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The Changing Military Balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia

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Lanham • Boulder • New York • London Military Balance

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Northeast Asia

CORDESMAN AND LIN

AUTHORS
Anthony H. Cordesman
ISBN 978-1-4422-4110-7
Aaron Lin

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with Scott Modell, Michael Peacock, and Steven Colley

Cover photo: U.S. Navy photo by LT Jared Apollo Burgamy/Released.

A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy
Blank
The Changing Military Balance in the
Koreas and Northeast Asia

AUTHORS
Anthony H. Cordesman
Aaron Lin

with Scott Modell, Michael Peacock, and Steven Colley

June 2015

A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

About CSIS
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 Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. XIII
SECURITY STRATEGIES .........................................................................................................................XV
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ...................................................................... xv
The Republic of Korea (ROK) ........................................................................................................ xvii
The United States and Japan ......................................................................................................... xviii
China ................................................................................................................................................xix
THE ECONOMIC BALANCE ....................................................................................................................XX
THE MILITARY SPENDING AND ARMS IMPORT BALANCE .................................................................. XXI
THE MODERNIZATION BALANCE ...................................................................................................... XXIII
The Focus of DPRK Modernization............................................................................................... xxiii
The Focus of ROK Modernization ................................................................................................. xxiii
The Focus of US Modernization ..................................................................................................... xxiv
The Focus of Chinese Modernization ............................................................................................. xxiv
I. KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA: HISTORY AND SECURITY STRATEGIES ...................... 1
DPRK ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
US Official Assessments ..................................................................................................................... 7
A Militarized and Impoverished Nation............................................................................................ 10
DPRK Statements on Military Policy ............................................................................................... 11
The Impact of Kim Jong-un .............................................................................................................. 12
Kim Jong-un, China, and Other States ............................................................................................. 15
DPRK Views of the US, Japan, and South Korea ............................................................................. 15
ROK ...................................................................................................................................................... 17
The ROK, China, and Russia ............................................................................................................ 17
The ROK and Japan.......................................................................................................................... 18
The ROK and the US......................................................................................................................... 19
The ROK and the DPRK ................................................................................................................... 20
Park Geun-hye and ROK Policy towards the DPRK ........................................................................ 22
Looking Toward the Future .............................................................................................................. 24
US ......................................................................................................................................................... 26
The Koreas and the Rebalance of US Interests in Asia .................................................................... 27
The Military Aspects of US Rebalancing .......................................................................................... 29
Shaping an Integrated Response....................................................................................................... 30
Focusing on the Koreas .................................................................................................................... 31
An Uncertain Degree of Strategic Patience ..................................................................................... 34
The Chinese Perspective on US Strategy .......................................................................................... 37
CHINA .................................................................................................................................................... 38
Chinese Policies and White Papers .................................................................................................. 39
Emerging Priorities in Chinese Strategy .......................................................................................... 45
Chinese Efforts at “Denuclearization” ............................................................................................ 55
JAPAN .................................................................................................................................................... 58
Korea and Japanese Defense Policy ................................................................................................ 60
Japan and the DPRK ........................................................................................................................ 65
Japan, China, and the ROK .............................................................................................................. 66
RUSSIA .................................................................................................................................................. 67
Russia and the Korean Military Balance .......................................................................................... 68
Mixed Security Policies .................................................................................................................... 69
II. THE “CONVENTIONAL” MILITARY BALANCE IN THE KOREAS AND NORTHEAST
ASIA ......................................................................................................................................................... 71
iv | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DETERRENCE, RESTRAINT, AND LEVELS OF CONFLICT ........................................................................ 71

A Clash or Conflict between the DPRK and ROK............................................................................ 72
FIGURE II.2: JAPANESE SUMMARY OF THE DPRK-ROK CONVENTIONAL MILITARY BALANCE IN 2012
.............................................................................................................................................................. 75
LEVELS OF “CONVENTIONAL” CONFLICT ............................................................................................. 76
Open-Ended Scenarios and Escalation Ladders .............................................................................. 76
Comparing Total “Conventional” Orders of Battle with Possible Combat Scenarios .................... 78
The Limits to Conventional Force Comparisons.............................................................................. 79
What to Count ................................................................................................................................... 79
TOTAL MANPOWER ............................................................................................................................... 80
ARMY AND LAND FORCES .................................................................................................................... 85
NAVAL AND MARINE FORCES............................................................................................................... 97
AIR AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES, AND DPRK ARTILLERY, MRLS, ROCKETS, AND MISSILES ............ 108
Fixed Wing Aircraft ........................................................................................................................ 108
Rotary Wing Aircraft ...................................................................................................................... 108
Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Guns ............................................................................. 109
Conventional Artillery and Surface-to-Surface Rockets and Missiles as a Counterbalance to Limits
in Airpower ..................................................................................................................................... 109
DPRK .................................................................................................................................................. 126
Leadership and Command and Control ......................................................................................... 126
Force Size and Structure ................................................................................................................ 128
Potential Invasion Scenarios and Capacities ................................................................................. 134
Military Personnel .......................................................................................................................... 136
ROK .................................................................................................................................................... 143
Responsibilities and Doctrine......................................................................................................... 146
Indigenous Equipment Development .............................................................................................. 146
UNCERTAIN PATTERNS OF CONFLICT AND ESCALATION ................................................................... 146
Cheonan.......................................................................................................................................... 147
Yeonpyeong .................................................................................................................................... 147
Political Fallout ............................................................................................................................. 151
Additional Issues and Scenarios ..................................................................................................... 152
III. KOREAN SPECIAL, ASYMMETRIC, AND PARAMILITARY FORCES ........................... 155
PARAMILITARY, POLICE, INTERNAL SECURITY, AND SPECIAL FORCES ............................................. 155
DPRK.............................................................................................................................................. 156
ROK ................................................................................................................................................ 162
COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORISM, AND LOW-LEVEL ASYMMETRIC WARFARE ............................... 163
DPRK.............................................................................................................................................. 163
ROK ................................................................................................................................................ 166
DPRK DRUG AND WEAPONS SALES AND OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES............................................. 167
Drugs .............................................................................................................................................. 167
Pharmaceuticals and Cigarettes .................................................................................................... 169
Supernotes, Insurance, and Trafficking.......................................................................................... 170
Illicit Revenue and the DPRK’s Official Stance ............................................................................. 172
Weapons Sales ................................................................................................................................ 172
ROK WEAPONS SALES ....................................................................................................................... 176
DPRK: CYBER, ELECTRONIC WARFARE, AND SIGINT CAPABILITIES .............................................. 177
Cyber .............................................................................................................................................. 177
Electronic Warfare and SIGINT ..................................................................................................... 181
ROK CYBER DEFENSE ........................................................................................................................ 182
IV. KOREAN MISSILE FORCES ...................................................................................................... 183
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | v

OVERVIEW OF DPRK MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................. 183

DPRK MISSILE PROGRAMS ................................................................................................................. 189
The Hwasong and Toksa Programs ................................................................................................ 189
The Nodong..................................................................................................................................... 190
The Taepodong Program ................................................................................................................ 191
The Musudan .................................................................................................................................. 196
The KN-08/Hwaseong-13 ............................................................................................................... 197
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Program .............................................................. 199
DPRK MISSILE FACILITIES ................................................................................................................. 202
DPRK AIR DEFENSE AND COUNTER-SPACE CAPABILITIES ................................................................ 204
ROK MISSILE DEVELOPMENT............................................................................................................. 205
The Early Program – The NHK Program ...................................................................................... 205
The 2001 MTCR and the Hyunmu-3 Cruise Missile ....................................................................... 206
Further Missile Limitation Agreement Revisions ........................................................................... 207
ROK MISSILE DEFENSE AND SPACE ................................................................................................... 207
Missile Defense ............................................................................................................................... 207
Space ............................................................................................................................................... 209
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................................................................... 209
V. KOREAN WMD FORCES .............................................................................................................. 213
DPRK CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................... 214
DPRK CHEMICAL WEAPONS .............................................................................................................. 215
Western Estimates of DPRK Stockpiles and Capacity.................................................................... 215
Korean Estimates of DPRK Stockpiles and Capacity ..................................................................... 217
Guesstimates of Key Locations ....................................................................................................... 218
DPRK BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ........................................................................................................... 224
Capabilities ..................................................................................................................................... 224
Facilities ......................................................................................................................................... 226
DPRK NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS ...................................................................................................... 229
Motivations for Acquisition ............................................................................................................ 229
Assessments of Capabilities: Plutonium ......................................................................................... 230
Assessments of Capabilities: Uranium ........................................................................................... 231
Nuclear Weapons and Warhead Developments.............................................................................. 233
Moves toward Sanctions ................................................................................................................. 245
Key Current Issues, Weapons Design, and Further Tensions ........................................................ 248
Halting Operations at the ROK-DPRK Joint Industrial Complex at Kaesong............................... 258
Attempted De-escalation ................................................................................................................. 259
Command and Control ................................................................................................................... 262
DPRK Nuclear Facilities ................................................................................................................ 262
ROK and US Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs ..................................................................... 269
The Japanese Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs .................................................................... 271
The Russian and Chinese Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs ................................................. 272
ROK CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................................... 272
ROK BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS .................................................................................. 273
ROK NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS ........................................................................................................ 273
Initial Weapons Research ............................................................................................................... 273
Reprocessing and Enrichment Activities ........................................................................................ 274
2010-2014 and the ROK Nuclear Development Debate ................................................................. 275
Civilian Facilities and the 123 Agreement ..................................................................................... 277
VI. KOREAN PENINSULA MILITARY MODERNIZATION TRENDS ...................................... 283
DPRK .................................................................................................................................................. 283
vi | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Key Force Upgrades....................................................................................................................... 286

ROK .................................................................................................................................................... 291
ROK Modernization Plans ............................................................................................................. 291
A Series of Defense Reform Plans .................................................................................................. 291
Key Force Upgrades....................................................................................................................... 298
Key Procurement Plans .................................................................................................................. 300
Modernization and Military Effectiveness...................................................................................... 302
Other Estimates of Modernization Trends and Spending ............................................................... 306
COMPARING THE MILITARY RESOURCES SHAPING THE KOREAN BALANCE ..................................... 312
KOREAN AND EAST ASIAN MILITARY SPENDING – LESS THE DPRK................................................. 314
DPRK .................................................................................................................................................. 320
Militarizing a Crippled Economy ................................................................................................... 320
Guesstimating the DPRK’s Military Spending ............................................................................... 321
The DPRK’s Defense Industry........................................................................................................ 321
ROK .................................................................................................................................................... 323
Defense Economics......................................................................................................................... 323
Defense Spending and Defense Reform .......................................................................................... 324
VII. NORTHEAST ASIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION TRENDS ....................................... 330
CHINA ................................................................................................................................................. 331
The US View of the Direction of Chinese Military Modernization ................................................ 331
A Transformation Underway: The Chinese View ........................................................................... 336
The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper ........................................................................................ 338
China’s Improving Conventional Capabilities ............................................................................... 339
Informationization and Realistic Training for Joint Warfare ........................................................ 340
Ground Forces ............................................................................................................................... 341
Naval Forces .................................................................................................................................. 346
Air and Air Defense Forces ............................................................................................................ 353
JAPAN .................................................................................................................................................. 365
The Roles of the Japanese Self Defense Forces ............................................................................. 367
Japanese Security Policies ............................................................................................................. 368
The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper ...................................................................................... 368
The 2014 Japanese Defense White Paper and the New NDPG...................................................... 369
Organization, Equipment, and Disposition of the SDF under the New NDPG .............................. 372
RUSSIA ................................................................................................................................................ 382
Modernization of Russian Forces ................................................................................................... 383
Western Analyses ............................................................................................................................ 384
CHINESE MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RESOURCES ....................................................................... 390
Capacity for Military Efforts and Official Chinese Reporting ....................................................... 390
US Analyses of Chinese Defense Budgets ...................................................................................... 392
Outside Assessments of Chinese Military Spending ....................................................................... 393
A Lack of Transparency.................................................................................................................. 394
The Chinese Response .................................................................................................................... 396
Chinese Arms Imports and Exports ................................................................................................ 400
JAPANESE MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RESOURCES ..................................................................... 403
The Impact of the Japanese Economy ............................................................................................ 403
Japanese Defense Spending ........................................................................................................... 404
RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RESOURCES ....................................................................... 405
Russian Military Spending ............................................................................................................. 406
VIII. US FORCES IN KOREA AND THE PACIFIC ....................................................................... 410
USFK-ROK HISTORY ......................................................................................................................... 410
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | vii

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE USFK-ROK ALLIANCE ..................................................................... 411

US FORCES IN KOREA ......................................................................................................................... 417
Comparative Capabilities ............................................................................................................... 421
USFK Relocation ............................................................................................................................ 423
Military Exercises ........................................................................................................................... 425
Military Operation Plans ................................................................................................................ 426
US FORCES JAPAN (UFJ)..................................................................................................................... 428
US Deployments in Japan ............................................................................................................... 428
The Strengths and Weakness of the US-Japanese Alliance ............................................................ 429
Resolving the Okinawa Issue? ........................................................................................................ 431
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND (US PACOM) ........................................................................... 434
The Prelude to “Rebalancing” ....................................................................................................... 434
The 2012 Shifts in Strategy ............................................................................................................. 435
The Total Size of PACOM Forces................................................................................................... 436
THE US AND EXTENDED REGIONAL DETERRENCE ............................................................................. 440
US ....................................................................................................................................................... 441
Restructuring, and “Rebalancing” US Forces for Asia and the Pacific ........................................ 441
The Pace of Modernization ............................................................................................................. 449
US ....................................................................................................................................................... 459
Pressure on the US Economy: A CIA Assessment .......................................................................... 459
Pressures on US Defense Spending through FY2016 ..................................................................... 460
Ongoing Cuts but Still Funding the World’s Largest Military Power............................................ 461
IX. THE BROADER BALANCE OF MISSILE, WMD, AND STRATEGIC FORCES................ 464
CHINA’S EVOLVING FORCE MIX AND STRATEGY ............................................................................... 464
Growing Chinese Deterrent and A2AD Capabilities...................................................................... 465
CHINESE CONVENTIONAL MISSILE CAPABILITIES .............................................................................. 467
CHINESE NUCLEAR-ARMED MISSILES ................................................................................................ 473
Chinese Missile Defense Capabilities............................................................................................. 479
Chinese Counterspace Capabilities ................................................................................................ 479
Space ............................................................................................................................................... 480
US MISSILE FORCES ............................................................................................................................ 483
Missile Defense and Space ............................................................................................................. 486
Space ............................................................................................................................................... 487
NUCLEAR FORCES ............................................................................................................................... 488
CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES ................................................................................................................ 493
Chinese and US Views of China’s Nuclear Forces ........................................................................ 493
Chinese Biological and Chemical Weapons ................................................................................... 497
Role of Chinese Special Forces and Tunnel Facilities ................................................................... 497
US NUCLEAR FORCES ......................................................................................................................... 497
Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................................................... 498
US Theater Nuclear Forces ............................................................................................................ 498
Other US Nuclear-Related Programs ............................................................................................. 501
JAPAN .................................................................................................................................................. 502
Missile Defense ............................................................................................................................... 502
Space ............................................................................................................................................... 504
RUSSIA ................................................................................................................................................ 506
Missile Capabilities ........................................................................................................................ 507
Missile Defense ............................................................................................................................... 507
Biological and Chemical Weapons ................................................................................................. 508
ENDNOTES ........................................................................................................................................... 509
viii | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Table of Figures
Figure I.1: Timeline of Key DPRK-ROK Events ....................................................................................... 1
Figure I.2: The DPRK’s Four-point Military Guideline ........................................................................... 12
Figure I.3: Most Salient Issues to the South Korean Public, March 2012 - March 2013.......................... 25
Figure II.3: Avenues of Approach from the DPRK to the ROK ............................................................... 78
Figure II.4: ROK Estimate of Korean Manpower Balance in 2012 .......................................................... 81
Figure II.5: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Manpower Balance in 2012 .................................. 82
Figure II.6: IISS Estimate of Total Active Military Manpower Affecting the Northeast Asian Balance in
2015 (in thousands) ................................................................................................................................... 83
Figure II.7: IISS Estimate of Total Military Reserve Manpower, Affecting the Northeast Asian Balance
in 2015 (in thousands) ............................................................................................................................... 84
Figure II.8: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2012 (Army) ..................................................... 87
Figure II.9: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Land Balance in 2012 ........................................... 88
Figure II.10: IISS Estimate of Army Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015 ................... 89
Figure II.11: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Modern Main Battle Tanks versus Total Holdings in 2015
................................................................................................................................................................... 91
Figure II.12: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Armored Fighting Vehicles (Army) in 2015 ........ 94
Figure II.13: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Modern versus Not Modern Armored Vehicles in
2015 ........................................................................................................................................................... 95
Figure II.14: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Artillery Strength in 2015..................................... 96
Figure II.15: ROK Estimate of Korean Naval Balance in 2012................................................................ 98
Figure II.16. IISS Estimate of Total Navy Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015 ........... 99
Figure II.17: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships in 2015 .............................. 105
Figure II.18: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Naval Combat Ships by Category in 2015 ......... 106
Figure II.19: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Submarines by Type in 2014 .............................. 107
Figure II.21: IISS Estimate of Total Air Force Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015 .. 112
Figure II.22: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft by Branch in 2015 114
Figure II.23: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Fixed Wing Aircraft by Type in 2015 ................ 115
Figure II.24: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Combat Aircraft by Force in 2015 116
Figure II.25: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Rotary Wing Aircraft by Type in 2015 .............. 117
Figure II.26: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Air/Missile Defenses in 2015 ............................. 118
Figure II.27: IISS Estimate of Total Korean and Northeast Asian Air/Missile Defenses in 2015.......... 120
Figure II.28: Northeast Asian Missile and Bomb Capabilities ............................................................... 121
Figure II.29: IISS Estimate of Total Paramilitary Manpower and Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015
................................................................................................................................................................. 124
Figure II.30: ROK Diagram of DPRK Force Organization .................................................................... 128
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | ix

Figure II.31: Deployment of DPRK Ground Forces in 2013 .................................................................. 131

Figure II.32: Deployment of DPRK Air Forces in 2013 ......................................................................... 132
Figure II.33: Deployment of DPRK Naval Forces in 2013 ..................................................................... 133
Figure II.34: DPRK Training Program for Military Officers .................................................................. 140
Figure II.35: DPRK Military Exercises and Activities............................................................................ 141
Figure II.36: Command Structure of ROK Forces .................................................................................. 145
Figure II.37: The Cheonan Sinking and Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (2010) .................................... 149
Figure II.38: The Northern Limit Line and Yeonpyeong Island ............................................................. 150
Figure III.2: DPRK Special Operation Forces, Missions and Roles ....................................................... 159
Figure III.3: The DPRK’s Reserve and Paramilitary Forces ................................................................... 159
Figure III.4: DPRK Infiltration Tunnels Discovered by the ROK, to Date ............................................. 161
Figure III.5: The DPRK’s Legal, illegal, and Illicit Activities Network (2010) ..................................... 175
Figure IV.1: DPRK Ballistic Missile Arsenal ......................................................................................... 187
Figure IV.2: ROK Ministry of National Defense Estimates of DPRK Missile Range............................ 188
Figure IV.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Estimates of DPRK Missile Range..................................... 188
Figure IV.4: KN-08 ICBM Related Testing ............................................................................................ 198
Figure IV.5: US Estimates of Primary North Korean Medium- and Long-Range Missiles.................... 200
Figure IV.6: Estimates of DPRK Hwasong and Nodong Missile Range – Northeast Asia .................... 201
Figure IV.7: DPRK Missile Launches through 2009 .............................................................................. 202
Figure IV.8: Possible Locations of DPRK Nuclear Warhead and Missile Facilities .............................. 204
Figure V.1: DPRK Possible CW Agents ................................................................................................. 216
Figure V.2: Defector Reports on the DPRK CW Program (as of 2004) ................................................. 220
Figure V.3: Map of Possible DPRK Chemical Facilities ........................................................................ 221
Figure V.4: Major DPRK Civilian Chemical Production Facilities (as of 2004) .................................... 222
Figure V.5: Possible DPRK Biological Agents ....................................................................................... 225
Figure V.6: Civilian DPRK Biological Facilities .................................................................................... 227
Figure V.7: Map of Possible DPRK Civilian Biological Facilities ......................................................... 228
Figure V.8: Estimates of DPRK Plutonium Production (as of 2006) ...................................................... 233
Figure V.9: Uncertain Progress in the Six Party Talks............................................................................ 239
Figure V.10: Key Agreements in the Six Party Talks ............................................................................. 240
Figure V.11: Known Disablement Steps at Yongbyon (as of January 2013) .......................................... 242
Figure V.12: Inter-Korean Transportation Corridors .............................................................................. 261
Figure V.13: South Korean Positive Perceptions of National Security (Present and Future) ................. 261
Figure V.14: North Korean Nuclear Power Reactor Projects (as of January 2011) ................................ 265
Figure V.15: List of Major North Korean Nuclear Sites ......................................................................... 266
x | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.16: Map of Major North Korean Nuclear Sites........................................................................ 267

Figure V.17: Map of Possible DPRK Nuclear, Biological, Missile, and Chemical Sites ....................... 268
Figure V.18: Nuclear Power Reactors Operating in the ROK ................................................................ 281
Figure V.19: ROK Nuclear Power Reactors under Construction or Planned ......................................... 282
Figure VI.1: Key DPRK Equipment Modernization, 2000-2014 ........................................................... 287
Figure VI.2: ROK Estimates of DPRK Equipment Trends from 2004 to 2012 ...................................... 288
Figure VI.3: ROK Estimates of DPRK and ROK Navy Equipment Trends from 2004 to 2012 ............ 289
Figure VI.4: ROK Estimates of DPRK and ROK Air Force Equipment Trends from 2004 to 2010 ..... 290
Figure VI.5: Key ROK Equipment Modernization, 2000-2014 .............................................................. 296
Figure VI.6: ROK Mid-term Force Improvement Plan........................................................................... 297
Figure VI.7: Relocation of ROK Forces ................................................................................................. 298
Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK Modernization – Part One .......................... 304
Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK Modernization – Part Two ......................... 305
Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK Modernization – Part Three ....................... 306
Figure VI.9: Investment Priorities Related to Improvement of Defense Capabilities............................. 309
Figure VI.10: 2012 Defense Capability Improvement Expenditure) ...................................................... 310
Figure VI.11: 2012 Defense Budget and Combat Capability Operation Expenditures........................... 311
Figure VI.12: Trends in Defense R&D Expenditures, 2004-2012 (Percent) .......................................... 312
Figure VI.13: Comparisons of Key Country-Level Indicators................................................................ 313
Figure VI.14: IISS Estimate of National Defense Budgets as a Percentage of GDP, 2008–2014 .......... 315
Figure VI.15: SIPRI Estimate of Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 2000–2013 .............. 316
Figure VI.16: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Defense Expenditures, 2007–2013 (US$ billions) ..... 317
Figure VI.17: SIPRI Estimate of Northeast Asian Military Expenditures, 2000–2012 .......................... 318
Figure VI.18: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Per Capita Defense Expenditures, 2007–2013 ........... 319
Figure VI.19: DPRK’s Economic Growth Rate and the Defense Industry’s Average Operating Rate .. 323
Figure VI.20: ROK Defense Budget and Annual Growth, 2006-2012 ................................................... 328
Figure VI.21: The ROK 2014 Defense Budget (KRW Billions) ............................................................ 329
Figure VII.1 Chinese Military Forces and Regions (Japanese 2012 Summary) ..................................... 358
Figure VII.2: Chinese Ground Forces by Region – Part One (US 2012 Summary) ............................... 359
Figure VII.3: Chinese Ground Forces by Region – Part Two (US 2013 Summary)............................... 360
Figure VII.4: Chinese Naval Forces by Region (US 2012 Summary) .................................................... 361
Figure VII.5: Chinese Air Forces by Region – Part One (US 2012 Summary) ...................................... 362
Figure VII.6: Chinese Air Forces by Region – Part Two (US 2012 Summary) ..................................... 363
Figure VII.7: The Chinese High Command (as of 2011) ........................................................................ 364
Figure VII.8: PLA Modernization Areas, 2000-2010 ............................................................................. 365
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xi

Figure VII.9: Operational System of the SDF and the Roles of the Chiefs of Staff ............................... 374
Figure VII.10: Japanese Estimates of Japanese Self-Defense Forces ..................................................... 375
Figure VII.11: Personnel, Tanks, and Artillery under Japanese NDPGs, 1976-2010 ............................. 376
Figure VII.12: Changes of Japanese Views Regarding Defense Capability and Subsequent NDPG’s .. 377
Figure VII.13: Japan’s National Security Strategy and the New NDPG ................................................. 378
Figure VII.14: Details of the New MTDP ............................................................................................... 379
Figure VII.15: Force Structure under the New NDPG (Annex Table of the New NDPG) .................... 380
Figure VII.16: Comparison of NDPG’s .................................................................................................. 381
Figure VII.17: Russian Military Districts and Major Forces................................................................... 388
Figure VII.18: Russian Forces Arrayed Near the North Korean Border ................................................. 389
Figure VII.19: Chinese Defence Budget Trends and IISS Estimates: 2009-2013................................... 398
Figure VII.20: PRC Defense Spending-related Comparative Statistics, 1980-2011 ............................... 399
Figure VII.21: PRC Official Defense Budget Annual Data, 2002-2012 ................................................. 400
Figure VII.22: IISS Assessment of Japanese Defense-Related Expenditures, 2009-2012 ...................... 405
Figure VII.23: Russian National Defense Expenditure Trends, 2005-2015 ............................................ 409
Figure VII.24: Russian Arms Procurement and Approximate State Armaments Program Objectives ... 409
Figure VIII.1: The ROK-US Alliance ..................................................................................................... 411
Figure VIII.2: Japanese Estimates of US, ROK, and DPRK Forces in the Korean Peninsula ................ 418
Figure VIII.3: ROK Reporting on Major Organizations and Assets of the USFK.................................. 419
Figure VIII.4: American Military Assets in the ROK ............................................................................. 420
Figure VIII.5: A Comparison of ROK, Combined US-ROK, and DPRK Military Assets ..................... 420
Figure VIII.6: Relocation of US Forces in Korea from 2006 .................................................................. 425
Figure VIII.7: Japanese Estimates of US Forces Japan (USFJ) in 2012 ................................................. 433
Figure VIII.8: US Forces in the Pacific in 2013, Equipment by Type and Location .............................. 437
Figure VIII.9: US Forces in the Pacific in 2013, Forces by Role and Location ...................................... 439
Figure VIII.10: US Total Force Plans, FY2015-FY2016 ........................................................................ 448
Figure VIII.11: US Military Investment Spending.................................................................................. 454
Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part One (US Army) .................................................................... 455
Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Two (US Navy) .................................................................... 456
Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Three (US Marine Corps) ..................................................... 457
Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Four (US Air Force) ............................................................. 458
Figure VIII.13: US Military Spending .................................................................................................... 463
Figure IX.1: Chinese Missile Forces, 2010-2012 .................................................................................... 470
Figure IX.2: Range of Chinese Precision Strike Capabilities – Part One (US 2013 Estimate) ............... 471
Figure IX.2: Range of Chinese Precision Strike Capabilities – Part Two (US 2012 Estimate) .............. 472
xii | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part One (2012 Japanese Estimate)............................ 476
Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part Two (2013 US Estimate) .................................... 477
Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part Three (2012 US Estimate) .................................. 478
Figure IX.4: US and Asian Nuclear Capable Forces............................................................................... 490
Figure IX.5: Comparative Estimate of Global Holdings of Nuclear Weapons ....................................... 492
Figure IX.6: Timeline of Japanese Missile Defense Development ......................................................... 505
Figure IX.7: Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense Systems ...................................................................... 506
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xiii

Executive Summary
The tensions between the Koreas – and the potential involvement of the People’s Republic of
China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) in a Korean
conflict – create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These conflicts could range
from posturing and threats – “wars of intimidation” – to a major conventional conflict on the
Korean Peninsula, intervention by outside powers like the US and China, and the extreme of
nuclear conflict.
The Korean balance is also affected by the uncertain mix of cooperation and competition
between the United States and China. The US rebalancing of its forces to Asia and the steady
modernization of Chinese forces, in particular the growth of Chinese sea-air-missile capabilities
to carry out precision conventional and nuclear strikes deep into the Pacific, affect the balance
in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. They also raise the possibility of far more intense conflicts
and ones that could extend far beyond the boundaries of the Koreas.
There are powerful deterrents to any such conflicts. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South
Korea) has emerged as a major economic power, one that is important to the economies of the
US, Japan, and China – as well as to the world. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK or North Korea) is one of the world’s most heavily militarized states, but it is still a
relatively small military power by US and Chinese standards. It remains vulnerable to US
airpower, missile power, and precision strike capability, and runs a serious risk of being isolated
if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support.
Both the US and China have reasons to prevent and contain a conflict in the Koreas and
Northeast Asia. Both are dependent on the ROK and Japan for critical aspects of their trade and
economies, and both are dependent on the overall stability of a global economy that is heavily
driven by the stability of Northeast Asia. Neither can “win” any conflict between them at a cost
approaching the benefits of avoiding a conflict, neither has an incentive to becoming locked into
an arms race that extends beyond basic national security concerns, and neither can “win” a
limited clash or conflict without triggering a far deeper, lasting process of competition that may
lead to far more serious wars.
Japan is another key player, and one that has virtually the same reasons to avoid intensifying its
present military efforts or becoming involved in a conflict if it can. Japan cannot, however,
stand aside from the Koreas and the overall balance of forces in Northeast Asia. Japan, too, must
assess its security position in terms of the DPRK’s expanding missile and nuclear capabilities
and the outcome of both the rebalancing of US forces and China’s pace of military
modernization. It, too, faces a “worst case” that could push it into creating far larger military
forces and even offensive missile and nuclear forces.
The fact remains that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war between the Koreas,
or one that escalates to involve the powers outside it. This is particularly true if one considers
the number of times that war has resulted from unpredictable incidents and patterns of
escalation. The historical reality is that the likelihood of less-probable forms of war actually
occurring has been consistently higher than what seemed in peacetime to be the most probable
contingencies and the patterns of escalation that seemed most likely from the viewpoint of a
“rational bargainer.”
xiv | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

This report focuses on the strategies, resources, and patterns of modernization that shape the
balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia as well as the broader balance in the Pacific region. It
assesses the balance of forces that shape the stability and security of the Korean Peninsula in the
full range of conflicts that could occur in the region. It focuses on the forces of the ROK and
DPRK, but looks at outside powers as well. It also addresses the complex and constantly
shifting mix of conventional, asymmetric, and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear) capabilities that shape the balance.
The report also examines these interrelated “balances” using a range of different sources –
emphasizing the official language used in DPRK, ROK, US, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian
sources where possible. These official sources seem to present the best view of what countries
think about their own forces and the threats they face, although many clearly are designed as at
least partial exercises in strategic communications and propaganda. They do, however, include
US Department of Defense reports that provide a unique unclassified picture of US intelligence
estimates and analysis.
The detailed contents of each chapter consistently reveal just how different the perceptions and
values of each side are, and how great the risk is of miscalculation based on different values.
North Korea is, to put it mildly, a strategic outlier in virtually all of its statements and actions –
differing sharply from China as well as South Korea, the US, and Japan.
Even when given sides appear to share the same values, it may be more a matter of rhetoric and
propaganda, and the political, ideological, and strategic differences between major actors are
compounded by major differences in the estimates of given sources, both in terms of data on
given military forces and as to how the balance should be assessed. It is clear that any model of
deterrence, scenarios, and escalation ladders – as well as arms control options – would present
the need for research and negotiations over basic data, similar to past experiences.
Such an assessment is critical to shaping a strategy that can deter and defend against North
Korea, in shaping negotiations, and in planning responses to a variety of potential situations on
the Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and that involve critical Chinese and American choices
between cooperation and competition. At the same time, the assessment shows there is no one
way of assessing the Korean military balance that can be used for policy planning, strategic
assessments, or arms control negotiations. The unclassified information available is often too
uncertain, national perceptions differ too much, and different combinations of forces may be
relevant in different situations.
At this point, there is only a limited common base of perceptions and data to build upon. The
analysis attempts to deal with these problems by drawing the primary statistical data on the
military balance from reporting by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and
supplementing each section with a range of data taken from US, Japanese, Chinese, Russian,
ROK, and DPRK official sources, other NGOs, and defense reporting by sources like IHS
Jane’s. However, similar data are not available in meaningful detail from unclassified DPRK –
and to a lesser extent, Chinese – sources, and there are too few unclassified data on exercises,
tactics, and doctrine that are detailed enough to try to interpret just how much declared
statements differ from underlying values and perceptions.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xv

Security Strategies
The security strategies that shape the Korean balance are driven by the DPRK’s aggressiveness
and militarization, long history of confrontation with the ROK, the legacy of the Korean and
Cold Wars, and the US presence in the ROK and Japan. At the same time, they are increasingly
driven by the emergence of China as a great power in Asia and the Pacific, and the broader
strategic competition between the US and China.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
In practice, regime survival and enhancing the cult of the “dear leader” are the DPRK’s grand
strategy. Its militarism, provocations of South Korea, and exaggerated threats are all means to
this end. As for ideology, the DPRK has never shown any evidence it cares about Marxism or its
people in another meaningful sense. In practice, its now hereditary “great leaders” owe more to
the emperors of ancient Korea’s Goguryeo kingdom, and the divinity they claimed through their
Jumong foundation myth, than Marx, Lenin, or Mao.
The DPRK has used a mix of threats and sporadic attacks, decades of military build-up, and
endless propaganda campaigns about foreign threats and invasions to justify its dictatorship, and
devoted the bulk of its resources to military forces. It has used such foreign threats to
manipulate its people, while it has used its military build-up and covert or limited attacks in an
effort to extort foreign aid and enhance its status and negotiating leverage.
In his February 2012 Senate testimony, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Ronald L.
Burgess Jr. stated, 1
…the primary goals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are preserving its current
system of government, improving its poor economy, and building national confidence and support for Kim
Jong Un – youngest son of the late Kim Jong Il and North Korea’s new “Great Leader.” North Korea’s
leadership is emphasizing policy continuity under Kim Jong Un which DIA anticipates will include
continued pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities for strategic deterrence and international prestige, as
well as to gain economic and political concessions.
In 2013, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper reported to the Senate that, 2
Kim Jong Un has quickly consolidated power since taking over as leader of North Korea when his father,
Kim Jong Il, died in December 2011. Kim has publicly focused on improving the country’s troubled
economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people, but we have yet to see any signs of serious
economic reform.
North Korea maintains a large, conventional military force held in check by the more powerful South
Korean-US military alliance. Nevertheless, the North Korean military is well postured to conduct limited
attacks with little or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship and the artillery 23
bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern Limit Line.
In 2014, Clapper described North Korea as follows, 3
Iran and North Korea are unpredictable actors in the international arena. Their development of
cyberespionage or attack capabilities might be used in an attempt to either provoke or destabilize the
United States or its partners.
…North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to
the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world’s largest populations, militaries,
and economies. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries,
including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007,
illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment in the
Second- Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement not to transfer
xvi | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology.
In addition to conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North Korea announced its intention
to “adjust and alter” the uses of existing nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at
Yongbyon, and restart its graphite moderated reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North
Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment
facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. North Korea has
publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken
initial steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to
developing long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its
efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on
deterrence and defense. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang’s view, its nuclear capabilities are
intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang’s
nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.
Two years after taking the helm of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has further solidified his position as unitary
leader and final decision authority. He has solidified his control and enforced loyalty through personnel
changes and purges. The most prominent was the ouster and execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek in
December 2013. Kim has elevated the profile of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) through
appointments of party operatives to key leadership positions and the convening of party conferences and
plenums. Kim and the regime have publicly emphasized his focus on improving the country’ s troubled
economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people while maintaining the tenets of a command
economy. He has codified this approach via his dual-track policy of economic development and
advancement of nuclear weapons. (Information on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and intentions
can be found above in the section on WMD and Proliferation.)
…Many instances of major cyber attacks manifested themselves at home and abroad in 2013 as illustrated
by the following examples….In March 2013, South Korea suffered a sizeable cyber attack against its
commercial and media networks, damaging tens of thousands of computer workstations. The attack also
disrupted online banking and automated teller machine services. Although likely unrelated to the 2012
network attack against Saudi Aramco, these attacks illustrate an alarming trend in mass data-deletion and
system damaging attacks.
These assessments reflect the DPRK’s emergence as one of the most militarized nations in the
world and the fact that it can still pose a very real and growing threat to regional stability that
has begun to take the form of nuclear and missile threats that could eventually extend to the
point of launching a nuclear war against the United States. The DPRK has worked to expand its
military capacity since the mid-1970s, valuing quantity over quality and focusing on
conventional means. Despite economic troubles, the DPRK has continued its efforts to
modernize its arms and pursue strategic WMD, with the ultimate goal of building a prosperous
and strong nation. 4
Performance-wise, various weapons found in North Korea’s ground forces, including T-62 tanks, M-1973
armored vehicles, various self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, AT-3/4 anti-tank missiles and
modified SCUD missiles, are modernized weaponry. North Korea is currently making concentrated efforts
to modernize its military equipment by building Pokpung-ho (“Storm Tiger”) tanks, which are reproduced
designs of Soviet-made T-72s, along with introducing, manufacturing and deploying 23mm antiaircraft
guns.
Changes in the DPRK’s leadership are also having an impact on the extent to which the DPRK
poses a military threat. The new leader, Kim Jong-un, was elected Vice Chairman of the Central
Military Commission in 2010. Following the death of his father, he was elected Supreme
Commander of the Korean People’s Army as well as Central Military Commission Chairman
and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission in April 2012. These three steps – and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xvii

a series of purges that followed, including the execution of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek in
December 2013 and his family in early 2014 – established his control and consolidated his
authority over the party, military, and state. 5
The DPRK has said often via state media that there would be no change in policy between Kim
Jong-un and his father. For example, shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death, the media stated that
“foolish politicians around the world, including in South Korea, should not expect any changes
from us.” 6 There have been no indications that Kim Jong-un is disposed to taking measures that
could reduce regional frictions or improve the daily lives of North Korean citizens. Several
factors make it likely that the DPRK’s political system – a concentrated, one-man dictatorship –
will continue without significant reform.
Senior North Korean officials do speak about military policy and strategy in broad terms. At the
fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962, the DPRK
adopted the military concept of ‘Four Military Guidelines’: extensive training for all soldiers,
fortifying the whole country, modernization of the armed forces, and arming the entire
population. Since then, the DPRK has been building its military capabilities in accordance with
these guidelines.
The DPRK has said it bases its military policy on a Four-point Military Guideline that promotes
such objectives. The DPRK’s constitution states that “on the basis of politically and
ideologically arming the military and populace, the state shall realize a self-defensive military
force built on the following objectives: (1) a cadre-based army, (2) modernization, (3)
militarization of the populace, and (4) a stronghold-based fortified nation.” 7
The DPRK promotes two main policies or ideologies in its government propaganda. The
primary state ideology is juche (“self-reliance”) – meaning that the focus of DPRK efforts is
always on making North Korea a strong, independent nation, not reliant on any other nation for
anything, including security. Juche promotes the idea of the collective identity as an organic
whole, with the supreme leader at the top of this unified system. The DPRK leaders’ personality
cults reinforce popular support for the system.
Secondly, the DPRK follows a songun policy (“military first”), presented as deriving from and
reinterpreting juche, in order to construct a strong socialist state politically, economically,
ideologically, and militarily. According to the DPRK communist party newspaper, songun is “a
unique mode of politics that dedicates maximum effort to reinforcing the KPA [Korean People’s
Army], in which military power becomes the basis that propels general tasks in the vanguard of
the socialist revolution and construction of a socialist nation.” 8
According to the South Korean government, “The North continues to pursue its military-first
policy and address the KPA as revolutionary armed forces. This indicates that the regime, which
maintains its power base in the military, has not abandoned its desire to take over by force and
unify the Korean peninsula under communism.” 9
The Republic of Korea (ROK)
Over the last half century, North Korea has made over 2,660 military provocations against
South Korea. This has not, however, prevented the ROK from taking repeated initiatives for
better relations. The ROK has sought to establish better relations with the DPRK over the years,
and done so with consistently uncertain results.
xviii | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Kim Dae-jung (President 1998-2002) adopted a “Sunshine Policy” in dealing with North Korea,
emphasizing increased communication, assistance, and exchanges with the DPRK while
delaying political settlement and reunification to a future time. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun
(President 2003-2007) followed a similar policy, entitled “peace and prosperity policy.”
During these two liberal presidencies, the ROK pursued large-scale economic engagement with
the DPRK for a decade, believing that they had to convince the DPRK’s leadership that its
external environment was benign. Through economic engagement, the ROK attempted to both
pacify the DPRK’s belligerence and initiate slow reform in the DPRK itself. In turn, these goals
would avoid any collapse of the DPRK and the so-called “hard landing” unification scenario.
When Kim Jong-il responded to the ROK’s unilateral offers of assistance, these two Presidents
felt validated that their policies were successfully working. However, the DPRK was simply
accepting ROK assistance and calling it “gifts” to its Great Leaders from the weaker ROK.
However, after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island attacks in 2010 in which the ROK military
failed to respond effectively to North Korean provocations, the ROK started promoting a new
strategy, called “active deterrence” or “proactive deterrence.” This policy emphasized enhanced
offensive capabilities in order to ensure deterrence of the DPRK, enabling the ROK military to
immediately retaliate in the event of any further DPRK provocations. The ROK Army has
deployed short-range missiles and other weapons systems to border areas in order to increase
rapidity of response. This also increases the potential for miscalculation or accidental escalation
– for example, ROK troops, wishing to implement the new strategic doctrine, accidentally shot
at an Asiana civilian airliner in 2012.
President Park Geun-hye was virtually forced to strongly denounce the DPRK’s third nuclear
test, saying it undermined trust-building and posed a significant threat to the Korean Peninsula
and international peace. At the same time, Park indicated that such DPRK actions were
anticipated, and thus her approach to the DPRK would not significantly change. She would
work to separate humanitarian assistance from the broader political issues on the Peninsula.
In her inauguration speech, she stated that “North Korea’s recent nuclear test is a challenge to
the survival and future of the Korean people, and there should be no mistake that the biggest
victim will be none other than North Korea itself.” She urged the DPRK to abandon its nuclear
ambitions, “instead of wasting its resources on nuclear and missile development and continuing
to turn its back to the world in self-imposed isolation.” 10
The United States and Japan
The US has remained firmly committed to the security of the ROK ever since the Korean War.
Thomas Donilon, the National Security Adviser to President Obama, stated in a March 2013
speech that that the overarching objective of the Obama Administration’s Asia policy was to
“sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness,
peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights of freedom.” The policy was
based on several key considerations. It: 11
…reflected a recognition of the critical role that the United States has played in Asia for decades,
providing the stabilizing foundation for the region’s unprecedented social and economic development.
Beyond this, our guiding insight was that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and
increasingly linked. Economically, Asia already accounts for more than one-quarter of global GDP. Over
the next five years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. This
growth is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are reshaping the region: China’s ascent, Japan’s
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xix

resilience, and the rise of a “Global Korea,” an eastward-looking India and Southeast Asian nations more
interconnected and prosperous than ever before.
At the same time, the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia has been driven by much
broader changes in the strategies and force postures of the United State and China. Current US
policy calls for a rebalancing of US strategy in Asia composed of five strategic pillars:
strengthening alliances, forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers, building a
constructive relationship with China, strengthening regional institutions, and building an
economic architecture to increase the benefits of trade and growth for countries in the Asia-
Pacific region and the US – such as through the US-ROK FTA and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP). Furthermore, this is a period of significant transition in Asia, especially in
Northeast Asia – a new DPRK leader at the end of 2011, a Japanese leadership change at the
end of 2012, and leadership transitions in both the ROK and China in early 2013.
The US alliances with Japan and the ROK remain the foundations of the US regional security
and economic strategy; polls in both countries show approximately 80% support for their
alliances with the US. Greater trilateral cooperation is envisioned as key to maintain security.
Militarily, the rebalance involves: 12
…in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our
naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the pacific over
the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working
to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-
Generation fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms. And we are working with
allies to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most
immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North
Korea.
In terms of the China-US relationship, US strategy indicates that both cooperation and
competition will continue, though the US states its policy has consistently been “to improve the
quality and quantity of our cooperation; promote healthy economic competition; and manage
disagreements to ensure that U.S. interests are protected and that universal rights and values are
respected…. the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.” In order to
achieve these goals, communication channels must be improved and practical cooperation on
important issues demonstrated. 13
China
China has steadily improved its military capabilities for well over a decade and is increasingly
projecting power throughout the East Asian region. These trends began as China emerged as a
major economic power, and have increasingly led to tension with the US and a number of
China’s neighbors.
China still maintains the “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty”
that it signed in 1961. However, past descriptions of the two countries as “blood brothers” and
“closer than lips and teeth” bear little resemblance to the current strategic realities. The PRC-
DPRK relationship has often been rocky over the past 60 years, and while China still sees the
DPRK as an important strategic buffer between it and the US presence in the ROK, it has shown
progressively less tolerance for the DPRK’s erratic leadership, has made growing overtures to
an ROK that is now a far more important and profitable economic partner, has sought to end the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons efforts, and has strong incentives to avoid any form of combat or
crisis on the Korean peninsula.
xx | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

