Asian Affairs

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THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION

MOVEMENT (PTM): POLEMICS AND CONSPIRACY
THEORIES

Abdur Rehman Shah

To cite this article: Abdur Rehman Shah (2020) THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION
MOVEMENT (PTM): POLEMICS AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES, Asian Affairs, 51:2, 265-285,
DOI: 10.1080/03068374.2020.1752568

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 Asian Affairs, 2020
Vol. LI, no. II, 265–285, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1752568

THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION

MOVEMENT (PTM): POLEMICS AND
CONSPIRACY THEORIES
ABDUR REHMAN SHAH

Abdur Rehman Shah is Assistant Professor at the Department of Inter-

national Relations, National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad.
He holds a PhD in International Relations from the School of International
and Public Affairs, Jilin University, China and an MPhil in International
Relations from the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-
i-Azam University, Islamabad. He has published articles in Asian
Survey, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies and Fletcher Security Review
among others. Email: [email protected]

Introduction
In early 2018, a newly-established civil-rights movement – the Pashtun
Tahafuz Movement or Pashtun Protection Movement (PTM) – very sud-
denly came to great prominence in the social media and press of Pakistan.
Established in the aftermath of the extra-judicial killing of a 27-year-old
Pashtun, Naqeebullah Mehsud, one of the Movement’s initial acts was to
hold a ten-day long demonstration in Islamabad comprising some 5,000
people from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The pro-
testors’ slogans of a ‘Pashtun Long March’ and ‘Justice for Naqeeb’ were
emblematic of an organised struggle for the rights of Pashtuns which, in
the words of the prominent Pashtun journalist, Rahimullah Yusufzai, ‘has
never been seen in years and years.’1 The protest proved to be so effective
in raising the prominence of the plight of ordinary Pashtuns that many
leading political figures, such as the Nobel Prize winner Malala Yusufzai
and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, expressed their support for the
Movement’s cause. Pakistan’s incumbent Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) (PML (N)) government, coming under increasing pressure,
had to reassure protesters that it would use all available resources to
arrest the killers of Mehsud.

However, by the time the PTM ended its protest in Islamabad in early
February, the groundwork for its larger agenda had already been set.

© 2020 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs

266 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

The movement had obtained considerable prominence at both national

and international levels, and moved to establish the greater objective of
challenging the power dynamics of Pakistan’s institutional structures
which were working to the disadvantage of Pashtuns. Since the security
affairs of FATA had long been under the control of the army, the PTM’s
demands had a direct bearing on the role and power of Pakistan’s power-
ful military establishment. Hence, not only did the military move to
engage the PTM in talks, but four out of five of the group’s initial
demands (an inquiry into extra-judicial killings, the locating of missing
persons, the lifting of curfews, the clearing of mines) actually came
under the purview of the military. In other words, from its very inception
the PTM in its struggle for Pashtuns’ rights was able to engage with Paki-
stan’s most powerful institution.

Since then, the PTM and the military have consistently tried to cast the
other in sharply hostile terms. This army-PTM feud has exposed Paki-
stan’s ethnic and institutional fault-lines, pitting each against the other
at a time when a stable FATA (now in the process of merger with
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)) has become essential for cross-border stab-
ility. A stable Afghanistan hinges on peace and stability in Pakistan’s
frontier region. The element of foreign solidarity with and support for
the PTM further adds to distrust between the PTM and the Pakistani
state on the one hand, and Pakistan and Afghanistan on the other; the
Pakistani state, and the army in particular, has insinuated that the group
is under the influence of a foreign agenda. An enduring sense of amity
and trust between the people of FATA and the state is important for
the effective ‘mainstreaming’ of FATA (i.e. its incorporation as a consti-
tutionally normal part of Pakistan, rather than operating under distinct
legal and constitutional provisions which have existed since colonial
times) and preserving the legacy of hard-won battles against militancy
in the region.

Against the backdrop of this crucial debate, this article seeks to analyse
the clashing perspectives of the PTM and Pakistan’s military establish-
ment. The article is arranged as follows. Following this introduction, it
examines the socio-political status of Pashtuns in the aftermath of mul-
tiple military operations intended to root out insurgency. It highlights
the many sufferings endured by citizens of FATA during these cam-
paigns. The next part discusses the situation of the rights and represen-
tation of Pashtuns, which has ultimately culminated in the emergence
of the PTM. Following this, it analyses the rhetoric of recrimination
and conspiracy theories that both the parties have resorted to against
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 267

each other. The next section identifies the dilemmas facing the PTM and
raises relevant questions about the future of the movement. Finally, the
conclusion looks for possible solutions and common grounds to this
increasing divide between Pakistani state institutions and Pashtun
nationalists.

The sufferings of FATA citizens

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the US,
Afghanistan became the main military theatre for the ensuing War on Ter-
rorism against Al Qaeda and its hosts, the Taliban government. As a
neighbouring country, Pakistan had to bear the brunt of the side-effects
of the US and NATO campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring
Freedom. The Taliban and Al Qaeda militants could not withstand the
ferocity of American firepower, and, a large number of their fighters
were forced to flee and take refuge in other countries, primarily Pakistan.

Pakistan’s 2,430-km porous border with Afghanistan, particularly in the

region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), presented a
natural ground for hideouts. As a result, from late-2001 onward, thou-
sands of militants fled to Pakistan’s tribal areas, especially the North
and South Waziristan agencies. This cross-border movement of militants
led to the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan’s FATA region. This Talibanisa-
tion provided refuge and support to Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda, Uzbek
and other fighters. It also challenged the (already shaky) writ of the Pakis-
tani state in the north-western part of the country. Under pressure from
Washington to root out these militants, Islamabad under the then Presi-
dent Pervez Musharraf started a military operation – Al Meezan – in
South Waziristan in early 2002. Later on, the formation of Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) by various militant outfits in late 2007 added
urgency to Pakistan’s counter-insurgency war in FATA. As a result, Paki-
stan carried out several major military operations in the region.

