CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Theories Relevant to Civil-Military Relations: ............................................................................................... 2
Military professionalism: .............................................................................................................................. 2
Patterns of Civil-Military Relations: .............................................................................................................. 3
What should be the relationship between civilian and military leadership ................................................ 3
Civil Military Symbiosis in Pakistan ............................................................................................................... 3
i. Overcoming two decades of terror ................................................................................................... 4
ii. Military diplomacy ............................................................................................................................ 4
iv. International Litigations .................................................................................................................... 5
v. Pandemic mitigation ......................................................................................................................... 6
vi. International cricket’s revival............................................................................................................ 6
Causes of Civil Military relations’ dilemma in Pakistan ................................................................................ 8
i. Weak Leadership............................................................................................................................... 8
ii. Lack of Political Consensus ............................................................................................................... 8
iii. Geo-Strategic and Regional Factors .................................................................................................. 8
iv. Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy ....................................................................................... 8
v. Military's Sway over Political Setup .................................................................................................. 8
vi. Civilian dependency over military ..................................................................................................... 9
vii. Economic Downfall ....................................................................................................................... 9
History of Army’s Role in Politics .................................................................................................................. 9
viii. Under Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan ............................................................................................... 9
ix. Under Yahya Khan ........................................................................................................................... 10
x. Under General Zia Ul Haq ............................................................................................................... 10
xi. Under General Pervez Musharraf ................................................................................................... 10
Consequences of Military Rule ................................................................................................................... 10
xii. Abrogation of Constitution ......................................................................................................... 11
xiii. Presidential System was favoured .............................................................................................. 11
xiv. A blow to Democracy .................................................................................................................. 11
xv. No Freedom of Media ................................................................................................................. 11
xvi. No Accountability ........................................................................................................................ 11
 xvii. International Sanctions ............................................................................................................... 12
Current Situation......................................................................................................................................... 12
Army’s dented image ............................................................................................................................ 12

Introduction
Civil Military Relations (CMR) in Pakistan have always remained controversial. The power
equation between the civil and military is being contested since the genesis of Pakistan. In
Pakistan, control over governance has oscillated between the two powers, civil and military. The
reasons for this periodic shuffling are incompetent political leadership, weak political parties and
institutions, rising power of civil-military bureaucracy, serious security threats to the country and
frequent use of military in aid of civil power. During its short and turbulent history, Pakistan
has oscillated between military rule, democratically elected governments, and hybrid
regimes. A decade and a half of democratic rule has made one thing abundantly clear: the state’s
service delivery arm, or the executive arm, cannot function properly or fulfil its purpose on its
own.
 According to Paul Staniland:
o a complex interaction between the nature of threat, political
institutionalization and government legitimacy determines the nature
of civil-military relations in a country.
 ● Paul Staniland’s notion of strong political culture and robust political
institutions:
o acting as bulwark against non-democratic forces, is worth examination
in greater detail in case of weak democracies

Theories Relevant to Civil-Military Relations:

 ● Huntington
o in his notion of objective and subjective control, viewed the civilian
control from the prism of external threats.
 ● Morris Janowitz
o examined the same from the lens of a value convergence between the
armed forces and civilians
 ● Huntington’s notion of objective control means ceding of maximum
professional autonomy
o to the armed forces by the civilians’ in return for the military’s
political neutrality.

Military professionalism:
As per Huntington has two imperatives i.e., functional and societal. The functional
imperative is to protect the state from external and internal threats, while the societal
imperative is to remain wedded to societal values and ideology

The subjective control another approach of exercising civilian control wherein the military
leadership was involved in the civilian governance functions with an attempt to civilianizing the
military with a purpose to build adequate stakes in the system for the military.

Patterns of Civil-Military Relations:

Five patterns of civil military relations are classified on the basis of pro-military and
antimilitary ideology of a state having two variables of degree of political power and
professionalism.

