which they had hoped, demands
to set the Generalissimo free came from everywhere. The
Central Government refused to parley just as Chiang Kai-
Shek himself did. Some of his commanders even started to
march towards Sian without orders. General Kwei Yun-
Chin, who was the head of the Chinese Military Mission in
London during 1945-1946, risked being court-martialled
for disobedience by gathering his troops for an immediate
expedition against the rebels in Sian.
Chang Hsueh-Liang and Yang Hu-Chcng began to see
that they had got more than they had bargained for. Their
motive was patriotic, but they were too ambitious and
certainly they were extremely rash. After seeing the
results of what they had done, they thought it would not
be too late to watch their step hereafter. On the third day
of the coup d^etaty Chang Hsueh-Liang said to Chiang
Kai-Shek:
327
‘We have read your diary and all your important docu-
ments and from them we have now learned the greatness
of your character. Your loyalty to the Revolution and
your determination to bear the responsibility of saving the
country far exceed anything we could have imagined.
Haven't you in your diary scolded me for having no
character? When I reflect on it to-day, I really feel that
I have no character. But you have been too silent with
your subordinates. If I had known but ten or twenty per
cent of what you have said in the diary, never would this
rash act have happened. Now I sincerely realise that my
own views were mistaken. Since I know the greatness of
your leadership, I feel I would be disloyal to our country-
men if I did not do my utmost to protect you.’
Yang Hu-Cheng said: ‘At first our idea was not like this.
Later on it all went in a very bad way. Indeed, we are
very sorry. Now we will obey whatever orders you care
to give.’ But when Chiang Kai-Shek asked him how it did
happen. Yang Hu-Cheng only replied that it was very
simple at first and would not give a clear answer. When
he was told to send the Generalissimo back to Nanking,
Yang Hu-Cheng said that he would retire to consult with
all the rest, and went away.
Though they realised that what they had done was a
mistake, they still wanted to ‘save face’ by getting Chiang
Kai-Shek to accept at least some of the proposals. The
Young Marshal later suggested that the last four points
could be ignored if the first four were agreed to. But
Chiang Kai-Shek maintained that he must be sent back to
Nanking first. In one of their arguments about these eight
points, Chiang Kai-Shek promised to put them before the
Government upon his return, but added that he himself
could not support such proposals. Chang Hsueh-Liang
was silent for a long while after he heard this and then
remarked:
‘You, the Generalissimo, certainly have a very high
328
character, but there is one defect, namely, that the
Generalissimo^s thinking is too old and too much inclined
to the right.’
‘What do you mean by the right? What do you mean
by old? And what do you mean by too much to the
right? ’
Chang Hsueh-Liang was vague and did not know what
to reply. Later he said:
‘The books you, the Generalissimo, read are mostly the
philosophic works of Han Fei-tze and Moti. Weren’t they
too old?’
‘I don’t know how many new books you have read,’
Chiang Kai-Shek replied, ‘nor what you consider as new
books. If you consider Karl Marx’s Das Kapitai or books
on Communism as new, then you may question me about
them as you choose and I’ll discuss them with you in detail.
You must know that one’s spirit is not new or old accord-
ing to the books one reads. Don’t you know what you
consider as new books I had already read many times some
fifteen years ago? ’
Whilst negotiations were at a deadlock and fighting
between the forces under Chang Hsueh-Liang and Yang
Hu-Cheng and those of the Central Government were
starting, it was agreed that one of the captured generals
should be allowed to fly to Nanking with a letter from
Chiang Kai-Shek ordering a truce of three days during
which they hoped to free Chiang Kai-Shek. At the end
of this period T. V. Soong came to Sian. As he had been
on very familiar terms with the Young Marshal, the situa*
tion improved. Through him it was arranged for his sister,
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, to come as she also knew the
Young Marshal quite well. She was as clever as she was
brave and put everybody at ease by greeting her husband’s
captor, who ‘looked very tired, very embarrassed and
somewhat ashamed’, as if nothing whatever had happened.
About her meeting with Yang Hu-Cheng she said: ‘I shook
329
hands with him as though I were just arriving on a casual
visit. Yang was obviously very nervous and just as
obviously very relieved at my calm attitude.’
Of the part Madame Chiang Kai-Shek played in getting
her husband back to Nanking there is no record. In her
own story of this incident, Sim: a Cotip (TEtat^ she was
very modest about herself. It merely implied that she flew
to join her husband in his distress: to give him moral sup-
port and to see to his personal comfort. But there is much
more behind this. Neither the Central Government nor
Chiang Kai-Shek would consent to bargain with the
captors and the captors dared not let him go without
some kind of safeguard for their own skin. Madame
Chiang Kai-Shek is a person upon whom both sides could
depend. Before she went to Sian, her husband had spent
ten days in captivity without hope of getting away : three
days after her arrival they flew back with colours flying.
No explanation is needed.
On December 22nd, Chiang Kai-Shek happened to read
the 3 1 St chapters of Jeremiah, when he was as usual study-
ing his Bible. The Chinese version reads as follows:
‘Jehovah will now do a new thing, He will make a woman
protect a man.’ In the afternoon Madame Chiang Kai-
Shek arrived. She had several conferences with the Young
Marshal, who tried to justify his actions by saying: ‘But
this would never have happened at all had you been here,
Madame. We did wrong in seizing the Generalissimo, but
we tried to do something which we thought was for the
good of the country.’ She also talked to other people,
particularly to ‘one man’ who was said to have influence
with the rest. She spent two hours talking with him, but
much of the time he did the talking. ‘He seemed to find
great relief in letting off steam.’ After they had finished
talking, he asked to see her again the next day. On
December 25th, the Young Alarshal personally escorted
the Chiangs out of Sian. They stayed the night in Loyang
330
and reached Nanking the following day, when fire-
crackers were let off all over the country to celebrate the
unexpected happy ending.
Chang Hsueh-Liang, the Young Marshal, did not shrink
from bearing the entire responsibility for the coup
dJetat. He faced the court-martial unflinchingly and was
sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and deprivation of
civil rights for five years. Chiang Kai-Shek, in his capacity
as Generalissimo, recommended clemency on the ground
of the prisoner’s prompt repentance and the part he played
in avoiding a civil war. Later on the sentence was
rescinded by two special Mandates, and he has since lived
quietly.
But Yang Hu-Cheng was still in Sian with his own men
and Chang Hsueh-Liang’s Manchurian Army. Chiang
Kai-Shek had to appeal to him again for a peaceful settle-
ment and at last he consented to resign his post and went
abroad. He was in England in 1937 also visited Spain
and other places on the Continent. It would be interesting
to conclude this episode with his comic adventures among
the leftist associations in Europe. He was a soldier risen
from the ranks and his well-wishers in England at once
realised that his speeches could not be honestly interpreted
into English for his educated admirers. He was told to say
whatever he liked, and a certain Chinese from Java by the
name of Liem, who could neither write nor speak his
mother-tongue but spoke English with a strong Javanese
accent which could be satisfactorily passed as a Chinese
accent, was given a series of English texts carefully pre-
pared by his left-wing friends. Mr Liem, who looked a
hundred per cent Chinese and certainly spoke with a rich
oriental accent, recited passages from his manuscript,
between Yang Hu-Cheng’s pauses during his most impres-
sive harangues. Everybody was happy and nobody the
wiser: his lecture tour was a great success.
On December 29th, 1936, Chiang Kai-Shek petitioned
the Government to relieve him from all his duties. He
wanted to take at least a portion of the responsibility for
the Sian revolt upon his own shoulders. He said: ‘I
sincerely hope that the Central Executive Committee will
censure me for my negligence of duty.’ He concluded:
‘I further request the Central Executive Committee
immediately to appoint some other competent man to
take over my duties, so that I may retire from active
service and await disciplinary punishment. In that case
the discipline of the State will be upheld and my con-
science may be set at ease.’
His resignation was unanimously rejected, but he pre-
sented it a second time and was met with the same answer.
At last he was granted a month’s sick-leave, as he had to
see doctors about the wounds he had received in his falls
on the day of the coup. On January 2nd, 1937, he left
Nanking for his native district, where he stayed for some
time until later he had to go to Hangchow and Shanghai
to be X-rayed and to consult a bone specialist. But in the
middle of February he flew to Nanking to reaffirm his
resignation to the combined meeting of the Central Execu-
tive and Supervisory Committees, when again it was re-
jected. Later on he was granted a further leave of two
months.
The coup cfetat in Sian, though during it he suffered
for fourteen days under custody, greatly enhanced his
prestige. The whole countiy seemed to show great con-
cern for his safety. His admirers now held him dearer than
before and even many of his political enemies changed
sides and joined him. They had learned, as the Young
Marshal had, through reading his diary, that he was the
greatest patriot of them all. Those who accused him of
being a traitor ready to co-operate with Japan found they
had been wrong. Those who remained his enemies after
this incident were mostly ‘die-hard Communists’, for
332
‘liberal Communists’ were quite ready to support his
leadership to build up national strength for the inevitable
Sino-Japanese war.
It should have been mentioned slightly earlier that in
the last days of November, 1936, just before Chiang Kai-
Shek was captured in Sian, news was published that Japan
had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Gemiany
and that the relations between Japan and Italy were also
extremely intimate, leading eventually to their mutual
recognition of each other’s conquests: Abyssinia and
Manchuria. For years Japan had been urging Chiang Kai
Shek to give her special rights to assist China in the sup-
pression of the Communists in Chinese territory, and
Chiang Kai-Shek had vigorously rejected such a request.
The Anti-Comintern Pact was announced at a time
when Chiang Kai-Shek was hoping to finish the Chinese
Communists in the very near future, and naturally his
political enemies made haste to spread the rumour that
Chiang Kai-Shek was contemplating joining the anti-Red
block. Chiang Kai-Shek promptly announced that the
suppression of the remnant of the Communists in the
North-West was exclusively China’s domestic affair and
would never be affected, or its process hampered, by out-
side influence or international politics.
In February, 1937, a telegram was sent to Nanking
from the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party pledging:
1. That the Communist Party will discontinue its efforts
to overthrow the Central Government by force;
2. that the Soviet Government in China will be
abolished and a special Area Government be
established by themselves;
3. that the Red Army be organised into the National
Revolutionary Army and be under the direct
333
control of the Military Council of the Central
Government;
4. that they will carry out Sun Yat-Sen’s Three
Principles of the People throughout this Special
Area; and
5. that they will give up their policy of confiscation of
people’s land.
In return, they asked the Central Executive Committee
of the Kuo Min Tang:
1. to stop all civil wars;
2. to guarantee freedom of speech;
3. to release all political offenders;
4. to convene a national salvation conference to be
participated in by every party, faction and
military clique;
5. to complete at once all preparations to defeat Japan;
and
6. to improve the living conditions of the people.
The Kuo Min Tang considered these proposals too
vague to be worked out and many of the demands had to
be dropped. It will be noticed that the Communists did
not ask for the reorganisation of the Government as did
the Young Marshal. Chiang Kai-Shek, though he was still
on sick-leave at the time, studied these points carefully
with his colleagues and finally came to the conclusion that
the time was not yet ripe to accept the proposals of the
Chinese Communists. But fighting between the Central
Government forces and the Communists ceased. Seeing
China was going to be unified, Japan decided not to wait
any longer. Just over a month after Chiang Kai-Shek’s
announcement of his resumption of office, which took
place on May 27th in Kuling on the Lu Mountain, Japan
started the Marco Polo Bridge incident and occupied
Peiping. A few months later the Chinese Communists,
finding that they were losing the sympathy of the people,
334
WITH PRESIDENT LIN SEN AND GENERAL CHANG CHIH-CIIUNG
AT YOUTH CORPS LEADERS’ CONFERENCE, MAY 1 943
issued a manifesto to announce ( i ) their giving up of their
former policy of Communistic Revolution by force, and
(2) their co-operation with the Central Government to
defend their native land against invaders. That brought
Chiang Kai-Shek’s anti-Communist Campaign to a tem-
porary stop. The Red Army, which used to fight against
him, henceforth fought under him for several years.
At the end of May, 1937, when Chiang Kai-Shek
arrived at Kuling and announced his resumption of
office, he immediately established various training corps,
especially for those who could only attend them during
the long summer holidays. He also invited all the known
leaders of the intellectual circles from every part of the
country to hold a conference in this beautiful summer
resort in Kiangsi, where he discussed with them important
questions of State. He knew that the war was quite near
at hand and that the country was not yet prepared for it:
the Sian coup (Tetat had hindered his work of preparation
for at least several months if not much more.
The Marco Polo Bridge incident was followed by a
large-scale unprovoked attack on Shanghai on August 13th.
Having returned to Nanking, Chiang Kai-Shek told his
officers and men to hold fast the following five points:
1. to determine to sacrifice to the end;
2. to believe firmly that victory would be ours in the
long run;
3. to fight with wisdom and initiative;
4. to co-operate with the people; and
5. to maintain their ground, to advance and never
retreat.
His own determination to fight to the end was clearly
indicated in the interview he granted to a German corre-
spondent in Nanking. He said:
‘As long as Japanese military invasion within Chinese
territory goes on, the Chinese defensive war will never
335 “
stop. Until the day when Japan gives up her aggressive
policy China will fight steadily even if there is only one
bullet in one rifle left.'
In spite of his open declaration to fight the Japanese to
the end as long as the Japanese invasion went on, his
political enemies constantly spread the rumour that Chiang
Kai-Shek had secretly negotiated for capitulation. This
attack was not fair. He had said at the very beginning
of hostilities: ‘We hope for peace, but we do not seek an
easy path to peace. We prepare for war, but we do not
want war . . . once the battle is joined, there can be no
distinction between north and south, or between old and
young.’ His actions had borne out these words.
Mr Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador to Japan
from 1932 to 1941, had written about Chiang Kai-Shek’s
peace efforts in his published memoirs and he spoke very
highly of Chiang Kai-Shek: ‘A brave and far-sighted man,
is still the legitimate head of the Chinese Government, is
still fighting the ruthless aggression against his country.’
Chiang Kai-Shek would certainly have liked to postpone
the outbreak of war as long as possible, and also would
certainly have preferred peace if it was honourable for
China to accept. But to fight he was determined, and so
he did under most unfavourable conditions for nine long
and hard years when Japan had set her mind on war, as
subsequent events have shown to the world.
In common with all the powers, Japan enjoyed the
rights to station her Army and sail her warships in Chinese
territory according to the treaties imposed upon China
during the previous few decades. With a good Army, a
formidable Navy and a brand-new Air Force, she chose
to make hay while the sun shone. On the other hand,
Chiang Kai-Shek had never had a year of peace since he
came into power in 1927. Besides the many ambitious
generals who wanted to force him away, the Communists
had been waging war upon him for ten years. His anti-
336
Communist Campaign had been a costly one and every-
one was overjoyed to hear that the Chinese Communists
had at last decided to co-operate with the Government.
But in August the whole country was overwhelmed to
hear that a non-aggressive pact had been secretly
negotiated and successfully concluded between China
and Russia.
The first year of war was a most difficult one. It was
barely eight months since that a small number of aircraft
had been added to the infant Air Force on the pretext of
celebrating Chiang Kai-Shek’s fiftieth birthday. As was
revealed later, China had only a few hundred aircraft,
including training machines, against Japan’s several thou-
sand first-line fighters and bombers. China had no bombers
at all, and had to improvise the fighters with whatever
bombing devices they could take. As for a Navy, China
was very badly off in this respect, whilst Japan was one of
the three biggest naval powers in the world. This left the
Chinese Army, of which Chiang Kai-Shek was the head—
for he was primarily an army man— to resist practically
single-handed a combined force of three services which
were much superior to those of the defenders.
It was a most trying time for Chiang Kai-Shek when
Shanghai had to be evacuated after three months’ hard
fighting. In another month, Nanking, the capital, fell.
Luckily he had prepared for that. During his air tour of
the South-West a few years previously he had located
Chungking, a port with rocky mountains behind it on the
Yangtze River in the Province of Szechuan, and now the
capital was moved there. The place was comparatively
safe for the Government to continue to conduct the
war, but he himself stayed in Wuhan to be nearer to
the areas of actual fighting, so as to direct military
operations.
In Wuhan an emergency National Congress of the Kuo
337
Min Tang was held in March, 1938, and ten days later
Chiang Kai-Shek was elected by a large majority the
Director-General of the Party, a post somewhat similar
to that held by Sun Yat-Sen, the founder, who had
exercised supreme power over his followers. Now there
had formerly been three most important leaders in the
Party: Hu Han-Min, the right-wing supporter, Wang
Ching-Wei, the left-wing supporter, and Chiang Kai-
Shek, who once said of himself that he was always ready
to support the side which deserved support and prosecute
the side which had become overbearing. These three had
been at the top of the list of the Kuo Min Tang since the
death of Sun Yat-Sen. Hu Han-Min died in the South
shortly after he left Nanking. There now remained only
Wang Ching-Wei, who thought he had been out-
manoeuvred by Chiang Kai-Shek.
