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Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army . 19 3 Browse Search
General James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox 7 1 Browse Search
Jula Ward Howe, Reminiscences: 1819-1899 3 3 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 2 0 Browse Search
Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History (ed. Benson Lossing) 2 2 Browse Search
The Daily Dispatch: December 19, 1861., [Electronic resource] 2 0 Browse Search
William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman . 1 1 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army .. You can also browse the collection for MacMahon or search for MacMahon in all documents.

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Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XVII (search)
k Charles. Meantime the Third Army, under the Crown Prince of Prussia-which, after haying fought and won the battle of Worth, had been observing the army of Marshal MacMahon during and after the battle of Gravelotte--was moving toward Paris by way of Nancy, in conjunction with an army called the Fourth, which had been organized fly compelled the surrender at Sedan. This sudden change of direction I did not at first understand, but soon learned that it was because of the movements of Marshal MacMahon, who, having united the French army beaten at Worth with three fresh corps at Chalons, was marching to relieve Metz in obedience to orders from the Minister ed, he graciously took time to explain that the sudden movement northward from Bar-le-Duc was, as I have previously recounted, the result of information that Marshal MacMahon was endeavoring to relieve Metz by marching along the Belgian frontier; a blundering manoeuvre, remarked the Chancellor, which cannot be accounted for, unles
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XVIII (search)
ill pressing forward, the men looking tired and much bedraggled, as indeed they had reason to be, for from recent rains the roads were very sloppy. Notwithstanding this, however, the troops were pushed ahead with all possible vigor to intercept MacMahon and force a battle before he could withdraw from his faulty movement, for which it has since been ascertained he was not at all responsible. Indeed, those at the royal headquarters seemed to think of nothing else than to strike MacMahon, for, fMacMahon, for, feeling pretty confident that Metz could not be relieved, they manifested not the slightest anxiety on that score. By 8 o'clock, the skies having cleared, the headquarters set out for Grand Pre, which place we reached early in the afternoon, and that evening I again had the pleasure of dining with the King. The conversation at table was almost wholly devoted to the situation, of course, everybody expressing surprise at the maneuver of the French at this time, their march along the Belgian fr
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XIX (search)
without parallel in history, for which Napoleon and the Regency in Paris must be held accountable. The first of these gross faults was the fight at Worth, where MacMahon, before his army was mobilized, accepted battle with the Crown Prince, pitting 50,000 men against 175,000; the next was Bazaine's fixing upon Metz as his base, and stupidly putting himself in position to be driven back to it, when there was no possible obstacle to his joining forces with MacMahon at Chalons; while the third and greatest blunder of all was MacMahon's move to relieve Metz, trying to slip 140,000 men along the Belgian frontier. Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to thMacMahon's move to relieve Metz, trying to slip 140,000 men along the Belgian frontier. Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to think of all this; to think that Bazaine carried into Metz — a place that should have been held, if at all, with not over 25,000 men — an army of 180,000, because it contained, the excuse was, an accumulation of stores. With all the resources of rich France to draw upon, I cannot conceive that this excuse was sincere; on the contra
Philip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General, United States Army ., Chapter XX (search)
d it could, in my opinion, have had ultimately no other termination. As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was the acceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attaching too much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting in three battles-Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte-all of which were lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along the Belgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I am glad to say, does not belong to him. With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon's army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans practically thMacMahon's army at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germans practically the victors. The taking of Paris was but a sentiment-the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces held without molesting that city, and only the political influences consequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace to be deferred. I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, eit