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MARCH 2021
FIIA
BRIEFING PAPER

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT

FROM TURKEY-GREECE CONFRONTATION TO REGIONAL POWER
STRUGGLES

Toni Alaranta

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FIIA BRIEFING PAPER MARCH 2021 I 302

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT

FROM TURKEY-GREECE CONFRONTATION TO REGIONAL POWER STRUGGLES

• At the core of the Eastern Mediterranean confict is the increasing competition between
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on one side and Turkey on the other, in relation to the
ability to determine exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

• Turkey’s foreign policy has become much more assertive and even aggressive in recent
years, evolving from determined diplomatic eforts to safeguard key national interests to
power projection and the use of military force.

• Te current Eastern Mediterranean confict has become part of a much wider regional power
struggle extending from EU member states to Turkey and several Middle Eastern states,
especially Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.

• Turkey’s most recent diplomatic openings and softening of rhetoric seem more like short-
term tactics in preparation for the March 2021 EU Council meeting and the expected change
in Turkey-US relations due to the new Biden administration.

• Te Biden administration and the EU are poised to start flling the alleged power vacuum
in the Eastern Mediterranean. For the current Turkish leadership, this new situation is
unwelcome, and the country remains determined to push its own agenda.

TONI ALARANTA
Senior Research Fellow

European Union Research Programme

Finnish Institute of International Afairs

ISBN 978-951-769-676-0
ISSN 1795-8059
Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen
Cover photo: Pixabay

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THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONFLICT
FROM TURKEY-GREECE CONFRONTATION TO REGIONAL POWER STRUGGLES

INTRODUCTION national interests to power projection and the use of

military force. Tis new assertiveness regarding the
For several decades, the Eastern Mediterranean confict Eastern Mediterranean is known in Turkey as the
consisted of a three-part struggle over territorial wa- Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine.1 In practice,
ters, sovereignty and exclusionary national narratives this has resulted in Turkey sending its own research
between Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. ships, escorted by military vessels, to what are seen by
Its origins can be traced as far back as the Greek War of the international community as the EEZs of either the
Independence in the 1830s, the Lausanne Peace Trea- Republic of Cyprus or Greece.
ty determining the current borders of the Republic of In some analyses, Turkey’s increasingly aggressive
Turkey in 1923, and the failed bicommunal federal state stance is explained for the most part by its disadvan-
established in Cyprus in 1960. Regarding the Cyprus taged position in recent developments in the region,
confict, the best – but ultimately lost – opportunity to most of all due to the fact that Turkey has been left out
resolve the issue was the 2004 Annan Plan for a bicom- of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, initially estab-
munal federal state. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean lished in January 2020.2 Te East Mediterranean Gas
confict is a multi-level and multi-actor power strug- Forum is an international body consisting of Egypt,
gle that is unlikely to wane any time soon. In addition Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Jordan and Israel. In Egypt in
to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, it also includes actors particular, it is seen to consolidate the country’s cen-
such as France, Italy, Libya, Egypt, and the United tral position as a regional energy hub. Tis mechanism
Arab Emirates. is directly linked to the confrontation between Turkey
Tis Briefng Paper frst identifes the main actors and Egypt that has been ongoing ever since the Egyp-
involved, and then proceeds to analyze the key de- tian military, under the leadership of current President
terminants of the confict. Te paper concludes that Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, ousted Mohammed Morsi and the
tension in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue in Muslim Brotherhood (MB) from power in 2013. Since
the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is that day, the Egyptian MB leadership has found sanc-
unlikely, however, as NATO can provide a necessary tuary in Istanbul, and Turkey has emerged as the lead-
platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation. Tis is ing state actor supporting the Brotherhood, allowing
likely to prevent an actual war, but will not be enough the continuation of the organization and its activities.3
to produce any lasting solution in the increasingly However, pushing Turkey out of the international
confict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean regional power cooperation focusing on the commercial use of East-
struggle. ern Mediterranean energy resources is insufficient
to explain Turkey’s current behaviour. It should be
noted that as early as 2016 – years before the estab-
THE ACTORS AND THEIR EVOLVING AGENDAS lishment of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum – Tur-
key’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made sever-
At the heart of the current Eastern Mediterranean al statements about the alleged need to update the
confict is the ability to determine exclusive economic Lausanne Peace Treaty. He once did so even during
zones (EEZs). Te competition is increasing between an ofcial visit to Greece. One can argue that it is in-
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on one side and deed impossible to understand the current conflict
Turkey on the other. Tis is nothing new but has now without paying attention to Erdoğan’s conviction.
become increasingly vocal for two main reasons. First,
the newly found energy resources have sharpened the 1 Cengiz Çandar, ‘Turkey’s Blue Homeland Doctrine: Signaling Perpetual Confict
existing rivalries, also inviting state-afliated energy in the Mediterranean and Rough Waters Ahead’, Turkey Analyst, 26 August,
2020, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/
corporations from countries like Italy and France. Sec- item/648-turkey%E2%80%99s-blue-homeland-doctrine-signaling-perpetu-
al-confict-in-the-mediterranean-and-rough-waters-ahead.html.
ond, Turkey’s foreign policy has become much more 2 Nathalie Tocci, ‘Unpacking the Confict in the Eastern Mediterranean’, IAI Com-
mentaries, October 2020, p. 2. Rome: Istituto Afari Internazionali.
assertive and even aggressive in recent years, evolving 3 Abdelrahman Ayyash, ‘Te Turkish Future of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’, Te
Century Foundation, 17 August, 2020, https://tcf.org/content/report/turk-
from determined diplomatic eforts to safeguard key ish-future-egypts-muslim-brotherhood/.

