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G. W. Smith (search for this): chapter 2.33
nst us both direct and cross fires. To my eye, Kenesaw there, at the middle bend of Johnston's long line, was more difficult than any portion of Gettysburg's Cemetery Ridge, or Little Round Top, and quite as impossible to take. From extreme to extreme, that is, from the Confederate infantry right to the actual left in a straight line, must have been six miles. The reports show that Johnston had just before the battle of Kenesaw received reinforcements from the Georgia militia under G. W. Smith. His numbers at this terrible battle are not now easily discovered, but standing so much as Johnston did on the defensive behind the prepared works, his losses were hardly ever as great as ours; so that, I think, at Kenesaw he had as many men as at Resaca. My judgment is confirmed by the surprisingly long defensive line which he occupied. Hood, at first, had the right, covering all the wagon approaches and trails from Ackworth and the north, and the wagon and railroads that ran between
J. A. Sladen (search for this): chapter 2.33
ecame confident. In those places where the small breaks had occurred, several attempts were made by Hood to reanimate his men and push on, but all in vain. This was called the battle of Kolb's Farm. In this battle, at one time the firing, on a part of my corps front, was rapid. I rode to a high plateau where I could see considerable of the ground where the contest was sharpest. I had sent my staff away with important messages, and had with me only my orderly, McDonald, and my secretary, Sladen. We three were on our horses, anxiously watching the results of the Confederate attacks, my horse being a few yards ahead of the others. Suddenly McDonald rode up to my side and said: General, I am wounded. Where, McDonald? In my left foot, sir, right through the instep. He was very pale and evidently suffering intensely. He looked me in the face, and in a low voice said: General Howard, I shall die from this wound 1 Oh, no, McDonald, you will not die A wound like that throu
McDonald (search for this): chapter 2.33
s sharpest. I had sent my staff away with important messages, and had with me only my orderly, McDonald, and my secretary, Sladen. We three were on our horses, anxiously watching the results of the Confederate attacks, my horse being a few yards ahead of the others. Suddenly McDonald rode up to my side and said: General, I am wounded. Where, McDonald? In my left foot, sir, right throughMcDonald? In my left foot, sir, right through the instep. He was very pale and evidently suffering intensely. He looked me in the face, and in a low voice said: General Howard, I shall die from this wound 1 Oh, no, McDonald, you will not McDonald, you will not die A wound like that through the foot is very painful, but not fatal. You go back to the field hospital, and when this battle is over I will visit you there. After he began to ride back from me, I was wounded and not you l When, near sunset, I went to the field hospital, I learned that McDonald had been sent back with other wounded to the general hospital on the top of Lookout Mountain.
Haskell (search for this): chapter 2.33
ominated a strong right flank. Just after this personal reconnoissance, with its results in his mind, Sherman met both Schofield and Hooker near there on the field of battle. At once Sherman showed Hooker's dispatch to Schofield. Sherman said: Schofield was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed between them, i.e., Schofield and Hooker. Schofield insisted that he had not only formed a strong right flank, as ordered, but that in the primary engagement the head of his column, part of Haskell's division, had been in advance of Hooker's corps, and were entitled to that credit. He affirmed, also, that dead men from his army were yet lying up there on the ground to show where his lines had been. Hooker, thus called to account, made answer, apologetically, that he did not know this when he sent the dispatch. But Sherman, considering that the original statement of Hooker had reflected to his hurt upon an army commander without cause, and that Hooker's exaggeration had led Thomas
Daniel Butterfield (search for this): chapter 2.33
ng the progress of this engagement, which became an assault upon Hooker's right flank, he called upon me for some help, asking me to relieve his left division (Butterfield's), so that it might be sent off for a reinforcement to his right. This request I complied with at once, using every regiment of mine not then in line. These replacing troops were five regiments of Colonel Grose's brigade. In this manner Hooker was given the whole of Butterfield's division for a reserve, or for resting any troops that had been long engaged; so his left flank was thoroughly secured. Just as soon as the Union troops all along these lines had recovered from the firstccount for his exaggerations. Sherman's determination to do so was increased when he found Hooker had used during the combat but two of his own divisions, for Butterfield's, kept back in reserve, had not been engaged at all during the day. Again, he saw, as before reported, one of Schofield's divisions properly placed abreast of
Jacob D. Cox (search for this): chapter 2.33
Johnston's weakened flank. Schofield's dispatch at 10 A. M. was encouraging: Colonel Reilly has carried a position on the Sandtown road and driven the enemy back. Cox will push forward as much as possible. Hascall is using his artillery freely and pressing strongly, but finds the enemy too strong to give hope of getting his works. But at last Cox's dispatch, received at 4.30 P. M., showed that nothing more could be done. Cox and Stoneman, routing a Confederate detachment and driving it back, seizing and holding an important Confederate outwork, had done good service for future operations, but that, important as it was, just then afforded poor consolatCox and Stoneman, routing a Confederate detachment and driving it back, seizing and holding an important Confederate outwork, had done good service for future operations, but that, important as it was, just then afforded poor consolation to our defeated commander. On the Confederate side, when General Johnston left the Kenesaw heights and retired to his headquarters he was greatly rejoiced with the triumphs of that day. In his modest account of his victory were these words in praise of our gallant attack against him: The Federal troops were in greater force
Jefferson C. Davis (search for this): chapter 2.33
assault the enemy's intrenchments at some point near the left of Stanley's and Davis's divisions, which will be selected by General Howard after a careful reconnoise enemy's works immediately in his front. The batteries of General Baird's and Davis's divisions will remain as at present posted until the contemplated movement ise, but gained nothing. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, selected Jeff. C. Davis's division. Davis chose what seemed to be the most vulnerable point in theDavis chose what seemed to be the most vulnerable point in the enemy's breastworks. He designated McCook's and Mitchell's brigades, placing McCook on his right and Mitchell on his left, in the rear of my right division (Stanleand rocky, covered with the usual trees and undergrowth. The signal, writes Davis, was given a little before nine o'clock, and the troops, following the example tune to the troops, and will ever be to the army and country a great loss. General Davis's losses were 770. Sherman still hoped against hope that Schofield, foll
J. B. McPherson (search for this): chapter 2.33
rmy has only three corps, and I know there was a very respectable force along McPherson's front, so much so that his generals thought the enemy was massing against tderate Loring held all the long breastworks of the Confederate right opposite McPherson; Hardee held the center and much of the left opposite Thomas's three corps, ly send an overwhelming force against Hooker without exposing his weakness to McPherson. Taking these things into account, Sherman took occasion the next day aftet two miles in the same direction; also northward from Sherman two miles with McPherson. Here, then, like the arrangements of Von Moltke in the Franco-Prussian Waordered, for Thomas to make a heavy assault at the center with his army while McPherson made a feint on the left and Schofield a threatened attack on the right. Ordatest losses was that of General Harker, who was in characteristics much like McPherson. Would that he could have lived to have realized some of his bright hopes, a
John Newton (search for this): chapter 2.33
k are selected near the present position of Colonel Grose's brigade. II. General Newton will lead the assault, being prepared to cover his own left. III. Major ll be prepared, with his other two brigades well in hand, to follow closely General Newton's movements. IV. General Wood will occupy his present front and extend tneral Stanley's and Wood's divisions will be pointed out in the morning. General Newton will commence his movement for the attack at sunrise, keeping his troops aser and I, were for hours closeted together. I went with my division commander, Newton, and we examined the ground which our juniors had selected that seemed least objectionable. Newton used the column of regimental divisions, doubled on the center. That formation seemed best for the situation; first, to keep the men concealed aery heavy, particularly in valuable officers. General Harker's brigade, says Newton, advanced through the dense undergrowth, through the slashing and abatis made b
Wheeler (search for this): chapter 2.33
so that Hooker's men encountered only a part of Hood's and a part of Hardee's commands. Schofield breasted the remainder of Hood's divisions and the cavalry of Wheeler, which supported Hood's moving left flank. In view of these plain facts Sherman was incensed that Hooker should have made such a fulsome report, and some words omy of the Tennessee, with Blair on the left, faced Hood. A short distance beyond, eastward, was Garrard's cavalry, trying to keep back the Confederate cavalry of Wheeler. Thomas, with his three Union corps, touched the middle bend opposite Loring and part of Hardee. Hooker's corps made Thomas's right; then came, on the extremeh of Sherman's front was at that time fully eight miles. There are four distinct combats which ought to come into this battle of Kenesaw: 1. The combat with Wheeler's cavalry near Brush Mountain. 2. The cavalry combat against Jackson. 3. The battle of Kolb's Farm on June 22d. 4. Our determined attacks and repulses at
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