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Harvie (search for this): chapter 1.56
n their front, and then, with one or two corps, which he could afford to spare, make a flank movement imperiling their position. Three railroads then supplied Atlanta. To take Atlanta, it would be necessary to take all three. On the 17th of July, Johnston had planned to attack Sherman, as the latter crossed Peach Tree creek, expecting just such a division between his wings as Sherman actually made. He had occasion to say this, and did say it more than once, to his inspector-general, Colonel Harvie. To thus successively engage the fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of his own, had been the purpose of his every movement. Success here would be decisive, he thought, by driving the defeated army against the Chattahoochie, where there were no fords, or to the east away from their communications. On the precipitous banks of the Peach Tree the Confederate army awaited the hour of battle. The superb strategy of their commander and the superlative excellence of the position he
A. P. Stewart (search for this): chapter 1.56
deem it just to give verbatim the instructions of Johnston to his strong, staunch hero, General A. P. Stewart. Find, said Johnston to him, the best position, on our side of Peach Tree Creek, for ourhe field. He did not say that he would attack Sherman on the crossing of Peach Tree, but, says Stewart, his dispositions were evidently made with a view to so attack, and were inconsistent with any other purpose. That evening Stewart rode to Johnston's headquarters to report that he had made the dispositions according to direction. He was met by Johnston with the order for the latter's removal. Stewart has since said: I would cheerfully have suffered the loss of either of my own arms to have been able to retain Johnston in command. There could have been no purer ransom for his generaltime for battle, Johnston had met the shreds and patches of his old troops, under the stanch A. P. Stewart. The best interpreter of a general's strength is the sentiment with which he animates his r
Longstreet (search for this): chapter 1.56
o the officer in command of the troops engaged. About three o'clock, he says, I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left me no apology for interference. Meantime McClellan was bending every energy to the active shipment of troops, by water, the hoped — for hour had struck. His orders were at once given. Written orders were dispatched to Hill, Huger, and G. W. Smith, and in writing acknowledged. Longstreet being near headquarters received his orders verbally. G. W. Smith was to take position on the left to support the attack which the other divisions were to makematter of controvery, the attack on the right did not begin until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. But even after the delay of all these hours, the rush of Hill and Longstreet had stormed and carried the entrenchments opposed to them, with the camp equipments, ordnance, and stores belonging to the troops assailed, driving Casey in utt
John Pope (search for this): chapter 1.56
e loss. Those who would make the Atlanta campaign exactly like Chancellorsville should remember that, from the last day's fight at the Wilderness to Appomattox, Lee attacked no more; that from this time on Lee fought only behind entrenchments; that what could be done in 1863, could not necessarily be done in 1864. The whole criticism of Johnston strangely forgets, that the victorious results at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville were the consequences of Jackson's spring upon the rear of Pope and Hooker; and not because Jackson suffered himself to be in their predicament. The question presented to Johnston at Rocky Face was, not whether he would do like Stonewall Jackson, but whether he would deliberately do like the generals whom Stonewall Jackson defeated. Every man in authority is the shepherd of a trust; but what so sacred as the general's-lives that will step to death at his bidding. Of all fiduciaries none has such account to render as he who is commissioned to wage the
Fabius (search for this): chapter 1.56
less than by seeking battle; that a march or manoeuvre at the right time, is more potent than a battle at the wrong time; that to seize a position which will threaten the adverse army the instant it does move, may far exceed the value of an attack upon it, if it does not; that the circuit of a large and politic strategy is wider and higher, and makes its demands upon an intellectual grasp more subtle and more vivid, than the mere rapture of pitched battle. This was the instruction of which Fabius and Marcellus were the apt pupils, and Hannibal the school-master. It is idle now to speculate as to what might have happened, had Johnston been allowed to be the real main spring of movements he was so fitted to direct; if the substance of his important command had been delivered to him. Fortune opposed him with an iron heart, which no excellence could touch. He opposed fortune with an iron will, which, unconquered and undismayed, has outlived fortune's worst and triumphed over it. His
S. B. French (search for this): chapter 1.56
