NYU Stern Newsletter - Issue 4 (2015 May - VC Investing
NYU Stern Newsletter - Issue 4 (2015 May - VC Investing
2014
Issue 4Page 1
May 2015
EVALUATION
EVALUATION:
Brad Burnham:
Managing Partner, Union
Square VenturesPg. 2
Matt Krna:
Partner, SoftBank Capital
Pg. 7
Prof. Aswath Damodaran:
Valuation ExpertPg. 11
Zeev Klein:
Co-Founder & Partner,
Landmark VenturesPg. 13
SIMR ConferencePg. 17
Rami Rahal:
Co-Founder, Blue Cloud
VenturesPg. 19
Mathew Farkash:
Co-Founder, Blueprint
HealthPg. 24
SIMR EventsPg. 28
Stern Investment Idea
Contest: Long MAS, Short
YOKU, Short HK: CAR
Pg. 29
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 2
Brad Burnham
Brad Burnham is a managing partner at Union Square Ventures. Brad began his
career in information technology with AT&T in 1979. He held a variety of sales,
marketing and business development positions there until 1989 when he spun Echo
Logic out of Bell Laboratories. As the first AT&T "venture, Echo Logic was a catalyst
for the creation of AT&Ts venture capital arm, AT&T Ventures. When Echo Logic
was sold in 1993, Brad joined AT&T Ventures as an Executive in Residence. He
became a Principal there in 1994 and a General Partner in 1996. At AT&T Ventures,
Brad was responsible for 14 investments including Audible and Classic Sports
Network. Brad co-founded TACODA in 2001 before joining Fred Wilson to create
Union Square Ventures in 2003. Brad has a BA in Political Science from Wesleyan
University. He is married with two kids and lives in New York City.
May 2015
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Page 3
We didnt turn down Airbnb because it was too expensive or anything like that, we
turned down Airbnb because we didnt understand it, and because we made the
classic venture capital mistake we thought of ourselves as the customers.
have long existed offline in the newspaper world.
Moving them online cut costs, but did not
fundamentally change the business. We started
to think, Gosh, there isnt really a 2.0
implementation of employment advertising.
What would that look like? We decided that it
had to look like Search because in the 1.0
implementation you just put the ads online, pay
for the posting, and save the cost of printing,
trucks, and distribution. The 2.0 model should
flip that around, and employers should put the
ads online, and somebody should be searching
across all those ads. So, we went looking for that
business. After tapping our network to find our
guys (Indeed.com founders), we tracked them
down and started what was a 6-month long
effort to invest in their company. After some
convincing, we led a $5 million investment in the
company, which turned out to be all of the
primary capital they ever took. They built a
business that they sold for reportedly over $1
billion to a Japanese company called the Recruit
Corporation from our initial capital base so
that was a huge home-run in terms of the returns
on that initial investment. I think it worked really
well because it was a 2.0 implementation
competing with a lot of 1.0 implementations, and
also because the founders were very
complimentary.
On the failures, Ive got a lot of to pick from. Lets
go with Wesabe, which was an early Mint.comlike company. It was a utility for managing
personal finance. I think that my two key
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 4
My partner, Fred, likes to say that venture backed companies are bought, not sold.
top of that. With the applications layer services,
the value is largely created by the users of those
services. In that model youre dependent on your
community to create the value in your service. If
youre dependent on the community to create
the value in your service, the network itself, the
brand of the network, has to be one that the
community embraces and believes in. Its a tricky
issue because it means that it would be hard for
some communities to be bought. A good example
of this would be Reddit right now. If Facebook
bought Reddit, would the Redditors still hang
out? I dont know, interesting problem. If Reddit
May 2015
EVALUATION
EV: You are a big believer and backer of peerto-peer services or the sharing economy. On
that front, anything particular you are
looking at currently that you think could be a
game-changer, and would like to share with
our readers?
BB: If you think about venture capital as a series
of generations, or the information technology
services businesses as a series of generations,
you sort of had Microsoft in the late 90s,
followed by a set of services that came out in the
first generation of the internet Yahoo!, AOL,
and Google probably and then you had a set of
services that came out in the second generation
Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, and Whatsapp.
Each new generation emerges at least to some
degree because they undermine the leverage of
the prior generation. The very interesting
question today is: what undermines the Web 2.0
era? You know, what undermines Facebook,
Apple, Google, Twitter, and Pinterest? If you look
at all of those businesses, most of them are
defensible through network effects. Weve been
successful in investing in network effects for a
Page 5
I think the most interesting young venture capital firms tend to be created by
people who were former entrepreneurs.
long time, and I think we understand them pretty
well. So the question is, what would undo
network effects? One of the things that would
undo network effects is a shared public data
layer and/or a shared public truth. Thats why
were interested in Bitcoin. It isnt the currency,
store of value, or medium of exchange thats
interesting about Bitcoin rather, it is the
underlying technology, or the BlockChain
technology that allows you and me to have a
shared version of the truth that is visible to
everybody in the world. I think thats more
important than most people think.
