Wednesday, April 3, 2024

From Literacy to “Support Needs” to “Communication Boards”: How vague guidelines enable non-evidence based claims and practices

 (Cross-posted at FacilitatedCommunication.org).

When you write general guidelines, you need to make clear not just what you’re saying, but what you’re not saying. And to figure out which things, of all the things you’re not saying, you most need to emphasize as things you’re not saying, you need to take a look at who is likely—unwittingly or deliberately—to misinterpret what you’re saying, and in what ways.

In a 2021 article for the Brookings Institute, for example, education scholar Tom Loveless writes about how California’s 1987 English language arts framework got hijacked by the Whole Language movement, an ineffective, non-evidence-based mode of reading instruction that is responsible for much of America’s ongoing reading crisis:

The document did not mention whole language reading instruction, but true believers in that approach put their stamp on the state’s policies during implementation.

More recently, as Loveless reports, the equivocal writing in the 2010 Common Core standards, which aimed at a balance between Whole Language and traditional phonics, has resulted in something similar. In reality, there is no balance: non-phonics-based approaches (most especially the misnamed “Balanced Literacy,” with its “Three Cueing System”) continue to dominate reading instruction.

Here’s the takeaway: if governments want evidence-based reading instruction to predominate, their education standards need to explicitly state which types of reading instruction aren’t evidence-based.

Switching gears rather dramatically, a similar lesson applies to the DSM-5 criteria for autism. One of the most controversial changes in the DSM-5 was its elimination of Asperger’s. Asperger’s, the mildest form of autism, is now folded into what was now a three-tiered “Autism Spectrum Disorder.” The problem lies in how the DSM has defined those tiers, or levels:

  • Level 1: “requires support”

  • Level 2: “requires substantial support”

  • Level 3: “requires very substantial support.”

Only in the fine print do we learn about the nature and purview of this support:

As is evident if you read past the first column, Level 1-3 support needs are defined, not in terms of the general requirements of daily living (organization, self-care, emotional regulation, and so on), but in terms of the two core symptom categories of autism: social communication deficits and restricted, repetitive behaviors. The levels, moreover, are a function of symptom severity.

For social communication/social interaction, for example, we have:

  • Level 3: “severe deficits in verbal and nonverbal social communication”; “very limited initiation of social interactions”; and “minimal responses to social overtures from others.”

  • Level 2: “marked deficits in verbal and nonverbal social communication”; “limited initiation of social interactions”; and “reduced or abnormal responses to social overtures from others.”

  • Level 1: mere “deficits in social communication”; “difficulty initiating social interactions”; and apparently “decreased interest in social interactions.”

[Emphasis mine]

And for restrictive/repetitive behaviors we have, among other things:

  • Level 3: “extreme difficulty coping with change” that “markedly interferes with functioning in all spheres”; and “great distress/difficulty changing focus or action.”

  • Level 2: “difficulty coping with change” that “interfere with functioning in a variety of contexts”; “distress and/or difficulty changing focus or action.”

  • Level 1: “difficulty switching between activities.”

The problem with this presentation is that, unless you read the fine print, it’s natural to assume that “support needs” means something much broader; that it includes support for any kind of need that might arise in the course of daily life—supports that might vary from day to day and from situation to situation. Supports for staying organized and keeping track of your things; for completing your assignments; for difficulties with emotional self-regulation; for fatigue and a need for frequent breaks. Support needs, in other words, that may be only indirectly or tangentially related to being autistic.

Because the DSM specifies the precise characteristics of autism support needs only in its fine print and doesn’t say explicitly what isn’t included as support needs, this much broader interpretation is precisely what some outspoken self-advocates have slapped onto it.  

Some self-advocates, for example, have characterized themselves as having high support needs because of organizational challenges, sensory sensitivities, anxiety, exhaustion after social events, and/or occasional meltdowns. Indeed, according to the Autism Self-Advocacy Network, “Support needs are just things autistic people need help with.”

But here’s the issue. Some of those who are diagnosed as Level 2 or 3 based on more severe core autism symptoms may actually have less anxiety and/or fewer organizational challenges and/or fewer issues with sensory fatigue than some of those who are diagnosed as Level 1, at least at certain times and/or in certain situations. This broadening of support needs beyond what the DSM actually specifies, therefore, both fuzzes up and twists around the autism spectrum.

Imagine a highly verbal individual who might once have been diagnosed with Asperger’s and who views herself as highly anxious or disorganized or easily overloaded with sensory stimuli—especially, say, in large social gatherings or at the end of a long day. This person can now claim to be "as autistic" as a nonverbal individual with profound challenges in social awareness and social reciprocity that affect him every moment of every day. Highly verbal but sometimes overwhelmed individuals who identify as autistic can now claim they have the standing to speak on behalf of their nonverbal counterparts. Finally, FC proponents can now claim that Level 3 autism doesn’t rule out linguistic sophistication, whether in those who are verbal but anxious and overwhelmed, or in non-to-minimal speakers—at least when those non-to-minimal speakers point to letters on held-up communication boards.

