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Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation

The simulation (or, "mental simulation") theory, introduced in 1986 by Robert Gordon and Jane Heal and further developed by Alvin Goldman, Paul Harris, and others, maintains that human beings are able to use the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological etiology of the behavior of others, typically by making decisions within a "pretend" context. The theory is usually, though not always, taken to present a serious challenge to the assumption that a theory underlies everyday human competence in predicting and explaining behavior, including the capacity to ascribe mental states. Unlike earlier controversies concerning the role of empathetic understanding and historical reenactment in the human sciences, the current debate between the simulation theory and the "theory" theory appeals to empirical findings, particularly experimental results concerning children's development of psychological competence, as detailed below.

What is Meant by `Simulation'?
Varieties of Simulation Theory
Areas of Empirical Investigation
Bibliography
Related Entries

What is Meant by `Simulation'?

Like the term `theory,' `simulation' has come to be used broadly and in a variety of ways. Simulation is sometimes equated with role-taking, or "putting oneself in the other's place." However, it is often taken to include mere "projection," or reliance on a shared world of facts and emotive and motivational charges, without adjustments in imagination; e.g., where there is no need to put oneself in the other's place, as one is, in all relevant respects, already there. (Gordon calls this the default mode of simulation.) Sometimes it is taken to include as well automatic responses such as the subliminal mimicry of facial expressions and bodily movements. Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols, whose critical papers have clarified the issues and helped refine the theory, urge that the term be dropped in favor of a finer-grained terminology.

Simulation is often conceived in cognitive-scientific terms: one's own behavior control system is employed as a manipulable model of other such systems. The system is first taken off-line, so that the output is not actual behavior but only predictions or anticipations of behavior, and inputs and system parameters are accordingly not limited to those that would regulate one's own behavior. Many proponents hold that, because one human behavior control system is being used to model others, general information about such systems is unnecessary. The simulation is thus said to be process-driven rather than theory-driven (Goldman).

Varieties of Simulation Theory

Important differences exist among simulation theorists on several topics. According to Goldman and (less clearly) Harris, to ascribe mental states to others by simulation, one must already be able to ascribe mental states to oneself, and thus must already possess the relevant mental state concepts. Gordon holds a contrary view suggested by both Kant and Quine: Only those who can simulate can understand an ascription of, e.g., belief--that to S it is the case that p. While no simulation theorist claims that all our everyday explanations and predictions of the actions of other people are based on role-taking, Heal in particular has been a moderating influence, arguing for a hybrid simulation-and-theory account that reserves simulation primarily for items with rationally linked content, such as beliefs, desires, and actions.

Areas of Empirical Investigation

Three main areas of empirical investigation have been thought especially relevant to the debate:

False belief. Taking into account another's ignorance or false belief when predicting or explaining their behavior requires imaginative modifications of one's own beliefs, according to the simulation theory. Thus the theory offers an explanation of the results of numerous experiments showing that younger children fail to take such factors into account. It would also explain the correlation, in autism, of failure to take into account ignorance or false belief and failure to engage in spontaneous pretend-play, particularly role play. Although these results can also be explained by certain versions of theory theory (and were so interpreted by the experimenters themselves), the simulation theory offers a new interpretation.
Priority of self- or other-ascription. A second area of developmental research asks whether children ascribe mental states to themselves before they ascribe them to others. Versions of the simulation theory committed to the view that we recognize our own mental states as such and make analogical inferences to others' mental states seem to require an affirmative answer to this question; other versions of the theory seem to require a negative answer. Some experiments suggest a negative answer, but debate continues on this question.
Cognitive impenetrability. Stich and Nichols suppose simulation to be "cognitively impenetrable" in that it operates independently of any general knowledge the simulator may have about human psychology. Yet they point to results suggesting that when subjects lack certain psychological information, they sometimes make incorrect predictions, and therefore must not be simulating. Because of problems of methodology and interpretation, as noted by a number of philosophers and psychologists, the cogency of this line of criticism is unclear.

The numerous other empirical questions of possible relevance to the debate include the following:

Does brain imaging reveal that systems and processes employed in decision-making are reemployed in the explanation and prediction of others' behavior?

Does narrative (including film narrative) create emotional and motivational effects by the same processes that create them in real-life situations?

Some philosophers think the simulation theory may shed light on issues in traditional philosophy of mind and language concerning intentionality, referential opacity, broad and narrow content, the nature of mental causation, Twin Earth problems, the problem of other minds, and the peculiarities of self-knowledge. Several philosophers have applied the theory to aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy of the social sciences. Success or failure of these efforts to answer philosophical problems may be considered empirical tests of the theory, in a suitably broad sense of "empirical."

Bibliography

The following collections include most of the relevant papers by authors mentioned in the article:

Carruthers, P. & Smith, P., eds., 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davies, M. and Stone T., eds., 1995, Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (The introductory chapter offers an excellent overview and analysis of the initial debate.)
Davies, M. and Stone T., eds., 1995, Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Acknowledgment

The main body of this entry is excerpted, with permission, from "Simulation vs Theory Theory", MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 1999)

Related Entries

materialism, eliminative | folk psychology, as a theory