EV: With all the hype over the NASDAQ
breaking the dot-com bubble high of 5000
for the first time in 15 years, do you believe
May 2015
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Matt Krna
Page 7
May 2015
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Page 8
At the end of the day, a seed-stage startup needs to become a business that can
make money, preferably at high margins while supporting ongoing growth at scale,
and if you cant articulate how that will happen its a problem.
Ive been a part of, they almost all involve the
intelligent use of data in some way, and in the
case of IDA that concept was very central to the
thesis. The reason that it was a memorable
investment for me was the way in which the
company weathered the 2008 financial crisis a
considerable proportion of the companys
customer base was comprised of large financial
institutions, and we worried that the downturn
would cause these clients to significantly pull
back their spending with us. What we found was
that the companys offering was extremely
resilient, and we ended up losing no customers
despite a perfect storm environment. It taught
me that even in the most difficult market,
companies that provide real value can succeed. It
was gratifying to see our investment thesis prove
out despite an adverse market that we didnt
predict.
May 2015
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Page 9
Id say one of the biggest mistakes that entrepreneurs make and one I try to
discourage them from making is trying to take on everything themselves.
benchmarks, but ultimately you need to balance
the potential upside if things go well against the
probability that they dont, and come up with an
acceptable rate of return to compensate for the
risk. The tricky part is that the landscape is
constantly changing right now its arguably
easier than any time in history to scale a
business to hundreds of millions of dollars in
revenue, but valuations are also relatively high
and competition for the best opportunities
extremely intense.
EV: Looking back, what is one deal that you
passed on, but wish you hadnt?
MK: Ive missed tons of investments (impossible
not to if youre in this business for long enough),
May 2015
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We definitely seem to be at the high point of the venture cycle right now, with
private market valuations often at a significant premium to public market
valuations, and prices escalating faster than underlying business growth.
as I can be in the business. At the end of the day
its the CEO that must make the tough decisions
necessary to build a business, but I try as much
as I can to make that burden a bit more bearable
by providing some context, distance and
perspective.
EV: What are your thoughts on the current
venture capital environment? Are the
seemingly high private market valuations
justified? Do entrepreneurs have too much
power at the negotiating table? Are there
deals that youve passed on simply because
the valuation was too high?
MK: We pass on investment opportunities all the
time because of valuation. We definitely seem to
be at the high point of the venture cycle right
now, with private market valuations often at a
significant premium to public market valuations,
and prices escalating faster than underlying
business growth. We also see many different
types of investors coming into the venture
market without a lot of experience or sometimes
even discipline. Venture investing isnt a country
club theres no admissions committee and
anyone can do it, but making money through
cycles is a lot more difficult than it looks when
everything is going in one direction, as it has
been for the last several years.
May 2015
EVALUATION
Aswath Damodaran
Page 11
May 2015
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Page 12
When valuing young companies, you always start with their story, because it is the
story that drives the valuation, not the other way around.
because investors are not considering that (a)
the market is not big enough to sustain all of the
companies (current and yet-to-come) that are
likely to be fighting for market share, (b) growth
is going to be far more expensive than is being
currently estimated and (c) the same factors that
allow for easy entry and scaling up will conspire
to hurt companies down the road. Does that
mean that I think every social media company is
overvalued? Not at all, since the winners will still
win big.
I consider myself a value investor, though my
definition of a value investor is not of the Ben
Graham variety (where you look for mature
companies trading at less than their book value),
but simply requires buying stocks when the
price is less than value. It is for that reason that I
go looking for opportunities where it is darkest
and there is the most uncertainty: in young
companies, distressed sectors, or countries with
significant political risk.
EV: Do you believe that the tech sector is in a
bubble? After reading through your response
to Mark Cubans quote about a private sector
bubble, were very curious to hear your
thoughts.
AD: If someone makes a statement that the
market (S&P 500, Nasdaq, social media) is in a
bubble, that person then has the obligation to
back it up. I find that most people who claim
bubbles base it on surface variables, i.e., that
stocks have gone up a lot over the last five years,
May 2015
EVALUATION
Zeev Klein
Page 13
May 2015
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Page 14
Looking at Africa for example, the economy has tripled in size since 2002, and six of
the worlds 10 fastest-growing economies are there. On the technology front, we
can learn a lot from how Africa is approaching wireless and mobile technologies to
overcome barriers to entry in the global marketplace.
market and establish their first beachhead
customers. Similarly, we are involved with a
public Chinese company who is seeking growth
through acquisition and currently looking at a
massive >$1 billion deal which would
immediately put them on the map. We are also
advising two public U.S. corporations who are
looking to expand into Eastern Europe via direct
investment in startups. The world has become
very flat, innovation is everywhere, and
companies looking for a competitive advantage
must now seek disruptive technology regardless
of its point of origin.
EV: What is your personal area of focus at LV?
What is your view on the evolution of the
growth oriented and emerging market
investing landscape and where do you see it
headed in the long-run?