China does not formally allocate military forces for the defense of the DPRK and does not
forward deploy military forces in that country. China has sought to moderate the DPRK’s
behavior and move it towards economic reform based on the Chinese model. It also has recently
stepped up its efforts to persuade the DPRK to restrain its aggressiveness and nuclear and
missiles efforts.
China did, however, save the DPRK from total defeat in the Korean War, and it is unlikely that
it would not react strongly to any developments that would threaten the DPRK’s ability to keep
ROK and US forces away from its borders, as well as a counterbalance to Japan. No one can
dismiss the possibility that Chinese forces might intervene if the DPRK again was threatened
with defeat, or if any form of regime collapse threatened to create a US presence in the DPRK
or deploy ROK forces near the Chinese border.
More broadly, Chinese strategy regarding the Koreas cannot be separated from it broader
strategic interests in Northeast Asia, in Asia as a whole, and the Pacific. Whether the US
chooses to formally state it or not, its “rebalancing” of its force posture and military
modernization efforts in Asia is driven in large part by China’s military modernization and
growing power projection capabilities. China in turn is doing far more than creating a “blue
water” navy and modernizing key elements of its forces. Its strategy involves the creation of
new joint warfare, power projection, and sea-air-missile-nuclear capabilities that affect any
confrontation or conflict in the Koreas and northeast Asia at least as much as any struggle that
affects Taiwan of US base and forces deeper in the Pacific up to the “second island chain.”
The Economic Balance
This analysis examines the resources each nation can use to create and sustain its military
forces. It looks at the relative size of military spending and arms transfers of the DPRK and
ROK, as well as China, Japan, Russia, and the US. There are, however, no reliable estimates for
the DPRK, a country that can manipulate its entire economy to support its military efforts
without regard to market prices or the market value of military personnel. Similar problems
affect estimates of Chinese efforts, though to a lesser degree.
In spite of these uncertainties in the data, it is clear that the ROK has a far greater capacity to
develop and support its forces than the DPRK. The CIA estimated in January 2015 that the
DPRK had a GDP that was worth roughly $40 billion on purchasing power parity terms in 2011
(ranking 103rd in the world), while the ROK’s GDP in 2013 was worth some $1.67 trillion
(ranking 13th in the world), or roughly 42 times that of that of the DPRK. It estimated that the
DPRK’s GDP at the official exchange rate was $29 billion in 2009, while the ROK’s GDP in
2012 was worth some $1.20 trillion, or roughly 41 times that of that of the DPRK. 14
It also estimated that the DPRK had a GDP per capita of about $1,800 in 2011 (ranking 198th in
the world), while the ROK’s GDP per capita was approximately $32,400 (ranking 40th in the
world), or 18 times of that of the DPRK. Over the past decade, the DPRK’s rankings in GDP
and GDP per capita have been decreasing, while those of the ROK have been steadily
increasing.
The CIA also estimated that the DPRK had a total population of 24.9 million in July 2014, while
the ROK’s population was 49.0 million, or nearly two times that of the DPRK. It estimated the
median age of the DPRK’s population at 33 years, and that of the ROK at 40.2 years. Finally it
estimated that the DPRK had 6.5 million males available for military service, 4.8 million males
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xxi

fit for military service, and 207,737 young men entering military age in 2014, while the ROK
had 13.2 million available males entering military age, 4.8 million males fit for military service,
and 365,760 males entering military age annually.
All of these data show that the ROK has far more resources to use in supporting its national
security structure than the DPRK, and that overall trends will remain significantly in the ROK’s
favor.
The World Bank and UN make somewhat different estimates of the size of the DPRK and
ROK’s resources, but all agree that the ROK has a vastly larger economy, far better income
distribution and personal wealth, and far more personnel that can be devoted to military service.
The ROK’s disadvantages are that its population has much higher expectations, it must pay far
more for manpower, it must price military investment in market rather than command terms,
and it finds it harder to command popular sacrifices in the name of enhanced security.
The ROK is limited largely by its perceptions and the military expenditures it chooses to make.
It has the economic capacity to easily spend far more than it does today, a much stronger
technology and manufacturing base, and access to the best weapons and military systems in the
US inventory.
Efforts to compare data between state-controlled and market economies raise major questions as
to the comparability of costs. This not only affects investment, but every aspect of manpower
and readiness. The DPRK, for example, can command any amount of manpower it wants at any
price it wants; the ROK cannot.
At the same time, it is clear that the DPRK has steadily declined as an economic power and in
every aspect of competitiveness with the ROK. While it is impossible to quantify the impact of
the DPRK’s economic issues on its military capabilities and readiness, the fact remains that it
has major problems in providing adequate stocks of basic commodities such as fuel.
There have been some reports that the DPRK’s economic problems are serious enough to limit
its training and production of basic military supplies like artillery ammunition. Such reports
cannot be confirmed, but the DPRK’s economic weaknesses may overshadow any benefits
gained from its ability to allocate economic resources without regard to popular and market
demands.
The DPRK’s industrial base is largely obsolete, and it lags a decade or more behind in key areas
of technology like computerization, modern communications, and other key technical elements
of the “revolution in military affairs,” which make up key elements of modern battle
management, targeting systems, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities – though it has been significantly increasing its cyber capabilities in recent years.
The Military Spending and Arms Import Balance
North Korea does everything possible to conceal its true level of military spending, and there
are no reliable estimates of how many resources it devotes to its forces. All outside sources
agree, however, that it is one of the most militarized countries in the world.
The ROK’s state-run Korean Institute of Defense Analyses reported that while the DPRK
officially said it spent $570 million on its military in 2009, calculating based on PPP, the real
amount was $8.77 billion – 13 to 15 times greater than announced. The total gross national
income of the DPRK in 2009 was approximately $25 billion, meaning that the DPRK spent
xxii | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

about a third of its national income on its military. According to DPRK figures, military
spending was $470 million in 2006, $510 million in 2007, and $540 million in 2008.
The 2014 Japanese Defense White Paper noted that, 15
Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international
community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities
and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys
most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s
Assembly in April 2014, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2014 national budget was 15.9%,
but it is believed that this represents only a fraction of real defense expenditures.
The ROK is far less militarized than the DPRK, but it has had to respond to the steady build-up
of the DPRK’s military forces. The ROK’s military expenditures in 2011 amounted to $28.3
billion, or approximately 2.7% of the country’s GDP. The ROK’s FY2012 defense budget
showed an increase of approximately 5% over the previous year, the 13th consecutive year-on-
year rise. The 2012 budget totaled 32.9 trillion won, accounting for 14.8% of the government
budget and 2.4% of ROK GDP. This was the fourth largest national spending category, after
healthcare, welfare and labor, general public administration, and education.
An expert at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses explained the 2014 budget’s force
maintenance and force improvement projects in detail, 16
The 2014 ROK defense budget was drawn up with a focus on the following objectives: maintenance of
steadfast military readiness posture by strengthening the combat capability of frontline units and providing
necessary logistics support, enhancement of military personnel welfare to boost their morale, and
reinforcement of core combat capabilities to counter asymmetric threats and local provocations.
Simultaneously, great efforts were made to eliminate waste and economize budget use.
South Korea’s 2014 defense budget comes to about KRW 35.7 trillion, a 3.5% increase over that of 2013
(based on supplementary budget). It also accounts for 2.5% of the GDP (based on estimated figures) and
14.4% of the government budget (general accounts). The defense budget is the fourth largest after the
budgets for health, welfare, and employment (KRW 97.4 trillion), general and provincial administration
(KRW 55.8 trillion), and education (KRW 49.8 trillion), among the 12 categories of the government
budget.
In their deliberation of the 2014 budget bill last year, the National Assembly members stressed the need
for an increase in the budget to promote the welfare of the people and invigorate the local economy. This
consensus resulted in a lower percentage increase in the defense budget than in the preceding year.
Nonetheless, a 3.5% increase in the defense budget is by no means small, considering that the percentage
increase in government budget (general accounts) stood at 2.7% due to the continued slow economic
growth and difficulties collecting tax revenue.
The IISS describes the trends in the ROK’s military spending as follows: 17
The 2012 defence budget amounted to US$29bn or 14.8% of the central government budget and 2.5% of
GDP. There is a growing consensus that defence spending should increase to at least 2.7% of GDP. The
‘Mid-Term Defense Plan 2013–17’ called for increased spending on capabilities including surface-to-
surface missiles, stand-off precision-guided weapons and airborne electronic-attack systems. However,
additional outlays will be constrained by annual growth rates that, due to the country’s maturing economy,
will likely hover around 2–3%, as well as by calls for increased social-welfare spending by presidential
election candidates.
As for outside powers, the US still leads the world in terms of total military spending, but it has
only limited deployments in Korea and Asia. At the same time, China is not only an emerging
military power, but also has major forces in the areas near its border with the DPRK. Japan is
able to afford significant forces in spite of the fact it spends no more than one percent of its
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xxiii

GDP on defense, but does not currently plan for missions that affect the Korean balance. Russia
is another major military power in the region that has a major stake in Northeast Asia, but it is
more likely to exert political pressure and influence than use military force.
The Modernization Balance
Modernization efforts are another key variable in assessing the balance in the Korean Peninsula.
The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great significance in
determining what type of engagements potentially can be fought there and what types of
equipment and systems would be needed to counter any provocations by the DPRK – potentially
including its allies. The modernization of the military forces of the Koreas also affects the role
that US and Chinese forces might play in any engagement as well as how many and what types
of forces they would need to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of
tension.
Once again, there are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of
Northeast Asian military modernization – especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified
sources do not include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other
weaponry, and they do not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not
include battle management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4)
assets. These are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.
The Focus of DPRK Modernization
The Korean balance is a case where any meaningful assessment requires a full examination of
all the complex issues and uncertainties involved, and one that looks at the overall pattern of
military change in the US, China and Japan, not simply modernization as it affects forces in the
Korean Peninsula. Any assessment of modernization trends requires a detailed examination by
key force element and service, and must then be assessed in terms of overall impact on the force
structures examined in Chapters VI and VII of this report.
The DPRK has focused its resources on expanding and further developing its asymmetrical
capabilities, including WMD, special operations forces, ballistic missiles, and
electronic/information warfare. For the DPRK leadership, these capabilities can project a greater
threat at a smaller cost than conventional capabilities. Asymmetric capabilities will be discussed
further in the latter chapters of this report.
The DPRK pursued an asymmetric strategy to enhance its long-range strike capability against
civilian and military targets in order to compensate for declining conventional capabilities.
Specific attention has been focused on self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and
ballistic missiles. More reliance has also been given to the Special Forces, tasked with stealthy
infiltration of the ROK rear. Most sources agree that DPRK Special Forces have been
augmented to a 200,000 end-strength, up from 180,000 in 2008.
The Focus of ROK Modernization
The ROK has modernized more rapidly with more advanced equipment than the DPRK, while
the DPRK has focused on force expansion. The ROK has almost achieved a massive lead in
modern aircraft and surface-to-air missiles. The analysis shows that the ROK has an effective
plan for force modernization through 2020 – a plan it has upgraded since 2005 to reflect the
increase in DPRK provocations over the past few years.
xxiv | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The ROK is committed to significant future defense reforms, especially in light of increased
DPRK provocations over the past several years, and especially in terms of military hardware. It
has gathered additional stealth air-to-surface missiles and advanced cluster bombs, in addition to
development of deep-penetrating ‘bunker-buster’ bombs capable of destroying fortified artillery
– in case the DPRK initiates a new artillery shelling attack, like at Yeonpyeong Island.
Current ROK modernization plans focus on three priority areas: increasing the integrity of the
ROK armed forces through military restructuring, ensuring active deterrence capabilities, and
maximizing the efficiency of the national defense administration and force structure. Early
warning and surveillance capabilities, include increasing the number of UAVs, were also
emphasized. Furthermore, current plans focuses on eight priority issues: 18
(1) Reorganization of the armed forces’ chain-of-command,
(2) Establishment of an island defense command for the northwest (Yellow Sea),
(3) Improvement of the national defense training structure,
(4) Organization of a priority order for strengthening military power,
(5) Response to North Korea’s special forces and cyber threats,
(6) Enhancement of mental strength and assistance for educating national citizens about
security,
(7) Improvement of the national defense personnel management system, and
(8) Bettering the efficiency of the national budget.
The Focus of US Modernization
The US is working with the ROK as part of its force rebalance to support its allies in Asia. In
spite of cuts in the US defense budget, the US is still carrying out major modernization
activities, building up its air-sea power projection capabilities and Special Forces, and
enhancing key aspects of its stealth and ISR capabilities.
US efforts must, however, be assessed in terms of the steady modernization of Chinese forces
and Chinese ability to deter or intervene in a conflict in the Koreas. Both the US and China are
modernizing their forces in ways that will radically change the balance of deterrence and
military capabilities in the Koreas, Northeast Asia, and the Pacific.
The US is focusing on a limited “rebalancing” of its forces that will lead to some redeployment
from Europe and the Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific. It is also focusing its force modernization
in ways that will enhance the capability of all its forces in Asia and its power projection
capabilities. As yet, it has no clear plans to make such changes and its efforts are being affected
by an internal financial crisis and growing defense budget cuts.
The Focus of Chinese Modernization
China is making far more rapid efforts to modernize key aspects of its land, air, and naval
forces, its conventional precision strike capabilities, its joint warfare and battle management
capabilities, its power projection capabilities, its space warfare capabilities, its missile and
nuclear forces, and its capabilities for asymmetric warfare including new areas like
cyberwarfare.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | xxv

No one can as yet predict how the resulting balance of US and Chinese capabilities will evolve,
but China may well emerge as a peer military power in Asia and even beyond. Combined with
the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs, this may lead to major changes in ROK and Japanese
conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear military modernization efforts – issues explored in more
depth in Chapters 4 and 9. At a minimum, it means that the balance in the Koreas will
increasingly be determined by the outside changes in US and Chinese forces and their degree of
strategic cooperation versus competition.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 1

I. Korea and Northeast Asia: History and

Security Strategies
The history of the events that have shaped the Korean balance is complex and involves a wide
range of different actors. In broad terms, however, it is the history of a long series of crises that
have been driven largely by North Korea’s (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s or
DPRK’s) need to use foreign threats to justify its dictatorship and militarism. South Korea (the
Republic of Korea or ROK) has been in a largely defensive position, supported by the US.
While there have been many efforts to negotiate a peace or more stable balance of forces, and
avoid the “nuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula, all have so far failed. They have left the
Koreas in a constant state of crisis, with growing military forces and the ever-present threat of
war. Figure I.1 provides a quick list of key events since the Korean War.
Figure I.1: Timeline of Key DPRK-ROK Events 19
o July 27, 1953: The Korean War ended in a truce signed by a representative of the US-backed UN forces
and a representative of DPRK and allied Chinese forces. The ROK was not a signatory. There is no formal
peace treaty, meaning the two countries are technically still at war. The Korean War cost 2 million lives.
o January 1968: North Korean commandos launched a failed assassination attempt on then-president of the
ROK, Park Chung-hee.
o August 15, 1974: Another assassination attempted on Park Chung-hee by a DPRK agent. Park survives,
but his wife is killed.
o October 9, 1983: DPRK agents struck at the area of a visit by South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan to
Burma, killing more than 20 people, including four ROK cabinet ministers. The president escaped.
o November 29, 1987: DPRK blew up a South Korean civilian airliner, killing 115 people. The US decided
to include the North on its list of countries that support terrorism.
o September 17, 1991: North and South Korea became UN members.
o December 31, 1991: North and South Korea announced that they have initialed an agreement banning
nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula, but did not agree on measures to ensure compliance.
o January 30, 1992: After years of promises and false starts, the DPRK signed an agreement to permit
inspections of its seven sites at Yongbyon, its heavily guarded nuclear complex 60 miles north of
Pyongyang.
o March 12, 1993: In a defiant move against international pressure to inspect its suspected nuclear weapons
development program, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, which it ratified in 1985, but then reconsidered the withdrawal. The North also began stockpiling
plutonium.
o May 29, 1993: North Korea conducted what appeared to be the first successful test of the country’s
homegrown midrange missile, raising Japanese fears that missiles could reach some of Japan’s most
populous cities.
o December 1993: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) told President Bill Clinton that the DPRK may
have one or two nuclear bombs, though the intelligence was murky. When the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) analyzed samples of North Korea’s plutonium in 1992, it had concluded that scientists had
engaged in more extensive reprocessing had been acknowledged.
2 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

o February 1994: The DPRK averted a possible trade embargo by allowing one full inspection of seven
atomic sites by the IAEA. But when inspectors arrived in March, the North refused to let them take
radioactive samples from critical parts of its nuclear reprocessing center at Yongbyon.
o May 1994: IAEA inspectors returned to North Korea to finish their inspection, concluding that the country
was within days of obliterating evidence of how much, if any, nuclear fuel had been diverted to its weapons
program. The Pentagon said the spent fuel could provide enough material for four or five nuclear bombs.
o May 31, 1994: The DPRK tested a cruise missile designed to sink ships; American officials said the cruise
missile was part of North Korea’s broad effort to upgrade its conventional forces.
o June 1994: The DPRK announced its withdrawal from the IAEA and said the agency’s inspectors would
no longer be allowed in the country. It also threatened to turn its stockpile of nuclear fuel into bombs. The
Clinton administration reinforced the American military presence in South Korea, while former President
Jimmy Carter, acting on his own, traveled to the North, meeting with Kim Il-sung and striking a deal that
averted confrontation.
o July 9, 1994: Kim Il-sung died suddenly. His son, Kim Jong-il became the DPRK’s leader.
o October 21, 1994: Negotiations following the Carter visit resulted in a deal: the DPRK agreed to freeze
and then dismantle the complex in Yongbyon and open up two secret military sites to inspection by
international experts. In exchange, an international consortium would replace the North’s current graphite
nuclear reactors with new light-water reactors, which produce little weapons-grade plutonium. The US and
its allies also agreed to provide fuel oil to the North.
o September 1996: A DPRK submarine landed commandos on the South Korean coast.
o August 31, 1998: The North fired a two-stage Taepodong-1 missile over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.
The firing suggested that North Korea had greatly increased the range of its missiles.
o June 2000: DPRK leader Kim Jong-il and ROK President Kim Dae-jung met in Pyongyang.
o January 2002: Then US President George W. Bush made his “axis of evil” speech, including North Korea
and linking it to Iran and Iraq.
o October 2002: Confronted by Bush administration officials with evidence that it had cheated on the 1994
agreement, North Korea admitted that it has been conducting a major clandestine nuclear program using
enriched uranium. It declared it had ‘‘nullified’’ its agreement to freeze all nuclear weapons development
activity.
o February 2003: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, the North decided to begin harvesting plutonium from
its five-megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon complex.
o August 9 2003: The US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan hold the first of several rounds of Six Party
Talks with the DPRK in Beijing.
o May 11, 2005: The DPRK said it had removed 8,000 spent fuel rods from a reactor at its main nuclear
complex at Yongbyon as one of several ‘‘necessary measures’’ to bolster its nuclear arsenal.
o February 2005: The DPRK claimed to have built nuclear weapons.
o September 19, 2005: The DPRK agreed to end its nuclear weapons program in return for security,
economic, and energy benefits.
o July 5, 2006: The DPRK test-fired seven medium- and long-range missiles.
o October 8, 2006: The DPRK said it had set off its first nuclear test, becoming the eighth country in history
to proclaim that it has joined the club of nuclear weapons states. The test was something of a fizzle – a
subkiloton explosion – but it was enough to win unanimous passage of a resolution that imposed new
economic sanctions.
o October 31, 2006: The DPRK agreed to resume the Six Party nuclear disarmament talks.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 3

o February 13, 2007: The US and four other nations reached a tentative agreement to provide North Korea
with roughly $400 million in fuel oil and aid in return for the DPRK’s starting to disable its nuclear
facilities and allowing nuclear inspectors back into the country.
o November 2007: The prime ministers of the two Koreas met for the first time in 15 years.
o March–May 2008: North Korea test-fired short-range missiles.
o June 27, 2008: The DPRK demolished the cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor site.
o July 2008: A DPRK soldier shot and killed a South Korean tourist at the Mount Kumgang resort.
o September 2008: Complaining that the Bush administration had not yet fulfilled a promise to remove
North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism, the DPRK moved to resume plutonium reprocessing.
o October 11, 2008: The US removed the DPRK from its list of states sponsoring terrorism after North
Korea agreed to resume disabling its nuclear plant and to allow inspectors access to its declared nuclear
sites.
o December 2008: Six Party Talks failed to reach an agreement on inspecting the DPRK’s nuclear sites. The
North subsequently said there would be no more talks and vowed to increase its nuclear efforts – including
uranium enrichment.
o April 5, 2009: The DPRK launched a long-range rocket capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Criticism
from the UN Security Council prompted Kim Jong-il to walk out of talks aimed at ending the North’s
nuclear program.
o May 25, 2009: The DPRK announced it had successfully conducted a second nuclear test, sparking an
emergency UN Security Council meeting. It also withdrew from the 1953 Korean War armistice.
o May 26, 2009: The DPRK fired three missiles into the sea near Japan and said it “fully ready for battle”
against the US.
o June 12, 2009: The UN Security Council voted unanimously on an enhanced package of sanctions that,
among other things, called upon UN members to inspect cargo vessels and airplanes suspected of carrying
military material in or out of the DPRK.
o November 2009: Shots were exchanged near the Yellow Sea border for the first time in seven years.
o January 2010: North Korea fired artillery near its disputed maritime border with the South. The ROK
returned fire, but no one was injured.
o March 27, 2010: ROK corvette Cheonan sank after an unexplained explosion; 46 sailors died. A later
investigation found that the boat was sunk by a torpedo launched from a North Korean submarine.
o September 2010: Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s youngest son, gained high-powered military and political
posts, resulting in increased speculation that he would be his father’s successor.
o October 2010: North and South Korea exchanged shots across the border.
o November 2010: The DPRK gave a US scientist a tour of a uranium plant, creating alarm at the
sophistication of its nuclear technology.
o November 23, 2010: The DPRK fired artillery rounds onto an inhabited South Korean border island. The
ROK scrambled its fighter jets and returned fire; two ROK marines and two civilians were killed.
o December 19, 2011: Kim Jong-il died of a heart attack, and Kim Jong-un was declared “supreme leader” two
weeks later.
o February 29, 2012: In the so-called Leap Day Agreement, the DPRK agreed to suspend nuclear weapons
testing and uranium enrichment and to allow international inspectors to monitor and verify activities at its
main reactor as part of a deal that included a US pledge to provide food aid.
o April 12, 2012: The DPRK launched a rocket that the US and its allies called a provocative pretext for
developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that might carry a nuclear warhead in the future. The failed
launch drew swift international condemnation, including the suspension of food aid by the US.
4 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

o December 12, 2012: North Korea successfully launched a long-range rocket into orbit.
o January 2013: In response to the UN Security Council’s unanimous decision to tighten sanctions, the
DPRK bluntly threatened the US, saying that it had no interest in talks on denuclearization and that it
would forge ahead with its missile and weapons development with the goal of developing the capability to
hit US territory.
o February 12, 2013: The DPRK confirmed that it had conducted a third nuclear test.
o March 7, 2013: The UN Security Council ordered new economic sanctions against the DPRK for its third
nuclear test, unanimously approving a resolution that the US negotiated with China.
o March 11, 2013: North Korea declared that it would no longer abide by the 1953 armistice amid joint US-
ROK military drills.
o March 15, 2013: The US said it would deploy additional ballistic-missile interceptors along the Pacific
Coast by 2017. The new deployment would increase the number of ground-based interceptors to 44 from
the 30 already in California and Alaska.
o March 27, 2013: The DPRK cut off the last remaining military hot lines with the South, accusing President
Park Geun-hye of pursuing her predecessor’s hardline policy.
o March 28, 2013: The US military carried out a rare long-range mission over the Korean Peninsula, sending
two nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bombers on a practice sortie over the ROK, underscoring Washington’s
commitment to defend its ally amid rising tensions with the North. In response, the DPRK ordered missile
units to be ready to strike the ROK and US.
o April 2, 2013: The DPRK threatened to restart its plutonium reactor.
o April 3, 2013: The United States announced that it was deploying an advanced missile defense system to
Guam two years ahead of schedule, in what the Pentagon said was a “precautionary move” to protect
American naval and air forces from the threat of a North Korean missile attack.
o April 4, 2013: The ROK’s defense chief said that the DPRK had moved a missile with “considerable”
range to its east coast, but that it was not capable of reaching the US, while the North’s military warned that
it was ready to strike US military forces with “cutting-edge smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear strike
means.”
o April 5, 2013: The DPRK’s government advised Russia, Britain, and other countries to consider
evacuating their embassies in Pyongyang. Analysts in Russia and the ROK suggested that the
announcement was part of rhetorical escalation of threats.
o April 8, 2013: North Korea said it would withdraw all of its 53,000 workers and “temporarily suspend the
operations” at Kaesong, an industrial park jointly run with the ROK, casting doubt on the future of the last
remaining symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation.
o April 9, 2013: The DPRK warned foreigners that they might want to leave the ROK because the Peninsula
was on the brink of a nuclear war.
o April 11, 2013: The Defense Intelligence Agency said with “moderate confidence” that the DPRK had
learned how to make a nuclear weapon small enough to be delivered by a ballistic missile.
o May 18-20, 2013: North Korea launched a series of short range missiles into the Sea of Japan.
o May 24, 2013: China tells North Korea to return to diplomatic talks regarding its nuclear weapons.
o August 7, 2013: A study conducted by the Institute for Science and International Security suggested that
North Korea is doubling area devoted to uranium enrichment.
o September 16, 2013: The Kaesong Industrial Complex was reopened after talks.
o March 31, 2014: A North Korean drone was found by South Korea, following an exchange of artillery fire
into NLL waters.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 5

o October 4, 2014: Three high ranking North Korean officials travel to South Korea to attend the closing
ceremony of the Asian Games.
o October 7, 2014: North and South Korean patrol boats exchange fire near the NLL.
o October 9, 2014: Kim Jong-Un has not been seen in public for over a month, missing some important
holidays and rituals. This fuels speculation regarding Kim’s grip on power, while others believe the
absence is due to health reasons. 20
o October 24, 2014: U.S. Commander [General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of USFK] said that he
believed North Korea had most likely completed its year’s long quest to shrink a nuclear weapon to a size
that could fit atop a ballistic missile.
o November 19, 2014: The research organization, the Johns Hopkins University’s U.S.-Korea Institute at
SAIS, reports on its website 38 North that recent commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear
facility showed evidence that the country might be preparing to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to extract
weapons-grade plutonium.
Three different DPRK leaders from the same family – Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-
un – have driven these events. They have used outside threats to maintain power, as well as the
steady militarization of the DPRK; the DPRK’s efforts to become a nuclear power; and the
responses of the ROK, US, and DPRK. At the same time, the balance in the Koreas and
Northeast Asia has been driven by much broader changes in the strategies and force postures of
the United State and China.
Current US policy calls for a rebalancing of US strategy in Asia that is composed of five
strategic pillars: strengthening alliances, forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers,
building a constructive relationship with China, strengthening regional institutions, and building
an economic architecture to increase the benefits of trade and growth for countries in the Asia-
Pacific region and the US – such as through the US-ROK FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP). Furthermore, 2011-2013 was a period of significant transition in Asia, especially in
Northeast Asia – a new DPRK leader at the end of 2011, a Japanese leadership change at the end
of 2012, and leadership transitions in both the ROK and China in early 2013.
The US alliances with Japan and the ROK remain the foundations of this US regional security
and economic strategy. Polls in both countries show approximately 80% support for their
alliances with the US. Greater trilateral cooperation is envisioned as key to maintain security.
Militarily, the rebalance involves: 21
… in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our
naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the pacific over
the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working
to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-
Generation fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms. And we are working with allies
to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most
immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North
Korea.
The relationship between the US and China is also a key element in US strategy. US policy calls
for both cooperation and competition to continue, and “to improve the quality and quantity of our
cooperation, promote healthy economic competition, and manage disagreements to ensure that
U.S. interests are protected, and that universal rights and values are respected…. the United
States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.” In order to achieve these goals, the
US feels that communication channels must be improved and practical cooperation on important
issues demonstrated. 22
6 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

China is a steadily growing regional power that has improved its military capabilities for well
over a decade and is increasingly projecting power throughout the East Asian region. These
trends began along with China’s emergence as a major economic power, and have increasingly
led to tension with the US – as well as a number of China’s neighbors.
China and the DPRK maintain the “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship
Treaty” that it signed in 1961. Chinese commentators have sometimes described the two
countries as “blood brothers” or “closer than lips and teeth,” but the PRC-DPRK relationship has
been rocky over the past 60 years, and China has sought to moderate the DPRK’s behavior and
move it towards economic reform based on the Chinese model.
China does not formally allocate military forces for the defense of the DPRK and does not
forward deploy military forces in that country. It also has recently stepped up its efforts persuade
the DPRK to restrain its aggressiveness and nuclear and missiles efforts. China did, however,
save the DPRK from total defeat in the Korean War, and it sees the DPRK as a critical buffer
that ensure ROK and US forces remain away from its borders, as well as a counterbalance to
Japan.
No one can dismiss the possibility that Chinese forces might intervene if the DPRK again is
threatened with defeat, or if any form of regime collapse threatened to create a US presence in
the DPRK or deploy ROK forces near the Chinese border. According to the 1961 treaty, China
does not have to come to North Korea’s aid if it is the attacker, which China clarified.
More broadly, US and Chinese strategy regarding the Koreas cannot be separated from their
broader strategic interests in Northeast Asia, in Asia as a whole and the Pacific. Whether the US
chooses to formally state it or not, its “rebalancing” of its force posture and military
modernization efforts in Asia is driven in large part by China’s military modernization and
growing power projection capabilities.
China in turn is doing far more than creating a “blue water” navy and modernizing key elements
of its forces. Its strategy involves the creation of new joint warfare, power projection, and sea-
air-missile-nuclear capabilities that affect any confrontation or conflict in the Koreas and
northeast Asia at least as much as any struggle that affects Taiwan of US base and forces deeper
in the Pacific up to the “second island chain.”
The end result is that the current security situation on the Korean Peninsula is shaped by the
military balance between the two Koreas, the role of US forces, and the positions of three other
regional powers: China (the People’s Republic of China, or PRC), Japan, and Russia. These
countries not only influence how the Koreas behave, but can also become entangled in any
potential DPRK-ROK crisis or conflict.
DPRK
As for ideology, the DPRK has never shown much evidence it cares about Marxism or the
welfare of its people as distinguished from the power and survival of its leaders. Regime survival
and enhancing the cult of the “dear leader” are the core of the DPRK’s grand strategy. North
Korea’s militarism, provocations of South Korea, and exaggerated threats are all means to this
end. In practice, its now hereditary “great leaders” owe more to the emperors of ancient Korea’s
Goguryeo kingdom, and the divinity they claimed through their Jumong foundation myth, than
Marx, Lenin, or Mao.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 7

The DPRK has used a mix of threats and sporadic attacks, decades of military build-up, and
endless propaganda campaigns about foreign threats and invasions to justify its dictatorship and
devoting the bulk of its resources to military forces. It has used such foreign threats to
manipulate its people, while it has used its military build-up and covert or limited attacks in an
effort to extort foreign outside aid and enhance its status and negotiating leverage.
US Official Assessments
Unlike the other countries in this report, the DPRK does not publish an English or Korean-
language defense white paper, security strategy, or other report discussing the country’s armed
forces in depth. There are, however, many outside sources that can help put its actions in context,
and North Korea does issue propaganda statements that help illustrate its views.
Senior US officials have summarized the US view of DPRK strategy as follows. In his February
2012 Senate testimony, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director Ronald L. Burgess Jr.
stated, 23
…[T]he primary goals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are preserving its current
system of government, improving its poor economy, and building national confidence and support for Kim
Jong Un – youngest son of the late Kim Jong Il and North Korea’s new “Great Leader.” North Korea’s
leadership is emphasizing policy continuity under Kim Jong Un which DIA anticipates will include
continued pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities for strategic deterrence and international prestige, as
well as to gain economic and political concessions.
In 2013, Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper reported to the Senate, 24
Kim Jong Un has quickly consolidated power since taking over as leader of North Korea when his father,
Kim Jong Il, died in December 2011. Kim has publicly focused on improving the country’s troubled
economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people, but we have yet to see any signs of serious
economic reform.
North Korea maintains a large, conventional military force held in check by the more powerful South
Korean-US military alliance. Nevertheless, the North Korean military is well postured to conduct limited
attacks with little or no warning, such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean warship and the artillery 23
bombardment of a South Korean island along the Northern Limit Line.
In May 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued its first unclassified report on the
military forces of the DPRK, providing a more detailed picture of US views: 25
Regime survival in a zero-sum competition for legitimacy on the Peninsula with the South has been the
consistent, overarching strategic objective of the Kim regime since 1945, but North Korean goals and
supporting strategy have evolved significantly over the years. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, North
Korea boasted a viable economy and military and international relationships that either matched or
outclassed those of the ROK. During this period, North Korea had reason to believe its goal of reunification
on its terms was a possibility. Since the loss of the Soviet Union as a principal benefactor, devastating
famine of the 1990s, and the economic rise and political maturation of the ROK, North Korea has largely
abandoned unilaterally enforced reunification as a practical goal.
North Korean goals and strategies reflect the reality of political isolation, significant economic deprivation,
a deteriorating conventional military, and the increasing political and military power of nearby states.
Nevertheless, the North has pursued a military posture that allows it to influence coercively South Korea
through provocation and intimidation, and to attempt to have as equal a voice as possible in the future of
the Peninsula.
North Korea’s pursuit of a “military first policy” demonstrates its view that ultimately the national security
of North Korea is disproportionately dependent on military might in the absence of any other notable
elements of national power. The DPRK seeks recognition as an equal and legitimate international player
and as a recognized nuclear power that is eventually able to normalize its diplomatic relations with the
8 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Western world and pursue economic recovery and prosperity. The DPRK’s rhetoric suggests the regime at
this time is unlikely to pursue this second goal, at the expense of the primary goal of pursuing its nuclear
and missile capabilities.
NATIONAL STRATEGY
Beyond its fundamental role as a guarantor of national and regime security, the North Korean military
supports the Kim regime’s use of coercive diplomacy as part of its larger diplomatic strategy. Through the
use of limited provocations – even those that are kinetic and lethal in nature – North Korea uses small-scale
attacks to gain psychological advantage in diplomacy and win limited political and economic concessions,
all while likely believing it can control escalation.
Closely tied to this strategy of political coercion are North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs
which – absent normalized relations with the international community – it sees as essential to its goals of
survival, sovereignty, and relevance.
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND REGIONAL BEHAVIOR
North Korea is dependent on China as a key benefactor, both in terms of diplomatic and economic support.
North Korea also maintains friendly relations with Russia, although the relationship is not as robust as
North Korea’s relations with China. In its pursuit of nuclear and missile capabilities, and in its use of
limited provocations for diplomatic objectives, North Korea is always conscious of how China and Russia
will respond, and likely calculates both are more concerned about limiting U.S. responses than trying to
control or dictate North Korea’s behavior.
In its approach to the ROK, North Korea seeks to extract aid and investment from the ROK using a
combination of diplomacy and coercion while minimizing any influence or leverage the ROK might try to
wield in return. North Korea adopted a largely adversarial posture toward former ROK President Lee
Myung Bak and his administration given his insistence on reciprocity and linking of aid to progress in
denuclearization, leading to the failure of the North’s traditional approach to exact concessions from the
ROK and drive a wedge in the U.S.-ROK relationship. North Korea’s objectives in delinking inter-Korean
relations from denuclearization and minimizing political concessions it makes in response to ROK
economic and development assistance are likely to be unchanged in its approach to the new Park Geun-hye
administration.
North Korea has a contentious relationship with the Japanese Government. Absent a breakthrough on the
issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens, there is little prospect for improvement in relations
or for a lifting of Japanese economic sanctions against North Korea
In 2014, DNI Clapper described North Korea as follows, 26
Iran and North Korea are unpredictable actors in the international arena. Their development of cyber
espionage or attack capabilities might be used in an attempt to either provoke or destabilize the United
States or its partners.… North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the
United States and to the security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world’s largest
populations, militaries, and economies. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials
to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor,
destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the reaffirmation of its
commitment in the Second- Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement
not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear
technology.
In addition to conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North Korea announced its intention to
“adjust and alter” the uses of existing nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at
Yongbyon, and restart its graphite moderated reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North
Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment
facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. North Korea has
publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial
steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing
long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its efforts to
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 9

produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on
deterrence and defense. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang’s view, its nuclear capabilities are
intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang’s
nuclear doctrine or employment concepts.
Two years after taking the helm of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has further solidified his position as unitary
leader and final decision authority. He has solidified his control and enforced loyalty through personnel
changes and purges. The most prominent was the ouster and execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek in
December 2013. Kim has elevated the profile of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) through appointments
of party operatives to key leadership positions and the convening of party conferences and plenums. Kim
and the regime have publicly emphasized his focus on improving the country’ s troubled economy and the
livelihood of the North Korean people while maintaining the tenets of a command economy. He has
codified this approach via his dual-track policy of economic development and advancement of nuclear
weapons. (Information on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and intentions can be found above in
the section on WMD and Proliferation.)
…Many instances of major cyber attacks manifested themselves at home and abroad in 2013 as illustrated
by the following examples….In March 2013, South Korea suffered a sizeable cyber attack against its
commercial and media networks, damaging tens of thousands of computer workstations. The attack also
disrupted online banking and automated teller machine services. Although likely unrelated to the 2012
network attack against Saudi Aramco, these attacks illustrate an alarming trend in mass data-deletion and
system damaging attacks.
In February 2015, DNI Clapper provided the following assessments on North Korea, 27
A growing number of computer forensic studies by industry experts strongly suggest that several nations—
including Iran and North Korea—have undertaken offensive cyber operations against private sector targets
to support their economic and foreign policy objectives, at times concurrent with political crises.
North Korea is another state actor that uses its cyber capabilities for political objectives. The North Korean
Government was responsible for the November 2014 cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE),
which stole corporate information and introduced hard drive erasing malware into the company’s network
infrastructure, according to the FBI. The attack coincided with the planned release of a SPE feature film
satire that depicted the planned assassination of the North Korean president.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the
security environment in East Asia. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to
several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor,
destroyed in 2007, illustrate its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies.
In 2013, following North Korea’s third nuclear test, Pyongyang announced its intention to “refurbish and
restart” its nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, and to restart its
graphite-moderated plutonium production reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North Korea
has followed through on its announcement by expanding its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting
the reactor.
North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, ranging from close-
range ballistic missiles to ICBMs, while continuing to conduct test launches. In 2014, North Korea
launched an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles.
Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is capable of posing a
direct threat to the United States and has publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess
that North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this system, although the system has not
been flight-tested.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on
developing missile and WMD capabilities, particularly building nuclear weapons. Although North Korean
state media regularly carries official statements on North Korea’s justification for building nuclear weapons
and threatening to use them as a defensive or retaliatory measure, we do not know the details of
10 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Pyongyang’s nuclear doctrine or employment concepts. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang’s view,
its nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy.
Three years after taking the helm of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has further solidified his position as unitary
leader and final decision authority through purges, executions, and leadership shuffles. Kim was absent
from public view for 40 days in late 2014, leading to widespread foreign media speculation about his health
and the regime’s stability. The focus on Kim’s health is a reminder that the regime’s stability might hinge
on Kim’s personal status. Kim has no clearly identified successor and is inclined to prevent the emergence
of a clear “number two” who could consolidate power in his absence. Kim and the regime have publicly
emphasized his focus on improving the country’s troubled economy and the livelihood of the North Korean
people while maintaining the tenets of a command economy. He has codified this approach via his dual-
track policy of economic development and advancement of nuclear weapons. (Information on North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program and intentions can be found above in the section on WMD and
Proliferation.) Despite renewed efforts at diplomatic outreach, Kim continues to challenge the international
community with provocative and threatening behavior in pursuit of his goals, as prominently demonstrated
in the November 2014 cyber attack on Sony.
Lt. General Vincent R. Stewart, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Described
North Korea as follows at the same hearing. 28
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) primary goals are preserving the control of the
Kim family regime, improving its poor economy, and deterring attack by improving its strategic and
conventional military capabilities. Pyongyang maintains that nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are
essential to ensure its sovereignty.
The DPRK continues to prioritize maintaining the readiness of its large, forward deployed forces. While
Pyongyang is stressing increased realism in military training, exercises still appear to do little more than
maintain basic competencies. Because of its conventional military deficiencies, the DPRK is also
concentrating on improving its deterrence capabilities, especially its nuclear technology and ballistic
missile forces.
We believe the DPRK continues to develop its nuclear weapons and missile programs which pose a serious
threat to the U.S. and regional allies. We remain concerned that the DPRK will conduct a nuclear test in the
future. Following the United Nations’ (U.N.) condemnation of its human rights record in November 2014,
Pyongyang indicated it would “not refrain any further from conducting a nuclear test.” This followed a
statement in March 2014 wherein North Korea’s Foreign Ministry warned it “would not rule out a new
form of nuclear test.”
Pyongyang is also making efforts to expand and modernize its deployed close-, short-, medium-, and
intermediate-range systems. It seeks to develop longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear
weapons to the U.S., and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road-mobile ICBM to operational capacity. In
2015, North Korea will continue improving the combat proficiency of its deployed ballistic missile force,
and will work to improve missile designs to boost overall capability. Pyongyang likely will launch
additional ballistic missiles as part of its training and research and development process. We remain
concerned by North Korea’s illicit proliferation activities and attempts to evade U.N. sanctions.

A Militarized and Impoverished Nation

There is broad agreement from most expert sources outside the DPRK that the DPRK has
emerged as one of the most militarized nations in the world, though its economy has been unable
to adequately support this militarization. The DPRK has worked to expand its military capacity
since the mid-1970s, valuing quantity over quality and focusing on conventional means – for
example, North Korea built its own hovercraft for naval operations and has also been working to
improve submarine capabilities and develop new mines and torpedoes.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 11

Despite long-standing economic troubles, the DPRK has continued its efforts to modernize its
arms and pursue strategic WMD, with the ultimate goal of simultaneously building a prosperous
and strong nation. 29
Performance-wise, various weapons found in North Korea’s ground forces, including T-62 tanks, M-1973
armored vehicles, various self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, AT-3/4 anti-tank missiles and
modified SCUD missiles, are modernized weaponry. North Korea is currently making concentrated efforts
to modernize its military equipment by building Pokpung-ho (“Storm Tiger”) tanks, which are reproduced
designs of Soviet-made T-72s, along with introducing, manufacturing and deploying 23mm antiaircraft
guns.
Since 2010, the DPRK has started using a large portion of its military for economic development
and public order; troops have been deployed to participate in a variety of economic construction
projects such as highways and power plants, as well as to work on farming and inspections.
However, the DPRK is finding it difficult to cope with the burden of further militarizing of its
economy, and it has had several effects that have contributed to further impoverishing the
DPRK: 30
First, the populace has had to bear more taxes to meet military expenditures. Second, increasing economic
dependence on the military causes distortions in the allocation of human and material resources, in addition
to cutbacks in resource supplies needed for civilian purposes. Third, a majority of finished goods and raw
material have to be channeled to support non-productive military armament. Fourth, it hampers rational
investment and constructions of new civilian facilities. Fifth, instilling conformity to military discipline and
ethos in all aspects of the economy impedes the development of liberal and cooperative social relations and
order.

DPRK Statements on Military Policy

The DPRK’s constitution states that “on the basis of politically and ideologically arming the
military and populace, the state shall realize a self-defensive military force built on the following
objectives: (1) a cadre-based army, (2) modernization, (3) militarization of the populace, and (4)
a stronghold-based fortified nation.” 31 Figure I.2 summarizes these guidelines and the policy
objectives that follow.
Senior North Korean officials do occasionally speak about military policy and strategy in broad
terms and their statements have reinforced these points. At the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean
Workers’ Party’s Central Committee in 1962, the DPRK adopted the military concept of ‘Four
Military Guidelines’: extensive training for all soldiers, fortifying the whole country,
modernizing the armed forces, and arming the entire population. 32 The DPRK has built its
military capabilities and developed its military policy in accordance with these guidelines ever
since.
North Korea promotes two main policies or ideologies in its government propaganda. The
primary state ideology is juche (“self-reliance”) – meaning that the focus of DPRK efforts is
always on making North Korea a strong and independent nation that is not reliant on any other
nation for anything, including security. Juche further promotes the idea of the collective identity
as an organic whole, with the supreme leader at the top of this unified system. The DPRK
leaders’ personality cults reinforce popular support for the system. 33
Secondly, the DPRK follows a songun policy (“military first”), presented as deriving from and
reinterpreting juche, in order to construct a strong socialist state politically, economically,
ideologically, and militarily. According to one DPRK Party newspaper, songun is “a unique
mode of politics that dedicates maximum effort to reinforcing the KPA [Korean People’s Army],
12 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

in which military power becomes the basis that propels general tasks in the vanguard of the
socialist revolution and construction of a socialist nation.” 34 The South Korean government
notes, “The North continues to pursue its military-first policy and address the KPA as
revolutionary armed forces. This indicates that the regime, which maintains its power base in the
military, has not abandoned its desire to take over by force and unify the Korean peninsula under
communism.” 35
After the collapse of the USSR and the loss of a significant source of patronage, the DPRK
increased emphasis on the songun policy to overcome the crises it faced: 36
In 1997, even amid severe economic difficulties, North Korea reinforced maneuvers for its mechanized
corps in rear areas as well as infiltration exercises for its special operation forces, while substantially
stepping up joint tactical exercises between its air force and navy. It also monitored wartime readiness and
training of its troops in all areas. In March 1998, for instance, the regime publically issued a nation-wide
wartime mobilization order for the purpose of an integrated exercise, involving the public, regime, and
military, that was meant to rehearse a shift to a war footing. Intensive energy-saving map exercises were
conducted afterwards for landing and takeoff drills for AN-2s, hydroplanes equipped with boats. In 1999,
the regime deployed a large number of field guns with large caliber and multiple rocket launchers in
underground facilities near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The regime also created an electronic warfare
unit and started to train military hackers.
Following the general officers’ talks held between the two Koreas in June 2004, North Korea suspended
propaganda broadcasts against South Korea along the DMZ. At the same time, however, it substantially
stepped up the political and ideological education of its troops. The Korean People’s Army reduced the
number of large-scale military exercises, but increased drills for special operation forces and
communication units, while placing unusual emphasis on the importance of exercises. Following the Iraq
war, North Korea started to train a large number of military hackers in preparation for cyber war, expanded
light infantry units, and reinforced capabilities for special warfare such as night fighting, mountain combat,
and street battles. The North Korean forces are also known to have improved their electronic jamming
skills as a means of dealing with electronic warfare as well as defense against precision guided missiles.

Figure I.2: The DPRK’s Four-point Military Guideline

Military Guidelines Policy Objectives

Transformation of the entire Train all soldiers ideologically, politically, and technically, and enable them to
force into a cadre army handle upgraded tasks in case of emergency
Modernization of the entire Equip trips with modern arms and combat skills, help them learn modern
force military science and skills, and train them to handle advanced weapons
competently
Armament of the entire Arm the entire working class, including workers and peasants, ideologically and
population politically along with the People’s Army
Fortification of the entire Construct extensive defense facilities across the country to turn it into an
country impregnable fortress
Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
107.

The Impact of Kim Jong-un

Recent changes in the DPRK’s leadership have also had an impact on the Peninsular military
balance. The new leader, Kim Jong-un, was elected Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission (CMC, a powerful institution of the Korean Workers Party) in 2010. Following the
death of his father, he was elected Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) as
well as CMC Chairman and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) in April
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 13

2012. These three steps established his control over the party, military, and state, consolidating
of his authority. 37
Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il, was approximately 27 years old at the time of his
succession and had previously been relatively unknown outside of the DPRK. Due to the
significant resemblance of Kim Jong-un to his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, ROK media outlets
speculated for months that Kim Jong-un had undergone plastic surgery to look like Kim Il-sung.
One Chinese TV report cited a diplomatic source that had confirmed the plastic surgery rumors,
which led to DPRK state media heatedly objecting to the “sordid hackwork of rubbish media,”
while Chinese government censors ordered Chinese media to “not report, comment on, or
redistribute stories about the personal lives of North Korean leaders (such as face-lifts).” 38
Kim Jong-un had been educated for several years in the West, leading some observers to believe
that he would open up the economy and begin to reintroduce Korea to the world when he first
took power. However, the DPRK state media has repeatedly stated that there would be no change
in policy between Kim Jong-un and his father; for example, shortly after Kim Jong-il’s death, the
media stated that “foolish politicians around the world, including in South Korea, should not
expect any changes from us.” 39
Kim has instigated only limited changes that have often been more a matter of tactics and
symbolism than substance. He has sometime sent signals he wants more of an opening, paid
more attention to economic development, and displayed a more populist image than his father,
such as by giving speeches, going on more expeditions around the country, allowing Western
influences such as clothing and Disney characters, being seen in public often with his wife, and
acting informally in public appearances – even embracing citizens at times. 40
In contrast to his father, Kim Jong-un has also focused his on-the-spot guidance visits on
Pyongyang. When he has left the capital, it has almost always been to visit military and security
sites. There have also been indications that Kim has been working to consolidate his support
among the urban elite – since taking power, a number of new projects aimed at this class have
been undertaken, including a maternity hospital, health complex, skating rink, apartment
complexes, and a fun fair. 41
At the same time, the changes in the DPRK since Kim Jong-un’s rise to power should not be
exaggerated. Since his accession, the DPRK has carried out two missile launches and one nuclear
test as well as negotiated and then abrogated an agreement with the US. Especially since late
2012 and early 2013, hopes of DPRK change have been fading quickly. Kim has not
fundamentally departed from his father’s policies and has re-introduced an even stronger version
of the songun military-first policy. In negotiations as well, he has followed the usual DPRK
policy of attempting to gain humanitarian and economic concessions from the other Six-Party
dialogue participants in return for reversible and largely symbolic concessions. 42
As one US analyst notes, there was also an unusually high frequency and intensity of threats in
the first year of Kim Jong-un’s rule, “raising questions about whether junior Kim fully
understands the ritualistic rules of the inter-Korean ‘threat-down’; whether he might be more
accepting of risks than his father, and whether he’s more likely to make miscalculations that
could drive a hair-trigger situation over the edge.” The need to consolidate his power politically
could lead Kim to “walk even closer to the edge than usual.” 43
14 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Some analysts initially believed it was unlikely that Kim – with little background in politics or
government experience – was developing and directing these moves. Kim’s aunt and uncle are
often pointed out as the most likely candidates to be wielding real power in the DPRK, but the
situation remains far from clear and expert opinion is highly divided. 44 One senior ROK
policymaker commented at the time, “Who is in charge in North Korea? It’s hard to say. How
strong is Kim Jong-un? We don’t know exactly. Who is giving orders in Pyongyang?
Apparently, it’s Kim Jong-un, but we are not sure about the inner-circle decision-making
process.” 45
Time seems to have provided the answer, although the power structure of the DPRK is so opaque
that it is hard to assess just how strong Kim really is. He seems to have directed several high-
level leadership changes, such as the sudden removal of Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho – Vice
Chairman of the CMC, Politburo Presidium member, general staff chief, and longtime mentor of
Kim Jong-un in military affairs – along with the removal or demotion of three other high-level
elder leaders who accompanied Kim Jong-il’s hearse.
There have since been few indications of any party, military, or state opposition to Kim’s
succession. 46 One report indicated that two-thirds of the DPRK’s senior generals have been
demoted, replaced, pushed aside to jobs with less power, or banished, while all have been
required to sign loyalty letters. 47 A January 2013 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report
noted that, 48
When Kim first came to power, many observers predicted that he would rule with the aid of regents coming
from his father’s inner circle, especially Kim-Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Songtaek. It is possible that a
collective leadership makes national policy decisions while promoting Kim Jong-un as the visible
figurehead of the regime. However, many analysts point to personnel decisions that seem to portray a
strategy to concentrate power in Kim Jong-un’s hands and sideline influential military leaders: four of the
highest-ranking generals in the Korean People’s Army (KPA) were stripped of their ranks. In addition to
the purges, a civilian party functionary was appointed to director of the KPA’s important General Political
Department. South Korean media have cited sources that say Kim is elevating the internal security
apparatus as well as those in charge of propaganda.
The appointments of Kim Jong-un and others to high-level party positions have led some analysts to posit
that the KWP may be gaining in stature over the military establishment. The emphasis on the Central
Military Commission, the tool through which the Party controls the military, may indicate that the regime is
moving away from the concentrated power in the National Defense Commission established by Kim Jong-
il and instead returning to a Party-centric order, as was the case under Kim Il-sung. The Songun, or
“Military First,” policy appears to have remained in place, but Kim Jong-un appears to have focused on
rebuilding many party institutions to establish an alternative power center.
The December 2013 arrest and execution of Kim Jong-il’s uncle -- Jang Song Thaek – is another
indication of Kim’s power. Jang Song Thaek was once considered the “Control Tower” who was
making high-level decisions when Kim Jong-il was in failing health, was the biggest change in
the government. Many theories and much speculation have been put forward to try to explain
why Jang was executed, even though he was a very powerful member of the regime.
Still, there are some indications that the political landscape in North Korea is not stable. Experts
note that Kim’s two predecessors, his father and grandfather, took more than 20 years to
consolidate power, even though they already had considerable political experience. In contrast,
Kim Jong-un has relatively little political experience, which makes a long consolidation process
a real possibility. Admiral Samuel Locklear, of United States Pacific Command, made a
statement indicating that he believes Kim Jong-un is still in the process of consolidating power.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 15

Kim also ceased making public appearances during part of 2014, with little initial explanation,
although this later seems to have been because he was ill.
Kim Jong-un, China, and Other States
Tactical political maneuvering aside, there have been no clear indications that Kim will take
measures that could reduce regional frictions or improve the daily lives of North Korean citizens.
Several factors make it likely that the DPRK’s political system – a concentrated, one-man
dictatorship – will continue without significant reform: “[c]hronic insecurity, a command
economy, a strong tradition of democratic centralism, a complex structure of political institutions
and a well-developed indigenous ideology,” all of which reinforce the concentration of power
and the Kim family cult. 49 It also appears that several of the DPRK prison camps have grown
significantly in size. 50
While Pyongyang has alternated between provocation and engagement in the past, others have
seen these moves as a way to reduce reliance on China, as China has become increasingly
annoyed with Pyongyang’s behavior. Kim Jong-un’s relationship with his Chinese counterparts
also seems less friendly than that of Kim Jong-il. Some analysts think that the age difference
between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping – as well as other Chinese leaders – is one of the reasons
that the two are not close, and it is unknown if they have ever met. 51
After the DPRK’s February 2013 nuclear test, China offered to send several senior officials to
help the DPRK improve its relations with other states, but North Korea did not accept. In late
November 2012, a Chinese Politburo member led a delegation to the DPRK with a letter from Xi
Jinping telling Kim Jong-un not to launch a ballistic missile – which he proceeded to do less than
two weeks later.
High-level contacts between the DPRK and China have been limited since Kim took power. 52
There were no major high-level meetings in 2013, and the DPRK sporadically reached out to
Russia and South Korea in 2014 while doing little to strengthen relations and economic ties to
China. At the same time, China’s leader Xi Jinping, visited Seoul in July 2014 – marking the first
time that a Chinese leader had gone to Seoul before going to Pyongyang. 53
DPRK Views of the US, Japan, and South Korea
The DPRK has sought warmer diplomatic ties with other countries to a limited degree when it
seems to have felt it needed to ease tensions, or that this could encourage joint ventures or the
lifting of some sanctions. However, the broader impact of such diplomatic overtures has been
limited. For instance, Russian investment in the port of Rajin is relatively small, and is miniscule
compared to Russian trade with South Korea. Japanese efforts to gain North Korean cooperation
in dealing the DPRK’s Japanese abductees has been cautious, and take careful account of North
Korea’s history of reneging on agreements.
In spite of occasional efforts to ease relations, the DPRK clearly sees the US, ROK, and Japan as
enemies. State media regularly reflect these views. Such media are a key instrument of the North
Korean regime, including the Rodong Sinmun [The Worker’s Newspaper], Pyongyang Sinmun,
Minju Choson [Democratic Korea], Pyongyang Times, and Korean Central News Agency
(KCNA) – which is the primary mouthpiece for the DPRK and one of the country’s most
influential news outlets. Of these, Rodong Sinmun, Pyongyang Times, and the KCNA publish
English-language versions. The daily KCNA and the weekly Pyongyang Times are run by the
state news agency, while the daily Rodong Sinmun is produced by the Central Committee of the
16 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Worker’s Party of Korea. As these sources are entirely government-controlled, a careful reading
of the articles and ideas expressed can offer some clues as to how the North Korean leadership
views the strategic situation.
These media normally present a view of the US that assigns blame for virtually all of the military
tensions since the Korean War. According to one recent KCNA article, the DPRK sees its
denuclearization as impossible due to the US’s hostile policies: the US divided Korea after the
Second World War, refused to establish diplomatic relations or even call the DPRK by its
official name, intentionally chose to prolong the state of armistice, and defined its ultimate goal
in 1953 as preventing the spread of communism to South Korea by turning it into a military
ally. 54
The same article states that the US deliberately ruined the Geneva conference for a peaceful
solution to the Korean War in 1954, restricted trade with the DPRK and imposed a myriad of
sanctions, “cooked up” UN Security Council resolutions after DPRK peaceful satellite launches,
practiced live shell firing at a DPRK flag in 2012, and advocated destroying statues of Kim Il-
sung. 55
Officially, the DPRK views its development of nuclear weapons as a means of legitimate self-
defense in a region in which it is surrounded by larger countries with powerful friends, strong
economies, much larger military budgets, and a history of intervention on the Korean
Peninsula. 56 In fact, the DPRK argues that US aggression is to blame for the North’s nuclear
weapons program – the only reason it developed nuclear weapons was to keep the Korean
Peninsula safe; a May 2013 article noted, “With the U.S. becoming ever more undisguised in its
frantic attempt to ignite a nuclear war, if the DPRK did not have a powerful nuclear force, a
thermonuclear war would have broken out on the Korean Peninsula.” 57
The DPRK’s treatment of Japan is shaped by Japan’s 1905-1945 occupation of Korea and past
history of militarism. South Koreans also have a tendency to view Japan in a negative light. One
DPRK state-run newspaper article noted, “The Japanese reactionaries are, however, getting
evermore undisguised in their moves to seize Tok Islets [Dokdo] in a bid to stage a comeback to
Korea, while distorting its past history of invasion and openly reviving militarism in all fabrics of
society…. Their ulterior design is to establish a triangular military alliance with the U.S. and the
South Korean puppet forces, take an active part in their war of aggression against the DPRK, and
thus regain Japan’s erstwhile status as a colonial ruler.” 58
The DPRK’s rhetoric has frequently been reported by outside media as more threatening than
either the DPRK’s actions or its exact words really imply. It is often reported that the DPRK has
directly threatened to attack the US, ROK, or Japan, but these quotations and references usually
do not include the full sentence or paragraph from which the threat came. While the DPRK does
make such threats, it is generally in the context of an “if” clause – as in, the DPRK will fight if
the US/ROK initiate. For example, one DPRK state-run newspaper remarked on March 8, 2013,
“The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK, already put on a high alert, are waiting for an
order for great advance for national reunification, determined to blast the strongholds of
aggression with prompt and fatal retaliation, should the provocateurs [i.e., US and ROK] make
even the slightest move.” 59 At the same time, it is entirely uncertain what actions would count as
“provocations,” one of many factors making an assessment of the unpredictable DPRK
exceedingly difficult.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 17

ROK
The ROK’s strategy and force posture are far more transparent than those of the DPRK. It has a
public defense budget, openly debates national security issues, and issues regular defense white
papers. The 2010 English-language Defense White Paper clearly declared that the DPRK and its
military were enemies of the ROK as long as threats and provocations such as the Cheonan and
Yeonpyeong Island attacks were continued. The paper also included defense structure and
operational systems reform in order to increase advanced military capabilities.
Moreover, the paper showed photos and maps of Dokdo Island, supporting Seoul’s claims that
the territory is indisputably Korean. 60 The 2012 Defense White paper went further, describing
Japan’s unjust territorial claims as a barrier to improving bilateral defense cooperation. 61
The ROK, China, and Russia
South Korea is also far more flexible in dealing with other states like China, and has far more
economic leverage. Sino-South Korean trade is some 40 times the volume of Chinese trade with
North Korea, and is managed on market terms rather than Chinese subsidies of North Korea. 62 In
recent years, the ROK has been promoting military exchanges with China, such as mutual visits
of aircraft and vessels. The relationship between the two countries was upgraded from a “full-
scale cooperative partnership” to a “strategic cooperative partnership” in May 2008, with
hotlines established between the Navies and Air Forces of the two countries that November. At
the first annual ROK-PRC Defense Strategic Dialogue in July 2011, enhanced military
exchanges were agreed to; a defense strategy dialogue has also been initiated. 63
At the 2012 ROK-PRC Strategic Dialogue, the two countries signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on national defense exchange and cooperation, in particular stipulating
vice minister-level strategic dialogue, mutual visits by high-level military personnel, and director
general-level defense policy working meetings on a regular basis, in addition to international
peacekeeping operations, cooperation in humanitarian relief activities, and combined search and
rescue operations.
The ROK and China also agreed to establish a hotline between the Defense Ministries to
strengthen strategic communications; this was the third such hotline that China had established
(the other two are with Russia and the US). The two countries also agreed to strengthen
cooperation and exchange in military education and further expand defense exchanges. 64
Relations between the two countries became cooler following the muted Chinese reaction to the
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents. China-ROK ties have improved significantly since
those two incidents, highlighted by massive bilateral trade and the Xi-Park state visits, the two
countries have different strategic goals that limit the development of this political relationship.65
The China-ROK relationship is also complicated in many areas that go well beyond DPRK-
related issues: 66
Seoul’s entanglements with China extend beyond the North Korean problem. China is unhappy with the
current state of relations with South Korea, which it describes as “carrying ‘dark currents’ that can swamp
the relationship at any time” and as “coming near a strategic crossroads.” The two countries also face a
wide range of complex bilateral issues—differing perspectives regarding history, norms, values, and the
ROK-U.S. alliance, as well as growing trade dependency—none of which has an easy or straightforward
solution. Mismanagement of these pending issues could cause rising ROK and Chinese expectations for
their two heads of state and improved bilateral relations to backfire. Although it may help that Park [Geun-
18 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

hye] is the first South Korean president to speak Chinese, what is really needed is a better contextual
understanding of China.
The ROK and Russia have also engaged in military exchanges, including of naval vessels and
high military officials. In September 2008, the ROK-Russian bilateral relationship was upgraded
to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” The two countries also agreed to cooperate in the areas
of defense industry, military supplies, and military technology. 67
The ROK and Japan
The 2010 ROK Defense White Paper refers indirectly to Japan as a military ally: “Solidifying
security ties with major Asia-Pacific alliances, the ROK, Japan, Australia, and the United States
have been trying to establish a more effective multilateral security system within the region
based on alliances.” There is a section in the report entitled “Exchange and Cooperation with
Japan,” looking at the two countries’ abilities to work together to “resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue and to ensure regional security and peace.”
ROK-Japan-US trilateral cooperation, Korea-Japan maritime search and rescue operations, and
increased military forces combined training are also mentioned. While a proposed ROK-Japan
intelligence sharing agreement fell through in July 2012 – the fact a draft had been developed did
demonstrate an increasingly closer and more cooperative relationship. 68 In mid-April 2013, the
Japanese ambassador to Seoul said that Japan was prepared to sign the military intelligence pact
with the ROK “at any time,” arguing that Japan and the ROK needed to increase military
partnership in the face of the DPRK’s increased threats. 69
On December 29, 2014, Japan, ROK, and the US finally signed a tripartite intelligence sharing
pact that designates the US as a third party to allow the ROK and Japan to share intelligence
indirectly and through the US. The pact states, “when [the ROK] and [Japan] intend to share
classified information with each other, each may do so under this Arrangement by providing
such classified information to [the] US Department of Defense.” 70
Nevertheless, the long history of tension between the two countries over Japan’s past occupation
of Korea, and disputes over rights in the Pacific still presents problems. The ROK’s President
Park Geun-hye stated in an interview in the Washington Post on May 8, 2013 that, 71
I remember eight years ago, when I had an interview with The Washington Post, that was also a time when
the North Korean nuclear crisis was ongoing, and when the Japanese were also making comments about
[disputed islands], thereby raising the temperature between Korea and Japan. Eight years later I’m very
disappointed and frustrated to see that we haven’t made any progress. Japan and [South] Korea share many
things in common — our shared values of democracy, freedom and a market economy — and there is a
need for us to cooperate on North Korea and on economic issues as well as security issues. But the
Japanese have been opening past wounds and have been letting them fester, and this applies not only to
Korea but also to other neighboring countries…. This arrests our ability to really build momentum, so I
hope that Japan reflects upon itself.
The territorial disputes and historical animosity has impeded ROK-Japan security cooperation,
and has even led South Koreans to perceive Japan as a threat to its security. Despite Japan’s
assertion that it has apologized for past war crimes in WWII, repeated South Korean calls for
Japanese apologies have led to some Japanese officials to believe that no amount of apologies
will satisfy South Korea.
On March 1, 2015, ROK President Park Guen-hye urged Japan, as had her predecessors, to admit
to the historical offenses to Koreans. She continued, “as Germany and France overcame conflict
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 19

and mutual enmity and became leaders in building a new Europe, it is time for South Korea and
Japan to write a new history together.” 72 However, there is little motivation to try to rectify this
issue in Japan, which may be seen as capitulating to a China-leaning ROK. Suggestions have
been made for the US to act as a mediator between Japan and the ROK in resolving the historical
and territorial conflicts, but there seems to be no strong consensus as to whether or not the US
should get involved in this conflict as a mediator. 73
The ROK and the US
The ROK and the US are allies with a close relationship and a well-institutionalized military
alliance. The importance of this alliance was highlighted in the new defense guidance the US
issued in early 2012. It has been consistently stressed in the strategic justification of US defense
budgets, and was given new emphasis in the US Quadrennial Defense Review conducted in
2014. Secretary of Defense Hagel stressed the importance of the alliance at its 60th anniversary
celebration in a statement in Seoul on September 30, 2013, and made similar statements in a joint
press conference at the Pentagon with South Korean Defense Minister Ham Min Koo on October
23, 2014 74
It is also a relationship that keeps evolving. It was agreed to expand ROK-Japan-US security
cooperation through the assistant secretary-level Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) at a 2012 ROK-
US Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting,. The cooperation includes humanitarian assistance,
maritime security, and nuclear non-proliferation. 75
At the October 2012 44th annual ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting, the two countries
signed a ROK-US Counter-Provocation Plan, in which the two would establish a combined
response system against DPRK provocations on the Korean peninsula. The ROK and the US also
agreed to increase combined surveillance activities of the DPRK, develop enhanced deterrence
strategies and response capabilities against DPRK asymmetric threats, and develop a “tailored
bilateral defense strategy.” Furthermore, the two countries agreed that they needed to hold the
ROK-US Extended Deterrence Table Top Exercise (TTX) annually, alongside senior-level
seminars, and finalized the road map for the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that
provides the foundations for the development of the US’s extended deterrence commitment. 76
In the wake of the DPRK’s third nuclear test, the US and ROK signed an updated contingency
Counter-Provocation Plan in the case of small-scale DPRK attacks, such as those on
Yeonpyeong in 2010. The plan gives the ROK the lead in responding to future provocations,
with US support. The press statement released at the time did not provide much specific
information, such as what exactly would constitute a provocation or when a provocation would
turn into a war – at which point, the US Forces Korea (USFK) Commander would lead allied
operations. 77
The transfer of operation control (OPCON) of forces on the Korean Peninsula from the US to
South Korea has been planned for several years, but has yet to take place. The previous plan
called for OPCON to be transferred in 2012. The transfer was scrapped in the wake of the
sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong, which raised concerns that South
Koreas was still not ready to take over operational control.
In October 2014, South Korea and the US agreed that OPCON would only be transferred to
South Korea on the basis of certain “conditions.” This amounted to an indefinite postponement
of the transfer, but the South Korean government was hopeful that these “conditions could be
20 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

met in order to transfer OPCON in the mid-2020s. According to the 46th SCM Joint
Communique:
The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to a stable OPCON transition at an
appropriate date and noted that the conditions-based approach ensures that the ROK will assume wartime
OPCON when critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on
the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition. Based on the SCM’s
recommendation, the National Authorities of the United States and the ROK will make a determination on
the appropriate timing for wartime OPCON transition.

The ROK and the DPRK

The ROK has sought to establish better relations with the DPRK, with consistently uncertain
results. Over the last half century, North Korea has engaged in over 2,660 military provocations
against the South. 78 This has not, however, prevented the ROK from taking repeated diplomatic
and political initiatives.
Kim Dae-jung (President 1998-2002) adopted the “Sunshine Policy” in dealing with North
Korea, emphasizing increased communication, assistance, and exchanges while delaying
political settlement and reunification to the far future. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun (President
2003-2007) followed a similar plan, entitled the “Peace and Prosperity Policy.” These policies of
rapprochement with the DPRK often required breaking – politically or rhetorically – with the
US, resulting in increased anti-American sentiment and harming the US-ROK alliance.
During these two presidencies, the ROK pursued large-scale economic engagement with the
DPRK for a decade, believing that it had to convince the DPRK’s leadership that the external
security environment was benign. Through economic engagement, the ROK attempted to both
pacify the DPRK’s belligerence and initiate slow reform in the DPRK itself. In turn, these goals
would avoid any collapse of the DPRK and a so-called “hard landing” unification scenario.
When Kim Jong-il responded to the ROK’s unilateral offers of assistance, these two Presidents
felt validated that their policies were working successfully. However, the DPRK was in reality
simply accepting the freely offered ROK assistance and propagandizing it domestically as “gifts”
from the weaker ROK. 79
The ROK and DPRK had two summit meetings (both in the DPRK, one in 2000 and the second
in 2007), which the ROK saw as evidence of transformative change in the DPRK, though it was
later revealed that the ROK had paid the DPRK $200 million to secure acceptance of the first
summit. During President Kim’s first year in office, the ROK gave $29 million in fertilizer, food,
and humanitarian aid; by 2007, under President Roh, aid had reached $635 million. 80
The two countries also agreed to two major inter-Korean economic projects: the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and the Kumgang Mountain tourism project; over 1.9 million South Korean
tourists visited the latter before it was shut down in 2008. North Korea accepted these projects
because they provided the regime with a large amount of cash and neither project had the
potential to enlighten the North Korean people or promote forces for change. 81
After the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, there was also a series of ROK-DPRK military
talks, 82
…including those between the respective defense ministers and working-level contacts. In the general
officers’ talks held on June 3-4, 2004, the two Koreas adopted and put into effect ‘an agreement on the
prevention of accidental clashes in the West Sea, suspension of propaganda broadcasting, and removal of
propaganda devices from the areas near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).’ Accordingly, both sides
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 21

restrained their naval ships from possible confrontations, prohibited any unprovoked actions against each
other, ceased propaganda activities and removed all propaganda devices from the MDL line.
Later, a working group meeting of the third round of general officers’ talks was held on July 20, 2005,
culminating in an agreement to establish correspondence offices to prevent accidental West Sea clashes.
The construction of these offices on August 13 enabled the two Koreas to make urgent calls using radio or
wireless communication. An agreement was also made to enable inter-Korean communication between
North and South Korean vessels, based on communication networks shared among international merchant
ships. Both sides also agreed to exchange information regarding ships engaged in illegal fishing activities.
During the third and fourth round of general officers talks held on March 2-3 and May 16-18, 2006,
respectively, South Korea proposed to prevent confrontations and establish joint fishing grounds in the
West Sea. These talks, however, ended without result as the North insisted on drawing a new maritime
West Sea border. Later, in the seventh round of general officers’ talks held in December 2007, the two
Koreas adopted an agreement to provide military guarantee for passage, communication and customs
clearance. Of the military talks held since 2000, however, few have been effective in producing agreement
on matters directly relevant to the building of inter-Korean trust.
However, at the same time as both political and military talks were occurring, the DPRK
engaged in further military provocations: 83
Around the 2000s, while economic cooperation between the two Koreas as well as South Korea’s economic
assistance to the North was in progress, the North carried out a series of provocations against the South,
including an infiltration of the South with its midget submarine, two nuclear tests (2006 and 2009), and
three test firings of long-range missiles (1998, 2006 and 2009). Other examples include: the Second Battle
of Yeonpyeong in 2002, which was sparked by North Korean vessels that had intruded the Northern Limit
Line in the West Sea. At this time, the North fired at a South Korean patrol boat on the day a match
between South Korea and Turkey was played during the Japan-Korea World Cup; the torpedo attack on the
South Korean corvette Cheonan in March 2010, just after the resumption of South Korea’s humanitarian
assistance to the North, including rice and cement; and the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in
November 2010, just before Red Cross talks between the two Koreas were scheduled to take place.
By the end of Roh Moo-hyun’s tenure, the majority of ROK citizens were criticizing these
engagement-oriented policies as being too naïve and resulting in a South Korea that was too
vulnerable to DPRK threats and provocations. The economic assistance was also criticized as
simply helping the DPRK regime, in particular the Kim family, increase its power and further
build up its military, threatening ROK security. 84
Lee Myung-bak (President 2008-2012) came to office with a much more hardline policy towards
North Korea, stressing a pragmatic diplomacy that would not offer concessions to the DPRK
without anything in return. His “Denuclearization, Opening and 3000” initiative focused on co-
existence and co-prosperity and gave top priority to resolving the nuclear issue, emphasizing the
ROK’s goal of the DPRK abandoning its nuclear weaponization program. The policy promised
ROK assistance in achieving a $3,000 GDP per capita in the DPRK once North Korea
denuclearized and opened its economy. The North refused. 85
The ROK did, however, make clear its readiness to decisively respond to military provocations
and maintain a deterrence capability. President Lee also worked to strengthen the US alliance –
during his tenure, alliance cooperation reached an all-time high – as well as ties with Moscow
and Beijing, while also promoting US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. 86 President Lee also
advocated the idea of “Global Korea,” raising the ROK’s international profile and the possibility
of South Korea playing a larger role in international affairs.
After the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island attacks in 2010 (discussed in Chapter 4) in which the
ROK military failed to respond effectively to DPRK provocations, South Korea switched to a
22 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

new strategy, called “active deterrence” or “proactive deterrence.” This policy emphasized
enhanced offensive capabilities in order to ensure deterrence, enabling the ROK military to
immediately retaliate in the event of any further DPRK provocations. The ROK Army has
deployed short-range missiles and other weapons systems to border areas in order to increase
rapidity of response. At the same time, this also increases the potential for miscalculation or
accidental escalation – for example, under the new strategic doctrine, ROK troops accidentally
shot at an Asiana civilian airliner in 2012. 87
In 2010 and 2011, Kim Jong-il indicated several times that he wanted to resume Six Party Talks,
but the ROK insisted that the North apologize for the Yeonpyeong shelling and include
enrichment activities in the proposed discussions. However, in January 2011 the ROK dropped
the requirement of an official DPRK apology for the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong provocations,
instead seeking assurances that the North would end its provocative actions and take responsible
measures for the incidents. Still, the negotiations for high-level meetings collapsed fairly
quickly. 88
On September 3, 2012, the ROK offered to send humanitarian aid to the DPRK, which
responded that it was ready to discuss the issue and asked what was being offered and how
much. The ROK indicated that it could provide 10,000 tons of flour, three million packets of
noodles, and medicine, and was willing to discuss further aid after the two sides met. The North
rejected the offer –the DPRK rejected a similar offer in 2011 as also being too small – with the
state-run news agency calling the “meager” offer “deeply insulting,” and noting that the ROK
often rejected DPRK requests for grain, construction equipment, and concrete. ROK officials
fear that any such aid would be used for the military. Under the Sunshine Policy, the ROK used
to send up to 500,000 tons of rice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer annually. 89
Park Geun-hye and ROK Policy towards the DPRK
Park Geun-hye became the South Korean President on February 25, 2013. During her campaign,
she asserted that she was willing to soften the ROK’s DPRK policy, desiring to steer a middle
course between Lee’s hardline policy and Roh’s engagement policies – a strong defense posture
promising retaliation with the possibility of dialogue and “flexible engagement.” 90
She adopted a campaign slogan of “trustpolitik,” emphasizing small steps in a process of trust-
and confidence-building in inter-Korean relations and on the Peninsula. “Trustpolitik” would
include a range of projects, such as cultural exchanges, increased economic cooperation, and
helping the DPRK join international financial institutions.91 Though she has said she will not
give significant aid to the DPRK until it ends its nuclear program, she is willing to meet Kim
Jong-un if doing so would improve bilateral ties. 92
President Park has also indicated she would continue at last some aspects of former President
Lee’s “Global Korea” policy, such as the ROK’s commitment to green growth and development
assistance. Park has also proposed a US-China-ROK strategic dialogue on how to deal with the
North. 93 Conversely, relations with Japan may be less congenial: 94
The new South Korean administration’s Japan policy may also face difficulties, Park’s good intentions
toward a “grand reconciliation” notwithstanding. It has become increasingly difficult in recent years to
distinguish a “realist Japan” from a “revisionist Japan,” and there is an emerging South Korean perception
that Japan’s rightist drift is not merely the mishap of isolated and select politicians but rather a consistent
trend of growing significance.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 23

The DPRK, however, has moved in a very different direction. It conducted a nuclear test in the
final days of the Lee Administration, sending a message emphasizing the negative consequences
of Lee’s hardline policy. At the same time, the DPRK made it more difficult for the new Park
Administration to be more flexible in its policies towards North Korea. 95
Through the DPRK’s actions, President Park was forced to strongly denounce the DPRK’s third
nuclear test, saying it undermined trust-building and posed a significant threat against the Korean
Peninsula and international peace. 96 At the same time, Park indicated that such DPRK actions
had been anticipated, and thus her approach to the DPRK would not significantly change – she
would continue to try to separate humanitarian assistance from the broader political issues on the
Peninsula. 97
In her inauguration speech, she stated that “North Korea’s recent nuclear test is a challenge to the
survival and future of the Korean people, and there should be no mistake that the biggest victim
will be none other than North Korea itself.” She urged the DPRK to abandon its nuclear
ambitions, “instead of wasting its resources on nuclear and missile development and continuing
to turn its back to the world in self-imposed isolation.” 98
President Park called for both a shift in the DPRK’s policies towards the ROK and increased
Chinese efforts to restrain the DPRK in a May 2013 interview in the Washington Post: 99
…The reason we see the security posture in the region being strengthened is because of what North Korea
has been doing, as North Korea escalates the level of threats and provocations…. The basis of peace in this
area is to maintain a firm deterrence posture, especially with regard to North Korea. If North Korea were to
choose to become a responsible member of the international community and desist from provocations... I’m
sure we would not need to see the strengthening of military postures in the region.
I’ve proposed a trust-building process on the Korean Peninsula. We will never tolerate North Korea’s
nuclear weapons and North Korea’s provocations. Its threats will not pay. At the same time, this trust-
building process is about keeping open the window to dialogue with North Korea at all times. If it chooses
the right path, there can also be consequences.  …. But what use would it be at this moment? As the Korean
saying goes, it takes two hands to clap.
I wasn’t referring to a specific country; it’s more about history. It can be said that if territory constitutes the
body, history constitutes the soul. .. Even a very small fire can be greatly inflamed, so it is imperative that
we have a hard-headed and correct understanding of history.
After President Xi Jinping took office in China we were able to see some changes, which President Obama
also referred to as positive. I believe that China can exert more influence on [North] Korea, I think they can
do more…In order for North Korea to change, and in order for the Korean Peninsula to enjoy greater peace,
North Korea needs to choose the right path, and China should exert greater influence in inducing North
Korea to do so.
When I meet with President Xi Jinping I look forward to engaging in very candid discussions with him on
issues that encompass North Korea, its nuclear weapons, as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. I
also hope to be able to engage in candid discussions with him about whether, if North Korea decides not to
become a responsible member of the international community, and chooses not to take the right path,
whether this current path that it is taking is sustainable. Is there a future there?
Of course, we can’t expect China to do everything, and the Chinese also say they can’t do everything. But I
do believe there’s room for them to undertake more with respect to some material aspects. At the same time
China has been able to achieve growth and development through reform and opening, and I think this offers
a very good model for [North] Korea to follow, and so they can perhaps strengthen their persuasion of
Korea in this regard…North Korea is very heavily dependent on China.
South Korean popular attitudes towards the DPRK shift with the level of tension. One ROK post-
election poll taken prior to the DPRK’s third nuclear test showed that the majority of South
24 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Koreans supported renewed dialogue with the DPRK and also favored providing humanitarian
aid “[r]egardless of the situation.” This was similar to South Korean attitudes following the 2006
nuclear test, after which there was little change in support for supplying humanitarian aid, and
the 2009 nuclear test, after which polls showed an increase in support for additional
humanitarian aid. 100 However, a poll taken after the third nuclear test showed that while only
60% of South Koreans felt threatened by the DPRK’s test, 55% supported a response of
sanctions, while only 37% supported dialogue. 101
While the same type of public opinion data is often not available for South Koreans’ perceptions
of the DPRK after missile tests, there is some data accessible for the April and December 2012
tests. After the April 2012 launch, 72% of South Koreans saw the act as a clear provocation and
56% thought it would not change DPRK-ROK relations. However, in a survey assessing the
most salient issues to the ROK public, while interest in the DPRK had jumped slightly following
the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, rising 5.3% to 12.6%, there was a much more muted
reaction to the April 2012 launch: interest in DPRK-ROK relations rose only 3.6%, reaching
14.8%. Although this did put it among the top three most important issues to South Koreans,
interest in ROK-DPRK did not detract from the two most important issues (job creation and
wealth redistribution); instead, interest in public education declined. 102
Similarly, after the DPRK’s December 2012 missile test, interest in the North-South relations
actually declined very slightly, from 7.9% in November 2012 to 7.8% in January 2013. Some
explanatory factors include the simultaneous ROK presidential election and the lack of DPRK
threats directly following the launch. However, interest in ROK-DPRK relations rose to 25.7% in
March 2013 due to the DPRK’s third nuclear test and increasingly bellicose rhetoric. 103 The
progression of the four issues most salient to the ROK public, from March 2012 to March 2013,
can be seen in Figure I.3.
Looking Toward the Future
The ROK has not yet publically stated how its force posture and strategy will change if the
DPRK goes on to create much larger nuclear forces, and react to the changing balance of US and
Chinese capabilities that will grow out of the US rebalancing to Asia and China’s shifts in
strategy and ongoing military modernization. The ROK’s public strategies and defense white
papers focus largely on past events and the present balance. Like Japan, however, the ROK must
assess the ongoing changes in the US-Chinese balance and their level of cooperation versus
competition as a key factor in its own security. For all of the reasons outlined in the following
chapters, this may lead to a major expansion of ROK military efforts and possibly ROK long-
range missile and nuclear programs.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 25

