When Moral Responsibility Theory Met My Philosophy of Disability
Keywords:
apparatus of disability, conceptual revolution, ontology, structural gaslightingAbstract
In this article, I aim to demonstrate that moral responsibility theory produces, legitimates, and even magnifies the considerable social injustice that accrues to disabled people insofar as it implicitly and explicitly promotes a depoliticized ontology of disability that construes disability as a naturally disadvantageous personal characteristic or deleterious property of individuals rather than identifies it as an effect of power, an apparatus. In particular, I argue that the methodological tools of “analytic” philosophy that philosophers of moral responsibility theory employ to establish the philosophical ___domain in which they engage have distinctly detrimental effects on disabled people.
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- 2024-05-30 (2)
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Copyright (c) 2024 Shelley Lynn Tremain

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