Nabokov's final Russian-language novel, The Gift, includes a devastating mini-biography of Chernyshevsky, ostensibly written by the protagonist. Think of it as a Russian equivalent to Twain on Fenimore Cooper. That it happens to be the best biography of Chernyshevsky available in English (translated by Nabokov's son) is icing on the cake.
The whole novel is great, but Chapter 5 (the biography) is a beautiful introduction to possibly the worst writer in all of Russian literature.
I did not know that, I have not read The Gift, will do now. I read Nabakov's biography (my version Speak, Memory) and do not remember him mentioning Chernyshevsky there either. I will re-read. Thank you.
Alexander Dugin is one intellectual I can think of, but the change he is talking about is not about changing Russian's current course, but rather paving the way forward given the current Russian regime's course.
American professor Mearsheimer has interesting interviews with Dugin discussing foreign policy and US-RU relations
The author of "Foundations of Geopolitics"? He has essentially engineered the current Russian geopolitical strategy. It is breathtakingly cynical and remarkably effective. Why can't Russia be as good at making their citizens wealthy, happy, and healthy as they are at manipulating politics in other countries and creating fake culture wars to divide and weaken their "enemies" which they seem to think is almost everyone.
> Why can’t Russia be as good at making their citizens wealthy, happy, and healthy as they are at manipulating politics in other countries and creating fake culture wars to divide and weaken their “enemies” which they seem to think is almost everyone.
People in the Western world misunderstand Dugin's idea of Eurasianism. Dugin's critique is fair and has strong moral and historical ground.
Eurasianism is mirror like response to Western led EU/NATO alliance.
The problem with EU/NATO is Western countries have little to zero regard to the wellbeing of the Global South, and only pillage and drain resources (decades of American forever wars in Global South that only stole resources and caused deaths and refugees as an example)
Eurasianism is the idea that global south should unite economically/militarily just like EU/NATO and look after each other, because neighbouring countries in Eurasia are landlocked and have strong incentive to cooperate and coexist peacefully.
In fact it is influence from the US/EU/NATO that sows chaos and wars that destabilizes the global south.
thats the idea: Eurasian states should cooperate with each other, and not be used as a battering ram against Russia (prime examples are Georgia and Ukraine, both had have healthy economic relations with Russia until 2008 when Bush G.W. decided to give NATO ascension and these countries were used by NATO as a disposable battering ram)
I doubt those are the sorts of intellectuals meant in this context! Although interesting how Mearsheiner blames Eastern European countries' NATO membership for the Ukraine war, whilst Dugin has literally called for Russian expansion via conquest since the 90's.
At least as far as American geopolitical dominance is concerned, the Marxist revolutions in both Russia's Empire and China were probably the best thing that could have happened to the U.S.
Without going into deeply detailed arguments for why, they essentially threw these large, geographically and socially rich countries back by decades from levels of wealth and power that they could have achieved much earlier to become stronger rivals for dominance before was actually the case in modern history.
The USSR did eventually industrialize itself into a major military and economic power under Stalin, but only at grotesque cost in human lives, resources and efficiency that first had to overcome the vast destruction that had happened between 1917 and 1933 or so. The Nazi invasion didn't help after that but the communist system had already done considerable damage by itself.
This is not what history tells. What we get is: the only time that western hegemony was threatened by non-western countries in modern times, they followed a variation of Marxism with revolutionary origin. Countries that did not followed this path, failed to threaten western hegemony. Despite some of them managing to get some wealth becoming partners of the west if they have a communist neighbor, at the cost of having a subordinate relationship, forfeiting some sovereignty and military control so that they cannot threaten western hegemony.
When Russia embraced capitalism, they become a shadow of what they once where, and the main threat to West hegemony is now a socialist country that managed to retain and adapt their communist path to the change of times.
This is confirmed by the western actions, that always resort to violence to prevent marxist parties to have influence in any country and create strong economic sieges against the ones that succeed, instead of encouraging them.
What you say is mostly either mistaken or blindly ideological nonsense. In the late 19th and very early 20th centuries, Russia was one of the most powerful economies in the world. Under Marxist rule it first fell backward severely and only later, at immense cost in human lives and waste, industrialized and militarized to a level strong enough to make it a political competitor of the United States.
However, during this prolonged period of industrialized communist administration, it slowly hollowed itself out until (without taking a more market oriented path, regardless of what political system it maintained), the USSR was a shell masquerading as a powerful force, leading to its economic collapse. The country could have maintained the communist facade and authoritarian government, while streamlining internally through capitalistic mechanisms, but it didn't before simply dissolving, and thus the sheer poverty that it had brought itself to, absent real economic reforms, was laid bare by the end of the 1980's.
Had the Russian Empire simply maintained the pseudo-capitalistic system under authoritarian rule that was the case under the czars, or even embraced the progressive liberal socialist (but partly capitalist) system that it was starting to develop between the February 1917 revolution and the Bolshevik coup of late 1917, Russia could have grown enormously and early as both an economic and political power in a way that would have made it into a very strong power indeed leading up to the 21st century.
It was soviet communism that slowly destroyed it, but first it did make it stronger through the sheer brute force of command industrialization and militarization at all costs, these mainly being huge and completely unsustainable costs in resources, sound economic practice and human life. This industrialized strengthening under a communist command economy was not at all sustainable for the long run in the case of the USSR. It had no choice but to either rot and collapse, or reform into a guided authoritarian market economy as happened in China (coming to that momentarily)
The chaotic lunacy of post-1991 Russia had little to do with any sort of functional, organized market system. It was instead closer to a stateless anarchy with a minimal, dysfunctional facade of a working central government riding on top of it. It was only after consolidation of administrative control under Putin that Russia started to redevelop economically, though still very imperfectly because under Putin too, things remain deeply corrupt, often poorly administered, though more functional and closely controlled by central authority than they were under Yeltsin.
