hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Stonewall Jackson 356 2 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee 169 11 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 150 0 Browse Search
Robert Edward Lee 115 15 Browse Search
Joseph Hooker 111 1 Browse Search
Chancellorsville (Virginia, United States) 106 0 Browse Search
Eppa Hunton 92 4 Browse Search
Robert E. Lee 92 0 Browse Search
George B. McClellan 88 2 Browse Search
United States (United States) 84 0 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 34. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 723 total hits in 86 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...
Providence, R. I. (Rhode Island, United States) (search for this): chapter 1.2
ternoon, as the infantry were suffering from the fire they were drawing from the enemy. General Jackson then withdrew, and General Lee dictated to Colonel Marshall a long letter to President Davis, giving him fully the situation. In it he regretted he could not have the assistance of Pickett's and Hood's divisions, but expressed his confidence in the good judgment that had withdrawn and kept them from him, and closed with the hope that, notwithstanding all our dangers and disadvantages, Providence would bless the efforts which he was sure his brave army would make to deserve success. I give all this detail to show the errors writers upon Chancellorsville have fallen into, in reference to the Origin of Gen-Jackson's famous flank movement. And as settling the question as to who originated this movement, I give the following extract from a letter written by General Lee to Rev. Dr. A. T. Bledsoe, in reply to one from Dr. Bledsoe, in which he asked the direct question as to whethe
United States (United States) (search for this): chapter 1.2
al Re-union of the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia Association, in 1879, says: The problem presented to General Lee's mind on Friday night, May 1st, was to decide how best to attack Hooker's army on the morning of May 2nd. Time was an important element; for near Fredericksburg, in his rear, was Sedgwick, largely outnumbering the Confederate force in front under Early. During the afternoon General Lee wished to attack from his right, and cut Hooker off from the United States Ford, severing his communications with Sedgwick, and rode down himself and examined the line all the way to the river, but found no place where he could do so. Returning at night, he found Jackson, and asked if he knew of any place to attack. Jackson said, No. Lee said, Then we must get around on the Federal right. Jackson said he had been enquiring about roads by the furnace. Stuart came up then, and said he would go down to the furnace, and see what he could learn about roads. He
A. H. Campbell (search for this): chapter 1.2
Furnace and Brock roads, which were old roads, and were clearly shown on the map of Spotsylvania county, prepared before the Battle of Chancellorsville, by Major A. H. Campbell, of the C. S. Engineer corps, (see Plate No. XCI, published with Vol. 25, of Rebellion Records). It is apparent from Dr. Dabney's account that General Jackson was seeking for a shorter route than Campbell's map showed, as well as information as to the condition of the known roads, but if the route of the Second Corps on May 2nd is correctly laid down by Hotchkiss on his map, all efforts to find a suitable cut-off failed, for it followed the old roads shown on Campbell's map. FurtCampbell's map. Furthermore, it was from his chaplain, (the Rev. Mr. Lacy), that Jackson sought information about the roads, for Dr. Dabney says: When his chaplain awoke in the morning, before the dawn of day, he perceived a little fire kindled under the trees, and General Jackson sitting by it upon a box, such as was used to contain biscuit fo
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1.2
It was obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore, Lee proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. General Lee was informed that the Rev. Mr. Lacy, a chaplain in Jackson's corps, was familiar with the country about Chancellorsville. Mr. Lacy informed the General that he had been pastor of a church yond Chancellorsville by a road sufficiently remote from the Federal position to prevent discovery. With this information Lee determined to turn the Federal position and assail it from a point where an attack was unexpected. The execution of a movim for him the origin of the movement, I will introduce, in corroboration of my statement, the following letter, from General Lee, published in the address of General Fitzhugh Lee, before the Southern Historical Society. Here follows General Le
Field (search for this): chapter 1.2
draw Ewell to himself and carry out the project on which his heart was set, he still kept in view the general situation. After he had dispatched the above letter (to General Lee with reference to an attack on Banks), a report came in which led him to believe that Ewell was more needed on the Rappahannock than in the Valley. Lee had already informed him that McDowell's advanced guard had occupied Falmouth, on the north bank of the river, opposite Fredericksburg, on April 19th, and that General Field had fallen back. Jackson, in consequence, permitted Ewell to remain near Gordonsville, close to the railway; assuring Lee that he would make arrangements so as not to be disappointed should Ewell be. The various authors of the life of Jackson, to whom General Lee refers, did not have Colonel Henderson's trained military perceptions to enable them to appreciate the relative positions of Lee and Jackson, and how impossible it was for the latter to take the initiative and act indepen
