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G.R. No. L-27524 - JOSE C. TECSON vs. RAFAEL

SALAS, ET AL.

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G.R. No. L-27524 July 31, 1970

JOSE C. TECSON, petitioner-appellant, vs.

HON. RAFAEL SALAS
Executive Secretary, HON. ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, HON. MARCIANO D. BAUTISTA,
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications, ALEJANDRO
B. DELENA, Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Public Works, and
Felix V. BAGTAS, Assistant Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of
Public Works, respondent-appellees.

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Salva, Carballo & Associates and Edmundo M. Villanueva for petitioner.

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Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M.
Amores for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:

It was not a light burden petitioner Jose C. Tecson, Superintendent of

Dredging, Bureau of Public Works, had taken upon himself seeking through
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition the nullification of his
detail to the Office of the President according to a directive of the then
Executive Secretary, Rafael Salas, acting by presidential authority, imputing

to it the character of a removal without cause. 1Thus, on its face, it could

not be asserted with confidence that the petition was sufficiently compelling.
It was no surprise then that the lower court, the Honorable Juan O. Reyes
presiding, sustained a motion to dismiss filed by respondents. The matter is
now before us on appeal. The fate in store for it is not any different. There
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is no valid legal reason for reversing the lower court, the applicable legal
Series

norms grounded on a realistic appraisal of the power lodged in the President

by the Constitution and statute alike calling for a recognition of such

competence on his part. We affirm the order of dismissal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The amended petition for certiorari and prohibition filed against respondents
on November 15, 1966 prayed that the detail dated October 14, 1966 of
petitioner Superintendent of Dredging of the Bureau of Public Works to the
Office of the President to assist in the San Fernando Port Project be declared
illegal, null and void. There was a motion to dismiss filed on November 29,
1966 by the then Solicitor General, now a member of this Court, the
Honorable Antonio P. Barredo, primarily based on a lack of cause of action,
as the power of the then Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the
President to detail petitioner, was beyond question. Such a motion elicited a

favorable response from the lower court, as shown by its order of December
17, 1966 dismissing the petition without pronouncement as to costs and
lifting the restraining order previously issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The basic question was set forth in such order. Thus: "Stripping off the
unnecessary allegations and data contained in the kilometric allegations of
the petitioner and the respondents in their respective pleadings, and after a
perusal of the amended petition, the Court finds that the principal issue
between petitioner and the herein respondents in the amended petition, is
whether or not the assignment of herein petitioner on temporary detail to
the office of Commodore Santiago Nuval, Presidential Assistant on Ports and
Harbors, by the President of the Philippines thru the Executive Secretary,

constitutes removal from office without cause. 2It incorporated the

challenged directive of the then Executive Secretary addressed to the
Secretary of Public Works and worded as follows: "Mr. Jose G. Tecson,
Superintendent of Dredging Bureau of Public Works, is hereby detailed to
the Office of the President, effective immediately, to assist in the San
Fernando Port Project. Mr. Tecson shall report directly to Commodore

Santiago Nuval Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors." 3It was clearly
set forth therein that it was issued "by authority of the President." chanrobles virtual law library

Then came this portion of the lower Court's Order of dismissal: "It is to be
presumed that the Presidential directive, thru the Salas Order, must have
been decided by Malacañang in the interest of public service, and such
official act should be considered regularly issued. Petitioner, however, argues
that the Salas detail order although issued by Authority of the President,
should be approved by the Budget Commissioner and the Commissioner of
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Civil Service there is noin
specification of the period of assignment. This
contention of the petitioner, if it were to be followed, wouldOPEN
Manila contravene the
generally accepted principle which recognizes presidential 'power control'
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 over the executive department. For then the acts of the President of the
Philippines would be subject to a subsequent approval or action by his