In the case of China, it only became a truly serious competitor to U.S. dominance once it started embracing market economics and completely abandoning centralized, command economy communism as of the 1980's. Prior to that, with the exception of a very big army and possession of the nuclear bomb (produced also at huge human cost), it was in most ways a very backward, clumsy power, albeit one with enough sheer weight to have at least some regional push.
Modern China is by far closer to a fascist, authoritarian capitalist economy than a country following anything resembling a communist path. In other words, it has more in common with the Nationalist system envisioned (but very, very ineptly implemented) by Chiang Kai Shek than with anything that the Marxist Chairman Mao had in mind. If the ghosts of both men are by chance wandering the landscape of modern China, I think it would be Chiang who you'd find nodding in approval much more often than Mao.
Ironic really, but definitely not a case of capitalism weakening political power.
Telling a long story do not transform it in true. Your story is more based on western ideology in propaganda. Notice that it was not able to neither explain nor counter the facts that supports my version:
* The west is very afraid when a competitor follows Marxism. It is something that it tries to avoid at all costs, and employs the maximum violence to prevent any country to become communist. A country becoming fascist? Not a big deal. Religious fanatics is taking the power? Well, the west helped a lot of them in the past and in the present. But becoming communist? This never is allowed.
* The only time that western hegemony was threatened by non-western countries in modern times, they followed a variation of Marxism with revolutionary origin.
These two facts are completely at odds with your explanation.
You defend that Marxism was detrimental to the development of the countries. Of course, everyone agrees, even Marxists, that the years following a revolution are very hard and it takes time to recover, both because of the internal struggle, and because the western countries launch a violent offensive trying to destroy by military force the revolution. And yet, even with this problem, no non-western country ever was able to threaten western hegemony, except after adopting Marxist theory. And several of them tried.
Russia was a feudal country at the time of revolution. It was in the past considered a traditional and powerful country, but at the time they had become very backward country, with feudal serfdom and very little industries. This can be seen in how humiliatingly they lost a war with Japan. Japan, and all European countries were much more modern than Russia. And after revolution, in some decades, they were sending satellites to space, spaceships to the moon, before all other countries, even USA. This is a fact. You can use the "No true Scotsman" argument, saying that they are not capitalist enough, and this explains why they are a shadow of their past. But when they were more capitalist? At that time in the past, when they were doing huge leaps and developing at astonishing speed or nowadays?
You talk a lot about "huge human costs". You are aware that capitalism genocided an entire continent to develop, right? And after this, for a long time, we had first slavery, then brutal colonialism, followed by great war between capitalist powers disputing colonies and markets... I do not know any other system that had a so high human cost.
Moreover,having markets it is not at odds with Marxism and communism. Even Lenin tried to develop some form of marked based on cooperatives in USSR. True communist cannot succeed isolated in a capitalist world anyway. In my definition, what defines a country as socialist, (or "communist" using the naming more common in USA) is which is the dominant class. The bourgeoisie in China indeed have power and is taken into account, but I do not think that the country is ruled by bourgeoisie and the capital, like in capitalist countries. But I know that this is a polemic opinion. Anyway, they still have five-year plans and centralize long-term decisions. And indeed, they are being successful into achieving their long-term centralized goals.
As all hypothetical questions about the past, it's hard to say. From the PoV of a common citizen, people were as poor before the revolution as after it. Also, the rise of Stalin and WWII add enormous noise to the equation.
In any case, the best we can do is to have a look at the countries that adopted Communism (the Eastern bloc) and compare them with their neighbors that didn't (have to). From that perspective, the answer is clear.
OTOH, if instead of Stalin Russia had a wise ruler, if instead of a police state it allowed people to explore various ideas and develop them, I bet we could see some very interesting results.
Thanks for the considered response. I guess it was a provocative question.
Regarding this: "the best we can do is to have a look at the countries that adopted Communism (the Eastern bloc) and compare them with their neighbors that didn't (have to)"
This does feel like an informative perspective. I suppose it assumes that Eastern bloc countries would be left to their own devices in the absence of the Lenin/Stalin USSR, which may be fairly safe to assume.
Some emigrated or fled; some (if they had leadership aspirations) were killed or imprisoned; and many may be keeping their heads low so as to avoid drawing attention from the current regime. Unfortunately.
>I wonder where all these Russian intellectuals sparking social changes are now? Their country needs them, the world needs them.
Like Lenin? I mean - yeah, he was an intellectual. He was also the one who in his letters and written orders expressed the will to terrorise and kill more people than some can imagine.
PS: just trying to point out that people sometimes confuse smart\intellectual people and something magical like "good" people.
Russian nationalism/imperialism is a powerful drug that is hard for Russians to unchain their minds from. So even if the intellectuals don't like Putin, Russia becoming a client state of China or wars as such, most of them dislike independent Ukraine even more. Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, Navalny etc etc.
Besides, Russia is "winning" Western elections, and who doesn't like to be on the winning team.
> Russia is "winning" Western elections, and who doesn't like to be on the winning team
Finland and Sweden voted to join NATO; Europe re-arms. Trump may not be pro-Ukraine, but his energy policy will wreck Russia's oil-dependent pocketbook while his China and Iran strategies will also hurt Moscow. Russia's other potential pillar, arms sales, is having its reputation trashed as the world watches 90s-era Western kit take out its "cutting edge" hardware.
Add to that the declining population and it's difficult to see the Russian nation continuing in its present form for more than a few generations. Maybe we'll see an independent Chechnya or even Siberia [1] in our lifetimes.
If Russia is winning I'd hate to see what losing looks like. Even if they manage to finally take Ukraine it's going to be a Pyrrhic victory in the extreme given the losses they've sustained and how the war has expanded NATO and solidified their opposition.
They seem to be pretty successful in sowing discord overseas with their propaganda but it's not getting them much in the long run. Their domestic problems are the biggest thing killing them and hosing the rest of the world down with bullshit won't help them there.
Neither Russian elites nor masses care about “Russia doing better”, the fall of the West is the end in itself, presumably it will assert the greatness of Russia and their version of the end of history will ensue, while wealth of the masses or the bleak demographic prospects won’t change a bit.