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 1.2
in the name of the President, replied that some such scheme had been for some time under consideration; and the burden of his letters, as we have seen, both to Ewell and Jackson, was that a sudden and heavy blow should be struck at some exposed portion of the invading armies. * * *. It was indeed unfortunate for the North that at this juncture the military affairs of the Confederacy should have been placed in the hands of the clearest-sighted soldier in America. It was an unequal match, Lincoln and Stanton against Lee; and the stroke that was to prove the weakness of the Federal strategy was soon to fall. General Jackson well understood and fully appreciated what he was expected to do if an opportunity offered, but also that he must refrain from doing anything that might interfere with the general plan of operations. A conspicuous instance of this is related by Colonel Henderson, who says, with reference to Jackson's plans for attacking the Federals under Banks': But,
Longstreet (search for this): chapter 1.2
t finally decided upon until the last hope of a successful attack in front was abandoned, on the information obtained by Captain Boswell and myself as to the strength of the enemy's position and defenses in front of Chancellorsville. Colonel Marshall seems also to be mistaken in saying that General Lee dictated a letter to President Davis on the night of May 1st, for General Lee wrote to Mr. Davis on May 2nd, in part, as follows: I have no expectations that any reinforcements from Longstreet or North Carolina will join me in time to aid in the contest at this point, but they may be in time for a subsequent occasion. We succeeded in driving the enemy from in front of our position at Tabernacle Church, on all the roads back to Chancellorsville, where he concentrated in a position remarkably favorable for him. We were unable last evening to dislodge him. I am now swinging around to my left to come up in his rear. I learn, from prisoners taken, that Heintzelman's troops fro
Stanton (search for this): chapter 1.2
of the President, replied that some such scheme had been for some time under consideration; and the burden of his letters, as we have seen, both to Ewell and Jackson, was that a sudden and heavy blow should be struck at some exposed portion of the invading armies. * * *. It was indeed unfortunate for the North that at this juncture the military affairs of the Confederacy should have been placed in the hands of the clearest-sighted soldier in America. It was an unequal match, Lincoln and Stanton against Lee; and the stroke that was to prove the weakness of the Federal strategy was soon to fall. General Jackson well understood and fully appreciated what he was expected to do if an opportunity offered, but also that he must refrain from doing anything that might interfere with the general plan of operations. A conspicuous instance of this is related by Colonel Henderson, who says, with reference to Jackson's plans for attacking the Federals under Banks': But, although aut
McHenry Howard (search for this): chapter 1.2
dier to violate this fundamental military principle. Three hours before sunset General Lee was on the Plank Road, two miles east of Chancellorsville. At four P. M., he sent a dispatch to General Stuart, of which the following copy is taken from the official records: Plank Road, 2 miles from Chancellorsville, May 1st, 1863, 4 o'clock. Major General Stuart, Commanding Cavalry; The captured prisoners agree in stating that this is Meade's corps with which we are now engaged, and that Howard's corps preceded them across the Rapidan, and has taken some other road. This is the only column that we can find in this direction. What has become of the other two? Meade appears to be falling back. I am very respectfully, yours, etc., R. E. Lee, General. It must have been soon after sending this that he received General Jackson's message saying the enemy had made a stand-at Chancellorsville, and moved forward on the Plank Road to the meeting with General Jackson, which, for
Jubal A. Early (search for this): chapter 1.2
ovement contributed much to insure its success. General Fitzhugh Lee, in his address at the Ninth Annual Re-union of the Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia Association, in 1879, says: The problem presented to General Lee's mind on Friday night, May 1st, was to decide how best to attack Hooker's army on the morning of May 2nd. Time was an important element; for near Fredericksburg, in his rear, was Sedgwick, largely outnumbering the Confederate force in front under Early. During the afternoon General Lee wished to attack from his right, and cut Hooker off from the United States Ford, severing his communications with Sedgwick, and rode down himself and examined the line all the way to the river, but found no place where he could do so. Returning at night, he found Jackson, and asked if he knew of any place to attack. Jackson said, No. Lee said, Then we must get around on the Federal right. Jackson said he had been enquiring about roads by the furnace. St
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ...