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Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 3 (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 8 8 Browse Search
Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner: volume 2 7 7 Browse Search
Edward H. Savage, author of Police Recollections; Or Boston by Daylight and Gas-Light ., Boston events: a brief mention and the date of more than 5,000 events that transpired in Boston from 1630 to 1880, covering a period of 250 years, together with other occurrences of interest, arranged in alphabetical order 7 7 Browse Search
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 1, Colonial and Revolutionary Literature: Early National Literature: Part I (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 6 6 Browse Search
Cambridge History of American Literature: volume 2 (ed. Trent, William Peterfield, 1862-1939., Erskine, John, 1879-1951., Sherman, Stuart Pratt, 1881-1926., Van Doren, Carl, 1885-1950.) 6 6 Browse Search
Medford Historical Society Papers, Volume 8. 5 5 Browse Search
George Ticknor, Life, letters and journals of George Ticknor (ed. George Hillard) 4 4 Browse Search
Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and letters of Charles Sumner: volume 3 4 4 Browse Search
Colonel William Preston Johnston, The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston : His Service in the Armies of the United States, the Republic of Texas, and the Confederate States. 4 4 Browse Search
Emil Schalk, A. O., The Art of War written expressly for and dedicated to the U.S. Volunteer Army. 4 4 Browse Search
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Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 4: grand tactics, and battles. (search)
t any one having thought of turning him. At Rivoli the turners were completely beaten, and they were not more happy either at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As will be seen in Art. 33, I am far from rejecting manoeuvres tending to outflank and to turn a wing, for I have constantly insisted upon them, but it is importie-Sainte, and the stream of Papelotte, presented to Ney obstacles more serious than the famous position of Elchingen, where he forced the passage of the Danube in 1805, upon the remnant of a burnt bridge. The courage of the defenders could, in fact, not have been absolutely equal in the two circumstances; but, apart from this chrring important passages, like the two attacks which took place in 1799 upon the Fort of Lucisteig in the Grisons; the taking of Leutasch and of Sharnitz by Ney in 1805; finally the carrying of a post not fortified even but which should serve as g<*> depot for provisions and munitions indispensable to the enemy, such<*> the enterp
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
han if he changed direction too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donanwerth and Ingolstadt, in 1805, was an operation nearly of the same kind; the direction chosen became the first cause of the destruction of the army of Mr him than that where he is found; it is a prudent manoeuvre rather than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired, in 1805, from Wischan upon Brunn, in order to lead the allies upon the point which suited him. It was thus that Wellington retreateing defended by lateral movements. This assertion has received, as we have said, cruel denials in the campaigns of 1800, 1805 and 1809, but as the lateral defense has not been precisely well attempted there, the question is still susceptible of conshed for the study of military men and statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France from 1803 to 1805, will be one of the most extraordinary monuments of the activity, foresight and skill of Napoleon; they cannot be too high
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), chapter 7 (search)
armont, detached to the right, and that of Augereau detached to the left, were disposable for acting upon the flanks. But from the passage of the Danube at Donauwert, all was disordered; Ney, at first reinforced to five divisions, was reduced to two; the main body was dislocated, part to the right, a part to the left, so that this fine order of battle became useless. It will ever be difficult to give an organization at all stable; meanwhile events are not always as complicated as those of 1805, and the campaign of Moreau in 1800, proves that the primitive organization can, to a certain point, be maintained, at least for the bulk of the army. To this end it seems that the organization of the army into four fractions, viz: two wings, a centre, and a reserve, is the only rational one; the composition of those fractions may vary according to the strength of the army, but in order to be able to maintain it, it will be indispensable to have a certain number of divisions out of line, to
munications, we close his line of retreat; to return to his base, he is obliged to force his way with the bayonet; if he fails in this attempt and is defeated, he will be forced to surrender. Examples of such operations are the campaigns of 1800, 1805, and 1806. In 1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, by su1805, Mack, with an Austrian army, near Ulm, was turned by Napoleon, and obliged to capitulate. This result was obtained in consequence of the position and extension of the two bases of operation. Fig. 2 will explain this, by supposing that a b forms the base of the French, (the Rhine,) and that they advance from a to n, and cut the Austrian army, which has advanced in the direction of m, from its base, c d. In 1806, the Prussians were also cut from their communications, obliged to fight at Jena and Auerstadt, front against Prussia; they were defeated, and the remainder of their army obliged to lay down arms, as they found their line of retreat continually closed by Napoleon's division advancing parallel with them i
manoeuvre marches we understand marches executed by large armies, and having more of a strategical object than a tactical one; they are, in fact, strategical flank marches. I will give the dispositions for marching as used by Napoleon at Ulm in 1805, and at Jena in 1806. Each of the corps designated in the plan was of three divisions, and in the manoeuvres at Ulm that of Ney was of five. In these marches the force of each army corps, and the distance between them, are such that it can resist Naumburg. If the Prussians attack him, their loss only becomes more certain, as the decisive point is Naumburg. The result of these marches and manoeuvres was the total loss of the Prussian army. March and manoeuvre of Napoleon near Ulm, 1805. The Austrian general, Mack, with from 70,000 to 80,000 men, advanced from the Austrian frontier as far as Ulm. Napoleon's army, arriving from Wurzburg, Mayence, Spire, and Kehl, numbered 180,000 men. This army was not directed against Ulm,
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 2: Strategy.—General divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a Campaign.—Analysis of the military operations of Napoleon (search)
nd France in the seven years war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head Mos In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If Han small force, the large and successive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations were both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminently s of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was the manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at Ratisbon in 1809. Interior lines of operations, when and 1797, the campaign of the Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 18the country between the Rhine and Danube without pulling a trigger. Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main body forced to surrende
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 3: Fortifications.Their importance in the defence of States proved by numerous historical examples (search)
Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in 1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be enoa, and several smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian aggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand army, starting from the soliagainst Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it would have enabled the Archduke Charles, afte
soldiers had surpassed the much vaunted rapidity of Caesar's legions. In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of Loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and climbing mountains and. glaciers. In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the early part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts on the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. During the same campaign the French infantry, pthan infantry; but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the most ground. In the Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But in the short campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of Murat displayed the most wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than any mounted troops of modern ages. The English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a rapidity truly extraor
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 7: sea-coast defences..—Brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on San Juan d'ulloa, and on St. Jean d'acre (search)
ench fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic. The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe; his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle — these
or the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of a general of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of Maria Theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that such troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons of Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas of things ; but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever formed the vanguards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because to speak of a vangua