I thought so too until the invasion of Ukraine, but it's been increasingly hard to apply this narrow motivation to the world events of late. At least with regards to Putin and his inner circle — the outer oligarchy of Russia is of course just taken for the ride and they would rather it all stopped, but they won't speak up.
Quite a few people arguing for change were murdered/killed. Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny for example. I guess those aren't very intellectual but the intellectuals are probably keeping their heads down to avoid similar fates.
Anna Politkovskaya was an anti Putin writer, also killed by poisoning.
Kasparov is fairly close. "Although I'm half-Armenian, half-Jewish, I consider myself Russian because Russian is my native tongue, and I grew up with Russian culture." He's written a well reviewed book and not been killed just yet. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Winter-Coming-Vladimir-Enemies-Stop...
It's not the of intellectuals that made Russian revolution happen.
Tsar Nicholas II made an unforced error.
Russia was in a war (World War I) and 1905 was already a rebellious year in Russia. It was idiocy to keep 100k forcibly conscripted peasants in the capital. His minister warned Nicolas that it was dangerous but he did not listen. Those troops were very unhappy peasants waiting to be sent to their deaths and communists and others had easy time to convince them to do something else than die.
Vladimir Putin is unlikely to make the same error.
Prighozhin was 1000km away from Moscow and was allowed some freedome only thanks to some limited support of a fraction of population, mostly what you'd call "rednecks".
One call and he had stopped the theatrics. And was zeroed two months later.
> Prighozhin was 1000km away from Moscow and was allowed some freedome only thanks to some limited support of a fraction of population
Substitute peasants with prisoners and a straight shot to Moscow versus already in and you've got the same situation. Putin didn't have enough materiel between Moscow and Prighozin to keep the fight from getting to Moscow.
> FSO alone has 50k uniformed troops to protect Moscow from the Army or any other attack from the periphery
Hence why I said "Putin didn't have enough materiel between Moscow and Prighozin to keep the fight from getting to Moscow." Prighozin couldn't have unilaterally seized Moscow. But he could have brought the fight to it. At that point, a new set of political calculations--ones I'm not qualified to speculate about--come into play.
He had no change. He started the rebellion from desperation in the first place. The end came quickly when FSB was threatening the family members of the group leaders.
Putin can be toppled, but it will be just rearrangement among powerful groups. There is no change of popular rebellion or intellectuals pushing change in Russia.
>Putin didn't have enough materiel between Moscow and Prighozin to keep the fight from getting to Moscow.
Putin had at least 600k military personnel around the country at the time (200k even if we take into the account that a good part of this number are paperworkers and such). Not to mention all kinds of police, special units etc.
This was a political problem for him (using your own military against Prighozhin would at least make him look week or even illegitimate at the time). Not a "technical".
He's in a much-stronger position than the Tsar was. The peasants in Moscow were the proximate cause of the Tsar's fall, but it wasn't the ultimate one.
What social changes do they need to make? Things are better now for them than they were the last time Westerners went in trying to remold Russia in their own image.
The thing is, Russians are deeply uncomfortable with actual democratic openness. Read about the reactions of normal people to watching televised political debates in the 90s. It inspired pure panic, as people had never seen anything but utter certainty from their leaders. Perhaps it's changed a bit now, but I really really doubt it. Russians are genuinely more comfortable with a strongman in charge even if it means they live in shit. At least they are familiar with the shit.
> Russians are genuinely more comfortable with a strongman in charge even if it means they live in shit. At least they are familiar with the shit
At which point a monarchy makes sense.
Dictatorships are unstable. They tie the fate of an immortal nation to the mortal whims and needs of a man. We came up with monarchy as a solution to this problem, and then swept it away when the modern republic was invented.
But republics aren't for everyone. Democracy requires compromise, and staring the uncertain and unknowable honestly in the eye. It may be high time that we admit that some populations prefer the certainty of autocracy. And within the ___domain of autocracy, the time-tested model is heridatory constitutional monarchy.
I think you're missing the biggest strengths/weaknesses of the two systems.
The biggest strength of autocracy is the ability to be more long-sighted. Democracy, taken to it's natural extremes, leads to a system where you have representatives spending most of their time in office planning for the next election, which is to say fund raising and focusing on things that'll pay-off before the next election cycle.
So you get an obsession on the very short-term stuff, and a tendency to trend towards oligarchy (though Plato would claim it trends to tyranny).
But the problem with autocracy (that monarchy only exasperates) is that a single bad leader can undo generations of achievements of skilled leaders. Aurelius was one of the wisest and most capable leaders to have lived. His only son was one of the worst.
Democracy's weakness is it's strength there - even the most inept (or perhaps senile) leader can't do that much and they'll be out of office in a few years anyhow.
----
Also, as I seem to end up debating with you in these little geopol threads often enough - let us hold one another to our predictions. Told ya on South Korea. ;)
And now as a random reader 7 hours later -- surely you must share that post/prediction with others! I'm too curious and your comment history is fairly dense.
It was in the midst of the 'Korean crisis' about 30 days ago. We were initially debating on what would happen.
My debate partner was under the might makes right pov, and felt that a person in power defacto declaring themselves dictator was sufficient to enact such, regardless of their popularity, particularly when reasonably enabled by law.
I was arguing that autocracy, in spite of lack of accountability, generally cannot sustain itself without relatively broad support.
Once it became clear that South Korea was in no mood to let an unpopular man declare himself dictator, we then debated his fate. I predicted death/imprisonment (as is practically a tradition in South Korean politics) while my debate partner was expecting him to get away scot-free, impeached at worst, arguing that no laws were broken in the President's attempt.
> my debate partner was expecting him to get away scot-free, impeached at worst, arguing that no laws were broken in the President's attempt
I never said this. What I may have argued is folks in the military following orders (note: not top brass) were not clearly breaking any laws so long as parliament hadn't overturned the martial law order.
> a person in power defacto declaring themselves dictator was sufficient to enact such, regardless of their popularity, particularly when reasonably enabled by law
Out of order, but I would have never said this either. No man rules alone is like rule one of politics. Rule two is the law flows from power; being legally correct and politically wrong is a historical footnote to losing power.