Communication boards, coincidentally or not so coincidentally, figure prominently in my final example of guidelines that aren’t sufficiently clear on what they’re not saying. These guidelines come in the form of two documents: a “Dear Colleague” letter from the U.S. Department of Education regarding the need for assistive technology (AT) in special education, and an accompanying document entitled “Myths and Facts Surrounding Assistive Technology Devices.”  Both of these went out on January 22nd of this year. The letter discusses the need for “AT devices and services for meaningful access and engagement in education” and adds that:

The use of AT devices and services is critically important for many children with disabilities as it can greatly improve their educational experience, improve their educational and post-school outcomes, and help develop important skills and abilities. These devices and services must be available, accessible, and appropriate for children with disabilities and their families. We all have a role to play in ensuring access to necessary AT devices and services for children with disabilities. Consider these examples of AT devices for children with a variety of disabilities.

The letter proceeds to list four categories of AT devices, one of which encompasses augmentative and alternative communication (AAC) devices. These are described simply as devices “to assist children with disabilities to communicate with teachers, peers, and their families.” The letter does not cite specific examples of what AAC devices are, let alone what they aren’t. Nor does the accompanying document, “Myths and Facts Surrounding Assistive Technology Devices.” But “Myths and Facts” does elaborate more on the larger category of AT devices, and here’s where the term “communication board” shows up:

Any item, piece of equipment, or product system, whether acquired commercially off the shelf, modified, or customized, that is used to increase, maintain, or improve the functional capabilities of a child with a disability.39 Examples of AT include screen readers, adapted daily living devices (e.g., a toothbrush holder), and communication boards.

Unfortunately, however, “communication board” is ambiguous. If you look it up on Google Images, you see:

So far so good: these are all examples of evidence-based AAC devices that can rest on stationary surfaces and that allow users to independently communicate their own authentic messages by pointing to pictures, icons, or words.

But if you add the search terms “Spelling to Communicate” and “S2C” to the “communication board” search, here’s what you get:

Suddenly we see the familiar held-up letterboards of S2C.

And if you add the search terms “Rapid Prompting Method” and “RPM” to the “communication board” search, you get something similar:

That’s because advocates of the variants of facilitated communication known as RPM (Rapid Prompting Method) and S2C (Spelling to Communicate) regularly use the term “communication board” for the letterboards that facilitators hold up to the index fingers of their non-speaking, Level 3 autistic clients.

So the U.S. Department of Education, by failing to specify which sorts of devices are and are not legitimate AAC devices, and by inserting the word “communication board” into its supporting document, provides an opening for supporters of RPM and S2C to claim that the U.S. government is calling for the use of RPM and S2C in schools.

And guess what? Just three days after the release of the Department of Education documents, the disability news journal Disability Scoop released an article entitled “Ed Department Warns Schools Not To Overlook Assistive Technology In IEPs” which opens as follows:

It’s hard to read the caption below the picture, but this is its first sentence: “Mitchell Robins, right, who has autism, points to letters to form words that therapist Anthony Bartell can write down to draft a blog post.”

The article makes no mention of S2C, RPM, or communication boards, and it only mentions AAC in the abstract. Those in the know, however, will instantly recognize in the caption and accompanying image all the tell-tale signs of S2C or RPM, and, in case there’s any doubt left, a quick Google search confirms that RPM is the methodology to which the pictured individual is being subjected.

In faulting the U.S. government and the DSM for being insufficiently clear about what they’re ruling out—whether it’s the Three Cueing System, a generic notion of support needs, and/or all variants of facilitated communication, hijacking all as these variants are of authentic communication—I’m assuming, of course, that the lack of clarity was inadvertent. But in the last case, the rapidity with which the release of the government documents gave rise to a celebratory article showcasing an RPM user (albeit while abstaining from all references to RPM or any other form of facilitated communication)—well, that one has me wondering.

Given how cozy certain sectors of the U.S. government have gotten with the FC lobby (see also the  platforming of FC last year by the National Institutes of Health at the National Institute of Deafness and Communication Disorders webinar on nonverbal individuals with autism, and the inclusion of facilitated individuals as members of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Inter-Autism Coordinating Committee), I can’t help but wonder if the inclusion of the word “communication board” in the U.S. Department of Education’s “Myths and Facts Surrounding Assistive Technology Devices” was somehow, shall we say, strategic.

Wednesday, March 20, 2024

Facilitated messages attributed to different people show distinctive styles, but this fails to rule out complete facilitator control

 (Cross-posted at FacilitatedCommunication.org).