Though the war in FATA started in 2002, it was in 2008–09 that many of
its citizens were forced to flee their homes to safer and more stable
regions of country because of the intensification of counter-insurgency
operations. Such people were identified as internally displaced persons
(IDPs). The first wave of IDPs came from South Waziristan, Swat,
Bajaur and Mohmand.2 The 2014 Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziri-
stan forced 500,000 people to migrate,3 the largest number of people dis-
placed by any single military offensive. In all, more than 3 million people,
268 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

or half of FATA’s population4 have experienced dislocation in different

phases as a result of the war. Most of these victims of the insurgency
moved to other cities of KP such as Dera Ismail Khan (D. I. Khan),
Bannu, Karak, Kohat, Hangu, Peshawar, Charsadda, and even to Rawal-
pindi and Karachi. It is noteworthy that thousands of Pashtuns also took
shelter in neighbouring Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan set up
dozens of relief camps for these IDPs in different cities, where they were
settled temporarily until the suppression of the insurgency in the tribal
areas.

This internal displacement brought about a host of other ordeals for

FATA’s citizens. First of all, the development of the region as a hub of
terrorism, and the subsequent diffusion of the insurgency from tribal
areas into other areas of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan prompted
massive military responses from Pakistan and the US, which in turn led
to the ‘militarisation’ of FATA. Pakistan deployed as many as 200,000
troops and conducted more than a dozen military operations in FATA.
The region in general, and North and South Waziristan in particular,
became no-go areas, dotted with hundreds of military outposts and check-
points. Citizens had to prove their residency by showing a ‘Watan Card’
in order to get access to their native areas.5 In addition, the region saw
an increasing level of curfews imposed for security reasons, which
adversely impacted people’s free movement and their daily activities.
FATA citizens were caught between the militants and state’s security
apparatus. Secondly, the War on Terror had a heavy toll on human life
generally. Very little public property (homes, markets and orchards)
and infrastructure (schools, hospitals, electricity lines and bridges) sur-
vived the decade-long war and bombings. Although there are no exact
figures about FATA’s human and economic losses due to the War on
Terror, it is estimated that 65,000 lives were lost in Pakistan,6 and
more than $250 billion7 in economic terms. FATA’s share of this loss
is likely to have been the largest, as it was the main battleground and
victim of this war.

Lastly, life as an IDP has its own toll. The war and subsequent displace-
ment upended the socio-economic foundations of the lives of FATA citi-
zens. At a social level, the war forced nearly 3 million people to look for
new abodes. Even though the government set up camps for the migrants,
the IDPs found them inhospitable for various reasons. Hence, save for a
very small number who couldn’t ultimately afford to accommodate them-
selves, a majority independently had to find new places to live. This leap
into largely unfamiliar social surroundings presented IDPs with new set
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 269

of challenges. Not only had they become detached from their original
social structure in FATA, they also struggled with access to basic ame-
nities such as housing, food, drinking water, health, and education
facilities.

The most disturbing social aspect of the war was that Pashtuns who had
settled in provinces other than KP were subjected to the stigma of ethnic
and racial profiling and stereotyping.8 Once out of their native land, the
IDPs were constantly treated with suspicion, and in particular as a poten-
tial security threat. Whenever a terror attack or other related incident
occurred, government officials – especially in Punjab and to some
extent Sindh – would pick out Pashtuns or people from FATA as being
responsible, even without having any substantial evidence to that
effect.9 This discriminatory treatment added further to the sense of victi-
misation suffered by FATA citizens, and aggravated the country’s ethnic
fault-lines.

In terms of economic conditions, after their displacement the IDPs were

left without proper sources of income. Instead they were left at the mercy
of government-led assistance programmes in the form of allowances
and rations. Accordingly, ‘each family was initially provided PKR
17,00010 … PKR 12,000 of which [was] intended for [a] monthly-
living subsistence allowance; and PKR 5,000, for a one-time purchase
of immediate non-food items … ’11 This assistance covered only the
most minimal economic needs of the IDPs, and had other further pro-
blems. In order to get access to the aid, the IDPs were supposed to be
registered with the National Database and Registration Authority
(NADRA). However, people without a Computerised National Identity
Card (CNIC) were not eligible to register and therefore could not get
access to the assistance.12 Similarly, families who had female heads
faced great difficulties in obtaining the aid. There were also reports of cor-
ruption13 and misuse of the aid meant for IDPs.14 Due to the govern-
ment’s negligence and flawed response towards their sufferings, the
IDPs came to harbour deep resentment towards state institutions.

On the political front, during this period FATA’s unique administrative

status divested its citizens of formal representation guaranteed under
the constitution to other provinces of the country. The colonial-era law
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, first introduced by
British rulers to run FATA, and then preserved by the Pakistani state
with few modifications after its 1947 independence, distinguished the
region from the rest of KP (then the North Western Frontier Province,
270 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

or NWFP). Accordingly, FATA was deprived of political representation

and was instead governed as an administrative unit by a complex execu-
tive chain with the President of Pakistan at the top, the KP Governor as a
middleman, and Political Agents (PA) functioning at ground (agency)
level. Even though FATA had representation in both houses of Parlia-
ment, i.e. the National Assembly and Senate, these members had no
powers to legislate on behalf of their constituency. It was the PAs who
had all the executive, administrative and judicial authority over their
respective agencies. This century-old political structure exacerbated the
sense of victimisation among FATA IDPs as they had no effective politi-
cal platform to recourse to for their demands and rights.15

The killing of Naqeebullah Mehsud and the emergence of the

PTM
For several years, the question of IDPs lingered in the provincial, i.e. KP,
and national milieu without being addressed properly. The constant suf-
ferings and other difficulties faced by IDPs came low down the agendas
of political parties. There were a number of reasons for this. First, main-
stream political parties dealt with the subject of the tribal areas strictly
within the context of national security and broader reforms in FATA.
On account of ongoing military operations in the region, FATA affairs
were predominately controlled by the army. Secondly, until the extension
of the Political Parties Order 2002 by President Asif Ali Zardari in 2011,
FATA’s politics (i.e. elections for tribal seats in Parliament) were beyond
the scope of political parties.16 However, one political party was an
exception to this norm: the Awami National Party (ANP). Being a
Pashtun nationalist party, ANP leaders raised from time to time the
issue of FATA IDPs and discriminatory treatment against Pashtuns in
Punjab and Sindh. Similarly, the ANP’s Sindh chapter supported the
cases of thousands of tribal people who fled to Karachi as a result of
the war.