ZK: As a Co-Founder at Landmark, a lot of my
time is spent on management, strategy and
vision. Earlier in my career I was involved a bit
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 15
The most common [valuation technique] is the VC Method, where an investor will
look at their target percentage ownership in say the context of an exit, and work
backwards to arrive at a negotiated valuation.
market comps, discounted cash flow, or revenue
multiples. Those tend to be starting points of a
negotiation, but honestly the most common is
the VC Method, where an investor will look at
their target percentage ownership in say the
context of an exit, and work backwards to arrive
at a negotiated valuation.
EV: A number of founders and start-up
management teams have recently succeeded
in monetizing their holdings at record high
valuations. How sustainable is this relatively
easy access to money? How is LV positioning
itself for an environment where deal flow
shrinks and opportunities diminish?
ZK: Yes, we are certainly in a relative high period
in terms of exits, priced rounds and overall
valuation. In order to make money, the old adage
of buy low and sell high still holds true. Investors
can certainly make money buying high and
selling higher, which has been a very effective
strategy for some in this market. But for me
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 16
Venture Capital and angel investing can be a very rewarding and lucrative part of a
balanced portfolio, but everyone should remember that its also a risky one with the
potential to lose money on a material part of your investment.
constantly improving yourself relative to peers.
Its a big market for boutiques, and we dont see
any issues with regards to saturation or
stagnation. That said, in order to win you have to
have what we sometimes call a unique and
repeatable competitive advantage. For us, those
points are going to be sector expertise in
domains like Digital Media and Enterprise
Software, and geographic expertise in key
markets like Israel. While we have looked at
additional expansion, with China being the next
most appealing market, we also see many
growth opportunities within our current scope
of operation. So its a balance between
optimizing and maximizing your current market
share, versus looking for new growth in new
sectors. For now, we are happy.
EV: In the past you have described yourself as
a capitalistic, for-profit individual focusing
on business innovation. As a champion of
events such as the Social Innovation Summit,
do you believe such initiatives are succeeding
in bringing together business and social
innovation? Or is something more required?
ZK: I dont see a conflict with the alignment of
Profit and Purpose, and in fact, I believe that
most successful companies and individuals
require a balance of both. Said differently, I
believe that your values drive your valuation.
Consumers want to buy products from good
companies; employees want to join and stay with
great bosses and great firms; shareholders and
stakeholders are more likely to own your stock
in the long term if you can demonstrate financial
and social results. While the majority of my day
is spent running the business, I consider it one of
On the days second panel, The Golden Age of Activist Investing, several prominent members of the activist
community discussed its evolution. Sitting at the crossroads of hedge funds and private equity, the
prominence and acceptance of activist investing has grown, and today it is increasingly viewed as a
distinct asset class. Examples of clear misbehavior by company managers, the advent of proxy advisors,
and acceptance (and even encouragement) by traditional mutual fund managers have all driven
activism's acceptance. The panelists highlighted that firms targeted by activists outperform for
several years after activist involvement and performance by activist funds has been strong. The
panel generally agreed that the growth of activism was not over.
During the third panel, Gaining an Edge in Equity Investing, moderated by CNBCs Courtney Reagan, four
portfolio managers discussed their approaches to outperforming the market. Manoj Tandon of Pzena
Investment Management indicated that he focuses on cyclically depressed companies not affected by
structural change and performs deep bottom-up analysis. David Dineen of Pinnacle Associates spoke
about finding high quality and undervalued securities within the small cap universe, which he believes
helps minimize volatility. Siddharth Thacker of Signpost Capital spoke about the importance of
examining history to understand fads. Mark Lee of Mountaineer Partners indicated that he believes
that all investment opportunities have been thoroughly analyzed on a backward looking basis, such that
identifying nonlinear forward opportunities is crucial to achieving outperformance.
The days final speaker, Michael Mauboussin, Head of Global Financial Strategies at Credit Suisse,
discussed a number of behavioral biases, how to separate skill from luck, and how to put behavioral
finance into practice. His advice for managers to successfully account for behavioral biases
included performing a premortum on an investment idea, creating a red team to challenge
ideas, and sizing an investment appropriately for edge level and calibrated level of conviction. He
also explained that in many fields including investment management there had been an absolute increase
in skill but a decrease in the standard deviation of skill level, which was driving structural changes in
favor of passive investment.
All in, it was a very insightful conference, and we very much look forward to seeing you at our next
conference, in Spring 2016!
May 2015
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Rami Rahal
Page 19
May 2015
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Page 20
There is always talk about fund vintage, but the way I see it, if the market is really
frothy you should not deploy the capital. Your main goal should always be to
maximize the value for your investors.
Along the way, I noticed that my [Blue Cloud] cofounder, Mir, was co-investing in a lot of VC deals
that were funneled through the investment bank
Madison Park. I became curious about the coinvesting route and discovered that VC firms are
quite open to this. Mir and I started out really
small, knowing that our investments might not
give us 10x or 20x returns. We wanted to
identify really stable companies that can return a
decent 3x, and by investing alongside the big
guys, who end up doing most of the work, you
get to piggy-back a little bit.