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In November 2016, Erdoğan described this in the fol- Te other distinct confict is largely about confronting
lowing words: interpretations of international maritime law between
Te Lausanne Peace Treaty is not a sacred Turkey and Greece. Greece’s claim for an Exclusive
text, it can very well be challenged. The First Economic Zone for the small islets a stone’s throw away
World War, the Second World War, and the Cold from Turkey’s coasts, such as Kastellorizo, is backed
War are all gone. Te power arrangements built by the 1982 iteration of the United Nations Convention
after the Cold War are being crushed. And yet on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS III, which essential-
they are still trying to imprison us with the Lau- ly enables islands to extend the maritime rights of the
sanne Treaty.4 mainland nations they belong to. Turkey, for its part,
Tus, one can safely say that Turkey’s increasing- has not signed UNCLOS III, but is instead following the
ly revisionist and assertive stance regarding the status interpretation included in the earlier UNCLOS I of 1958,
quo in its neighbourhood predates by several years the which did not treat islands the same way. Instead, it
anti-Turkey aspects involved in the East Mediterranean assigned continental shelves to their contiguous main-
Gas Forum, which has been under construction since land, giving the waters around most ofshore islands to
January 2020. It is obvious that the repeated remarks the nearest continental state.5
by the Turkish leadership about the need to update the Finally, the third component of the current crisis is
Lausanne Peace Treaty, especially when combined with the Libyan civil war. Turkey has been very active in Libya,
increasing military spending and foreign policy activism militarily supporting the Tripoli-based, UN-recognized
in the region more generally, have upset the Greeks. Government of National Accord (GNA). The maritime
Te same kind of motivation to undo the current sta- agreement between the GNA and Turkey was signed on
tus quo in the Eastern Mediterranean is obvious in the 27 November 2019. From the Greek perspective, the main
case of Cyprus. Back in 2004, Turkey under its current concern is that the agreement ignores the presence of the
leadership invested heavily in the UN peace plan, which islands of Crete, Kos, Karpathos, Kastellorizo and Rho-
envisioned a bicommunal federal state on the island. des between the Turkish-Libyan coasts. Te treaty is also
Tis so-called Annan Plan was then put to a referendum disputed by Egypt, which has recently become a vocal
in both ethnic communities. Te Turkish Cypriot com- supporter of Greece in its confrontation with Turkey. Tis
munity accepted the plan with a clear majority, while position, on the other hand, is part of the evolving power
the Greek side rejected it with an even larger majority. struggle between Egypt and Turkey. In its attempt to de-
Soon after, the Republic of Cyprus became an EU mem- ter Turkey’s actions, Greece has also recently increased
ber state, leaving the Turkish minority in complete in- its strategic cooperation with the United Arab Emirates
ternational isolation. Recently, the Turkish leaders seem and France. France’s strong support for both Greece and
to have become completely disillusioned with any pros- the Republic of Cyprus against Turkey is also directly re-
pect of a federal state and are now, together with newly lated to the Libyan crisis, where Turkey’s activism and
elected Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar, openly determined backing of the GNA has crucially obstructed
speaking about the two-state solution for the island. France’s aspirations. Although ofcially neutral, France
Tis position is also manifest in the Turkish Cypriots’ has long supported the GNA’s main rival, the rebel gen-
attempt to bring their highly disadvantaged position to eral Khalifa Haftar.
the attention of infuential international actors, such as
the EU and the US. Indeed, the Greek Cypriots’ steps
to commercialize energy resources seem to ignore the KEY DETERMINANTS OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT
Turkish Cypriots altogether.
In its present stage, the Eastern Mediterranean con- Te current Eastern Mediterranean confict has become
fict is thus a combination of several distinct issues that part of a much wider regional power struggle extend-
can be analyzed separately perhaps in theory but hard- ing from EU member states (Greece and the Republic of
ly in practice. Te original issue is the Cyprus confict, Cyprus and through them the entire EU) to Turkey and
frozen since the 1974 Turkish invasion of one-third of several Middle Eastern states. As Greece and the Republic
the island and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Cyprus are EU member states, the Eastern Mediterra-
of Northern Cyprus, only recognized by Turkey itself. nean confict is inevitably the EU’s internal afair as much