Interesting, especially as I'd have to say that events have proven both of you right from my perspective:
- soldiers gladly obeyed orders to essentially end all democracy
- soldiers mostly seemed to stop obeying their dictator's orders when they got confused about who's even in charge and what was legally standing rather than the public will.
- Yoon is not dead, not even imprisoned
Given all that mess, I can see aspects of both of your claims being true. It's quite interesting!
Fwiw his not being arrested is probably something of a technicality at this point. The government tried to serve an arrest warrant on him but it resulted in a stand of between large numbers of police and large numbers of his entourage, some military, and so on. In the end the police backed down and the drama is only escalating.
The only part accurately summarised is the arrest bit. On that, there is no “told ya.” Yoon has not been arrested. (The chances he may be have gone up. The chances he will be imprisoned have not, in my view, as have those that trying to force his arrest precipitates a halting political crisis.)
This bit, on the other hand, is totally unsubstantiated: “a person in power defacto declaring themselves dictator was sufficient to enact such, regardless of their popularity.” Nobody argued that.
Also: “I was arguing that autocracy, in spite of lack of accountability, generally cannot sustain itself without relatively broad support.” <— You never said this. The closest we came to this was in what adversarial states would want.
You literally quoted me saying as much in the other thread, then tried to mock it:
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[me, quoted by you] maintaining power without relatively widespread support is quite difficult
[you] Strange claim in a thread about the Korean peninsula.
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I'm sure you know that Yoon was/is extremely unpopular. This was the crux of the issue. If Yoon had an 80% approval, I believe he would be the dictator of South Korea today instead of impeached and with a warrant out for his arrest.
Now obviously you agree with that as well. So where did we disagree? Right, on what happens when an unpopular man tries to declare himself dictator.
> Russia already tried monarchy and it didn't end too well
They also tried democracy and failed wholly at that.
Russia tried monarchy as an empire and with an absolute ruler. Something like the Kuwaiti monarchy might suit them better. Though I’m not sure it works since the modern Russian state sort of remains an empire, something made clear by their conscription discrepancies between Moscow and peripheries.
Louis XVI had a weak but what we would call progressive reign. Louis enacted religious tolerance, abolished imprisonment without trial, and abolished letters de cachet which subjected the monarchy edicts to approval of regional parliaments.
Russians were open for open liberal reforms and to become part of the EU and Western world.
People were sick of Communist rule and praised US culture.
The problem is that US/EU betrayed liebral reforms in Russia with the goal of dismantling the state.
USA supported liberal reforms in Central Europe/Warsaw pact countries like Hungary Romania Poland where shock therapy provided transition from communist economy to liberal market economy, and their currency was supported by the IMF/WB/US from severe shocks.
US literally lent money to Central European countries to ease their transition and not kill their economies.
According to Jeff Sachs, the author of shock therapy in Poland, the same shock therapy was prescribed to Russia, but no support was provided. Russian liberal reforms were betrayed by USA. Which led to severe currency and economic crisis.
Crisis led to garage sale of all state assets and privatization by foreign financial groups (oligarchs), which created a very deep sense of unfairness among Russians. This led to ascencion of Putin as he returned some of that unfairly privatized property from oligarchs
>Russians are deeply uncomfortable with actual democratic openness
>It inspired pure panic, as people had never seen anything but utter certainty from their leaders
Russians are not uncomfortable with actual democratic openness. There were periods in Russian history when actual democratic openness was an option. Right before the USSR formation and around 1990s
The problem is that after 1991 you've got a few generations of people who are used to ussr socialism and its ways and guarantees.
You can't expect people to switch from one way of thinking to the other. The state had beed paying them all their lives. Sometime only because they had some kind of job at all. Many of them developed an addiction to their "salary for existence".
You can't go and tell them that starting tommorow they will have to compete on a market that is yet to be build. And that the whole new shiny system like that of the West will be functional 2-3 decades later. And right after they were playing (from their perspective) the same game waiting for the communism.
Fellow intellectual Lenin started killing them, Stalin finished the job. And no, the country didn't need them then and they don't need them now (see Russian history of the twentieth century for more details).
As Stalin has been quoted as saying "A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic"-- subsequent purges/famines following the revolution resulting in roughly 25% of the Russian population (without even counting WWII casualties) being killed, so it's not exactly a strong sell for "intellectuals sparking social changes".
Years ago I read an introduction to a collection of Chekhov's letters that provided an illuminating context to the intellectual & aesthetic climate of Russia in the 19th century. It explained that authors like Chernyshevsky asserted that all novels, really all art, ought to be of a politically salient character; that it ought to highlight the suffering the marginal & subaltern. So many of the authors we now revere -- Dostoevsky, Chekhov, even Tolstoy, aroused the ire of the Russian intelligentsia for failing to meet this standard, for writing for purposes other than political and revolutionary utility. The introduction asserted that this was an overwhelmingly unanimous sentiment among the Russian left.
I like to recommend Ivan Turgenev's "Fathers and Sons" as it gives a contemporary critical view of the nihilistic and utopian ideologies that shaped Russian intellectual discourse of the 1860s.
Currently reading The Brothers Karamazov for the first time and while I knew it was supposed to contain a lot of theological/philosophical ideas, it's also very political. Socialism was already in the air in 1870s Russia such that it's often discussed by characters in the novel.
There's one scene where one of the Russian nobleman who has often lived in Paris suggests to some Russian Orthodox priests that he had heard it said in Paris that the worst socialists were not the atheistic ones, but the Christian Socialists. The Priest takes umbrage with this asking if the nobleman was lumping these priests into that category. This on the heels of a multi-page discussion on the separation of church and state and whether the state will eventually subsume the church or whether the church will eventually subsume the state.
Socialism was discussed in many countries in the 19th century. There was still no widespread idea that socialism could be a negative for the world (this is a direct product of the cold war). Intellectuals in countries such as England and Germany were open to developing the idea of a socialist society, and France even had a brief communist revolution.