EV: I imagine that fundraising is no walk in
the park, could you take us through the
process of getting Blue Cloud up and
running?
RR: Initially, we wanted to start Blue Cloud as a
$3-$5 million fund. I soon realized that a $5
million fund demands a similar infrastructure
and thought process to a larger fund, so why not
aim a bit higher. Raising the first fund was one of
the hardest things I have ever done. In the first
fundraising trip, I naively thought that if I
pitched to about 50 people, 10 to 15 of them
would write million-dollar checks and we would
May 2015
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This business is about hustling whether you want to raise a fund or work for one.
market has cooled, the reserves run dry before
the company is able to go public. One solution is
to access credit lines, but this is not optimal. The
solution is typically to turn to other VCs, which
then raises the issue of control/board seats.
Additionally, most of these later stage funds
dont want to invest anything less than $25
million. This is where we come in.
To summarize, there isnt really an institutional
investor that does what we do in late-stage. I
think weve identified a huge opportunity in the
market. If we just call a company and ask them if
they are interested in raising another $5 million,
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Mathew Farkash
Co-Founder, Blueprint Health
Page 24
Mathew Farkash
May 2015
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Page 25
As they say with startups - the only thing known with certainty in forecasting a
startup's business is that those forecasts will be wrong.
continue to provide support to the companies
long after the initial twelve weeks. Our interests
are aligned; the better resources and client
access we can provide to our companies, the
more our companies will progress. Ultimately,
the growth of our companies will make them an
attractive acquisition and well be able to meet
or exceed our performance targets.
Our position in the marketplace allows us to
source deal flow at attractive valuations. Because
of this, the performance of our funds has been
very strong.
EV: Could you speak briefly about some of the
major success stories out of Blueprint?
Where are these companies now?
MF: We track several metrics about our portfolio
companies, but the primary indicator we look at
is revenue. Our portfolio is almost entirely
enterprise startup and as I mentioned, 85% of
our portfolio is generating revenue. Enterprise
sales can be a slog, but getting paying clients
means that someone is validating your value
May 2015
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Starting a company has its fair share of ups and downs; in many cases, the
struggles enable the successes.
know how to build healthcare companies
(healthcare entrepreneurs), sell in to healthcare
organizations (industry executives) and finance
the growth of health tech companies (investors).
There is a high bar for accelerators to hit in
order to deliver value to their companies above
and beyond the equity they take. Its unclear to
me that the vast majority of healthcare
accelerators achieve this. For that reason, we feel
confident in our ability to continue to attract the
best founders.
EV: One of our interviewees mentioned that
the single most useful background for being
in the venture business is having had the
experience of starting a company. Clearly
youve displayed some entrepreneurial spirit
along your career path so far. What is the
most rewarding part of starting your own
business? How do you leverage your
background to help other entrepreneurs find
their stride?
MF: Starting a company has its fair share of ups
and downs; in many cases, the struggles enable
the successes. At Blueprint, its been
tremendously rewarding to work alongside our
May 2015
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Pictured from left: Yang Lu, Kota Isogai, Troy Green, Abhi
Sanghi, Sid Agarwal, Billy Duberstein, Vinny Nyamathi, Dan
Reagan, Bryce Webster, Sid Dandekar, Ethan Ellison, Jerry
Jiang, Owens Huang
2nd Annual
Stern
Investment Idea
Contest
Thursday, April 16, 2015
First place: Katherine Shinkareva (MBA 2016), who pitched Masco Corporation (MAS, $27 per share), a
building products producer, with a target price of $32 per share (22% upside). She made a strong case for
momentum in the repair and remodeling industry, an improvement in capital allocation owing to a new
CEO and activist involvement, and a margin expansion from cost cutting and declines in input costs.
Second place: Owens Huang (MBA 2015), who pitched shorting Youku Tudou Inc. (YOKU, $16 per share),
a Chinese internet television company, with a price target of $10 per share (39% downside). He made a
compelling case that Youku is losing growth momentum and market share, it is operating in a capitalintensive commodity industry with low margins and low loyalty, and the company faces a recent SEC
probe and lawsuit.
Third Place: Jerry Jiang (MBA 2016), who pitched shorting Car Inc. (0699 HK, $17 per share), Chinas
largest car rental company, with a target price of $5 per share (70% downside). Jerry made a strong case
that Car Inc. uses aggressive accounting that inflates profit margins, its new franchisee model creates offbalance sheet credit risks, and its 37-times earnings multiple does not account for low barriers to entry
and the potential for industry disruption.
Billy Duberstein (MBA 2016), who pitched Ubiquiti Networks, Inc. (UBNT, $29 per share), a wireless
products company, with a price target of $41 per share (40% upside). He argued that the company will
further penetrate the enterprise market, will grow in emerging markets through a new product
introduction, has new partnerships with major carriers in China and India, and has an exceptional owneroperator with a long-term vision for the company.