Figure I.3: Most Salient Issues to the South Korean Public, March
2012 - March 2013

Source: Kim Jiyoon and Karl Friedhoff, The Asan Public Opinion Report, Asan Institute, March 2013.
26 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

US
The US has remained firmly committed to the security of the ROK ever since the Korean War.
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, stated in March 2013 that that
the overarching objective of the Obama Administration’s Asia policy was to “sustain a stable
security environment and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of
disputes, and respect for universal rights of freedom.” The policy was based on several key
considerations: 104
This reflected a recognition of the critical role that the United States has played in Asia for decades,
providing the stabilizing foundation for the region’s unprecedented social and economic development.
Beyond this, our guiding insight was that Asia’s future and the future of the United States are deeply and
increasingly linked. Economically, Asia already accounts for more than one-quarter of global GDP. Over
the next five years, nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. This
growth is fueling powerful geopolitical forces that are reshaping the region: China’s ascent, Japan’s
resilience, and the rise of a “Global Korea,” an eastward-looking India and Southeast Asian nations more
interconnected and prosperous than ever before.
The 2014 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is the primary public document the
US issues on national security policy, put US policy towards the ROK is the following broader
context, 105
In striving to achieve our …strategic objectives, the Department will also continue to rebalance and sustain
our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region,
seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic,
and security interests. Faced with North Korea’s long-range missiles and WMD programs – particularly its
pursuit of nuclear weapons – the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the
Korean Peninsula. As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States
will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast
Asia.
…The United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century, with deep and enduring economic
and security ties to the region. Particularly in the past six decades, the United States has helped ensure
peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region through our commitment to free and open commerce,
promotion of a just international order, and maintenance of open access to shared domains. U.S. economic,
security, and people-to-people ties with the region are strong and growing.
The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics, and security. Defense
spending in this region continues to rise. As nations in the region continue to develop their military and
security capabilities, there is greater risk that tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to
natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict, reversing the trends of rising
regional peace, stability, and prosperity. In particular, the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China’s
military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from
China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions.
A multilateral security architecture – composed of groups such as the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and regional actors collaborating on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to
maritime security to counterterrorism – is emerging to help manage tensions and prevent conflict.
Traditional anchors of regional security such as Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and
growing powers such as India and Indonesia, are taking on additional leadership roles to foster increased
communication and shared understanding.
As many Asia-Pacific countries seek to achieve greater prosperity, establish regional norms, and strive for a
stable military balance, North Korea remains closed and authoritarian. North Korea’s long-range missile
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs – particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in
contravention of its international obligations – constitutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 27

…Supporting the broader U.S. rebalance to the region, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in
Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. By 2020,
60 percent of U.S. Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific, including enhancements to our critical naval
presence in Japan. This will include LCSs rotated through Singapore, a greater number of destroyers and
amphibious ships home-ported in the Pacific, and the deployment of surface vessels such as Joint High
Speed Vessels to the region. The Department is increasing the number of U.S. naval and air forces and
relocating Marines to Guam as part of our distributed laydown, which will result in a force posture
that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.
The U.S. Air Force already stations assets in the Asia-Pacific region, including tactical and long-range
strike aircraft, and will move additional forces such as ISR assets to the region, operating in concert with
allies and partners to improve land, air, and maritime ___domain awareness. The deployment of Marines to
Darwin, Australia will grow with the goal of establishing a rotational presence of a 2,500 strong Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) over the coming years.
Even during the past decade while engaged in two warfights, the U.S. Army maintained a viable,
substantial presence on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia to deter aggression and demonstrate
commitment to regional stability. The end of U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan will mean that forces
currently allocated to these conflicts will be available to return to their assigned home stations – many of
which are in the Asia-Pacific region – to support the rebalance or for other missions. These forces will
resume regular bilateral and multilateral training exercises, pursue increased training opportunities to
improve capabilities and capacity of partner nations, as well as support humanitarian, disaster relief,
counterterrorism, and other operations that contribute to the stability of the region.
The Department of Defense FY2015 defense budget request reinforced these policies, 106

…the Department will…continue to rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our
contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region
that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests. Faced with North Korea’s
pursuit of long-range missiles, and weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear weapons—the
United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. As part of our
broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in
Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia.

The US has also continued to work with South Korea in areas like reshaping their joint command
responsibilities in the event of war, and dealing with the emerging missile and nuclear threat
from North Korea. The US, ROK, and Japan signed a trilateral information sharing arrangement
concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea on December 24, 2014 that
created, a framework by which the defense authorities of the United States, the Republic of
Korea, and Japan may voluntarily share classified information. The Department of Defense is to
serve as the hub for information shared trilaterally...” 107
The Koreas and the Rebalance of US Interests in Asia
Current US policy calls for a rebalancing of US strategy in Asia composed of five strategic
pillars: strengthening alliances, forging deeper partnerships with emerging powers, building a
constructive relationship with China, strengthening regional institutions, and building an
economic architecture to increase the benefits of trade and growth for countries in the Asia-
Pacific region and the US – such as through the US-ROK FTA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP).
The US alliances with ROK and Japan do clearly remain the foundation of the US’s regional
security and economic policies. Moreover, polls in both the ROK and Japan show approximately
80% support for the alliances with the US. Greater trilateral cooperation is envisioned as key to
28 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

maintain security. Militarily – discussed in more detail later in this report – the rebalance
involves: 108
…in the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific. Sixty percent of our
naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is also shifting its weight to the pacific over
the next five years. We are adding capacity from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working
to prioritize the Pacific Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-
Generation fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms. And we are working with allies
to make rapid progress in expanding radar and missile defense systems to protect against the most
immediate threat facing our allies and the entire region: the dangerous, destabilizing behavior of North
Korea.
In terms of the China-US relationship, US strategy indicates that cooperation and competition
will both continue, though US policy has consistently been “to improve the quality and quantity
of our cooperation, promote healthy economic competition, and manage disagreements to ensure
that US interests are protected and that universal rights and values are respected…. the United
States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, prosperous China.” In order to achieve these goals,
communication channels must be improved and practical cooperation on important issues
demonstrated. 109
To that end, a deeper U.S.-China military-to-military dialogue is central to addressing many of the sources
of insecurity and potential competition between us. This remains a necessary component of the new model
we seek, and it is a critical deficiency in our current relationship. The Chinese military is modernizing its
capabilities and expanding its presence in Asia, drawing our forces into closer contact and raising the risk
that an accident or miscalculation could destabilize the broader relationship. We need open and reliable
channels to address perceptions and tensions about our respective activities in the short-term and about our
long-term presence and posture in the Western Pacific.
It is also critical that we strengthen the underpinnings of our extensive economic relationship, which is
marked by increasing interdependence. We have been clear with Beijing that as China takes a seat at a
growing number of international tables, it needs to assume responsibilities commensurate with its economic
clout and national capabilities. As we engage with China’s new leaders, the United States will encourage
them to move forward with the reforms outlined in the country’s twelfth Five Year Plan, including efforts
to shift the country away from its dependence on exports toward a more balanced and sustainable
consumer-oriented growth model. The United States will urge a further opening of the Chinese market and
a leveling of the playing field. And the United States will seek to work together with China to promote
international financial stability through the G-20 and to address global challenges such as climate change
and energy security.
Another such issue is cyber-security, which has become a growing challenge to our economic relationship
as well. Economies as large as the United States and China have a tremendous shared stake in ensuring that
the Internet remains open, interoperable, secure, reliable, and stable. Both countries face risks when it
comes to protecting personal data and communications, financial transactions, critical infrastructure, or the
intellectual property and trade secrets that are so vital to innovation and economic growth.
It is in this last category that our concerns have moved to the forefront of our agenda. I am not talking
about ordinary cybercrime or hacking. And, this is not solely a national security concern or a concern of the
U.S. government. Increasingly, U.S. businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about
sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies through
cyber intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale. The international community cannot
afford to tolerate such activity from any country. As the President said in the State of the Union, we will
take action to protect our economy against cyber-threats.
From the President on down, this has become a key point of concern and discussion with China at all levels
of our governments. And it will continue to be. The United States will do all it must to protect our national
networks, critical infrastructure, and our valuable public and private sector property. But, specifically with
respect to the issue of cyber-enabled theft, we seek three things from the Chinese side. First, we need a
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 29

recognition of the urgency and scope of this problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the
reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations. Second, Beijing should take serious steps to
investigate and put a stop to these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in a constructive
direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace.

The Military Aspects of US Rebalancing

These policies all, however, require resources and most US policies towards its future force
deployments and modernization in Asia have not yet been publically tied to specific
implementation plans. The US was still debating both the overall shape of its “rebalancing to
Asia,” at the end of 2014. The US has also been making major cuts in its defense spending
whose size and impact is not yet predictable, and in spite of a leveling of its baseline defense
expenditures in FY2013-2015, and in projected spending for 2016-2019. Debates over civil
spending, the deficit, federal debate, and Sequestration could lead to further cuts. Furthermore,
the US will inevitably react to the fact Northeast Asia is continuing to go through a period of
significant political transition – with a new DPRK leader at the end of 2011, a Japanese
leadership change at the end of 2012, and leadership transitions in both the ROK and China in
early 2013. 110
Given this background, it is not surprising that the US has not announced its overall plans for
reshaping its forces that affect the Korean balance, Northeast Asia, and Pacific. Even if it had, it
is unclear that such plans would be fully funded, or would be stable in the face of the changes
taking place in DPRK nuclear capabilities and every aspect of Chinese military forces.
The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have, however, issued a number of documents explaining the
changes being made in strategy and force posture in Asia since this became part of the new
defense strategy issued by the DOD in late 2011. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
described the rebalance to Asia in detail in a speech on April 8, 2013. He discussed that the
rebalance involves an investment of time, energy, and intellectual capital, in the Asia-Pacific
region, across the US government, and that “we’re not only rebalancing to the Asia Pacific, but
also within the Asia Pacific, in recognition of Southeast Asia and South Asia to the region as a
whole.” And, while the “rebalance to Asia is mostly a political and economic concept, not a
military one,” there are some significant military components. 111 This tracks with JCS Chairman
General Martin Dempsey’s April 2013 remark that the US would now carry out an Asia-Pacific
policy of “three mores:” more interest, more engagement, and more quality assets. 112
Militarily, the rebalance to Asia is composed of five pillars: force structure decisions, presence
and posture, investments (in technology, weapons systems, and human capital), innovations in
operational plans and tactics, and strengthening alliances and partnerships in the region.
Particularly in terms of the first pillar, Carter noted that, as the US draws down from
Afghanistan, the military will be releasing significant capabilities that will be re-deployed to the
Asia-Pacific. 113
For the Navy, naval surface combatants and eventually carriers, as well as naval intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and processing, exploitation and dissemination capabilities,
will be moved to the Asia-Pacific region. Already, EP-3 signals reconnaissance aircraft have
been moved from CENTCOM to PACOM, and soon CENTCOM will be releasing Firescout
UAVs and several electronic surveillance aircraft from Afghanistan. P-3s will also be returned to
PACOM. In addition, the Navy is adding a fourth forward-deployed naval force SSN to
Guam. 114
30 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Overall, the Navy is shifting its posture to the Asia-Pacific, with up to 60% of its naval assets
assigned to the region by 2020. This shift will take place in three main ways. First, the US will
move six of the 10 destroyers based in Spain for ballistic missile defense to the Asia-Pacific
region, leaving four to protect the US’s European allies. Secondly, destroyers and amphibious
ships that have conducted security cooperation and humanitarian assistance missions in South
America, Africa, and Europe, will be replaced by new joint high-speed vessels and littoral
combat ships under construction. This move will free destroyers and amphibious ships to deploy
to the Asia-Pacific. Thirdly, the Navy will generate more forward presence, such as the joint
high-speed vessel littoral combat ships and mobile landing platforms that use rotating military or
civilian crews. 115
The Air Force will also shift capacity from Afghanistan to the Asia-Pacific, including ISR assets
like the MQ-9 Reaper, U-2, and Global Hawk. The Air Force will also allocate space, cyber,
tactical aircraft, and bomber forces to the region – 60% of its overseas-based processes are
already stationed there, including 60% of combat F-22s. More B-1s will be available from
Afghanistan, augmenting the B-52s already on continuous rotational presence in the Asia-
Pacific. 116
The Army has approximately 91,000 soldiers and civilians assigned to the Asia-Pacific,
including the forward presence of eight active component Brigade Combat Teams, 12 batteries
of Patriots, and many theater-enabling units. After a decade of using PACOM assets in
CENTCOM, PACOM will regain control of the other 60,000 soldiers assigned to the Asia-
Pacific. Army units assigned to PACOM will focus on PACOM-specific mission profiles – like
bilateral training exercises. The Army is preferentially protecting the readiness and
modernization of soldiers in the ROK. The Marines also have roughly 18,000 forward-deployed
in the region, and is increasing infantry battalions (rotational). An EA-6 Prowler squadron and
more heavy lift and attack helicopters will be added to the region as well. 117
Across the region, the US military will be modernizing and enhancing its forward presence,
including by adding aviation capability in Japan, upgrading missile defense posture, and working
to revise US-Japanese defense guidelines to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The US and
Japan have an achieved important milestone in the effort to realign the Marine Corps presence in
Okinawa, which helps build an operationally resilient and sustainable posture in Northeast
Asia. 118
Shaping an Integrated Response
In his April 2013 speech, then Deputy Secretary of Defense Carter emphasized the need to have
an internationally integrated response in dealing with the DPRK. And, he stressed that the
rebalance is “not aimed at anyone – no individual country or group of countries.” In closing,
Carter argued that the US’s rebalance to Asia was sustainable and would continue for a variety of
reasons: 119
The rebalance will continue, and in fact gain momentum for two reasons: First, U.S. interests in the region
are enduring, and so also will be our political and economic presence. This presence is accompanied by
values of democracy, freedom, human rights, civilian control of the military, and respect for the
sovereignty of nations that America has long stood for, and that human beings welcome and I think relate
to. So our interest in staying a pivotal force in the region will, we believe, be reciprocated.
Second, we have the resources to accomplish the rebalance. Some who wish to question the rebalance to
the Asia-Pacific theater point to the current, seemingly endless debate in Washington about the U.S.
budget, and wonder whether all this can be accomplished.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 31

I’m interested to hear this because I’m more accustomed to listening to people question why the U.S.
spends more on defense than the next 16 largest militaries in the world combined. This statistic is true and
won’t change much in coming years. It’s also worth noting that most of the rest of the money that the world
spends on defense is spent by countries that are allies and friends of the United States. These levels of
defense spending are a reflection of the amount of responsibility that the U.S. and its friends and allies
share for providing peace and security.
You may also be wondering whether the sequester will change these facts in a significant way. It won’t,
and here’s why: Sequester was never intended to be implemented and is very disruptive because it gives us
very little managerial flexibility in where we take budget adjustments this year. But wherever we have
flexibility, we are favoring and protecting the rebalance. We continue to review and revise our plans for
executing the FY13 budget in the face of sequester, increased costs of the Afghanistan campaign, and the
fact that we only recently got an appropriation. Back in January I gave direction about what is exempt from
or protected from sequestration, and the Services and components are applying that guidance. It explicitly
directs the protection, wherever possible, of activities related to the rebalance this year.
The main point is that the arbitrary cuts that sequester imposes under the Budget Control Act are
temporary, lasting through October of this year. In other words, sequester is an artificial, self-inflicted
political problem, not a structural problem. Hopefully, the turmoil and gridlock will end and the U.S. can
get back to normal budgeting.
When it does, Congress and the President will decide what DoD’s budget will be in the years beyond fiscal
year 2013. The President has been clear about holding defense spending steady in the long run or reducing
it by a few percentage points, including especially by improving efficiency of defense spending. If the
drastic cuts that began with sequester this year were extended for a decade, U.S. defense spending would be
cut somewhere around ten percentage points. This is the range under debate today. None of these political
scenarios changes the math I described earlier: the U.S. defense rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is not in
jeopardy.
That said, there is obviously considerable uncertainty about where an overall budget agreement, which is
needed to end the current turmoil, will lead. And what is clear to us in DoD is that we need to think and act
ahead of this uncertainty, and not in reaction to it. Moreover, it’s not the budget but strategic necessity that
requires us to examine and reexamine our defense in a fundamental way: strategically, we are turning a
corner after ten years of war, and we need to master the security challenges that will define the future. And,
as you know I believe deeply, we need to improve the way we spend the taxpayer’s defense dollar, always
striving for what I’ve called Better Buying Power….
Finally, it is important to stress that the strength of our rebalance is not measured only by comparing
defense budget levels. The end of the war in Iraq and the reduction in Afghanistan allow us to shift the
great weight of effort from these wars to our stabilizing presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Next, this
weight has accumulated over decades of U.S. defense spending, so you have to consider a nation’s defense
investments over time. It takes decades to build a military capability of the kind the U.S. has.
And probably most importantly, another feature of the U.S. military today is that its operational experience
is unrivaled, including such attributes as the ability to work constructively with partners, fuse intelligence
and operations, to operate jointly among services, and to support forces with logistics – all of these skills
honed in Iraq and Afghanistan. For these reasons – enduring values and increasing military power – the
United States can and will succeed in rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific in the years to come.

Focusing on the Koreas

US military strategy towards the Koreas reflects these policies, although the US has not yet
defined what “rebalancing” means in any mid or long-term detail, and its strategy will have to
adapt to force developments in the ROK, future USFJ resources, and DPRK and Chinese actions.
In a 2010 report, US Forces Korea (USFK) remarked, “the Korean peninsula is the strategic
lynchpin of Northeast Asia and is vital to America’s position in the region, as well as America’s
security and prosperity.” The ROK-US alliance helps ensure regional stability and USFK is
32 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

committed to strengthening the alliance, especially in terms of the Strategic Alliance 2015
plan: 120
• Refining and improving our combined ROK-U.S. defense plans.
• Defining and developing new organizational structures required for the ROK to lead the war
effort.
• Implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korea of today and the future.
• Preparing for the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in
December 2015.
• Consolidating U.S. military units within two enduring hubs as part of the Yongsan Relocation
Program and Land Partnership Program.
The US national military strategy developed in 2014, described the US strategy for Korea and
Northeast Asia – and for shaping the Korean military balance – as follows: 121
A multilateral security architecture – composed of groups such as the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and regional actors collaborating on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to
maritime security to counterterrorism – is emerging to help manage tensions and prevent conflict.
Traditional anchors of regional security such as Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and
growing powers such as India and Indonesia, are taking on additional leadership roles to foster increased
communication and shared understanding. (p. 4)
We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve
peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests.
Faced with North Korea’s long-range missiles and WMD programs – particularly its pursuit of nuclear
weapons – the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. As
part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will maintain a robust
footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia. (p. viii)
As many Asia-Pacific countries seek to achieve greater prosperity, establish regional norms, and strive for a
stable military balance, North Korea remains closed and authoritarian. North Korea’s long-range missile
and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs – particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in
contravention of its international obligations – constitutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States. (p. 4)
We will retain and strengthen our power projection capabilities so that we can deter conflict, and if
deterrence fails, win decisively against aggressors. The North Korean regime continues to pursue interests
counter to those of the United States. Faced with this threat, the United States is committed to maintaining
peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and closely monitors the situation through military and
diplomatic channels in coordination with the ROK, Japan, China, and Russia. The U.S. Armed Forces will
continue their close collaboration with the ROK military to deter and defend against North Korean
provocations. The ROK military is a highly capable, professional force that is increasing its ability to lead
the defense of Korea. The United States trains regularly with members of the ROK military and participates
in a variety of bilateral and multilateral exercises aimed at increasing interoperability. (p. 20)
As noted earlier, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review re-emphasized the US rebalancing to the
Asia-Pacific first set forth in the US defense strategic planning guidance issued in early 2012.
The QDR projected that by 2020, “60 percent of US Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific.”
(p. 34) In regards to North Korea, ballistic missile defense takes center stage as the US deploys a
second radar in Japan that can track and provide early warning of ballistic missiles from North
Korea. Although the QDR considers North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities a “limited
ballistic missile threat,” (p. 13), it projects that an ICBM threat to the US homeland will exist in
the 2020s (p. 32). While several countries with advanced militaries already field ballistic missiles
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 33

that can reach the US, current “limited threats” that may develop into much more serious ones
later appears to be of concern.
Similarly, the updated US National security Strategy issued in February 2015 reaffirmed the US
commitment to South Korea in the broader context of US strategy for the Pacific region, 122
Our commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the profound risks
posed by North Korean weapons development and proliferation… The United States has been
and will remain a Pacific power. Over the next 5 years, nearly half of all growth outside the
United States is expected to come from Asia. That said, the security dynamics of the region—
including contested maritime territorial claims and a provocative North Korea—risk escalation
and conflict. American leadership will remain essential to shaping the region’s long-term
trajectory to enhance stability and security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and
transparent system, and ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.
To realize this vision, we are diversifying our security relationships in Asia as well as our defense
posture and presence. We are modernizing our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
the Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure they are fully capable of
responding to regional and global challenges. We are committed to strengthening regional
institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to
reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective responses to shared challenges, and help ensure
peaceful resolution of disputes. We are also working with our Asian partners to promote more
open and transparent economies and regional support for international economic norms that are
vital to maintaining it as an engine for global economic growth. The TPP is central to this effort.
As we have done since World War II, the United States will continue to support the advance of
security, development, and democracy in Asia and the Pacific. This is an important focus of the
deepening partnerships we are building in Southeast Asia including with Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. We will uphold our treaty obligations to South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and
Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly to democracy. We will support the people
of Burma to deepen and sustain reforms, including democratic consolidation and national
reconciliation.
The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China. We seek to
develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and
promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek cooperation on shared
regional and global challenges such as climate change, public health, economic growth, and the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there will be competition, we reject the
inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of
strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from
maritime security to trade and human rights. We will closely monitor China’s military
modernization and expanding presence in Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of
misunderstanding or miscalculation. On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect
our businesses and defend our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain
whether by private actors or the Chinese government
US interests on the Korean Peninsula include denuclearization, preventing proliferation of
nuclear and missile technology, the threat of DPRK nuclear weapons leading others – such as the
ROK or Japan – to develop their own nuclear deterrent, deterring a DPRK attack against US
allies, a reunified Korea under ROK control, and improving DPRK citizens’ quality of life. 123
For many years, the US has worked to convince the DPRK to give up its nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles, with little success. According to an analysis by David Kang and Victor Cha, 124
34 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Since Ronald Reagan’s time in office, successive U.S. administrations have put forward the idea that if
insecurity and relative deprivation drive North Korea’s obsession with nuclear weapons, then surely the
answer is for the United States and neighboring countries to guarantee a peaceful peninsula, and provide
money, food, and political recognition to the regime. This has been the basis of the agreements reached
with North Korea in 1994 under Bill Clinton and in 2005 under George W. Bush.
From 1989 to 2010, U.S. presidents, their national security advisers, and secretaries of state have given
written and verbal assurances of non-hostile intent and a willingness to engage to the North over 33 times.
Pyongyang acknowledged, rejected, and ignored these assurances, all the while continuing with their
nuclear and weapons programs. In fact, the record of U.S. engagement is pretty impressive. In addition to
massive amounts of food, energy, and other economic assistance given over a period from 1994 to 2008,
two former U.S. presidents (Clinton and Carter) have visited with the North Korean leadership to express
U.S. good intentions, as have (in less formal contexts) the New York Philharmonic, Google Chairman Eric
Schmidt, and of course Dennis Rodman.
Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have each written personal letters directly to the North Korean leader
about a willingness to make a deal. And when North Koreans have visited the United States, they have
been hosted by everyone from Gov. Bill Richardson to Henry Kissinger, and been given the company of
luminaries such as Paul Volcker, Winston Lord, and Bob Hormats. Clearly, this charm offensive hasn’t
worked. Signing a peace treaty in advance of denuclearization would recognize and legitimize Pyongyang’s
nuclear status, leaving it little incentive to shed those weapons. North Koreans have said to me that a peace
treaty is just a piece of paper; why would they give up their cherished nuclear program for that?

An Uncertain Degree of Strategic Patience

The Obama Administration has pursued a policy of “strategic patience” towards the DPRK,
waiting for verifiable changes before making any large concessions. The US has repeatedly
called for the DPRK to take concrete, irreversible denuclearization steps along the lines of the
2005 Six Party Talks Joint Statement, comply with international law (including UN Security
Council Resolutions), stop provocative moves, and improve relations with its neighbors. 125
In particular, the US current policy towards the DPRK is based on close and expanded
cooperation with the ROK and Japan, close coordination with China, a refusal to reward bad
DPRK behavior such as by yielding to threats or accepting empty promises, reaffirming the US
commitment to the defense of both its homeland and its allies, and encouraging the DPRK to
choose a better path. If the DPRK is willing to negotiate and implement commitments in good
faith, the US is willing to provide both food and economic development assistance. The Obama
Administration has stated on many occasions that it will not accept the DPRK as a nuclear state
or stand by while the DPRK seeks to develop nuclear-armed missiles that could threaten the
US. 126
While the Obama Administration has conveyed the potential for dialogue and assistance to the
DPRK, overall Obama’s policies have actually resembled those of the Bush Administration:
“demanding irreversible denuclearization, applying financial sanctions, carrying out military
exercises, and demanding a North Korean return to, and reaffirmation of, the denuclearization
commitments of the Six-Party Talks” are among the primary similarities. 127
At the same time, it is important to stress that the US does operate in a more constrained budget
atmosphere. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapters II and III, and Chapter IX.
There is no way to predict their full impact as of yet, but the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS) is scarcely the only outside voice that argues that the US “rebalance towards Asia”
has not yet been followed by a clear list of actions that shift military capabilities to the Asia-
Pacific theater, and that resources may drive the US force posture as much as strategy: 128
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 35

For all the talk of the military rebalancing to Asia, the steps taken towards this in the FY2013 budget,
issued on 13 February 2012, were modest. Troop numbers in Europe were slated to drop by 10,000 to about
70,000, while marines were to be deployed to Australia and Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. In the
Middle East, the number of troops deployed will be significantly below their peak level, but substantial
assets remain in Kuwait and other locations such as Bahrain (US Fifth Fleet and NAVCENT HQ) and
Qatar (home to a Combined Air Operations Center and a USAF Central Command forward-deployed
headquarters). Since its themes had been foreshadowed in previous announcements, the main interest in the
budget was in the detail of the many cuts proposed for the military and its equipment programs. But the
budget’s publication was the beginning rather than the end of the process: it shifted battles about specific
reductions beyond the Pentagon hierarchy and into the political arena.
As had been the case ever since the US first raised the issue of rebalancing its strategy to Asia,
the FY2016 budget request that President Obama circulated in February 2015 did nothing to
clarify the situation. It did not describe any plan, but the Department of Defense summary of the
request did state that: 129
It is important to note that the FY 2016 budget request comes after several years of declining defense
budgets. The post-Iraq/Afghanistan defense drawdown is the fifth major defense drawdown since the end
of World War II (WWII), following those after WWII and the Korean, Vietnam, and Cold wars. This
decline began with the FY 2010 budget.
With continuing fiscal and strategic uncertainty, this FY 2016 budget request reflects the Department’s
attempt to fashion a coherent defense program with the proper balance between capacity, capabilities, and
current and future readiness. The FY 2016 funding levels will allow the military to protect and advance
U.S. interests and execute the updated defense strategy - but with somewhat increased levels of risk for
some missions. The Department will continue to experience gaps in training and maintenance over the near
term and will have a reduced margin of error in dealing with risks of uncertainty in a dynamic and shifting
security environment over the long term. As a global leader, the United States requires a robust national
defense strategy to protect and advance its interests, and ensure the security of its allies and
partners, with a military that can implement that strategy effectively. This can only be achieved
by the package of balanced reforms and initiatives that the Department is presenting to Congress
and will require Congress partnering with DoD to make politically difficult choices. Most
importantly, the specter of sequestration needs to be eliminated. The QDR strategy cannot be
executed at sequester-levels of funding.
If anything, the Department of Defense request seemed to back away from an emphasis on Asia
and described a much vaguer and resource-driven rebalancing of the force that reflected the
growing problems in Europe raised by Russian pressure on the Ukraine failed to establish any
clear global priorities: 130
The Department must rebalance the Joint Force to address major changes in the security environment.
Rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict. Future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies
against non-state actors to high-end conflicts against states armed with weapons of mass destruction and/or
advanced anti-access and area-denial capabilities. To address this diverse range of challenges, the U.S.
military will broaden its capabilities to the full spectrum of possible operations. While preserving hard-won
expertise in counterinsurgency and stability operations, the Joint Force must also be prepared to battle
sophisticated adversaries employing advanced warfighting capabilities, to include space and cyber
capabilities. The Department will sustain robust investments in science, technology, research, and
development in areas most critical to meeting future challenges or where there is greatest potential for
game-changing advances.
Rebalancing and sustaining presence and posture abroad to protect U.S. national security interests.
In meeting its priorities, the Department will continue to rebalance and sustain its global posture. The
Department will continue its contributions to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, while remaining fully committed
to the security of allies and partners in the Middle East. The Department will continue to work with allies
and partners in Europe to promote regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, enhanced military
36 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

capability, and enhanced interoperability. Across the globe, DoD will ensure that the Joint Force is properly
manned, trained, and equipped in the event of a crisis.
Rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the Joint Force. After more than 10 years of
conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force’s full spectrum readiness capabilities have
atrophied. Taking the prudent steps outlined in the QDR will improve the Department’s ability to meet
national security needs. Key force structure decisions in this QDR include:
• Sustaining a world-class Army capable of conducting the full range of operations on land including
prompt and sustained land combat by maintaining a force structure that it can train, equip, and keep ready.
Under the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department will rebalance within the Army, across the
Active, Guard, and Reserve components. The active component of the Army will reduce its planned post-
war end strength from the 490,000 soldiers proposed in the budget for FY 2015 to 450,000 personnel by the
end of FY 2018. The Army National Guard will reduce its planned force structure from 350,200 in FY
2015 to 335,000 soldiers by the end of FY 2017. If the Department returns to the funding levels in the
Budget Control Act of 2011, the Army will be forced to downsize to 420,000 Active Component soldiers
and 315,000 Reserve Component soldiers. These drawdowns would be detrimental to meeting the defense
strategy outlined in the QDR.
• Providing stability in shipbuilding to affordably deliver warfighting requirements. The FY 2016 budget
includes construction of 48 ships across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), including the steady
production of destroyers and submarines; construction of ten ships of each type is funded through FY 2020.
The Department of the Navy will build 14 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in the FYDP, the last 5 of which
will be of the modified LCS configuration. The modified configuration program begins in FY 2019 with no
gap from earlier LCS production; it provides improvements in ship lethality and survivability, delivering
enhanced naval combat performance at an affordable price. The FYDP shipbuilding construction program
also includes one aircraft carrier; one LHA replacement; one Landing Ship, Dock replacement (LX(R));
five T-ATF(X) fleet ocean tugs; one afloat forward staging base platform; and four T-AO(X) fleet oilers.
The FY 2016 budget also funds the overhaul/life extension of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN-
73), its Carrier Air Wing, and associated force structure. If the Department returns to sequester-level
funding, the Navy will be forced to retire this carrier and air wing, and it will be unable to procure
approximately 9 ships and 35 aircraft over the FYDP. These cuts would jeopardize the Navy’s
modernization and recapitalization plans, threatening both readiness and the industrial base.
• Maintaining the role of the Marine Corps as a vital crisis response force, protecting its most important
modernization priorities and ensuring readiness but reducing from 184,100 end strength in FY 2015 to a
planned end strength of 182,000 active Marines by the end of FY 2017. If sequester-level cuts return, the
Marines would continue their drawdown to an end strength of 175,000 by 2019, which would be
detrimental to meeting the defense strategy outlined in the QDR.
• Maintaining an Air Force with global power projection capabilities and modernizing next generation Air
Force combat equipment — to include fighters, bombers, and munitions — particularly against increasingly
sophisticated air defense systems. To make resources available for these programs and preserve
investments in critical capabilities, the Air Force will reduce capacity in some single-role aviation
platforms by the end of the FYDP. A return to sequester-level funding would necessitate additional force
structure reductions plus cuts to flying hours and weapon sustainment that would delay readiness recovery.
• Achieving the right balance between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) is
critical to the Department’s overall efforts to size and shape the future joint force. The RC provides
capabilities and capacity that complement those of the AC and bolster the ability of the joint force to
execute the national defense strategy. As the Department reshapes the joint force, it will continue to rely on
the RC to maintain those complementary capabilities and capacity.
As the joint force rebalances to remain modern, capable, and ready — while reducing end strength—the
Department will take the following additional steps that are consistent with the President’s Budget
submission to protect key capability areas:
• Air/Sea. The Department will increase the joint force’s ability to counter advanced anti-access and area-
denial capabilities by continuing to invest in fifth-generation fighters and long-range strike aircraft,
survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare capabilities.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 37

• Nuclear Deterrence. The DoD will continue to invest in modernizing the triad’s essential nuclear delivery
systems, command and control, and, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, nuclear weapons and
supporting infrastructure.
• Space. The DoD will move toward less complex, more affordable, more resilient systems and system
architectures and pursue a multi-layered approach to deter attacks on space systems.
• Missile Defense. The DoD will make targeted investments in defensive interceptors, discrimination
capabilities, and sensors.
• Cyber. The Department will continue to invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces to
operate and defend DoD’s networks, enhance its ability to conduct cyberspace operations, support military
operations worldwide; and to counter cyber-attacks against the U.S.
• Precision Strike. The DoD will procure advanced air-to-surface missiles that will allow fighters and
bombers to engage a wide range of targets and a long-range anti-ship cruise missile that will improve the
ability of U.S. aircraft to engage surface combatants in defended airspace.
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The DoD will rebalance investments toward
systems that are effective in highly contested environments while sustaining capabilities appropriate for
more permissive environments in order to support global situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and
other operations.
• Counter-Terror and Special Operations. The DoD will slightly increase Special Operations Forces growth
to an end strength of 69,900 personnel, protecting DoD’s ability to sustain persistent, networked,
distributed operations to defeat al Qa’ida and other terrorist networks, counter other emerging transnational
threats, counter weapons of mass destruction, build the capacity of U.S. partners, and support conventional
operations.
If the Department returns to sequester-level funding, the ability to hedge against future risk with these
investments in key capability areas would be put at risk. The ability to hedge against near-term risk by
bolstering readiness will also be undermined

The Chinese Perspective on US Strategy

Chinese views of the US approach to Asia can see the US in different – and far more extreme ––
terms. China does not issue official critiques of US military strategy and plans like those the US
Department of Defense (DOD) issues on Chinese strategy and forces. At the same time, it does
tightly control what its press is allowed to print and Chinese press reports are an important
source of official Chinese opinion.
The following quotes show that Chinese strategic patience with the US has limits that are
important both in considering how China may view US policy towards the Koreas and Northeast
Asia, and as an introduction to the US analyses of China discussed in the following section: 131
• Liaowang, August 23, 2012: The strategic objective of the United States “is to ensure its leading status in
the entire Asia pacific region, build a trans-Pacific order centered on the United States, and continue its
Pacific dominance. And the key link in achieving this objective is to dismantle the East Asian regional
corporation framework which has already taken shape….The key link here is to sow discord in the good
neighborly, friendly, and cooperative relations between China and countries on its periphery.” 132
• Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2013: The United States “is boosting old military alliances, damaging the
political foundation of East Asian peace, sharpening the territorial sovereignty contradictions between
China and the countries around it, building a united front aimed at China, forcibly pushing the Trans-
Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership, and disrupting the self-determined cooperation and regional
integration process between the East Asian countries…in order for China to achieve strategic balance in the
Asia Pacific region, it must greatly increase its military presence…. [China] should give full play to the
strategic role of Russia and DPRK.” 133
38 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

• Renmin Ribao, February 28, 2013: “America’s overall goal is to secure the total control of the Eurasian
Continent, and the purpose of clearing the perimeter is to pave the way for ultimately subduing China and
Russia...this no longer is simply containment aimed at impeding expansion; rather, it is a way of choking
aimed at controlling or even suffocating the other side…judging by the historical experience of the Cold
War between the United States and the Soviet Union, containment will surely be accompanied by
murder.” 134
• Jiefangjun Bao (a military journal), January 22, 2013: After a long critique of the United States, the article
ended as follows: “We [China] should cast away that pacifism and romanticism, which will easily evolve
into capitulationism under pressure and threat. We should make full struggle preparation and war
preparation. Only by doing so can China maintain a longer period of peace and development.” 135
It is useful to note that China’s views on US contingency planning, like the Counter-Provocation
Plan. Contingency planning is common and “ensures an effective Alliance response to potential
crises.” However, such planning – North Korean regime collapse scenarios, for instance - may
complicate Chinese perspectives on the future stability of the Korean Peninsula. According to
Korean scholars at the Korea Institute for Defense analyses, Chinese perspectives tend to view
potentially any move by the US vis-a-vis North Korea, as a thinly disguised effort to contain
China. This same suspicion can be applied to other US action in the region. The above quotes
from Chinese sources reflect certain voices that are concerned that US intentions in the region
are fundamentally detrimental to China.
China
China does not issue any documents or official, open-source studies that formally allocate
military forces for the defense of the DPRK and does not forward-deploy military forces in that
country. It did, however, save the DPRK from total defeat in the Korean War, and it still sees the
DPRK as a critical buffer ensuring that ROK and US forces remain away from its borders, as
well as a counterbalance to Japan. Furthermore, no one can dismiss the possibility that Chinese
forces might intervene if the DPRK was again threatened with defeat or any form of regime
collapse that threatened to result in a US presence in the DPRK or deployment of ROK forces
near the Chinese border.
China believes that maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula is beneficial to its
national security and economic development. It has sought to moderate the DPRK’s behavior
and move it towards economic reform based on the Chinese model. It also stepped up its efforts
to persuade the DPRK to restrain its aggressiveness and nuclear and missiles efforts. While
China has voiced regret and condemnation over the DPRK’s nuclear tests and missile launches,
it resists any UN Security Council resolutions that might destabilize the DPRK politically. China
also sees an improvement in DPRK-ROK relations as the first step towards resolving issues on
the Korean peninsula and believes that the DPRK and the US should follow the Leap Day
Agreement – discussed later in this report – resolving their disputes through compromise and
dialogue. 136
At the same time, the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia is driven by the broader changes
taking place in the strategies and force postures of the United States and China. China has
steadily improved its military capabilities for well over a decade and is increasingly projecting
power throughout the East Asian region. These trends began as China emerged as a major
economic power, and have increasingly led to tension with the US, as well as a number of
China’s neighbors.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 39