Furthermore, it was the print and electronic media of Pakistan which

played a key role in highlighting the status of IDPs across various parts
of the country. From their displacement and tortuous journeys from
their native land to settlement in different cities and camps, and encoun-
ters with multiple challenges, the press and news channels actively pre-
sented the stories of FATA IDPs. In addition, international media such
as the BBC, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and
to a certain extent the New York Times and Washington Post have
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 271

played an effective role in publicising the conditions and voices of

Pashtuns.

Although the current hardships of FATA people go back for around 20

years, no notable civil rights or political group had been able to emerge
to advocate the cause of the people affected by war. This being so, the
ground was ripe for the advent of the PTM to fill this long-lasting
vacuum. For decades in FATA, the maliks (local tribal leaders) had
played the most prominent role through the jirga (council) system in
running the social and, to some extent, the administrative affairs of the
tribal areas. However, that jirga structure proved to be too much part
of the status-quo, or too anachronistic, to reflect the changing priorities
of the regions.

During the 2009 military operations in Swat and South Waziristan, hun-
dreds of thousands of Pashtun families settled in Karachi, as the city
offers better opportunities for making a livelihood, and also hosts a size-
able population of the same ethnicity. One such migrant family was that
of Naqeebullah (Naqeeb) Mehsud, which fled South Waziristan in 2009
as a result of Operation Rah-e-Nijat conducted by the Pakistan army
against extremist elements in the tribal areas. About 10 years later after
their move to Karachi, the 27-year old Naqeeb Mehsud was killed on
January 13, 2018, along with three other people in an encounter with
police.

The killing proved to be a tipping point. It provoked a strong backlash on

social media against the extra-judicial killings staged by the police, and
discriminatory treatment meted out to FATA Pashtuns. The police
officer who had orchestrated the killing of Naqeeb, Senior Superintendent
of Police Rao Anwar, maintained that Naqeeb had links with the terrorist
group the TTP, and had been involved in various high-profile terror cases.
However, Naqeeb’s family rejected these allegations outrightly, and said
that he was an innocent citizen running his own business. The country’s
top court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, took a suo moto notice of the
killing and ordered an inquiry into the reality of the ‘encounter’.

The two-day investigation carried out by senior police officials found that
Naqeeb was killed in a ‘fake encounter’ which was ‘staged’ by Rao
Anwar and his team.17 The inquiry committee concluded that, based on
the profile of his background and history, the deceased had no militant
tendencies. He was living a ‘happy family life’ and pursuing goals for
his own future. In fact, the investigations discovered that, far from any
272 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

interest in militancy, Naqeeb was aspiring to become a model: Naqeeb’s

Facebook page was full of photos of him posing as a model, and had a
considerable following. After all these revelations, Rao Anwar was sus-
pended, put on trial and then sent to jail. Notwithstanding all the
belated steps taken by the government to rectify the injustice done to
the family, the damage was already done.

This chain of events exposed the institutional malfeasance of ‘extra-judi-

cial killings’ carried out by the police. It is an open secret that police in
Pakistan systemically stage these kind of encounters to get rid of what
they purport to be hardcore criminals. The term ‘encounter’ is in fact a
euphemism for extra-judicial killing of purported criminals by police.18
A report by Human Rights Watch found that during 2015 ‘2,108 men
and seven women were killed’ by police across Pakistan as a result of
this culture of ‘encounter-killings’.19 Pakistan’s intrinsically flawed judi-
cial and colonial-era legal systems perpetuate this culture of the police
abusing their powers, with ensuing impunity from accountability.20
Rao Anwar’s case in fact has turned out to be the epitome of this
malaise. An investigation by the Dawn newspaper revealed that Rao
Anwar, ‘Sindh’s so-called encounter specialist’, did not face ‘a single
inquiry – despite having slain at least 444 people between 2011 and
2018’.21 Despite these investigations and the obvious necessity for
reform of Pakistan’s institutions of law and order, the government has
yet to undertake any overhaul.

The saga of Naqeeb – from his displacement out of FATA to his killing
and the subsequent impunity of Rao Anwar – symbolised the helplessness
of FATA citizens in the face of the oppressive policies of state pursued in
the name of security. Soon after his killing, social media was awash with
slogans such as ‘justice for Naqeeb’ and ‘justice for Pashtuns’. From the
print and electronic media to social media, the story of Naqeeb’s murder
was extensively covered. This media activism played, on one hand, a key
role in highlighting the travails of Pashtun IDPs, which up to that point
had been neglected. On the other hand, this media coverage, combined
with the support of civil society institutions and some politicians, drew
the sympathies of the wider population towards the difficulties suffered
by the war-ravaged FATA citizens. The very nature of Naqeeb’s
killing, in a fake ‘encounter’ with the police, further compounded
public outrage; it was this public outcry that forced the Supreme Court
of Pakistan to take notice of the issue.22
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 273

It was around this time that a young friend of Naqeeb, Manzoor Ahmad
Pashteen, (like Naqeeb, a member of the Mehsud clan,) decided to take
further action. Along with 20 friends, he decided to set out on a protest
march from D. I. Khan to Islamabad to seek justice for the killing of
his late friend.23 Manzoor had earlier set up the ‘Mehsud Tahaffuz (pro-
tection) Movement’ (MTM) at Gomal University, D. I. Khan (where he
was a student) in May 2014.24 In late 2017, weeks before the killing of
Naqeeb, the MTM activists had decided to launch a campaign against
the use of landmines in FATA, which had killed dozens of children. It
was shortly after this time that the news of murder of Naqeeb was
reported, and the MTM took the initiative in protesting his killing. Thou-
sands of other Pashtuns joined the protest in Islamabad as they came to
know through print, electronic and social media the cause of march.
With the issue of injustice against Pashtuns (as illustrated by Naqeeb’s
killing) gaining nationwide prominence, an increasing number of
people were drawn to the cause of the group. Members of the protest
movement also used Facebook and Twitter to stream the march and
their subsequent 10-day-long sit-in in Islamabad. This was from this
protest that the PTM was founded under the leadership of Manzoor
Pashteen.