Ethan Ellison (MBA 2016), who pitched Iconix Brand Group Inc. (ICON, $33 per share), a brand
management company, with a target price of $45 (30% upside). He argued that Iconix offers an attractive
asset-light business model, a catalyst in the form of the new Peanuts movie coming out in 2015, a strong
CEO with an eye for acquiring attractive brands, and an overreaction to a recently published short thesis
and lawsuit.
Jeff Nathan (MBA 2015), who pitched Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (BXE, $3 per share), a Canadian oil & gas
exploration and production company, with a price target of $10 per share (200% upside). He argued that
oil prices will eventually rebound from $50 as oil has a steep supply/demand curve and US shale drilling
has a higher production ramp and steeper decline curve than conventional production. He also argued
that the management team has an underrated ability to allocate capital, a downside analysis shows the
company passes its liquidity and coverage requirements through 2017, and the stock trades at an
opportunistically low valuation.
Vinny Nyamathi (MBA 2015), who pitched shorting Fortescue Metals Group (FMG AU, $2 per share), an
Australian iron ore producer, with a target price of $0.85 (56% downside). He argued that the iron ore
industry is poised for further deterioration, the company is at a cost disadvantage relative to competitors,
the company faces high debt levels and negative free cash flow, the company had issues with their recent
attempts to refinance their debts, and the LTM multiple is misleading investors into thinking the stock is
cheap.
We are very proud of this years contestants and participants. Research at Stern is thriving. Please get in
touch with us to attend or participate next year. We hope to see you in Spring 2016!
Sincerely,
Stern Investment Management and Research Club
Contributed by Jeff Nathan
Jeff is a second year MBA student at NYU Stern. Jeff worked at T. Rowe Price during the
summer and plans to return there after graduation. Prior to Stern, he was a Vice
President at Atlas Holdings LLC, a private equity firm. He holds a BA from Washington
University in St. Louis. Jeff can be reach at [email protected].
Jeff Nathan
2nd Annual
MBA
Finalists
Owens
Huang,
Jerry
Jiang,
Vinny
Nyamathi,
Bryce
Webster,
Ethan
Ellison,
Katherine
Shinkareva,
Billy
Duberstein,
and
Jeff
Nathan
May 2015
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Page 33
Katherine Shinkareva
Industry
Recommendation
1yr Target / Total Upside
Building Products
BUY
$32.00 / 20%
Investment Thesis
Ticker
MAS
Momentum and growth in repair and remodeling industry:
Price ($)
$26.51
Following the spinoff of its insulation business, MAS will be a pure
Date of Price
15-Apr-15
play on the remodeling industry. Strong enthusiasm for this sector
is warranted. The median age of housing stock is almost double
52-Week Range ($)
$19.50 - $27.40
what it had been in the 1980s. Although there is an ongoing need
Market Cap ($ mm)
9,172
for maintenance, spending sharply retreated during the economic
Diluted Shares O/S
downturn. However, that pent-up demand is materializing now
349
(mm)
discretionary remodeling spending is increasing for the first time
Float %
98.9%
since 2005. There is also a shift towards higher cost items and
larger scale renovation projects, fueled by positive developments in
Shares Sold Short (mm)
12.2 / 4.0
the broader economy (job growth acceleration, consumer
/ Days to Cover
confidence increase and home equity appreciation). The industry is
TTM P/E
11.05
on the cusp of significant and sustainable growth. Repair and
remodeling spending peaked in 2007 at $324 billion, but is
Forward P/E
21.27
projected to surpass this number in 2015. MAS is well positioned to
TTM EV/EBITDA
11.14
capitalize on the growth. As a leader in its segments, it can leverage
its brand equity to win market share and charge higher prices. For
Forward EV/EBITDA
10.01
example in 2014, MAS realized margins of 15% in its
Dividend ($) / Yield (%)
$0.36 / 1.37%
plumbing/faucet segment compared to the industry average of 8%.
source: Capital IQ, Nasdaq
Similarly, the paint segment generated 18% margins compared to
the industrys 11%. This dynamic of industry growth and leading market share will propel MAS stock forward
in the coming years. (source: Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Company Filings)
Balanced approach to capital allocation through share buybacks, strategic M&A and deleveraging: MAS
has historically been a financially conservative company with robust cash flow generation. In 2014, cash and
short-term investments on hand and revolver availability totaled approximately $3 billion. This financial
profile attracted the attention of activist investor Dan Loeb, who lobbied for capital return to shareholders.
MAS began a multi-year share repurchase program, buying back 5 million shares in 2014 and allocating $400 $500 for buybacks in 2015. MAS also raised its dividend by 20% to $0.09 quarterly. The company can
May 2015
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Page 34
continue returning cash to shareholders. In 2014, the dividend payout ratio was 14% (24% with buybacks)
compared to a historical average of approximately 50% while competitor payouts have been in the 30-70%
range. For 2015, the total payout ratio will be 60% - 70%. MAS is also refining its approach to M&A and its
debt profile. Historically MAS focused mainly on organic growth, but new CEO Keith Allman identified
strategic M&A in the plumbing and paint segments as an important initiative. MAS is also deleveraging,
pledging to reduce debt by $300-$500 million. 2015 leverage targets are Debt / EBITDA of 2.5 3.0x and FFO
/ Debt of 25 30%.
Margin expansion from cost cutting initiatives and declines in input costs: MAS is pursuing a leaner
operating model initiatives include technology upgrades, plant closures and layoffs. Similarly, deflation in
raw material (titanium dioxide, copper and zinc) costs will boost operating margins over the short-term.
These cost control measures will help offset foreign exchange headwinds and challenges in the cabinets
business, which has been plagued by pricing and delivery issues for years.
Valuation
Current multiples are in line with the peer group, but MAS should trade at the higher end of the historical range for
building product companies (8 12x EV / EBITDA) given strong competitive position and growth prospects. MAS
trades at a discount on a forward basis despite strong operating metrics.
Installation
8%
6%
7.5
10%
8%
8.0
7%
6%
6.5
Paint
4%
20%
12.5
4%
23%
13.0
3%
15%
11.0
Other
10%
8%
7.5
10%
8%
7.5
10%
8%
7.5
Total
5%
12%
11.3
6%
13%
11.7
5%
10%
9.5
Company
Fortune Brands (FBHS)
American Woodmark (AMWD)
Norcraft (NCFT)
Average
Forward Multiples
P/ E
EV / EBITDA
22.7
13.0
22.5
9.3
21.4
11.9
22.2
11.4
ROE
9.5%
10.8%
10.2%
3-year Averages
ROA
5.1%
6.0%
6.1%
5.7%
ROC
7.2%
9.7%
7.7%
8.2%
Installation
Products
22.9
23.3
22.8
23.0
11.0
13.5
18.2
14.2
19.4%
-35.0%
-4.4%
-6.7%
2.5%
3.5%
0.7%
2.2%
7.0%
4.9%
1.2%
4.4%
Decorative
Paint
25.8
19.7
17.9
21.1
16.0
12.4
11.3
13.2
45.2%
22.0%
27.0%
31.4%
10.8%
6.7%
9.0%
8.8%
21.7%
12.9%
13.9%
16.2%
Other
17.9
45.0
18.8
27.2
11.3
13.1
15.6
13.3
-2.3%
29.6%
13.7%
4.2%
0.6%
9.0%
4.6%
5.7%
0.8%
11.1%
5.9%
17.9
11.3
47.7%
6.1%
9.9%
Base
Bull
Bear
Segment
Cabinets /
Plumbing
Revenue growth
EBIT margin
EV / EBITDA
Revenue growth
EBIT margin
EV / EBITDA
Revenue growth
EBIT margin
EV / EBITDA
Cabinets
2%
1%
8.0
3%
1%
8.5
1%
1%
7.5
Plumbing
5%
16%
12.0
5%
17%
12.5
4%
15%
10.0
$mm
Adj. EBITDA
Implied EV / EBITDA
Enterprise Value
Net Debt
Pension Liability
Equity Value
SOTP Discount 10%
Shares O / S (mm)
Price Target
Upside / Downside %
$
$
$
$
$
Base
1,310
11.28
14,128
(1,487)
(488)
12,153
0.9
349
$31.38
18.4%
$
$
$
$
$
Bull
1,422
11.75
15,887
(1,487)
(488)
13,912
0.9
349
$35.92
35.5%
source: Capital IQ
Considerations
Foreign exchange rates: MAS earns 20% of revenue internationally. A strong US dollar could also
introduce new foreign competitors although brand equity will mitigate some of the risk.
High Consumer Concentration: MAS has had good relationships with Home Depot and Lowes, it could
experience pricing pressures from them.
Demographics: Millennials have been slow to form households. The shift towards multi-family housing
reduces volumes. Housing starts indicate this trend may be reversing, but the American Institute of
Architects continues to focus on multi-family design.
Bear
$ 1,139
9.67
$ 10,677
$ (1,487)
$ (488)
$ 8,702
0.9
349
$22.47
-15.3%
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 35
Ticker:
Current Price($) 4/17/15:
Price Target($):
Short Return(%):
(YOKU)
16.8
10
40%
1. Losing growth momentum and market share with increasing competition from Baidu and Tencent.
YouKu posted revenue growth of 33% in FY14, significantly lower than its key competitors (Baidu: IQiyi+PPS
+108% YoY; Tencent video +167% YoY; Sohu video +62% YoY). YouKu faces fierce competition, and the
market share of revenue dropped substantially to 17% in 2014, compared to 22% in 2013. The revenue gap
between YouKu and Baidu has been narrowing quickly. IQiyi and PPS, owned by Baidu, have around the same
numbers of browsing hours and achieved market share of 12%. This shows that either YouKu charges more
expensive advertising fee or YouKu puts too many Ads on its website or in the video streaming. Both reasons
explain the slower revenue growth. The game is changed since clients now know IQiyi has the same size user
base. IQiyi is depressing YouKus revenue momentum.