China still maintains the “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty”
that it signed in 1961. However, past descriptions of the two countries as “blood brothers” and
“closer than lips and teeth” bear little resemblance to the current strategic realities. The PRC-
DPRK relationship has often been rocky over the past 60 years, and while China still sees the
DPRK as an important strategic buffer between it and the US presence in the ROK, it has shown
progressively less tolerance for the DPRK’s erratic leadership, has made growing overtures to an
ROK that is now a far more important and profitable economic partner, has sought to end the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons efforts, and has strong incentives to avoid any form of combat or crisis
on the Korean peninsula.
More broadly, Chinese strategy regarding the Koreas cannot be separated from it broader
strategic interests in Northeast Asia, in Asia as a whole, and the Pacific. Whether the US chooses
to formally state it or not, its “rebalancing” of its force posture and military modernization efforts
in Asia is driven in large part by China’s military modernization and growing power projection
capabilities. China in turn is doing far more than creating a “blue water” navy and modernizing
key elements of its forces. Its strategy involves the creation of new joint warfare, power
projection, and sea-air-missile-nuclear capabilities that affect any confrontation ort conflict in the
Koreas and northeast Asia at least as much as any struggle that affects Taiwan of US base and
forces deeper in the Pacific up to the “second island chain.”
Chinese Policies and White Papers
The broader context for China’s treatment of the Koreas is set by its overall strategic priorities.
Many of these were formalized in 2004, and a DOD analysis describes Chinese thinking at the
time as follows: 137
In 2004, former President Hu Jintao articulated a mission statement for the armed forces titled, the
“Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” These “new historic
missions” focus primarily on adjustments in the leadership’s assessment of the international security
environment and the expanding definition of national security. These missions were further codified in a
2007 amendment to the CCP Constitution. The missions, as currently defined, include:
• Provide an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position.
• Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategic opportunity for
national development.
• Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests.
• Play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.
According to official writings, the driving factors behind the articulation of these missions were: changes in
China’s security situation, challenges and priorities regarding China’s national development, and a desire to
realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’s objectives. Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman Xu
Caihou in 2005 asserted “the historic missions embody the new requirements imposed on the military by
the Party’s historic tasks, accommodate new changes in our national development strategy, and conform to
the new trends in global military development.” While these missions are not expected to replace the
defense of China’s sovereignty in importance, implications for PLA modernization may be increased
preparation for and participation in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, interaction
with the international community that allows the PLA more opportunities to learn from other militaries, and
greater efforts to improve PLA logistics and transport capabilities.
The Department of Defense’s 2014 report on Chinese military power noted these four points and
added that: 138
40 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The PLA has adopted these imperatives and put them into practice over the past decade, particularly its role
as guarantor of the CCP’s ruling position. This has been critical to maintaining stability during China’s
leadership transition, important CCP meetings, and various corruption scandals among senior officials in
2013. The PLA has implemented the other missions through continued modernization and
professionalization focused on protecting China’s national interests and sovereignty claims. It has also
taken on a larger role in military diplomacy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid/disaster relief operations.
President Xi’s instructions to the PLA to resolutely obey the CCP while preparing to “fight and win battles”
were clearly broadcast throughout the force in 2013.
China’s Defense White Papers have increased in transparency over the past 10 years, describing
the larger Chinese national security goals and strategy in more detail, while also looking at force
structure and missions. One CRS report summarized, “The overall purpose of the Defense White
Paper seems to be to counter what Beijing calls the ‘China Threat Theory’ and to affirm that the
PRC remains a peaceful power pursuing ‘Peaceful Development’ with a military that is
‘defensive in nature.”‘ 139
The 2010 White Paper: Strategy and Conventional Forces
The 2010 China Defense White Paper emphasized China’s peaceful intentions, but did not
include many specific details about military capabilities, especially the PLA’s future force and
how it would be used to advance or defend China’s national interests. 140
China has now stood at a new historical point, and its future and destiny has never been more closely
connected with those of the international community. In the face of shared opportunities and common
challenges, China maintains its commitment to the new security concepts of mutual trust, mutual benefit,
equality and coordination. By connecting the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common
interests of other peoples around the globe, connecting China’s development with that of the world, and
connecting China’s security with world peace, China strives to build, through its peaceful development, a
harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.
Looking into the second decade of the 21st century, China will continue to take advantage of this important
period of strategic opportunities for national development, apply the Scientific Outlook on Development in
depth, persevere on the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a
national defense policy that is defensive in nature, map out both economic development and national
defense in a unified manner and, in the process of building a society that is moderately affluent on a general
basis, realize the unified goal of building a prosperous country and a strong military.
The 2010 White Paper also differed from its predecessors in that it expressed confidence that
China’s position relative to other world powers had significantly improved, highlighted the
PLA’s growing focus on military operations other than war, and gave only incremental new
information regarding the PLA’s doctrine, capabilities, and structure. 141As described in the
paper, China saw the international security environment as increasingly complicated: 142
China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges. China has vast territories
and territorial seas. It is in a critical phase of the building of a moderately prosperous society in an all-
round way. Therefore, it faces heavy demands in safeguarding national security…. Pressure builds up in
preserving China’s territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests. Non-traditional security concerns,
such as existing terrorism threats, energy, resources, finance, information and natural disasters, are on the
rise. Suspicion about China, interference and countering moves against China from the outside are on the
increase.
…In the face of the complex security environment, China will hold high the banner of peace, development
and cooperation, adhere to the concepts of overall security, cooperative security and common security,
advocate its new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation,
safeguard political, economic, military, social and information security in an all-round way, and endeavor
to foster, together with other countries, an international security environment of peace, stability, equality,
mutual trust, cooperation and win-win.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 41

At the same time, the White Paper remarked that, “the international balance of power is
changing… Prospects for world multi-polarization are becoming clearer. The prevailing trend is
towards reform in international systems…. Profound realignments have taken place in
international relations.” 143
China’s defense goals and interests were stated as “safeguarding sovereignty, security, and
interests of national development,” “maintaining social stability,” “accelerating military
modernization,” and “maintaining world peace and stability.” In addition, the paper appeared to
legitimize greater power projection both at home and abroad. The seven tasks under the
“Deployment of the Armed Forces” section are: 144
(1) Safeguard the borders, coastal and territorial air security
(2) Maintain social stability
(3) Participate in National Construction, Emergency Rescue, and Disaster Relief
(4) Participate in UN Peacekeeping Operations
(5) Conduct Escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and Waters off Somalia
(6) Hold Military Exercises and Training with Other Countries
(7) Participate in International Disaster Relief Operations
Emphasis was on increased levels of joint operations, which would allow greater effectiveness in
the use of missiles, counter-space capabilities, and naval, air, and amphibious-airborne strikes.
Joint operations in these areas would be necessary for any anti-access/anti-denial capacity under
development.
The document also emphasized the importance of informationization to the Chinese military: 145
In line with its strategic objective of building informationized armed forces and winning informationized
wars, and with overall planning and phased implementation, the PLA is trying to break through major
bottlenecks which hinder the building and improvement of combat effectiveness of systems. The fighting
capabilities of the armed forces in conditions of informationization have been significantly raised.
A step-change development has been achieved in information infrastructure. The total length of the national
defense optical fiber communication network has increased by a large margin, forming a new generation
information transmission network with optical fiber communication as the mainstay and satellite and short-
wave communications as assistance.
Significant progress has been made in building information systems for reconnaissance and intelligence,
command and control, and battlefield environment awareness. Information systems have been widely
applied in logistics and equipment support. A preliminary level has been achieved in interoperability
among command and control systems, combat forces, and support systems, making order transmission,
intelligence distribution, command and guidance more efficient and rapid.
Strategic planning, leadership and management of informationization have been strengthened, and relevant
laws, regulations, standards, policies and systems further improved. A range of measures, such as assembly
training and long-distance education, have been taken to disseminate knowledge on information and skills
in applying it. Notable achievements have been made in the training of commanding officers for joint
operations, management personnel for informationization, personnel specialized in information technology,
and personnel for the operation and maintenance of new equipment. The complement of new-mode and
high-caliber military personnel who can meet the needs of informationization has been steadily enlarged.
42 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The 2010 White Paper: Nuclear Forces and the DPRK Nuclear Program
The 2010 China Defense White Paper reiterated the standard Chinese non-first use policy and
efforts for non-proliferation, supporting “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of
nuclear weapons.” The document argued that, 146
…[C]ountries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear
disarmament. They should further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and
legally binding manner, so as to create the necessary conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons. When conditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states should also join in multilateral
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear
disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan
with different phases, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear
weapons.
China holds that, before the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-
weapon states should abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, make
an unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will they use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiate an international legal
instrument in this regard. In the meantime, nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on
no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other.
…China has never evaded its obligations in nuclear disarmament and pursues an open, transparent and
responsible nuclear policy. It has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and
in any circumstances, and made the unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China
has never deployed nuclear weapons in foreign territory and has always exercised the utmost restraint in the
development of nuclear weapons, and has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it
ever do so. It will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level required for national security.
…China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic
balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on
the process of nuclear disarmament. China holds that no state should deploy overseas missile defense
systems that have strategic missile defense capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international
collaboration.
…China firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of
delivery, and consistently deals with non-proliferation issues in a highly responsible manner. China
maintains that, in order to prevent proliferation at source, efforts should be made to foster a global and
regional security environment featuring mutual trust and cooperation, and the root causes of WMD
proliferation should be eliminated. It holds that non-proliferation issues should be resolved through
political and diplomatic means. It holds that the authority, effectiveness and universality of the international
non-proliferation regime should be upheld and enhanced. The international community should ensure
fairness and prevent discrimination in international non-proliferation efforts, strike a balance between non-
proliferation and the peaceful use of science and technology, and abandon double standards. China has
joined all international treaties and international organizations in the field of non-proliferation, and supports
the role played by the United Nations in this regard, and has conscientiously implemented any relevant
resolutions of the UN Security Council.
At the same time, the 2010 White Paper mentioned North Korea and denuclearization several
times, though without any direct pressure on North Korea regarding its uranium enrichment
program, missile and nuclear tests, or 2010 attacks on South Korea. The 2006 White Paper did
mention the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests. The 2010 White paper referenced strengthened
military relations and friendly exchanges with both the DPRK and ROK militaries: 147
China advocates resolving the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula peacefully through dialogues and
consultations, endeavoring to balance common concerns through holding six-party talks in order to realize
the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 43

the Northeast Asia. China, always considering the whole situation in the long run, painstakingly urges
related countries to have more contacts and dialogues in order to create conditions for resuming six-party
talks as early as possible.
The 2013 White Paper
China’s leaders stated that the country was undergoing a period of strategic opportunity through
2020 at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in November 2012, and
they publically focused on domestic development in the context of a relatively peaceful
international order. In general, it seemed as if Xi Jinping was concentrating more on great power
diplomacy than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. 148 In practice, however, China was concentrating on
both civil and military development.
China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, quickly began establishing himself as a strong military leader,
going on high-profile visits to Navy, Air Force, Army, and Missile Command facilities during
his first 100 days in office. He has also launched a campaign to enhance the armed forces’ ability
to “fight and win wars,” while taking direct control of an interagency body that has overseen the
escalation over islands claimed by both Japan and China. 149
China released a new 2013 Defense White Paper – The Diversified Employment of China’s
Armed Forces – on April 16, 2013. This white paper is different from its predecessors in several
key ways. One is that the White Paper revealed the structure of each military branch in terms of
numbers of troops and officers as well as the organization of each branch, all of which will be
discussed further in Chapter 4. Moreover, the Air Force, Navy, and domestic R&D investment
are all emphasized in terms of capabilities and operational reach expansions.
The 2013 White Paper started by discussing China’s view of itself in the international arena and
China’s place in it, emphasizing again the PRC’s commitment to peaceful development: 150
In today’s world, peace and development are facing new opportunities and challenges. It is a historic
mission entrusted by the era to people of all nations to firmly grasp the opportunities, jointly meet the
challenges, cooperatively maintain security and collectively achieve development.
It is China’s unshakable national commitment and strategic choice to take the road of peaceful
development. China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense
policy that is defensive in nature. China opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics, and does not
interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a
hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion. China advocates a new security concept
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and pursues comprehensive security,
common security and cooperative security.
It is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive as well as a strong guarantee for China’s peaceful
development to build a strong national defense and powerful armed forces which are commensurate with
China’s international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests. China’s armed
forces act to meet the new requirements of China’s national development and security strategies, follow the
theoretical guidance of the Scientific Outlook on Development, speed up the transformation of the
generating mode of combat effectiveness, build a system of modern military forces with Chinese
characteristics, enhance military strategic guidance and diversify the ways of employing armed forces as
the times require. China’s armed forces provide a security guarantee and strategic support for national
development, and make due contributions to the maintenance of world peace and regional stability.
The Paper also implicitly criticized the US’s increased presence in the Asia-Pacific as well as
highlighting the increasing complication of international relations: 151
There are signs of increasing hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism. Local turmoils occur
frequently. Hot-spot issues keep cropping up. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges
44 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

interweave and interact. Competition is intensifying in the international military field. International security
issues are growing noticeably more abrupt, interrelated and comprehensive. The Asia-Pacific region has
become an increasingly significant stage for world economic development and strategic interaction
between major powers. The US is adjusting its Asia-Pacific security strategy, and the regional landscape is
undergoing profound changes.
…China still faces multiple and complicated security threats and challenges. The issues of subsistence and
development security and the traditional and non-traditional threats to security are interwoven. Therefore,
China has an arduous task to safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development
interests. Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence
in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser. On the issues concerning China’s territorial
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some neighboring countries are taking actions that
complicate or exacerbate the situation…. Major powers are vigorously developing new and more
sophisticated military technologies so as to ensure that they can maintain strategic superiorities in
international competition in such areas as outer space and cyber space.
In such a situation, the PLA plans to “broaden their visions of national security strategy and
military strategy, aim at winning local wars under the conditions of informationization, make
active planning for the use of armed forces in peacetime, deal effectively with various security
threats and accomplish diversified military tasks.” 152 In particular, the PLA will adhere to the
following fundamental principles and policies: 153
• Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country’s
peaceful development.
• Aiming to win local wars under the conditions of informationization and expanding and intensifying
military preparedness.
• Formulating the concept of comprehensive security and effectively conducting military operations
other than war (MOOTW).
• Deepening security cooperation and fulfilling international obligations.
• Acting in accordance with laws, policies and disciplines.
The document also discussed the work of the PLA in supporting national economic and social
development – such as building highways, railways, airports, water conservancy facilities,
hydroelectric units, viaduct bridges – as well as work to preserve the environment, like
controlling desertification, preserving wetlands, and afforesting barren hills. In these missions,
the PLA and People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) have, since 2011, contributed more than 15
million work days, been involved in more than 350 province-level construction projects, and
planted more than 14 million trees.
The PLA and PAPF have also set up centers and undertaken projects to reduce poverty, solve
domestic water and irrigation problems, and support cultural, educational, technological,
scientific, and health undertakings. The two services have in addition undertaken disaster relief
and emergency rescue operations – since 2011, the PLA and PAPF have rescued or evacuated
over 2.45 million people, transported 160,000 tons of goods to disaster areas, and participated in
operations due to floods, earthquakes, fires, typhoons, and droughts. Over 370,000
servicepersons and 870,000 militiamen and reservists have been involved in this work. 154
The paper also stressed the PLA’s increasing ability to safeguard maritime rights and interests
and protect overseas interests, which 155
…have become an integral component of China’s national interests. Security issues are increasingly
prominent, involving overseas energy and resources, strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and
Chinese nationals and legal persons overseas. Vessel protection at sea, evacuation of Chinese nationals
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 45

overseas, and emergency rescue have become important ways and means for the PLA to safeguard national
interests and fulfill China’s international obligations.
In a final key departure from previous papers, this White Paper contained no statement about
“no-first use” of nuclear weapons for the first time since China developed nuclear weapons 50
years ago. 156 The document acknowledged that China would use nuclear weapons in an attack,
but did not rule out their use in other circumstances as well: 157
The PLASAF [PLA Second Artillery Force] keeps an appropriate level of readiness in peacetime. It
pursues the principles of combining peacetime needs with wartime needs, maintaining vigilance all the time
and being ready to fight. It has formed a complete system for combat readiness and set up an integrated,
functional, agile and efficient operational duty system to ensure rapid and effective responses to war threats
and emergencies. If China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders
of the CMC, go into a higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the
enemy from using nuclear weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear
missile force of the PLASAF will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either
independently or together with the nuclear forces of other services. The conventional missile force is able
to shift instantly from peacetime to wartime readiness, and conduct conventional medium- and long-range
precision strikes.

Emerging Priorities in Chinese Strategy

The US Department of Defense issued an updated version of its own white paper on Chinese
strategy and military developments called the Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014 in April 2014. The Department of
Defense views Chinese strategy as becoming more competitive and as involving related shifts in
its military capabilities that could make China far more of a peer competitor to the US, and
steadily alter the balance in Northeast Asia and in the Koreas unless the US is successful both in
rebalancing its forces in Asia and in creating more effective partnerships with the ROK and
Japan.
The US report described China’s changing strategy and related shifts in its force posture as
follows: 158
Since 2002, China’s leaders have described the initial two decades of the 21st century as a “period of
strategic opportunity.” They assess that during this time, international conditions will be conducive to
domestic development and expanding China’s “comprehensive national power,” a term that encapsulates
all elements of state power, including economic capacity, military might, and diplomacy. China’s leaders
anticipate that a successful expansion of comprehensive national power will serve China’s overriding
strategic objectives, which include perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, sustaining economic
growth and development, maintaining domestic political stability, defending national sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and securing China’s status as a great power. Though there is debate in Chinese
academic circles over whether China can sustain the “period of strategic opportunity” though this decade,
Chinese leaders have continued to reiterate the centrality of this period to achieving these key strategic
objectives.
China’s leaders routinely emphasize the goal of reaching critical economic and military benchmarks by
2020. These benchmarks include successfully restructuring the economy to maintain growth and increase
the quality of living of China’s citizens to promote stability; making major progress in military
modernization; and attaining the capability to fight and win potential regional conflicts, including those
related to Taiwan, protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), defense of territorial claims in the
South China Sea and East China Sea, and the defense of western borders. Statements by Chinese leaders
indicate that, in their view, the development of a modern military is necessary for China to achieve greater
power status. These statements also indicate that the Chinese leadership views a modern military as a
critical deterrent to prevent actions by outside powers that could damage Chinese interests, or to allow
China to defend itself against such actions should deterrence fail. (p.15)
46 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

China’s leaders see this period as providing an opportunity to focus on fostering a stable external
environment to provide the PRC the strategic space to prioritize economic growth and development and to
achieve “national rejuvenation” by 2049. At the same time, Chinese leaders express a desire to maintain
peace and stability along their country’s periphery; expand their diplomatic influence to facilitate access to
markets, capital, and resources; and avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countries.
This strategy has led to a growing Chinese presence in regions all over the world, and particularly on its
periphery, creating new and expanding economic and diplomatic interests. China’s expanding interests
have led to friction between some of its regional neighbors, including allies and partners of the United
States. (p. i)
…China regards stable relations with its neighbors and the United States as essential to its stability and
development. China continues to see the United States as the dominant regional and global actor with the
greatest potential to both support and, potentially, disrupt China’s rise. Many Chinese officials and the
public see the U.S. rebalance to Asia as a reflection of “Cold War thinking” and as a way to contain
China’s rise. In addition, China remains concerned that should regional states come to view China as a
threat, they might balance against China through unilateral military modernization or through coalitions,
possibly with the United States. (p. 15)
Despite its desire to project an image of a developing country engaged in a peaceful development strategy,
China’s efforts to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity (underpinned by growing economic
and military capabilities) have occasionally manifested in assertive rhetoric and behavior that generate
regional concerns about its intentions. Prominent examples of this include China’s response to Japan’s
arrest of a PRC fishing trawler captain following a collision with Japanese coast guard vessels in 2010, its
use of punitive trade policies as an instrument of coercion, its actions to shield North Korea from the
international response to its sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, and its action to pressure
Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea and Japan in the East China Sea. Official statements
and media during these situations indicate that China sees itself as responding to perceived threats to its
national interests or provocations by outside actors. China’s lack of transparency surrounding its growing
military capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased concerns in the region about China’s
intentions. Absent a move towards greater transparency, these concerns will likely intensify as the PLA
modernization progresses (p. 16)
The DOD went on to cite several specific shifts in Chinese strategy that were having major
impacts on US power projection capabilities as well as on ROK and Japanese deterrent and
defense capabilities. 159
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). As part of its planning for military contingencies, China continues to
develop measures to deter or counter third-party intervention, particularly by the United States. China’s
approach to dealing with this challenge is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the capability to
attack, at long ranges, military forces that might deploy to or operate in the western Pacific, which the
Department of Defense characterizes as “anti-access and area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities. China is
pursuing a variety of air, sea, undersea, space and counterspace, and information warfare systems and
operational concepts to achieve this capability, moving toward an array of overlapping, multilayered
offensive capabilities extending from China’s coast into the western Pacific. (p. 30)
An essential element, if not a fundamental prerequisite, of China’s emerging A2/AD regime is the ability to
control and dominate the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace. PLA authors
often cite the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed “information blockade” or
“information dominance,” and to seize the initiative and gain an information advantage in the early phases
of a campaign to achieve air and sea superiority. China is improving information and operational security to
protect its own information structures and is also developing electronic and information warfare
capabilities, including denial and deception, to defeat those of its adversaries. China’s “information
blockade” likely envisions the use of military and non-military instruments of state power across the
battlespace, including in cyberspace and outer space to deny information superiority to its adversaries.
China’s investments in advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems, counterspace weapons, and computer
network operations (CNO) – combined with propaganda and denial through opacity – reflect the emphasis
and priority China’s leaders place on building capability for information advantage. (p. 30-31)
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 47

In more traditional domains, China’s A2/AD focus appears oriented toward restricting or controlling access
to China’s periphery, including the western Pacific. The development of China’s conventionally armed
missiles has been rapid, even in the context of overall Chinese military modernization. As recently as ten
years ago, several hundred short-range ballistic missiles might have ranged targets in Taiwan, but China
effectively had no capability to strike many other locations in or beyond the first island chain (such as U.S.
bases in Okinawa or Guam). Today, however, China has more than 1,000 conventionally armed ballistic
missiles. U.S. bases on Okinawa are in range of a growing number of Chinese MRBMs, and Guam could
potentially be reached by air-launched cruise missiles.
(To put these comments in a broader context, China’s 2013 white paper stated that, “China is also
developing weapons for its entire military to project force further from its coast. Current and projected
missile systems will allow the PLA to strike regional air bases, logistical facilities, and other ground-based
infrastructure. Chinese military analysts have concluded that logistics and power projection are potential
vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating transportation,
communications, and logistics networks. China is fielding an array of conventionally armed ballistic
missiles, ground- and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, special operations forces, and cyber-warfare
capabilities to hold targets at risk throughout the region.” 160
Territorial Disputes. Senior Chinese officials have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity as a “core interest,” and PRC officials repeatedly state China’s opposition to actions they perceive
as a challenge to this core interest.
In the South China Sea, Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels maintained a presence at Scarborough
Reef throughout 2013, following the 2012 standoff with the Philippine coast guard. In May 2013, China
sent maritime law enforcement ships to the waters near Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly
Islands. Philippine military personnel are stationed on Second Thomas Shoal aboard a former U.S. tank-
landing ship that was deliberately grounded there in 1999. Both sides claim sovereignty over Scarborough
Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and China maintains a continuous civilian maritime law enforcement
presence at both locations.
The Chinese Government maintains that its maritime rights extend to virtually the entire South China Sea
and often illustrates its claim using a “nine-dash line” that encompasses much of the South China Sea area.
At the same time, China is ambiguous about the precise meaning of the nine-dash line. To date, China has
not clarified the meaning of the line or articulated its legal basis. In January 2013, the Philippines requested
arbitration from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea nine-dash line claim. China has opted out of the
proceedings.
As China increases activities in the South China Sea in support of its maritime claims, Chinese forces are
interacting more frequently with other countries’ forces. On December 5, 2013, a PLA Navy vessel and a
U.S. Navy vessel operating in the South China Sea came into close proximity. At the time of the incident,
USS COWPENS (CG 63) was operating approximately 32 nautical miles southeast of Hainan Island. In
that ___location, the U.S. Navy vessel was conducting lawful military activities beyond the territorial sea of
any coastal State, consistent with customary international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. Two PLA Navy vessels approached USS COWPENS. During this interaction, one of the PLA
Navy vessels altered course and crossed directly in front of the bow of USS COWPENS. This maneuver by
the PLA Navy vessel forced USS COWPENS to come to full stop to avoid collision, while the PLA Navy
vessel passed less than 100 yards ahead. The PLA Navy vessel’s action was inconsistent with
internationally recognized rules concerning professional maritime behavior (i.e., the Convention of
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea), to which China is a party.
In the East China Sea, China claims sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, which the Chinese refer to as the
Diaoyu Islands. The Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan and are also claimed by Taiwan.
In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyo announced plans to purchase three of the five Senkaku Islands from
private Japanese owners. In September 2012, the Government of Japan purchased the three islands. China
protested the move and since that time has regularly sent maritime law enforcement ships – and, less often,
aircraft – to patrol near the Senkaku Islands to assert PRC claims, including regular Chinese maritime
operations within 12 nautical miles (nm) of the islands. In November 2013, China announced an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea with coverage that included the Senkaku Islands
and overlapped with previously established Japanese, South Korean and Taiwan zones. (p. 2-3)
48 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

China’s use of force in territorial disputes – both on land and at sea – has varied throughout history. Some
disputes led to armed conflict, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A
contested border with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In
more recent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to its neighbors.
Since 1998, China has settled eleven land-based territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. In China’s
maritime periphery, tensions continue over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and ownership of potentially
rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits.
The East China Sea contains approximately seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100 billion
barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country should separate the EEZs, while
China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench (which
almost reaches Japan’s shore). In early 2009, Japan accused China of violating a June 2008 agreement
providing for joint exploration of oil and natural gas fields and claimed that China unilaterally drilled
beneath the demarcation line, extracting reserves from the Japanese side. China continues to contest
Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands to the south.
The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast and Southeast Asian security considerations.
Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes,
including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Island groups and other land formations within its “nine-dash line”
claim—parts of which are disputed in whole or in part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands among other features, makes the same
claims as China. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelf claims in the South China Sea made
by Malaysia and Vietnam. In its protest to the UN Commission, China included the ambiguous “nine-dash
line” and reiterated that it has “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the
adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed
and subsoil thereof.”
Despite improving political and economic relations between China and India, tensions remain along their
shared 4,057-km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh (which China asserts is part of Tibet and
therefore of China) and over the Aksai Chin region at the western end of the Tibetan Plateau. In 2009,
China and India said they would establish a hotline between their Prime Ministers after exchanging barbs
over the status of the border region of Arunachal Pradesh. By 2011, however, progress still lagged as India
reportedly found trouble obtaining suitable encryption technology to establish the hotline. Chinese and
Indian officials met in late September 2013 to finalize the text of the Border Defense Cooperation
Agreement, which will supplement existing procedures managing the interaction of troops along the Line
of Actual Control. (p. 21)
Counter-Space. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems – and to deny adversaries
access to space-based systems – as central to enabling modern, “informationized” warfare. Although PLA
doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations
form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and would serve a key role in enabling A2/AD
operations. A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of
operations in space to enable “informationized” warfare, claiming that “space is the commanding point for
the information battlefield.” , PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and
interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,” suggesting that such
systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed
to “blind and deafen the enemy.” The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations also
states that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors … will deprive an opponent of initiative on
the battlefield and [make it difficult] for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counterspace capabilities. In
addition to directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, China demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic kill
capability against satellites in low Earth orbit when it destroyed the defunct Chinese FY-1C weather
satellite during a test in January 2007.
Military Information Operations. Chinese military writings describe informationized warfare as an
asymmetric form of warfare used to defeat a technologically superior, information-dependent adversary
through dominance of the battlefield’s information space. Information operations encompass defensive and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 49

offensive military actions and focus on defending PLA information systems, while disrupting or destroying
an adversary’s information systems. Chinese writings view informationized warfare as a way to weaken an
adversary’s ability to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during war and discuss it as a way to
force an adversary to capitulate before the onset of conflict. The PLA conducts military exercises
simulating operations in complex electromagnetic environments and likely views conventional and cyber
operations as a means of achieving information dominance. The PLA GSD Fourth Department (Electronic
Countermeasures and Radar) would likely use jamming and electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, and
deception to augment counterspace and other kinetic operations during a wartime scenario to deny an
adversary’s use of information systems. “Simultaneous and parallel” operations would involve strikes
against U.S. warships, aircraft, and associated supply craft, as well as the use of information attacks to
hamper tactical and operational communications and computer networks. These operations could have a
significant effect upon an adversary’s navigational and targeting radars.
As the following chapters of this report make clear, these developments are reshaping the
structure and character of virtually every aspect of Chinese forces, make it a far more effective
military power in terms of both conventional and asymmetric warfare capabilities, and altering
the balance of nuclear deterrence affecting the Koreas and the rest of the Pacific region.
China and the Koreas
China’s strategy toward the Koreas is increasingly driven by its broader rivalry with the US over
power and influence in Asia and the Pacific as well as by China’s concern that the US is
rebalancing its posture in the Pacific to compete with Chinese military forces. China sometimes
does not name the US, but its 2013 Defense White Paper stated, 161
Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the
region, and frequently makes the situation tenser… [China] has an arduous task to safeguard its national
unification, territorial integrity and development interests.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily issued a more blunt commentary that same day –
echoing an earlier speech in March 2013 by China’s President Xi Jinping: “Currently, the world
situation is undergoing its most profound and complex changes since the end of the cold
war…Hostile Western forces have stepped up their strategy of imposing Westernization on our
country and splitting it up, and they are doing their utmost to fence in and contain our country’s
development.” 162
US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James R. Clapper discussed such Chinese actions as
follows in his testimony to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence early 2013, 163
During 2012, Beijing adopted strong, uncompromising positions in maritime territorial disputes with
several of its neighbors. In each case, China sought to expand its control over the relevant territories and
obstructed regional efforts to manage the disputes. Beijing’s regional activities appear to be, in part, a
response to the US strategic rebalance toward Asia-Pacific, which Chinese leaders believe is aimed at
undermining China’s position in the region. Globally, Beijing has both assisted and hindered US policy
objectives on such issues as Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and North Korea, and it continues to expand its
economic influence and to try to parlay it into greater political influence.
The leadership transition in Beijing continues to unfold as Chinese leaders grapple with a confluence of
domestic problems—including lagging economic indicators, corruption, and pressure for political reform—
that are fueling leadership fears about the potential for serious domestic unrest.
The leadership team that is confronting these internal challenges is also likely to maintain uncompromising
positions on foreign policy issues, especially those involving maritime and territorial disputes in the South
and East China Seas.
DNI Clapper described China as follows in his 2014 testimony, 164
50 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Chinese leaders will try to focus primarily on domestic priorities during 2014 while leveraging China’s
growing influence in the region. A new generation led by Xi Jinping is in place and its ambitious policy
agenda is coming into focus: accelerate economic reforms, make governance more efficient and
accountable, and tighten Communist Party discipline.
China will probably continue its increasingly proactive approach to maritime disputes, including a hardline
stance toward Japan over the Senkaku Islands. More broadly, China’s growing confidence, new
capabilities, and other perceived challenges to China’s interests or security will drive Beijing to pursue a
more active foreign policy.
Growing regional competition in territorial disputes and competing nationalist fervor increase the risk of
escalation and constrain regional cooperation. Sovereignty concerns and resurgent historical resentments
will generate friction and occasional incidents between claimants in the East and South China Seas and
slow or stall bilateral or multilateral efforts to resolve the disputes.
Beijing has highlighted its pursuit of a “new type of major power relations” with Washington, but China is
simultaneously working at least indirectly to counterbalance US influence. Within East Asia, Beijing seeks
to fuel doubts about the sustainability of the US “rebalance” and Washington’s willingness to support its
allies and partners in the region.
China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization designed to enable its armed forces to
achieve success on a 21st century battlefield. China’s military investments favor capabilities designed to
strengthen its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike options, counter foreign military intervention in a
regional crisis, and provide limited, albeit growing, capability for power projection. During 2013, the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) introduced advanced weapons into its inventory and reached milestones
in the development of key systems. China’s first domestically developed heavy transport plane, the Y-20,
successfully conducted its initial test flight. Additionally, China has continued to develop multiple
advanced ballistic and cruise missiles.
Developments in PLA capabilities support an expansion of operations to secure Chinese interests beyond
territorial issues. For example, China is pursuing more effective logistical support arrangements with
countries in the Indian Ocean region.
Elements from China’s army, navy, air force, and strategic missile forces from multiple military regions
participated in Mission Action 2013 in September and October 2013. The exercise included two large-scale
amphibious landings and coordinated long-range air force and naval air operations in a maritime
environment.
His 2015 testimony was very similar, 165
China will continue to pursue an active foreign policy—especially within the Asia Pacific—bolstered by
increasing capabilities and its firm stance on East and South China Sea territorial disputes with rival
claimants. The chances for sustained tensions will persist because competing claimants will probably
pursue actions—including energy exploration—that others perceive as infringing on their sovereignty.
China will probably seek to expand its economic role and outreach in the region, pursuing broader
acceptance of its economic initiatives, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Although China
remains focused on regional issues, it will seek a greater voice on major international issues and in making
new international rules.
Notwithstanding this external agenda, Chinese leaders will focus primarily on addressing domestic
concerns. The Chinese Communist Party leadership under President Xi Jinping announced an ambitious
agenda of legal reforms in late 2014 that built on its previous agenda of ambitious economic reforms—all
aimed at improving government efficiency and accountability and strengthening the control of the
Communist Party. The difficulty of implementing these reforms and bureaucratic resistance to them create
the possibility of rising internal frictions as the agenda moves forward. Beijing will also remain concerned
about the potential for domestic unrest or terrorist acts in Xinjiang and Tibet, which might lead to renewed
human rights abuses. Following months of pro-democracy protests in late 2014, Chinese leaders will
monitor closely political developments in Hong Kong for signs of instability.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 51

His counterpart in the Department of Defense, Lt. General Vincent R. Stewart, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, described China in more military terms, 166
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is building a modern military capable of defending China’s “core
interests” of preserving its political system, protecting territorial integrity and sovereignty (China views
these to include Taiwan and other contested claims to land and water), and ensuring sustainable economic
and social development.
The PLA remains focused on transforming the army into a fully mechanized force. The PLA is converting
its divisions into brigades to increase lethality and improve combat capabilities. China’s national-level
training focus has been on brigade-level exercises that stress unit combat mission capabilities under
realistic conditions, long distance mobility, and command and control. We expect these trends to continue.
The PLA Navy continues to expand its operational and deployment areas. China’s first aircraft carrier,
commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full potential until it acquires a fully operational fixed-wing
air regiment, but we expect the navy will make progress toward its goal this year.
The South China Sea (SCS) remains a potential flashpoint. Overlapping claims among China, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei– exacerbated by large-scale construction or major steps to
militarize or expand law enforcement– has increased tensions among claimants. This has prompted an
increase in defense acquisition, to include submarine capabilities, in some of these countries.
In 2014, China twice deployed submarines to the Indian Ocean. The submarines probably conducted area
familiarization to form a baseline for increasing China’s power projection. China continues production of
JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We
expect China to conduct its first nuclear deterrence patrols this year.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is approaching modernization on a scale unprecedented in its history. China
now has two stealth fighter programs - the third and fourth J-20 prototypes, which conducted their first
flights in March and July 2014. Further PLAAF developments are anticipated.
China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50-60 ICBMs. China is adding more survivable road-mobile
systems, enhancing its silo-based systems, and developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent. They are also
augmenting more than 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a
limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-
16, which will improve China’s ability to strike regional targets. China continues to deploy growing
numbers of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile and is developing a tiered ballistic missile defense
system, having successfully tested the upper-tier capability on two occasions.
China does not usually stress the fact it still adheres to the 1961 “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid
and Cooperation Friendship Treaty.” 167 The 1961 treaty is renewed automatically every 20 years
and is only subject to change if both parties agree. It states that “the two parties undertake to
adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either party by any state,” and that “in the event
of one of the parties being subjected to armed attack by any state or several states together and
thus being involved in a state of war, the other party shall immediately render military and other
assistance by all means at its disposal.” The treaty does not apply in the case of a DPRK attack
on the ROK – only if the DPRK is attacked. 168
The ramifications of Korean re-unification vis-a-vis the US bring Chinese geostrategic concerns
into focus. In particular, China is concerned with US support for a South Korean led
reunification of the Peninsula. Beijing has to date rejected any joint contingency planning with
the US regarding North Korea. According to Yun Sun, from the East Asia Program at the
Stimson Center,
A careful examination of China’s strategic concerns reveal that Beijing’s rejection is fundamentally
determine by one factor: the endgame in North Korea…In the case of North Korea, although China does
share the US-ROK goal of denuclearization, it understands very well that denuclearization is not the
endgame in the mind of either Washington or Seoul. In the event of a North Korea contingency, the US and
52 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

ROK would likely pursue not just a policy of denuclearization but also one of stabilization leading to a
South Korean-led reunification. Successful implementation of this policy would inevitably alter the power
equilibrium on the Korean peninsula.
In Beijing’s view, a Korea unified under current circumstances would most likely be pro-US given the
history and reality of the US-ROK alliance. US influence and alliance would prevail on the whole
peninsula regardless of whether or not American troops were deployed to the north of the 38th parallel.
This change would have a critical negative impact on China’s security environment. Whether such a
unified Korea would try to remain neutral is relevant but not a game-changer. China fundamentally sees
South Korea as incapable or unwilling to challenge the US and their military alliance. Furthermore, even if
such a unified Korea indeed becomes neutral, it would still tremendously damage Chinese influence on the
peninsula. It is believed that South Korea, upon reunification will be more assertive and ready to challenge
China on bilateral and regional issues, with or without the alliance with the US. Therefore, many in China
see that it has no reason to abandon its strategic leverage on North Korea, not only vis-à-vis the US, but
also vis-à-vis South Korea.
Unless Beijing determines the endgame in the event of North Korea contingencies is beneficial to China’s
strategic interests, it will not engage in such discussions or support any planning that Washington and Seoul
pursue. Given this reality, any viable discussion about North Korea contingencies must begin with a
genuine, credible and realistic conversation about the agendas of the three sides so as to address their
shared and conflicting interests.
Economic Ties with the Korean Peninsula
China is a major trading partner of the DPRK, but it is not clear how much the Chinese economy
really benefits from such trade. Unlike Chinese trade with ROK, which is conducted in market
terms, Chinese trade with the DPRK often seems to be heavily subsidized and a de facto form of
aid.
Estimates differ as to the trade volumes involved. According to one estimate, China accounted
for 70%, or $5.6 billion, of the DPRK’s trade volume (a total of $8 billion) in 2011. This was an
increase of 62% over 2010. In late 2012, the PRC reportedly agreed to investments in cross-
border infrastructure and trade with the DPRK worth almost $1.3 billion – though there were
reports that many Chinese businessmen are becoming disillusioned by the tough deals imposed
by the DPRK, such as the demand that Chinese businesses in the North build their own roads and
supply their own electricity. 169
The CIA has a different estimate of total trade volumes. It estimates that total North Korean
exports were $3.703 billion in 2012 and $3.954 billion in 2012, with some 63% going to China
in 2012, and 27% to the ROK. It estimates that total North Korean imports were $4.367 billion in
2011 and $4.827 billion in 2012, with some 73% coming from China in 2012, and 19% to the
ROK. 170
This makes a striking contrast to the ROK’s trade data. The CIA estimates that total South
Korean exports were $547.9 billion in 2011 and $557.3 billion in 2012, with some 24.5% going
to China in 2012, 10.7% going to the US, 7.1% going to Japan, 6% going to Hong Kong, and
4.2% going to Singapore in 2012. It estimates that total South Korean imports were $519.6
billion in 2012 and $516.6 billion in 2012, with some 15.6% coming from China in 2012, and
12.4% from Japan, 8.3% coming from the US, 7.6% coming from Saudi Arabia, 4.9% coming
from Qatar, and 4.4% coming from Australia. 171
To put these CIA estimates in perspective, Chinese trade with the DPRK in 2012 involved some
$2.49 billion in exports and $3.52 billion in imports. Chinese trade with the ROK in 2012
involved some $127.3 billion in exports and $81.1 billion in imports.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 53