Though Wang Ching-Wei had been welcomed back to
join the Government soon after the Japanese invasion of
Manchuria, and though he had been entrusted with the
important office of President of the Executive Yuan, he
left it after a brief period and became as carefree, if not
irresponsible, as he always had been. He was an excellent
critic but not very good in other respects. But he, no
doubt, had quite a different opinion of himself. Being one
of the oldest followers of the late founder of the Kuo Min
Tang, and having seen the rise of Chiang Kai-Shek into
power so rapidly, he naturally nursed very strong jealousy
over this in secret.
But there were many things he did not take into
account. First, he had rebelled against the Central
Government several times, joining with almost anyone
who was dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-Shek. Whilst Chiang
Kai-Shek had done everything he could to hold the
country together, sacrificing his personal friends and
reputation, Wang Ching-Wei had always chosen the
easier and more high-sounding ways for the sake of
338
publicity. After the outbreak of war, when the people
began to realise what Chiang Kai-Shek had been planning
in secret and what wrongs he had suffered without grumb*
ling, his prestige soared much higher than before. Not
only members of the Kuo Min Tang but almost the whole
population of China, except those who had special back-
grounds, considered Chiang Kai-Shek the indisputable
leader of the nation. Wang Ching-Wei had scarcely any
place in the heart of the common people.
As the Director-General of the Party, Chiang Kai-Shek
initiated in June, 1938, the organisation of San Min Chu I
Youth Group, ‘San Min Chu V meaning the Three
Principles of the People originated by Sun Yat-Sen. This
is an organisation founded on the amalgamated principles
of the New Life Movement, the Society of Moral
Endeavour, and the Young Men’s Christian Association,
together with the Kuo Min Tang as an overall boundary.
It can be easily imagined that VVang Ching-Wei and his
personal followers considered this as a move to establish
a smaller party within the Party and that such a move
would make him and his supporters lose their importance
in the Party.
But Chiang Kai-Shek was not trying to build up his
personal power. On the contrary, with the whole country
facing a formidable foe he wanted to get together every
ounce of the nation’s strength to fight and save China. The
Chinese Communists, who had done their utmost against
him, he readily welcomed to Wuhan to participate in the
People’s Political Council which he had convened in July,
on the first anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China
Proper. Not only were the Communists’ representatives
given seats in this war-time Parliament, but people of
every political tendency and leaders of every society and
all walks of life. This was the first time in the history of
the Kuo Min Tang that it had such a gathering of people
with different or even opposite political beliefs express-
339
ing their opinions openly. In countries where one party
rules this is something unheard of.
Towards the end of October the situation became much
worse. Canton, the important city in the South, and
Wuhan which had been used as the centre of resistance,
fell into enemy hands one after the other. Chiang Kai-
Shek was one of the last to leave the burning city of
Wuhan, which had been ordered to be destroyed so that
the Japanese could not make use of it. The city was a
tragic sight to see from the air as it was burning, and
Chiang Kai-Shek declared upon the fall of Wuhan that
the war was to go on and that he was more confident than
before that Japan would be defeated in the end. But
whilst he was doing his utmost to stiffen the people for the
difficult time ahead, Wang Ching-Wei was losing heart.
In December he secretly left Chungking, the war-time
capital which Chiang Kai-Shek had chosen and where he
stayed until final victory came.
The early part of 1939 revealed Wang Ching-Wei’s
treacherous intentions. He went to live, not in Chinese
territory, but in the Honoi, Annam, where he could get
in touch with the enemy without being stoned by his
countrymen. When his dealings with Japan became
known, he was expelled from the Kuo Min Tang. He
soon cast off his mask of virtue and went over to Japan,
to be their puppet. This was at approximately the same
time as the Japanese invaded and occupied Hainan, the big
island on the south tip of China. Whilst Wang Ching-
Wei believed Japan could be appeased, Chiang Kai-Shek
at once saw the real ambition of the enemy. He pointed
out to England and America that this step by Japan meant
a prelude to a full-scale invasion of the whole of the
Pacific: the aggressor’s ambition always grew greater after
appeasement.
But in 1939 Europe was soon to be a battlefield, and the
340
preoccupied England and America refused to be fore-
warned. It is ironical to observe that, though the people
in England had sympathy with China, it was a famous
British statesman who helped Japan to defend her cause
in Geneva, and the British Government dared not help
China in the least for fear of annoying Japan, who was
still England’s ally. In America public opinion was almost
entirely on the side of China, but even then Jaoan was
depending upon that country for petrol and other vital
war materials. Up to the very time of the attack on Pearl
Harbour some American merchants had been continuously
supplying Japan with scrap-iron and other things which
would obviously be used to make war on America.
It must also be mentioned here that though the Anti-
Comintern Pact had been signed by the Axis and Japan
and that the relations betw^een those three countries were
intimate, Chiang Kai-Shek never allowed his sentiment to
blind his reason. In fighting against Japan he would not
refuse the help offered to him by Japan’s allies. Italy had
supplied him with aircraft and materials, and Germany
gave him a number of military and technical advisers. He
used them to their full advantage, just as he did the things
he got from Russia after the non-aggression pact and later
the barter agreement. It was only after the opening of
hostilities in Europe that these people began to be
repatriated.
In 1939, hard pressed though China was, Chiang Kai-
Shek considered it important not to let the enemy rest.
He marshalled his forces and launched four quite large-
scale general counter-offensives. They were costly but
they did much good. The first offensive took place in
April, the second in July, and the third in September,
while the last one took place in the Winter. As the enemy
could not make much progress on the ground, he started
from the month of May to intensify his bombing of
Chungking. When the Japanese aircraft came to the war-
341
time capital day after day and night after night to pour
down explosives, people who had to take shelter in the
huge caves of the rocky mountains outside the city began
to see Chiang Kai-Shek’s foresight in selecting this place
to house the Government. When he came to see what
destruction the enemy had done after the raid, people in-
variably cheered him in spite of the heavy losses they had
sustained.
It was also in 1939 that he first organised the Central
Training Corps in the suburban district of Chungking. All
the Government officials and teachers were given a short
course of military and political training. The training
went on for years until all the officials and teachers in the
whole country had attended.
The year 1 940 was a year of set-backs and grave news,
except for a successful counter-attack in February. In
March news came to Free China that Wang Ching-Wei,
formerly the ardent follower of Sun Yat-Sen and pro-
minent leader of the Kuo Min Tang, had been installed
by the Japanese as the puppet head of a bogus state with
its capital in Nanking. Those who had supported him and
joined him in his repeated attacks on Chiang Kai-Shek
now learned their lesson. Chiang Kai-Shek became the
sole representative of the indomitable spirit of the Chinese
people.
In June, Japan advanced as far as I-Chang, and here
Chiang Kai-Shek made his last firm stand. From hence-
forth he made continuous attacks on this very long
Japanese supply line so that no further progress could
be made by the enemy on this route. Whilst China was
having a very difficult time, the democracies in Europe
were also in dire distress. Holland and Belgium had been
invaded, and France capitulated soon after Italy entered
the war on the side of Germany. England, after Dunkirk,
was in daily danger of being invaded. At that time
342
Germany, Italy and Japan were feared by everybody. In
an effort to appease Japan, England agreed to close the
Burma Road, which was China’s life-line, and this made it
even harder for Chiang Kai-Shek to carry on his fight. It
looked as if there were no justice in the world; those who
were powerful could dictate and those who were weak
had to obey. Fortunately, the mistake was soon
corrected. After three months England reopened the
Burma Road.
The following year, 1941, brought more grim news.
The Chinese Communists, who had promised to fight
under the Central Government, had begun to act inde-
pendently. Chiang Kai-Shek disanned and disbanded the
New Fourth Army, a part of the Communist troops. That
was the beginning of a rift between the Chinese Govern-
ment and the Communists. In the second war-time Parlia-
ment, the Second People’s Political Council, all the Com-
munists refused to join. After that, in spite of everybody’s
urging and pleading, the internal strife in China became
worse as the days went by.
But Chiang Kai-Shek’s stern action in dealing with
Chinese Communists did not in the least influence his
diplomatic policy. In the same year the Sino-Russian
Barter Agreement was concluded, by which China was to
supply Russia with tea and other products in exchange
for her war materials. But in July Germany betrayed the
non-aggression pact she had recently signed with Russia
and invaded Soviet occupied territory. This naturally
made Russia keep for herself some of the supplies which
would otherwise have been sent to China. Nevertheless
this unexpected German attack did a great service to
the Allies: it bound Russia together with England and
America. And when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and
Hongkong in December of the same year, and Hitler and
Mussolini declared war on America, Chiang Kai-Shek
immediately declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan,
343
m'
thus creating the ‘A.B.C.’ block: America, Britain and
China.
Just before Japan’s treacherous attack on Pearl Harbour,
America seemed to be very anxious to appease Japan,
whilst China was struggling desperately against Japan’s
onslaught, and it was not very heartening to the defender
to hear that special conversations were going on in Wash-
ington between Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador,
and the American authorities. Later a special Japanese
envoy, Kuroso, was welcomed in America to help the
admiral. Japan announced in her papers that suggestions
for the stoppage of all military and economic aid to
Chungking, leaving China alone to deal with Japan, were
to be discussed. Chiang Kai-Shek bore these things with
the same fortitude as he had done the closing of the Burma
Road. However, he was deservedly rewarded in the
following year by the joint British and American
announcement that the special rights and privileges Britain
and America had enjoyed in China under the ‘unequal’
treaties would be relinquished. New and fair treaties on
an equal footing were negotiated in 1942 and signed in
the first days of 1943. Following the signature of these
new treaties, Chiang Kai-Shek told the people in a broad-
cast that the injustice which had been done to China for
the past hundred years was now wiped away and that
such a magnificent act on the part of the American and
British Governments reflected the greatest honour and
credit on the people of their nations. He further reminded
his own people that with the new treaties came new
responsibilities. The official English version of this
important speech is included in this book as Appendix III.
To go back to the Spring of 1942, now that the Burma
Road had been reopened and that England had become our
ally, Chiang Kai-Shek paid a visit to India, at that time
the most important link between China and the outside
world. Much good was done by that trip and he was
enthusiastically received by the Indian people. At that
particular moment the Indian leaders were not co-operat-
ing with the British authorities, and Chiang Kai-Shek, who
had great love and respect for a people who were fighting
for their independence, handled the delicate situation with
admirable tact. He left India beloved and respected by
all.
Since China, Britain and America were fighting against
a common foe in Asia, Chiang Kai-Shek sent out some of
his best troops to Burma to form the Chinese Expedi-
tionary Force, and to facilitate co-operation he had
Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell, who had had long
experience in China, appointed Commander of the Force.
This, unfortunately, led to very unpleasant happenings
two years later. Japan, after taking Singapore, Java and
Corregidor, invaded and occupied Burma. Though Stil-
well, as Commander of the Chinese forces in Burma, could
not be blamed for withdrawing into India, many Chinese
strategists found it difficult not to criticise the American
general who lost his battle so rapidly and ran away so
swiftly. This was one of the causes for the recall of Stil-
well requested by Chiang Kai-Shek. The other important
cause was the differences these two men had regarding
Chinese Communists.
The co-operation between the Kuo Min Tang and the
Chinese Communist Party since 1937 had been an emer-
gency measure. The feelings beuveen these two political
parties, who had been killing each other whenever they
had a chance, were comparable to those between the Arabs
and Jews in Palestine, or to those between the Moslems
and Hindus in India. That they had, are having, and will
continue to have, great suspicion of each other is beyond
the least doubt. The Kuo Min Tang, being in power,
could not tolerate an opposition party with an independent
army and a practically autonomous government in Yenan.
345
At the beginning of the war in China the Communists
were hard pressed, and had to compromise— of course,
temporarily. As the years went by, their military and
economic strength having increased, they naturally
wanted to extend their power. On the other hand, the
Central Government had suffered severe set-backs on
account of the war, and if they did not make a determined
stand against the expansion of the Communists it was pos-
sible that one day they would find their relative positions
exchanged.
A civil war, however, would not have been popular, and
the Kuo Min Tang had to be as tolerant as they could but
always to be cautious in not giving away too much ground
and so endangering their own position. This being the
situation, the Communists could not help realising that if
they had less military strength their position would be
worse. They were not without political ambition and they
had to make the most of their advantages. They went on
recruiting while the war lasted and no one dared to blame
them for that. After the disarming and disbanding of their
New Fourth Army they had to take every precaution to
protect themselves against the forces of the Government.
Thus the two sijjes drifted further and further apart.
By the year 1943, the troops of the Chinese Communist
Party and those of the Government were, so to speak, not
on speaking terms. Guarding themselves against a possible
siege, the Communists had been consolidating their stations
in the North and had created a no-man’s-land between
themselves and the Government area. The Government,
on the other hand, had fortified a frontier against the Com-
munists, and some of their best troops were thus used. And
the situation between the Communists and the Govern-
ment continued to worsen.
In the meantime Chiang Kai-Shek’s star rose high. He
published his Chinds Destiny in which he reviewed the
recent past and discussed the immediate future of China.
346
It was hailed as the most important book written during
the war and statesmen in every country were most anxious
to read what he had to say. The book was commented
upon in numerous papers and periodicals all over the
world. Next he was installed as Chairman of the State
Council, which is equivalent to the Presidency of China,
on the loth of October, because the former President, Lin
Sen, had died a few months previously. The official
English translation of the speech he made on his assump-
tion of office is included in this book as Appendix IV. In
it he expresses very strongly his democratic views. It is
true that he had held this office once before— from 1928 to
1931— but this time there had been practically no dissent
when he was nominated and elected. And to crown all, as
head of the state he went to Egypt to attend the Cairo
Conference, meeting there for the first time Churchill and
Roosevelt, and was hailed all over the world as one of the
greatest sta'^esmen of his age.
To live up to his splendid reputation, Chiane^ Kai-Shek
did everything possible to appease the Communists. The
Hsin Hua Daily News^ a Communist paper, had quite a
free hand in its publication in Chungking, though not a
single leaflet edited by the Kuo Min Tang was allowed
to circulate in the Red capital of Ycnan. Moreover,
representatives of the Chinese Communists had their
offices in Chungking and enjoyed the same freedom as
did other citizens of Free China, but the Kuo Min Tang
people could not expect such treatment in the Communist
area. The last party which went to visit Yenan was a small
group of liberal-minded journalists and correspondents of
independent newspapers, and they made their trip in 1944.
This party was as heavily ‘conducted’ as would be an
organised tour into any country behind ‘the iron
curtain’.
In spite of all this, criticism of the Government and Kuo
Min Tang spread, and eventually also of Chiang Kai-Shek
347
himself, who, it is interesting to note, was not touched in
the early years of the war. The right-wing members of
the Kuo Min Tang, who never had liked the Communists,
urged the application of strong measures towards them
once more; but Chiang Kai-Shek wanted to preserve a
united nation even at a very high cost, and continued to
tolerate the Communists for several years. The effort was
in vain: civil war was in the making, and when it broke
out, Chiang Kai-Shek once again became the blackest
figure in all the Communist publications. It is not possible
that the same man could be a butcher from 1927 to 1938,
a saint from 1938 to 1945, and turn back into a murderer
after 1945: it is obvious that the policy of the party took a
new turn at each of these specific times.
The Cairo Conference, which took place during the last
week of November, 1943, was ‘Chiang Kai-Shek’s Confer-
ence’, as Roosevelt so aptly put it. On December 2nd it
was officially announced in the three capitals that Mr
Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Chiang Kai-
Shek had held a five-day conference in North Africa.
Agreement had been reached regarding further military
operations against Japan. A declaration was made that
Manchuria, the Island of Formosa and the Pescadores
Islands would be restored to China; that Korea would be
made an independent state; and that Japan would be
stripped of all the territories she had seized and occupied
by force since 1914.
China being the senior member of the three countries
who were resisting Japanese aggression, it was Chiang
Kai-Shek’s responsibility to propose what territorial and
other charges they should impose on the guilty nation.
This was an extremely successful and smooth meeting,
because Chiang Kai-Shek was a far-sighted statesman who
did not seek for territorial gains on account of losses sus-
tained during the war. Churchill and Roosevelt realised
348
that if all the other conferences could be like this, political
and diplomatic life would be much happier.
Regarding the treatment of Japan after the war, Chiang
Kai-Shek said to Roosevelt that, so long as the Japanese
military caste could be prevented from coming into power
again, it would be better to allow the common people in
Japan to have a free hand in deciding what kind of govern-
ment they should have. This statement met with complete
agreement.