2. China online TV is a capital-intense commodity business with low margin and low loyalty. The market is
fragmented and competitive: Internet giants like Baidu and Tencent are pouring money to invest in video
content and mobile presence. Baidu (IQiyi+PPS) announced they spent RMB 1.8bn for content cost in 2014,
increased 125% from 2013. In Baidu conference, they said Baidu would increase the spending with same path
in 2015, implying above RMB 3bn 2015. YouKu also spent RMB 1.8bn in 2014, but if YouKu didnt increase the
spending, they would loss viewers and advertising clients. But even when they spend, the contents are mostly
the same, and customers have no loyalty. Another concern is the bandwidth cost while migrating video
resolution from SD to HD and Ultra HD. Its difficult to cut the cost, because most bandwidth is controlled by
State-owned enterprises. This explains why YouKu cannot generate profit.
3. SEC probe and lawsuit of accounting fraud ruin the companys reputation. On March 26, many law firms
allege that YouKu made false and misleading statements about its revenue, failed to properly record nonmonetary transactions, and lacked "internal controls over financial reporting." As a result, YouKu's financial
statements were false and misleading. YouKu postpone its annual report till the end of April.
4. When will YouKu generate profit? Sell-side analysts will continue to downgrade their forecasts. Several
sell side analysts recommend Buy by evaluating YouKu through DCF, but all the models show no positive
profit before 2019. The DCF assumption is unreliable. In the past calls, YouKu has always announced
disappointed result, and sell-side analysis downgraded the target price. It is impossible to turn around this
terrible situation. Additionally, YouKu finished USD 300m buyback with average price of $18.6 in 2014, now
15% loss. The CFO, Mr. Ge Xu, resigned last November.
May 2015
EVALUATION
Company Information:
YouKu Tudou Inc. is an Internet television company.
The Company's Internet television platform enables
consumers to search, view and share video content
quickly and easily across multiple devices in the
People's Republic of China. YouKu now generates
87% of revenue from Advertising and 12% from
Subscription.
Near-Term Catalysts for Short:
(1) SEC probe and lawsuit of accounting fraud
(2) Regulatory risks in Chinas media industry
(3) Litigation based on allegations of copyright
infringement
Page 36
Profitability
ROA
ROE
ROCE
Gross Margin
OP Margin
Net Margin
2012
2013
2014
-3.9%
-4.5%
-6.6%
25.4%
-25.6%
-23.6%
-5.5%
-6.5%
-7.2%
17.9%
-22.4%
-19.2%
-5.2%
-6.3%
-8.3%
19.4%
-22.8%
-22.0%
Valuation: The one-year target price is $10, implying a 40% potential downside. I used 1.4x tangible BV of 2014,
equal to the BV of 2015.
DCF: Zero. Losing growth momentum, YouKu wont generate profit or free cash flow at least till 2019. The sellsides DCF assumption after 2019 is too uncertain.
Tangible Book Value: $7.
M&A Value: Alibaba has 20% of shares; Baidu and Tencent wont acquire YouKu. Alibaba wont provide
additional capital in the near term.
Peer Comparison: YouKu is the only public stock that operates 100% business in online TV in China. Its unfair
to compare its valuation to Baidu, Tencent and Sohu.
Profile:
Market Capitalization ($,mm)
Share Outstanding ($,mm)
Beta
52-Week Price Range ($)
Avg. 3M Daily Vol. (mm)
3,240
193.3
2.9
26.9/11.9
2.0
2014
(4.7)
2015e
(5.8)
2016e
(6.9)
% of Total Shares
Outstanding
20.3%
18.0%
6.3%
4.1%
3.7%
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 37
4/10/2015
HK$17.4
HK$5.1
HK$18 / 9.88
RMB 0.27
RMB 0.38
49.6x
36.6x
STRONG SELL
2,358
53
0.911
RMB 3,520
RMB 436
Nil
HKD 41,236
64%
Investment Summary
Inflated margins on both aggressive accounting for depreciation and abnormally low direct operating expense
led to 20% net margin vs. Hertz/AVIS 2-5% net margin.
The newly introduced franchisee model may put the company into serious credit risk.
Given the asset-heavy and low entry barrier nature, current 36.6x 2015PE is not justified. My target price of
HKD 5.1 is based on 18x 2020EPS and cost of equity of 8%. With 70% downside, I suggest STRONG SELL.
Business Description
Founded in 2007 and IPOed in September 2014, CAR Inc. (CAR) is Chinas largest car rental company, followed by
eHi (EHIC US). Currently, CAR has a total fleet size of 63,522 vehicles, which is greater than the aggregate size of
the top 2-10 players. CAR has a dominant short-term car rental market share of 31%. In 2014, rental revenue and
sales of used cars accounted for 81% and 19% of total revenue, respectively.
Investment Thesis
Reported profitability violates basic law of economics. CAR originally filed an S1 to the SEC in early 2012.
Due to loss making and unfavorable valuation, CAR gave up its first IPO attempt on the NYSE. However, in its
second attempt to IPO in Hong Kong, it achieved a splendid operating turnaround within just one quarter (from
2013Q4 to 2014Q1). Car rental operating margin significantly improved from 4% in 2013 to 30% in 2014.