subordinate officials in the executive department." 4Why there was no

removal from office without cause was explained in such order thus: "The
respondents further argue that the temporary assignment of the petitioner
to the Office of the President is not a demotion in rank and salary. Neither is
it to be considered as a disciplinary action taken against him. The detail
does not involve removal from his present position by transferring him to
another position in a lower class. He will retain his position as
Superintendent of Dredging and will receive all the emoluments and
privileges appurtenant thereto. In citing Sec. 32 of the Civil Service Act of
1959, petitioner seems to be of the impression that he is being transferred
from one position to another, but this is not the case as regards the
abovequoted detail order of Secretary Salas. The same Sec. 32 of Civil
Service Act of 1959 provides 'that a transfer from one position to another
without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary when

made in the interest of public service'." 5It was the conclusion of the lower
court, therefore, that there was likewise a statutory authority for such detail
in the Office of the President, which was neither a demotion nor a
disciplinary action and as such valid. Hence the order of dismissal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The matter was elevated to us on appeal, petitioner, now appellant,

stressing that he had a valid cause of action as there was a removal or, at
the very least, a transfer from his present position to another without his
consent contrary to the constitutional provision, at the same time disputing
the presidential authority under his power of control to order such a detail.
On that issue decisive of this controversy, we find for respondents and, as
noted, affirm the order of dismissal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

1. The basic philosophy of the presidential type of government adopted in

our Constitution was expounded with force and lucidity by Justice Laurel in

Villena v. Secretary of Interior 6in words the validity of which has not been
impaired by the passage of time. It upheld in that case an order of
suspension of the petitioner municipal mayor by such department head,
notwithstanding the lack of statutory authority. This the Court was able to
do, surmounting what otherwise should have been an insuperable obstacle,
by attaching to such order of suspension the character of a presidential act.
Thus: "After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of
the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not suggested,
that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and
considering the department organization established and continued in force
by paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required
by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive department and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively

the acts of the Chief Executive." 7 chanrobles virtual law library

Justice Laurel then proceeded to make clear why such an assumption is a

logical corollary of the conferment of the totality of executive power in the
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President. As heFirms in
"With reference to the Executive Department
pointed out:
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visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the
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 establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article
VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with
the enunciation of the principle that 'The executive power shall be vested in
a President of the Philippines.' This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no
other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and
hold office in an advisory capacity, and in the language of Thomas Jefferson,
'should be of the President's bosom confidence' (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498),
and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General,
453). 'are subject to the direction of the President., Without minimizing the
importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in
reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as
forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 'each head of a department is, and must be, the President's
alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required
by law to exercise authority' (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21

at 30: 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160)." 8 chanrobles virtual law library

A few months earlier, in Planas v. Gil, 9Justice Laurel already had occasion
to emphasize such plenitude of authority vested in the President. These
were his words then: "Viewed from the totality of powers conferred upon
the Chief Executive by our Constitution, we should he reluctant to yield to
the proposition that the President of the Philippines who is endowed with
broad and extraordinary powers by our Constitution, and who is expected to
govern with a firm and steady hand without vexatious or embarrassing
interference and much less dictation from any source, is yet devoid of the
power to order the investigation of the petitioner in this case. We should

avoid that result." 1 0

It is true that insofar as presidential intervention over local affairs is

concerned, the Villena decision no longer speaks with authority. It did lend
itself to the criticism that it was not sufficiently mindful of the distinction
under the Constitution delineating the power of the President to "have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices" and his limited
power to "exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be

provided by law, ...," 1 1 In the Villena as well as the Planas vs. Gil cases,
Justice Laurel appeared to have taken a rather expansive view of such
supervisory authority, the effect of which could blur the line distinguishing it

from control. Hebron vs. Reyes, 1 2 with the then Justice, now Chief Justice,
Concepcion as the ponente, clarified matters. As was pointed cut, the
presidential competence is not even supervision in general, but general
supervision as may be provided by law. He could not thus go beyond the
applicable statutory provisions, which bind and fetter his discretion on the
matter. Moreover, as been earlier ruled in an opinion penned by Justice

Padilla in Mondano v. Silvosa, 1 3 referred to by the present Chief Justice in

his opinion in the Hebron case, supervision goes no further than "overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform

their duties." 1 4 Control, on the other hand, "means the power of an officer
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter." It would follow then, according to the present Chief
Justice, to go back to the Hebron opinion, that the 'President had to abide