 The first represents low military professionalism and high political power:
o indicating either backward countries or modern ones with the sudden
emergence of threats.
 The second represents anti-military ideology in countries having armies with
low military professionalism and low political power
o like the totalitarian states e.g; WW II era Germany.
 The third are the countries with anti-military ideology with a military having
low political power and high military professionalism
o like USA.
 The fourth category comprises countries with pro-military ideology
o where military holds high political power and high professionalism
e.g; Israel and Pakistan.
 The fifth type is pro-military ideology with low military political power along
with high professionalism
o e.g; Great Britain.20

What should be the relationship between civilian and military leadership

In the early days of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam clearly articulated the role of the military in the
following words: “Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do
not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to
carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted.”

Civil Military Symbiosis in Pakistan

Without a symbiotic civil-military relation, it wouldn’t have been possible to successfully tackle
the natural calamities like the 2005 earthquakes and the 2010 and 2022 floods, manage the Covid
pandemic, fight locust attack, eradicate terrorism, implement CPEC, and surmount international
challenges posed by FATF grey-listing, and avoid multibillion-dollar Reko Diq and Karkey
penalties.
i. Overcoming two decades of terror

 United States’ so called ‘War on Terror’

 Between 2002 and 2022, the country suffered over 28,000 civilian and
security forces casualties in more than 15,000 incidents of violence.
 Following on to the gains made during 2014’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb,
Pakistan’s security forces commenced Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad in 2017 and
carried out more than 300,000 intelligence-based operations (IBOs) across the
length and breadth of the country.

ii. Military diplomacy

 Be it socioeconomic and military relation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and China, or
revival of a shaky IMF deal, or CPEC, or FATF, military diplomacy has been of immense
help.

iii. ‘Game changer’ corridor

 India has publicly opposed the multibillion-dollar project and, according to

Pakistani intelligence agencies, is plotting to sabotage it by fomenting unrest
in Balochistan.
 The military raised a special division for CPEC security

The first component in CPEC is of a road network. The second component is of the
[Gwadar] port, so given the situation in Balochistan that could never have happened
without the military’s intervention or military’s role i.e. maintaining law and order in
the volatile province

iv. International Litigations

 The mishandling of Karkey and Reko Diq cases had resulted in a financial
nightmare after Pakistan lost its cases in the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes which slapped a massive fine of $1.6
billion and $11 billion, respectively for reneging on contracts with a Turkish
and a Canadian firm.
 A Turkish company namely Karkey Karadeniz Electrik Uterim (Karkey) was
found involved in corruption, a core committee comprised of civil and
military leadership led to the uncovering of evidence of corruption in Turkey,
Switzerland, Lebanon, Panama, and Dubai (the UAE).
 This evidence was presented to the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Tribunal by the Core Committee.
 Pakistan Army amicably resolved the Karkey dispute and saved Pak USD 1.2
billion in penalties imposed by ICSID.
 Due to the Army’s countless efforts under the leadership of COAS, Pakistan
was saved from the $11 billion penalty in the Reko Diq case and reconstituted
 a project aimed at excavating huge gold and copper reserves from the site in
Balochistan.
 The Reko Diq agreement was a result of COAS’ personnel efforts as he
convinced all parties for a National Consensus

v. Pandemic mitigation

 Pakistan was able keep numbers manageable. The National Command and
Operation Centre (NCOC), established and enabled with support from both
civil and military authorities chalked out an effective strategy of testing,
tracing and targeted rather than blanket lockdowns.

vi. International cricket’s revival

 In the process, Pakistan became a big no-go area for foreigners while the
perception was further accentuated by the negative press it received in the
West.