Comparable net profit margin also hiked from -7% in 2013 to 20% in 2014. This is much higher than AVIS
2.9%, Hertzs 3.2% and Brazils leader, Localizas 10%. Given the traditional asset-heavy business model and
low entry barrier nature of car rental industry, I think 20% net profit margin is hardly achievable. For car rental
companies, depreciation and direct operating expenses are the major cost contributors.
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 38
Questionable depreciation. According to the company, CAR is able to dispose most rental vehicles at 65% of
purchase price after 30-36 months. This implies a monthly depreciation rate of 1.16%, which is materially lower
than N. American rental companies 1.67%. Compared to N.A. players, CAR may be under-depreciating its fleet.
The sudden turnaround in 2014 was largely attributed to the significant improvement of deprecation as % of
rental revenue. The ratio improved from 31.3% in 2013 to 23.4% in 2014. I believe the improvement is mostly
attributed to the introduction of franchisees since 2013 December. As of 2014H1, CAR has 717 directly operated
service locations in 70 cities and 202 franchised service locations in 162 small cities. Before 2014, CAR disposed
its used cars only through third party dealers. But in 2014, 1/3 of the disposed cars were sold to its own
franchisees. I find that the net carrying value for used vehicles disposed through leasing to franchisees (76% of
purchase price) is significantly higher than the average disposed value of 65% of purchase price.
Unusually low direct operating expense (DOE) as % of rental revenue. Direct operating expenses are
comprised of payroll costs, store expenses, insurance fees, repair and maintenance fees and fuel expenses. CARs
sudden financially turnaround is also attributed to the improvement of DOE as % of rental revenue from 39% in
2013 to 34.5% in 2014, compared to global peers 51%-56% and eHis >50%. However, we do not see better
operating efficiency regarding fulltime headcount per vehicle (Total headcount per car: CAR 0.12; AVIS 0.06;
Hertz 0.05).
Off balance sheet credit risks through subsidiary capital leasing firms. If above mentioned is correct, why
are the franchisees willing to purchase the used vehicles from CAR at above market price and swallow the losses
for CAR? This is because CAR provides favorable loan terms to franchisees. CAR provide 3 year non-warranty
loan with 30% down payment and 4% interest rate (current three year loan rate from big 4 commercial banks is
at least 6%) . At the end of Year 4, franchisees will be able to acquire CARs stock at a pre-determined PE ratio.
In 2014, CAR disposed 15,483 vehicles, among which 5,298 were disposed through leasing to franchisees. This
led to a total lease payment receivable of RMB 360Mn. Future P&L impacts will come from potential write-off
from trade receivables and interest loss from above loans.
Valuation
With rapid near term growth, CAR is trading at 53x and 30x 2015/16 EPS. However, due to the asset-heavy
business nature and CARs aggressive accounting treatment, current valuation should not be justified.
Target price HKD 5.1 (Current Price: HKD 17.4): I performed market sizing for Car until 2020. Chinas
disposable income will grow at CAGR of 7%, while car rental market size will grow at CAGR of 14%. Market share
of CAR will grow from current 8% to 17% by 2020 (Which is similar to AVIS market share in US). CARs revenue
and fleet size will grow 33% and 30% respectively. My target price of HKD5.1 is based on a net profit margin of 5%
(normal peer margin) to 2020 revenue, 2020 P/E of 18x (high-end of peers) and a generous cost of equity of 8%. In
order to support the fleet size growth, further equity/bond financing will be inevitable.
How is my view different from the market?
Revenue (RMB MM)
2015E
2016E
Concensus
5581
8171
My estimates
4459
6583
Difference
-20.1%
-19.4%
EPS (RMB)
2015E
0.48
0.38
-20.8%
2016E
0.81
0.60
-25.4%
Risks
May 2015
EVALUATION
Page 39
Ethan is a first year MBA student at NYU Stern. This summer, Ethan will intern at Morgan
Stanley as an Equity Research Associate. Prior to Stern, Ethan was a decorated member
of the U.S. Air Force, where he served for six years. His most notable role was as a Satellite
Operations Analyst, in which he safeguarded multibillion-dollar satellite constellations,
while leading a five-member team in a top-secret security setting. Ethan earned his B.S. in
Business Administration from the University of Vermont, holds a M.S. in Financial Analysis
from the University of San Francisco, and is a CFA Level II Candidate.
Ethan Ellison ([email protected])
Siddharth is a first-year MBA student at NYU Stern. This summer, Sid will intern at UBS as
an Equity Research Associate. Prior to Stern, Sid was an emerging markets investment
banker, assisting large Indian corporates in raising debt capital. He has completed all
three levels of the CFA examination and also manages his familys investment portfolio
across equity, debt, real estate and other alternative asset classes. Sid has a M.S. in
Industrial Engineering from Purdue University and a Bachelors in Computer Science from
the University of Mumbai, India.
Siddharth Dandekar ([email protected])