Chiang Kai-Shek knew it was a foregone conclusion that
Japan would be defeated if the resources of the three great
countries were put together to pursue the war against her.
The tide of war had just begun to turn in favour of the
Allies. In Europe, Italy had surrendered and Germany
was on the defensive. In Asia, if the combined forces of
the three countries could be effectively co-ordinated and
offensive bases steadily built up, our victory would be but
a matter of time. But first he must put his house in order.
He had tried hard to accommodate the Chinese Com-
munists, but had tried in vain. The most serious criticism
his Communist and left-wing opponents had against him
was the one-party rule or tutelage of the Kuo Min Tang
of China. The urgent need, therefore, was the Constitu-
tion, without which the country could hardly be regarded
as a democratic one.
The year 1 944 was marked by little improvement in the
relations between the Chinese Government and the Com-
munists. Chiang Kai-Shek announced that the Kuo Min
Tang was preparing to ‘Huan Cheng Yu Min’, or to
‘return the Government to the people’. The draft Consti-
tution was discussed and its early adoption was indicated.
In the meantime, the Communist Army in the North be-
came more and more alienated, and as by now only a
very small amount of American supplies were given to
China, the Red Army cried aloud demanding a bigger
share. General Stilwell, who had not been very popular
349
among the Chinese Government troops, thought that the
Communists ought to receive much more than was given
to them. He was an outspoken man and expressed his
opinion freely, to the effect that a radical change in the
Chinese Government was urgently needed. Fie went so
far as to suggest that all the Chinese troops should be re-
organised and that Communist and Government troops
should receive American supplies equally; and moreover,
that all of them should be put under the supreme control
of an American Commander-in-Chief.
Though this was pressed by an American Mission sent
to China to advise on China’s military measures, it was an
open secret who was the true author of the demand. More-
over, it was inevitable that the over-all American Com-
mander-in-Chief would be none other than Stilwell
himself. Neither Chiang Kai-Shek, as head of the State
and Generalissimo, nor the Chinese Army could tolerate
this. General Stilwell’s unpopularity among the Chinese
Army was difficult to understand by Americans and
Europeans. From the Chinese point of view he had had a
very unlucky start. FIc was given command of the Chinese
Forces in Burma towards the end of March, 1942, and
early in May the British forces, quite unprepared, with-
drew safely into India. Stilwell joined them, whilst the
Chinese troops were fighting as rearguards. Later it was
widely circulated in Chinese Army circles that Stilwell had
wired to Chungking to ask where the Chinese troops were
—the troops of which he was in command!
Another story equally widely circulated was that at the
very beginning, when Stilwell was given one of the best
buildings in Chungking for his office, he had exclaimed
that it was unfit for him, and that aircraft loads of timber,
for parquet flooring, and Indian carpets, had arrived over
the Himalayas to furnish his headquarters. These stories
went deep into the minds of many, and no doubt they
eventually created a lot of mischief. Now, with his
350
staunch support of the Communist forces, which had been
hostile to the Government for some time, and his bid to
become over-all commander, Chiang Kai-Shek found it
impossibe to retain his services. In October, 1944, Roose-
velt announced General Stilwell’s recall and said that it
had resulted from differences in the personalities of
General Stilwell and General Chiang Kai-Shek. He added
that they had had differences of opinion ‘quite a while
ago’. Subsequently General Chiang Kai-Shek had asked
that General Stilwell be displaced. Of course, Roosevelt
did not like it. He said the reason for the recall was ‘just
one of those things’. Sometimes you hated someone, he
added, and just could not help it. It was a thunderbolt
from the blue.
Chiang Kai-Shek had been one of the most popular
figures in the American Press. After that day his fall was
sharp and rapid. Public opinion easily went to the other
extreme. People began to conclude that Stilwell was the
symbol of virtue and efficiency, and that Chiang Kai-Shek
was an accumulation of reaction and corruption, and that
they hated each other like poison from the very day they
met. This is far from being the case. In point of fact,
though they both had fiery tempers they had been on good
terms for a quite a while. That was why Stilwell was first
appointed Chiang Kai-Shek’s Chief-of-Staff. But people
forget this.
Besides the Communist issue and the adverse opinion the
Chinese Army had of Stilwell, a third cause was advanced
by a British war chronicler, Mr Peter Graves. Pie said
that the real reason for Stilwell’s dispute with Chiang Kai-
Shek, apart from a profound incompatibility of temper,
was his insistence that some of the best trained and best
equipped Chinese divisions should be transferred to the
Yunan-Burma front, whereas the Generalissimo wished to
employ them in the defence of the airfields in Southern
3H
China and also of the Chinese section of the Burma Road.
He regarded the Communist question as a side-issue.
But in 1 944, for anyone to dare to say anything against
the Communists would have been unpardonable. Chiang
Kai-Shek’s quarrel with Stilwell was singled out for pub-
licity because the Communist issue would arrest general
attention. In China the attitude of the Communists
stiffened and co-operation between the two political
parties became impossible. Chiang Kai-Shek’s position
became more difficult when the Japanese offensive made
rapid gains from Hunan towards the West. For a time
Chungking seemed to be unsafe and the South-West was
partially overrun by the enemy. Had Chiang Kai-Shek
transferred all his best troops to the Burma border, it
would have been impossible to stop the Japanese assault
and to save the critical situation. In the winter Chinese
counter-attacks were pressed home and the Japanese had
to retreat once again.
Chiang Kai-Shek and Roosevelt had to make up their
differences quickly. Major-General A. C. Wedemeyer,
Stilwell’s successor, and Major-General Patrick Hurley,
who succeeded Mr C. Gauss as Amerian Ambassador in
China, were cordially welcomed by Chiang Kai-Shek. Mr
Donald Nelson’s return to China was also requested by
Chiang Kai-Shek, and, accompanied by thirteen experts,
Mr Nelson was sent by the White House to China almost
immediately. As the grand strategy developed, counter
offensives.in all theatres of war against the aggressors were
successful. By the end of 1944, after such heart-breaking
set-backs, Chinese forces from both ends of the Burma
Road met at last, and it was soon re opened for
traffic.
On New Year’s Day, 1945, Chiang Kai-Shek announced
that the National Assembly would be convened and the
Constitution adopted, not at the end of the war, but as
soon as the military situation improved. But events raced
352
on, and victory in Europe was in sight less than a year after
the Allied landing in France. To the San Francisco Con*
ference Chiang Kai-Shek sent a national delegation com-
prising men from every party, some Communists, some
Young China Party members, some Democratic League
leaders, and some non-partisans. And immediately follow-
ing the San Francisco Conference, Chiang Kai-Shek sent
T. V. Soong, the Prime Minister, and Wang Shih-Chieh,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to conclude the new Sino-
Russian treaty which had been in negotiation for some
time.
The Sino-Russian Treaty was finally signed in August,
1945, almost at the same time as the Japanese surrender.
It is not the intention of the humble author to comment
on the advantages or disadvantages of this particular
treaty. It served for the time being as a solution of various
knotty problems between China and Russia regarding
Manchuria, Mongolia and the Chinese Communists.
With the surrender of the Germans in Europe, followed
by that of Japan in Asia immediately after the dropping
of the two atomic bombs, China hastened to rebuild her-
self. Chiang Kai-Shek invited Mao 'Fse-Tung from
Yenan, the Red capital, to Chungking so that they could
have a direct talk to bring the two parties together. For
several months past, because of the outbreak of severe
criticisms of the Kuo Min Tang all over the world, the
Chinese Communist Party had been hoping that a separate
and independent Soviet Government could be recognised
by some of the pro-Communist countries. It was also
hoped that America would arm the Chinese Communists.
But Major-General Hurley, the American Ambassador,
said when he visited Washington:
‘The Communists were simply an armed political party
and there was no possibility that America would arm them.
The Government’s view was that to furnish arms to any
political party would be tantamount to a recognition of
353
another belligerent, and the United States recognised and
supported the National Government of China.’
At that moment civil war in China was already brew-
ing. Any arms supplied to armed political parties would
be used to strengthen their power, and it was very fortu-
nate that though most of the Press had been in support
of arming the Communists in China, this had not been
done. This state of things led to the Kuo Min Tang-
Communist Conference in Chungking, which started at
the end of August, 1945, after Mao Tse-Tung’s arrival.
Chiang Kai-Shek was sincere in hoping for a reconcilia-
tion with the Communists. His reluctant agreement to the
Russian terms of the Sino-Russian treaty was the first
indication of this, and his efforts in getting Mao Tse-
Tung, who had abused him to an intolerable extent, to
have direct negotiations with him was another. For more
than a month, representatives of both parties discussed con-
ditions for co-operation, while in the meantime hostilities
between the armed forces of both sides started. By
October certain agreements had been reached to effect a
resumption of communication and a cease fire, but they
could not really be put into practice. By the end of
November, Hurley’s work of mediation had failed and he
was succeeded by General Marshall, who came to China
in December as a special envoy to try to bring the two
parties together. And later, Leighton Stuart, who had
been in China for a very long time, was appointed
Ambassador and did everything he could to promote
peace. Chiang Kai-Shek responded to their efforts warmly
and sincerely. In January, 1946, Chiang Kai-Shek called
a Political Consultation Conference, to which people of
every party were invited.
Unfortunately this Conference was a success only on
paper. Its thirty-eight members consisted of eight from
the Kuo Min Tang, seven from the Communist Party, five
from the Young China Party, two from the Democratic
354
League, five from various other parties and nine non-
partisans. The best work they did was the passing of
agreed resolutions on the following five questions:
1. The reorganisation of the Government,
2. the outline of political policy,
3. the question of Alilitary affairs,
4. the People’s Assembly, and
5. the Constitution.
Everything would have gone well if the differences
between the Kuo Alin Tang and the Communist Party
could have been solved. But this was never to be. To
expect the Kuo Alin Tang to give up its exalted position
is wishful thinking; and to induce the Communists
not to have recourse to their armed strength is day-
light dreaming. In April, 1946, the Communist repre-
sentative, Chou En-Lai, announced an ‘all-out’ state of
hostility in Alanchuria, where the Soviet troops were
asked to withdraw. But before the complete withdrawal
of Russian forces, the Chinese Communists marched for-
ward and announced their ‘capture’ of Chang-Chun, the
capital of Alanchuria.
This was the first serious blow to the peace talks.
Chiang Kai-Shek had to postpone the convening of the
National Asvsembly, which was to have been held on Alay
5th, because the Communists, feeling that they were doing
well in Alanchuria, became more difficult than before. In
Alay the Government officially moved back to the old
capital, Nanking, and peace talks were continued whilst
the Communists extended their territory in the North. It
was claimed by the Communists that they had control over
seventy per cent of Alanchuria, with local regimes estab-
lished in most districts.
General Alarshall did not despair. He found Chiang Kai-
Shek quite willing to compromise. He urged the Com-
munists to hand over Changchun to the Government and
then discuss terms. This, of course, the Communists refused
355
to do. By the end of May the Government troops re-took
Changchun and other important cities in Manchuria from
the Communists. Although negotiations for peace were still
going on in Nanking, and local truces had been agreed in
many places, it became plain that these negotiations were
useless as long as the two armed forces were facing each
other on the battlefield. But even after General Marshall
had left China to take up his new post in Washington in
January, 1947, Leighton Stuart, the American Ambassador,
still went on with the good work of mediation. It was of
no avail. Soon the Communist spokesman, Wang Ping-
Nan, officially announced Yenan’s decision to impose its
political demands on the Chinese Government by force of
arms and continued to harass communications. Chiang
Kai-Shek’s appeal to the whole nation for reconstruction,
which was such an urgent need for post-war China,
was shattered and in 1947, when he announced general
mobilisation to check the Communists, full-scale civil war
was officially started.
The National Assembly was convened in the last days
of 1946, and after a forty-one day open session presented
to the county a new permanent constitution which was
adopted and announced to be effective as from December
25th, 1947. But the Communists did not send their repre-
sentatives to this Assembly, though the seats allotted to
them were kept vacant in case they changed their minds
at the last minute. Communists seldom change their
minds. The Civil War went on. Yenan, the capital of
‘Red China’, was captured by Government troops in xMay,
1947, and this time there was no celebration, as had been
the case after the capture of Juikin in 1934. Chiang Kai-
Shek realised that this was no time for celebration.
The formation of China’s first ‘Multi-Party’ Govern-
ment in April, 1947, with Chiang Kai-Shek as President,
was far from a final settlement of China’s pohtical troubles.
356
The unco-operative Communist Party and Democratic
League did not join in and China's internal strife was
redoubled. Civil wars are never popular in China, any
more than any other country. The one who wins gains
nothing except administrative power: he suffers in every
other respect.
Political struggle in China is clearly reflected in inter-
national affairs. Immediately after the war the world
Powers began to be at variance with each other and two
opposing camps were formed. Peace-lovers all over the
world were alarmed and great efforts have been made in
trying to bring them together. Both sides professed they
did not want another war, but both sides were suspicious
and had to prepare in case the other side should strike first.
To-day Europe— and even the whole world— is virtually
divided into two groups and so far all efforts for their
reconciliation have not been successful. Whilst one side
considers the Marshall Plan to be nothing but humani-
tarian, it has been attacked by the other side as an instru-
ment of aggression.
Chiang Kai-Shek’s role in China has never varied ever
since the Chinese Communists became a potential political
power. The worst that can be said of him is that he could
not see eye to eye with the Communists. But then neither
could the Communists see eye to eye with him, or indeed
with anybody else. The world at large has misunderstood
him. For a time, before the Communists attacked him,
he could do no wrong: he was the hero of the age for a
few years. And then suddenly all kinds of unbelievable
lies were poured upon him. Everything that was not to
the liking of his critics was attributed to him and con-
demned as his crime. Any mistake committed by his subor-
dinates was listed against him. Although the head of the
State is responsible for the general conduct of his adminis-
tration, it is hardly fair to blame him for everything his
followers do. But in party politics, it is very convenient
357
for his enemies to take advantage of that in order merely
to discredit him.
No doubt the Kuo Min Tang has done wonderful things
for the Chinese people. But that does not rule out the fact
that many of its members, regarding themselves as of a
privileged class, have acted in a manner which brings no
credit to their party. Since the Revolutionary Army’s
North Punitive Expedition, when members of the Kuo
Min Tang and the Communist Party got in touch with
the common people, there has been a saying that the
Revolutionary soldiers are as admirable as the Revolu-
tionary partisans are abominable. Chiang Kai-Shek, who
was responsible for the first half of this sentence, will
also become responsible for the second half if he does not
give the Kuo Min Tang an overhaul now that he is the
Director-General of the Party. To meet the overwhelm-
ingly difficult conditions of post-war China he must be
open-minded and open-armed to welcome people of every
political belief and to co-operate with them in the adminis-
tration which the Kuo Min Tang has monopolised for so
long. As the head of a Constitutional Government he
must see to the prevention of the partisans being main-
tained as a privileged class. He is not unaware of the
hardships China is facing, nor of the criticisms that have
been levelled at him. In his Christmas broadcast of 1947
he said:
‘When we look at the present world situation through
the lens of the Christian faith, much which is confused and
obscure becomes clearer. We realise that even suffering
has its part in the slow process of national self-realisation.
In the midst of all the privations and discouragements
which China is suffering to-day, we are strengthened by
the knowedge that these trials, if manfully faced, will lead
to an ultimate self-renewal. Such faith will not fail to lead
us to our goal, be it world peace, national unity or the
welfare of our people.
'358
‘Certainly no one has ever known sorrow on this earth
as did He whose birth we honour at Christmas. His life
was an ordeal of persecution. He was despised and re-
jected of men. By any human everyday success-standard,
Jesus’ career on earth was a career of failure and un-
relieved disaster. And yet, how tremendous was His
ultimate success, how total His final triumph! VVe know
now that His strength was born of the purification which
He gained from His sacrifice and affliction.
‘In China, during the last few years we have known, to
the dregs of the bitter cup, the meaning of national sorrow.
We have suffered inestimable losses due to war and
internal rebellion. We have known misrepresentation and
cruel slander in its blackest form. Our motives have been
misinterpreted; our faults have been distorted beyond all
semblance of reality. It has not been a pleasing experi-
ence, but it does not daunt us. We know that these un-
happinesses are the price which must be paid for our ideal
of a democratic China.’
In his inaugural address when he was installed as Presi-
dent, he also expressed his democratic principles by quot-
ing Confucian maxims. He is a Confucian at heart and
knows the importance of the common people to the State.