DCAF Criteria and Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations: 1. First amongst

the seven key features of the democratic control of armed forces include
civilian authorities’ control over military’s “mission, composition, budget and
procurement policies.” (Pakistan’s civilian leadership has de-jure control over
all of the above as per the constitution, but the degree of control differs
according to the form of government and quality of the governance)

2. Second feature is the oversight of military performance by democratic

parliamentary and judicial institutions, a strong civil society and an
independent media.” (On this score too, the de-jure reality of Pakistan’s civil-
military relations features satisfactory control of the civilians)

3. Third feature is the civilian expertise in the defence affairs. (This is an area
where there is a need of significant improvement on part of the civilians to
improve capacity to provide effective policy guidance to armed forces)

4. The role of the expansion of a military employed in aid of the civil government
as a natural phenomenon should be curbed by limiting the military’s
employment on non-military tasks
 5. The fifth criterion is the ideological neutrality. (On this criterion, the score is
even, as the military and civil components of the state in Pakistan normally
are in harmony over the ideological orientation of the country, except that the
armed forces sometimes appear more conservative in ethos viz-a-viz the
society)

6. The sixth criterion is the minimal role of the military in the national economy.
(The military may be one of the largest employers of the country, or may be
contributing significantly to national economy, but it needs to exercise care
not to disturb the civilian industrial sector because of its economic interests
and activities)

7. The seventh criterion is the presence of an effective chain of command within

the military that goes up to civilian commander in chief in order to ensure
military’s accountability. (In Pakistan, during the military rule, this criterion
was applied by default and presently exists as per the constitutional
arrangement wherein the military is answerable to the President as well as the
Prime Minister, with the Prime Minister holding effective authority over
armed forces as a constitutional head of the government)

8. The eighth criterion is the democratic rights of the armed forces personnel. In
Pakistan, due to frequent military take overs in the past, this aspect remained
overshadowed by the military’s own institutional and legal environment.

An overall evaluation of Pakistan’s civil-military relations, in the light of DCAF

criteria, indicates the presence of the right structures and rules for an ideal balance
between the two. However, there is a need for improvement in the quality of

civilian oversight to provide effective policy guidance and leadership to the

military
Causes of Civil Military relations’ dilemma in Pakistan
i. Weak Leadership

 The poor performance of elected leaders and assemblies in federal and

provinces make the democracy more complex.
 Failure of democracy, the leadership crisis, after the death of Jinnah, created a
leadership void.
 Lack of political leadership during early years of Pakistan had desperately
missed the opportunity to establish strong political party system.
 During the period 1950-1958, Pakistan appointed seven prime ministers and
one commander in chief, a record which may be attributable to the political
immaturity of Pakistan’s political aspirants. Military considered that political
leaders are not able to rule over the country.

ii. Lack of Political Consensus

iii. Geo-Strategic and Regional Factors

 Since the very inception of the country the war hysteria and Indian threat
perception enhanced military‘s political position and institutional strength.
 Due to the fact Pakistan made alliances with international actors, to get
military and economic aid.
o First, army gets chance in decision making of foreign policy and
ultimately hijacks the vital elements of the foreign policy issues of
Pakistan.
o Second, externally military and economic support to the Pakistan made
army more powerful than the civilian institutions governments in
Pakistan.

iv. Rising Power of Civil-Military Bureaucracy

Due to lack of basic infrastructure, Pakistan had to make new beginning in all spheres.
The country needed competent and a determined leadership to build and nurture
democratic institutions. The feudal leadership of political parties was not capable of
dealing with the multifarious problems faced by the country. It depended heavily on
the civil and military bureaucracy. The result was the bureaucratic elite became
disproportionately assertive, steadily increasing their power at the expense of the
political elite. For instance, a civil bureaucrat Governor-General of Pakistan, Ghulam
Muhammad (1951-55), dissolved the National Assembly in 1954 and the Federal Court
justified and validated his unconstitutional act on the basis of the “law of necessity”.

