Lenders Commercial Finance LLC v. Pestilli, Mass. Southeast Housing Court
In a recent post-foreclosure eviction case before the Southeast Housing Court, Justice Anne Kenney Chaplin issued a head-scratching ruling that a third party purchaser at foreclosure was required to issue a 90 day notice to quit to the former owner. The ruling goes against the generally accepted rule of law that a foreclosed owner still in occupation of the mortgage premises is merely a tenant at sufferance, not entitled to any notice prior to an eviction. The case is Lenders Commercial Finance LLC v. Pestilli, 16-SP-03779.
Lenders Commercial Finance LLC v. Pestilli, Mass. Southeast Housing Court
In a recent post-foreclosure eviction case before the Southeast Housing Court, Justice Anne Kenney Chaplin issued a head-scratching ruling that a third party purchaser at foreclosure was required to issue a 90 day notice to quit to the former owner. The ruling goes against the generally accepted rule of law that a foreclosed owner still in occupation of the mortgage premises is merely a tenant at sufferance, not entitled to any notice prior to an eviction. The case is Lenders Commercial Finance LLC v. Pestilli, 16-SP-03779.
Conmontrealth of Massachusetis
BRISTOL, SS: HOUSING COURT DEPARTMENT
PLYMOUTH, SS SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
Docket No. 16-SP-03779
Lenders Commercial Finance LLC
Plaintiff
vs.
Bruce Pestilli & all occupants
Defendants
{UDGMENT
This action came on for trial/hearing before the Court, Chaplin, F.J. presiding, and the
issues having been duly tried/heard and findings having been duly rendered, it is ORDERED and
ADJUDGED under Rule 10 of the Uniform Rules of Summary Process that:
Judgment DISMISSING the Plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and without costs.
Accordingly, judgment enters at 10:00 a.m. this 3" day of February 2017.
Pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 239, Section 5, an aggrieved party must
file a notice of appeal with the Court within ten (10) days after the entry of the judgment.
Pld te ffx
MARK R. JEFFRIES
CLERK MAGISTRATECOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
THE TRIAL COURT
BRISTOL, SS HOUSING COURT DEPARTMENT
PLYMOUTH, SS SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
Docket No. 16-SP-03779
Lenders Commercial Finance LLC
PLAINTIFF
<
Bruce Pestilli & all occupants!
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
INTI (ON
The plaintiff, Lenders Commercial Finance LLC, has moved for the entry of summary
judgment in its favor against the defendant, Bruce Pestilli, on the Summary Process Summons
and Complaint in this action. As grounds for this Motion, the plaintiff contends that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor
as a matter of law. The defendant has opposed the entry of summary judgment in the plaintiff's
favor,
A Motion for Summary Judgment should be allowed if, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
"There is no evidence that anyone other than the named defendant occupies the premises. Accordingly, the
remainder of this decision is limited to the named defendant only.‘material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” MR.CivP.
56(c). Route One Liquors, Inc. v. Secretary of Administration and Finanee, 439 Mass. 111,
115 (2003); Community National Bank v, Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553-556 (1976). “Summary
judgment, when appropriate, may be rendered against the moving party.” M.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The
moving party bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating these elements. Pederson v.
Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1980). “[TJhe opposing party cannot rest on his or her
pleadings and mere assertions of disputed facts to defeat the motion for summary judgment.”
Lalonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 209 (1989). Rather, the non-moving party must “show with
admissible evidence the existence of a dispute as to material facts.” Godbout v. Cousens, 396
Mass. 254, 261 (1985),
The plaintiff filed several exhibits, the Affidavit of Jonathan Goldman, Esq, and the
Affidavit of Richard D. Vetstein, Esq. in support of its Motion. The defendant filed a written
Opposition and several exhibits in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion,
EACTS
‘The Court finds that the following facts are undisputed:
The plaintiff, Lenders Commercial Finance LLC, is the record owner of 726 South Ave.,
Whitman, MA (“the premises”). The plaintifi’s Quitclaim Deed was recorded in the Plymouth
County Registry of Deeds at Book 47025, Page 230 on June 8, 2016. (Affidavit of Jonathan
Goldman, Esq. [*Goldman Affidavit”] Ex. B),
On November 3, 2005, Bruce E. Pestilli granted a mortgage to Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for Dynamic Capital Mortgage, Inc, using the
premises as collateral. This mortgage was recorded in the Plymouth County Registry of Deeds at
2Book 31688, Page 262 on November 8, 2005. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B).