I got so distracted with other pro-FC developments that have emerged since last August—Angie Kim’s Happiness Falls, Jennifer Binder-Le Pape’s purported myths about RPM/S2C, Vikram Jaswal’s latest pro-S2C paper, and some half-dozen other developments—that I’m only now getting to the second of two papers published this past year by Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, and Mitra, the first of which I critiqued here at the end of August.

As with Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, and Mitra (2023), this second paper, (Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, Cortelazzo, and Mitra, 2023), focuses on touch-based facilitated communication (FC) as used with individuals with cognitive and sensorimotor disabilities. (The individuals’ precise diagnoses and measured language skills remain unspecified). The authors’ other paper provided a highly quantitative task analysis of the sensorimotor skills involved in sitting in front of a keyboard and pointing to letters; this paper provides a highly quantitative stylistic analysis of a database of facilitated messages in Italian. Its goal is to explore who authored these messages—the facilitator, the facilitated person, or some combination of both.

This article purports to build on other analyses of facilitated messages that have found the texts of the facilitated individuals (or facilitatees) to differ stylistically from those of their facilitators—particularly in the more frequent appearances of unusual words and neologisms (made-up words). Such differences, the authors acknowledge, are not proof of authorship by the facilitatees (they cite Saloviita, 2018). And it’s impossible to know, they concede, what the facilitatee’s texts would look like, stylistically speaking, without the assistance of a facilitator, since none of the facilitatees can type independently. But the authors nonetheless insist that such a quantitative study can potentially answer questions about authorship.

Of course, there’s a much simpler, more definitive procedure that can answer—and has answered—that question: the controlled message-passing experiment in which the facilitator is blinded to the answers to the questions asked of the facilitatee. Dozens of such message-passing tests were conducted back in the 1990s, some 25 to 30 years before this article was written, beginning shortly after FC was introduced to the United States in the late 1980s. The answer was total facilitator control. The facilitators were the sole authors of the facilitated messages.

Despite this, FC persists, and Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, Cortelazzo, and Mitra (2023) open by introducing it. The authors describe FC as a technique used with people with a combination of “atypical cognitive capacity” and “sensorimotor coordination deficits” to “physically support them, for example, by touching their torso or arm as they type.” The authors add that “The neurophysiological mechanism of such motor assistance for linguistic expression is not known.”

Given what all the rigorous studies of FC have shown, namely that the literate facilitator is controlling the messages by directing and cueing (however unwittingly) the facilitatee, “not known” is bit of a stretch.

It’s not that the authors are unaware of this possibility: they acknowledge that the prevailing view among experts is that of total facilitator control via facilitator cues. But they insist that it’s just one theory about what’s happening, and they proceed to propose that the facilitative touch could serve, not to cue and control, but instead to help to reduce the “cognitive load” of the facilitated person. Their only evidence for this is their other 2023 article—the one I critiqued here.

While the authors also acknowledge the results of the message-passing tests of the 1990s, they also cite the various “alternative” tests that message-passing-averse researchers have conducted since then: measurements of eye-gaze fixations on letters (Jaswal et al., 2020); measurements of index-finger accelerations towards letters (Faure et al., 2021); and linguistic analysis of facilitated output (Bernardi & Tuzzi, 2011; Niemi & Kärnä-Lin, 2002; Tuzzi et al., 2004; Tuzzi, 2009). (For our critiques of these articles, see here and here). These various studies, the authors claim, create a more “complex picture” of what’s going on and suggest some involvement of the user (the facilitatee) in creating the message. Stylistic analysis in particular, the authors claim, allows for

a time-extended perspective on the text construction process as it operates naturally, without the insertion of experimental artifacts. The analysis of text generated over long periods of time, while the user and their partnership with facilitators evolve, provide a stronger test of individual influences than snapshot methods using arbitrary tasks in which the user possibly is not motivationally invested.

The authors do not elaborate. In particular, they don’t tell us what sort of “complex picture” or longitudinal text analysis, on one hand, or experimental artifacts, snapshot methods using arbitrary tasks, or lack of motivational investment by the facilitatee, on the other, could possibly account for the common outcome, seen in the rigorous message passing tests of the 1990s, of facilitatees typing out information to which only the facilitator had access—e.g. a picture of a key instead of a flower.

What other explanation there could possibly be—other than the simple, straightforward explanation that the facilitator is the one controlling the messages—is hard to imagine.

Despite their express reservations about this simple explanation, and despite the pro-FC track records of some of their co-authors (see Emerson et al., 2001; Grayson et al. 2012), the authors assure us that “we start from the maximally sceptical position that the facilitator is the sole [authoring] agent”. They proceed to claim that, if the facilitator is the sole author

It should not be possible, then, to find unique stylistic fingerprints associated with specific FC users.