v. Military's Sway over Political Setup

 After seven years of instability (1951-58), in which as many as seven prime ministers
rose and fell, the military regime put the country on the path of economic and political
stability. Hamid Khan, a renowned lawyer, writes in “Constitutional and Political
History of Pakistan”: “Ayub's term of office [1958-69] was the golden era for the
bureaucracy, which exercised its powers, unbridled by any political interference.”
Again, after the restoration of democratic governance during 1988-99, four
governments were dissolved by the President of Pakistan invoking Article 58 (2)(b).
On 12 October, 1999, the military once again ousted the elected government and
Pakistan was again under their despotic rule.

vi. Civilian dependency over military

The paradox of military intervention into the domestic politics of Pakistan is
dependency of political leadership on military in the time of crisis. In 1947, it was the
army that was asked to establish civil secretariat in Karachi. They vacated their
barracks, renovated them to house the secretariat and the staff coming from Delhi. It
was the Army which largely contributed to safeguarding the movement of several
refugee convoys carrying millions of refugees from East Punjab as well as establishing
their camps at Lahore. In addition , apart from dealing with the Rawalpindi Conspiracy
of 1951, Ayub Khan was also relied upon to rebuild the Pakistani Army and restore
order during the riots and lawlessness in East Pakistan in the years 1953, 1954, 1956,
and 1958. Ayub Khan also restored order during the persistent clashes with the tribal
and paramilitary forces on the North West Frontier. In short, the army was frequently
called in aid of civil authorities in all natural disasters, emergencies and other civil
functions even today.

vii. Economic Downfall

In 1958, Pakistan was in grip of economic crisis, facing scarcity of consumer of goods,
rising prices, shortage of food, financial indiscipline and large-scale deficit financing
by the government. Moreover, the government Treasury was empty and foreign
exchange reserves were down. The First Five Year plan was not passed until the year
1958. The economic life of Pakistan was based on smuggling, black marketing and
hoarding. Ayub Khan claimed that internal unrest will make the country vulnerable and
weak to deal with external threats, as a result the army needed to be in power.

History of Army’s Role in Politics

The Pakistan army’s first intervention into politics was as early as 1958, led by General
Ayub Khan, who abolished the constitutional regime established by the 1956
Constitution. Subsequently, the military would stage three coups in October 1958, July
1977, and October 1999.

viii. Under Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan

 In the first military coup, Pakistan President Iskander Mirza abrogated the
Constitution and declared martial law, and appointed General Ayyub Khan as
chief martial law administrator. Days later, Ayub Khan overthrew Iskander
Mirza. Since this incident, the army in Pakistan has always been in control

ix. Under Yahya Khan

In March 1969, General Yahya Khan, COAS from 1966 to 1971, took power
after Ayub Khan’s resignation in the wake of mass agitation against his rule.
Yahya Khan abolished Ayub’s constitution and ruled the country under martial
law until December 1971, when he was forced to hand over power to a civilian
leader.

x. Under General Zia Ul Haq

With the adoption of a new constitution in 1972, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became
the first prime minister of Pakistan, though democracy did not last long when
General Zia Ul Haq took power in a bloodless coup and ruled under martial
law. But under Zia Pakistan Army expanded its presence in the administration
with increasing military involvement in wide-ranging administrative activities,
from managing essential services and monitoring state-owned schools to
conducting the census and building non-military roads. Today, the military,
under democratic governance, has wider and deeper participation in civil
administration than it had during the martial law regimes.

xi. Under General Pervez Musharraf

For the third time in 1999, General Pervez Musharraf took over Pakistan and
declared himself the President of Pakistan. To tighten the control of the army
over the political parties Musharraf established the National Accountability
Bureau (Pakistan’s apex anti-corruption organization), which is usually run by
former military personnel, to ban opposition leaders from participation in
parliamentary elections under allegations of corruption. To maintain power
over security policy and ensure a strong budget for the military, Musharraf
created the National Security Council which comprises the chiefs of all military
services and is in charge of making decisions about defense and national
security policies to increase the military’s role in policymaking in Pakistan