In the early 19th century the memory of the Münster rebellion was still fresh. IIRC Marx and Engels discussed it. The Münster rebellion didn't go well. But "it's alright, we can always try again!".
> Socialism was already in the air in 1870s Russia such that it's often discussed by characters in the novel.
That's not necessarily a valid conclusion. It is a work of fiction. You can't use it as evidence of what was going on in Russia. At best it can be used as evidence of what were the topics the author were thinking about, and as such an indirect proof of what was discussed in the zeitgeist.
Similarly I could write a book set in 2025's America where everyone constantly talks about how the collapse of the bubblegum markets wiped them out, and discusses the benefits and ills of bubblegum trading. Doesn't make it true.
Sure, but the author is writing with his audience in mind. As I understand it, it started out as serialized stories in a periodical and was popular. If he wrote about something that was completely foreign to his audience it's not likely to have become popular. It really seems like he's having his characters take various positions on topics that were being discussed in the culture.
Perhaps you can appreciate the difference between The Lord of the Rings, which was self-consciously written to be a mythology for England, and The Brother's Karamazov which is set in the middle of the 19th century. We get it Walter, you hate socialism.
I appreciate that, and I'm sure we feel very similarly about the importance of individual freedoms. My snark has to do with the fact that I find your comments on political threads to be ideological and uninteresting, which is disappointing as someone who thinks highly of your work (and talks) on programming.
You can say the same thing about any book ever written, "it's only about what the author was thinking about" - yeah, that's how writing generally works lol.
Between 1991 and 1998 there was an undercover war waged in Great Britain between two warring factions of a secret cabal. At various points one faction or the other controlled the so called "Ministry of Magic" main function of which is to enforce the secrecy of the whole conspiracy.
I know it is true because I read it in a book. Except it is not, it is completely made up and none of it is true. One can accidentally stumble upon true statements in the book. For example there is indeed a Kings Cross station both in the real world London and the fictional one.
> You can say the same thing about any book ever written,
Not really. There are this class of books called "nonfiction" where the stated goal of the author is to write true things. For example if you say "Socialism was already in the air in 1870s Russia, I read it in Peter Kenez's A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End" that would be not mistaken.
This is a truly bizarre and random attack. I don't think OP claimed the book as "proof" of radical socialist fervor in the first place - it's the widely known history, and are we attempting to contradict that?
> You interpreted it as “Socialism is discussed in the novel therefore it was in the air,”
Yes. I still read it that way.
> but that’s not what was said.
If you say so. I re-read the comment and I interpret it the same way still. If we are not using the book as evidence of what was going in Russia, but evidence of what topic was interesting to its audience then I'm happy with that.
Tangent: I would be very interested in an AI produced version of Brothers K, In graphic novel form, Illustrated in the style of Gerhard (of Cerebus fame).
There is an interesting quote by him (regarding the so-called "NATO's expansion"): "This was especially painful in the case of Ukraine, a country whose closeness to Russia is defined by literally millions of family ties among our peoples, relatives living on different sides of the national border. At one fell stroke, these families could be torn apart by a new dividing line, the border of a military bloc."[0]
Paradoxically, it wasn't NATO who did this 20 years later but his beloved Putin.
Before Putin decided to start the war with Ukraine in 2014, the citizens of both countries used to visit the other one very often. There were many Russian tourists in Crimea. The families definitely were not "torn apart" - not even close to what is happening now during the war.
Putin caused the war, but the idea that NATO had no role in it is hard to justify.
The Americans knew that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke Russian intervention, and they did it anyway.[0] What security benefits were to be gained that were worth risking this horrific outcome?
The whole thing reminds me of the British security guarantee for Poland in '39. If it was intended to gin up an excuse to fight, it was masterful. If it was a good-faith attempt at securing the peace, it was asinine and catastrophically counterproductive.
> The Americans knew that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke Russian intervention
Its true that NATO (not just the US) understood that as a Russian concern, and that’s why they acceded to Russia’s demand not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008.
Leading immediately to Russia invading Georgia in 2008, and then invading Ukraine – who had no active efforts on either the Ukraine or NATO side toward NATO membership – in 2014, immediately after Ukraine threw out the Russia-aligned government that had taken over while Russia was militarily occupied in Georgia (unsurprisingly, this invasion led to a renewed Ukrainian interest in NATO membership.)
But given the actual sequence of events, its pretty hard to claim that NATO expansion in Ukraine – which literally was not progressing until after the 2014 invasion – lead to Russian intervention in Ukraine. In fact, both 2008 and 2014 events support the idea that the reason that Russia was concerned about NATO expansion in Georgia and Ukraine is that it would complicate their existing intent to intervene in those countries with or without NATO involvement.
>Leading immediately to Russia invading Georgia in 2008
Encouraging Saakashvili to resolve Georgia's territorial issues by taking over breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And then Russian intervened. [0]
>who had no active efforts on either the Ukraine or NATO side toward NATO membership
The efforts were quite active during pro-Western president's rule and were halted by pro-Ukrainian president.
>Ukraine threw out the Russia-aligned government
No, Yanukovich was thrown out by pro-Western coup 'mid-wifed' by the US. [1]
"The night before the clashes, Right Sector called on all of its members to ready themselves for a "peace offensive" on 18 February. <...> That morning, around 20,000 demonstrators marched on the parliament building as that body was set to consider opposition demands for a new constitution and government. Around 09:45, the demonstrators broke through the police barricade of several personnel-transport trucks near the building of the Central Officers' Club of Ukraine and pushed the cordon of police aside. The clashes started after some two dozen demonstrators moved a police vehicle blocking their path to parliament." [2]
Right Sector is "the right-wing, paramilitary confederation of several ultranationalist organizations" [3]
>that’s why they acceded to Russia’s demand not offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans in 2008
They did something worse:
While NATO consisted of twenty-seven allies, Bush knew that the Alliance was divided right down the middle on the issue. He understood MAP was controversial but he also had many leaders from NATO allies, largely but not only from Central and Eastern Europe, coming through the Oval Office that spring urging him to push for it. In Bush’s mind, the final decision would boil down to a handful of countries and personalities who held the key votes—himself, Merkel, and Sarkozy—and who would be decisive in shifting the debate one way or the other. Bush also sensed a fault line in the German position. While Merkel and Steinmeier both opposed MAP, they did so for very different reasons. In Bush’s mind, Merkel’s thinking was not driven by concern over Russia, which meant she could still be persuaded to move. She, too, believed in the advancement of democracy and freedom and was willing to stand up to Moscow. He hoped he could personally appeal to those instincts over the heads of those in her government who focused, too much, in his mind, on Moscow.