According to other estimates, the combined, legal and illegal trade between the DPRK and PRC
has been approximately $10 billion annually. Furthermore, China has provided food and fuel aid
to the DPRK for many years, fearing that the DPRK would collapse without this assistance.
However, since normalization in 1992, Chinese trade with the ROK has increased exponentially:
bilateral trade was $245 billion in 2012, 38 times higher than 20 years previously. 172
China has also allowed North Korean workers to work in China. In June 2012, 20,000 visas were
issued to North Koreans to work in Jilin Province (North Koreans laborers also reportedly work
in Russia and the Middle East 173), with the majority of their wages to be garnered by the DPRK
government. Chinese companies have been investing in natural resource extraction in the DPRK,
such as mining coal and rare earths – there is an estimated $6 trillion worth of DPRK mineral
reserves. A recent $10 billion infrastructure project on the DPRK-Chinese border would improve
Chinese access to the country for mining purposes, and China was alleged to have expanded
investment in border areas in August 2012. 174 As a January 2013 CRS report notes, 175
China and North Korea continue to develop their highly complementary trade and investment ties, though
several contradictions hamper deeper engagement. North Korea needs foreign capital to improve its
infrastructure, exploit natural resources, and create productive exporters, but the multitude of corrupt and
self-serving actors within the North Korean system has led to poor results for Chinese investors. China is
by far North Korea’s largest trading partner (57% of all trade in 2011), but North Korea fears dependence
on China and exposure to subversive information from China’s relatively open society. Despite the
obstacles, the two countries announced their intention to create or revamp several Special Economic Zones
in northern North Korea to facilitate deeper economic linkages.
Tensions with the DPRK
China finds some of North Korea’s actions and extreme rhetoric to be a liability, but China’s
view of the US, Japan, and other Pacific powers means it feels it needs North Korea as a buffer.
The end result is a set of mixed policies and reactions.
As early as 1997, some Chinese government officials discussed the DPRK-China treaty’s
military assistance clause as “a remnant of Cold War era thinking and no longer relevant to the
current situation.” It was reported that the PRC proposed that the language be changed in 2002,
but the DPRK refused. Other Chinese experts opposed emendation, arguing that the clause was a
deterrent to DPRK nuclearization and US preemptive attack, as well as a guarantor of PRC
leverage over the DPRK. 176
Since 2010, an increasing number of Chinese academics have been calling for China to
reappraise its ties with the DPRK, especially because of the reputational and material costs to
China. 177 In the wake of the DPRK’s third nuclear test, one academic remarked, “The public
does not want China to be the only friend of the North Korean government, and we’re not even
recognized by North Korea as a friend… For the first time the Chinese government has felt the
pressure of public opinion not to be too friendly with North Korea.” Another prominent political
scientist wrote on the Foreign Policy website that it was time for China “to cut its losses and cut
North Korea loose.” 178
In an early 2013 interview, former ROK President Lee Myung-bak said that the Chinese
perception of the DPRK was changing, adding, “Since the middle of (former Chinese) President
Hu Jintao’s term, Beijing has sent us the message that we shouldn’t consider China ‘too much on
the North’s side.’ The leaders of South Korea and China have discussed that the Seoul-
Washington alliance helps Seoul’s relationship with Beijing, rather than affect it.” These
54 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

comments suggest that there have been or could be ROK-China and ROK-US talks regarding
how to cope with an emergency situation in the DPRK. 179
In March 2013, a government advisory group called the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference debated whether to “keep or dump” and “fight or talk” with the DPRK. 180 China has
had other reasons to question the cost of China’s ties to the DPRK. Incidents like the May 8,
2012 13-day DPRK detention of 28 Chinese fishermen and their three boats are a case in point.
The Chinese fishermen were taken captive three nautical miles inside Chinese waters and towed
to the DPRK with a ransom demand of approximately $190,000. 181 Inflamed “Netizens” in
China’s blogosphere called on the government to cancel DPRK aid, renewing public debate in
China over the nature of the DPRK-PRC relationship. 182
China seems to have been further irritated by the DPRK’s third nuclear test, which the DPRK
carried out on an important Chinese holiday. While the state media has not called Kim Jong-un
unflattering names, editorials and commentators have reacted negatively; one editorial
proclaimed, “When Pyongyang’s acts seriously violate China’s interests, we will by no means
indulge it,” while another paper criticized the DPRK for violating UN resolutions against missile
launches and nuclear testing. Chinese social media sites have seen a multitude of jokes, images,
and derogatory names aimed at Kim Jong-un – such as “The Kid” and “Fatty, the Third.”[AL1]
While the Chinese government usually censors Internet comments that are too critical of or
against PRC foreign and domestic policy, the insults to Kim Jong-un have not been erased. 183
Jonathan Pollack made the following comments on the role of North Korean unpredictability in
China’s behavior towards the North: 184
So what goes essentially unmentioned, I think, in most renderings of explaining Chinese behaviors, is a
deeper fear, a deeper fear of the unpredictability, of the North, of its adversarial nationalism, that it is not
accountable to China, and that the steps that China has sought to take, both under Hu Jintao and now under
Xi Jinping, to gain a measure of predictability in North Korean behavior, assurance that it will not take
steps that might undermines the security of China. These kinds of assurances have gone nowhere. It is the
power of the weak, over the power of the strong. Look at, both historically and at present, North Korea,
rather than being some form of strategic asset for China, is very very much a strategic liability, and more
than this, China often talks about, its concerns about the lack of strategic trust, between the United States
and China. There is most assuredly, a total lack of strategic trust, between the leaders here in Beijing, and
the leaders in Pyongyang.
Despite this lack of trust between Beijing and Pyongyang, the reality is that China maintains
stability as its top priority for the Korean Peninsula. As of 2014, debates over whether China
should reconsider its relations with North Korea have largely stayed in the academic and public
spheres. Official government policies have remained steady and do not yet show signs of a large
shift in the near-term. 185 In fact, China may have to tread very carefully in its policies toward the
Peninsula. 186
Some argue that the legacy of the Korean War weighs heavily on the minds of more traditional
constituencies within the Chinese Communist Party and army. But deeper, current anxieties also inhibit
Beijing. China fears that extreme actions by an unpredictable, heavily armed neighbor with a xenophobic
leadership could trigger a larger crisis on the peninsula that would quickly involve China. Lacking realistic
options to control North Korean behavior, China prefers instead to avoid doing anything that might alienate
Pyongyang.
Daniel Sneider of the Asia-Pacific Research Center describes China’s constrained North Korea
policy by saying, “It’s clear that the Chinese have enormous leverage over North Korea in many
respects. But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime?
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 55

Probably not.” 187 Different perceptions between China, North Korea, the US, and US allies,
regarding exactly what constitutes destabilization may feed perception gaps between these
actors.
While the lack of official Chinese commentary makes it difficult to determine Chinese leverage,
China appears to have increasing difficulty in influencing North Korea’s actions and policies.
The execution of Jang Song Thaek, who was considered to be one of Beijing’s major channels of
communication with the North, highlights the diminishing influence of North Korean advocates
of closer cooperation with China. This is due in part to the deteriorating military-to-military
relationship between the two countries: 188
The ties between the two armed forces were fairly active for many years, but ‘almost all of those people on
both sides have died off or are retired…The current leaderships in the KPA and PLA have no set of shared
camaraderie on the battlefield to bring them into contact with one another. Also, by and large the senior
officers in the two forces do not trust each other.’
The increased distance between Beijing and Pyongyang has also been partly the result of Chinese
efforts to dissociate itself from the North Korean regime, such as backing economic sanctions on
North Korea. However, China still continues its efforts to develop special economic development
zones along the China-North Korea border. This mix of cooperation and frustration with North
Korea demonstrates that China’s general policy and economic support towards North Korea may
continue even if China increasingly sees North Korea as more of a liability. 189
In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, representatives
from the US Institute of Peace state that “larger geopolitical calculations – in which the US is
central – dictate that China’s interest in maintaining the North Korean regime and a divided
peninsula is not contingent on good relations with Pyongyang.” 190 The potential consequences of
destabilization or regime collapse are too severe for China to put significant portions of North
Korean aid and political support under risk of termination.
Such a Chinese perspective is something that Pyongyang can use to its advantage. Although
China does not like the idea of a nuclear armed North Korea, it values North Korean stability
more. Knowing this, Pyongyang can reasonably continue its nuclear development while
continuing to receive economic support from China. However, this strategy would depend on
assuming that China is willing to tolerate a nuclear North Korea to a certain extent. Pyongyang
would have to play a sort of brinksmanship with China, continuing its nuclear development but
not to the point where China would be willing to cut off economic aid.
Chinese Efforts at “Denuclearization”
These problems and risks may lead China to do more in the future to try to influence the DPRK
to decrease provocations and give up nuclear development, but this is far from clear. China
provides the bulk of food, fuel, and development aid to the DPRK. Since 2008, China has been
the only regular source of assistance, providing an estimated 100,000 tons of food, 500,000 tons
of oil (70% of the DPRK’s fuel), and $20 million worth of goods annually. The PRC also often
sends free aid shipments, though the contents and scale are not usually made public. One
example was a December 2011 delivery of 500,000 tons of food and 250,000 tons of oil to assist
in stabilizing the new DPRK regime. 191 Without China’s assistance, the North Korean regime
would be unlikely to last long.
56 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Furthermore, a June 2012 UN report looking into the past several years of DPRK sanctions
enforcement listed Chinese involvement in 21 of the 38 suspected breaches of sanctions
addressing luxury items and weapons. In two of those instances, China was involved in the
DPRK’s ballistic missile component and other unconventional weapons materials purchases or
sales. 192
China has long taken a “no war, no instability, no nukes” ( ) position regarding the
Koreas as well as desired to maintain the useful purpose the DPRK serves as a buffer state
against the ROK. Also, in the event of a regime collapse or other large-scale unrest, China
worries about a mass influx of refugees pouring into its northeastern provinces. In the context of
the US’s rebalance towards Asia, the buffer provided by the DPRK could be increasingly
important in Chinese strategic calculation. 193
China has, however, consistently prioritized peace and stability over denuclearization and control
of the DPRK, and is unwilling to put substantial pressure on the DPRK for fear of decreasing the
stability of the current regime – despite China’s clear preference for a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula. CSIS’s Victor Cha calls this a “mutual hostage” relationship. 194
One ROK scholar at Seoul National University has argued that there are three structural and
perceptual obstacles that make any change in China’s DPRK policy unlikely or even
impossible: 195
First, Beijing predicts a difficult future for Sino-U.S. relations. Second, Beijing views U.S. alliances with
South Korea and Japan as part of a U.S. strategy to contain China’s rise. Third, the Korean peninsula lacks
a stable mechanism for peace. Since none of these obstacles is likely to be addressed in the near term,
China’s modus operandi regarding North Korea is likely to remain unchanged, rendering the regional
situation similar to that of the past.
At the same time, some in China worry that the ROK, Japan, or even Taiwan could develop
nuclear weapons due to the growing DPRK threat. The increase in nuclear weapons states not
sanctioned by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could cause the NPT to collapse,
creating more uncertainty in international security. 196
Also, the DPRK could transfer nuclear materials, knowledge, or technology to another country or
non-state actor, potentially to the detriment of Chinese security. 197 Other Asia-Pacific countries
could also be pushed towards the US, which would be contrary to Chinese regional interest and
attempts to increase its soft power appeal. 198 Internationally, China loses face and reputation by
its support of the DPRK.
China must also consider the risk that the DPRK might go too far and trigger a US strike against
the DPRK. If such a strike left the present DPRK regime in place, this would not harm Chinese
security interests and would embarrass China if it did react. If the regime did fall as a result, or if
the ROK and US intervened in response to DPRK instability, the result might be a reunified
peninsula under ROK control – giving South Korea control of the North’s weapons, and putting
US soldiers at the Chinese border. 199 To mitigate this Chinese fear, at least, former ROK
President Lee Myung-bak has argued that the ROK should signal China through an NGO that, in
the case of reunification due to a contingency in the DPRK, the US military would stay south of
the DMZ. 200
China does, however, need to consider how much a DPRK strategic buffer is worth, and whether
it could find a way to put a more moderate and stable regime in place. The issue is not simply a
matter of military risk. China’s continued support of the DPRK has led to strained relations with
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 57

the US, ROK, and Japan as a result of the increase in DPRK provocations over the course of the
past decade, in particular nuclear and missile tests and the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents.
As a result, the ROK and Japan have strengthened their alliances with the US and increased
bilateral coordination with each other, as well as considered expansion of their own missile
forces and missile defense, and increased other aspects of the regional arms race. China’s
diplomatic shielding of the DPRK has also weakened its claim to be an honest broker in the Six
Party Talks and tarnished its international image, especially at the UN, while perhaps
encouraging risky DPRK moves due to lack of Chinese punishment. 201
China seems to have realized that more pressure on the DPRK is necessary to make progress
towards denuclearization in the wake of the DPRK nuclear test. The PRC has put some open
pressure on the DPRK to assuage US demands that it use its leverage to greater effect. In early
May 2013, China’s chief nuclear envoy told ROK diplomats that China will not accept the
DPRK as a “nuclear-armed state,” and a consensus on this issue between the ROK, US, and
China appears to have been reached. 202
Chinese efforts taken to pressure the DPRK include: 203
• Delaying aid shipments
• Raising the nuclear issue in many official exchanges, regardless of the primary issue at hand
• Special envoys with letters or messages to heed PRC warnings, at critical times
• Chinese leaders using more forceful language with DPRK leaders
• Chinese officials occasionally publically stating their frustrations with the DPRK
• Increasing news references to the differences between the two countries and Chinese actions in response to
the DPRK’s destabilizing acts
• Discussion of the DPRK in multilateral settings, including those with the ROK and Japan, and voicing of
opposition to DPRK provocations and nuclear ambitions
• Denials of DPRK requests for military aid
• Tightening of export control policies to restrict the sale of dual-use items to the DPRK.
Starting in 2003, China used incentives and rewards to gain DPRK participation in the Six Party
Talks, while from 2006-2009, China switched to increased use of coercive measures to influence
the DPRK. Since 2009, China has instead followed comprehensive engagement in an attempt to
increase influence over the DPRK, enhancing high-level ties in a variety of areas and sectors.
This has led to an increase in the economic instruments being used to influence DPRK behavior,
with the primary goals of the DPRK engaging in policies that paralleled Chinese interests and
curbing costly DPRK provocations. 204
North Korea was discussed at length during the early June 2003 summit between Presidents
Obama and Xi. It also reported that Chinese officials discussed using their economic and energy
provision to the DPRK as leverage in DPRK provocations. American officials reported that the
Chinese apparently agreed with the US that if the DPRK continues to develop nuclear weapons,
the US will further increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, while the ROK and
Japan will be much more likely to develop their own weapons in advance – potentially further
destabilizing the region. 205
58 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

According to US National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, China and the US agreed that dealing
with the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal was a promising issue for “enhanced cooperation.” The two
agreed that they should work together to achieve denuclearization of the DPRK and “that North
Korea has to denuclearize, that neither country will accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed
state.” 206
Much will depend, however, on the broader interactions between the US and Chinese military
strategies and force development plans that affect their overall security policies in Northeast
Asia, the rest of Asia, and the Pacific. According to the Department of Defense report for 2013,
China sees stable relations with its neighbors and the US as essential to stability and necessary
for maximizing its current window of opportunity to expand and develop as a great power. At the
same time, “China’s growing economic and military confidence and capabilities occasionally
manifest in more assertive rhetoric and behavior when Beijing perceives threats to its national
interests or feels compelled to respond to public expectations.” 207
China, in turn, sees the US as an increasing risk. Whatever it may think of the DPRK, it may see
the US rebalance to Asia as potentially as threatening as the US see the modernization of
Chinese forces and the steady expansion of Chinese power projection and anti-access area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities. Once again, the choice each power makes between cooperation and
competition is likely to be a key factor in shaping not only their capabilities in the Koreas and
Northeast Asia, but the reactions and strategies of the ROK and Japan.
Japan
Japan sees the DPRK’s military build-up, political hostility, and North Korea’s nuclear programs
as a direct threat to Japanese national security. The government takes the position that one key
way to counteract this threat is through close cooperation with the ROK and the US, allowing for
the strict implementation of bilateral and UN Security Council sanctions. At the same time, the
Japanese government holds that the Six Party Talks should be continued in order to move
forward with denuclearization of the DPRK. 208
Japanese relations with the ROK are based on common strategic interests, but there are also
serious tensions. An analysis by the US CRS summarizes Japan’s policies towards the Koreas as
follows: 209
After a period of relatively warm ties and the promise of more effective security cooperation, Tokyo-Seoul
ties appear to have cooled anew. Under the DPJ governments and the Lee Myungbak administration in
Seoul, South Korea and Japan managed historical issues, cooperated in responding to North Korean
provocations, and exchanged observers at military exercises. The two countries were on the verge of
concluding two modest but significant bilateral security agreements on information sharing and military
acquisitions until an anti-Japanese outcry in South Korea scuttled the signing. The new governments in
both capitals appear less likely to reach out to each other, dimming U.S. hopes for more sustained trilateral
cooperation among the three democracies. Policy toward North Korea has been the one issue where regular
trilateral consultation persists, and the February 2013 nuclear test by North Korea will provide an
opportunity for the three capitals to coordinate their response.
…In addition to the comfort women issue discussed above, the perennial issues of a territorial dispute
between Japan and South Korea and Japanese history textbooks continue to periodically ruffle relations. A
group of small islands in the Sea of Japan known as Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese (referred
to as the Liancourt Rocks by the United States) are administered by South Korea but claimed by Japan.
Mentions of the claims in Japanese defense documents or by local prefectures routinely spark official
criticism and public outcry in South Korea. Similarly, Seoul expresses disapproval of some of the history
textbooks approved by Japan’s Ministry of Education that South Koreans claim diminish or whitewash
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 59

Japan’s colonial-era atrocities.

Some of Abe’s cabinet appointments have raised concern among South Koreans. Minister of Education
Hakubun Shimomura has criticized history textbook companies for being insufficiently patriotic by, among
other items, giving undue deference to the concerns of China and South Korea in their presentation of
Japan’s colonial past. Abe’s appointment of Shimomura appears to signal his intent to follow through on
the LDP’s pre-election advocacy of reducing “self-torturing views of history” in education and of giving
the central government greater authority over the content of history textbooks. Abe’s Cabinet also includes
Internal Affairs Minister Yoshitaka Shindo and Minister for Administrative Reform Tomomi Inada, who
have aggressively asserted Japanese territorial claims, including a well-publicized attempt to visit South
Korea in 2011 to advocate for Japanese sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets.
…Since 2009, Washington and Tokyo have been strongly united in their approach to North Korea.
Although the U.S. and Japanese positions diverged in the later years of the Bush Administration,
Pyongyang’s string of provocations in 2009-2010 forged a new consensus among Japan, South Korea, and
the United States. North Korea’s provocations have helped to drive enhanced trilateral security cooperation
between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. Japan also appeared to be at least somewhat in synch with the
United States in late 2011 and early 2012 when the Obama Administration—with the blessing of the South
Korean government—was negotiating agreements with North Korea over its nuclear and missile programs
and food aid. North Korea’s 2012 missile launches and the February 2013 nuclear test are likely to drive
closer cooperation among the three governments.
Tokyo has adopted a relatively hardline policy against North Korea and plays a leadership role at the
United Nations in pushing for stronger punishment for the Pyongyang regime for its military provocations
and human rights abuses. Japan has imposed a virtual embargo on all trade with North Korea. North
Korea’s missile tests have demonstrated that a strike on Japan is well within range, spurring Japan to move
forward on missile defense cooperation with the United States. In addition to Japan’s concern about
Pyongyang’s weapons and delivery systems, the issue of several Japanese citizens abducted by North
Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s remains a top priority for Tokyo. Japan has pledged that it will not
provide economic aid to North Korea without resolution of the abductee issue. The abductee issue remains
an emotional topic in Japan.
In 2008, the Bush Administration’s decision to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism in exchange for North Korean concessions on its nuclear program dismayed Japanese officials,
who had maintained that North Korea’s status on the list should be linked to the abduction issue. Although
the abductions issue has lost potency in recent years, Abe came onto the political scene in the early 2000s
as a fierce advocate for the abductees and their families and could dedicate attention to the issue.
In late 2013 and 2014, relations between Japan and South Korea showed no signs of significant
improvement. 210
Japan’s relations with South Korea continued to worsen in late 2013 and early 2014, a development that
drew considerable attention from U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress who met with officials from
each country. A poor relationship between Seoul and Tokyo jeopardizes U.S. interests by complicating
trilateral cooperation on North Korea policy and other regional challenges.
…Tense relations also complicate Japan’s desire to expand its military and diplomatic influence, goals the
Obama Administration generally supports, as well as the creation of an integrated U.S.-Japan-South Korea
ballistic missile defense system. Furthermore, South Korea-Japan frictions could damage U.S. relations
with South Korea or Japan if and when either country feels the United States is taking the other country’s
side in the ongoing bilateral disputes.
As of February 2014, Abe and his South Korean counterpart President Park Geun-hye had yet to hold a
summit, and the high-level interaction that has occurred between the two governments frequently has been
contentious. South Korean leaders have objected to a series of statements and actions by Abe and his
Cabinet officials that many have interpreted as denying or even glorifying Imperial Japan’s aggression in
the early 20th Century. For much of 2013, South Korean leaders stated that they would have difficulty
holding a summit, or improving relations, unless Japan adopts a “correct understanding” of history. Many
Japanese argue that for years South Korean leaders have not recognized and in some cases rejected the
60 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

efforts Japan has made to acknowledge and apologize for Imperial Japan’s actions. As a result, South
Korea has arguably helped to undermine those Japanese who have made such overtures, including a
proposal that the previous Japanese government floated in 2012 to provide a new apology and humanitarian
payments to the surviving “comfort women.” During the fall of 2013, many U.S. policymakers and Asia
watchers grew concerned that the Park government, by appearing to allow history issues to affect most
aspects of Seoul-Tokyo relations, was being overly narrow and was damaging U.S. interests in Asia. Abe’s
visit to Yasukuni in December 2013, however, shifted the focus back to Japan.

Korea and Japanese Defense Policy

Japan released new National Defense Program Guidelines in 2010 that were intended to guide
Japan’s defense policy for the next 10 years. The report was the first major update since 2004,
and listed the following seven aspects of Japan’s changing security environment: 211
1. Number of so-called “gray zone” disputes (confrontations over territory, sovereignty and economic
interests that are not to escalate into wars) is on the increase.
2. A global shift in the balance of power has been brought about by the rise of emerging powers and the
relative change of the U.S. influence.
3. Issues such as sustained access to cyberspace, in addition to international terrorism and piracy, have
become global security challenges.
4. North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues are immediate and grave destabilizing factors to regional
security.
5. Military modernization by China and its insufficient transparency are of concern for the regional and
global community.
6. Russia’s military activities are increasingly robust.
7. A full-scale invasion against Japan is unlikely to occur today, but the security challenges and
destabilizing factors Japan faces are diverse, complex and intertwined.
The document also established Japan’s three security objectives: “(1) to prevent and eliminate
external threat[s] from reaching Japan; (2) to prevent threats from emerging by improving
international security environment; and (3) to create global peace and stability and to secure
human security,” to be established by internal capacity building, cooperation with allies, and
“multilayered” international security cooperation. 212 As described by the NTI, 213
The [2010] NDPG introduced a major shift in post-World War II Japanese strategic thinking, replacing the
“basic defense force concept” with a “dynamic defense force concept” that will embrace proactive and
assertive rather than passive and reactive defense policies… In line with this approach, the new NDPG
stipulated that Japan will continue to improve and develop missile defense capabilities in cooperation with
the United States. Of significant note is the ongoing debate over whether, in conjunction with the further
improvement of the missile defense system, Japan’s decades-old self-imposed arms export ban should be
eased.
The new NDPG were also undertaken in an international security environment with growing momentum—
at least among some states—toward a world free of nuclear weapons. While the document’s “dynamic
defense force concept” and further emphasis on U.S.-Japan missile defense cooperation are proactive
responses to intensifying regional security threats, the guidelines did not clearly reflect international efforts
to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Instead, the NDPG adopted the same line on extended nuclear
deterrence as all past versions had, stating that, “As long as nuclear weapons exist, the extended deterrence
provided by the United States with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, will be indispensable…” Issues
surrounding Japan’s position on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are left unresolved, reinforcing
the continued tension between Japan’s global pro-disarmament stance and its reliance on U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 61

The 2010 Japanese Defense White Paper introduced the concept of a “Dynamic Defense Force”
for the first time, a concept which involves the effective and flexible use of Japan’s Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) against unspecific contingencies – apparently understood to be North Korea and
China. 214 In keeping with this shift, the White Paper called for a review of SDF deployment and
looked to strengthen the US-Japan alliance. The 2012 Defense White Paper continued these
plans, further promoting the Dynamic Defense Force concept.
Japan’s 2012 White Paper provided additional updates and discussed the concept of a Dynamic
Defense Force in more detail: 215
In order to react to the changing security environment, a major characteristic of the 2010 NDPG is the
principle of developing a “Dynamic Defense Force.”
In the regions surrounding Japan, there still exist large-scale military forces including nuclear forces, and
many nations are modernizing their military forces and increasing their military activities. Under these
conditions, not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also “dynamic
deterrence”, which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation’s will
and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions,
is important. Additionally, warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in
military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive
operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important.
Since many of security issues currently exist around the world may spread across national boundaries,
international coordination and cooperation are becoming important. Under such circumstances, roles of
military forces are tending to be increasingly diversified and becoming more involved in various everyday
operations such as humanitarian aids and disaster relief, peace keeping, and providing countermeasures
against piracy. The SDF has contributed to many international peace cooperation activities, and their
activities abroad have been becoming routine. It is important for the SDF to be capable of continuing and
supporting such activities.
Given these conditions, it is necessary that Japan’s future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively
perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force
without basing on the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that place priority on “the existence of the defense
force.” To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of “Dynamic Defense Force” that has
readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology
based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of
this “Dynamic Defense Force” focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.
In order to handle an increasingly challenging security environment, Japan needs to steadily build an
appropriate-size defense force. In doing so, and in light of the difficult financial circumstances, the 2010
NDPG state that Japan will carry out “selection and concentration” to selectively concentrate resources on
truly necessary functions and bring about structural reform to the defense force to produce increased
outcome with limited resources after carrying out drastic optimization and streamlining the SDF overall
through fundamental review of the equipment, personnel, organization, and force disposition. Through a
fundamental review of personnel management system, it is also stated that Japan will curve personnel costs
and improve its efficiency and increasing the SDF strength by lowering its average age, in order to improve
the structure of the defense budget, which has a high promotion of personnel cost that currently suppresses
the expenditure of SDF activities. One of the characteristics of the 2010 NDPG is that it touches upon
structural reform to the defense force and personnel structure reforms as above.
A 2012 Japanese defense White Paper described Japan’s security environment as “becoming
increasingly harsh” despite deepening cultural and economic ties with regional neighbors. In the
Forward, the Defense Minister wrote that, 216
In North Korea, a new regime centered on Kim Jong-un was put in place in a short period of time, and the
country pressed ahead with the launch of a missile, which it calls “Satellite”, in April this year. As well as
continuing to boost its defense expenditure and broadly and rapidly modernizing its military forces, China
62 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

is expanding and intensifying its activities in waters near Japan. Russia is stepping up the activities of its
naval vessels and aircraft in its Far Eastern region.
Taking a broad overview of the international community as a whole, frequent regional conflicts and
terrorism, as well as other asymmetric threats, inspire a great deal of fear among the public. Furthermore,
the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons, and the ballistic missiles that are their means of delivery, is becoming a major problem.
The 2012 White Paper discussed Japan’s strategy of increasing defense capabilities,
strengthening the US-Japan alliance, “encouraging bilateral defense cooperation and exchange,
starting with Australia and South Korea, which are our key partners in the Asia-Pacific region,
[and] striv[ing] to promote relationships of mutual understanding and trust with China and
Russia, which are our neighbors…,” increasing international peacekeeping activities, and
developing a crisis management system “that facilitates a swift, accurate response, as well as
strengthening intelligence functions, in order to ensure the safety of the country and the
reassurance of the nation in regard to various internal and external risks, such as major
earthquakes and missile launches by North Korea.” 217
The same paper warned that, “Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital
for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.” The
document also comments, 218
North Korea’s nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan’s national security and it is also a critical
problem for the entire international community in terms of non-proliferation of WMD. In particular,
nuclear tests by North Korea, when considered in conjunction with North Korea’s reinforcement of its
ballistic missile capability that could serve as the means of delivery of WMD, simply cannot be tolerated as
they constitute a serious threat to the security of Japan and do considerable harm to the peace and stability
of Northeast Asia and the international community.
As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for deploying existing ballistic missiles,
extending the range and converting into solid fuel propulsion…. North Korea’s missile issue is, coupled
with its nuclear issue, destabilizing factors for the entire international community and the Asia-Pacific
region, and such developments are of great concern.
In terms of strategies to resolve the situation on the Korean peninsula, the White Paper notes, 219
While it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to maintain close cooperation to resolve the
North Korean nuclear problem, roles played by other countries like China and Russia (the other participants
in the Six-Party Talks), as well as such international institutions as the United Nations and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also important.
In December 2013, Japan approved a new set of National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).
It pointed out what Japan saw as a new security environment that required a new response: 220
As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global
security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a
security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of
the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries
such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time,
the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability.
There is an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor
contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.
In the maritime ___domain, there have been cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas due to
piracy acts as well as coastal states unilaterally asserting their rights and taking actions. In addition,
securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace is becoming a significant security challenge for the
international community against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 63

…In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries,
which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and
destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security
environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe since the formulation of 2010 NDPG. As
the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single
country to deal with them on its own. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary that countries which share
interests in responding to shared security challenges, among others, cooperate and actively respond to
maintain regional and global stability.
The basic policies underlying the new NDPG shifted slightly in next year’s defense white paper,
The Defense of Japan 2014: 221
The new NDPG clearly states Japan’s basic policy on defense from the standpoint of highlighting the most
fundamental matters essential to the Japan’s defense, as explained below.
First, in light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities
along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation,
thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in
securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as
well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships
with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.
Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture
for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S.
Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries, while
closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure
necessary for its defense capabilities to fully exercise their capabilities.
Under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with
the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power
that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and
observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.
Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. is
indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will
closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts,
including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a
constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.
Based on this, the new NDPG defines the following three approaches as key pillars for Japan’s defense
within today’s increasingly severe security environment.
(1) Japan’s own efforts;
(2) Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and
(3) Active promotion of security cooperation
The Defense of Japan 2014 explained the differences between the 2010 NDPG and the new
NDPG as follows: 222
…the new NDPG carry with it great significance because it identifies functions and capabilities of
particular emphasis from a comprehensive viewpoint based on capability assessments focused on the
functions and capacities of the entire SDF, strictly focusing on the basic approach of responding to various
situations by joint operations By advancing defense capability buildup based on the results of these
capability assessments, it has become possible to realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability
buildup, overcoming the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces more easily than
ever.
Compared to the 2010 NDPG, the new NDPG calls for the establishment of a wider-ranging logistical
support foundation. For example, SDF camps and bases will become important deployment staging
64 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

grounds for the dispatch for disaster relief, and to minimize damages to these camps and bases, it is
essential to improve survivability1 including recovery capabilities. Additionally, failure to provide
adequate accommodations for personnel or family support measures will make it impossible to respond
immediately during a situation and fully ensure readiness. In addition, taking into consideration a variety of
elements, including “skills,” “experience,” “physical strength,” and “morale,” it is necessary to ensure the
edge of SDF troops.
As such, it is important to carry out rigorous training and exercises in peacetime as well as
comprehensively carry out personnel education measures, such as recruitment and support for re-
employment, including the further utilization of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel. Furthermore,
the collaboration and cooperation with local governments and relevant organizations as well as
understanding and cooperation of the general public is indispensable to enabling the SDF to respond
appropriately to various situations. As a result, it is extremely critical to actively strengthen collaboration
with local communities and boost communication capabilities.
Given the vital importance of fundamentally enhancing the wide-ranging logistical support foundation
compared to the 2010 NDPG to effectively carry out various activities, as explained above, the new NDPG
calls for the strengthening of infrastructure for enabling a broad range of defense capabilities to be
exhibited, such as training, exercise and operational infrastructure, personnel and education, defense
production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and development,
collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancing of intellectual
base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.
The 2010 NDPG described the development of a “Dynamic Defense Force that demonstrates
readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, underpinned by advanced technical
capabilities and intelligence skills, in light of trends in the level of military technology.” The
Defense of Japan 2014 summarized the characteristics of the Dynamic Joint Defense Force under
the new NDPG:
The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be
seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, the new NDPG states
Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness,
sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with
a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.
In this regard, characteristics prioritized by the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, “resiliency” and
“connectivity” which had not been expressed in the previous NDPG, are newly pointed out. This is based
on the result of reviewing functions and capability to be especially prioritized from a comprehensive
perspective after implementing capability assessments based on joint operations. Specifically, “resiliency”
refers to necessary and sufficient securing of “quality” and “quantity” of defense capabilities that underpin
various activities, and further strengthen the basic foundation for SDF. “Connectivity” refers to the
strengthening of posture to collaborate with relevant ministries and offices, local governments, private
sector, and to cooperate with the U.S., to seamlessly respond to various situations, from peacetime to
contingencies.
A new Japanese Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (new MTDP) was laid out
in December 2013 to systematically transition towards the realization of the Dynamic Joint
Defense Force that “follows the philosophy laid out in the new NDPG:”
To seamlessly and dynamically fulfill the responsibilities outlined in the new NDPG, with a focus on
enhancement of joint operability, emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in
particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities
(5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer
space and cyber space threats; (8) large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 65

In addition to enhancing the above capabilities, SDF units would be reorganized, with more units
being deployed towards southwest Japan. The new MTDP addresses the North Korean threat
primarily through BMD and enhanced ISR:
Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive
improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles.
The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including
the new BMD equipment.
In preparations for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile
attack, the SDF will continue to procure necessary equipment, etc., in order to improve its ISR posture,
ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants as well as search and destroy infiltrating units.

Japan and the DPRK

For the DPRK, historical grievances and propaganda – including Japan’s status as a former
colonizer, an ally of the US, and a supporter of the ROK’s economic development – have
resulted in extremely negative attitudes towards Japan. For Japan, the DPRK was low in the list
of international priorities prior to 1998. This changed, however, when DPRK carried out long-
range ballistic missile tests that overflew Japan – resulting in both the Japanese government and
the general public realizing the seriousness of the threat. 223
While relations with the DPRK warmed somewhat in the early 2000s, the revelation in 2002 that
the DPRK had kidnapped more than a dozen Japanese citizens during 1977-83 led to Japanese
government and public outrage. While some of the abductees were allowed to return to Japan for
a visit, the DPRK held their families hostage, (though the Japanese government declined to force
them to return to the DPRK). Many Japanese are not convinced by the DPRK’s claims that most
of the abductees are dead. In fact, when the remains of one abductee were returned to Japan, tests
showed that the remains were not those of the abductee that the DPRK had claimed. 224
The lack of further DPRK concessions on this issue has resulted in a hardening of Japanese
public opinion towards the DPRK, with the government cutting almost all trade and ties,
dropping food aid, and pressing the US to do likewise. The DPRK, in return, has increased
demands for Japanese colonial occupation reparations and removal of sanctions.
Normalization of relations between the two countries was a part of the 2005 Six Party Joint
Statement, but both implementation of the agreement and the talks themselves have stalled and
warmer relations have not been realized. In addition, Japan has reduced support for the Six Party
Talks process overall, as it has failed to denuclearize the DPRK and also does not address the
DPRK’s ballistic missiles, which Japan sees as directly threatening its national security. 225
In January 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s party declared that Japan would increase military
spending for the first time in 11 years, starting in April 2013. While this is in part due to the
escalated confrontation with China over disputed islands, it is also in response to the DPRK’s
December 2012 rocket launch over Japan’s southern islands. 226
Despite Abe’s efforts to increase Japanese involvement in regional security, his administration
has also made diplomatic progress with North Korea, which was highlighted by North Korea’s
agreement to reopen investigations into Japanese abductees. In return, Japan lifted some of the
economic sanctions it has placed on North Korea. North Korea’s efforts may be part of a push to
“diversify its diplomatic focus away from China,” as relations with China have soured after
North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013. 227
66 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Such a conclusion appears to be complemented by Hwang Pyong So’s visit to Seoul, and the
release of an American prisoner in October 2014. While it is impossible to determine what will
come of the recent Japan-North Korea engagement, some experts believe that North Korea’s
decision to engage with Japan is only a tactical move aimed towards the more strategic goal of
improving relations with the US. 228
Japan, China, and the ROK
Japan, China, and the ROK have increased their formal cooperation in foreign policy, economy,
trade, science, technology, and culture over the past ten years. They institutionalized cooperation
mechanism involving a Trilateral Summit Meeting, Secretariat, 18 ministerial meetings, and over
50 working-level mechanisms. 229 However, Japanese relations with China and the ROK have
had their own tensions. As the International Crisis Group has reported, 230
Japan and South Korea have recognised the need to increase military cooperation against the North Korean
threat. After the attack on Yŏnp’yŏng Island, defence ministers discussed two proposals. The General
Security of Military Information Agreement would allow sharing of information on issues such as the
North’s nuclear and missile programs. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) would
allow exchanges of logistical supplies and support. South Korean Defence Minister Kim Kwan-jin was to
sign the agreements in Tokyo in May 2012, but the signing has been delayed due to a domestic backlash
over military cooperation with Japan.
Tensions between Japan and China have increased steadily as a result of debates over maritime
rights and sovereignty over islands in the northeast Pacific, but both sides have been careful to
try to limit the level of confrontation. Despite the fact that Japan and China have been engaging
in disputes over islands claimed by both states, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe remarked in
2003 that, “I have absolutely no intention to climb up the escalation ladder… For me, Japan’s
relations with China stand out, as among the most important. I have never ceased to pursue what
I called [a] ‘Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’ with China.
The doors are always open on my side for the Chinese leaders.” 231
At the same time, due to Japan’s US alliance-first strategy, it is difficult for China to have a
dialogue with Japan regarding the islands. 232 The most the leaders of the two powers – Abe and
Xi – could manage during their first meeting since each took power was a handshake at a
meeting in November 2014 that was perceived throughout the world as “frosty” at best. 233
Disputes in the Sea of Japan, or East Sea, also affect Japan and the ROK. They involve a small
set of islands known as the Liancourt Rocks (or, Takeshima by the Japanese and Dokdo by the
Koreans), which are claimed by both countries, but is administered by the ROK. In the summer
of 2012, tensions between Japan and the ROK rose significantly after the ROK President, at the
time Lee Myung-bak, visited the islands, prompting Japan to increase its territorial claims
assertions and attempts to take the issue to the International Court of Justice, all of which the
ROK rejected. 234
Several bilateral meetings were also cancelled, and the atmosphere of tension had remained.
Although the two countries continue to cooperate, especially with the US and especially
regarding the DPRK, these islands and other issues have reduced the prospects for increasing
trilateral US-ROK-Japan relations.
As is the case with the ROK, this raises the broader issue that at least the public aspects of
Japan’s strategy and force posture have not yet addressed how Japan will react if the DPRK goes
on to create much larger nuclear forces, and to the changing balance of US and Chinese
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 67

capabilities that will grow out of the US rebalancing to Asia and China’s shifts in strategy and
ongoing military modernization.
Like the ROK, Japan’s public strategies and defense white papers focus largely on past events
and the present balance. Like Japan, however, the ROK must assess the ongoing changes US-
Chinese balance and their level of cooperation versus competition as key factor in its own
security. For all of the reasons outlined in the following chapters, this may lead to a major
expansion of ROK military efforts and possibly ROK long-range missile and nuclear programs.
Russia
Russian policy towards North and South Korea had been shaped largely by its broader relations
with China, the US, and Japan, and has been affected by the growing tension between Russia and
the West over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. DNI James R. Clapper reported to the Senate in
March 2013 that Russian domestic political developments and foreign policy were shaped by the
following major considerations: 235
During the next year, Russia’s political system of managed democracy will come under greater strain as the
Kremlin grapples with growing social discontent and a society that is increasingly in flux. Important sectors
of the Russian public are frustrated with the country’s sluggish economy and are no longer content with a
political system that lacks any real pluralism and suffers from poor and arbitrary governance and endemic
corruption. All of these factors present Russian President Vladimir Putin with far greater challenges than
any he faced during his two previous terms in office.
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 was intended to restore strength and vigor to a system that he
believed had weakened under President Dmitriy Medvedev. Instead, antipathy over the Putin-Medvedev
job swap touched off some of the largest political protests Russia has seen since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Despite these unprecedented protests, the Russian leadership has demonstrated firm resolve to
preserve the system, while a disparate opposition movement struggles to become more cohesive, broaden
its base, and build momentum. After initially tolerating demonstrations and offering a few political reforms
in the hope of dividing the opposition, the Kremlin took a more aggressive approach, adopting measures to
restrict opposition activities, such as targeting opposition figures for harassment and using legislative and
judicial means to confront, intimidate, and arrest opponents. These actions have helped to thwart the
opposition’s ability to build momentum and preserve the Kremlin’s control of the political system, but they
have not addressed the sources of bitterness and dissatisfaction.
Russian foreign policy is unlikely to deviate significantly from its current course in the next year, but
domestic political factors almost certainly will exert greater influence on foreign policy. Putin is sensitive
to any US criticisms of Russian domestic political practices, which he perceives as meddling in Russia’s
internal affairs. Nevertheless, he sees benefits in cooperating with the United States on certain issues.
Missile defense will remain a sensitive issue for Russia. Russian leaders are wary that in the long run US
pursuit of a “missile shield” will result in systems that enable the United States to undercut Russia’s nuclear
deterrent and retaliatory capabilities. Russian leaders also see aspects of US plans for missile defense in
Europe as serious threats to their core national security interests. The Kremlin will continue to look to the
United States and our NATO partners for guarantees that any system will not be directed at Russia.
Clapper’s 2014 statement came before Russia had seized Crimea and provided military support
to the rebels in eastern Ukraine, and most US and other NATO statements in 2014 focused on the
security of Russia. Russia, however, has accused the US and Europe of trying to use states like
Ukraine to encircle it, reached out to China, and accused the US of trying to destabilize Asian
and other developing states to serve US interests through covert policies that Russia calls “Color
Revolutions.” It may well see the DPRK as a pawn to play in this game.
68 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Russia and the Korean Military Balance