Besides Manzoor Pashteen, other prominent figures in the movement

include Ali Wazir, Mohsin Dawar, Gulalia Ismail, and Ismat Shahjahan.
Most of the PTM leadership, not to mention its members, have a history
of political and social activism before their establishment of PTM. Ali
Wazir who lost his father, two brothers, uncle and cousins in the War
on Terror, contested elections for the National Assembly in 2008 and
2013, and was later close to Manzoor Pashteen.25 Mohsin Dawar
headed the ANP-affiliated National Youth Organisation before the for-
mation of the PTM. Ismat Shahjahan is a feminist social worker with
years of active participation in the leftist Awami (People’s) Working
Party. Gulailai Ismail’s groundbreaking work on women’s rights issues
has earned her international recognition and awards. The PTM’s suppor-
ters include a large number of younger and relatively well-educated Pash-
tuns who came of age during the long War on Terror. Overall, the PTM
leadership and supporters have a strong inclination towards anti-estab-
lishment and Marxist-socialist or leftist political tendencies.26 The
PTM also has a strong female wing of activists and draws many
women to its public rallies and gatherings.

It was during the 10-day Islamabad sit-in that the PTM emerged on the
national political scene. In early February 2018, whilst the PTM was
274 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

holding rallies in Islamabad, an informal meeting was arranged

between the PTM and the media wing of the Pakistan armed forces,
the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Accordingly, a 15-
member delegation from the PTM, including Mazoor Pashteen and
Mohsin Dawar, met the Director-General (DG) of the ISPR, Major
General Asif Ghafoor on 8 February. The PTM delegation presented
a five-point list of demands: (1) The hanging of Rao Anwar; (2) the
establishment of a judicial commission to looking into ‘extrajudicial
killings’ of Pashtuns; (3) presenting missing persons in courts and
the release of innocent people; (4) the lifting of the curfew from
FATA and stopping of torture of locals, especially in Waziristan
after violent incidents; and, (5) the clearance of mines from FATA,
particularly the Mehsud areas of Waziristan.27

These initial talks were fairly successful. The two parties discussed all
the major issues and reached a consensus on resolving the PTM’s
major demands. For instance, the abolition of the Watan Card as an
identification document for FATA people, a decrease in the number
of checkpoints, the amicable treatment of FATA citizens at the remain-
ing army checkpoints, and the clearance of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) were carried out without much delay after the
meeting. The army also agreed to resolve other outstanding issues
raised by the delegation. In addition, the DG ISPR facilitated further
meetings between the PTM and the military command deployed in
North and South Waziristan. At the same time, the KP government for-
mulated a jirga that held one round of talks with the PTM. The PTM
on its part showed satisfaction with the initial response of the state.
Hence the early outcomes of the interface between the PTM and
army were promising. It should be noted that the army was more
willing at first to talk to the PTM for two reasons. Firstly, the move-
ment, in its initial phase, appeared to be more moderate in tone, before
it metamorphosed into a more popular and combative mode during the
following months. Secondly, the public outcry against the treatment of
FATA people as accentuated by electronic and social media impelled
the army to engage PTM in talks.

Despite these initial mutual understandings and gains on the ground, this
coordination between the two sides unfortunately proved transient. Links
between the PTM and the army in the following months became cold and
distrustful. In the army’s view, the PTM was responsible for an impasse
as the movement ‘drifted away from its original demands.’28
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 275

The shift in PTM narratives: ‘the Punjabi-dominated state is

conspiring against Pashtuns’
Despite holding these talks with army, the PTM went on to hold very
large back-to-back gatherings in major cities including Quetta, Peshawar,
Lahore, Swat and Karachi. It became increasingly vocal and public in
lambasting the army and the state. During the months after their talks
with the army, the movement started to interpret those five demands in
ways that were ever more subjective and broad. In other words, the
demands provided a foundation for the PTM’s narratives which were
set to attack the institutional status quo vis-à-vis Pashtuns, spark nation-
alist sentiments and a feeling of victimhood amongst Pashtuns, and,
above all, challenge the role of the Pakistani state and military establish-
ment in politics. The PTM’s approach evolved from being conciliatory to
highly confrontational.

The anti-establishment bent of the PTM’s rhetoric has been the most con-
tentious aspect of this civil rights movement. In Ali Wazir’s own words,
the PTM members ‘name names and are not shy to address powers that
the rest of society, the media, and politicians are too scared to identify,
let alone criticize.’29 This movement for the rights of FATA citizens
has many genuine reasons to act in this forceful way. The region has
been at the centre of a deadly war between the militants and state auth-
orities (as well as American drone attacks) which has led to the annihil-
ation of human life, culture and property at massive scale. For years,
FATA citizens had no representatives who were able to be cogent advo-
cates for their sufferings, issues and rights. The PTM emerged as a natural
outcome of this grave plight of some five million people. Even so, certain
aspects of the movement’s narratives are implausible, since they are very
much grounded in conspiracy theories.