<...> Adamkus stepped in to echo B_sescu’s point: “Do we agree that these countries should become NATO members?” Merkel replied, “We agree on that. Where we don’t agree is on timing.” The response of the three presidents was immediate and spontaneous: “Then let’s write that down!”
<...> Listening to Merkel, the Central and Eastern European leaders sensed an opening. NATO had never before stated explicitly that a country would become a member. None of them had ever had such a pledge. Most of their Western European counterparts, in all likelihood, would never have suggested this approach. They doubted if Merkel’s foreign minister would have either, but he was not in the room. If Merkel agreed, it could be a major step forward. Merkel then took out her pen and wrote on a sheet of paper: “We agree today that Georgia and Ukraine shall one day become members of NATO.” After studying the wording, B_sescu said: “Madame Chancellor, in our part of the world saying ‘one day’ means nothing and does not commit you to anything—it means never.” Kaczy_ski chimed in: “Absolutely.” Merkel agreed to delete “one day” <...>
<...> British prime minister Gordon Brown leaned over to President Bush at the Council table and half-jokingly said, “I am not sure what we did here. I know we did not extend MAP. But I’m not sure we didn’t just make them members of NATO.”
The question now was how Russia would react—and whether Putin would keep his promise to Bush not to create a problem at the summit.
<...> Moscow’s very public goal had of course been to ensure that Georgia and Ukraine did not get MAP. Technically, of course, NATO had not given it to them. But these countries had received something that was arguably better and stronger—an explicit political promise from NATO heads of state that they would one day became members. That had never happened before.
<...> The Russian president was even tougher on Kiev—describing Ukraine as an artificial creation and a state whose final formation was not complete. He noted that large parts of Ukraine were dominated by ethnic Russians and had been given to Ukraine by Moscow in an arbitrary fashion under Stalin, and asked, “Who can say that we do not have interests there?” The issue of NATO membership, he claimed, could threaten the very existence of Ukraine. “We should act very, very carefully. We do not have a right to veto [such a decision] and we probably don’t even want one, but I want all of us to realize, when deciding such issues, that we have our interests there as well.” At the press conference afterwards, Putin was also polite, but he was clear in reaffirming his opposition to NATO enlargement. Russia viewed “the appearance of a powerful military bloc” on its borders “as a direct threat” to its security, he said. “The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice,” he continued. “National security is not based on promises.” [0]
These sort of black and white, good and evil, analogs don't make any sense as NATO is, in large part, a proxy for the US. And we've overthrown, invaded, and destroyed more countries than literally anybody. Multiple of those invasions were also based on fabricated evidence/lies. And when international law, such as the UN, gets in the way - we simply ignore it.
These are not the behaviours of a 'neighbourhood watch.'
> These sort of black and white, good and evil, analogs don't make any sense.
Not black and white but worse and better. And Russia is so much worse (Its main offerings seem to be destruction and thievery) that nearly all of its neighbours tried to join NATO.
I don't think this is an apt analogy. It would be more like "I only robbed your house b/c you threatened to join the neighborhood watch, after twenty years of explicit promises by the neighborhood watch that you wouldn't." And the "neighborhood watch" vs "crime" thing is stacking the deck a bit---in modern society we have a professionalized police force and a norm against vigilante first-strike violence, but sovereign countries can by definition go to war.
This doesn't even mean I "want Russia to win" or whatever, but I definitely would like NATO to put on its adult pants.
after twenty years of explicit promises by the neighborhood watch that you wouldn't
You've been lied to. Instead of propagating the lie, please consider informing yourself. Begin by understanding the fact that any such promises were made to a state that no longer exists by people who were unauthorized to make them. Moving on, consider that nobody spends billions of dollars or Euros preparing to defend themselves against countries who are not a genuine threat to peace and stability, particularly those whose leaders have stated their revanchist goals publicly and unequivocally.
Then, go back to the people who lied to you, ask them why they did so, and ask them not to do it again. Chances are, someone lied to them, too.
What makes NATO proximity so bad for Russia? Do they actually think NATO would use it to launch invasions? Do they have no idea how much Europe hates war and military combat? There are other more likely reasons for Putin to invade Ukraine, such as mineral/crop/nuclear resources and leaving behind an imperial legacy. NATO expansion is almost certainly just the most convenient scapegoat, without which some other justification would be floated.
NATO was created as an anti-Soviet bulwark. The Soviet Union is gone, yet NATO has continued to expand in a manner which seems designed to weaken the strategic position of Russia. Add to that America's history of color revolutions and military aggression, and it would be difficult not to interpret this as anything other than a threat.
Imagine China entered into a "defensive" military alliance with Mexico. Imagine you spoke to a Chinese friend about it, and they demanded that you justify "what makes Chinese proximity so bad for America?", as though the Chinese have just as much reason to place their military assets along our southern border as we do! Would you consider such a question to be in good faith?
> Do they actually think NATO would use it to launch invasions? Do they have no idea how much Europe hates war and military combat?
Within living memory, 10 million Soviets were killed in an unprovoked invasion from Europe. It's hardly unreasonable for them to be concerned.
> Within living memory, 10 million Soviets were killed in an unprovoked invasion from Europe.
Correction. WWII costed Soviet Union between 20 and 30 million lives [0]. Main thrust of the German onslaught in 1941 went through Ukraine. The same happened in WWI when in 1914 Germany and Austria invaded Russia through Ukraine.