4 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, ‘Türkiye’nin Yeni Güvenlik Konsepti 5 Jonathan Gorvett, ‘Turkey’s Challenge to the Regional Status Quo Begins in the
Konferansında Yaptıkları Konuşma’, 22 November, 2016, https://www.tccb.gov. Eastern Mediterranean’, World Politics Review, 1 September, 2020, https://
tr/konusmalar/353/61114/turkiyenin-yeni-guvenlik-konsepti-konferansin- www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29031/how-eastern-mediterrane-
da-yaptiklari-konusma. an-tensions-are-complicating-the-cyprus-turkey-dispute.

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EU-Turkey leaders' meeting in March 2020 brought President Erdoğan and Turkish Minister for Foreign Afaris, Mevlüt Cavusogly around the same table
with President of European Council, Charles Michel and President of European Comission, Ursula von der Leyen. Source: European Union

as it is an unwelcome foreign policy issue. Rather than Whether or not this will change in the future is at least
determinedly pushing for a consistent long-term policy partly dependent on the policies adopted towards Tur-
of helping to resolve the confict, the EU has at least thus key by the new Biden administration in the US. From
far mainly played for time, postponing all big decisions to these premises, another key determinant is the extent
a future date. Tis stance was also applied in the Decem- to which the EU and the US manage to compose a joint
ber 10–11, 2020 Council meeting, when it was decided Turkey policy that would work as a major deterrent for
that all strict measures against Turkey, such as widening Turkey’s aggressive policies.
sanctions, would be considered in the next meeting in Te alliance architecture now being built by all three
March 2021. Tis stems from the fact that the EU’s Turkey main protagonists is likely to shape the extent to which
policy is now divided by the ‘hardliners’ such as Greece, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey are willing to push for un-
Cyprus, and France on one side, and Spain, Italy and Ger- compromising positions. Greece has by now become
many on the other, who are very reluctant to do anything an important European party to France’s increasing
that might further antagonize Turkey. attempt to forge a commercial and security architec-
Te position taken by states like Italy, Spain and Ger- ture together with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
many has been explained by their signifcant commer- In confronting this anti-Turkish block, Turkey has its
cial interests in Turkey, and the anticipation that any expanding infuence in Libya, accompanied by its secu-
measures leading to a Turkish economic crisis would rity agreement with the GNA. In addition, in the Middle
also severely harm the European banking sector. The Eastern alliance architecture, Turkey and Qatar stand
draft statement for the EU Council conclusions in De- against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and
cember 2020 rejecting any strict measures against Tur- Egypt. Te most recent developments, such as Israel’s
key implicitly underscored that as a NATO ally and an agreements with the UAE and Bahrain in terms of nor-
EU candidate country, Turkey is seen to be in a diferent malizing the relations (the so-called Abraham Accords),
category conceptually in comparison to a country like and the ending of the Qatar blockade by the KSA-led
Russia, which is seen to be overtly hostile towards the coalition, have not changed this basic mechanism.
EU.6 In these circumstances, the EU has avoided taking a Further, as the new Biden administration is likely
frm stance in countering Turkey’s aggressive behaviour. to take certain positions that are less friendly to Tur-
key – for instance in terms of the Eastern Mediterranean
6 Robin Emmott, ‘Exclusive - EU to toughen sanctions on Turkish drilling - draft and the Kurds – there are now signs that Turkey is try-
statement’, Reuters, 9 December, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/
turkey-eu-draft/exclusive-eu-to-toughen-sanctions-on-turkish-drill- ing to break the current alliance formation by sending
ing-draft-statement-idUSKBN28J1N6.