But to change a system of one-party rule into a democracy,
drastic steps are required. Those who have been entrusted
with the government of the country must make great
sacrifices and tremendous efforts. Since the 1911 Revolu-
tion which overthrew the Monarchy, China has seen many
new rulers. Most of them have tried to do their best for
the country and invariably have failed. Chiang Kai-Shek
has held such a position longest of them all, and has cer-
tainly passed through the most difficult time of all. He
has had many and great achievements and naturally some
failures. He has received the greatest amount of adulation
and also suffered the bitterest and most numerous attacks.
There are still greater tasks ahead for him to do and they
359
will require greater efforts and sacrifice on his part.
To-day hundreds of millions of people in China are pin-
ning their only hope on him: he is the indisputable leader
of the entire nation. His name has already a prominent
place in History, but what future historians will say of
him will be the final verdict, which can only be reached
after he has completed his work on this earth.
THE END
360
APPENDIX I
THE NEW LIFE MOVEMENT
The struggle of Qiina to emerge from the Revolution which
in 19 1 1 began successfully by overthrowing the Manchu
Dynasty has been hampered by the unpreparedness of the
people for the responsibilities of public life, and by the age-
long influence of apparently sanctifled customs.
For hundreds of years the people of China were discouraged
from interesting themselves in the affairs of government and
were taught, even with the executioner’s sword, that the
administration of the country was the exclusive concern of the
official class.
The people consequently, through the centuries, gradually
ceased to have any interest in government and lapsed, as the
rulers desired, into complete disregard of national affairs, con-
fining themselves to seeking the welfare of the family and the
clan, and knowing nothing, and caring nothing, about the
responsibilities of citizenship, the requirements of patriotism,
or the urge of loyalty to the country or its flag.
In forced conditions such as these, the habits of the great
population of China developed along lines quite contrary to
those characterising the peoples of other countries, with the
result that when the political window opened they were, in
a sense, blinded by the light that suddenly and unexpectedly
poured in upon them. They found themselves without under-
standing of political life, bewildered owing to lack of universal
education, and hampered by age-long aloofness and habits that
are of little consequence to a small country which may be con-
fined and self-contained within its own boundaries, but which
have a tremendously suffocating effect upon a great country
flung, willy-nilly, into the wide-sweeping economic and political
currents of the world.
The march of events is inexorable and cannot wait for the
sluggards to catch up, and therefore it became incumbent upon
those who know the problem of China to take strong action to
break down the demoralising influence which centuries of sup-
pression of national sentiment and feelings have had.
361
A new national consciousness and mass psychology have to
be created and developed, and with that intention what is called
‘The New Life Movement’ has been launched.
Peoples of the outer world may not at first be able to under-
stand the necessity for such a movement, but they will do so if
they realise that they have grown up with national conscious-
ness fully developed around and about them, whereas the
Chinese people have been deliberately and forcibly bereft of it,
and, therefore, know nothing of those sentiments and impulses
that so quickly move the Occidental peoples when matters con-
cerning their country come forward for consideration or action.
It is to correct the evil consequences arising from this serious
state of affairs that action is now being taken along a psycho-
logical and educational line.
I. The Significance of the New Life Movement
To correct, or to revolutionise, an age-old habit is a difficult
thing, but by using the simplest and^ therefore, the most efficient
means it is hoped that, in time, the outlook of the people will be
entirely changed and they will be able with spirit and com-
petency to meet the requirements of the new time and the new
life. The aim of the New Life Movement is, therefore, the
social regeneration of China.
It is to this end that their thoughts are now being directed
to the ancient high virtues of the nation for guidance, namely,
etiquette, justice, integrity and conscientiousness, expressed in
li, i, lien and ch'ih. These four virtues were highly respected
by the Chinese people in the past, and they are vitally necessary
now if the rejuvenation of the nation is to be effected.
China has had a cultural history of some five thousand years
with fine standards to guide the daily life of the people, and yet,
owing to oppression and disregard, these have disappeared, and
rudeness and vulgarity have supervened.
China, with a territory of 1,896,500 square miles, possesses
abundant natural resources, and the only reason to account for
the present degeneration and lack of development is that public
virtues have been neglected.
We have a population of over four hundred millions, yet,
because we have neglected to cultivate our virtues, social dis-
order reigns and most of the people lead a life far below that
which they should enjoy.
We have, therefore, to learn that, to correct personal and
362
national failings, we must fall back upon the influence of the
old teachings. Rudeness and vulgar manners can be corrected
by cultural and artistic training, and degeneration can be over-
come by developing good personal character. It is difficult,
however, to succeed merely through the ordinary processes of
education and governance. If we are determined to reform we
must start with the most fundamental question — we must re-
form our habits first. This, therefore, is why the New Life
Movement is regarded as the key to the salvation of our nation.
II. The Interpretation of the New Life Movement
A. What is Life?
Dr Sun Yat-Sen said : ‘Life of the people comprises the liveli-
hood of the people, the existence of society, the welfare of the
nation, and the life of the masses.' Althougli the people's life is
thus divided into four phases, yet livelihood is the general mani-
festation of the other three. Inexistence depends upon protec-
tion ; welfare needs development ; and life demands propagation.
To satisfy all these needs, we have to resort to activities. And
life is nothing more than the continuation of activities.
B. What is New Lije?
All activities to satisfy the desire for the propagation of life,
the protection of human existence, and the development of
national welfare, are bound to change with changing conditions.
Time does not stand still, and environment changes with time.
Therefore, only those who re-adapt themselves to new condi-
tions, day by day, can live properly. When the life of a people
is going through this process of re-adaptation, it has to remedy
its own defects, and get rid of those elements which become
useless. Then we call it New Life.
C. What is the New Life Movement?
In order to satisfy the requirements of a new life for a people,
we have, to a certain extent, to depend upon the Government,
especially its system of education, its economic policies, and its
measures to insure the protection of all. Whether the policies
of a government can Ije successfully carried out, however,
depends greatly upon the customs and habits of the people at
the time. When an old order collapses and a new order is about
to arise, the new policies are frequently handicapped if the new
system does not base its foundation on the social customs of
the time. It is, therefore, necessary to start a movement first,
to teach the people to adapt themselves to new conditions,
before any ardent support for the new policies can be expected
from the people. ‘Water always flows over a wet surface, while
fire goes wherever it is dry.’ The function of any social move-
ment is to prepare the wet surface for water and the dry place
for fire. This accounts for the fact that every nation, during its
period of transition, pays more attention to the change of
customs and habits than to the new policies themselves. The
success of these social movements virtually means the success
of the new policies of the Government. This illustrates very
well the necessity of our New Life Movement. This movement
must start with those well aware of its necessity, and gradually
expand to others — from the near to the more distant, and from
its simpler phase to the more complex. If a man can cultivate
new habits himself, it is possible that the members of his family
will be influenced ; and a family can, by turn, influence the
whole community. A social movement goes hand in hand with
policies and education ; it is not dependent.
III. The Object of the New Life Movement
A. IV hy is Nezv Life needed?
The general psychology of our people to-day can be described
in one word — spiritlessness. What manifests itself in behaviour
is this : no discrimination between the good and the evil, no
difference l)etwcen what is public and what is private, and no
distinction between the fundamental and the expedient. Be-
cause there is no discrimination between the good and the evil,
it follows that right and wrong are confused ; because there is
no difference between public and private, there lacks proper
guidance for taking and giving ; and because there is no distinc-
tion between the fundamental and expedient, there is misplace-
ment of the first and the last. As a result, officials tend to be
dishonest and avaricious; the masses are undisciplined and
callous ; the adults are ignorant and corrupt ; the youth becomes
degraded and intemperate; the rich become extravagant and
luxurious ; and the poor become mean and disorderly. Naturally
it resulted in the complete disorganisation of social order and
national life. Consequently, we are not in a position either to
prevent or to remedy natural calamities or disasters caused
364
from within or invasions from without. The individual, society,
and the whole country are now suffering. It would be impos-
sible even to continue living under such miserable conditions.
It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to get rid of these back-
ward conditions and to start to lead a new and rational life.
B. Why is a New Life Movement needed?
In order to raise the standard of the people's livelihood and
to create a new society, it is indispensable to rely both on the
Government and on education. Unfortunately, both the Govern-
ment and education were inefficient in the past, because those
who conducted them were not sufficiently sincere. As a result,
the law lost its function ; technical knowledge had little practical
use; and even machinery did not work efficiently. Why is it
that men in the same position worked differentlv, and that the
same technique and the same machinery did not bring the same
results? Obviously, in order to make the law or the machine
work, it does not depend so much upon the law or the machinery
themselves as it docs upon the personnel. The key lies in the
human element. Social movement is the one way which will
influence personal character to a large extent in a short time.
No other method, political or educational, can l>e compared with
it. Of course, politics and education have their roles to play.
It is not our object to explain them here. In such a national
crisis, if we are not willing to bind our hands waiting for death,
we ought to reconstruct our society with extraordinary means
instead of merely sitting down and waiting for the process of
natural evolution. In other words, it is a gigantic task for the
New Life Movement to wipe out the backward conditions of
society by a wild storm and to supply the community with
vitality and the right spirit by a gentle breeze.
IV. The Contents of the New Life Movement
A. The Principles of the New Life Movement
The New Life Movement aims at the promotion of a regular
life guided by the four virtues {li, i, lien and cNih). These
virtues must be applied to ordinary matters, such as food, cloth-
ing, shelter and action. The four virtues are the essential
principles for the promotion of morality. From these rules,
one learns how to deal with men and matters, how to cultivate
oneself, and how to adjust oneself to surroundings. Whoever
violates these rules is bound to fail ; and a nation which neglects
them will not survive.
There are two kinds of sceptics :
First, some hold the view that the four virtues are simply
rules of good conduct. No matter how good they may be, no
benefit to the nation can be derived from them if the knowledge
and technique used by that nation are inferior to others.
Those who hold this view do not seem to understand the
difference between matters of primary and secondary import-
ance. From the social and national point of view, only those
who are virtuous can best use their knowledge and technique
for the salvation of the country. Otherwise, ability may be
abused for dishonourable purposes. Li, i, lien and ch'ih are the
principal rules alike for a community, a group, or the entire
nation.' Those who do not observe these rules will probably
utilise their knowledge and ability to the disadvantage of
society. Therefore, these virtues may be considered as matters
of primary importance upon which the foundation of a nation
can be solidly built.
Secondly, there is another group of people who argue that
these virtues are merely refined formalities, which have nothing
to do with the actual necessaries of daily life. For instance, if
one is hungry, can these formalities feed him ? This is probably
due to some misunderstanding of the famous teachings of
Kuantze, who said : 'When one does not have to worry about
his food and clothing, then he cares for personal honour ; when
the granary is full, then people learn good manners.* The
sceptic fails to realise that the four virtues teach one how to be
a man. If one does not know those, what is the use of having
abundance of food and clothing? Moreover, Kuantze did not
intend to make a general statement, merely referring to a
particular subject at a particular time. When he was making
broad statements, he said: 'Li, i, lie^i and ch'ih are the four
pillars of the nation.* When these virtues prevail, even if food
and clothing are temporarily insufficient, they can be produced
by man-power: or if the granary is empty, it can be filled
through human effort. On the other hand, when these virtues
are not observed, there will be robbery and beggary in time of
need ; and from a social point of view robbery and beggary can
never achieve anything. Social order is based on these virtues.
When there is order, then everything can be done properly, but
when everything is in confusion, very little can be achieved. To-
day robbers are usually most numerous in the wealthiest cities
366
A RECENT PORTRAIT (1946)
of the world. This is an obvious illustration of confusion caused
by non-observance of virtues. The fact that our country has
traitors and Communists, as well as corrupt officials, shows
that we, too, have neglected the cultivation of virtues, and, if
we are to recover, these virtues must be adopted as the
principles of a new life.
B. The Meaning of Li, I, Lien and Ch’ih
Although li, ij lien and clidli have always been regarded as
the foundations of the nation, yet the changing times and
circumstances may require that these principles be given a new
interpretation. From the pragmatic point of view to-day, we
may interpret the four virtues as follows:
Li means regulated attitude (mind as well as heart).
I means right conduct (in all things).
Lien means clear discrimination (honesty, in personal, public
and official life).
Ch'iJi means real self-consciousness (integrity and honour).
The word li means ‘reason’. It becomes a natural law when
applied to nature; it becomes a rule, when applied to social
affairs ; and it signifies discipline, when used in reference to
national affairs. These three phases of one’s life are all regu-
lated by reason. Therefore, li can be interpreted as regulated
attitude of mind and heart.
The word i means ‘proper’. Any conduct which is in accord-
ance with natural law, social rule, or national discipline must
be considered as proper. When an act is not proper, or when
one thinks it proper but docs not act accordingly, the act is
naturally not right and therefore cannot be called i.
The word lien means ‘clear’. It denotes distinction between
right and wrong. What agrees with li and i is right, and what
does not so agree is wrong. To take what we recognise as right
and to forgo what we recognise as wrong, constitutes clear
discrimination. This is lien.
The word cJdih means ‘consciousness’. When one is conscious
of the fact that his own actions are not in accordance with li, i
and lien, he feels ashamed. When he is conscious of the fact
that others are wrong, he feels disgusted. But the conscious-
ness must be real and thorough, so that he will strive to improve
the good and endeavour to get rid of the evil. Then we call it
ch'ih.
From the explanations given above, it is clear that ch^ih
367
governs the motive of action, that lien gives the guidance for
it, that i relates to an action actually being carried out, and that
li regulates the outward form of that particular action. The four
are inter-related. They are inter-dependent upon one another
in order to make a virtue perfect. Otherwise, li without i be-
comes dishonest; li without lien becomes extravagant; and li
without ch'ih becomes flattering. All these may appear like li
but really they are not. Similarly, i without li turns to be offen-
sive; i without lien lavish, and i without ch'ih fantastic. All
these are not really i. Again, lien without li is false ; lien with-
out i is niggard; and lien without ch*ih is corrupt. They are
not lien. In like manner, ch'ih without li will be chaotic ; ch'ih
without i, violent; and ch'ih without lien ugly. They are no
longer ch'ih.
It would be a golden opportunity for traitors and sinners if
the four virtues were perverted.
C. The Meaning of Food, Clothing, Shelter and Action
There are two necessary elements in our daily life. One refers
to the material side of our food, clothing, shelter, and com-
munications, and the other to the manner in which the material
is used to serve our daily purposes. The first belongs to the
practical side; and the second may be called the manifestation
of the spiritual side of human life.
The Chinese word hsin may be interpreted broadly or
narrowly. Narrowly, it simply means 'walk' ; but broadly it
means 'action'. All kinds of human behaviour in connection
with daily life may be included in this word hsin. While Dr
Sun Yat-Sen referred to food, clothing, shelter, and communi-
cations in 'The Three Principles of the People', he used the
same word hsin to denote communications only (the extended
sense of walk). In his ‘Principles of National Reconstruction'
he said : 'The Government should co-operate with the people in
developing agriculture in order to provide the people with
sufficient food; in developing the textile industry in order to
provide them with sufficient clothes, in building all kinds of
houses in order to improve their shelter, and in constructing
roads and canals in order to provide means of communication
for them.' He used the same word hsin for communications,
apparently, in the narrower sense.
But in this monograph, I intend to use the same word hsin
both in its broad and in its narrow sense. My own 'Philosophy
368
of hsin* also includes both. This is also true of the previous
chapters.
D. The Application of Li, I, Lien and Ch’ih to Food, Clothing,
Shelter and Action
What I want to develop now, is how to apply these four
virtues to food, clothing, shelter and action.
The means of maintaining our livelihood may be divided into
three phases : first, the obtaining of materials ; second, the selec-
tion of quality; and third, the manner in which these materials
are used. Let me put them separately.
T. The obtaining of materials should be governed by the
principle of lien. Clear discrimination should be exercised
between what is ours and what is not. If they do not belong
to us, we should not take them. In other words, the materials
for our daily life should be acquired through our own labour or
through other proper means. Strife should not be encouraged.
A parasite is not a good example. Even giving and taking
improperly should be avoided. ‘What really matters is the
degradation of personality, but not dying in hunger.’ The
famous saying of a Confucianist can be quoted to illustrate
this point.
2. The selection of quality should be governed by the
principle of i. Do the proper thing in a particular situation.
For instance, it is proper for an old man to use silk and to
take meat and to have lots of leisure ; but a young man should
be trained to endure hardship. What is proper in Winter is
not necessarily proper in Summer. What is proper in the North
is not necessarily proper in the South. Similarly, different
positions may influence a situation differently. A ruler, or an
army commander, must have some authority ; while those of a
lower rank should not enjoy the same thing, but should respect
discipline. Thus, what is proper is influenced by age, season,
___location, and rank ; the selection of quality varies in different
situations.