I believe the part of the reason why Russians had the highest number of casualties in WWII was the fact that Stalin didn't care about the lives of his citizens and send men to fight in thousands, with another row shooting the ones who wanted to flee.
Because what we called the "Soviet Union" was really just another Russian Empire. No one was particularly concerned about the other Soviet "states" except insofar as to worry about what Russia would order them to do. Hell, half the time we referred to the Soviet Union as "Russia" and "the Russians."
So while the "Soviet Union" is gone, Russia remains, weakened by it's loss of territories, still as irredentist and imperialist as ever. Hence why ex-Soviet and Soviet client-states begged to join.
> Because what we called the "Soviet Union" was really just another Russian Empire. No one was particularly concerned about the other Soviet "states" except insofar as to worry about what Russia would order them to do.
Wow, that sounds pretty bad. But I seem to remember that when Ukraine unilaterally declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Russia let them go without a fight. That's hardly what you'd expect from an evil empire, is it? Imagine how poorly you'd think of them if instead they had chosen to wage an unconstitutional war, suspended habeus corpus, shut down newspapers and imprisoned dissenters! Imagine the low regard you'd hold them in if they had invaded the "rebel" territories, killing the very people they insisted were their countrymen, burning their homes and property until they surrendered, then unconstitutionally altering the terms of their membership in the empire.
> Imagine how poorly you'd think of them if instead they had chosen to wage an unconstitutional war, suspended habeus corpus, shut down newspapers and imprisoned dissenters! Imagine the low regard you'd hold them in if they had invaded the "rebel" territories, killing the very people they insisted were their countrymen, burning their homes and property until they surrendered
You mean like what Russia is now doing to Ukraine?
> Russia let them go without a fight. That's hardly what you'd expect from an evil empire, is it?
The USSR's collapse was rather peaceful not by their own choice. The USSR was in such a deep shit by the final days that officers were forcing conscripts into street prostitution to earn money for food. Secret services and armed forces became completely demoralized. Officers and soldiers sat in their bases, ignored orders in total apathy, and were busy drinking or selling off anything they could, even copper wiring from the walls of their barracks was sold for scrap. You could buy a truckload of binoculars directly from the gates of a military base for less than $100. Radars, missiles, fighter jets too - anything for the almighty dollar. Survival until the next day was the only concern; little else mattered.
Russia didn't have much of a choice in the matter given the whole economic collapse happening, but I'm glad we're on the same page about who had been in control. Not that they didn't try in the beginning though. They tried to blockade Lithuania and send tanks which backfired, but they literally couldn't afford to have an actual civil war.
The US civil war comparison alluded to is superficial nonsense. They're only similar if you ignore all the details that matter like states voluntarily joining with full knowledge they were giving up sovereignty, actual federal political representation and that the Confederacy started the war by attacking Union soldiers first. Nor was there anything unconstitutional about waging a war, putting down a rebellion or even suspending habeas corpus - those are explicitly enumerated powers - powers that several of the seceding states helped draft.
> the Confederacy started the war by attacking Union soldiers first.
The idea that Sumter justified the Yankees' war of aggression is one of the greatest canards in human history. The Yanks were occupying foreign soil at Sumter (an act of war). They lied about their plans to leave. They attempted to resupply the occupiers but were foiled by an attack... which resulted in zero Union dead. Ergo the Yanks had to wage total war? Lmao.
The agrresion was by southern states who commited treason in the name of slavery. They attacked an American fort on american soil. They never had a plan to leave because it was American soil.
> Wow, that sounds pretty bad. But I seem to remember that when Ukraine unilaterally declared its independence from the Soviet Union, Russia let them go without a fight.
Russia declared independence from the Soviet Union before Ukraine did.
NATO is not a living organism that expands. It is composed of free countries who can join it if the rest agrees (the rest didn't agree on Georgia or Ukraine). Whenever a country like Finland or Sweden feels threatened by Russia, they can join NATO and immediately gain protection from Russia. That's why Putin hates NATO as it limits his option for potential invasion. So far, he could only invade Georgia and Ukraine - only because they are not in NATO.
> Imagine China entered into a "defensive" military alliance with Mexico.
Yeah. I'd be worried if I was a US citizen. Because China has a recent history of pushing airspace boundaries and behaving in an expansionist manner. But the comparison there is more accurately with Russia rather than NATO. Russia is continually making minor incursions into NATO and European airspace and waters, for example, whereas the reverse is very rare. I'm no fan of US foreign policy, but it pales in comparison to Russia's.
> Within living memory, 10 million Soviets were killed in an unprovoked invasion from Europe.
Believing that the political reality of Europe in the 1940s is anywhere close to today is bizarre.
But concretely what is bad about it? Would Russia feel it implied a threat of invasion? Would they worry that their own citizens would realise how much their global power has declined?
I mean, I wouldn't feel 100% comfortable but I wouldn't launch an invasion over it. Especially since it predictably encourages other bordering countries like Finland to accelerate their membership, and Ukraine itself will definitely be pushing for membership as soon as possible once the war is over. It was neither a proportionate nor a productive course of action, if that was the reason.
Russia has repeatedly over the years said that Ukraine joining NATO is the Red Line. this was going all fine until we started fucking with that Red Line. Invasion surprised no one that followed what’s been happening in that area between Russia and NATO (USA…)
This both fails to answer the question of why NATO expansion is concretely bad for Russia, and brings up a new claim which is irrelevant and inaccurate.
False, you are spreading blatant lies.
Russians were pretty transparent about reasons. Budapest Memorandum as of 2003 guaranteed Ukraine sovereignty in exchange for nuclear disarmament, provided that Ukraine stays neutral state.
Ukraine decided to break the Budapest Memorandum by seeking the NATO ascension, and GW Bush promised them NATO in 2008, and then in 2014 CIA/State Department organized a coup (just a mere month before official elections) and pro-western puppet leader was put in charge (search Victoria Nuland's call where she decided to appoint pro-western Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister after the coup) who decided to seek EU and NATO membership.
