Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 25
Frank Gardener Moore, Professor Emeritus in Columbia University, Ed.

19. Hannibal, having moved his camp from the region of Beneventum to the vicinity of Capua, led his troops out into battle-line on the third day after his arrival. [2] Since in his absence the Campanians had had a successful battle a few days before, he had no doubt whatever that the Romans would be much less able to withstand himself and his repeatedly victorious army. [3] But once the battle had begun, the Roman line was hard pressed, especially by the cavalry charge, being overwhelmed by their darts, until the signal was given to the cavalry to urge their horses against the enemy. [4] Thus a cavalry battle was in progress when the distant sight of the Sempronian army,¹ commanded by Gnaeus Cornelius, the quaestor, inspired in both armies the same fear that fresh enemies were approaching. [5] As if by agreement the signal for recall was given on both sides, and marching back to the camp they separated on almost even terms. Yet a larger number fell on the [p. 417]Roman side because of the first charge of the² horsemen. [6] Thereupon the consuls, in order to draw Hannibal away from Capua, marched off the following night in different directions, Fulvius into the region of Cumae, Claudius into Lucania. [7] The next day Hannibal, on being informed that the Roman camp was empty and that they had marched away in different directions in two columns, was at first uncertain which to follow, but pushed on [8??] in pursuit of Appius, who after leading the enemy around wherever he pleased, returned by a different road to Capua.

Hannibal had another opportunity for success presented to him in this region. [9] There was one Marcus Centenius, with the cognomen Paenula, conspicuous among the centurions of the highest rank³ for his huge body and his courage. [10] Having finished his military service, he was brought into the senate by Publius Cornelius Sulla, a praetor, and begged the fathers to give him five thousand soldiers. [11] He, being well-acquainted, he said, both with the enemy and the country, would soon accomplish something worth while, and as for the arts by which both our generals and our armies had till then been ensnared, he would use them against their inventor. [12] This was not more stupidly promised than stupidly believed, as if the qualities of soldier and general were the same. [13] Instead of five thousand, eight thousand soldiers were given him, half of them citizens, half allies. And he himself on his march raised a considerable number of volunteers from the farms, and with his army nearly doubled reached Lucania, where Hannibal had halted after vainly pursuing Claudius. [14] The result was never in doubt, [p. 419]as between Hannibal as commander and a centurion,⁴ and between armies one of which was a veteran in victory and the other altogether raw, in large part also irregular and half-armed. When the columns were in sight of each other and neither side refused battle, the lines were immediately drawn up. [15] They fought, however, as was to be expected where nothing was fairly matched. For more than two hours the battle continued, since hope inspired the Roman line so long as their commander held his ground. [16] Not only in keeping with his old reputation, but also for fear of future disgrace, if he should survive a disaster brought on by his own rashness, he threw himself upon the weapons of the enemy and fell, whereupon the Roman line was at once routed. [17] But, as all the roads were occupied by cavalry, so far were they from having any route open even for flight that out of so great a multitude barely a thousand escaped, while the rest scattering met death in various forms.