f unto him it seemeth good. Of all trusts and talents this is the one to be wisely used, and in no wise abused. The policy of Johnston was not the step forward which would slide three steps back, but the step back which would find the strength to stride trebly forward. It was the drawing back of the ram's foot to strike with the horns. The movement from Dalton began on the 12th of May. Polk's advance under Loring, and Polk himself, reached Resaca from Demopolis, Ala., on the same day. French's division of the same army joined near Kingston several days later, and Quarles's brigade at New Hope church on the 26th. One may be permitted to believe that Johnston incurred as large risk as could be exacted of a soldier and a patriot when he left the whole protection of his rear to the expected arrival of this much-hurried reinforcement. The position taken at Resaca to meet the movement through Snake Creek Gap was made untenable in consequence of a similar movement by Sherman towards C
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 1.56
. The gage of battle was thrown down, and by Johnston lifted with a knight's good conscience. Whatan at least two days nearer Richmond than was Johnston at Bull Run. Face to face with these conditiptured nor held. The well calculated blow of Johnston was fierce and stunning, and his very deliberd the batteries of Vicksburg. To the mind of Johnston it was clear that, when this could happen Vicfaith was wanting. The chief criticisms of Johnston's conduct of this campaign rests on his failu risk. On May 1st, the effective strength of Johnston's army, infantry, artillery, and cavalry was tself is shaken. Nothing could be finer than Johnston's demeanor in this, his unlooked for, and, toless than fifteen thousand men. At their head Johnston burst upon Sherman's left wing with an electrich on the 18th of April, Sherman accorded to Johnston, and which had they been ratified, would haveon, to declare that the force and vitality of Johnston's character was like the ocean wave—not to be[125 more...]
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1.56
t arm of Jackson, and launched by the genius of Lee, was the thunderbolt to rive asunder McClellan'. He should have fought, his critics say, as Lee and Jackson fought at Chancellorsville; he shouxpressed by some, to inaugurate the triumphs of Lee and Jackson at the portal of the Georgia campaicksburg Railroad crosses the North Anna, to cut Lee's communications. Did Lee strike the force lefd have to be crossed twice. On the other hand, Lee had concentrated his army between the Little Rite upon either of the opposing wings. Some say Lee should have left a small part of his force to hal A. A. Humphreys. Hancock was intrenched, and Lee well knew the advantage that gave, and that he n to march through the Carolinas to the rear of Lee. When the western army went to pieces in hopele assembled in the Carolinas, united to those of Lee; whenever the latter could most effectually witd himself so as to facilitate his junction with Lee, whenever the time should come to unite once mo[4 more...]
Bragg (search for this): chapter 1.56
f the forces of Holmes and Pemberton; those of Bragg to co-operate if practicable. By the junctionestions made by him respecting the commands of Bragg and Pemberton, as well as objections interposeat he was ordered to go to the headquarters of Bragg, for the purpose of determining whether the la of his companion in arms, and advised against Bragg's removal. His letter to the Confederate Pres it then appear to you necessary to remove General Bragg, none in this army or engaged in this inveberton's telegrams indicated an effort against Bragg, in whose vicinity Johnston was, and not againd inspire confidence. Johnston succeeded to Bragg upon an unenviable throne. Whether justly or rmy he now commanded was the same which, under Bragg, had been routed at Missionary Ridge. Shermanss. His first movement was with the troops of Bragg's then near Goldsboro, added to those of D. H.s sufficient to scotch Schofield's advance. Bragg's troops and those of the Army of Tennessee we
William J. Hardee (search for this): chapter 1.56
il Sherman's left at dawn on the 29th of May, and Polk and Hardee to join in the battle successively. At 10 A. M. Hood repofirst, his own troops from Charleston, or Sherman's army. Hardee did, indeed, cross the Pedee, at Cheraw, on the morning ofin through which of these places Sherman's route would be. Hardee was instructed to follow the road from Fayetteville to Ral miles, is also that to Smithfield. On the 15th of March, Hardee had reached Elevation, on the road to Smithfield. On the rising on that beautiful Sabbath in March, when all except Hardee had reached the point of rendezvous. The gap made by his the Tophet of Tennessee. At last the wayworn troops under Hardee, which had marched day and night to join battle, appeared althall, who commanded all that was left of Polk's corps. Hardee led the charge of the right wing. With an annihilating funot with fear but with confidence. Once more he looked to Hardee to deal the blow he wanted. That intrepid man, first kiss
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