Reflection

This chapter wraps up Part II of the book. Toward that end, I offer some final replies to Rasmussen’s concerns for Liberal Naturalism, further clarifying the view and its merits. I then raise some concerns about Rasmussen’s appeal to perfection as an explanatory stopping point. I conclude the chapter by reflecting on how much progress we’ve made in our search for the existence and nature of foundational reality: We agree that the foundation is necessary in some sense, that it includes principles of reason and morality, and that it may well include both irreducibly physical and phenomenal properties. Our main differences are therefore few. I therefore gesture toward the final section of the book, which focuses on whether the foundation of reality is good.

1. 1.

   The canonical formulation of the objection is White (2005).

2. 2.

   For detailed discussion, see, e.g., Manson (2009), Oppy (2006), and Sober (2019).

3. 3.

   Cf. Manson (2009).

4. 4.

   Ibid.

5. 5.

   Ibid, p. 277.

6. 6.

   Ibid.

Authors and Affiliations

1. El Camino College, Torrance, CA, USA

   Felipe Leon

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Correspondence to Felipe Leon .

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