Accordingly, the PTM maintains that the military establishment is in

league with the militant outfits which have wrought havoc on Pashtuns
and their homeland. Views of this sort have been expressed repeatedly
by top the PTM leadership in public gatherings and interviews. For
Mohsin Dawar, also currently a member of national assembly, the War
on Terror in FATA was ‘a contrived war between militants and Pakistan’s
military’ but the costs were ‘borne almost entirely by the Pashtuns.’30
Manzoor Pashteen’s views are no less contentious on this subject. He
claimed that when the PTM ‘soldiered on, they (the army) unleashed
the Taliban (to derail the movement).’31 Ali Wazir worries that ‘efforts
276 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

are underway to mobilise sectarian terrorists and other fanatics to

“counter” our peaceful campaign.’32 Of all the PTM’s claims, perhaps
the most tendentious is the common slogan raised during the movement’s
gatherings: ‘That there is terrorism, the ones in uniform (army) are behind
it’ and ‘that there is thuggery, the ones in uniform are behind it.’ In the
same vein, Gulalai Ismail has said that the military establishment
should be held responsible in its entirety for all the liabilities of War
on Terror. Her scathing remarks on the subject caused her frequent trou-
bles with Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, and forced her to escape
to the US.

The PTM proclaims that the war was a part of a malicious design
being employed against those of Pashtun ethnicity. In March 2019,
in his speech to a gathering of thousands of PTM supporters in
Peshawar, Manzoor Pashteen gave voice to this idea in the following
words:
In order to occupy KP land, you (i.e. the military) devised an effective scheme, you
incited Pashtun youths here and thus created extremism in this place, then you
started military operation to eliminate those militants, but actually your plan was
to capture the resources, land and homes of Pashtuns, you did not come to Swat
for (military) operations, you brought Mullah Fazlullah to Swat to steal Zamrud
(emerald) from here and to establish cantonments.33

It is noteworthy that Manzoor had raised the same views almost one year
ago: ‘your (i.e. Pashtun) area is backward, (because) they (i.e. the
Punjabi-led establishment) don’t let you do the business, they have
raised thugs (i.e. militants) here who take money from business-folks
by force.’34

More or less the same views were expressed by Ali Wazir in a Pesha-
war gathering in March 2018: ‘you (military establishment) have
appropriated the mountains of Pashtuns, you have created your own
agents (i.e. militants) among Pashtuns.’ So much so that in a television
interview Manzoor Pashteen, while referring to a video of dubious
nature (in which a person ostensibly claiming to be a former Pakistan
army solider alleges that army orchestrated the attack), alluded to the
possible role of the establishment in the atrocious attack against the
Army Public School in December 2015 in which over 140 students
were killed.35 In sum, the PTM’s perspectives on the issue of the
War on Terror and Pashtun rights are to great extent embedded in a
conspiracy mindset.
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 277

The state’s response: discrediting, marginalising and silencing

the movement
On its part, the Pakistani state and military have adopted a different
approach but with familiar narratives to counter the challenge of the
PTM. The Chief of Army Staff, General Qamar Javed Bajwa in a
thinly veiled reference to the PTM declared that ‘Our enemies know
that they cannot beat us fair and square and have thus subjected us to a
cruel, evil and protracted “hybrid war”. They are trying to weaken our
resolve by weakening us from within.’36 He had earlier termed the move-
ment’s gatherings as ‘engineered protests’.37 DG ISPR Major-General
Asif Ghafoor has addressed the issue of the PTM extensively. On one
occasion he even warned that the movement ‘should not cross those
lines where the state has to use its force to control the situation.’38 In
April 2019 he categorically upped the ante by suggesting the movement
was financed by foreign agencies:
On the PTM website, they have got a number that states the amount of funds they
have collected from Pashtuns around the world. But tell us how much money did
you get from the NDS (Afghan National Directorate of Security) to run your cam-
paign? How much money did RAW (India’s Research and Analysis Wing) give
you for the first dharna [demonstration] in Islamabad?39

The civilian government holds the same views about the PTM. After a
May 2019 clash between the army and PTM workers in North Waziristan,
Firdaus Ashiq Awan, special adviser on information and broadcasting to
the Prime Minister, condemned the PTM and observed that ‘Some of the
people [i.e. the PTM] have become agents of the foreign forces. They are
misguiding people by doing propaganda against the state.’40 In this way
the PTM has been cast as a ‘proxy’ or ‘agent’ of foreign countries who are
trying to destabilise the Pakistani state and institutes. When Ali Wazir and
Mohsin Dawar, despite being barred by Pakistani authorities from board-
ing flights to Kabul, joined the oath-taking ceremony of the recently re-
elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, Radio Pakistan ran a bizarre
story claiming without evidence that they were ‘fulfilling the vested
agenda of India through Afghanistan’.41

The government has taken many steps in dealing with the rise of this
movement. On the one hand, an absolute media ban or blackout,
mainly due to intensive pressure from the state, of PTM activities, state-
ments and rallies has been observed by almost all the print and electronic
outlets of the country. In other cases, many of its workers are accused of
278 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

crimes such as inciting instability and slandering the state institutions, and
dissuaded from holding public gatherings and rallies. Consequently,
PTM leaders and workers are charged and jailed under mostly contrived
allegations of sedition, defaming state institutions and disturbing the
peace. This two-pronged institutional push against the PTM on the part
of the Pakistani state has almost crippled the existence of this movement
in the milieu of national politics.

The political impasse: questions about the future of PTM

Even if the PTM has emerged as a new political force to be reckoned
with, it seems to be falling victim to its strongly confrontational approach.
Many of the mainstream political parties that supported the agenda of
PTM’s Islamabad sit-in have gradually distanced themselves from the
party’s intemperate criticism of the military establishment, its blind
nationalism, and inflexible view point. The ANP, which claims to be
representing the cause of Pashtun nationalism and to advocate for the
rights of FATA citizens, adopted a surprising about-turn in its attitude
towards the PTM. In a series of telling episodes, the party suspended the
membership of its prominent workers such as Mohsin Dawar42, Afrasiab
Khattak and Bushra Gohar,43 and Latif Afridi44 for participating in PTM
political activities. The ANP also reportedly discouraged its members
from taking part in the rallies of the PTM. Thus the movement’s contraven-
tion of established norms and generally-accepted parameters of challenging
the status quo has put the group at variance with other political parties.