Russia has long maintained relatively close cooperation with the DPRK, holding summit
meetings, releasing joint statements, and signing several agreements over the past decade.
Although Russia did join the UN Security Council’s condemnation after the DPRK’s second
nuclear test in 2009, Kim Jong-il visited Russia in August 2011, and the two countries agreed to
a variety of construction projects and other cooperation. In general, Russia wishes to enhance its
position as a mediator and increase its economic presence in the region. 236
Russia published a new Military Doctrine in February 5, 2010. The document did not discuss the
Koreas per se, but it reflected a perceived reduction in military and political threats while also
referencing the use of military force in solving conflicts and an increase in military dangers in
certain areas. Russia’s stated national interests are to develop partnerships with other states based
on common interests, protect Russian interests, and promote the use of special armed forces
formations to assist Russia’s economy.
The threats Russia included in the 2010 Military Doctrine are a general deterioration in the
international military-political system, the use of military force in states near Russia, other
countries’ increased mobilizations, and the impeding of state and military command and control.
Dangers listed mostly applied to the West, especially NATO, and again the expansion of foreign
militaries located on or near Russia. Also discussed were missile defense systems and territorial
claims. 237
World development at the present stage is characterized by a weakening of ideological confrontation, a
lowering of the level of economic, political, and military influence of certain states (groups of states) and
alliances and an increase in the influence of other states with ambitions for all-embracing domination,
multipolarity, and the globalization of diverse processes.
Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. There is a continuing tendency towards a strong-arm resolution
of these conflicts, including in regions bordering on the Russian Federation. The existing international
security architecture (system), including its international-legal mechanisms, does not ensure equal security
for all states.
That said, despite the decline in the likelihood of a large-scale war involving the use of conventional means
of attack and nuclear weapons being unleashed against the Russian Federation, in a number of areas
military dangers to the Russian Federation are intensifying.
In contrast to the previous (2000) Military Doctrine, the 2010 version did not specifically refer to
Russia as a democracy or remark upon the defensive character of its doctrine. Before it was
released there were many reports that the document would discuss Russia’s possible preemptive
use of nuclear weapons; 238 however, the final version had almost exactly the same language as
the 2000 document, reaffirming the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a WMD or
conventional weapons attack that threatens the existence of the state. 239
Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts
and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of attack (a large-scale war or regional war).
In the event of the outbreak of a military conflict involving the utilization of conventional means of attack
(a large-scale war or regional war) and imperiling the very existence of the state, the possession of nuclear
weapons may lead to such a military conflict developing into a nuclear military conflict.
…In the context of the implementation by the Russia Federation of strategic deterrence measures of a
forceful nature, provision is made for the utilization of precision weapons.
The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of
nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 69

aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very
existence of the state is under threat.
The Korean peninsula was not mentioned in Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine, but the 2014
Japanese Defense White Paper commented as follows on Russian and DPRK relations: 240
While North Korea and Russia became estranged with the end of the Cold War, they signed the Russia-
North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000. In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, then
Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia. A Russia-North Korea summit was held for
the first time in nine years, and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a gas-pipeline project, among other
matters. In September 2012, after the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, the two countries signed an
agreement that writes off 90% of the debt owed to Russia by North Korea, and in such ways, friendly
relations have been maintained between the two countries. Furthermore, in September 2013, a railway
opened for service connecting Khasan, a coastal area in the Russian Far East, and Rajin Port in northeastern
North Korea.
Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After the nuclear test
conducted by North Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that condemned the test but
expressed that it was against sanctions that could influence normal trade and economic relations with North
Korea.
While it still uncertain how much the Ukraine crisis will change Russian relations with the
DPRK, Russia has sharply reduced its nuclear cooperation with the US, threatened to limit
further arms control talks. It reached out to the DPRK in 2014 by offering new economic
projects, and more political exchanges. It held a vote in the Duma that forgave some $10 billion
in debt incurred during the Soviet era, and allow the DPRK to pay off $1.09 billion more over a
20 year period in equal installments every six months – a period that mean most of the payments
in the outyears would be offset by inflation. Russia also promised to reinvest $1 billion more that
Pyongyang still owed into a trans-Siberian railway through North Korea to South Korea. It also
discussed a pipeline that could allow Russia to export gas and electricity to South Korea. 241
Mixed Security Policies
Like China, Russia has oppose the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development in the past because
this could cause the ROK, Japan, and other countries to develop their own nuclear capabilities
and/or increase development of their missile defenses – both of which could be used against
Russia. Russia has also been interested in economic development of Northeast Asia, and in using
the DPRK as a transit country for export, rail, and energy links to the ROK. 242
At the same time, Russia strengthened its relationship with the DPRK long before the crisis over
the Ukraine. For example, Russia signed a military technology cooperation agreement with
North Korea in 2001, 243 and then-President Medvedev met in August 2011 with Kim Jong Il,
who was visiting Russia for the first time in nine years. At the same time, Russia generally
supports the UN Security Council resolutions regarding DPRK nuclear and missile tests.244
Russia has also been increasing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region and has joined a variety of
regional frameworks. It has been a big supporter for the Six Party Talks, as the country otherwise
has the weakest political, economic, and cultural links, among the six participants, to the Korean
peninsula and East Asia. Russia’s leverage over the DPRK is much smaller than China’s,
resulting in significant limitations of its plans for the region. Furthermore, Russia has realized
that as long as the DPRK is pursuing nuclear weapons, its ambitious economic projects will
remain unrealized. 245 The invitation of Kim Jong-un to Moscow for the May 9, 2015 celebration
70 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

– marking the 70th anniversary of the former Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany – has
been seen a sign of thawing relations, most likely to increase economic interest in the Korean
peninsula. 246
There still, however, are leaders and think tanks in Russia that view the DPRK negatively. For
example, one prominent Russian think tank released a report analyzing DPRK’s collapse as a
certainty and concluding that ROK-led Korean reunification would coincide with Russia’s
national interest. This is in opposition to Russia’s official policy of equidistance between the two
Koreas.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 71

II. The “Conventional” Military Balance in the

Koreas and Northeast Asia
The military balance has long been a key factor shaping the stability of the Koreas and Northeast
Asia. For decades, the DPRK has shaped the military balance in the Koreas through periods of
deliberate confrontation and military threats, threatening military movements and exercises, a
steady military build-up, and sporadic acts of low-level violence ranging from assassination to
artillery attacks and ship sinkings. It has focused on ROK targets but also consistently threatened
the US.
There is no one military balance that is likely to shape a conflict between the Koreas. As Figures
II.1 and II.2 show, it is possible to make radically different counts of the conventional balance –
depending on the analyst’s perspective. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) count in
Figure II.1 is far more favorable to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North
Korea) than the Japanese count in Figure II.2.
Much depends on the scenario used in making the count. The ROK count is a total force
inventory. The Japanese count focuses on the modern conventional forces likely to dominate a
major conventional conflict. Both methods have value, but both can tell only part of the story –
even for conventional forces – and tacitly assume very different levels of each side’s forces that
would be committed to a conflict.
Moreover the term “conventional” does not apply to the forces each nation would have in many
credible scenarios. Asymmetric and nuclear forces are likely to play a major role in the way any
conflict develops. Asymmetric warfare can be used at any level of conflict, and much of the
DPRK’s past behavior has used low-level asymmetric warfare to threaten the ROK at levels that
have drawn a military response. The DPRK can also use its limited nuclear capabilities, and
missile threats to try to deter ROK or US conventional attacks on the DPRK, even if it has no
intention of actually using nuclear weapons.
Deterrence, Restraint, and Levels of Conflict
At the same time, there are powerful political and economic deterrents to a major conflict for all
of the reasons outlined in Chapter II. The ROK has emerged as a major economic power, and
one that is important to the economies of the US, Japan, Russia and China (People’s Republic of
China or PRC) – as well as to the world. The DPRK is one of the world’s most heavily
militarized states, but is still a relatively small military power by US and Chinese standards. It
remains vulnerable to US aid, missile power, and precision strike capability, and runs a serious
risk of being isolated if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support.
Much depends on China’s position and the extent to which it seeks to prevent, contain, and de-
escalate any conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as well as on US and ROK efforts to avoid any
repetition of the mistakes made during the Korean War – and that appeared to place US forces
near the border of China – or to confront China with the loss of the DPRK as a buffer state in
ways China felt would become a threat.
72 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

As the analysis of Chinese conventional and nuclear missile forces in Chapter IX makes clear,
China already can bring important anti-access/area denial (A2AD) assets to bear in a “worst
case” conflict in the Koreas, and while the Chinese modernization efforts described in Chapter
VII may today be focused on Taiwan and the Pacific, they directly affect its future capabilities to
intervene in the Koreas and Northeast Asia as well as increasingly challenge US power
projection.
Every aspect of the broader balance of US and Chinese military capabilities and modernization
efforts in Asia and the Pacific – and the extent to which they cooperate or confront each other in
any present or future Korean crisis or conflict – affects the more narrow balance of forces now in
the Koreas and Northeast Asia.
A Clash or Conflict between the DPRK and ROK
The fact remains, however, that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war. This is
particularly true if one considers the number of times that war has been the result of
unpredictable incidents and patterns of escalation. The historical reality is that the likelihood of
less-probable forms of war actually occurring has been consistently higher than what seemed in
peacetime to be the most probable contingencies and the patterns of escalation that seem most
likely from the viewpoint of a “rational bargainer.”
Moreover, the DPRK has long emphasized irregular warfare, low-level attacks, covert
operations, and large Special Forces. Its forces are ground and missile “heavy” compared to
those of the ROK. The DPRK puts far more emphasis on force quantity or mass, while the ROK
has emphasized land and air technology and force quality. The DPRK has long built up large
stocks of chemical weapons, may have biological weapons, and is an emerging nuclear power
that may add nuclear warheads to a large force of long-range missiles. The ROK is just
beginning to develop longer-range missile forces and has not seriously pursued nuclear weapons.
It is, however, acquiring missile defenses.
Much would depend on the conditions and levels of preparation and warning that led to a
confrontation or actual fighting. Total forces and orders of battle may or may not be relevant
measures in a given crisis or conflict. Pyongyang might conduct a major conventional buildup to
pressure the ROK, Japan, and/or the US. It might do so to deal with internal unrest, trying to
focus the nation on a foreign enemy. It might launch a limited war for the same reasons, or
engage in limited provocations – like those in 2010 – to which it expects to receive a limited
ROK response and little punishment or censure from the international community.
It is doubtful that the ROK would initiate such a conflict. South Korea cannot be sure what level
of escalation would follow any response to a limited incident or DPRK action of the kind
Pyongyang initiated by sinking the ROK ship Cheonan and firing on Yeonpyeong. The ROK
might also be confronted with a DPRK succession crisis or massive suppression of the
population – creating a strong incentive for some form of decisive ROK military action.
If the DPRK and ROK did go to war with “conventional” forces, the resulting level of restraint
and escalation ladder would be far less clear. The perceptions of risk and capability could be so
different on each side – and involve such different mixes of the use and threatened use of
asymmetric, conventional, nuclear, and long-range missile forces – that each side might make a
major miscalculation, and a conflict might escalate in unpredictable ways that neither side could
control.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 73

There also are major uncertainties to the outcome of any such conflict. A battle near the DMZ,
directed at a target like Seoul, could rapidly escalate to the point at which it threatened the
ROK’s entire economy, even if no major invasion took place. DPRK missile, rocket, and artillery
fire would be met in kind, as well as by precision air strikes, though the ability of such strikes to
suppress DPRK forces is uncertain, as are the potential losses to the ROK air forces. The ROK
might well respond with strikes deep into the DPRK, attacking countervalue targets like key
economic and infrastructure facilities, but again, the exchange rates in terms of casualties and
tactical outcomes would not be predictable before such a war occurred.
Similar problems drive any assessment of the outcome of a major DPRK invasion of the ROK,
even if one only focuses on DPRK-ROK forces. The DPRK has far larger ground forces, but the
outcome of what would today be an air-land battle driven heavily by the overall mobility of
DPRK land forces and their ability to concentrate along given lines of advance relative to the
attrition technically superior ROK land and air forces could inflict is impossible to calculate with
any confidence, as is the actual mix of forces both sides could deploy in a given area and
scenario. It may be possible to simulate with advanced war gaming models and classified data,
but it is unclear what level of confidence would result.
74 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.1: ROK Summary of the DPRK-ROK Conventional

Military Balance in 2012

Sources: While the 2012 Defense White Paper was released in Korean in December 2012, no English translations have yet been
made available. However, one news agency compiled a graphic of the conventional military capabilities balance based on
information in the 2012 report; see “South Korean Defense White Paper 2012 Published,” ROK Drop, December 22, 2012,
http://rokdrop.com/2012/12/22/south-korean-defense-white-paper-2012-published/; Ho Jun Kim, “‘NLL = De Facto Maritime
Boundary Line,’ Officially Affirms the Government (Ministry of National Defense),” Yonhap News, December 21, 2012,
http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/politics/2012/12/21/0511000000AKR20121221062451043.HTML?template=2087.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 75

Figure II.2: Japanese Summary of the DPRK-ROK Conventional Military

Balance in 2012

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 14.

76 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Levels of “Conventional” Conflict

As Sun Tzu pointed out centuries ago, wars do not have to involve conflict if military force can
be used politically in the equivalent of “wars of intimidation.” The DPRK has found that one
way to both mobilize support for the regime and put pressure on its neighbors and the US is to
utilize military pressure in the context of some self-generated crisis. It has learned that one
rational way for a power with limited resources but large military forces to survive is to appear
“irrational” and then compromise. Within limits, it has been able to count on the ROK and US
showing restraint, China being forced to largely stand aside or support its “buffer” state, Japan
and other Asian states pressing for some form of compromise that the DPRK can exploit, and
Russia largely standing aside.
No one, however, can be certain that the DPRK is not going to escalate its future threats and
actions in ways that lead to serious conventional conflicts. The DPRK can threaten the ROK’s
capital, raid across the DMZ, provoke large-scale maritime clashes, provoke a major artillery
strike, or raise the political ante with a new set of attacks on the ROK’s leaders. This can lead to
escalation at a level neither side wants and serious miscalculations that increase the level of
conflict. It can provoke a cycle of challenge and response neither side can easily end. The
DPRK’s manipulation of a large artificial threat of ROK and US invasion can be manipulated to
win popular support and some experts fear that any internal power struggle in the DPRK might
result in its leadership provoking a war to retain power.
The DPRK’s unique ideological extremism and reliance on the cult of the leader may also
interact with the fact it has not had any serious military experience since the 1953 cease-fire in
the Korean War. Its complex mix of regular and internal security forces and massive bureaucracy
may interact with ideology and reliance on the leader in ways that make its military operations
both inefficient and unpredictable and lead to unexpected levels of escalation or tactical and
strategic behavior.
Furthermore, the DPRK’s economic weaknesses may impose problems in terms of readiness and
sustainability that may lead to military actions that are more desperate, or at least different, from
what might be expected based on the size of its order of battle and the deployment of its forces.
This further highlights the risk of relying on “rational bargainer” behavior and scenarios in a
conventional – or any other form of – conflict.
Open-Ended Scenarios and Escalation Ladders
The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) presents special problems for the ROK. It is four kilometers long
and about 250 kilometers wide, and allows North Korean forces to deploy much closer to the
capital of South Korea than ROK forces can deploy near the capital of North Korea - Pyongyang,
the capital of the DPRK, is approximately 125 kilometers north, while the ROK’s capital, Seoul,
is about 40 kilometers south. There are some 20,000 artillery pieces and armored vehicles, as
well as over one million troops, in the surrounding areas.
The DPRK has deployed many of its forces near the DMZ and has massive Special and naval
forces designed to support raids and use smaller systems like mine layers and submersibles. It
emphasizes artillery, rocket, and missile forces. The ROK emphasizes defense, conventional
military forces, air power, and air and missile defenses. It can count on limited support from US
ground forces and a far larger US presence in terms of air precision strike, stealth, cruise missile,
and naval forces.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 77

The threat of a large land war for control of the entire peninsula cannot be dismissed, but a
repetition of a Korean War-type conflict seems increasingly unlikely. The Korean Peninsula is
250 kilometers wide at the narrowest point and approximately 1,000 kilometers long. Most of the
Peninsula is mountainous, so heavily armored forces are generally either forced to use
predictable routes or are unable to move quickly. According to the International Institute of
Strategic Studies (IISS), there are three main avenues of approach for a land offensive that are
shaped by Korea’s topography; these are also shown in Figure II.3: 247
Two are in the relatively flat western part of the Peninsula, known as the Chorwon and Kaesong Munsan
corridors, and provide the most direct approaches to Seoul and Pyongyang, although much of the flat
terrain is marsh land and rice fields. The third route runs along the east coast through the Taedong
Mountains and is the most amenable to vehicle passage. In some places, these corridors are about 15km
wide and interconnected with other possible routes, which would utilise existing road networks and suitable
terrain in the central and eastern parts of the Peninsula.
It is important to note, however, that such terrain considerations affect the use of modern
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and precision air power. Joint warfare
today can count on 24-hour surveillance and targeting of land movements almost regardless of
weather. As the wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003 demonstrated, smart submunitions and stand-
off precision strike weapons vastly increase the lethality of the modern strike aircraft and
bombers in US and ROK forces. Stealth adds another dimension, as does the ability to use cruise
missiles, deep strikes, and weapons like earth penetrators to attack DPRK command, control,
computer and battle management (C4I/BM) assets and critical infrastructure.
The end result can be an air-land battle rather than a battle dominated by land forces. In fact,
stealth, precision-guided air-to-surface weapons, and cruise missiles are becoming the equivalent
of “weapons of mass effectiveness,” and if the ROK must fear massive artillery and rocket
strikes on a key target like Seoul, the DPRK must increasingly fear an ROK-US response that
can strike deep into the DPRK. This changes the definition of “conventional” in terms of war
fighting effects, but the DPRK can respond with its own rockets, missiles, and weapons of mass
effectiveness.
As is described in detail in a later chapter, the DPRK has large stocks of chemical weapons, a
small nuclear arsenal, and possible possession of biological weapons, all of which add another
wild card to the problem of assessing the balance. The DPRK could escalate to the use of such
weapons to try to deter counteroffensives and hold any gains, limit ROK and US air and missile
strikes, limit other forms of ROK and US escalation, try to force a favorable settlement, or to
ensure regime survival if the DPRK’s other forces faced a major defeat and ROK attacks across
the DMZ.
The risk of some type of DPRK use of CBRN weapons – if only in terms of threat and
intimidation – will grow if the DPRK can develop a serious stockpile of nuclear weapons and
arm longer-range ballistic missiles. The DPRK’s nuclear efforts are also creating a growing risk
that China and the US will compete to provide some form of extended deterrence for each side
with their own missile forces, that the ROK will go nuclear, and that Japan will develop its own
counterstrike capabilities against the DPRK.
There is also a slowly increasing risk that a conflict will escalate beyond the Korean Peninsula –
a threat compounded by the many tensions between Asian states over the emergence of China as
a power capable of regional power projection and a major nuclear and missile power in its own
78 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

right, and by the many tensions over control of islands and offshore waters in Northeast Asia and
the rest of the Pacific.
Figure II.3: Avenues of Approach from the DPRK to the ROK

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2001; cited in Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “The Future of US Airpower on the Korean
Peninsula,” Air & Space Power Journal, 2005. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/bechtol.html.

Comparing Total “Conventional” Orders of Battle with Possible

Combat Scenarios
The force counts that follow provide more detailed estimates of the conventional forces on each
side and offer a break out of equipment types that gives some indication of force quality.
In broad terms, the ROK has the advantage in “conventional force” quality, while the DPRK has
the advantage in force quantity. James R. Clapper, the US Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), summarized the Korean conventional balance as follows on February 10, 2011: 248
North Korea’s conventional military capabilities have eroded significantly over the past 10-15 years due to
persistent food shortages, poor economic conditions, inability to replace aging weapons inventories,
reduced training, and increased diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Therefore, Pyongyang
increasingly relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although
there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a
major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 79

Nevertheless, the [Korean People’s Army (“KPA”) remains a large and formidable force capable of
defending the North. Also, as demonstrated by DPRK attacks on the South Korean ship Cheonan in March
2010 and Yeongpyong Island in November, North Korea is capable of conducting military operations that
could potentially threaten regional stability. These operations provide Pyongyang with what the regime
may see as a means to attain political goals through coercion.

The Limits to Conventional Force Comparisons

It is important to note, however, that the DPRK faces serious limits on its conventional
capabilities that Clapper did not address, and that could seriously affect its ability to exploit its
apparent conventional strength. Some experts feel that the DPRK’s recurrent economic crises
have severely affected its ability to upgrade major weapons, modernize combat and service
support forces, and logistic stocks and capabilities.
This may affect the quality and quantity of basic military stocks like artillery ammunition, and
there are reports that the DPRK lacks the national fuel stocks to even carry out a major
conventional offensive. Other reports question its levels and realism in training as well as the
readiness and size of its capability to sustain offensive operations. These reports cannot be
confirmed at the unclassified level, but they also cannot be ignored. They present further reasons
why the DPRK might choose scenarios or attack models that do not seem predictable. Such
limits could encourage it to rely on asymmetric or nuclear options, depending on the scenario
and cause of any fighting. They might also force it to seek a sudden, surprise conventional
victory in any all-out conventional attack.
It is also unlikely that either the DPRK or ROK will ever go to war with their entire orders of
battle, and – in any case – the term “conventional” does not fit a DPRK force structure that
includes so many Special Forces, covert elements, and unconventional capabilities, with so much
experience in political warfare, and that are so different in deployment, terrain, and vulnerability.
Nevertheless, comparisons of total forces have broad value in measuring the contingency
capabilities of a given side, even if they are not direct measures of the forces that would be
involved in any given case of actual warfare. They also help illustrate the different ways forces
can be counted and the range of differences that exist in the data provided by given sources.
The official sources quoted in this analysis provide only limited summary data on the balance of
forces now in Korea, and only the ROK provides summary breakouts of the data on key aspects
of the DPRK-ROK balance. As for other sources, comparisons based on the unclassified data
issued by the IISS seem to provide the most reliable non-governmental source of data on the
forces of each country, although an examination of other NGO and commercial data from
sources such as Jane’s reveals significant differences.
What to Count
All of these comparisons are affected by the fact it is difficult to determine what number of US
and Chinese forces could or should be counted, so most of the following comparisons count total
US and Chinese forces.
China could deploy many of its forces into the Korean theater relatively quickly. The US can
project air and sea power relatively quickly but has a lesser forward-deployed capability base and
support available for such forces, and faces more serious problems in land force power
projection. As a result, much might depend on the US forces now in Korea.
80 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The size and nature of US forces that are in the ROK or might deploy in wartime is discussed in
more detail in Chapter VIII. Key US official sources like the US Pacific Command (PACOM) do
not provide a detailed unclassified breakout of the US forces in the ROK or of those forces could
be deployed in a given contingency. The IISS does, however, provide an estimate of US forces in
South Korea and Asia and these data are discussed in more depth in the section on US forces.
To summarize, the IISS reports that the US now permanently deploys some 28,500 troops in the
ROK. This includes some 19,200 US Army forces including the 8th Army headquarters, the US
2nd Infantry division at Tongduchon, as well as one artillery, one combat aviation, and one air
defense brigade. These are equipped with modern tanks, AFVs, artillery, Patriot surface-to-air
missiles, and AH-64 attack helicopters. There are also 8,800 USAF personnel, the 7th Air Force
Headquarters, two fighter squadrons with 20 F-16C/Ds, a squadron with 24 A-10C-IIs, an ISR
squadron with U-2s, and a Special Forces unit. There are also roughly 250 US Navy and 250 US
Marine Corps personnel stationed in the ROK.
These numbers are limited, but scarcely define the US presence that would affect any serious
conflict. US naval and air forces would surge into the Korean theater from outside the area in any
conflict or crisis, and the current total of US forces in Japan and the ROK is only a symbol of
such a potential surge. US land forces would be slower to surge, but would also build-up from
outside Japan and the ROK. Much would also depend on Japan’s willingness to serve as a
staging point and how much pressure China did or did not put on other areas of the Pacific, such
as the Taiwan Straits.
Total Manpower
The ROK provides DPRK and ROK manpower comparisons and total Northeast Asian
manpower comparisons for 2010, shown in Figures II.4 and II.5. Unlike the ROK’s equipment
counts, these manpower counts are almost identical to the IISS breakouts of manpower data for
active and reserve forces and for regular and paramilitary forces for 2013 – if one allows for the
passage of time.
Figure II.6 shows the IISS estimate of total manpower on each side, while Figure II.7 shows
the number of reserves available for each country. It is clear that the DPRK and China have
much larger manpower totals than the ROK and US. The DPRK also has roughly twice the
active military manpower of the ROK.
In practice, however, manpower quality and training – and associated weapons, sustainability,
battle management, ISR, and C4 capabilities – are likely to be as important as total active and
reserve manpower. Sheer numbers are still important, but total manpower is no longer a key
measure of force strength. The qualitative aspects of the manpower totals in Figures II.4 and
II.5 are discussed in more detail in the country sections that follow.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 81

Figure II.4: ROK Estimate of Korean Manpower Balance in 2012

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
Infantry Reconnais Self
Armored Towed Guided
Tanks Combat sance Propelled MLRS
Vehicles Artillery Weapons
Vehicles Vehicles Artillery
DPRK 4200 2200 4800
ROK 2400 2700 200 30

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
82 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.5: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Manpower

Balance in 2012
60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0
DPRK ROK China Japan Russia
Towed Artillery 6176 422 12765
Armored Vehicles 2200 2700 2700 804 15700
Tanks 4200 2400 7400 806 20800

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 83

Figure II.6: IISS Estimate of Total Active Military Manpower Affecting the
Northeast Asian Balance in 2015 (in thousands)
3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Other 100 3.5 263 41.2
Paramilitary 660 12.65 189 450 489
Air Force 398 47.1 110 65 148 334.55
Navy 235 45.5 60 68 130 517.95
Army 1600 151.05 1020 522 230 539.45

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015 (London: Routledge, 2015).
84 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.7: IISS Estimate of Total Military Reserve Manpower,

Affecting the Northeast Asian Balance in 2015 (in thousands)
8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Reserves 510 56.1 600 4500 2000 854.9
Civilian 14
Additional Paramilitary Reserves 5700 3000

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2015.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 85

Army and Land Forces

The ROK white paper estimate of the land forces balance for 2010, shown in Figures II.8 and
II.9. reflects a much larger DPRK superiority in tanks and other armored vehicles that the IISS
shows for 2015, and the ROK uses a different – but undefined – way of counting artillery. The
ROK also presents a different count of helicopters, and flags a DPRK advantage in river crossing
assets ignored in other estimates of the balance. Other differences occur when the comparison is
expanded to cover China and Japan and are further complicated by the fact that the ROK changes
definitions from one type of comparison of the same forces to another.
There are no consistent patterns in the differences in the estimates for China and Japan, but it
should be noted that official US estimates often count the same forces very differently in given
commands, services, and branches of the US intelligence community. Much depends on the
reason a given comparison is developed and the definitions used – definitions that often are not
explicitly explained in a given source.
From 2000 to the present, the DPRK army made significant organizational changes that resulted
in greater numbers of light infantry units. IHS Jane’s reported that the DPRK army undertook the
“expansion of existing division-level light infantry battalions within the DMZ corps to regiments
and the reorganization of seven infantry or mechanized infantry divisions into light infantry
divisions.” Such changes came about after army studied recent wars such as those in the Balkans,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, which convinced the DPRK army of the need to increase the number of
light infantry troops. 249
IHS Jane’s estimates that the ROK has eight corps with a total of four armored brigades, six
mechanized infantry divisions, 16 infantry divisions and two infantry brigades, an air assault
brigade, and three counter-infiltration brigades. It has a much smaller Special Forces command
with seven brigades. Both countries have large numbers of combat and service support units as
well as independent artillery and air defense elements. 250
The IISS estimates for 2014 are different. The IISS Military Balance reports that the DPRK
Army is an 11 corps force with two mechanized corps and nine infantry corps. Its armored forces
include one armored division, 15 armored brigades, and four mechanized divisions. The bulk of
its forces are still infantry – 27 divisions and 14 brigades – with much more limited speed of
maneuver and combined armored warfare capability. 251 There are another 40 reserve infantry
divisions and 18 reserve infantry brigades. The DPRK does, however, have a large Special
Forces Command with some 88,000 men; a mix of land, sea, and air units that include nine light
infantry bridges; ten sniper brigades; and three airborne brigades.
Comparisons of numbers of combat units do, however, have little operational meaning since
units with the same title can differ so much in actual strength between and within given
countries. It is clear from their different force structures, however, that the DPRK has designed
its land forces to engage in combined conventional and asymmetric warfare, including a major
ability to infiltrate the ROK and deploy Special Forces – and that the ROK has tailored its forces
to respond. What is not clear is the readiness, training, and real-world effectiveness of each force
structure and the degree to which the DPRK can actually use much of its active and reserve
infantry effectively in any kind of modern offensive warfare.
Figure II.10 shows the IISS estimate of relative balance of army manpower and land force
equipment strength. Here, too, the DPRK and China have a major lead in force strength. Given
86 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the economic disparity between the Koreas, this figure demonstrates that the DPRK is one of the
most militarized countries in the world.
The detailed equipment breakouts in Figure II.10 show that the DPRK has roughly 1.5 times the
main battle tanks (MBTs) of the ROK – though the ROK has superior overall armored mobility
and armored engineering capability. The DPRK also has nearly twice the artillery strength of the
ROK as well as a massive lead in multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). The ROK has a lead in self-
propelled artillery and combined arms mobility and maneuver capability.
The counts of anti-tank weapons are not detailed enough to assess with any accuracy, but other
data indicates that the ROK has a qualitative advantage in anti-tank guided weapons types. There
are also problems in counting each nation’s air defense weapons, but the DPRK seems to have
extraordinarily large holdings of unguided anti-aircraft guns while the ROK has a limited lead in
man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
The ROK has a lead in Army helicopters and in attack and multirole helicopters, but such counts
are misleading as the DPRK places its helicopter forces in its Air Force. The force includes at
least one regiment of M-24 Hind attack helicopters and significant numbers of transport and
multirole helicopters, but no detailed current count is provided.
As noted earlier, there is no way to determine the land forces the US and China could (or would)
deploy to the DRPK or ROK in a sustained crisis or major war. China would, however, have a
major advantage in moving its forces, and the US would find it difficult to rapidly reinforce by
more than one additional division.
Figure II.11 to Figure II.13 summarize Northeast Asian armored fighting vehicles (the number
of number of MBTs, AIFVs, AAVs, APCs, RECCE in active service). Figure II.11 helps show
that the DPRK has a lead in MBTs, but most are older Russian and Chinese models which
predate the T-72s that were unable to compete effectively against the US M-1A1s during the first
Gulf War. The DPRK’s numerical advantage is partially offset by the major ROK lead in tank
quality provided by its K1 and K1A1 tanks.
Figures II.12 and II.13 show that the DPRK is less mechanized than the ROK and more limited
in total armored maneuver strength, and that the ROK Army at least has parity in rotary wing
attack and transport capability because of superior aircraft capability. The ROK Army has rough
parity in the number of other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs) and superior overall quality.
The ROK also has a larger inventory of OAFVs if the holdings of other forces are included.
It should be noted that the actual operations of the land forces on each side would be sharply
affected by the air-land and surface-to-surface missile battles – areas where the quality of ISR
capability and smart air munitions would have a major impact on the balance.
Figure II.14 looks at Northeast Asian artillery strength. Both countries have massive numbers of
artillery weapons. The ROK has an advantage in self-propelled artillery mobility and quality, but
the DPRK has a major advantage in numbers and in the ability to deploy area fire from weapons
like multiple rocket launchers. It also has numerous sheltered and buried artillery units deployed
near the DMZ and ROK border. This allows the DPRK to immediately threaten the ROK’s
capital and to carry out harassing fire as a means of intimidating the population and disrupting
the ROK economy.
What is not clear is the extent to which the ROK has an advantage in targeting fire management
and being able to sustain force during movement. It seems to have an advantage over most
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 87

DPRK units, which rely heavily on massed fire because of a lack of advanced targeting, fire
management, or artillery radar systems, but the scale of that advantage is unclear.

Figure II.8: ROK Estimate of Korean Force Balance in 2012 (Army)

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
River
Infantry Reconnai Self
Armored Towed Guided Crossing Helicopte
Tanks Combat ssance Propelled MLRS
Vehicles Artillery Weapons Equipme rs
Vehicles Vehicles Artillery
nt
DPRK 4200 2200 4800 3000
ROK 2400 2700 200 30 600

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
Note: The appendix gives figures for “ground-to-ground missiles,” 30 launchers for the ROK and 100 launchers for the DPRK.
The body of the report gives this figure of 30 for “guided weapons.” It is unclear if “guided weapons” and “ground-to-ground
missiles” are meant to represent the same class of weapon system.
88 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.9: ROK Estimate of Northeast Asian Force Land

Balance in 2012
40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
River
Infantry Reconnai Self
Armored Towed Guided Crossing Helicopte
Tanks Combat ssance Propelled MLRS
Vehicles Artillery Weapons Equipme rs
Vehicles Vehicles Artillery
nt
Russia 20800 15860 2200 15700 12765 5870 4026 1278
Japan 806 68 102 804 422 187 99 418
China 7400 2350 800 2700 6176 1785 1770 651
ROK 2400 2700 200 30 600
DPRK 4200 2200 4800 3000

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
Figures for ROK and DPRK Artillery, excluding MLRS, are combined under “field artillery.” The ROK possesses 5300 and the
DPRK possesses 8600. Another category of system is “armed vehicles,” but it is not clear exactly what is included in this
category. The ROK possesses 2700 and the DPRK possesses 2200.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 89

Figure II.10: IISS Estimate of Army Manpower and Equipment

in Northeast Asia in 2015
Army and Army Reserve Manpower (in thousands, including conscripts)

China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US

Active 1600 151.05 1020 522 230 539.45

Reserve portion of 510 54.2 600 portion of 4500 portion of 2000 539.75

Army Equipment (not including reserves)

Platforms China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US

Tank 7,290 688 4,060+ 2,414 2,600 2,338
Tank, light 750 560+
Tank, main battle 6,540 688 3,500+ 2,414 2,600 2,338
Personnel Carrier 9,070 1,091 2,500 3,575 12,325+ 33,206
Armored infantry fighting
3,850 68 340 5,125 4,559
vehicle
Armored personnel carrier
4,150 234 some 2,560 3,500 5,000
(tracked)
Armored personnel carrier
870 556 2,500 220 2,500 2,972
(wheeled)
Armored personnel carrier
10 17,417
(protected patrol vehicle)
Armored recovery vehicle some 69 238 some 1,108
Armored engineer vehicle 207 some 250
Reconnaissance 200 164 1,200 1,900
Artillery 13,178+ 1,777 21,100+ 11,038+ 4180+ 5,923
Multiple rocket launcher 1872+ 99 5,100 185 850+ 1,205
Self-propelled 2,280 160 1353+ 1,500 969
Towed 6,140 422 3,500 150 1,242
(self-propelled/towed) 8,500
180+
Gun/mortar 300 some (80+ Self-P.,
100 Towed)

Mortar (self-propelled) 24

Mortar (towed) 2,586 1,072 1,500

Mortar (not classified) 7,500 6,000 2,507

Anti-Tank 6,678+ some 1,700+ 58+ 526+ 1,512+
90 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Missile (self-propelled) 924 some some some 1,512

Missile (manpats) some some some some some some
Recoilless Launcher 3,966 some 1,700 some some
Guns (self-propelled) 480 50
Guns (towed) 1,308 8 526
Rocket Launcher some some
Air Defense 7,672+ 381+ 11,000+ 330+ 1,570+ 1,207+
Guns (self-propelled) 376 52 some 170 some
Guns (towed) 7,000+ 11,000 160 some
Surface-to-air missile
296 203 some some 1570+ 727
(self-propelled)
Surface-to-air missile (towed) 126 480
Surface-to-Air Missile
some some some some some some
(MANPAD)
Aircraft 8 9 some 218

Transport 8 9 157

ISR 52
ELINT 9
UAV some some 312
Landing Craft 81
Landing Craft Utility 45
Helicopter 839 440 481+ 4,345
Attack 150 114 60 741
Multirole 351 175 356
ISR 71 72
Transport 338 255 246+ 2,854
Search and rescue 168
Training 154
Missile some some 64+ some 120
Bridge Systems some 22 some some 60
Mine-Clearing Vehicles some some some
Radar, Land-based some some 251
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 91

Figure II.11: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Modern Main

Battle Tanks versus Total Holdings in 2015
Modern Main Battle Tanks

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Type-10 39
Type-90 341
K1A1 484
K1 1000
Type-99A 100
Type-99 500
Type-98A 40
Type-96A 1050
Type-96 1000
T-90/T-90A 350
T-80BV/U 80 550
M1A1/A2 Abrams 2785

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data include both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment
used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
92 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Not Modern Main Battle Tanks

4500

4000

3500

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Type-74 308
M48A5 597
M48 253
Type-88A/B 500
Type-79 300
Type-59D 550
Type-59II 500
Type-59 2000
T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/
3500
Type-59/Chonma/Pokpoong
T-72B3 400
T-72B/BA 1500

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data include both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include
equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent
equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 93

Total Holdings of Main Battle Tanks

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Modern 2690 380 1564 900 2785
Not Modern 3850 308 3500 850 1900
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data include both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment
used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
94 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.12: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Armored

Fighting Vehicles (Army) in 2015
40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Main Battle Tank 6,540 688 3,500 2,414 2,600 2,338
Light Tank 400 560
Armored Amphibious Vehicle 350 166 1,311
Reconnaissance Vehicle 200 164 1,200 1,900
Armored Personnel Carrier 5,020 790 2,500 2,790 6,000 25,389
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle 3,850 68 340 5,125 4,559
Armored Recovery Vehicle 69 238 1,108

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data includes primarily Army inventories and Marine inventories for Armored
Amphibious Vehicles (or Amphibious Assault Vehicles). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 95

Figure II.13: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Modern

versus Not Modern Armored Vehicles in 2015
45000

40000

35000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
AIFV, Modern 4002 68 340 4225 4559
AIFV, Not Modern 1200
APC, Modern 2620 540 1700 2000 29448
APC, Not Modern 2400 250 2500 1090 4800
AAV, Modern 166 1311
AAV, Not Modern
RECCE, Modern 200 152 200 1,900
RECCE, Not Modern 1000
MBT, Modern 2690 380 1564 900 2785
MBT, Not Modern 3850 308 3500 850 1900

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data include both Army and Marine inventories. Figures do not include equipment
used for training purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
96 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.14: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Artillery

Strength in 2015
25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Artillery, Mortar 2,586 1,096 7,500 6,000 1,500 2,507
Artillery, Towed 6,140 422 3,500 150 1,242
Artillery, Self-Propelled 2,280 160 1,353 1,500 969
Artillery, SP/Towed 8,500
Artillery, Multiple Rocket
1,872 99 5,100 185 850 1,205
Launcher
Artillery, Gun/Mortar 300 180

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures
are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 97

Naval and Marine Forces

In the past two decades, there have been significant changes in the naval military equipment and
weaponry of Northeast Asian states, including Russia. In particular, there has been a trend
towards more technologically advanced guided missiles and submarine-launched torpedoes. At
the same time, the US has sharply improved its naval aircraft and their avionics and weaponry,
cruise missile capabilities, and missile defense – including new theater missile defense
capabilities. It has also steadily improved its submarine warfare capabilities. Its weaknesses lie in
areas like mine warfare, and the ability to deal with “swarms” or “clusters” of smaller missile-
armed ships.
Once again, there are major differences and limits in the data. The ROK data on the naval
balance in 2012 in Figure II.15 make no distinction between the size and capability of naval
surface vessels – a count that sharply understates the quality of the ROK fleet. The IISS has very
different estimates for 2015. Figure II.16 shows relative balance of naval manpower and
equipment strength. Figure II.17 provides a comparison of Northeast Asian naval combat ships,
Figure II.18 looks at combat ships by category, and Figure II.19 gives a comparison of regional
submarines by capability.
Some trends and aspects of the balance are clear. The DPRK has a lead over the ROK in
manning, though the DPRK is inferior in major naval surface vessel fleet strength and capability.
The DPRK also has a major lead in patrol boats and costal combatants, amphibious vessels,
potential mine layers, and smaller surface vessels of the kind that can be used in asymmetric
warfare, allowing it to operate close to shore and outside the normal operating area of major US
naval surface vessels. Only 16 of the DPRK’s 383 patrol boats and costal combatants, however,
are armed with anti-ship missiles, and the ROK does have a relatively large naval coastguard,
with 114 small patrol and coastal combatants.
The DPRK has a similar lead in conventional submarines and small submersibles (72:12), as
does China over Japan. The DPRK uses small submarines to infiltrate its Special Forces. Many
of the submarines, however, are aging, and ROK and US forces have a qualitative advantage in
the air and sea aspects of anti-submarine warfare.
Such quantitative comparisons again have their limits. Operations by the naval forces on each
side would be sharply affected by the air-sea, smart mine, and anti-ship missile battles – areas
where the quality of ships and aircraft, their weaponry, air/missile defenses, ISR capability, and
smart munitions would again have a major impact.
The “balance” would also be determined by joint operations, rather than sea power alone. A
combination of ROK and US naval and air forces would probably have a decisive advantage
over the DPRK. Chinese air intervention could affect the balance and China is gradually
developing a far more effective Navy; the ROK and US would also need time to defeat a
deployed DPRK submarine force and would likely face problems in dealing with mines and
coastal anti-ship missiles.
Naval forces are only part of overall interactions involved in the air-sea and air-land battle(s).
The interaction will be scenario-specific, shaped by new and unpredictable mixes of forces and
tactics, the impact of intangibles like training and readiness, the role of relative ISR capabilities,
and a host of other factors.
98 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.15: ROK Estimate of Korean Naval Balance in 2012

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
Surface Support & Aux. Mine Warfare Amphibious
Submarines
Combatants Vessels Vessels Ships
DPRK 420 70 30 30 260
ROK 120 10 20 10 10

Source: Based on material provided from the Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 99

Figure II.16. IISS Estimate of Total Navy Manpower and

Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015
Navy and Navy Reserve Manpower (in thousands, including conscripts; figures include Naval Aviation and
Marines)

China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US

Active 235 45.5 60 68 130 517.95

Reserve portion of 510 1.1 portion of 600 portion of 4500 portion of 2000 137.3

Naval Equipment (not including reserves)

Platforms China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Aircraft Carriers 1 2 1 10
Cruiser 0 2 0 3 6 22
With guided missile 2 3 4 22
Heavy nuclear-powered with
2
guided missile
Destroyers 17 34 0 6 18 62
With guided missile 2 6 1 28
With guided missile and
15 28 6 17 34
helicopter platform
Dry Deck Shelters 6
Frigates 54 9 3 14 10 11
With guided missile 21 6 3 9 4
With guided missile and
33 3 5 6 4
helicopter platform
Aviation Frigate 7
Submarines, Strategic 4 12 14
Ballistic missile, nuclear-
4 12 14
fuelled
Submarines, Tactical 66 18 72+ 23 47 59
Nuclear-powered, attack, with
9 45
cruise missile
Diesel, coastal 32+ 11
Nuclear-powered, attack 5 17 14
Diesel, patrol, ASW capability 60 18 20 12 21
Diesel, with ballistic missile 1
Midget 20
100 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Patrol and Coastal