3. The manner in which materials are used should be
governed by the principle of li, which includes natural law,
social rules, and national discipline, as explained in the former
chapter.
The inter-relationship of these four virtues has already been
fully discussed. When applied to daily life, this is even more
true. All virtues should be carefully observed. If one of them
is neglected, there is a black spot in our life.
369
V. The Procedure of the New Life Movement
1. Organisation
1. The whole movement should be conducted by the Nan-
chang Association for the Promotion of the New Life Move-
ment. If a similar movement is started in other provinces,
municipalities, or districts, similar associations may be
organised, but a district association should be directed by a
provincial association.
2. The provincial, municipal, or district associations should
be organised and directed by the highest administrative
authority of that area. The local Party organisation, the
bureau of civil or social affairs, the bureau of education, the
bureau of public safety, and the local military authorities should
each send a representative of high rank to participate in the
work of the association. Social groups may also send
representatives.
3. Let the farmers be guided by the county officers ; workers
by the managers or the responsible persons of the trade unions ;
merchants, by trustees of the Chambers of Commerce ; students,
by their teachers ; soldiers, by political secretaries or Party
representatives in the Army ; civil servants, by their superiors ;
and women, by their organisations. But the local association
should control all.
2. The Work of the Movement
1. Investigation,
2. Planning, and
3. Execution.
3. Expenses of the Movement
Funds should be used economically. They should be collected
from the organisers of the movement or from the local govern-
ment. No contributions should be raised from the public.
4. Activities of the Movement
The Nanchang Association should decide general policies
for the whole movement. In the beginning, the movement
should be confined to two campaigns : ( i ) good manners, and
(2) cleanliness.
5. The Working Principles of the Movement
I. The movement should be started first from oneself, and
gradually be extended to others.
370
2. It should first be started with civil servants and gradually
extended to the general public.
3. It should be started with simpler matters and gradually
extended to others.
4. Easy and inexpensive matters should be taken up first.
5. Public organisations or public places, such as schools,
offices, stations, piers, theatres, parks, etc., should be improved
first.
6. The Methods of the Movement
1. Inspection follows instruction. The public should be taught
with personal examples, lectures, pictures, literature, plays, and
cinemas. Then the Association should send out, from time to
time, agents to inspect the results of the movement and rewards
should be given to those who deserve them.
2. Only superiors are allowed to interfere with the daily
activities of their inferiors. Friends can advise one another.
7. The Time of Work
Week-ends and holidays, as well as leisure hours, may be
used to promote the movement. The activities of the move-
ment should not replace the regular duties of the individual.
Conclusion
In short, the main object of the New Idfe Movement is to
substitute a rational life for the irrational, and, to achieve this,
we must observe li, i, lien and ch'ih in our daily activities.
1. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that rudeness and
vulgarity will be got rid of, and that the natural life of our
people will be more refined, in accordance with cultural and
artistic standards. By art, we are not referring to the special
enjoyment of the gentry. We mean the cultural standard of all
the neople. It is the boundary-line between civilisation and
barbarism. In ancient times, the Qiinese knew the six arts
(etiquette, music, shooting, driving, writing and mathematics).
It is a pity that most of us have neglected our own arts, for, as
a result, we are somewhat behind the Western nations in these
fields of artistic achievement. A lack of artistic training is
specially revealed in the prevailing social conditions to-day.
Suspicion, jealousy, hatred and strife are symptoms of bar-
barism. To remedy these, we have to emphasise art.
2. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that beggary and
robbery will be removed, and that officials will be honest and
371
patriotic, that corruption will cease, and that people will pursue
more productive enterprises. The poverty of our nation is
primarily caused by the fact that there are too many consumers
and too few producers. Consequently, many people have to
live like parasites. To remedy this, we have to emphasise the
four virtues, and we have to make people work harder and
spend less, and the officials must be honest. This was the secret
of success of the two ancient kingdoms of Ch’i and Ch’u. It is
also the primary cause of the strength of present-day Italy and
Germany.
3. By observing these virtues, it is hoped that social and
official disorder will be remedied, and that people will become
more military-minded. If a country cannot defend itself, it has
every chance to lose its existence. The larger its territory, the
more attractive it looks to the invaders. There is only one way
for national salvation — that is, to promote the economic
stability of the country and develop the patriotic and fighting
spirit of the people. Now, the Communists are not yet com-
pletely suppressed, and our territory shrinks every day in the
face of foreign invasion. In order to pass through this crisis
successfully, we have to pacifv the interior and resist external
aggression. To do this, we have to rely upon force. Our people,
therefore, must have military training. As a preliminary, we
have to acquire the habits of orderliness, cleanliness, simplicity,
frugality, promptness, and exactness. We have to preserve
order, emphasise organisation, responsibility and discipline, and
be ready to die for our country at any moment.
In conclusion, the life of our people will be more refined
when we have more artistic training; we will be richer when
we are more productive ; and we will be much safer when we
are more patriotic, better trained and equipped to defend our-
selves. This rational life is founded on li, i, lien and ch'ih. The
four virtues, in turn, can be applied to food, clothing, shelter
and action. If we achieve this, we will have revolutionised the
daily life of our people, and we will have laid the solid founda-
tion for our nation.
37 ^
APPENDIX II
Some Reflections on My Fiftieth Birthday
Having devoted a good portion of my life to the cause of the
Revolution, but before accomplishing one-hundredth part of
the work I wish to do for my country, I find myself at the age
of fifty. Educated and maintained by the State for more than
thirty years, I have since manhood enrolled myself in the Army
and dedicated myself to the cause of the National Revolution.
During all these years, what I ate, what I wore, and what
other things I needed daily, were derived from the State, in
other words, from the sweat and toil of the people. My debt to
the country is great indeed.
The hearty and inspiring spirit with which my compatriots,
both at home and abroad, men and women, young and old, have
contributed towards the purchases of the aeroplanes as a birth-
day present for the Government made me deeply conscious of
the profound trust and great hopes that are reposed in me. Un-
worthy as I am, it awes me even more to think that I should
be the recipient of such an honour which I know not how to
repay.
I recollect now the counsel of my teachers, the assistance of
my comrades, and the heroism and sacrifice of my colleagues.
They are as vivid as if they were before my eyes, and I reflect
upon them with extremely mixed feelings.
Among such deep impressions is the indelible memory of my
mother who endured so much in educating and bringing up the
fatherless boy. Now, while the trees by her grave have grown
tall and thick, I cannot but realise how little I have accom-
plished and how I have failed to live up to the hopes that she
had placed in me.
The difficulties confronting the Party and the State are
numerous, the misery of the people is still great, and the road
to recovery is long. It makes me ashamed to think that I have
allowed time to slip by without accomplishing my duty.
While my mind is full of these unrestful thoughts, I choose
at this time to make public the hardships and difficulties which
my mother endured in bringing up her family, so that the world
^73
may better realise and appreciate the position of the helpless
and the poor. I also hope that this may serve in some measure
as an incentive for us to practise self-restraint and self-training,
and to remind us of the great task of national salvation.
I was born in a little village where my grandfather and my
father maintained a farm and pursued their studies. Through
diligence and frugality they had acquired a little wealth. My
father died when I was nine years old. After that, my family
had to undergo all sorts of difficulties and tribulations.
It will he remembered that the then Manchu regime was in
its most corrupt state. The degenerated gentry and corrupt
officials had made it a habit to alnise and maltreat the people.
My family, solitary and without influence, became at once
the target of such insults and maltreatment. From time to time
usurious taxes and unjust public service were forced upon us,
and once we were publicly insulted before the court. To our
regret and sorrow none of our relatives and kinsmen was stirred
from his apathy.
Indeed the miserable condition of my family at that time is
beyond description. It was entirely due to my mother and her
kindness and perseverance that the family was saved from utter
ruin. With an iron determination she bodilv undertook to save
the family from its threatened fate and, with the same deter-
mination, she resolutely undertook to bring up the children in
the proper manner.
Her task was neither light nor enviable, for she had to look
after everything herself. As a boy she loved me verv deeply,
but her love was more than the love of an average mother ; she
was a very strict disciplinarian. She never failed to hold me to
strict account whenever I was unusually mischievous.
Upon returning home she would ask me where I had been
and what I had been doing, and when T got back from school
she would question me on the lesson of the day. She taught me
how to conduct and behave myself. She would make me do
manual labour in order to train me physicallv. In a word, all
her time and energy were devoted to mv well-being.
Having reached manhood, I determined to go abroad for a
military education. At first manv of our kinsmen and neigh-
bours were quite surprised at, and some of them were hostile
to, my decision. They certainly would have prevented me from
carrying out mv wish had it not been for mv mother’s resolute
will and her efforts to supplv me with the necessarv funds.
Later, when the general principle of our National Revolution
374
became more deeply rooted in my mind, I decided to dedicate
myself to the Party and the nation — a step which involved
much difficulty and subsequent dangers. At that time, all my
relations forbore from communicating with me. The only one
who still believed in whatever I had undertaken to do, and did
everything to help me, spiritually and materially, was my
mother.
At the time of the establishment of the Republic, I found
myself at the age of twenty-five. By then I had been able to
improve our home for my mother and to gratify her wishes a
little. Unfortunately, the establishment of the Republican form
of government was not followed by the establisliment of per-
petual peace.
Already internecine conflicts among warring militarists had
occurred all over the land. In such circumstances, the applica-
tion of Party principles was absolutely impossible, and for a
time the cause of the Revolution seemed hopelessly lost. At
this critical time, my mother again came to me with valuable
advice. For a period of seventeen years — that is, from the time
I lost my father at the age of nine till I was twenty-five years
old — my mother had never spent a day free from domestic diffi-
culties. Though often anxious about my fugitive life during
that period, she remained persistently calm and self-confident
and regarded the reconstruction of our home as her only
responsibility.
Once she said to me : T had become such a poor widow since
your father’s death, and sometimes the conditions were so un-
bearable that 1 really did not know how to preserve ourselves.
My sole conviction was that a fatherless cliild like you must
be carefully brought up before wc could expect any success in
this world. Our house must be carried on by an heir who could
keep untarnished the good reputation of our family.^ At another
time she said: ‘Such things as misfortunes, dangers and human
sufferings are of daily occurrence in every corner of the world,
but in the face of these we must practise self-reliance and self-
betterment in order to find a way out. Hence, the greater our
domestic difficulties, the more important it is to uphold our
family traditions ; the worse our domestic disaster, the stronger
we have to make our will. For a poor widow and a poor orphan,
or anyone who is trying to support himself in this cruel world,
there is nothing better than the strict observance of self-reliance
and self-betterment.’
At the first disappointment I encountered in the early days
of the Revolution, my mother again came to my aid. She
taught me how to make the princiole of filial piety applicable
to the whole nation. She told me to recall to mind how we over-
came our home difficulties in the earlier days, and wished me to
apply the principle in a broader sense — in a national sense — so
that injustice and oppression might forever disappear from
human history. She impressed upon my mind that to be merely
a dutiful son does not fulfill all the exacting conditions of the
principle of filial piety ; the principle demands also an unflinch-
ing devotion to the cause of the nation.
All these good counsels were given by my mother with the
purpose of guiding my life in this world. Although it has always
been my ardent desire to do everything in accordance with my
late mother’s wishes, yet so far I have not been able to live up
to her great expectations. Whenever I reflect on the conditions
in which we two — a widowed mother and a fatherless son —
lived in the shadow of cold realities, I cannot but pray for the
day when I should be able to fulfil my mother’s wishes in a
worthy manner.
Such is the great debt I owe to my country, and such is the
great debt I owe to my mother. In some of my leisure moments,
I have reflected upon my experiences during the past fifty years.
I cannot but confess that the first twenty -five years of my life
were beset with great difficulties. I suffered the loss of my
father, I was handicapped by the want of means, and again I
was handicapped by my limited knowledge in the struggle for
a better life.
The latter twenty-five years were equally difficult, for upon
my shoulders has fallen the great task of national salvation. All
these long years of hard struggle appear to me as if they had
happened yesterday. Fellow countrymen and dear comrades, it
all depends upon one’s own endeavour to bring back one’s old
glories, and, as the reflection on things gone by inevitably
throws light upon the things to come, I take this opportunity
to dwell a little further on the principles whereby a nation may
establish itself.
There is a proverb which says: 'From the family is built a
nation.’ The cause by which a family rises or falls can be
equally applied to a nation. Just as with a family, a nation may
be powerful at one time and weak at another. Whether a nation
perishes or flourishes depends upon the endeavour and deter-
mination of its people. The past hundred years have witnessed
a number of nations establishing themselves after years of hard
376
struggle, and these nations have set us a noble example to
follow. No crops can be harvested without a due share of
labour, and no labour is ever denied its due reward. If we can
keep on struggling with singleness of purpose, we are sure
ultimately to triumph over our difficulties.
At this point I would like to draw an analogy from my own
experience. During my childhood, as I have just related, my
family was in a most difficult situation, but, difficult as our situa-
tion was, and oppressed as we were by those in power, yet my
mother went on boldly with her noble task of safeguarding
the sanctity of her home and the supreme duty of bringing up
her children. From this we may learn a profitable lesson. In
our march towards national salvation, there is no difficulty too
great for us to overcome if we have the courage and resolution,
but I must point out that our success depends entirely upon
our own efforts.
Ever since the death of Dr Sun Yat-Sen in 1925, China has
encountered numerous disasters both within and without. The
country was first overrun by Communists, who almost suc-
ceeded in overthrowing the Republic and the Kuomintang.
Following came a series of foreign aggressions which resulted
in the loss of the Three North-eastern Provinces. In the midst
of these disasters and sufferings, which covered a period of ten
years, and which endangered the very life of the nation, the
people began to lose confidence in their leaders and, in turn, to
lose confidence in themselves. The situation undoubtedly was
critical, and the crisis confronting the nation was unprecedented
in our history, but in spite of this I still cherish great hope ; I
find despair neither in the defeat of international justice nor
in our own apparent impotence.
By hope lies in the revival of our old national traits of self-
reliance, self-improvement, temperance, and self-consciousness.
Should each and every one of us devote himself to the cause
of national salvation with the same persistence and endurance
as my mother showed in raising her family, it will not be long
before China takes her place once more among the great
Powers of the world. Should the women of the nation do their
best to have their homes well-managed and their children
properly brought up, I am sure their effort will contribute
immensely towards the upbuilding of the nation.
Our late leader, Dr Sun Yat-Sen, once said that the existence
of China as a nation depends entirely on following the line of
her destiny. We should not imitate the superficialities of the
West, nor plagiarise the Doctrine of Might of the imperialistic
nations. The eight great virtues — loyalty, filial piety, kindness,
love faithfulness, righteousness, peace and justice — are in
accordance with the true spirit and time-honoured character-
istics of the Chinese race. Filial piety is particularly emphasised
in the testaments of our late Leader. We should, therefore,
observe filial piety as one of our fundamental principles in
rebuilding the nation.
In practising the virtue of filial piety, we must strictly observe
two fundamental codes of conduct. The one is to do honour
to our parents, and the other to conduct ourselves without dis-
grace. In order to do honour to our parents we must endeavour
to improve ourselves and to follow the teachings of our fore-
fathers. To conduct ourselves without disgrace, we must be
fair and honest in our daily dealings, in order not to bring
humiliation upon our parents. The Chinese nation has had a
very long history and a glorious civilisation. No nation can
ruin us unless we first ruin ourselves. If each one of us recog-
nises his own weakness and endeavours to correct himself
accordingly, he will have no difficulty in removing any obstacle
he may encounter in life, and if we can do this collectively, we
can remove all obstacles confronting the nation.
For my own part, I have been painfully conscious of my
inability to discharge my responsibilities in such a way as to
fulfil the expectations of my countrymen and the fervent wish
of my late mother. I am always mindful of two things — that,
so long as the people are still in distress, I have not fulfilled
my mother’s long-cherished wish, and that, so long as the task
of national salvation is not yet accomplished, I shall be respon-
sible for the distress and sufferings of the people. Therefore, I
sincerely appeal to my countrymen to help me to fulfil my
mother’s ardent wish — to fulfil the great task of national salva-
tion.
378
APPENDIX III
New Treaties^ New Responsibilities
Fellow Countrymen :
On October lo, 1942, the United States and Great Britain
spontaneously announced the relinquishment of the special
rights and privileges they had enjoyed in China under the
unequal treaties. Yesterday our Government signed with them
in Chungking and Washington new treaties based on equality
and reciprocity.
