
Acknowledgments

This book began life as two chapters excised from my 2001 book *The Fate of Knowledge*. As I completed that manuscript, it became clear that the sciences of human behavior I was using to exemplify scientific plurality required far more space than I could allot to them. My observations needed to be articulated in the context of more pressing questions raised by the very aim of understanding human behavior. At the time those included the conceptualization of behavior and the complicated relationships among the sciences, culture, and policy. These matters demanded treatment on their own merits.

As I have worked my way through this investigation, I have used a social epistemological methodology to understand the differences and similarities among the several approaches, focused on characterizing what the different approaches are dedicated to explaining, and followed the circulation of assumptions and values through multiple technical and cultural contexts. The sciences of behavior have recently been advanced by rapid changes in genetics and neurobiology, as well as in the psychological and social sciences. Nevertheless, the persistence of certain themes across the decades invites philosophical inquiry into the kind of knowledge these sciences provide about human behavior and how it matters.

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I've been fortunate in being given opportunities to present parts of this work at national and international conferences and universities. The discussions on

those occasions introduced me to new sources and helped me clarify my ideas. Journal and anthology editors who published early versions of parts of chapters both encouraged me to persist in the project and pushed me to think more clearly about the issues it encompassed. Lisa Lloyd and Ken Waters read early versions of chapters and talked with me at length and on many occasions. The comments of anonymous referees who read the manuscript were invaluable, leading me to restructure the entire book. Kenneth Kendler read a large portion of the draft and generously talked with me about issues in the research. Valerie Miner also offered excellent advice on various portions of the manuscript. Colleagues at Stanford University's Center for the Integration of Research on Genetics and Ethics and Clayman Institute for Gender Research offered helpful feedback, as did participants in reading groups at the University of Washington and Waterloo University, as well as the students in the fall 2010 and 2011 offerings of my course "Philosophy, Biology, and Behavior." Finally, Karen Darling's enthusiasm for the project sustained me in the final push to completion. Joel Score's smart and sensitive copyediting made the book more readable. I am deeply grateful to everyone who contributed to the shaping of this book. Responsibility for its remaining errors, of course, rests with me.

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I am grateful to The University of Minnesota Press for permission to use portions of "Theoretical Pluralism and the Scientific Study of Behavior," first pub-

lished in 2006 in *Scientific Pluralism*, edited by Steven Kellert, Helen Longino, and C.K. Waters (volume 19 in the series Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science), in chapter 8.

In addition, parts of chapter 8 draw on arguments presented in earlier form in my “Evidence in the Sciences of Behavior,” in *Evidence*, edited by Peter Achinstein (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), and “Knowledge for What?,” in *Philosophy of Behavioral Science*, edited by Kathryn Plaisance and Thomas Reydon (Kluwer, 2011). Parts of chapters 9 and 10 were prefigured in “Behavior as Affliction: Framing Assumptions in Behavior Genetics,” in *Mutating Concepts, Evolving Disciplines: Genetics, Medicine, and Society*, edited by Rachel Ankeny and Lisa Parker (Kluwer, 2002).

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Scientific inquiry and knowledge are social, I have argued. So is philosophical inquiry. I am grateful to all who have entered into this dialectical adventure with me.