The movement’s stance with regard to state institutions is, to an extent,

unnecessarily censorious and its rhetoric based on oversimplifications
of complex realities. In fact, PTM leaders seem to be bending the truth
to inflame nationalist sentiments, a tactic that has worked effectively so
far to animate the movement. Just when the army started working to
deliver on most of the PTM’s initial demands, e.g. Watan Cards, check-
points and de-mining etc., the movement through its bitter recriminations
signalled that there was no room for further conciliation with state insti-
tutions. It should be observed that it would be counterproductive for Paki-
stan to withdraw all its troops from the tribal regions at such an early
stage, when the government has restored some level of stability, at
such a huge price.

The question of Pashtuns being pushed into the trap of extremism, and
their place in contemporary society and politics in Pakistan, is far more
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 279

complex than the PTM’s portrayals. For instance, it is undeniable that

many of the militant outfits (both national and international) have
thrived among predominantly Pashtun populations and areas. By con-
trast, Rao Anwar, who killed Naqeeb in the ‘encounter’ with the conse-
quent creation of the PTM, was closely associated with Asif Ali
Zardari, co-chairman of Pakistan People’s Party, with which the PTM
has developed close links in recent months. Above all, most of the key
positions under the current government of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf
are held by Pashtuns. This factor complicates the PTM’s claims that Pash-
tuns are generally suppressed and that the group represents the demands
of all Pashtuns. Though two of group’s top leaders, Mohsin Dawar and
Ali Wazir, contested national elections and are currently representing
their respective constituencies in the national assembly (an act which
Manzoor Pashteen openly criticised), unlike other political parties PTM
has shied away from parliamentary politics. The movement is more com-
mitted to working on its civil rights agenda through public rallies and
demonstrations.

The Pakistan military has played a crucial role and deserves credit for
eliminating the sanctuaries of terrorists in the region. Even though it
could have been more initially proactive in routing the militancy in
FATA and more humane and careful in dealing with its citizens, yet
saying the army is responsible for all the misery of Pashtuns is a far-
fetched assertion. Around 6,00045 security personnel lost their lives in
the War on Terror, and 200,000 are still in stationed in FATA to maintain
security and order. Secondly, playing an ethnic card of Us (Pashtuns) vs
Them (Punjabis) – as many of the PTM leaders characterise this struggle
in public speeches – is self-defeating in longer term. Pakistan has come a
long way to attain the level of ethnic harmony that currently prevails. The
PTM should, therefore, avoid playing the ethnic card.

The PTM’s efforts to revive trans-border Pashtun nationalism, and its

consequent warming to the Afghan government at a time when the dis-
trust between Islamabad and Kabul has hit a new high, has spawned
more contention than solutions. The slogan of ‘lar ow bar yow Afghan’
or ‘low-land (Pashtuns of Pakistan) and high-land (Pashtuns of Afghani-
stan) are one Afghan’ renews Pakistan’s apprehensions about the historic
irredentist claims of Afghanistan over areas across the border in Pakistan
– the so-called ‘Pashtunistan’ claim. The PTM’s narratives and policies
related to this broader objective have not been helpful. The assertion of
cultural ties and amity between the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan
as such is not inimical in itself. Yet the PTM’s outreach to Kabul verges
280 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

on creating strategic mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan at the

state-level that further complicates relations between Pakistan on the
one hand, and the PTM and the Afghan government on the other.

Lastly, with the passage of the 25th amendment to the Constitution of Paki-
stan in May 2018, the region has begun a process of changing its regressive
colonial era status, and is merging with KP as a properly-administered area.
Moreover, the successful holding of elections in 16 constituencies in the tribal
areas for membership of the provincial assembly on July 21, 2019 is yet
another historic milestone in the process of change in that region. As this is
the case, the PTM now needs to redefine its political agenda. In one way,
the PTM approach stands at odds with these parliamentary reforms: the
PTM openly discourages its members from contesting elections, a position
that leads to a tendentious debate on whether the PTM, through street politics,
or elected members (of the KP and National Assemblies), through parliamen-
tary elections, can represent the Pashtuns best. The PTM’s narratives can
have serious repercussions in the long run for the state’s efforts to incorporate
the FATA region and earn the trust of FATA citizens. No doubt, the move-
ment has successfully harnessed the considerable disillusionment with a
more than decade-long war, and the many instances of heavy-handedness
and general disregard on the part of state towards the region.

As touched on above, the year 2019 was not propitious for the movement,
as the Pakistani state posed systemic hurdles for the activities of the
movement, which in turn contributed in pushing the group to the
margins. But a chain of intense stand-offs, fighting, incarcerations and
recriminations between the PTM workers and army have recently put
the group in limelight once again. Overall the trajectory of this movement
seems to have taken a new shift: the PTM, according to Mohsin Dawar,
intends to ‘undermine the destructive status quo’ of the power division
and asymmetry between the civilian government and military institutions,
wherein the latter holds the dominant position.46 This goal marks a sub-
stantial drift from the original five demands as laid out by the PTM during
the original Islamabad sit-in. It has yet to be seen how the PTM walks this
fine line of actuating its agenda without fomenting political troubles or
getting further estranged from the mainstream politics of the country.

Conclusion
Despite its problematic approach towards state institutions, the PTM is
what an editorial of the Dawn newspaper aptly described as an
THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 281

‘undeniably indigenous and organically founded’47 movement for the

rights of the war-ravaged Pashtuns of north-western Pakistan. The move-
ment is mostly composed of millennials from tribal areas who are young
and relatively well-educated. For decades, the Pashtuns of FATA were
oppressively ruled under the colonial-era law of FCR which deprived
all the citizens of basic rights of justice and rule of law. The War on
Terror further added to the miseries of these people. The PTM ran an
effective campaign – both at the national and international level – of
spreading awareness about the tribulations of tribal areas. Indeed, for
some, Manzoor Pashteen’s rights campaign is comparable to the non-
violent movement led by Khan Abdul Gaffer Khan or the ‘Frontier
Gandhi’ for the independence and rights of Pashtuns during the earlier
part of the twentieth century.48

The initial interest and success of the movement in ameliorating the con-
ditions for Pashtuns counter the efforts to discredit the movement as a
‘foreign proxy’ or ‘agent’; such arguments, do a great disservice to the
cause of the five million Pashtuns. Instead of suppressing the voice of
this movement, the state institutions should take heed of its legitimate
concerns and demands. In fact, gaining the lost confidence and trust of
FATA citizens in state institutions is a crucial part of the broader goal
of nation-building, particularly as the tribal areas constitute, in the pro-
visions laid out in the Constitution, an inalienable part of Pakistan.