My countrymen ! It may be recalled that last year was the
one hundredth anniversary of the first of the unequal treaties
concluded between China and the foreign Powers in the Ching
Dynasty. After fifty years of bloody revolution and five and
a half years of war of resistance during which great sacrifices
have been made, we have at last transformed the painful history
of one hundred years of the unequal treaties into the glorious
record of their abolition. This resurrection constitutes not only
an important page in the history of the Chunghau nation, but
also means the setting up by Great Britain, the United States
and other countries, of a beacon of equality and freedom to
enlighten the world. By doing this, the United Nations, who
are our comrades-in-arms, have shown beyond perad venture
that their object in this war is to fight for humanity and justice.
It is indeed an act which reflects the greatest honour and credit
on the British and American Governments and peoples. Especi-
ally gratifying is the attitude of the United States, which is at
one with us in our hopes and aspirations and has made no
reservations whatsoever. The action the British and American
Governments have taken has not only increased the fighting
strength of the Allies, but has dealt a particularly severe blow
to the morale of the aggressor nations !
However, our countrymen must understand that independ-
ence and freedom are something 'to be obtained through our
own efiforts’, I have repeatedly told our countrymen that 'only
when we can stand on our own feet is it possible to have
independence, and only when we can make our nation strong
is it possible to have freedom*. The Chinese Republic must
379
be able to stand on her own feet and make herself strong before
she can be a free and independent nation, and our people, the
armed forces and civilians, must be able to stand on their own
feet and make themselves strong before they can be a free and
independent people. The abolition of the unequal treaties and
the attainment of independence and freedom, therefore, can only
increase the responsibility of our nation, and arouse our people’s
consciousness of their duties and obligations, instead of justify-
ing in the slightest degree self-conceit or self-satisfaction on
their part. Hereafter, if they cannot fulfil the obligations and
discharge the duties which are incumbent upon them in order
to make China a completely free and independent nation and
accomplish the task which they owe to humanity, our independ-
ence and freedom will be lost again; and after the conclusion
of the present war the entire Chinese nation may still have
to suffer from the shackles of former days and the endless dis-
tress resulting therefrom. Should this unfortunately come to
pass, we would have to wait, for I don’t know how many
hundreds of years, before we could hope to regain our nation’s
independence again, and all our future generations would for-
ever have to suffer the tragic fate of slaves and beasts of burden.
In a word, China’s future destiny entirely rests on the shoulders
of the present generation. In order to preserve the vast
territory that our forefathers have left to us as well as the exist-
ence and happiness of future generations, all of us must from
this day forth, when our independence and freedom have just
been recovered, make up our minds to serve our country and
as a united people do our best to discharge our duty of
strengthening our nation and enabling her to stand on her own
feet.
Our victorv in this world war against the aggressor nations
is now in sight. The brutal Japanese aggressors and their Axis
partners, Germany and Italy, will surely collapse in the near
future and the coming year is going to be the most crucial year
in our war of resistance. There are people who think that
China’s destiny will be decided at the international conference
to be held following the conclusion of the present world war.
There are others who think that after her war of resistance
has ended in glorious victory the status China has already
attained will, in common with other nations, automatically
enable her to enjoy the blessings of justice and peace and that
there is nothing else to worry about. Such notions are all
bom of a psychology characterised by self-conceit, smugness,
380
lack of self-reliance and blind following of others. Our people
should fully wake up to the folly of this sort of mentality. They
ought to understand that China’s destiny should be decided
now when we are striving to strengthen our nation, and we
should not sit idle waiting for the opening of the peace con-
ference after the termination of the war. China to-day has
reached a stage where it must be decided whether she is to
survive or to perish, to be her own master or to be a slave
of others. Are we going to survive or to perish? To be our
own master or be slaves of others? This is the choice our
countrymen have to make within this year! From now on, all
of us must not again be apathetic or be content to muddle
along. We shall have no time for indecision and hesitancy.
Beginning from this very day we must bear more hardships
and sufferings than we have done during the last five years of
bloody struggle with the enemy, and must bestir ourselves to
march forward, for present circumstances no longer permit us
to live a life of idle ease.
Fellow countrymen, heretofore we were justified in saying
that the failure of our Revolution and national reconstruction
had been mainly due to the existence of the unequal treaties.
During the last century Qiina has been suffering from the
manifold oppressions of the unequal treaties, and this has re-
sulted in political disunity, backwardness of economic develop-
ment, and evil social tendencies. The cumulative effect of these
factors is to make moral cowards of our people, who have for-
gotten even how to save themselves while the lowering of their
ethical standard has deprived them of their sense of honour.
Up to the present, therefore, the Chinese people’s moral
degradation and loss of self-confidence may be said to have
reached their nadir. Directly or indirectly this is entirely due
to the influence of the unequal treaties. The foreign Conces-
sions and Garrison Areas have been the breeding-ground of
decadent customs and evil habits. Now since the unequal
treaties have been abolished, the unhealthy conditions caused
by these treaties will have no harbourage, and the decadent
customs and evil habits will surely be uprooted. Moreover,
the forces which have given rise to these conditions and those
who have become tainted by such customs and habits will no
longer be able to put the blame on others. These conditions,
however, which have developed and accumulated in the course
of one hundred years, may still exist below the surface in the
life of our people and in our customs and habits ; nay, they
381
may even be the media through which selfish desires and feudal-
istic thoughts continue to exist — desires and thoughts which
are contrary to the trends of the day, obstructive of the National
Revolution and detrimental to the nation’s existence without
our being aware of it. For this reason our people must be of
one mind and with singleness of purpose encourage one another,
sincerely repent their past faults and completely get rid of their
undesirable customs and habits to the end that under the in-
spiration of their common belief in the Three Principles of the
People they may devote themselves to the great task of bringing
the war of resistance to a victorious conclusion, thus consum-
mating the work of national reconstruction.
The object that we ought to strive to achieve — the success
of the Nationalist Revolution — has long been clearly placed
before the entire nation. China’s future destiny depends on the
greatest and best efforts that our people will iointly make for
the attainment of this object. We must sincerely abide by the
instructions of Dr Sun Yat-Sen, Father of our Republic, believe
in the Three Principles of the People, follow the plans of the
National Revolution, obev the laws of the National Govern-
ment, and loyally and honestly with all our mind and heart
discharge all duties incumbent upon us. We must each and all
strictly live a war-time life, carry out the scheme for the control
of commodity prices, observe the law of general mobilisations,
practise economy and increase production, so as to enhance our
power of resistance on the one hand and effect psychological,
ethical, social, political and economic reconstruction on the
other, in the hope that we may within the shortest time pos-
sible carry out the whole plan of reconstruction for the co-
ordination of our culture, economy, and national defence and
lay the foundation of our country and people.
My fellow countrymen ! The present moment which marks
the turning-point in China’s destiny is the best opportunity for
the people to make up their mind to serve the country. More-
over, we ought to consider it our very good fortune to live
in this extraordinary age when, with our past humiliation
wiped out and our independence and freedom regained, we can
have the chance to make our country strong. A few words
more : at this moment when China’s fate is hanging in the
balance, we must be careful in our actions and guard against
unseemly conduct, and above all we must have self-respect.
Since our nation has now already attained a position of enuality
with other nations, the nationals of friendly Powers residing
382
in China will henceforth receive the protection of our laws.
All of them, whether tourists, merchants or missionaries, pro-
vided they deal with us on a footing of equality and abide by
Chinese laws, should be treated courteously and in a friendly
manner according to the traditional spirit of China as a country
that values courtesy and justice. I earnestly hope that my
countrymen will seriously nonder over the lessons taught by the
history of the last hundred years and do their utmost to dis-
charge their present responsibilities. Furthemore, they should
bear in mind that they cannot secure the independence of their
nation by just waiting for it, and that the people in all walks
of life must pay special regard to courtesy and justice, under-
stand the importance of honesty, develop their sense of honour,
and, of one mind and with singleness of purpose, make re-
doubled efforts before they can hope to attain true victorv,
equality and freedom. Only in this way can we keep pace with
our allies in sharing the responsibilities for the reconstruction
of the world, the safeguarding of peace, and the emancipation
of mankind.
hope I welcome this memorable day of our independence and
My countrymen! To-day with unbounded confidence and
freedom which is the beginning of a new destiny for the
Chunghua nation. It is with the utmost sincerity that I thank
you all for the patriotic spirit with which you have shared with
me all dangers and hardships despite sacrifices and sufferings,
ever since the commencement of our war of resistance. It is
with the same sincerity that I hope to comfort the departed
spirits of our martyrs, soldiers and civilians, who have laid
down their lives for their country. Lastly let us pray for our
victory 1
Long live the equality and freedom of the Qiinese Republic!
Long live the success of the National Revolution 1
Long live the Three Principles of the People!
383
APPENDIX IV
Presidential Speech
On this day every year we recall China's glorious past with
great rejoicing and animation. It is on such an auspicious occa-
sion to-day that I assume the post of President of the National
Government.
At a time when China’s war defence is entering into a decisive
stage, when national reconstruction is begun in all earnestness,
when military and economic machinery is to be strengthened,
and when home administration and foreign relations are to be
developed, I feel ever more the weightiness of my responsi-
bilities, and I shudder at the thought of the great task which
falls upon my shoulders.
As early as thirty-two years ago, Dr Sun Yat-Sen laid down
the policy for building up the Republic of China. In regard to
foreign relations, it provides that China ‘should fulfil the
obligations and enjoy the rights of a civilised nation’ and
‘should foster closer relations with friendly nations on the prin-
ciple of peace, with a view to elevating China’s position in the
family of nations and realising the ideal of universal brother-
hood’. In regard to home administration, it aims at ‘welding
together the territories of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols,
Muslims, and Tibetans into one country, and linking them into
one nation’ and also at ‘firmly establishing a republican form
of government, improving the people’s livelihood and fulfilling
the high aspirations of the nation through the consummation of
the revolution’.
The titanic struggle we are now engaged in is in pursuance
of this consistent policy. Internallv we strive for the realisation
of local autonomy throughout the country, consolidation of
national unity, establishment of government by law and con-
summation of democratic rule. Externallv we seek to cultivate
closer relations with friendly nations, to win the war against
agression, to collaborate with our Allies in establishinor per-
manent world peace after the war, to develop our rich natural
resources and carry out economic reconstruction and to enhance
the well-being of mankind through self-exertion as well as inter-
national collaboration.
384
Since we concluded new treaties with Great Britain and the
United States last January on the basis of equality, our ideal
of national independence and equality may well be said to have
been realised. After the realisation of the principle of
nationalism, we have to carry out the principles of democracy
and people’s livelihood. In this connection all our fellow-
countrymen should thoroughly understand the significance
implied in the following bequeathed teaching of Dr Sun Yat-
Sen :
'The people are the foundation of the State.’
The fortunes of the people hinge upon the State.’
We should bear in mind the close relationship between the
people and the State. I wish now to explain how we should
exert ourselves for the realisation of the principle of democracy
and the establishment of democratic government.
As far back as three thousand years ago, when writing was
invented in China, there were already manifestations of demo-
cratic ideas. The Kao Tao Mu in the Shu Ming (Rock of
History) says: The wisdom of heaven is reflected by the
wisdom of the people, and the reward or ounishment by heaven
is based upon the judgment of the people.’
Confucius says : 'Love what the people love and hate what
the people hate.’ Mancius says : ‘The people are to be valued.’
All these ancient maxims are the source of the democratic
thought and the crystallisation of the Chinese traditional spirit.
It is in this ancient and profound civilisation that Dr Sun
Yat-Sen’s principles of democracy originated. Dr Sun Yat-
Sen’s programme of revolution has as its objective the awaken-
ing and rallying of the people to join the common struggle. The
significance of his principle of democracy lies in the investment
of political rights in the people. In other words its ultimate
goal is to make all the people take part in the administration
of State affairs. In view of the grand achievements made by
only a handful of patriots in the Chinese revolution in iQii
towards the total realisation of the princinle of democracy,
450,000,000 Qiinese will jointly shoulder the heavy responsi-
bilities of the country.
However, there is an important prerequisite to the realisation
of the principle of democracy. The democratic spirit lies in the
observance of law and discipline. Failure in this will under-
mine the foundation of the democratic system and endanger the
republic, therefore, it is imperative that our citizens should
grasp fully the true meaning of freedom and government by
385
law, and cultivate the good habit of respecting freedom and
observing law and discipline ; for only thus can a solid founda-
tion of democracy be laid. We should not evade, but fulfil, all
obligations prescribed by law and, of course, at the same time
enjoy equally rights and privileges as provided by law.
If China wants to continue to exist as a nation in this world,
we should one and all form the law-abiding habit. We should
consider it an honour to respect and observe law and a dis-
grace to violate and undermine it. Not only should we not work
for personal gain under the pretext of freedom, but also not
evade our responsibilities, thereby neglecting our duties as
citizens. Just as Government officials should loyally perform
their duties, so all the people should jointly share the responsi-
bilities and do their part. Only thus can China attain equality.
As a public servant, I will from to-dav work unswervingly
for the welfare of the nation in the same spirit of patriotism
as before. If I should ever transgress the limit of my power,
it is the duty of every citizen to censure and correct me. I will
observe all laws and respect ].)ublic opinion in order to set an
example of democratic rule in China. Now that our ultimate
victory is in sight and a great future for China is dawning, I
will strive for the Nation’s advancement courageously and
conscientiously together with my fellow-countrymen.
386
APPENDIX V
Chronological Table
1887 — Born in Brookmouth on October 31st.
1888— Aet. i:
1889 — Aet. 2 :
1890 — Act. 3 : Puts a chopstick down his throat.
1891 — Aet. 4 : Nearly drowned in a water jar, and in the Brook.
1892 — Aet. 5 : Starts to study at home.
1893 — Aet. 6 : Still studying ‘The Great Learning’ at home.
1894 — Aet. 7: Finishes his first book; his grandfather dies.
War with Japan breaks out over Korean c|iiestion.
1895 — Aet. 8: Studies ‘The Analects of Confucius’ and ‘The
Sayings of Mencius’ ; his father dies. China signs Peace
Treaty dictated by Japan; Sun Yat-Scn starts his revolu-
tionary activities.
1896 — Aet. 9: Starts to study ‘The Book of Odes’. Sun Yat-
Sen is imprisoned in London but set free after James
Cantlie’s intervention.
1897 — Aet. 10: Begins to take up active duties in his family;
discusses democratic principles.
1898 — Aet. 1 1 : Finishes ‘The Book of Odes’ ; learns classical
essays ; his younger brother dies. China leases various
settlements to the Powers ; Reform Movement starts and
collapses in Peking.
1899 — Aet. 12: Studies ‘The Book of Ancient History’: writes
his first poem on ‘Bamboos’.
1900 — Aet. 13 : Finishes studying ‘The Book of Changes’ ; helps
his mother in housework. Boxer’s uprising breaks out
in Peking; Sun Yat-Sen strikes again in Kwangtung and
fails.
1901 — Aet. 14: Studies ‘The Spring and Autumn Chronicles’;
marries Miss IMou according to his mother’s orders.
China accepts the dictated Peace Treaty with the vic-
torious Powers.
1902 — Aet. 15: Reads and punctuates ‘The Chronicle Out-
line of the General Mirror’ ; tries his hand at the State
Examination.
387
1903 — Aiet. 16: Studies in the Phoenix Mountain School,
and finishes ‘The Book of Rites’ under a private tutor.
Russo-Japanese War starts in Chinese territory.
1904 — Aet. 17: Studies works of ancient philosophers and
‘The Art of War’; begins to be interested in revolution-
ary work.
1905 — Aet, 18: Studies in the Dragon River Middle School;
decides to study military art in Japan; his maternal
grandmother dies ; sails for Japan ; returns because unable
to get into a military school.
1906 — Aet. 19: Enters Paoting Military Academy; defies
Japanese instructor who has insulted China; selected for
going to Japan.
1907 — Aet. 20 : Enters Preparatory Military Academy in
Tokyo; joins Sun Yat-Sen Revolutionary Society, the
China Union introduced by Qien Chi-Mei.
1908 — Aet. 21 : Devotes his time to revolutionary works whilst
studying in the Military Academy. Both the Emperor
Kuang Hsu and the Empress-Dowager, the Motherly and
Auspicious, die.
1909 — Aet. 22: Graduates from Military Academy and joins
the Field Artillery in Takada; continues his revolutionary
activities.
1910 — Aet. 23: Remains with the Field Artillery in Takada;
continues his revolutionary work. Many unsuccessful
attempts at revolution made by Sun Yat-Sen.
1911 — Act. 24: Returns to Shanghai in the summer and works
jointly with Chen Chi-Mei for the revolution ; sails for
Japan in September and comes back again in October when
the Wuchang outbreak starts ; takes Hangchow, the capital
of his Province ; goes to Shanghai to train a new infantry
regiment. Sun Yat-Sen comes back from abroad.