Thus, Ukraine effectively nullified the neutrality clause of the Budapest Memorandum.
So it was Ukraine that walked back from Budapest Memorandum by giving up neutral status, that nullified the territorial sovereignty guarantees given by Russia.
if you think about it, it kinda makes sense. Russia can tolerate friendly and aligned country on its border that is 70% comprised of Russian speakers and/or Russian ethnicity.
But Russia cannot tolerate NATO member on its border, the same way that USA cannot tolerate Canada/Mexico that are in military alliance with Russia/China.
Ask yourself, what would USA do if tomorrow Canada/Mexico decided to join exclusive economic and military alliance with China ?
The Budapest memorandum was signed in 1994 and not 2003, it sets no neutrality requirements on Ukraine, nor was there a coup in Ukraine, nor was Ukraine scheduled to have any elections in 2014, nor was or is Ukraine in the process of joining NATO, and nor has Mexico anything to do with it all.
Did you generate your post with an AI tool? It's such a strange collection of undisputably incorrect statements, from the wrong year of the Budapest memorandum to the invalid reference of upcoming elections in 2014.
In August 2014, and only after Russia invaded both the Crimea and the Donbas. In fact even after the invasion of just the Crimea (in March) his government was still playing it safe, and renouncing any intent to join NATO (Reuters, March 18):
Ukraine's new pro-Western leadership is not seeking membership of NATO, Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk said on Tuesday, in comments intended to reassure Russia and Ukraine's large number of Russian-speakers.[0]
It only changed its tune -- was forced to change its tune -- when Russia doubled down on its "covert" intervention in the Donbas by sending armored vehicles with Russian military plates, and attempted a similar assault on Mariupol.[1] Which (unlike the events you are falsely describing) actually did tear the Budapest Memorandum (and the UN Charter) to shreds. And rendered whatever "defensive" objections Russia may have had to Ukraine's bloc status entirely moot.
They want buffer states with puppet leaders such as Lukashanko, as Russia and East Ukraine is all flat and supposedly easy to invade.
Basically the expansion of NATO and the EU screwed up the Kremlin's plans to weaken Russia's Western neighbours and bring them into its sphere of influence. Poland and Romania are the new West Germany. In fact Moldova was part of Romania before it was occupied by the USSR after WW2, so it's pretty much in a similar situation to East/West Germany. It became independent after 1991 because Russia wanted to control it. They are using narratives such as the "Moldovan language" (in fact Romanian) since at least the 70s and later blackmail using Transnistria in order to divide and control. Moldova being admitted into the EU is basically on a path to de facto unification.
The NATO core has invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, participated in the dissolution of both Libya and Syria, and is currently extending an occupation of Lebanon and perpetrating a genocide in Palestine.
I think fear of NATO is pretty reasonable, but it's likely it's rather seen by Russia and others as moving the limit of the possible in international law and war.
The above interventions are all highly morally dubious, agreed. However, I do not think it at all likely that NATO would attempt similar against a highly developed country with a (relatively) modern military such as Russia.
The Americans knew that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke Russian intervention, and they did it anyway.[0]
Except they didn't.
The footnote you cite describes Burns's concern, but not what actually happened:
NATO rejected Ukraine's membership appliction in 2008, and Ukraine itself formally disclaimed aspirations of joining NATO in 2010, stating that Ukraine would remain a "European, non-aligned state."
And there the situation sat until 2014, when Russia invaded anyway, making any objections it might have had to Ukraine joining NATO instantly and forever moot.
This idea that the West was aggressively dragging Ukraine into NATO is just a soundbite you heard somewhere, but has no connection to reality.
The most absurd thing of this story is that NATO cannot guarantee the defense of Ukraine. Even now after 2 years, NATO cannot establish air defenses over Ukraine. So what is the point of the expansion? To make the whole NATO weaker?
It is not a member, but the whole conflict is about NATO offering the possibility of membership to Ukraine. What's the point of considering them for membership if they don't want to get involved?
> It is not a member, but the whole conflict is about NATO offering the possibility of membership to Ukraine.
No, its not. The Russo-Ukrainian war started when Ukraine had a neutrality commitment and no one was pushing for changes from the NATO side, either.
Now, immediately after Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and invaded and begin direct (with “deniable” forces) and local proxy wars in other parts of Eastern Ukraine, Ukraine dropped that commitment and resumed attempts to join NATO, but the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is about Russia trying to take over Ukraine despite their being no active efforts toward NATO membership, not about NATO offering membership to Ukraine.
> The most absurd thing of this story is that NATO cannot guarantee the defense of Ukraine.
NATO could, it chooses not to.
> Even now after 2 years, NATO cannot establish air defenses over Ukraine.
“Cannot” implies it has tried and failed, rather than simply repeatedly deciding not to try.
> So what is the point of the expansion? To make the whole NATO weaker?
Expansion doesn’t make NATO weaker. (Except insofar as NATO’s consensus decision making make decision-making dependent on the least-reliable member, which is actually a problem recently, and potentially about to become a much bigger one with the new US administration.)
> So they’re lying, because they have repeatedly said to Ukraine that they’re committed to protect them against foreign aggression.
No, they haven’t.
They have repeatedly said they will provide material assistance to Ukraine in the current emergency with Russia, but they have pointedly not committed the alliance to protect Ukraine, and have in fact stalled every Ukrainian request for such a commitment since 2008. They have indicated that at some future time they expect to be willing to make such a commitment, but that’s…very different than making it now.
(There have been several NATO members discussing making a similar commitment outside the confines of the alliance, and more directly intervening in the conflict, but that is both still just talk, and distinct from the commitments of the alliance itself.)
If that were true, the rational move for the US would have been to back off and let Putin's imperialist vision continue to unfold unimpeded. Eventually there would be an enormous market for weapons to eject his forces from Eastern Europe and points west.
What history tells us, though, is that the best time to stop Putin was 2014, and the second best time is now.
The whole novel is great, but Chapter 5 (the biography) is a beautiful introduction to possibly the worst writer in all of Russian literature.