Operating under this purportedly well-founded assumption (more on that shortly), and under their purportedly maximal skepticism, the authors set out to investigate whether children with developmental disabilities “exhibit their own stylistic signatures alongside those of their facilitators.” They look both at whether keeping the facilitator constant across different facilitatees results in one style or many; and at whether keeping the facilitatee constant across multiple facilitators results in many styles or one.

As with Jaswal et al. (2020), Faure et al. (2021), Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, and Mitra (2023), and Jaswal et al. (2024), it would have been orders of magnitude simpler to measure authorship through rigorous message-passing tests. And it would have been orders of magnitude simpler to measure literacy skills through direct assessments of literacy skills (can the facilitatee place the “key” label, say, on a picture of a key, and the “flower” label on the picture of a flower?). Instead, what we get is yet another fancy study: “a multi-level quantitative linguistic analysis” complete with “unsupervised machine-learning methods, particularly cluster analysis.”

Cluster analysis from Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, Cortelazzo, and Mitra (2023)

And what do the multi-level quantitative linguistic analysis, unsupervised machine-learning methods, and cluster analysis show? “[T]hat the users’ stylistic signature is detectable alongside that of facilitators.”

The authors’ conclusion? The texts are co-authored: co-created by both the facilitatee and their facilitator:

The results clearly show that texts written via FC generally present two linguistic imprints: the user and the facilitator. Based on this result, FC is better described as a co-creation process in which two distinct and active participants collaborate in the production of linguistic content.

Here the authors acknowledge, but claim to rule out, the obvious alternative explanation: namely, that the facilitator is subconsciously channeling the imagined writing style of an imagined persona that they’ve projected onto their facilitatee. In fact, this is arguably the most plausible way in which facilitators concoct the messages that they unwittingly facilitate.

But Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, Cortelazzo, and Mitra suggest that this simply isn’t possible, especially given that one of the facilitators in the study facilitated 10 different individuals (the other two involved in the study facilitated six and four respectively). They seem to think that facilitators are somehow facilitating these multiple individuals “simultaneously” and that there’s a limit on how many different personas one can imagine and subconsciously channel. They also seem to think that facilitators are incapable of coming up with different styles on their own and instead would need to have “external models”:

[N]o studies have so far demonstrated the possibility of imitating more than one style simultaneously. This hypothesis, while logically possible, requires demonstration. Besides, even if we assume that facilitators consciously manipulate their style such that statistical models end up attributing texts to users instead, and also that facilitators can maintain up to ten different stylistic systems and use them in the correct contexts, we must contend with the issue of stylistic models…. However, in the case of FC, facilitators have no external models to which they can refer, so it is unclear on which basis they would organize their imitation.

Novelists, among other people, would beg to differ. Would Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, Cortelazzo, and Mitra admit, say, The Moonstone or Dracula or The Color Purple as demonstrations of the possibility of imitating more than one person’s (character’s) style?

Confident that they’ve dispensed with the alternative explanation for their results—facilitators channeling the imagined personas of their facilitatees—the authors draw further conclusions:

  • “FC users possess a level of literacy skills, which any AAC intervention should seek to nurture and develop to improve users' quality of life.”

  • “As the user is clearly a participant in text generation, there is scope for touch-based assistance to serve as a scaffold in DD individuals' linguistic development, and to contribute positively to their quality of life and connection with carers.”

  • “Whether the individual does, or could develop to, generate typed text independently should not determine the value of practising and better understanding touch-assisted typing techniques.”

The authors seem unconcerned with the disturbing implications of life-long dependence on others for communication—especially communication that must be co-authored by those others. Such dependence, fortunately, is bypassed by most legitimate forms of AAC.

But the authors, like other FC proponents, repeatedly characterize FC as a form of AAC: one specifically for those with a combination of sensorimotor and cognitive disabilities. Referencing their other article (Nicoli, Pavon, Grayson, Emerson, and Mitra, 2023), the authors suggest that the issue for such doubly-disabled individuals isn’t a lack of linguistic skills, but of challenges involving cognitive overload and planning difficulties that the facilitator’s contact on the facilitatee’s arm or torso somehow ameliorates. Linguistic skills, purportedly, are intact, and facilitation serves to unlock them, providing

cognitive simplification by reducing the cognitive demands of formulating a full-language expression… or by reducing the overall cognitive demands of the task by supporting attention, providing emotional reassurance and reducing the cognitive demands of the co-occurrent motor task while maintaining text-based communication…

As I’ve discussed in earlier posts, for example here, this is at odds with decades of rigorous research on the autistic minimal-to-non-speakers who constitute the majority of people subjected to FC.

Second, the authors cast FC as a form of scaffolding. But scaffolding, by definition, is something that (1) supports something—i.e., existing skills and (2) will eventually be removed—i.e., when existing skills reach mastery.