1912 — Aet. 25: Resigns his command; sails for Japan. Sun
Yat-Sen elected Provisional President of Chinese Re-
public; Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu-Yi) abdicates; Sun Yat-
Sen resigns his Presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-Kai.
1913 — Aet. 26: Returns to Shanghai to start revolution against
Yuan Shih-Kai who has prosecuted the Chinese Union
and assassinated Sung Chiao-Jen, a brilliant member of
the Union ; fails in his attempt and escapes to Japan again.
Sun Yat-Sen calls all his followers to denounce and fight
against Yuan Shih-Kai.
1914 — Aet. 27 ; Returns again to Shanghai to begin another up-
388
rising ; fails again and goes to Manchuria to inspect revolu-
tionary forces in the North; joins Sun Yat-Sen in Tokyo;
studies philosophy. Yuan Shih-Kai dissolves Parliament;
war breaks out in Europe.
1915 — Aet. 28: Starts his third uprising in Shanghai against
Yuan Shih-Kai and is nearly made a captive, falls danger-
ously ill, his mother coming to Shanghai to nurse him.
Yuan Shih-Kai accepts Japan's twenty-one secret demands
on China, and later acclaims himself the new Emperor.
1916 — Aet. 29: Launches a surprise attack on the Kiang Yin
Fortress between Nanking and Shanghai; fails and goes
to Shantung as Chief-of-Staf¥ to Revolutionary Army
which is later disbanded. Chen Chi-Mei, Chiang Kai-
Shek’s sworn brother, is assassinated by Yuan Shih-Kai;
many provinces denounce Yuan Shih-Kai who abdicates in
favour of his own Presidency and dies.
1917 — Aet. 30: Stays in Shanghai and proposes Northern
Punitive Expedition. Sun Yat-Sen goes to Canton and is
elected Generalissimo of Chinese Army and Navy and
head of a New Government in Canton in opposition to the
one in Peking which is in the hands of War Lords.
1918 — Aet. 31 : Goes to Canton to join Sun Yat-Sen ; appointed
Head of Field Operation Department of the Cantonese
Army under the command of Chen Chiung-Ming during
the Fukien Campaign; directs operations against the
Fukien Forces ; promoted to be Commander of the Second
Detachment. European War ends.
1919 — Aet. 32 : Resigns his commands and goes back to
Shanghai and his native place; travels and visits many
places.
1920 — Aet. 33: Rejoins Chen Chiung-Ming’s Cantonese Army
in its Kwangsi Campaign and prepares his operational
plans for this expedition ; breaks with Chen Chiung-Ming
and retires in spite of strong persuasion by his friends to
come out again.
IQ2I — Aet. 34 : Goes to Canton again because of Sun Yat-Sen’s
invitation and joins Chen Chiung-Ming reluctantly; fore-
sees Qien Chiung-Ming’s rebellion and warns Sun Yat-
Sen of it ; his mother dies and he returns home for mourn-
ing. Sun Yat-Sen is elected President of China by extra-
ordinary Parliament ; Peking Government orders Southern
Expedition.
1922 — Aet. 35: Severs friendship with Chen Chiung-Ming;
389
joins Sun Yat-Sen on gunboat when Chen Chiung-Ming’s
rebellion breaks out; escapes to Shanghai with Sun Yat-
Sen; appointed Chief -of -Staff to New Cantonese Army
commanded by Hsu Chung-Chih and goes to Fukien.
1923 — ^Aet. 36: Goes back to Canton to join Sun Yat-Sen as
his Chief-of-Staff ; Sun Yat-Sen has returned to Canton
after Chen Chiung-Ming has been defeated; advises Sun
Yat-Sen in fighting further rebellions; goes to Russia on
Good Will Mission as Sun Yat-Sen has established cordial
friendship with Soviet Russia.
1924 — Aet. 37: Returns to Canton and is appointed member
of Military Council of Kuo Min Tang and later President
of Whampoa Military Academy; puts out Merchants'
Corps Rebellion in Canton. Kuo Min Tang holds its First
National Congress after reorganisation; Russian political
advisers and military staff officers are engaged by Sun
Yat-Sen who goes to Peking hoping to unify China
peacefully.
1925 — Aet. 38: Leads Cadet Army in mopping up Chen
Chiung-Ming’s remaining forces and other rebellious
armies. Sun Yat-Sen dies in Peking; National Govern-
ment established in Canton.
1926 — Aet. 39: Elected member of Central Executive Com-
mittee at the Second National Congress of the Kuo Min
Tang ; made Chairman of the Military Council ; takes quick
and drastic measures against Chinese Communist and
Russian who plot against him; appointed Commander-in-
Chief of the Northern Punitive Expedition ; defeats the
Northern War Lords Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Chuan-Feng;
conquers nearly all the Southern and Eastern Provinces.
1927 — Aet. 40 : Reaches Nanking and Shanghai ; Chinese Com-
munists attack him ; suppresses Chinese Communist Party ;
establishes National Government in Nanking while anti-
Chiang Kai-Shek movement spreads from Wuchang; re-
signs and goes to Japan; returns to Shanghai to marry
Soong Mei-Ling after announcing the dissolution of his
first marriage ; is persuaded to return to Nanking.
1928 — Aet. 41 : Resumes post of Commander-in-Chief and con-
tinues the Northern Punitive Expedition; reaches Peking
while the last of War Lords dies; appointed Chairman
of the State Council; brings over the Young Marshal to
support the National Government; China is unified.
1929 — Aet. 42: Opens Demobilisation Conference; calls the
390
Third Rational Congress and is attacked by Wang Ching-
Wei and his followers; several revolts break out and are
suppressed.
1930 — Aet. 43 : Several military leaders demand his resigna-
tion ; civil war breaks out in the North ; Wang Ching-Wei
joins the rebels; the Young Marshal marches to Peking
in support of Chiang Kai-Shek ; the rebellion is suppressed.
1931 — Aet. 44: Calls First National People’s Convention to
adopt Provisional Constitution; disagrees with Hu Han-
Min over Provisional Constitution ; conducts Anti-Com-
munist Campaign ; South revolts ; Japan invades Man-
churia ; resigns all posts.
1932 — Aet. 45: Is recalled to Nanking; Japan invades
Shanghai; moves Nanking Government to Lo-Yang; con-
cludes Shanghai Truce with Japan; resumes anti-Com-
munist Campaign in Kiangsi ; Government moves back to
Nanking. Henry Pu-Yi is installed as Japanese puppet-
Emperor of ‘Manchukuo’.
1933 — Aet. 46; Japan invades Jehol ; concludes Tangku Truce
with Japan; continues anti-Communist Campaign; revolts
break out in North and South.
1934 — Aet. 47 : Suppresses revolts ; continues anti-Communist
Campaign; initiates ‘New Life Movement’; tours North-
West by air; drives Communists out of Kiangsi. Japan
initiates Mongolian rebellion.
xg35 — Aet. 4(S: Drives Communists out of Kweichow; tours
South-West by air; reorganises and reforms Provincial
Governments in South-West; establishes training camps
for officials in Szechuen. Japan invades the Province of
Charbar.
IQ36 — Aet. 49: Drives Communists further north from Shansi
to Shensi; Japan spreads her influence in North China:
nation celebrates his birthday by presenting aeroplanes to
the State; is captured by pro-Communist forces in Sian
while touring Shansi and Shensi, but is soon released;
resigns all his posts and retires to his native place. Japan
signs anti-comintern pact with Germany.
— Aet. 50: Resumes office; establishes training corps in
Kiangsi'; Japan invades North China and South China;
leads the whole nation in defensive war ; moves Govern-
ment to Chungking.
1938 Aet. 51: Is elected Director-General of the Kuo Mm
Tang ; proclaims immediately that war is to go on after
391
the fall of Hankow and Canton. Wang Ching-Wei leaves
Chungking secretly.
1939 — Aet. 52 : Launches general counter-offensive ; warns
England and America when Japan invades Hai-Nan
Island; establishes the Central Training Corps. Germany
invades Poland; war breaks out in Europe; Poland par-
titioned.
1940 — Aet. 53; Launches more counter-attacks; Wang Ching-
Wei is installed as Japanese Puppet in Nanking; the
Burma Road is closed for three months by England. Italy
enters European War; capitulation of Belgium and
France.
1941 — Aet. 54: Concludes Barter-Agreement with Russia; dis-
bands the New Fourth (Communist) Army; declares war
on Japan, Germany and Italy when Japan attacks Pearl
Harbour and Shanghai. Germany invades Russia;
America enters the war; England at war with Japan.
1942 — Aet. 55: Makes new fair treaties (so called 'equal
Treaties’) with England and America; visits India; finds
Chinese Communists not co-operative ; gives Lieut-General
Stilwell command of Qiinese Expeditionary Forces in
Burma, Japan takes Singapore; takes Java; takes Cor-
regidor ; takes Burma.
1943 — Aet. 56: Tries in vain to secure the co-operation of
Chinese Communists; publishes China's Destiny; installed
as Chairman of State Council ; goes to Cairo for Four
Power Conference. Tide of war begins to turn in favour
of the Allies ; Italy surrenders.
1944 — Aet. 57 : Still tries to parley with the Qiinese Com-
munists ; discusses the draft Constitution ; asks President
Roosevelt to recall General Stilwell ; critical situation in
South-West China is saved; Burma Road is recaptured.
Allies land in France.
1945 — Aet. 58: Announces the Convention of National
Assembly to adopt the Constitution as soon as the military
situation improves ; negotiates new treaty with Russia.
Germany surrenders ; Atomic bombs are dropped in Japan ;
Russia declares war on Japan; Japan surrenders; the
world war is ended.
1946 — Aet. Appeals to the whole nation for reconstruc-
tion; calls political consultation conference; moves back
to Nanking; General Marshal and Ambassador Leighton
StuarPs efforts in bringing the Government and Com-
munists together fail. Russia and Western Democracies
begin to be at variance.
1947 — Aet. 60: Breaks with Communists; calls National
Assembly; adopts Constitution; civil war starts; Yenan,
the Communist capital, is captured ; civil war spreads ;
Cominform is established in Europe ; Marshall’s plan is
opposed by Russia and her satellites; Europe is virtually
divided.
393
MAIN DOCUMENTS QUOTED
Family:
Chiang Kai-Shek’s memoir to his Grandfather (April, 1918) page 7
Chiang Kai-Shek's memoir to his Grandmother (8 November, 1932) 10
Chiang Kai-Shek’s memoir to his Maternal Grandfather (1 3 June, 1932) 13
Inscription on the tomb of Chiang’s Father (7 August, 1918) 17
Chiang Kai-Shek’s memoir to his Mother (June, 1921) 22
Sun Yat-Sen’s elegy for Chiang’s Mother (23 November, 1921) 138
Historical:
HoPington Tong on Chiang as a Student (1937) 47
General Nagaoka on Chiang as a Cadet (1929) 58, 65
Sergeant Shimoda on Chiang as a Cadet (9 January. 1936) 60
Chiang’s article in Army paper on world Utopia (1912) 74
Chiang’s elegy for Chen Chi-Mei (30 May, 1916) 90
Sun Yat-Sen’s telegram to Chen and Chiang (27 June, 1918) 101
Chiang’s review of military operations in 1918 (May 1931) 103
Shao Yuan-Chung’s letter to Sun Yat-Sen (1 October, 1918) 105
Chen Chiung-Ming’s letter on Cantonese Army (15 January, 1919) 110
Chen Chiung-Ming’s letter on Cantonese Army (5 December, 1919) 113
Sun Yat-Sen urges Chiang to work with Chen (29 October, 1920) 115
Chiang’s complaining letter to Chen (6 November, 1920) 117
Chiang’s letter to Tai Chi-Tao (5 January, 1921) 118
Tai Chi-Tao’s reply fl4 January, 1921) 119
Chiang’s letter to Tai-Chi-Tao (20 January, 1921) 122
Chiang warns Sun Yat-Sen about Chen (5 March, 1921) 131
Chiang’s final protest to Chen (23 April, 1922) 145
Liao Chung-Kai’s telegram to Chiang about Chen (31 May, 1922) 148
Liao Chung-Kai’s letter to Chiang about Chen (1 June, 1922) 149
Chiang urges Hsu Chung-Chih to attack Chen (I June, 1922) 150
Chen’s letter to Sun Yat-Sen (July, 1922) 155
Sun Yat-Sen to Chiang on Russia and Communists (21 November, 1922) 160
Chiang’s letter to Hsu Chung-Chih (9 February, 1923) 164
Sun Yat-Sen’s letter to Chiang on JofTe (30 August, 1922) 172
Sun Yat-Sen’s — Adolf JofTe Manifesto (26 January, 1923) 174
Sun Yat-Sen’s telegram urging Chiang to go to Canton (24 December, 1923) 179
Chiang’s letter to Sun Yat-Sen on Hu Han-Min (2 March, 1924) 193
Chiang’s l^^ttcr to Sun Yat-Sen on Revolutional Council (9 October, 1924) 194
Sun Yat-Sen’s reply (9 October, 1924) 195
Sun Yat-Sen’s letter to Chiang on conditions in Canton (9 September. 1924) 202
Sun Yat-Sen’s telegram urging Chiang to leave Canton (9 October, 1924) 203
Chiang’s reply urging Sun Yat-Sen to return (9 October, 1924) 203
Chiang’s letter to Liao Chung-Kai on Russia (14 Match, 1924) 210
Chiang’s letter to Chou En-Lai on Propaganda (21 November, 1925) 231
Chiang’s letter to his students on Communism (14 April, 1926) 245
Chang Tso-1 in’s Manifesto denouncing Chiang (1 December, 1926) 258
Chiang’s telegram to Kuo Min Tang on Chen Tu-Hsiu (24 August, 1926) 262
Chiang’s telegram to Wang Ching-Wei urging co-operation (3 October, 1926) 263
Chiang’s telegram to Teng Yen-Ta on adverse publicity (22 December, 1926) 265
Wang Ching-Wei— Chen Tu-Hsiu Manifesto (April, 1927) 270
Chiang’s declaration ot his resignation (13 August, 1927) 276
Hu Han-Min and others to Feng Yu-Hsiang (14 August, 1927) 279
Wang Ching-Wei’s telegram denouncing Chiang (24 September, 1929) 294
Hsu Chung-Chih’s telegram to Chiang (6 December, 1929) 297
Chiang’s proclamation at Nanchang (1934) 313
Chinese Communists Pledge (February, 1937) 333
Chiang’s Christmas Broadcast. 1947 358
394
INDEX
Abyssinia 322, 333
Air Force 220, 318, 319, 337
America, see United States
Ancestor Worship 9
Anti-Chiang Kai-Shek Movement
264-267, 270, 271, 274, 275, 292, 293,
296, 298, 302, 305, 312
Anti-Comintern Pact 333, 341
Art of War, The 42, 67
Association for Discussion of European
Alfairs 95
Austria 45
Belgium 45, 342
Bentham, Jeremy 74
Bible, The 330
Bluecher, General 185, 218
Bolshevik! 104, 170, 171, 257-259, 261, 285
Borodin. Michael 181, 194, 222, 223, 236,
240, 246, 259, 262, 265, 272, 273. 276
Boxers, see Righteous Harmonious Boxers
Buddhism 8, 10, 24, 25. 242
Burma (and Burma Road) 343-345, 350-352
Cairo Conference 347, 348
Cantlie, Sir James 31, 42
Canton Government 183, 197,220,235,237,
254, 291, 297
Cantonese Army 21, 98, 100, 104, 108-115
118, 124. 135, 139, 142, 143. 149, 152, 157
158. 162, 165, 166, 196, 197. 205, 282
Chang Ching-Kiang (follower of Sun Yat-
Sen and friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) 121,
122, 124, 127, 179, 224. 245, 264, 281
Chang Hsueh-Liang (The Young Marshal)
147, 289-291, 299, 302-306, 318, 322, 323,
325-332, 334
Chang Tso-IJn (Marshal Chang) 147, 148,
180, 201, 206, 207, 213, 234, 249-251, 256,
258, 259, 261, 263, 269, 275, 289, 290. 299
Chen Chi-Mei (follower of Sun Yat-Sen
and sworn brother of Chiang Kai-Shek)
50, 55, 64-68, 76-79, 81, 86-94, 115, 116,
123. 189
Chen Chiung-Ming (rebel General of the
Cantonese Army) 98, 99, 101-103, 105-
107, 111-1 17, 123, 125-135, 139-167, 173,
174, 180, 190, 193, 197, 200, 202, 205, 215
224, 228, 229. 235. 243, 256
Chen Chun-Hsuan (head of the Kwangsi
Clique) 95, 100, 115
Chen Kuo-Fu (nephew of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s sworn brother) 87, 92, 136
Chen Li-Fu (nephew of Chiang Kai-
Shek’s sworn brother) 92
Chen Tu-Hsiu (formerly leader of Chinese
Communists) 262, 270
Cheng Chien (follower of Sun Yat-Sen) 240
Chiang, Madame (mother of Chiang Kai-
Shek) 10-14. 22-29, 33, 38. 40, 48-50, 56,
69, 70, 87, 135-139, 142, 179
Chiang Kai-Shek, see Chronological Table
pp. 387-393
ancestors 3 et seq.
