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Estimation of enteric methane emission factors for Ndama cattle in the Sudanian zone of Senegal
Methane (CH 4 ) emission estimations for cattle in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) reflect limited production levels and diets that are high in cellulose...
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Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment
We investigate how, in a situation with two players in which noncooperation is the only equilibrium, cooperation can be achieved via costly...
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Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de (1743–1794)
Condorcet was a French mathematician and philosopher. With many of his fellow encyclopédistes he shared the conviction that social sciences are...
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Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de (1743–1794)
Condorcet was a French mathematician and philosopher. With many of his fellow encyclopédistes he shared the conviction that social sciences are...
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Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de (1743–1794)
Condorcet was a French mathematician and philosopher. With many of his fellow encyclopédistes he shared the conviction that social sciences are...
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Cores and large cores when population varies
In a TU cooperative game with population N , a monotonic core allocation allocates each surplus v (S) among the agents of coalition S in such a way that...
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Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
Two microeconomic models of joint ownership are discussed: the division of unproduced commodities and the joint production of a single output by a...
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Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
A cooperative venture yields a nonnegative surplus. Agents are differentiated by their opportunity costs only. Two surplus sharing methods (equal...
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Choosing from a tournament
A tournament is any complete asymmetric relation over a finite set A of outcomes describing pairwise comparisons. A choice correspondence assigns to...
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Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
A choice function picks some outcome(s) from every issue (subset of a fixed set A of outcomes). When is this function derived from one preference...
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Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
When preferences are single peaked the choice functions that are independent of irrelevant alternatives both in Nash's and in Arrow's sense are...
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On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
This paper investigates one of the possible weakening of the (too demanding) assumptions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. Namely we deal with a...
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Two and three person games: A local study
Using the tools of differential geometry two-person games in normal form and their “ordinary” points, i.e. the points which are not equilibria in any...
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Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
In this paper we propose a new class of games, the “strategically zero-sum games,” which are characterized by a special payoff structure. We show...
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Rationalité et Formation des coalitions dans un jeu régulier à n joueurs
Nous envisageons un jeu à n joueurs sous forme normale $$(0)u:{\sum...
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Extension of 2 Person Zero Sum Game
Let X and Y “be the pure strategy sets of 2 players Xavier and Yves. Then every payoff function g: X × Y → R defin es a 2 person zero sum game where...
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