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Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee, Chapter 13: campaign in Virginia.-Bristol Station.-mine Run.-Wilderness. (search)
the Potomac was now consolidated into four corps-Second, Fifth, and Sixth-commanded by Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick, and the Ninth under Burnside. (Under the consolidation the First and Third Corps disappeared.) When the sun sank to rest on the 4th, Grant had crossed his whole army, and on the morning of the 5th confidently started across the Wilderness in a southerly direction to force Lee to accept battle. Crossing the river without opposition relieved his mind from serious apprehensiotheir whole front and drove their right back in some confusion. Lee's right wing was threatened with disaster; neither Longstreet's corps nor Anderson's division of Hill's had arrived. The former left his camp near Gordonsville at 4 P. M. on the 4th, and marched that afternoon sixteen miles. The next day, when Hill and Ewell were fighting, he resumed his march, lost his way, had to retrace his steps, and finally went into camp on the night of the 5th near Verdiersville, some ten miles in the
Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee, Chapter 15: evacuation of Richmond and the Petersburg lines.--retreat and surrender. (search)
properly made, would plant the Army of the Potomac across the Danville road at Burkeville, as well as at another point between there and Amelia Court House, twenty miles northeast of Burkeville. In that case Lee's withdrawal to Danville would be blocked, his junction with Johnston foiled, and the use of the Danville Railroad taken away from him. Sheridan arrived at Jetersville — on the Danville Railroad, seven miles from Amelia Court House, where Lee was that morningon the afternoon of the 4th, with some eighteen thousand troops of all arms, and intrenched. Meade did not reach him until late in the afternoon of the 5th. The last of Lee's force, Ewell, it will be remembered, did not reach Amelia Court House until noon that day. Still, if Lee's supplies had been there as ordered, he might have moved against Sheridan at Jetersville very early on the 5th with his whole force except Ewell, over twenty thousand men, and defeated him and reached Burkeville, thirteen miles farther, befor
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Promoted Major-General of Volunteers-Unoccupied territory-advance upon Nashville-situation of the troops-confederate retreat- relieved of the command-restored to the command-general Smith (search)
n to me of February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of March. On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my command back to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson. From Fort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi, and Paris, Tennessee [also Corinth, Mississippi; Jackson, Tennessee; and Humboldt, Tennessee]. We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the same day I was back on the Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received the following dispatch from General Halleck: Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant, Fort Henry: You will place Maj-Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? H. W. Halleck, Major-General I was surprised. This was the first intimation I had received that General Halleck had called for information as to th
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, The Army at Pittsburg landing-injured by a fall --the Confederate attack at Shiloh-the first day's fight at Shiloh-General Sherman-condition of the Army-close of the first day's fight --the second day's fight-retreat and defeat of the Confederates (search)
ked where he was if he remained. This view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. On the 1st of April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. On the 2d Johnston left Corinth in force to attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel [Ralph] Buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. The pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall General Sherman returned to camp and repor
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Headquarters moved to Memphis-on the road to Memphis-escaping Jackson-complaints and requests-halleck appointed commander-in-chief --return to Corinth — movements of Bragg- surrender of Clarksville — the advance upon Chattanooga-Sheridan Colonel of a Michigan regiment (search)
in strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with great loss. Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d of September I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jackson and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On the 4th I received direct orders to send [Gordon] Granger's division also to Louisville, Kentucky. General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march upon Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent one division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place. This gave Buell about seventeen days start. If he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and Chattanooga must hav
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Van Dorn's movements-battle of Corinth-command of the Department of the Tennessee (search)
troops for us must come by a circuitous route. On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had been ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn was coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and held at bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinth to hold them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating the National lines
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Johnston's movements-fortifications at Haines' Bluff-explosion of the mine-explosion of the second mine-preparing for the assault-the Flag of truce-meeting with Pemberton-negotiations for surrender-accepting the terms- surrender of Vicksburg (search)
ld be: We always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them ; or, We are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves. The garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly thrfour hours to effect a surrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time-my recollection is two weeks. It was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. On the 4th
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Sherman's campaign in Georgia-siege of Atlanta --death of General McPherson-attempt to capture Andersonville-capture of Atlanta (search)
ampaign It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. He covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. On the 4th and 5th [of August] Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to command him. If he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was
Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Grand movement of the Army of the Potomac- crossing the Rapidan-entering the Wilderness- battle of the Wilderness (search)
y. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads. Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in position. Burnside at this time was no
J. B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, chapter 27 (search)
he reports to-day of squadrons of the enemy's cavalry seen in the surrounding counties are not reliable — they were probably our own men in quest of the enemy. May 8 To-day the city is in fine spirits. Hooker had merely thrown up defenses to protect his flight across the river. The following dispatch was received last night from Gen. Lee: Chancellorsville, May 7th, 1863. To his Excellency, President Davis. After driving Gen. Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, on the night of the 4th inst., I returned on the 5th to Chancellorville. The march was delayed by a storm, which continued all night and the following day. In placing the troops in position on the morning of the 6th, to attack Gen. Hooker, it was ascertained he had abandoned his fortified position. The line of skirmishers was pressed forward until they came within range of the enemy's batteries, planted north of the Rappahannock, which, from the configuration of the ground, completely commanded this side. His army,
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