school teachers 11, 33, 34, 36, 40
near relatives 20, 26, 38
childhood 31-43
character 122, 123, 124
death of his mother 135
mission to Moscow 176-179, 190
second marriage 282, 285
President of China 347, 384-386
fiftieth birthday message 373-378
reading 47, 48, 329
on Japanese aggression 75
on political life 240
on Unequal Treaties 379-383
Chiang Kai-Shek, Madame (nee Soong
Mei-Ling) 282, 285, 286, 315, 322, 329,
330
Chicherin 176, 178, 192
Chihli clique 140, 144, 147, 158, 170, 171,
180, 205
China Eastern Railway 43, 169, 171, 175,
181, 261
China Union (Tung Meng Hui) 51, 55, 64
69. 70, 76
China*^ Destiny 346
Chou En-Lai (Communist) xiii, 213, 215,
231, 355
Chronicle Outline of the General Mirror,
The 41
Chu Cheng (follower of Sun Yat-Sen) 93,
121. 136
Chu-Ke Liang (ancient Statesman and
General) 3 1 1
Chu Pei-Tch (General and friend of
Chiang Kai-Shek) 218. 225, 229
Chu Ta-Fu (follower of Sun Yat-Sen) 21,
107. 1 14, I 16, 117. 121
Churchill, Ri. Hon. Winston 320, 347, 348
Clan Books 3
Communists 161, 174, 175, 182, 187, 196-
200, 207, 209, 211-215, 220-223, 236-248
253, 255, 258-286, 291-314,317-323, 329,
332-334, 339, 343-358
Confucius 1, 2, 4, 20, 42, 315, 359
Confucian classics 1, 13, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39
40. 41, 298
Consortium, The (International Banks) 77
Corps Diplomatique 170, 208
Dare-to-Die Commandoes 66-71
Das Kapital (Marx) 178. 329
Democratic League 353, 354, 357
Dragon River School 46-48
East River Expedition 216, 217, 227-230,
233
Embroidery Brook 7, 8, 18-20
English, see Great Britain
Enlarged Conference, The 301, 302, 304
395
Eugene Chen (diplomat and follower of
Sun Yat-Sen) 196, 237
Feng Hua (Home of the Chiangs) 3, 4, 48,
67, 281, 308
Feng Kuo-Chang (War Lord and President
of Peking Government) 96, 97, 104
Feng Yu-Hsiang (The Christian General)
206, 234, 240, 259, 261, 263, 272, 275, 278
286-294, 300-305, 313
Formosa 348
Fortnight in Sian, A 322
France 30, 43-45, 77, 173, 191,211,213,221
245, 260, 269, 293, 342
French Concession (Shanghai) 86, 87;
(Tientsin) 207
Galens, see Bluecher
Gauss, C. 352
Geneva 341
Germany 43, 45, 75, 77, 173, 287, 306, 322,
333, 335, 341-343, 349, 353
Graves Peter, 351
Great Britain 30, 44, 45, 75, 77. 173, 191,
192, 200, 202, 211, 214, 220-223, 226,
260, 268, 331, 340-345, 350
Grew, Joseph C. 336
Guide, The 262
Henry Pu-Yi (abdicated Emperor Huan
Tung, later Japanese puppet ruler in
‘Manchukuo’) 56, 96, 206, 310
Hitler, Adolf 267, 322, 343
Ho Yin-Ching (General and follower of
Chiang Kai-Shek) 240, 281
Hollington Tong (English Teacher and
friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) x, 47
II Sin Hua Daily News, 347
Hsu Chien (pro-Cornmunist follower of
Sun Yat-Sen) 260, 265-267, 270
Hsu Chung-Chih (General and friend of
Chiang Kai-Shek) 93, 94, 100, 102, 105-
108, 114, 117, 118, 126, 129-132, 135, 142,
147, 149-151, 158, 162-168, 172, 196, 198,
204, 216, 218, 225, 228, 229, 237, 297,
298, 301
Hsu Shih-Chang (President of Peking
Government) 104, 111, 131, 140, 157, 158,
170
Hu Han-Min (follower of Sun Yat-Sen)
121, 160, 188-190, 193-196, 203, 204, 206,
216, 223-229, 237, 239, 245, 248, 256,
271, 278, 281, 293, 303-305, 307, 338
Huang Fu (friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) 288
Huang Hsing (revolutionary) 115, 116, 149
Hurley P., General 352-354
Imperialists 200, 259, 269, 272
Indemnity (Boxer) 45, 169
India 344, 345, 350
International ^ttlement (Shanghai) 221
269
Italy 45, 173, 306, 322, 333, 341-343,
349
Japan 30, 34. 43, 45. 46, 49, 54, 57, 77, 82.
83. Ill, 112, 133, 169, 173, 188, 192,211.
287-290, 294, 295, 299, 306-312, 317-323.
332-345, 348, 349, 352, 353
Ioffe, Adolf 170-175, 181, 188, 190, 218
Kaiser (German) 266. 267
Kalinin, Michall Ivan 176, 177
Kant, Immanuel 74
Karakhan, Leo 169, 170, 181
Korea 34, 348
Ku Ching-Lien (Chiang Kai-Shek’s tutor)
42, 46, 48
Ku Nai-Ping (revolutionary) 70, 73
Ku Meng-Yu (follower of Sun Yat-Sen)
248
Kuang Hsu (Emperor) 30, 31, 43, 56, 57, 63
Kung, H. H. (formerly Minister of Finance)
285
Kuo Min Tang 34, 51, 77, 80, 81, 93, 95, 96,
100, 125, 127, 129, 157, 161, 163, 171,
172, 176, 179, 182-190, 192, 194, 196,
199, 200, 207, 209, 213, 215, 221, 223,
234-237, 240, 241, 246-248, 250, 251,
253, 255, 258-262, 264, 267, 270-274,
277, 278, 281, 282, 286, 291-293, 299-301,
304, 309, 321, 334, 338-340, 342, 345-349,
353, 354, 355, 358
Kwangsi campaign 126, 128, 131, 132, 135,
139, 162,
Kwangsi clique 100, 113-115, 130, 133,
139, 198
Kwei Yun-Chin (General and follower of
Sun Yat Sen) xu, 327
League of Nations 306
Lenin. Nikolay 104, 170, 171, 176,^ 178,
192, 210, 257
Leveson, Sir Arthur C., Admiral 191
Li Hou-Chi (War Lord and Governor of
Fukien) 100-102, 108, 109, 112
Li Shih-Tseng (follower of Sun Yat-Sen)
264, 279, 281
Li Ta-Chao (Communist and member of
Kao Min Tang) 261, 262
Li Tsung-Jen (Kwangsi General and now
Vice President of China) 241, 281, 290,
300
Li Yuan-Hung (the Buddha) 72, 80, 85. 95.
158, 166, 170, 180,.
Liao Chung-Kai (follower of Sun Yat-Sen
and friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) 148-150,
162, 163, 172, 173, 188-190, 194, 196.
210, 218, 224, 225, 226, 227-229, 235-237
Lin Chu-Han (Communist and member of
Kuo Min Tang) 239
Lin Sen (formerly President of China) 308,
318, 347
Lincoln, Abraham 187
Liu Chen-Huan (General of the Kwangsi
Army) 197
Lung Yu (Empress Dowager) 71, 73
Manchus 7, 23, 28, 30, 42, 44, 46, 48, 52,
68. 69, 70, 73, 75, 77, 144, 147, 191, 268
Manchuria (“Manchukuo”) 56, 310, 333,
348, 353, 355, 356
Mao, Mr (Chiang’s tutor) 34, 40
Mao Tse-Tung (Communist and formerly
member of Kuo Min Tang) 213, 237,
247, 386, 353, 354
March 20th Incident 243
Marco Polo Bridge Incident 334, 335
Marshall, General George 354-357
Marx, Karl 178, 329
Mencius 22, 35, 221, 284
Merchants Corps 79, 187, 194, 200-205
214, 215
Mongolia 76, 175-177, 211, 317, 323, 353
Moukden Incident 306
Mussolini, Benito 266, 322, 343
396
Nagaoka, General 58, 65
Nanking Road Massacre 220, 260
National Assembly 355, 356
National Government (Nanking) 271, 276,
281, 282, 290, 294-296, 299, 306, 31 1
Navy (British) 154, 191, 202, 214, 222, 268
Navy (Chinese) 78, 79, 86, 87, 97. 133, 147,
149, 151-153, 157, 202, 220, 243. 244,
271, 337
Nelson, Donald 352
New Life Movement 315, 316, 339, 361-372,
Northern Government (Peking) 21, 111,
129-135, 140, 166-171, 181, 182, 189, 191
201, 205, 234, 249, 260, 261
Northern Punitive Expedition 97, 127, 128,
141-157, 186, 201-207, 216, 220, 234, 235,
238, 241, 246-250. 255, 262. 265, 267, 271,
272, 275-278, 280, 283, 286, 288, 290,
295, 297, 298, 300, 310, 358
“Old Comrades,” see Western Hills Con-
ference
Paris Peace Treaty (1919), 111, 169, 287
Pearl Harbour 341, 343. 344
Peking Government, see Nothern Govern-
ment
People’s Party, see Kuo Ming Tang
People’s Political Council 339, 343
People’s Representative Convention 83
People’s United Front 321, 322, 326
Pescadores Islands 348
Political Consultative Conference 354
Portugal 30, 192
Quo Tai-Chi (follower of Sun Yat-Sen and
formerly Ambassador to London) xii, 310
Record of the Independence of Chekiang
70
“Red Bandits Suppression” 312, 323
Reformers 43, 44, 63
Resurgent China Society 34, 43, 51, 64
Righteous Harmonious Boxers 44, 169, 191
Rising Sun News 57
Roosevelt, Franklin D, 347, 348, 349, 351,
352
Roy, M. N. 272
Russia 43, 45, 46, 75, 76, 77, 104, 133, 169,
171, 173, 175-178, 181, 182, 185, 188-192,
195, 198, 199. 207, 209-213, 222-224, 229,
233, 236, 240-245, 248, 250, 254, 259,
261, 263, 270, 272, 273, 291, 301. 313,
337, 341, 343, 354, 355
Saika Gakyo (Japanese Language School)
50
San Francisco Conference 353
San Min Chu I Youth Group 339
Shakee Massacre 220, 222, 225, 260
Shameen 221
Shao Yuan-Chung (follower of Sun Yat-
Sen) 105, 106
Shen Hung-Ying (General of the Kwangsi
Army) 139, 162-168
Shih Ching-Tang (ancient traitor) 259
Shimoda, Sergt. 60. 65
Sian 105, 147, 285, 289, 322, 323-332, 335
Sian: A Coup d' Etat 323, 330
Sino-Russian Treaty 337, 341, 353, 354
Society of Moral Endeavour 316, 317, 339
Some Reflections on my Fiftieth Birthday*
319, 373-378
Soong Mci-Ling, see Chiang Kai-Shek,
Madame
Soong, T. V. (brother of Madame Sun
Yat-Sen, Madame Chiang Kai-Sck, and
Madame H.H. Rung) 237, 282,285, 300,
329, 353
Stalin, Joself210, 321
Stilwell, Jos. W. 345, 349, 350-352
Stuart, Leighton 354, 356
Sun Chuan-Fang (War Lord) 234, 249, 250,
251, 256-259, 269, 274, 281, 287, 288
Sun Fo (Sun Yat-Sen’s son) 308, 309
Sun-JofFe Manifesto 174, 190
Sun Yat-Sen (founder of Kuo Min Tang
and Father of the Republic) 20, 21, 30, 31,
34, 42, 46. 49, 50. 51, 55, 61, 64, 68, 69,
72, 73, 76, 79, 81. 82, 92-105, 111-118,
121-168, 171-175, 178-182, 185-212,
217-219, 223-228, 233-235, 242-247,
253, 255, 256-262, 269, 270, 276, 290,
291, 294, 297, 298, 327, 334, 338, 339,
342
Sun Yat-Sen, Madame (jiee Soon Ching-
Ling) 237, 282, 285
Sun Yat-Sen Society 199
Sung Chiao-Jen (follower of Sun Yat-Sen)
76, 77
Tai Chi-Tao (follower of Sun Yat-Sen and
friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) 118-124, 126,
136, 179
T’ai P’ing Kingdom (and Rebellion) 13, 15,
30, 42
Tan Ping-Shan (Communist and Member
of Kuo Min Tang ) 196, 237, 239, 247
Tang Sheng-Chih (General) 248
Tan Yen-Kai (Scholar, General and
follower of Sun.Yat-Sen) 206, 21 6, 225, 229
Tangku Truce 311
Teng Keng (General in Cantonese Army)
99, 101, 103, 112, 129, 131, 143
Teng Yen-Ta (formerly Member of Kuo
Min Tang, later Communist) 265, 266,
267, 270
Third International 179, 181, 223, 244, 247,
272
Three Principles of the People 51, 55, 187,
198. 246, 247, 263, 299, 334, 339
Tibet 76, 211
Tokyo Daily News 60
Trotsky, Leo 176, 177, 178, 210
Tsai Kung-Shih (diplomat, murdered by
Japanese) 287
Tsai Yuan-Pei (Member of Kuo Min
Tang and late Chancellor of Peking
University) 281
Tsao Kun (War Lord and bribing President
of Peking Government) 140, 147, 166,
170, 180, 182, 201, 202, 206, 234, 249,
295
Tseng Yuen (Governor of Chekiang) 67
Tsinan Incident 288, 289, 295
Tzu Hsi (Empress Dowager) 30, 43-46, 56
Tuan Chi-Jui (War Lord and Chief
Executive of Peking Government) 71, 96,
97, 104, 140, 147, 180, 206-208, 234. 249,
258, 260, 261
Tung Meng Hui (see China Union)
Unequal Treaties 175, 207, 208, 268. 344,
379, 383
397
Union of Military Youth 199, 200
United States of America 39, 45, 77, 133,
173, 191, 192, 211, 268, 340, 341, 343,
344, 345, 349, 350-353
Voice of the Army, The 73
Wang Ching-Wei (formerly follower of
Sun Yat-Sen, later traitor) 160, 163, 180,
188-190. 194-196, 207, 218, 220, 223-
225, 229. 237-239. 242. 244, 245, 248,
256, 263, 264, 269-272, 274, 280, 281,
292-294, 296. 299, 301, 303-305, 307-
309, 338-340, 342
Wang Ping-Nan (Communist spokesman)
356
Wang Shih-Chieh (Minister for Foreign
Affairs) 353
War Lords 95, 130, 140, 157, 158, 162, 167,
170, 186, 207, 232-234, 249-253, 255.
256, 259. 261, 266, 269, 272, 274, 276,
277. 282. 289, 290, 291, 295
Wedemeyer, A. C., General 352
Wellington Koo (diplomat) 181, 261
Western Hills Conference 235, 236, 238,
240, 245. 293. 303
Western Powers 169, 191, 198, 207, 221,
260, 269
Whampoa Academy 182-185. 188, 196,
197, 199, 201-204, 206, 218, 222, 224
227, 246, 265, 266
Wu, C. C. (diplomat) 225, 237
Wu Chih-Hui (follower of Sun Yat-Sen
and friend of Chiang Kai-Shek) 279, 281
Wu Pci-Fu (the Scholar-General among
the War Lords) 140, 147, 166, 170, 205,
206, 220, 234, 249, 250, 251, 256-259,
262. 263, 269, 274, 288, 295
Wu Ting- Fang, (diplomat and friend of Sun
Yat-Sen) 225
Yang Hu (follower of Sun Yat-Sen) 86, 88
Yang Hu-Cheng (General of Sian Coup)
303, 318, 322, 325, 326^-329, 331
Yang Hsi-Min (General of the Yuannesc
Army) 197
Yeh Chu (rebel General) 147-151, 154
Yen Hsi-Shan (General and Governor of
Shansi) 286-288, 290, 291, 293, 294, 300,
301, 303, 305
Yenan 345, 347. 353, 356
Young China Party 353, 354
Y.M.C.A. 316, 339
Yuan Shih-Kai (foremost War Lord and
First President of Peking Government)
50, 63, 71-73, 76-84, 86-90, 95, 96, 104,
133, 189
Zinoviev 176
398
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