Third, they characterize FC as a teaching aid. But they don’t say what it’s teaching. What could it possibly be that facilitators are instructing the facilitatees by touching their arms or torsos?

Then there’s the problematic notion of co-authored messages: messages, that is, that are purportedly co-constructed by the facilitator and facilitatee. On one hand, the authors acknowledge that who constructs what is unclear from their data/results:

The nature of the corpora and these methods do not allow us to discern the details of what originates with the user and the facilitator. The scope of these analyses is at the stylistic level with no presumption nor power to distinguish facilitators' traits from users' features on a sentence-by-sentence basis. Also, these analyses do not allow any comment on how the facilitator influences and supports the user. These questions require other methods and task-oriented analyses. What the present results clearly show is that the user is not linguistically passive, and the facilitator moulds rather than wholly constructs the typed text.

In addition, they acknowledge that:

Co-authorship does not offer certainty that a message written by integrating two linguistic sources fully mirrors the FC user's own intention.

But then, noting that what was most stylistically distinct about the facilitated messages of given facilitatees were their unusual word choices, they hypothesize that the facilitatees supplied the content words and the facilitators supplied the syntactic and morphological framework:

[The] facilitators create syntactical structures within which users can fill in their own content… Syntactical scaffolding by the facilitator may also involve adjusting morphological endings, suggesting linkers or auxiliary verbs, or providing syntagmatic prompts to help begin communication (e.g. “I think that …”, or “I feel that …”)…. In this respect, the facilitators' work would be comparable to that of editors.

How one person supporting the arm or torso of another person promotes this kind of division of linguistic labor (content words vs. syntax), editing (adding and adjusting of endings and function words), and syntagmatic prompting is left unsaid. Such a linguistic cooperation/co-construction, if that’s actually what’s going on, is unlike anything seen in any other interpersonal collaboration anywhere else on planet Earth.

What’s much more likely is that the collaboration, if that’s the right word for it, operates at the level of individual letters. Sometimes the facilitatee manages to hit an unexpected letter, and the facilitator’s non-conscious response is to cue one of those unusual words or neologisms so often seen in FC.

Actual communicative collaborations, of course, involve conscious behaviors. Given this, if the authors were truly convinced that that was what was going on and genuinely curious about who was contributing what, why didn’t they simply query the facilitators? Why didn’t they dispense with all the quantitative cluster analyses and post-analytical speculation and simply ask them, directly: “Which parts of the sentence did you contribute and which parts did you leave up to the facilitatee?”

Better yet, talk the facilitators—and yourselves—into doing a simple, straightforward message-passing experiment.

REFERENCES

Bernardi, L., & Tuzzi, A. (2011). Analyzing written communication in AAC contexts: A statistical perspective, Augmentative and Alternative Communication, 27:3, 183-194 DOI: O.3109/07434618.2011.610353

Emerson, A., Grayson, A., & Griffiths, A. (2001). Can't or Won't? Evidence relating to authorship in Facilitated Communication. International Journal of Language and Communication Disorders, 36, Supplemental: 98-103. DOI: 10.3109/13682820109177866

Faure, P., Legou, T., and Gepner, B. (2021). Evidence of Authorship on Messages in Facilitated Communication: A Case Report Using Accelerometry. Frontiers in Psychiatry. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.543385

Grayson, A., Emerson, A., Howard-Jones, P., and O’Neil, L. (2012). Hidden communicative competence: Case study evidence using eye-tracking and video analysis. Autism. 16 (1); 75-86. DOI: 10.1177/1362361310393260

Jaswal, V.K., Wayne, A. & Golino, H. (2020) Eye-tracking reveals agency in assisted autistic communication. Scientific Reports 10, 7882. DOI: 10.1038/s41598-020-64553-9

Nicoli G, Pavon G, Grayson A, Emerson A and Mitra S (2023) Touch may reduce cognitive load during assisted typing by individuals with developmental disabilities. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 17:1181025. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2023.1181025

Nicoli G, Pavon G, Grayson A, Emerson A, Cortelazzo M and Mitra S (2023) Individuals with developmental disabilities make their own stylistic contributions to text written with physical facilitation. Frontiers in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 2:1182884. doi: 10.3389/frcha.2023.1182884

Niemi, J., & Kärnä-Lin, E. (2002). Grammar and Lexicon in Facilitated Communication: A Linguistic Authorship Analysis of a Finnish Case, Mental Retardation, 40:5, 347-357 DOI: 10.1352/0047-6765(2002)040<0347:GALIFC>2.0.CO;2

Saloviita T. (2018). Does linguistic analysis confirm the validity of facilitated communication? Focus Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities, 33(2):91–9. doi: 10.1177/1088357616646075

Tuzzi, A., Cemin, M., & Castagna, M. (2004). "Moved deeply I am" Autistic language in texts produced with FC, Journées internationales d’Analyse statistique des Données Textuelles, 1097-1105

Tuzzi, A. (2009). Grammar and lexicon in individuals with autism: A quantitative analysis of a large Italian corpus, Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 47:5, 373-385 DOI: 10.1352/1934-9556-47.5.373

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

Life lessons from programming

  1. Your instructions must be crystal clear, not omit any steps, and anticipate all possible scenarios.
  2. If something goes awry, there’s always a logical explanation.
  3. If something goes awry, it’s your fault, not that of The Cosmos.
  4. You are not the victim of an irrational universe.
  5. Instead, you are complicit in much of the irrationality that most directly affects you.