On December 15, 2008, MERS assigned the mortgage to Bank of America, N.A., with an
effective date of November 13, 2008. This Assignment of Mortgage was recorded in the
Plymouth County Registry of Deeds at Book 36660, Page 282 on January 5, 2009. (Goldman
Affidavit Ex. B).
Joseph E. Brooks, Esq. of Harmon Law Offices, PC as attorneys for Bank of America,
NA,, executed a mortgagee’s affidavit on April 7, 2011. The affidavit states that Bank of
America, N.A. sent the statutory foreclosure sale notice to the defendant by certified mail, retum
receipt requested, that the foreclosure sale was scheduled for March 8, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., and
that Bank of America, N.A. published a notice of sale in the Whitman Express on February 11,
2010, February 18, 2010 and February 25, 2010. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B). The Affidavit
states that, on March 8, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., the foreclosure sale was postponed by public
proclamation (o April 23, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., that, on April 23, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., the
foreclosure sale was postponed by public proclamation to May 28, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., that, on
May 28, 2010 at 12:00 p.m,, the foreclosure sale was postponed by public proclamation to July 2,
2010 at 12:00 p.m., and that, on July 2, 2010 at 12:00 p.m., the foreclosure sale was postponed
by public proclamation to August 3, 2010 at 12:00 p.m.
On August 3, 2010, Bank of America, N.A. conducted a public foreclosure auction, at
which it was the highest bidder. The Affidavit of Sale was recorded in the Plymouth County
Registry of Deeds at Book 39839, Page 3 on April 13, 2011. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B).
On March 30, 2011, Bank of America, N.A. executed an Assignment of Bid to Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. This Assignment of Bid was recorded in the PlymouthCounty Registry of Deeds at Book 39839, Page 6 on April 13, 2011. (Goldman Affidavit Ex.
B).
On March 30, 2011, Bank of America, N.A. executed a Massachusetts Foreclosure Deed
By Corporation to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, This Deed was recorded in the
Plymouth County Registry of Deeds at Book 39839, Page 1 on April 13, 2011 (Goldman
Affidavit Ex. B)
On April 29, 2015, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation executed a Quitelaim
Deed to New Penn Financial LLC. This Deed was recorded in the Plymouth County Registry of
Deeds at Book 45500, Page 17 on May 1, 2015. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B)
On April 7, 2016, New Penn Financial LLC executed Quitclaim Deed to Bank of
America, N.A. This Deed was recorded in the Plymouth County Registry of Deeds at Book
47025, Page 227 on June 8, 2016. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B).
On April 27, 2016, Bank of America, N.A. executed a Quitclaim Deed to Lenders
Commercial Finance, LLC. This Deed was recorded in the Plymouth County Registry of Deeds
at Book 47025, Page 230 on June 8, 2016. (Goldman Affidavit Ex. B)
On June 22, 2016, the plaintiff served the defendant with a 30 Day Notice to Vacate.
(Affidavit of Richard D. Vetstein, Esq. [“Vetstein Affidavit”] Ex. A).
The defendant continues to occupy the premises. (Complaint).
DISCUSSION
‘The plaintiff contends that itis entitled to summary judgment in its favor against the
defendant on its Summary Process Summons and Complaint for possession of the premises on
‘he grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute with respect to its superior
4"ight to possession of the premises, The defendant contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to
summary judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
GL. c. 186, §12 provides, in pertinent part: “Estates at will may be determined by either
Party by three months’ notice in writing for that purpose given to the other party; and, ifthe rent
reserved is payable at periods of less than three months, the time of such notice shall be sufficient
1 iCis equal to the interval between the days of payment or thirty days, whichever is longer...”
The Court finds that there is no evidence in this action that there was ever any agreement
between the partis for the defendant to pay any rent to the plaintiff, or for any definite rental
Period. Accordingly, the Court finds that G.L. c. 186, §12 requires that the plaintiff terminate the
defendant's tenancy at will by service of a 90 Day Notice To Quit for possession.
Since the plaintiff served the defendant with a 30 Day Notice to Vacate, the Court finds
that this Notice to Vacate is legally insufficient to terminate the defendant's tenancy as a matter
of law. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Summary Process Complaint must be dismissed
without prejudice and without costs
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court rules as follows:
1, The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and without costs.
ANNE KE! CHAPLI
FIRST JUSTICE
Date: February 3 ,2017
cc: Richard D. Vetstein, Esq.
F, Steven Treffletti, Esq.