Frustrated and Aware
Knowing When Disagreement Is Deep
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v45i1.8444Keywords:
deep disagreement, epistemic emotion, frustration, naïve realism biasAbstract
Abstract: How do we know that we are in a deep disagreement – i.e. disagreement irresolvable by rational means? Some suggest, we know that only after trying out all our rational arguments. However, such strategy risks backfiring by polarizing the parties. This paper proposes an alternative way of recognizing depth. Drawing on epistemic capacity of emotions, I argue that debater’s emotional experience during deep disagreement, namely frustration, functions as an indicator of the disagreement’s depth.
Résumé: Comment savons-nous que nous sommes en profond désaccord, c'est-à-dire insoluble par des moyens rationnels ? Certains suggèrent que nous ne le savons qu'après avoir présenté tous nos arguments rationnels. Cependant, une telle stratégie risque de se retourner contre nous en polarisant les parties. Cet article propose une autre façon de reconnaître la profondeur du désaccord. En m'appuyant sur la capacité épistémique des émotions, je soutiens que l'expérience émotionnelle du débatteur lors d'un profond désaccord, à savoir la frustration, fonctionne comme un indicateur de la profondeur du désaccord.
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