The PTM’s clear stance against terrorist and extremist elements in the
region is thoroughly laudable. For a long time, Pashtuns have provided
manpower to militant groups in the name of Islam, which has had pro-
foundly detrimental consequences for the ethnic group. Now, the PTM
has attempted to turn this tide. The movement has vociferously
denounced insurgency and militancy in the tribal areas. Above all, the
group has led to a growing awareness among Pashtuns that war and mili-
tancy in the name of Jihad is far more toxic and self-defeating in the long
run.

Having said that, the movement, however, needs to rethink its approach.
Rather than just venting inflammatory rhetoric and stirring controversies,
the PTM’s agenda has to be focused on realistic goals and reforms. FATA
has had too much fighting and instability. Mainstreaming the tribal areas
through broader constitutional reforms, establishment of better education,
health and transportation facilities, the imposition of a civilised and trans-
parent system of law and order, and de-securitisation of the region in the
282 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

longer run are more pressing needs. The PTM must take consideration of
these sorts of causes.

Nonetheless there are many bright spots in this whole debate. The PTM
was able to mobilise social media for the cause of civil rights in a way
rarely seen before in a country like Pakistan. The non-violent movement
for reforms in FATA has been remarkably effective in prompting the state
to take the demands of these people seriously. The struggle has led to a
greatly increased use of social media for political activism and awareness.
Many of the IDPs have already repatriated and settled back in their native
areas. Above all, with FATA already being streamlined through its full
merger with KP, and the recent successful holding of elections, the
way to the region’s progressive evolution has largely been paved.
Having so much commonality in the goals with regard to FATA, the
state and the PTM need to find common ground that will usher in a
new era of a truly sustainable peace and development in this new part
of KP.

NOTES

1. Mehreen Zahra-Malik, ‘In Pakistan, Long Suffering Pahtuns Find Their Voice’. The
New York Times, February 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/world/
asia/pakistan-pashtun-long-march.html (accessed 25 February 2020).
2. ‘Pakistan’s Achievements in War on Terror But at What Cost: A Special Review of
the Current Decade’. Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, March/April 2019, p. 50,
https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/pakistans-achievements-in-war-on-terror-
but-at-what-cost-a-special-review-of-the-current-decade (accessed 19 July 2019).
3. ‘2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile-Pakistan’ cited in ‘EASO Country of
Origin Information Report: Pakistan Security Situation’. European Asylum
Support Office, July 2016, p. 33, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5798b74f4.html
(accessed 19 July 2019).
4. Abu Bakar Siddique, ‘Understanding Waziristan’s Agony’. Gandhara, May 12,
2016, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistan-waziristan-cheegha-review/27728699.
html (accessed 19 July 2019).
5. ‘Watan Cards to be Replaced by CNICs in FATA’. Dawn, February 16, 2018,
https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=16_02_2018_016_001
(accessed 23 July 2019).
6. Anwar Iqbal, ‘War on Terror Left Half a Million Dead in 17 Years, says Report’.
Dawn, November 10, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1444744 (accessed 23
July 2019).
7. Shabaz Rana, ‘Economists Estimates Washington’s War Against terror Cost Paki-
stan $252bn’. The Express Tribune, April 3, 2019, https://tribune.com.pk/story/
1942464/2-economist-counts-cost-washingtons-war/ (accessed 23 July 2019).
 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 283

8. Imtiaz Ali, ‘HRCP Condemns ‘Racial Profiling’ of Pashtuns by Punjab Govt Offi-
cials’. Dawn, February 27, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1317344 (accessed
23 July 2019).
9. Yasir Habib Khan, ‘The Discriminated Pashtun’. The News, March 5, 2017, https://
www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/562817-discriminated-pashtun (accessed 25 Feb-
ruary 2020).
10. At March 2020 exchange rates, PKR 17,000 is the equivalent of GBP 82, or US$
102.
11. ‘Impact Assessment of FDMA’s Cash Assistance on IDPs and Returnees in the
FATA’. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, November
2016, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/pakistan/document/
impact-assessment-fdma’s-cash-assistance-idps-and-returnees-fata (accessed 25
February 2020).
12. ‘Paksitan: Solutions to Displacement Elusive for Both New and Protracted IDPs’.
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, August 25, 2015, https://www.internal-
displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201508-ap-pakistan-
overview-en.pdf ( accessed 27 February 2020).
13. ‘North Waziristan IDPs Stage Protest Against Alleged Corruption’. Khyber News,
December 9, 2015, https://khybernews.tv/north-waziristan-idps-stage-protest-
against-alleged-corruption/ (accessed 10 March 2020).
14. Saad Sayeed and Radha Shah, ‘Displacement, Repatriation and Rehabilitation:
Stories of Dispossession from Pakistan’s Frontier’. Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, April 2017, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
arbeitspapiere/Sayeed_and_Shah_2017_Internal_Displacement_Pakistan.pdf
(accessed 28 February 2020).
15. This system is set to change as FATA is due to be incorporated as a normal part of
Pakistan with full constitutional rights.
16. Irfan Ghauri, ‘Politcal Reforms: A Century Later, Some Rights for the Tribals’. The
Express Tribune, August 12, 2011, https://tribune.com.pk/story/229954/president-
zardari-signs-fata-political-parties-order-2002-extension/ (accessed 8 March 2020).
17. Imtiaz Ali, ‘Naqeebullah was Killed in “Fake Encounter”, had no Militant Ten-
dencies: Police Inquiry Finds’. Dawn, January 20, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1384163 (accessed 24 July 2019).
18. Jon Boon, ‘Pakistan Police Accused of Illegally Killing Hundreds of Suspects a
Year’. The Guardian, September 16, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2016/sep/26/pakistan-police-accused-of-illegally-killing-hundreds-of-suspects-a-
year (accessed 13 March 2020).
19. ‘This Crooked System: Police Abuse and Reform in Pakistan’. Human Rights
Watch, September 2016, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/
pakistan0916_web.pdf (accessed 13 March 2020).
20. Ibid.
21. Fahim Zaman and Naziha Syed Ali, ‘Dawn Investigations: Rao Anwar and the
Killing Fields of Karachi’. Dawn, March 12, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1389761#tab-0 (accessed 13 March 2020).
284 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM)