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by the then provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on suspension

and removal of municipal officials, there being no power of control that he
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such disciplinary action could be taken. 1 5
 Insofar, however, as the power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus or offices is concerned, the Villena ruling applies with undiminished

force. 1 6 As a matter of fact, the present Chief Justice, in a decision

rendered more than a year later after Hebron v. Reyes, People v. Jolliffe, 1 7
quoted extensively from the Villena ruling to stress what Justice Laurel
referred to as the "qualified political agency" concept resulting in the
"assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for Acts of
any member of his cabinet." No doubt can be entertained then as to the
continuing vitality of the Villena doctrine concerning the plenitude of
authority lodged in the President implicit in the power of control expressly

granted him by the Constitution. 1 8 Nor should any restrictive significance

be attached to the wording in the Mondano decision as to the implications of
such concept considering that there was no need in such case for a more
elaborate treatment, all that was necessary being to distinguish it from

supervision. In Pelaez v. Auditor General, 1 9 the present Chief Justice left

no doubt as to its all embracing scope. Thus: "The power of control under
this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to

act in lieu of such officers." 2 0 The assertion then that such a broad grant
of authority could not justify the challenged directive cannot be taken too
seriously. If it were not so, the result would be not observance but defiance
of a constitutional command. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

2. The detail of petitioner to the Office of the President was thus

unobjectionable. By no stretch of the imagination could it be considered a
removal. It was not even a transfer. Even if it could be so viewed, the same
conclusion would emerge, as such was allowable under the Civil Service Act
provision then in force, so long as there be no reduction in rank or salary,
such transfer therefore not being considered disciplinary when made in the

interest of public service. 2 1 Nor is there any merit to the assertion made in
the brief of petitioner that the directive of the Executive Secretary, acting
upon authority of the President, needed the approval of the Civil Service
Commission and the Commissioner of the Budget for its enforcement. Such
a thought is repugnant to the very concept of a single, not a plural,
executive in whom is vested the whole panoply of executive power. It is not
only illogical, but it does not make sense, to require as a prerequisite to its
validity the approval of subordinate to an action taken by their superior, the
President, who tinder the Constitution is the Executive, all prerogatives
attaching to such branch being vested in him solely. In that sense, for those
discharging purely executive function in the national government, he lie
gives orders to all and takes orders from none. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

3. It would seem undisputed, then, that the lower court had no alternative
but to dismiss the petition. The cause of action was clearly lacking. What
was done did not amount to a removal. Moreover, the power of the
President to order the detail was manifestly undeniable. It would likewise
appear that petitioner failed to exhibit due deference to one of the
fundamental postulates of government service, namely, that a public office
is a public trust. While rightfully the Constitution guarantees the security of
a public official's term, as well as his right to be compensated, there can be
no disputing the truth of the assertion that the overriding concern is that the
task of government be performed and performed well. One in public service,
therefore, should not lack awareness that whatever talents he may possess

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should be beneficially employed for the public welfare, the determination as

to where they should be devoted being ordinary left to the discretion of his
OPEN
Manila superiors. In the language of Justice Sanchez in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, 2 2
Business Registration, Corporate Law, Family Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Visa abolawfirm.ph
"the use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to
 harness the abilities of employees to promote the optimum public service
cannot be objected to." chanrobles virtual law library

When petitioner was therefore required to assist in the San Fernando Port
Project, directly under the then Presidential Assistant on Ports and Harbors
in the challenged directive of the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of
the President, his duty as a public official was clear. He had to yield
obedience. He ought to have known, as one of those entrusted with
govermental functions, that what is controlling was not his choice of what
should be done but what the interest of the service requires. It was made
clear in the directive that he remained Superintendent of Dredging in the
Bureau of Public Works. There was no demotion in rank. There was no
diminution of salary. To give heed to his protest and invalidate such a detail,
well within the power of the President, would be to nullify the concept of a
public office being a public trust. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