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cooperative signals to Israel and Egypt. Tere are even CONCLUSIONS: AVOIDING WAR BUT TENSION IS
signs that attempts are also underway to improve rela- HERE TO STAY
tions with France. All of this can be inferred from the
latest statements by Turkey’s Foreign Minister Çavuşoğ- Te new alliance architecture and security arrange-
lu and even President Erdoğan himself.7 Recently, the ments are still relatively fexible and are duly enabling
Turkish leadership has also uttered some conciliatory Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey to settle their long-term
words towards the EU, but it is difcult to see how this disputes, if that is indeed what they are seeking.
could change the country’s main goal of obstructing all However, with every confrontational step and show
actions in the Eastern Mediterranean that are seen to of military power the domestic expectations have in-
‘confne Turkey to its shores’. creased, thus making it harder to seek compromises.
It is also hard to imagine that Turkey would consid- What used to be a long-standing dispute over maritime
erably reduce its long-term goal of becoming a regional borders between Turkey and Greece, accompanied by
‘order producing country’. Tat said, there are signs that the frozen confict over divided Cyprus, is now part of
in addition to utilizing ‘gunboat diplomacy’, Turkey is a regional power struggle with several European and
currently preparing to take steps to invigorate the dip- Middle Eastern actors.
lomatic negotiations to further its agenda in the Eastern Rather than determinedly seeking a compromise,
Mediterranean. Te decision to reopen the so-called Ex- Turkey’s recent diplomatic opening and softening of
ploratory Talks with Greece, halted since 2016, clearly rhetoric seems more like a short-term tactic in prepara-
signals this. Te same can be said about Turkey’s wish tion for the March EU Council meeting and the expected
for a broad Eastern Mediterranean Conference, with- change in Turkey-US relations due to the new Biden ad-
in which all sides would be represented and where the ministration. With more conciliatory statements, Tur-
current problems would be discussed in a constructive key wishes to avoid any hard sanctions from the EU and
spirit. Tis wish has been accompanied by more concil- prepare the ground for a new beginning with the US. A
iatory words regarding EU-Turkey relations.8 real change for the better in the Eastern Mediterranean,
When it comes to Greece and its increased attempts not to mention resolving the current confict and all its
to forge a chain of strategic partnerships in the East- various side efects, would however require a crucially
ern Mediterranean, one can argue that the signing of new foreign policy orientation, something that Turkey
the 27 November 2019 Libyan-Turkish memorandum is highly unlikely to go for. Sensing this, Greece and Cy-
on maritime delimitation acted as the real catalyst for prus are likely to deepen their security arrangements
implementing a more proactive foreign policy. Accord- with regional states, simultaneously using the solidarity
ingly, Greece has managed to settle EEZ delimitation argument in an attempt to get Italy, Spain, and Germany
with both Italy and Egypt.9 Whereas Turkey is calling to toughen their actions against Turkey.
for a multilateral Eastern Mediterranean Conference, Tere seems to be an almost undisputed consensus
Greece would like to see Turkey signing UNCLOS III, that the Trump administration’s unilateral policies and
through which the maritime boundaries and exclusive lack of cooperation with Western allies created a power
economic zones would be settled in the context of the vacuum, especially in the Middle East. It is also often
current international law of the seas.10 As explained stated that Turkey was one of the actors determined to
above, Turkey is unlikely to do this as the current pro- utilize this, from Libya to Syria, from the Eastern Medi-
cedure is highly disadvantageous from its perspective. terranean to Nagorno-Karabakh. Te Biden administra-
Like Greece, the Republic of Cyprus has recently signed tion and the EU will no doubt fnd it easier to cooperate
an array of defence and security agreements with var- and, consequently, even start flling the alleged power
ious regional actors, such as the United Arab Emirates, vacuum. It should be noted that for the current Turkish
Jordan, Israel and Egypt. leadership, this new situation is unwelcome, and the
country is determined to push its own agenda, also in
7 Sedat Ergin, ‘2020’den 2021’e dış politika (5)-Mısır ile ilişkilerde kıpırdama var, the Eastern Mediterranean.
ya İsrail?’, Hürriyet, 5 January, 2020, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/se-
dat-ergin/2020den-2021e-dis-politika-5-misir-ile-iliskilerde-kipirdama-var- As things stand now, it can be expected that the EU
ya-israil-41706212.
8 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, ‘Avrupa Birliği Ülkeleri Büyükelçileri will slightly widen the list of Turkish individuals on
ile Toplantıda Yaptıkları Konuşma’, 12 January, 2021, https://www.tccb.gov.tr/
konusmalar/353/123549/avrupa-birligi-ulkeleri-buyukelcileri-ile-toplanti- whom sanctions have been imposed in its March 2021
da-yaptiklari-konusma-.
9 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘Te Eastern Mediterranean as an Emerging Crisis Zone:
Council meeting. It can also be expected that the new
Greece and Cyprus in a Volatile Regional Environment’, in Eastern Mediterranean
in Uncharted Waters: Perspectives On Emerging Geopolitical Realities, ed. Mi-
Biden administration and the EU can agree in principle
chael Tanchum (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2020), p. 27. on how to respond to Turkey, ofering opportunities
10 Ibid., p. 29.

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for both cooperation and for drawing certain red lines.
None of these is likely to change Turkey’s Eastern
Mediterranean policies, but in the best-case scenario
they will push Greece and Turkey to seek a mutually
acceptable negotiation framework. As such, the ten-
sion in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue for
the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is
likely to be avoided, however, as NATO can provide a
necessary platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation.
Tis is likely to prevent an actual war, but it will not
be enough to provide any real long-term solution to
the increasingly tense Eastern Mediterranean regional
power struggle any time soon. I

MARCH 2021
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