22. Imtiaz Ali, ‘SC Steps in After Outrage over Naqeeb’s Killing’. Dawn, January 20,
2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1384033 (accessed 13 March 2020).
23. Manzoor Ahmad Pashteen, ‘The Military says Pashtuns are Traitors. We Just Want
Our Rights’. The New York Times, February 11, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/02/11/opinion/pashtun-protests-pakistan.html (accessed 24 July 2019).
24. Sarah Aleazar and Sher Ali Khan, ‘Anatomy of Political Movement’. Himal South-
asian, June 15, 2018, https://www.himalmag.com/pasteen-tahafuz-protection-
movement-rally-manzoor-pashteen-pakistan-rights/ (accessed 15 March 2020).
25. Ibid.
26. Tayyaba Jiwani and Ayyaz Mallick, ‘Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement: Challenging the
“War on Terror”’. Jamhoor, February 2, 2020, https://www.jamhoor.org/read/2020/
2/2/pashtun-tahaffuz-movement-challenging-the-war-of-terror (accessed 15 March
2020).
27. Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘Army PTM Talks Stall After Promising Start’. Dawn, May 4,
2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1405541 (acceded 24 July 2019).
28. Ibid.
29. Ali Wazir, ‘What Does the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement Want’. The Diplomat, April
27, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/what-does-the-pashtun-tahafuz-
movement-want/ (accessed 24 July 2019).
30. Mohsin Dawar, ‘Why Pashtuns in Pakistan are Raising up’. The Washington Post,
April 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/17/why-
pashtuns-pakistan-are-rising-up/?utm_term=.583bac53425f (accessed 24 July
2019).
31. Pashteen, op cit.
32. Wazir, op cit.
33. ‘Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen Historical Full Speech To PTM Peshawar Jalsa’, March
31, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mI907Ps8hDg&t=1866s (accessed
24 July 2019).
34. ‘Manzoor Pashteen Heart-touching Speech to PTM Peshawar Jalsa’, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=NdBIsqOt12E (accessed 24 July 2019).
35. ‘Zara Hat Kay’. Dawn News, March 15, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
UH2ENLe2lxY (accessed 24 July 2019).
36. Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘“Hybrid war” Imposed on the Country to Weaken it from
Within’. Dawn, April 15, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/news/1401747 (accessed
25 July 2019).
37. Baqir Sajjad Syed, ‘“Engineered Protests” won’t be Allowed, Say Army Chief’.
Dawn, April 13, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1401345 (accessed 25 July
2019).
38. ‘ISPR DG Warns PTM not to Cross the Line and Compel them to Use Force’.
Samaa, December 6, 2018, https://www.samaa.tv/news/2018/12/pilgrims-
entering-via-kartarpur-corridor-wont-be-allowed-to-travel-in-the-rest-of-pakistan-
ispr-dg/ (accessed 25 July 2019).
39. ‘Your Time’s up, Army Tells PTM’. Pakistan Today, April 29, 2019, https://www.
pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/04/29/times-up-army-tells-ptm/ (accessed 25 July
2019).
 THE RISE OF THE PASHTUN PROTECTION MOVEMENT (PTM) 285

40. ‘PTM Attacked Pak Army Checkpost, Led by Mohsin Dawar; 3 Killed and 5
Injured: ISPR’. The Pakistan Tribune, May 26, 2019, https://thepakistantribune.
com/2019/05/26/ptm-attacked-pak-army-checkpost-led-by-mohsin-dawar-3-killed-
and-5-injured-ispr/ (accessed 25 July 2019).
41. ‘Radio Pak Claims MNAs Dawar and Wazir ‘Fulfilling Vested Indian Agenda
Through Afghanistan’. Dawn, March 10, 2020, https://www.dawn.com/news/
1539808/radio-pak-claims-mnas-dawar-wazir-fulfilling-vested-indian-agenda-
through-afghanistan (accessed 18 March 2020).
42. ‘ANP Dissolves NYO’s Organising Committee’, The News International, March
21, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/295040-anp-dissolves-nyo-s-
organising-committee (accessed 16 March 2020).
43. Arif Hayat, ‘ANP Suspends Party Membership of Khattak, Zohar for “Causing
Unrest”’. Dawn, November 12, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1445168
(accessed 16 March 2020).
44. Sohail Khattak, ‘ANP Terminates Membership of Founding Member’. The Friday
Times, September 13, 2019, https://www.thefridaytimes.com/anp-terminates-
membership-of-founding-member/ (accessed 16 March 2020).
45. ‘Pakistan Lost over 50,000 Civilians in War on Terror’. The Express Tribune,
January 3, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1599831/1-pakistan-lost-50000-
civilians-war-terror/ (accessed 25 July 2019).
46. Mohsin Dawar, ‘We’re Peacefully Demanding Change in Pakistan. The Military
Says We’re “Traitors’”. The Washington Post, February 14, 2020, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/14/were-peacefully-demanding-change-
pakistan-military-says-were-traitors/ (accessed 17 March 2020).
47. ‘Who is Traitor?’. Dawn, January 15, 2019, https://epaper.dawn.com/print-
textview.php?StoryImage=01_05_2019_008_001 (accessed 25 July 2019).
48. Daud Khattak and Frud Bezhan, ‘Pakistan’s Pashtuns Find New ‘Frontier Gandhi’.
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 25, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/
pakistans-pashtuns-find-new-frontier-gandhi/29122617.html (accessed 17 March
2020).

ORCID
Abdur Rehman Shah http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6471-0736