4. There is another consideration that militates against the stand of

petitioner. The question before the judiciary in its appraisal of the validity of
the acts of the President or of Congress is one of power. It is not for this
Tribunal, much less for an inferior court, to inquire into the motives that
may have prompted the exercise of a presidential authority. At the most, it
can look into the question of whether there is legal justification for what was
done. If the answer were in the affirmative, that disposes of the matter. In
the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the
President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or
decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at
work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way
it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by
and between the three departments of the government. At the very least
then, the presumption is to be indulged in that the exertion of a legitimate
governmental power springs from a belief that thereby public interest is
served and the common weal promoted. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of December 17, 1966 is hereby

affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ.,

concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, J., concur in the result. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Barredo, J., took no part.

Endnotes:

1 The other respondents' named were the then Secretary of

Public Works and Communications, Antonio Raquiza; the then
Undersecretary of Public Works, Marciano D. Bautista, the
Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Public Works, Alejandro B.
Delena; and the Asst. Superintendent of Dredging of such
Bureau, Felix V. Bagtas.

2 Appendix A, Brief for the petitioner-appellant, p. 109.

3 Ibid., p. 110.

4 Ibid., p. 111.

5 Ibid., pp. 111-112.

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Manila 6 67 Phil. 451 (1939).

Business Registration, Corporate Law, Family Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law, Visa7 Ibid.,
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p. 463.
 8 Ibid., P. 464.

9 67 Phil. 62 (1939).

10 Ibid., p. 78.

11 Art. VII, See. 10, par. 1, Constitution.

12 104 Phil. 175 (1958).

13 97 Phil. 143 (1955).

14 Ibid., pp. 147-148.

15 Reference was made to sections 2188-2191 of the revised

Administrative Code. It is to be noted that under the
Decentralization Act of 1967, Republic Act No. 5185, the
procedure for suspension or removal of municipal official had
been modified. Thus: "Written subscribed and sworn charges
against any elective provincial and city official shall be preferred
before the President of the Philippines; against any elective
municipal official before the provincial governor or the secretary
of the provincial board concerned; and against any elective
barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal
or city secretary concerned. Within seven days after the charges
are preferred', the President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case
may be, or his duly authorized representative, as provided in the
preceding paragraph, shall notify the respondent of such
charges. The President, Provincial Board and City Municipal
Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the truth
or falsity of the charges within ten days after receipt of such
notice. Provided, That no investigation shall commence or
continue within ninety days immediately prior to an election. The
preventive suspension of the respondent officer shall not extend
beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the
expiration of sixty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated
in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until their completion, unless the delay in the
decision of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the
suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided,
however, That it the suspended officer shall have been found
guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days, his
suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may
continue until the case is finally decided by the Provincial Board."
(See. 5.) As far as the appellate power of the President is
concerned, however, no change was made in the aforesaid Act.

16 Marc Donnelly and Associates v. Agregado, 95 Phil. 145

(1954); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957) ; Acting
Collector of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, 102 Phil. 244
(1957); Commissioner of Customs v. Auyong Hian 105 Phil. 561
(1959) ; People v. Jolliffe 105 Phil. 677 (1959) ; Demaisip v.
Court of Appeals, 106 Phil 237 (1959) ; Juat v. Land Tenure
Administration, L-17080, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 361; Tulawie v.
Provincial Agriculturist of Sulu, L-18945, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA
611; Lacson-Magallanes Co. v. Pano L-27811, Nov. 17, 196,7 21
SCRA 895.

Law Firms in BGC - Corporate Law Firms 17 105 in

Phil. 677 (1959).
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with approval the Villena ruling, the writer wrote a concurring
 opinion quoting in full the elaborate dissertation of Justice Laurel
in an opinion likewise signed by the Chief Justice.

19 L-23825, Dec. 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.

20 Ibid., p. 582.

21 Sec. 32, Republic Act No. 2260 (1959). On that point the Civil
Service Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6040 (1969), has
undergone a change. Thus: "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law and after due process: Provided, That a transfer
from one position to another without reduction in rank or salary
shall not be considered disciplinary.

22 L-30773, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 637.

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