Browsing named entities in John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army. You can also browse the collection for November 29th or search for November 29th in all documents.

Your search returned 20 results in 5 document sections:

John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter X (search)
turnpike at Spring Hill. While I have no wish to take any part in that discussion, I must say that I think the mistake was Hood's. I think he attempted a little longer march, over a very bad road, than could be made in so short a time. The 29th of November is a very short day, and the march of troops across pontoon bridges and through deep mud is very slow. If Hood had turned down the north bank of Duck River, across the fields, which were no worse than his road, he could have got into a fighse at Franklin made final success easy and certain. A retreat at any time before nine o'clock A. M. on the 29th would have led to substantially the same result as if begun at 2 A. M. If the plan adopted and ordered early in the morning of November 29 had been carried out, by which the line of Duck River would have been abandoned in the middle of that day, the head of the column from Spring Hill would have arrived at Franklin about midnight, expecting to cross the Harpeth without delay; but
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XI (search)
e answer being received by me next morning, November 29. It is thus seen that up to the morning :30 P. M. and his answer was received by me November 29 (no hour mentioned in the records). The DepThe appendix to my report mentions the date November 29, but does not give the hour. My official r, artillery, and trains. In the morning, November 29, I sent a brigade of infantry toward Huey'st my reply to General Thomas of 8:30 A. M., November 29, and my orders to Ruger of 8 and 8:45 A. M.m the north bank of Duck River. Early on November 29, I sent the following brief despatch in rep15 A. M. to Wilson. Soon after 10 A. M., November 29, the first report from the brigade sent towf the order actually given to the troops on November 29 explains how that mistake occurred. In bri division at that place in the afternoon of November 29 cannot be overestimated or too highly praisad already learned at 2 A. M. the same day (November 29). The only question in my mind that General[5 more...]
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XII (search)
information that cavalry could possibly give. If it is true that the operations of our cavalry were to some extent influenced by apprehension of a cavalry raid on Nashville or other vital point in our rear, that was only what General Thomas had been apprehending all the time, and to meet which he had assembled eight thousand troops in Nashville, perhaps not informing the commander of his own cavalry of that fact quite as early as he might have done. See Thomas's despatch of 8 P. M., November 29, to Colonel H. C. Wharton, Wilson's staff officer: War Records, Vol. XLV, part i, p. 1146. In fact, the redoubtable Forrest had become famous, and his troopers were esteemed a very large factor in the problem then undergoing solution—greater in some respects, as I have pointed out, than the events justified. In my report of the battle of Franklin I gave all the information in my possession of the gallant action of our cavalry in driving that of the enemy back across the Harpeth at t
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIII (search)
y assault and his rear reached by Thomas's cavalry before noon, and nothing less than a miracle could have prevented the capture of Hood's army. It is worthy of note as instructive comparisons that on November 30 Hood advanced from Spring Hill to Franklin and made his famous assault in just about the same length of time that it took our troops to advance from the first to the second position at Nashville and make the assault of December 16; and that the Fourth and Twenty-third corps on November 29 and 30 fought two battles—Spring Hill and Franklin—and marched forty miles, from Duck River to Nashville, in thirty-six hours. Time is an element in military problems the value of which cannot be too highly estimated, yet how seldom has it been duly appreciated! The remnant of Hood's army having made its escape across the Tennessee River, the pursuit terminated, and General Thomas issued his remarkable General Orders, No. 169, announcing that the rear-guard of the flying and dispirited
John M. Schofield, Forty-six years in the Army, Chapter XIV (search)
December 16 that battle due to the spontaneous action of subordinate commanders statements in the reports of the Corps commanders explanation of the absence of orders the Phraseology of General Thomas's report. the official records, Hood's statement, and Sherman's estimate, made at the time, agree pretty closely in placing Hood's infantry force at about 30,000 men when he crossed the Tennessee and began his advance toward Nashville. He lost a considerable number at Spring Hill on November 29, and over 6000, besides thirteen general officers, at Franklin on November 30. Therefore 24,000 must be a liberal estimate of his infantry strength after the battle of Franklin. The infantry strength of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps did not exceed 22,000 present for duty equipped, of which one brigade (Cooper's) of the Twenty-third was sent by General Thomas to guard the fords of Duck River below Columbia, and did not rejoin the corps until after the battle of Franklin. Hence Hood'