Consequences of Military Rule

Long military rule have left intractable and spillover impacts on politics, economy, and foreign
policy of Pakistan.

xii. Abrogation of Constitution

The most enduring repercussion of the long military rules in Pakistan is it diminished
state constitution. Whenever, Army comes into power it figures out its own set of rules.
In 1958 Ayub abrogated the constitution of 1956 and gave his own constitution of 1962,
Yahya abrogated the 1962 constitution when come in to power, Zia ul Haq suspended
the constitution of 1973, and then when Musharaf come into power he too suspended
the constitution of 1973.

xiii. Presidential System was favoured

The military rules in Pakistan has been trickling down the civilian institution especially
the parliamentary democracy. Whenever Military Generals come into power they just
introduced presidential form of government or strengthen the executive by introducing
unconstitutional reforms in the country. General Ayub introduced presidential form of
government, General Zia introduced controversial (58,2b) through which the President
can dismissed elected governments, the article proved source of political instability in
Pakistan in 1990-1999 where elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
were dismissed by the president. General Musharaf introduced LFO (legal frame work
order).It also brought the structural change in the political structure of Pakistan.

xiv. A blow to Democracy

Democratic institutions like judiciary or be it parliament and democratic values like

freedom of speech, right to protest, Liberty will take a serious blow upon staging a coup
by armed forces, it might even take decades to rebuild these institutions and restoring
people’s faith in these institutions.

xv. No Freedom of Media

Since the military leaders have limited exposure to media, the press would not be able
to perform its task as a watch dog and unable to exposes the misdeeds done by the
administration and moreover military does not encourage freedom of press.
xvi. No Accountability

Political leadership which cannot afford to start a war so easily owing to the fact of
accountability and has to face with the probing press and would be answerable to
parliament, whereas military junta(administration) neither have any such compulsion
nor any accountability.
 xvii. International Sanctions

The country would have to face international isolation as well as economic sanctions
which would hurt country’s economic growth leading to all sorts of problems like rise
in poverty, degradations of life style, crime, law and order situation etc.

Current Situation
Gen. Syed Asim Munir has assumed the charge as Pakistan’s 17th Army Chief. He replaced
Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, who retired on 29 November after a six-year-long stint as the
country’s army chief. Gen. Munir has taken over the army’s reins at a time when the civil-
military relations in Pakistan are in complete disarray. His predecessor has left behind an
unprecedented political and economic mess for him to clean. On the security front, he was
welcomed by the armed group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s unanimous declaration of the
end of the ‘indefinite’ ceasefire on 28 November and calls for attacks across Pakistan. Gen.
Munir has his task cut out to address these multifarious challenges.
Current Challenges for Army

Army’s dented image

As the new COAS, Gen. Munir will have to work on improving the army’s tarnished public
image. His predecessor, Gen. Bajwa had made several controversial decisions and actively
interfered in the country’s politics, which sullied the military establishment’s ‘neutral’ image.
Moreover, political leaders across the party lines such as Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N)
supremo Nawaz Sharif and former Prime Minister Imran Khan of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
(PTI) accused Gen. Bajwa and other top military officials of dismantling civilian institutions and
weakening the country’s democratic system. While such accusations are not uncommon in
Pakistan, one additional element this time was the massive public outrage over Gen. Bajwa’s
overt interventionist policy.
Security Challenges
Gen. Munir faces grave security challenges such as the resurgent TTP amidst
rising tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban’s interim government in Kabul. After
months of negotiations, the TTP called off the ceasefire on 28 November as Pakistan rejected
the group’s key demands—the reversal of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) merger
with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and withdrawal of troops from tribal regions. Like his predecessors,
Gen. Munir may initiate a new counterterrorism operations in the erstwhile FATA region to
control growing militancy and consolidate his power as the top army commander. On the eastern
front with India, there has been a relative calm after both sides recommitted to the ceasefire in
February 2021.