I was reminded of these lessons last week when creating a new username and password facility for SentenceWeaver: a tricky endeavor as I didn’t want to undermine the older first-and-last-name-based logins that my current users are using. The trickiness was exacerbated by the fact that there was some zombie code hiding in one of my files–entirely my fault, of course.

Wednesday, March 6, 2024

Illusions of literacy in nonspeaking autistic people: a response to Jaswal et al. 2024

 (Cross-posted at FacilitatedCommunication.org).

Do minimally-speaking autistic individuals have literacy skills?

You might assess this by seeing if such individuals can associate word labels with objects—placing the “dog” label, say, on a picture of a dog, and the “cup” label on the picture of a cup. You might assess this by seeing if the person can independently write or type out word labels of their own for the dog and the cup. You might assess this by presenting the person with a note that says, say, “Do you want to watch a video or go outside?” and seeing if the person, for example, responds by fetching a video-playing iPad. That note could be written on paper, but it could be typed out on the overwhelming majority of AAC devices that, contrary to what the pro-FC sector tells you, include keyboards and regularly expose users to printed word labels.

But why use such direct, straightforward literacy probes when you can instead deploy novel equipment and fancy statistics to generate much more indirect and highly indeterminate results? After all, that’s precisely what Vikram Jaswal did in his recent attempt (Jaswal et al., 2020) to find support for the variant of FC known as Spelling to Communicate (S2C, see Beals, 2021 for a critique of this highly flawed study).

This time around, in a study that has just come out (Jaswal, Lampi, and Stockwell, 2024), Jaswal sets out to explore the literacy skills of minimally-speaking S2C users—which, if they are found to exist in sufficient quantities, might convince some more people that S2C is valid. (In fact, the only procedures that would definitively test the validity of S2C, should anyone ever agree to participate in them, are a series of controlled message-passing tests).

In what the authors tout multiple times as a pre-registered study, they created an iPad game with arrays of symbols that flash one at a time in different sequences. Participants were measured on how quickly they responded to the flashing symbols by tapping on them. Some symbol arrays were alphabetic symbols (letters) that just happened to precisely replicate the letter arrangements of the letterboards used in S2C. Others were arrangements of symbols that look nothing like letters:

(From Jaswal et al., 2024)

In one condition, the Sentences Condition, the letters on the letter array flashed in sequences that spelled short sentences. In this condition the experimenter gave the participant an oral prompt about the given sentence, saying it twice, as in this example: “This time, the letters will flash in a sequence that spells, ‘I should water the backyard today. I should water the backyard today.’”

In the other conditions, no sentence prompt was provided. In the “Matched Symbol Sequences” condition, the symbols flashed in a position sequence that matched the position sequence of the flashing letters in the Sentences Condition. In the “Reverse Letter Sequences” and “Reverse Symbol Sequences,” the flashing letters and flashing symbols followed the flashing letters (or the positions of the flashing letters) of the Sentence Condition sentences in reverse order. For instance, in the case of “I should water the backyard today,” the “Reverse Letter Sequences” followed the sequence “yadotdraykcabehtretawdluohsi.”

Measuring the “latency,” or the time it took a participant to go from one flashing letter to the next, Jaswal et al. report the following findings:

Latency is, on average, lower (by several tens of milliseconds) for the Sentences Condition than for the other conditions.

In the Sentences Condition, but not in the Reverse Letter Sequences condition, participants tapped flashing two-letter sequences that are relatively common in English spelling (e.g., “he”) faster than they tapped flashing two-letter sequences that are relatively less common (e.g., “hs”).

In the Sentences Condition, participants showed sensitivity to words and word boundaries: they were slower to tap on the first flashing letter of the word than on the subsequent flashing letters of the word.

All of these behaviors, Jaswal et al. argue, mimic the behavior of literate individuals when they type. Just how closely, however, remains unexplored, as the study reported no comparisons on the flashing letter/symbol tasks between these participants and a comparison group whose literacy was beyond dispute.

But even if these patterns of relative tapping speed on flashing letters/symbols mimic those of people whose literacy is beyond dispute, is this enough to conclude that the autistic participants are literate? Does it mean, say, that they understand written commands to “water the backyard”?

In fact, the difference between

  • (a)

    • tapping the sequence “Ishouldwaterthebackyardtoday,” guided entirely by flashing letters

    • tapping that flashing sequence faster than both the flashing sequence “yadotdraykcabehtretawdluohsi” and flashing sequences of symbols that look nothing like letters, and

    • pausing slightly, while tapping the flashing sequence “Ishouldwaterthebackyardtoday,” between the flashing “I” and the flashing “s,” the flashing “d” and the flashing “w,” the flashing “r,” and the flashing “t,” the flashing “e” and the flashing “b,” and the flashing “d” and the flashing “y”

and

  • (b)

    • knowing what the printed words “I,” “should,” “water,” “the,” “backyard,” and “today” actually mean

Is quite vast.

Jaswal et al. acknowledge the multiple years of experience that most of their participants have had, via S2C, in pointing to sequences of word-spelling letters on held-up letterboards (two participants had between one and two years of experience; the remaining 29 had at least two). And they acknowledge that these experiences could have taught the participants statistical regularities about letter sequences and word boundaries that could explain these results. But they argue that this explanation is ruled out by the fact that the participants (1) weren’t faster with common, flashing two-letter sequences in Reverse Letter Sequences condition (where the letters didn’t spell words), and (2) weren’t consistently faster at tapping flashing letter sequences for more common words than for less common words.

There are major problems with these lines of reasoning, however. In the Reverse Letter Sequences, the sequences so obviously violated English spelling conventions that anyone who has grown accustomed to those spelling conventions—for example by being subjected to years of S2C—will quickly recognize that all bets are off. All of the sequences, that is, contained sub-sequences that are impossible to parse into words:

  • ohy, ehtr, dluohsi, afkaer, ofmaer, ahsdikeht, ohya, ehtno, tsti, sg, odtso, nahtre, ruo, tuo

If they had wanted to, Jaswal et al. could have easily avoided this confound by scrambling the letters in ways that didn’t result in such unparsable sequence. For example, instead of

  • yadotdraykcabehtretawdluohsi

they could have had

  • kaydotdrackabethawdlerthisou

Second, Jaswal et al. assume that what determines how quickly a flashing letter sequence is tapped out is how common the corresponding word is. But, as they themselves propose elsewhere, the issue is predictability: how predictable is the next letter based on what came before? Plenty of common words offer little predictability. Consider the words “it,” “had,” and “way,” which the authors found had high average latency-per-letter (slower typing). With “it,” common though it is, many letters could follow the “i,” and after the “t” the word is over. The same goes for “had” and “way.” It’s longer words with more predictable patterns, even if they’re less common, that should permit lower average latency-per-latter (faster typing). Consider the three words in Jaswal et al.’s sample that show the most extreme combination of lower-than-average commonality (relative to the other words) and lower-than-average latency-per-letter: “walking,” “raining,” and “outside”. By the time you get as far as “walki,” “raini,” and “outs,” the final letters are fully predictable (and, indeed, readily outputted by autofill functions).

(From Jaswal et al. 2024).

But Jaswal et al. propose that the patterns of latency observed in the Sentence Condition and not in the other conditions are evidence, not of a rote, statistical learning of letter patterns, acquired during years of S2C-based prompting, but instead of “motivated, literate participant[s]” who are able to “convert the sentence the experimenter spoke aloud into its written form.”

Of course, if Jaswal et al. had wanted to actually test this hypothesis, they could have included a comparison condition in which the experimenter refrained from reading the sentence out loud.

But this might have put a dent in their grandiose conclusions:

About half of the participants showed the signature pattern consistent with literacy; those who did not show the pattern may also know spelling conventions but be unable to demonstrate their knowledge on our task, which required sustained attention and speeded responses to over 550 targets. Regardless, our findings suggest that at least five times more participants have foundational literacy skills than would be expected from professional estimates based on nonspeaking people’s overt behavior. [Italics mine]

And:

Our finding that participants without phrase speech as well as participants with phrase speech showed the signature pattern of faster responses in the Sentences condition compared to the Matched Symbol Sequences condition… demonstrates that it is possible for nonspeaking autistic people to acquire aspects of literacy regardless of their speech proficiency. Second and relatedly, it is frequently suggested that more positive outcomes are associated with autistic children who achieve functional speech (i.e. phrase speech) by 5 years of age... At least as far as learning foundational literacy skills, there was no difference in our sample of nonspeaking autistic adolescents and adults between those who had some phrase speech and those who did not.

Turning to the question of how these minimally-speaking and non-speaking individuals might have acquired these literacy skills, Jaswal et al. end up, in an odd reversal, admitting that “statistical regularities clearly played a role” and that

the year or more of practice participants had communicating on a letterboard held by a trained assistant may have highlighted orthographic regularities and sound–letter correspondences, though we note that the training our participants had received on the letterboard does not involve explicit instruction on these correspondences.

Indeed.

But the authors appear oblivious to the implications. Learning “orthographic regularities and sound–letter correspondences” isn’t the same as being literate. Consider the stereotypical American Bar/Bat Mitzvah in which a teenager recites passages written in Hebrew without understanding most of the words he/she is pronouncing. Few people would say that that individual is literate in Hebrew. To be literate, sounding out and spelling out letter patterns aren’t enough: you must also know the meanings of whatever it is you’re pronouncing or spelling. Yes, orthographic regularities and letter-sound correspondences are included in foundational literacy skills. But if that’s all you have, you aren’t literate and, unless circumstances change dramatically, you never will be. This is especially the case if most of your “communications” involve S2C, which, with its exclusive focus on letter positions on the S2C board and on prompting kids to point to them (“right next door,” “keep going, keep going,” “you’re almost there”), completely omits meaning.

But Jaswal is no literacy expert. As a result, he has no problem closing the article with what reads like a subtle infomercial for S2C, complete with citations from pro-FC researchers:

An important question for future work will be investigating why, given this underlying orthographic competence, most nonspeaking autistic people do not learn to express themselves in writing. As suggested earlier, part of the challenge is lack of opportunity because of underestimation of nonspeaking autistic people’s capacity to acquire literacy…

[Note the omission here of the various ways, mentioned in the opening paragraph of this blog post and seen accompanying image, in which the evidence-based AAC devices routinely used with nonspeaking autistic people are in fact designed to promote literacy.]

The significant proprioceptive and motor challenges that many nonspeaking autistic people face can also interfere with learning to write by hand or type using conventional interfaces (e.g. Gernsbacher, 2004; Leary & Donnellan, 1995; Torres et al., 2013).

[Note the FC-friendly take on autism as a motor disorder that disrupts “conventional”—i.e., independent—typing, asserted in the pro-FC literature but never actually demonstrated.]

Thus, another important area for future work will be leveraging advances in technology to create accessible and customizable communication interfaces as well as opportunities to practice the skills required to use them.

Stay tuned for future articles by Jaswal et al. on how “advances in technology” can promote sophisticated literacy in minimally-speaking individuals, with the usual conflation of evidence-based AAC technologies with communication tools that, however high-tech they may be, are ultimately facilitator-directed and facilitator-controlled.

Meanwhile, a segment within Jaswal et al.’s final paragraph reminds us of the giant elephant that has been lurking in the room the entire time:

According to the nonspeaking autistic participants in this study and their families, the most effective means of communication available to them currently involves spelling words and sentences on a letterboard held vertically by an assistant. (All the study participants are working on the skills to be able to type without assistance.) Were it not for concerns about the role of the assistant…this would serve as prima facie evidence that they are literate. We used an experimental task that did not involve an assistant (i.e. no one held the iPad or touched participants) to investigate if these participants possess foundational literacy skills. [Italics mine.]

If the participants in the study were able to type out sentences without an assistant on stationary iPads with flashing letters, then why, when typing sentences that aren’t guided by flashing letters, do they need the letterboard to be held up by an assistant?

Such an assistant, as all the available evidence suggests, is the one most likely to be controlling the messages, including the message that this is “the most effective means of communication available to me.” And such an assistant, as all the available evidence suggests, may well be the only truly literate person involved in producing such messages.


REFERENCES

Beals, K. (2021) A recent eye-tracking study fails to reveal agency in assisted autistic communication. Evidence-Based Communication Assessment and Intervention, 15:1, 46-51, https://doi.org/10.1080/17489539.2021.1918890

Beals, K. (2024) Can message-passing anecdotes tell us anything about the validity of RPM and S2C? Evidence-Based Communication Assessment and Intervention, https://doi.org/10.1080/17489539.2023.2290298

Gernsbacher M. A. (2004). Language is more than speech: A case study. Journal of Developmental and Learning Disorders, 8, 79–96. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4266410/

Jaswal, V. K., Lampi, A. J., & Stockwell, K. M. (2024). Literacy in nonspeaking autistic people. Autism, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/13623613241230709

Jaswal, V. K., Wayne, A., & Golino, H. (2020). Eye-tracking reveals agency in assisted autistic communication. Scientific reports10(1), 7882. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-64553-9

Leary M. R., Donnellan A. M. (1995). Autism: Sensory-movement differences and diversity. Cambridge Book Review Press.

Torres E. B., Brincker M., Isenhower R. W., Yanovich P., Stigler K. A., Nurnberger J. I., Mextasas D. N., Jose J. V. (2013). Autism: The micromovement perspective. Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 7, Article 32. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2013.00032

Vyse, S. (2020). Of Eye Movements and Autism: The Latest Chapter in a Continuing Controversy. Skeptical Inquirer.