223+ 6 153 116 84 55
Combatants
Corvette
15 36 17
(anti-ship missile & SAM)
Corvette, missile 31
Hydrofoil boat, with missile 3
Hydrofoil boat, with torpedo 1
Patrol boat, fast, with missile 6 16
Patrol craft, offshore 5
Patrol craft, coastal 72 18
Patrol boat, with missile 7
Patrol Craft, with missile 26 18
Patrol boat, river/roadstead 42
Patrol craft, fast 76+ 25 13
Patrol boat, fast 34+ 96 80
Mine Warfare, Counter 55 35 24 9 53 11
Mine countermeasures,
4
support
Mine countermeasures, ship 24
Mine countermeasures, ocean 12
Mine Layer 1
Mine hunter, inshore 15
Mine hunter, ocean 6 2
Mine sweeper, coastal 16 25
Mine sweeper, drone 10 6
Mine sweeper, ocean 16 25 3 11 11
Mine Warfare, Layer 1
Missile some some some some some
Bombs some some
Logistics and Support 211 82 23 24 621 271
Drydock Ship (AFDL) 1
Cargo Ship 24 2 30
Auxiliary crane ship 9
Cargo ship, ammunition 2
Ballistic missile transport 3
Submarine Tender 7 8 1 11
Torpedo Recovery 12 2
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 101

Repair Ship 13
Auxiliary Repair Dock (ARD) 3
Personnel Transport (AP) 11
Survey Ship 5 4 72 10
Harbor Tug 2 60 17
Fireboat 2 42
Barracks Ship 3
Light fleet oilers 7 13
Oiler 1 15
Submarine rescue and salvage
6 1 2
ship
Fast Combat Support Ship 5 3
Range Support Tender 2
Missile Range
5 1 1 3
Instrumentation Ship
Dry Cargo Ship (AKEH) 14
Roll-On/Off Cargo Ship
65
(AKR/AKRH)
Deperming/degaussing barge 5 28
Diving Tender 6 91 2
Hospital ship 3 3 2
Icebreaker 1 4
Intelligence collection ship 1 14 11
Cable Repair Ship 1 7 1
Medium harbor tug 16
Miscellaneous Auxiliary Ship 4 1 93 5
Submarine Auxiliary 1 2
Submarine Auxiliary
7 1
(Nuclear)
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
1
(UUV)
Oceanographic Research
8 2 17 6 6
Vessel
Fuel replenishment 5
light oiler ship 5
Salvage and Rescue Ship 2 1 14 4
Sea-going buoy tender 7 48
Submarine rescue ship 2
102 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Support 5
Oiler Transport 50 3 9
Auxiliary oil replenishment
3
ship
Training Craft 3 8 12 1
Training Craft, Sail 1
Yard Patrol (Training) 25
Tug, fleet, ocean 51 28 62 4
Water transport 18 2
Ocean Surveillance Ship 8
Yacht 1
Amphibious 241 23 267 212 45 1590
Amphibious Assault Ship
8
(LHD)
Landing Ship Assault (LHA) 2
Amphib. Transport Dock
3 1 10
(LPD)
Amphib. Assault Vehicle 166 1311
Amphib. Command Ship
2
(LCC)
Landing Craft Air Cushion
3 6 5 7 80
(LCAC)
Landing Craft Medium
20 12 25 10 7 25
(LCM)
Landing craft, tank 6
Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 120 2 11 32
Landing craft, vehicles and
136 20
personnel (LCVP)
Landing Craft Personnel
108
(LCP)
Landing Craft Personnel
96
(LCPL)
Landing craft, utility air
10
cushion vehicle
Dock Landing Ship (LSD) 12
Landing ship, medium 59 10
Landing ship, tank 26 3 4 20
Aircraft 484+ 150 21 198 2472
(combat capable) 332 78 16 136 1,150
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 103

Anti-Submarine Warfare 3 80 16 27 158

Maritime Patrol 26
Attack 5
Bomber 30
Fighter 24 40
Fighter, ground attack 228 31 1284
Search and rescue 7 3
ISR 7 8 2
ELINT/EW 7 5 4 160
Aerial refueling tanker 3 45
Training 106+ 31 4 643
Transport 66 27 5 50 88
Command & Control (C2) 16
Airborne Early
10 76
Warning/Control
Tiltorotor 208
Helicopter 103+ 131 42 185 1110
Anti-submarine warfare 44 86 24 83 255
Attack 151
Mine countermeasures 11 28
Combat Search and Rescue 6 19 56 19
Airborne early warning 10+ 2
Multi Mission Support 255
EW 8
ISR 3 3 3
Training 120
Transport 43 12 15 36 279
UAV some 93
Air Defense/Missiles 72+ 0 0 0 146 some
SAM (self-propelled) 86 some
SAM (manpad) some some some
Guns (self-propelled) 60
Coastal defense missile
72
system
Tank (Marines) 73 0 0 100 200 447
Tank, light 73
104 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Tank, main battle 100 200 447

Personnel Carrier (Marines) 152 0 0 0 1100 4059
Armored personnel carrier 800 4059
Armored infantry fighting
152 300
vehicle
Reconnaissance 60 252
Artillery 40+ 0 0 some 365 1506
Artillery, gun/mortar 66
Self-Propelled 40+ 263
Towed some some 832
Multiple rocket launcher some 36 40
Mortar some 634
Anti-Tank some 0 0 0 0 95+
Missile/Manpats some some some some
Self-Propelled some some 95
Recoilless Launcher some
Guns some
Armored Recce/Recovery
185
Vic
Armored Engineer Vehicle 42
Radar, Land 23
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 105

Figure II.17: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Naval

Combat Ships in 2015
450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Aircraft Carriers 1 2 1 10
Cruisers 2 3 6 10
Destroyers 17 34 6 18 62
Frigates 54 9 3 14 10 11
Mine Warfare, Layer &
55 35 24 9 53 11
Countermeasures
Patrol and Coastal Combatants 223 6 153 116 84 55
Submarines, Strategic 4 12 14
Submarines, Tactical 66 18 72 23 47 59

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in
active service.
106 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.18: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Naval

Combat Ships by Category in 2015
400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Submarines 70 18 72 23 59 73
Principal Suface Combat Ships 71 45 3 23 34 95
Patrol and Coastal Combatants 223 6 153 116 84 55

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in
active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 107

Figure II.19: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Submarines

by Type in 2014

US

Russia

ROK

DPRK

Japan

China

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Midget 20
Diesel, Coastal 32 11
Diesel, Patrol, ASW Capability 60 18 20 12 21
Diesel, with Ballistic Missile 1
Nuclear-powered, Attack, with Cruise
9 45
Missile
Nuclear-powered, Attack 5 17 14
Ballistic missile, nuclear-powered 4 12 14

Source: Based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2014. Figures do not include equipment used for training
purposes. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
108 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Air and Air Defense Forces, and DPRK Artillery, MRLs,

Rockets, and Missiles
The air and conventional missile balance is the aspect of the overall balance where outside power
projection forces can deploy most rapidly and probably be most effective in limiting a conflict.
US forces can surge quickly out of Japan and even from bases as far away as Guam. US air units
can deploy across the Pacific in a matter of days, and the US Navy deploys significant cruise
missile assets that could carry out precision strikes deep into the DPRK on short notice.
As before, the ROK data on the air balance in 2012 shown in Figure II.20 are radically less
favorable than the IISS data for ROK. The IISS shows a ratio of total DPRK vs. ROK air force
combat aircraft of 620 to 467 (1.3 times greater). The ROK white paper for 2012 shows a ratio of
total DPRK vs. ROK air force combat aircraft of 820 to 460 (1.8 times greater). As before, the
ROK does not provide an explanation the differences.
Fixed Wing Aircraft
Figure II.21 shows the IISS estimate of the balance in 2015 in terms of air manpower and
equipment numbers in each country. If one looks only at the DPRK and ROK, the DPRK again
has leads over the ROK in manning (112,000 versus 65,000) and in total aircraft (603 versus
569). The DPRK, however, is far inferior in terms of aircraft quality at every level, while the
ROK has a larger and more capable mix of total air, army, and naval attack and combat
helicopters.
The DPRK’s only aircraft approaching a modern type in a force of 620 combat aircraft are 35
MiG-29A/S fighters. The ROK is completing a buildup of 59 F-15K advanced modern fighters
and has 164 modern F-16C/Ds. The ROK’s 60 AH1F/J attack helicopters are superior in
individual capability to the DPRK’s 20 Mi-24s. While the data involved are uncertain, the ROK
also seems to have superior radar and battle management and is interoperable with US AWACs
and ISR systems. As of March 2014, South Korea agreed to purchase 40 F-35A stealth fighters
and 4 Global Hawk reconnaissance drones, which will further enhance South Korea’s
technological superiority over North Korean air forces. This purchase of stealth aircraft and high
endurance drones will also impact the broader regional military balance, particularly with China,
which is developing its own stealth aircraft drones.
Figure II.22 depicts Northeast Asian fixed wing combat aircraft by country and military force. It
shows that both China and the US could radically alter the air balance in a matter of days.
Figure II.23 shows the air balance by country and mission type. It indicates that the DPRK’s Air
Force does not have the support of the kind of intelligence, AWACS-type, and ISR enablers that
the ROK possesses and is in many ways a “1970s” air force, compared to those of the ROK, US,
China, and Russia.
Rotary Wing Aircraft
Figure II.24 shows the total rotary wing or helicopter balance by country and service. This is an
area where the ROK has a major lead over the DPRK.
Figure II.25 looks at rotary wing aircraft by country and mission type. The ROK again leads in
terms of modern type, diversification, and the ability to support a wider range of missions. At the
same time, this figure highlights an aspect of US capability that often tends to be overlooked.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 109

The US has a large fleet of rapidly deployable modern attack helicopters, many with advanced
anti-armor weaponry. The balance of armored weapons in the Koreas could be altered
significantly by the deployment of US attack helicopters.
Figures II.26 and II.27 add another dimension to the air balance. They show that the DPRK has
large surface-to-air missiles forces, but most were first deployed in the Vietnam era or early
1970s, and have only had limited upgrades. The ROK IHAWK systems are relatively modern,
and the ROK has significant numbers of Patriots, which are fully modern air defense systems
with a point defense capability against missiles. The DPRK, however, has much larger short-
range air defenses, although most have limited effectiveness and many are anti-aircraft unguided
guns.
Surface-to-Air Missiles and Anti-Aircraft Guns
Figure II.27 shows relative balance of surface-to-air missile (SAM) and ballistic missile
strength, while Figure II.28 shows overall missile and bomb capacities – to the extent they are
available in open source literature. The trends in missile defense are discussed later in Chapter 4.
The DPRK has large, but mostly obsolete surface-to-air missile defenses.
North Korea does have one of the densest air defense networks in the world, but its equipment is
primarily Soviet-designed missiles and radars – either made in the USSR or licensed and
produced in the DPRK – developed in the 1950s-1970s. The US has been working for decades to
develop ways to defeat such weapons, using radar jamming, anti-radar missiles, and stealth
technology; the B-2 and F-22 were designed specifically to evade this type of defense, and B-52s
could take out the DPRK’s air defense system by firing AGM-86 cruise missiles from beyond
the range of DPRK defenses. The DPRK’s inventory includes the SA-2 Guideline, SA-6 Gainful,
SA-3 Goa, SA-13 Gopher, SA-16 Gimlet, SA-4 Ganef, SA-5 Gammon, and the SA-17 Gadfly. 252
The DPRK also has massive numbers of short-range man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS) and anti-aircraft guns. The IISS estimates that the DPRK has some 3,000
MANPADS and 11,000 guns. The ROK has smaller holdings of SAMs, but has far more modern
and more capable Hawk and Patriot systems, compared to the DPRK’s aging SA-2, SA-3, and
SA-5 systems.
The ROK’s qualitative advantage in SAMs would more than offset the DPRK’s advantage in
numbers. It is unclear how much the DPRK’s advantage in anti-aircraft guns and MANPADs
really matters. Most are aging and have limited range and capability. US and ROK strike aircraft
have effective countermeasures against most MANPADS and can use air-to-surface missiles
from standoff ranges.
Conventional Artillery and Surface-to-Surface Rockets and Missiles
as a Counterbalance to Limits in Airpower
More broadly, the data on ROK and US forces shown in this section can only hint at the
qualitative advantages that the ROK/US side could have when the total associated weapons,
sustainability, battle management, ISR, and C4/BM capabilities of US and ROK forces are
considered, and that this would be particularly true if China stood aside from the conflict. The
role of external players is critical in any engagement scenario, and relative force quality could
easily be far more decisive than force numbers.
110 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

As has been discussed earlier, the potential DPRK counterbalance to ROK and US advantages in
airpower would be the use of longer-range artillery, rockets, and shorter-range ballistic missiles
as a substitute for air power.
The DPRK’s longer-range tube artillery includes 130mm M-1975/M-1981/M-1991 (27+
kilometers), 152mm M-1974/M-1977 (12.5 kilometers), 170mm M-1978/M-1989 self-propelled
weapons (60 kilometers with a rocket assisted projectile), and 122mm D-30/D-74/M-1931/37
(15.4 kilometers), 130mm M-46 (27+ kilometers), and 152mm M-1937/M-1938/M-1943 towed
weapons (12.5 kilometers).
The IISS also estimated that the DPRK had 5,100 107mm, 122mm and 240mm multiple rocket
launchers in 2014. Its 107mm multiple rocket launchers had a maximum range of 11 kilometers,
its 122mm multiple rocket launchers had a maximum range of 20 kilometers, and its 240mm
multiple rocket launchers had a maximum range of 35 kilometers. In 2014, North Korea fired its
new KN-09 300mm missiles in test firings. According the North Korean state media, the KN-09
could fire GLONASS guided missiles. In a June 2014 test, the missiles flew about 180-190km
before landing. 253
Global Security reports that, 254
South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm “could
fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs…North Korea has about 5,000 long-range artillery
tubes within range of Seoul, and the total rate of fire of these artillery pieces would be between 2,000 and
4,000 rounds per minute. The DPRK’s two hundred 240mm MRLs fire either 12 or 22 rounds, providing a
maximum single salvo of no more than 4,400 rounds… These launchers can fire a first strike of many
thousands of missiles and return in a few minutes to protected caves or to alternate firing positions. The
MRLs move out from underground facilities (UGFs), fire from preplanned firing positions, and return to
the UGFs. Examination of the available data on the UGF sites suggests that a number of possible “exit and
return” methods for the MRLs may be possible. In this case, the launchers move directly from the firing
points to the UGFs. This procedure makes it difficult to target the launchers, because once they fire it only
takes 75 seconds to return to their UGFs...
The IISS estimated that the DPRK had 24 fire units for longer-range rockets and missiles. These
forces included units with FROG-3/FROG-5/FROG-7; 30+ Scud-B/Scud-C (200+ missiles), and
10 Nodong (90+ missiles). Some of its Musudan IRBMs may be nearing operational status, and
it has KN-08s in development.
It is not clear that these systems have a precision strike capability, but they may well have cluster
or submunition warheads as well as chemical and possibly biological warheads. Nuclear
warheads are almost certainly under development. The FROG has a nominal maximum range of
70-90 kilometers with 390-500 kilogram warheads and a CEP of 500-700 meters.
The Scud B has a nominal maximum range of 270 kilometers with 985 kilogram conventional
warheads and a CEP of 500-700 meters. The Scud-C has a nominal maximum range of 900
kilometers with 600 kilogram conventional warheads and a CEP of 500-1,100 meters. No Scud-
Ds – which have early terminal guidance systems – were reported in the DPRK inventory.
The Nodong has a nominal maximum range of 900 kilometers with a nominal 1,000 kilogram
conventional warhead and a CEP worse than 1,500 meters. The Musudan IRBM has a nominal
maximum range of 2,500-4,000 kilometers with a 1,000-1,250 kilogram warhead and a CEP of
1,300-2,300 meters. The status of the KN-08 and Taepodong-2 ICBMs is uncertain and no clear
date exists for a KN-08 operational status. The Nodong, Musudan, and KN-08 are long-range
systems that are likely to be equipped solely with nuclear warheads.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 111

It is possible that the DPRK might escalate to using chemical warheads, believing that the ROK
and US response would be limited by a lack of chemical weapons and reluctance to escalate to
even low-yield tactical nuclear warheads.
These missile and CBRN forces will be discussed in more detail later in this report.

Figure II.20: ROK Estimate of Korean Air Force Balance in 2012

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Combat Air Mobility
ISR aircraft Trainers Helicopters
Aircraft Aircraft
DPRK 820 30 330 170 300
ROK 460 40 40 190 40

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
112 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.21: IISS Estimate of Total Air Force Manpower and

Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015
Air Force and Air Force Reserve Manpower (in thousands, including conscripts)

China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US

Active 398 47.1 110 65 148 334.55

Reserve portion of 510 0.8 portion of 600 portion of 4500 portion of 2000 168.85

Air Force Equipment (not including reserves)

Platforms China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Aircraft 3016+ 729 995+ 747 1,912 3,481
(combat capable) 2,239 552 563 571 1,201 1,410
Bomber 106 80 141 137
Fighter 842 201 401 174 420 275
Fighter, ground attack 573 152 48 314 345 838
Command & control 5 6 4
ELINT 4 32 22
Search and rescue
ISR 51 17 24 86 82
SIGINT 4
Airborne early warning and
8+ 17 4 22 32
control
Electronic warfare 13 3 14
Combat Search and Rescue 26 26
Attack 120 34 215 197
Airborne command post
Tanker 11 4 15 167
Tanker/transport 59
Training 950 245 215+ 189 198 1,130
Transport 333+ 64 217 38 432 498
Helicopter 70 51 302 49 912 184
Attack 20 296
Multirole/EW 22 80 3 54
Transport 40 15 202 30 532 100
Combat search and rescue 8 84
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 113

Search and rescue 36 16

Training 30
Tilt-rotor 35
Air Defense 16,654+ 0 350+ 206 376 0
Guns (towed) 16,054
Surface-to-air missile (manpad) some some
Surface-to-air missile
38
(static/shelter)
Surface-to-air missile (self-
300+ 48 376
propelled)
Surface-to-air missile (towed) 300+ 312+ 158
Armored Infantry Fighting
180 1,165
Vehicle
Armored Personnel Carrier 4 700
Artillery 162 0 0 0 600+ 0
Towed 54 350+
Multiple rocket launcher (towed) 54
Mortar 54 250
Radar
Air-to-Air Missile some some some some some some
Bombs, laser/TV/INS/GPS-
some some
Guided
Missile, Tactical some some some some some some
Anti-tank some
UAV some some 106+ some 353
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
114 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.22: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Fixed Wing

Combat Aircraft by Branch in 2015
3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Navy 332 78 16 136 1,150
Air Force 2,239 552 563 571 1,201 1,410

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some
equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 115

Figure II.23: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Fixed Wing

Aircraft by Type in 2015
7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Attack 120 34 220 197
Combat Search & Rescue 26
Tanker/Transport 59
Transport 407 100 217 43 482 743
Training 1,056 276 215 189 202 1,773
Tanker 14 4 15 212
ISR 58 17 24 94 136
Search & Rescue 33 3
ELINT 4 32 31
Early Warning & Control 18 17 4 22 108
Fighter Ground Attack 801 152 48 314 376 2,122
Fighter 866 201 401 174 460 275
Electronic Warfare 20 8 4 174
Bomber 136 80 141 137
Reconnaissance &
3 80 16 27 158
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Command & Control (C2) 5 6 20
Maritime Patrol 26
SIGINT 4
UAV 106 758

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data for each fixed-wing aircraft mission represents the sum of all active service
aircraft in the Army, Navy, and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some
equipment figures are estimates.
116 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.24: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Rotary Wing

Combat Aircraft by Force in 2015

US

Russia

ROK

DPRK

Japan

China

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000

China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US

Army 501 114 0 235 0 1,097
Navy 44 86 24 83 661
Air Force 22 100 3 350 35

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment figures
are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service. “Combat” defined as platforms designed for the
purpose of offensive combat operations; included are Army (attack and multirole), Navy (anti-submarine warfare, attack, and
multirole), and Air Force (multirole, attack and tilt-rotor).
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 117

Figure II.25: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Rotary Wing

Aircraft by Type in 2015
6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Electronic Warfare 8
Training 30 274
Early Warning 10 2
Tilt-rotor 243
ISR 74 3 75
Search & Rescue 36 16 168
Combat Search & Rescue 14 19 56 103
Mine Countermeasures 11 28
Attack 150 114 20 60 296 892
Anti-Submarine Warfare 44 86 24 83 255
Transport 421 282 202 291 568 3,233
Multirole 373 80 476 54 611

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data for each rotary wing aircraft mission represents the sum of all active service
aircraft in Army, Navy, and Air Force inventories. Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. Some equipment
figures are estimates.
118 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.26: IISS Estimate of Total Northeast Asian Air/Missile

Defenses in 2015
Country Major SAMs (SP/T/Static) Light SAMs (MANPAD)

DPRK 38 S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

179+ SA-2 Guideline
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
133 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
179+ S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)

ROK Chun Ma (Pegasus) FIM-43 Redeye

158 MIM-23B I-HAWK FIM-92A Stinger
48 Patriot PAC-2 Javelin
Mistral
9K31 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

China 200 HQ-7A HN-5A/HN-5B Hong Nu

24 SA-15 Gauntlet (9K331 Tor M1) FN-6/QW-1/QW-2
30 HQ-6D Red Leader
24 HQ-16A
18 HQ-17
24 HD-6D
60+ HQ-7
32+ HQ-9
24 HQ-12 (KS-1A)
32 S-300PMU (SA-10B Grumble)*
64 S-300PMU-1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
64 S-300PMU-2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
300+ HQ-2/HQ-2A/HQ-2B(A) (SA-2)
Guideline

Japan 50+ Type-81 Tan-SAM Type-91 Kin-SAM/Kei SAM

126 MTM-23B I-HAWK
40 Type-03 Chu-Sam
113 Type-93 Kin SAM
120 MIM-104 Patriot

Russia 430+ 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly) 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
420 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko) 9K333 Verba
450 9K35M3 Strela-1/Strela-10 (SA-9 9K388 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher) 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
120+ 9K330/9K331 Tor (SA-15 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
Gauntlet)
250+ 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
248 S-300PS/PM (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20
Gargoyle)
32 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
20 S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 119

12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

150 BTR-ZD

US 703 M998/M1097Avenger FIM-92/92A Stinger

24 THAAD
480 MIM-104 Patriot/PAC-2/PAC-3

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Figures represent equipment in use across service branches. All equipment figures
represent equipment in active service.
120 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.27: IISS Estimate of Total Korean and Northeast Asian

Air/Missile Defenses in 2015
25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
Guns, Self-Propelled 376 52 170 60
Guns, Towed 23,054 11,000 160
SAM, unclassified 72
SAM, Static 38
SAM, Self-Propelled 596 203 48 2,032 727
SAM, Towed 300 126 312 158 480

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Data include Army, Air Force, and Navy (and Marine) inventories. It should be noted
that the exact number of these equipment types is not available for most countries; real numbers are likely much higher and
broader. Additionally, data showed that each country contained man-portable surface to air missiles but no quantities were
available.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 121

Figure II.28: Northeast Asian Missile and Bomb Capabilities

Country Missiles Bombs

DPRK 24 FROG-3/FROG-5/FROG-7
KN-08 (in development)
Musudan
~10 Nodong
30+ Scud-B/Scud-C
HY-1 (CSS-N-2)
KN-01 (in development)
Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)
Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)
R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
PL-5
PL-7
R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex)
R-27R/ER (AA-10 A/C Alamo)
ROK 30 Hyunmu I/IIA/IIB
RGM-84A Harpoon
AGM-84 Harpoon
AGM-130
AGM-142 Popeye
AGM-88 HARM
AGM-65A Maverick
AGM-84-H SLAM-ER
AIM-9/9X Sidewinder
AIM-7 Sparrow
AIM-120B/C5 AMRAAM
China HY-1 (CSS-N-2) Silkworm Type-200-4/Type-200A
HY-2 (CSS-C-3) Seersucker LS-500J
HY-4 (CSS-C-7) Sadsack KAB-500KR
AKD-8 KAB-1500KR
AKD-9
AKD-10
YJ-61
122 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

YJ-8K
72 YJ-62
YJ(KD)-63
YJ-83K
YJ-91 (Kh-31P variant)
KD-10
KD-88
Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
Kh-31A/P (AS-17 Krypton)
Kh-59 (AS-18 Kazoo)
PL-2B
PL-5
PL-5B/C
PL-8
PL-9
PL-11
PL-12
R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
CJ-10/CJ-20 (reported)

Japan 86 Type-88
ASM-1 (Type-80)
ASM-2 (Type-93)
AAM-3 (Type-90)
AAM-4 (Type-99)
AAM-5 (Type-04)
AIM-7 Sparrow
AIM-9 Sidewinder
Russia 212 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) KAB-500
50 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) KAB-1500L
K-29 (AS-14 Kedge) KAB-500KR
K-37M (AA-X-13 Axehead) KAB-1500KR
Kh-15P (AS-16 Kickback) KAB-500OD
Kh-22/32 (AS-4 Kitchen) UPAB 1500
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 123

Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)

Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
Kh-31A/AM (AS-17B Krypton)
Kh-31P/PM (AS-17A Krypton)
Kh-55/55SM (AS-15A/B Kent)
Kh-555 (AS-15C Kent)
Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13 Kingbolt/AS-18
Kazoo)
Kh-101
Kh-102
24 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight)
12 K-300P Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge)
4K44 Redut (SS-C-1 Sepal)
4K51 Rebuzh (SS-C-3 Styx)
R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo)
R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo)
R-27P/EP (AA-10 Alamo E/F)
R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B)
R-60 /R-60T (AA-8 Aphid)
R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
R-77/R-77-1 (A-12 Adder)
US AIM-9 Sidewinder BLU-109/Mk 84
AIM-9X Sidewinder II BLU-110/Mk 83
AIM-7 Sparrow BLU-111/Mk 82
AIM-120/120B/C AMRAAM BLU-117/Mk 84
AGM-65A/B/D/E/F/G Maverick Mk 46
AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire Mk 50
AGM-84E SLAM/SLAM-ER LACM Mk 54
AGM-154A JSOW CBU-59
AGM-176 Griffin CBU-99
AGM-86B/C/D LACM Paveway II (GBU-10/12/16)
AG-130A Paveway III (GBU-24)
AGM-158 JASSM JDAM (GBU-31/32/38)
AGM-84/84D Harpoon GBU-15
AGM-119A Penguin 3 GBU-39B
AGM-88/88A/B HARM GBU-43B
124 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

MALD/MALD-J Laser JDAM (GBU-54)

GBU-57A/B
Enhanced Paveway II
Enhanced Paveway III
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015. Figures represent equipment in use across service branches. All equipment figures
represent equipment in active service.

Paramilitary Forces
Figure II.29 portrays the balance of paramilitary strength. The DPRK has massive paramilitary
forces compared to the ROK, but these forces are primarily instruments of regime control over
the North’s population, and this aspect of the balance is unlikely to affect any DPRK attack on
the ROK. The DPRK already has larger ground forces than it can support in any offensive.
However, the situation could be different in the case of any ROK or ROK/US counteroffensive
into the DPRK. Depending on the loyalty of such forces, they could put up significant local
resistance both during a counteroffensive and in the rear of any ROK or ROK/US advance.
The US does not have paramilitary forces, so the US is not included. China and Russia have far
larger paramilitary forces than the Koreas – unsurprising given their significantly larger
demographic and geographic sizes. It is unlikely, however, that either country would use such
forces in any conflict in the Koreas.
Figure II.29: IISS Estimate of Total Paramilitary Manpower and
Equipment in Northeast Asia in 2015 255
Paramilitary Manpower (in thousands, including conscripts)

China Japan DPRK ROK Russia

660 12.65 189 4.5 489

Paramilitary Equipment
Equipment China Japan DPRK ROK Russia
Armored infantry fighting
1000
vehicle / personnel carrier
Artillery 0 0 0 0 90
Self-propelled 90
Frigates 3
Patrol and Coastal
804 395 0 55 233
Combatants
Patrol vessel, offshore 232 28 5 4
Patrol craft, offshore 67 28 16 17
Patrol Craft with SAM 46
Patrol Boat 200 252 9 45
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 125

Patrol boat (fast) 304 47 81

Patrol Boat, Riverine 25
Patrol craft, coastal 26 24 13
Patrol vessel, offshore with
1 14 1
hanger
Patrol hydrofoil with
2
torpedo
Logistics and Support 0 37 0 30 41
Sea-going buoy tender 1
Survey ship 12 2
Yard Craft, Miscellaneous 5
Torpedo recovery vessel 3
Fireboat 9
Salvage and rescue ship 30
Icebreaker 5
Cargo ship 8
Stores Ship (Light) 7 6
Oiler 2
Tug, fleet, ocean-going 18
Amphibious (LC/LCAC -
1 7
patrol)
Aircraft 0 23 0 6 86
ISR 2 5
Transport 21 1 86
Helicopters 0 47 0 16 200
Multirole 7 8
Transport 40 8
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2015.
126 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DPRK
The DPRK’s constant emphasis on regime security, building up its military forces, using these
forces to make military threats and carry out politically driven low level attacks, and creating
growing missile and nuclear capabilities have all combined to drive the shape of Korean balance
and have done so for decades. The DPRK not only is a militarized state, it has made military
confrontation the primary reason for its existence.
While it is possible that the DPRK’s leader could reform the state and focus on the economy and
the needs of his people, he could only do so by depriving the regime of its rationale for
authoritarian control and the use of so much of its economy to maintain its military forces. The
DPRK would then emerge as a fifth-class economy and state little able to compete in a Northeast
Asia where economic development has long been the key test of success for North Korea’s
neighbors – all of which have vastly outpaced the DPRK.
Leadership and Command and Control
North Korea is a hereditary and hierarchical dictatorship dominated by a supreme leader and
those he personally depends upon for political power, regardless of the DPRK’s formal
command structure. This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness and structure of its
C4I/BM and ISR systems, but some aspects of its formal command structure are relatively clear.
South Korean analysis indicates that the primary DPRK military organs include the National
Defense Commission (NDC), the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Ministry of People’s
Armed Forces (MPAF), the General Staff Department (GSD), and the General Political Bureau
(GPB). 256 This structure in shown in Figure II.30. The following is a more in-depth description
of these organizations’ development and roles: 257
Among them, the NDC was established along with the adoption of the socialist constitution in 1972. In
1992, it became the supreme guiding organ of the armed forces when the constitution was revised to build
institutional support for Kim Jong-il’s military control. To reinforce NDC functions, further amendments
followed which authorized the management of overall national defense (1998) and promoted its status as
the supreme guiding organ of national defense (2009).
The Chairman of the NDC takes command of all activities of North Korea’s armed forces and national
defense projects. While the GPB oversees the WPK’s organization and other political and ideological
projects, the GSD commands military operations, and the MPAF represents the military at home and
abroad. The MPAF came into being when the regime was established in 1948 to take charge of military-
related foreign affairs, industry, finance and other administrative works, but the constitutional revision in
1998 relocated the MPAF under the direct guidance and command of the NDC. At present, Kim Jong-un is
known to have assumed the positions of Supreme Commander of the KPA, Chairman of the CMC, First
Chairman of the NDC. This empowers the young ruler to command and oversee all military forces in North
Korea, in addition to exercising administrative and power over them.
In December 1962, the 5th session of the 4th Central Committee adopted the Four-point Military Guideline
proposed by Kim Il-sung. To implement the guideline, a military commission was newly established under
the Central Committee, which was renamed the Central Military Commission (CMC) in November 1982.
The CMC oversees the discussions and decisions of military policies and their implementation, reinforces
the armed forces including the KPA, conducts the organization and supervision of projects promoting the
munitions industry, and exercises military command. In the meantime, the GPB takes charge of political
tasks of the WPK within the KPA with similar authority as other organs under the Central Committee, and
this in effect enables the WPK to tighten its grip over the military. Party officials are also assigned to each
and every military unit, so that they may guide and direct all works of the armed forces to comply with
WPK lines and policies.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 127

As was discussed in Chapter I, Kim Jong-un is the General Secretary of the Korean Workers
Party (KWP) and the CMC, First Chairman of the NDC, and Supreme Commander of the KPA.
The main channel for command and control of the KPA starts at the NDC and goes to the GSD,
from which command and control extend to each military branch and 25 known bureaus that
have various amounts of control over the operational units. The Ministry of People’s Armed
Forces has the authority to administer military affairs – which includes representing the military
externally and undertaking internal work like military logistics, finance, and diplomacy. 258
There are two additional paths of command and control to make sure that the KPA remains under
tight political control – one through the KWP’s Central Committee (to the NDC’s General
Political Bureau, which supervises indoctrination programs and the Workers’ Party organizations
that are part of the KPA, then down through the KPA to the lower levels), and the second
through the NDC (to the Ministry of State Security as well as the Security Command, which also
has representatives throughout the KPA structure). 259
The US DOD report on the DPRK’s military forces issued in May 2013 notes that, 260
The DPRK National Defense Commission (NDC) is the symbolic nominal authority over the North’s
military and security services. The Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces (MPAF) is the administrative
superior of the KPA, while operational command and control is exercised by its subordinate General Staff
Department. The 1992 constitution shifted control from the president to the NDC and Kim Jong Il directly
exercised control of the military as chairman of the NDC, and Supreme Commander of the KPA.
Kim Jong Un was made the supreme commander of the KPA shortly after his father’s death and named to
the newly created position of “first chairman” of the NDC in April 2012, when Kim Jong Il was made
“eternal chairman” of the NDC. In the same month, Kim Jong Un was named first secretary of the Korean
Worker’s Party, after his father was made “eternal general secretary” of the KWP. At the same time, Kim
Jong Un also became the chairman of the Central Military Commission of the KWP, having previously
been one of two vice chairmen.
…North Korea’s nationwide fiber optic network is available to every sector of society, and North Korea
has invested in a modern nationwide cellular network. Telecommunication services and access are strictly
controlled, and all networks are available for military use, if necessary.
128 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.30: ROK Diagram of DPRK Force Organization

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper, 30.

Force Size and Structure

The US DOD issued its first unclassified report on the DPRK’s military forces in May 2013.
This report described the DPRK’s ground forces as follows: 261
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) is a large ground-centric military, supported by a large ballistic missile
arsenal, extensive special operations forces and limited air and naval forces. With approximately 70 percent
of its ground forces and 50 percent of its air and naval forces deployed within 100 km of the demilitarized
zone, which has served as the de facto shared border since 1953, the KPA poses a continuous threat to the
ROK and deployed U.S. forces. However, after decades under a failed economy and the resulting food
shortages, the KPA is a weakened force that suffers from logistical shortages, aging equipment, and poor
training.
…The KPA’s ground forces are dominated by conventional and light infantry units, supported by armor
and mechanized units and heavy concentrations of artillery. These forces are forward deployed, are
fortified in several thousand underground facilities, and include long-range cannon and rocket artillery able
to fire deep into the ROK from their garrisons.
The ground forces possess light and medium tanks armored personnel carriers, and multiple rocket
launchers (MRLs). This large artillery force includes long-range 170-mm guns and 240-mm MRLs, many
of which are deployed along the DMZ and pose a constant threat to northern parts of the ROK, including its
capital city of Seoul.
…the ground forces comprise the vast majority of North Korea’s military. Most of the conventional
weapons systems were developed based on 1960s and 1970s era technology. However, they have attempted
to overcome this technological disadvantage by relying on massive numbers of artillery systems while
simultaneously increasing its light infantry forces.
The DOD map of the deployment of DPRK ground forces is shown in Figure II.31. Unclassified
estimates of the DPRK forces differ in detail. The DOD estimates DPRK ground forces as
having a total strength of approximately 950,000 personnel, 4,100 tanks, 2,100 other armored
vehicles, 8,500 artillery weapons, and 5,100 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). 262
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 129

The IISS Military Balance for 2013 estimates DPRK ground forces as having a total strength of
approximately 1,190,000 personnel, 3,500 main battle tanks, 3,060+ armored vehicles, 8,500+
artillery weapons, and 5,100 multiple rocket launchers (MRLs). 263 The differences are probably
as much a matter of counting rules and real differences in underlying estimates, but illustrate the
problems in making direct numerical comparisons of the balance.
The IISS estimates for 2014 report that the DPRK army is a 12-corps force with two mechanized
corps, nine infantry corps, and a capital defense corps. Its armored forces include one armored
division, 15 armored brigades, and four mechanized divisions. The bulk of its forces are still
infantry – 27 divisions and 14 brigades.
Jane’s provides a somewhat different estimate of the structure of DPRK ground forces as
follows; there are more striking differences in the IISS and Jane’s estimates of DPRK Special
Forces, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 264
16 Corps-level formations
o 10 infantry corps
o 2 mechanized corps
o 1 Pyongyang Defence Command
o Air Defence Command
o 11th Storm Corps (previously the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau)
o Strategic Rocket Forces Command
o 173 combat divisions and brigades
A number of specialized units that are under the General Staff Department bureaus, as well as
special operations personnel (part of the internal security and intelligence agencies), are also part
of the ground forces. 265
Starting in 2000, the KPA has initiated many organizational changes in the ground forces to
increase offensive capabilities as well as to adapt to changing economic conditions (such as the
lack of fuel). Examples of these changes include reorganizing some mechanized brigades and
light infantry brigades, expanding some light infantry battalions along the DMZ to regiment size,
enlarging light infantry regiments to brigades, and equipping some light infantry with bicycles to
increase mountain-terrain mobility. 266
A Jane’s analysis of these changes – which seems to differ from the limited data on unit
structure provide by the IISS – indicates that, 267
Beginning in 2000 but more significantly from 2003 to the present, the KPA has undertaken a number of
significant organisational changes within its ground forces units. Among the more significant changes was
the expansion of existing division level light infantry battalions within the DMZ corps to regiments and the
reorganisation of seven infantry or mechanised infantry divisions (each divisions consists of approximately
7,000 troops for a total of approximately 50,000 troops) into light infantry divisions. These later
organisational developments were apparently achieved by stripping these divisions of the majority of their
combat and combat support units (for example artillery, armour, air defence and so on). Accompanying
these organisational developments was the expansion of urban, nighttime and mountaineering training for
all special operations units. Some of the light infantry units deployed along the DMZ are equipped with
bicycles to increase mobility within the mountains.
130 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

It is believed that the KPA undertook these changes to organisation and training following a strategic
review of a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula, combined with lessons learned from the recent
conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, which convinced the KPA of the need for a greater number
of “light” units. This is possibly one of the most interesting developments in KPA conventional forces in
the past 20 years. Additionally, some light infantry battalions within divisions deployed along the DMZ
were expanded to regiment size.
The DOD map of the deployment of DPRK air forces is also shown in Figure II.32. The DOD
estimates the DPRK Air Force as having a total strength of approximately 110,000 personnel,
800+ combat aircraft, 300 helicopters, and 300+ transport aircraft. 268 The IISS Military Balance
for 2014 estimates DPRK air forces as having a total strength of approximately 110,000
personnel, 603 combat aircraft, 302 helicopters, and 217 transport aircraft. 269
The DOD described the DPRK’s air forces as follows: 270
The Air Force is primarily responsible for defending North Korean air space. Its other missions include
special operations forces insertion, transportation and logistics support, reconnaissance, and bombing and
tactical air support for KPA ground forces. However, due to the technological inferiority of most of its
aircraft fleet and rigid air defense command and control structure, much of North Korea’s air defense is
provided by surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).
The NKAF’s most capable combat aircraft are its MiG-29 and MiG-23 fighters and its SU-25 ground-
attack aircraft. However, the majority of aircraft are less capable MiG-15s, -17s, -19s (F-6), and -21s. The
NKAF operates a large fleet of AN-2 COLT aircraft, 1940s vintage single-engine, 10-passenger, bi-planes,
which are likely tasked with inserting SOF into the ROK. The air force is rounded out with several hundred
helicopters, predominantly Mi-2/HOPLITE and U.S.-made MD-500 helicopters (obtained by
circumventing U.S. export controls in 1985). The rotary-wing fleet is used both for troop transport and
ground attack.
North Korea possesses a dense, overlapping air defense system of SA-2/3/5 SAM sites, mobile and fixed
AAA, and numerous man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), like the SA-7.
The DOD map of the deployment of DPRK naval forces is shown in Figure II.33. It described
the DPRK’s naval forces are as follows: 271
The North Korean Navy (NKN), the smallest of the KPA’s three main services. This coastal force is
composed primarily of aging, though numerous, small patrol craft that employ a variety of anti-ship cruise
missiles, torpedoes, and guns. The NKN maintains one of the world’s largest submarine forces, with around
70 attack-, coastal, and midget-type submarines. In addition, the NKN operates a large fleet of air-
cushioned (hovercraft) and conventional landing craft to support amphibious operations and SOF insertion.
The force is divided into East and West Coast Fleets, which each operate a range of patrol craft, guided-
missile patrol boats, submarines, and landing craft.
Unclassified estimates of these DPRK forces again differ in detail. The DOD estimates the
DPRK Navy as having a total strength of 60,000 personnel, 72 submarines, 383 patrol
combatants, 267 amphibious ships and landing craft, 30 mine warfare vessels, and 30
support/auxiliary vessels. 272 The IISS estimates the DPRK Navy as having a total strength of
60,000 personnel, 70 submarines, 420 patrol combatants, 260 amphibious landing craft, 24 mine
warfare vessels, and 23 support/auxiliary vessels. 273 According to IHS Jane’s, compared to other
naval assets in the DPRK Navy, the submarine force has a higher state of readiness. 274
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 131

Figure II.31: Deployment of DPRK Ground Forces in 2013

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, 2013, Department of Defense, March 2014, 16,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/North_Korea_Military_Power_Report_2013-2014.pdf.
132 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.32: Deployment of DPRK Air Forces in 2013

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, 2013, 17.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 133

Figure II.33: Deployment of DPRK Naval Forces in 2013

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, 2013, 11.
134 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Potential Invasion Scenarios and Capacities

There is surprisingly little data on the full scope of DPRK military exercises and plans, and
particularly on how well the DPRK trains and plans to use its large Special Forces and other
“asymmetric” force elements either independently or in concert with its more “conventional”
armored, mechanized, and infantry forces. There is also surprisingly little unclassified
transparency in the official white papers and command statements of the US, ROK or Japan on
either the readiness and capability of DPRK forces in given scenarios or in net assessment terms
relative to the ROK and US.
As noted earlier, both US Department of Defense and IISS analyses indicates that the actual
capabilities of DPRK forces do not match its numbers. 275 Approximately one-half of the DPRK’s
major weapons were designed in the 1960s, with the other half even older. The issues of fuel,
maintenance, and lack of spare parts would decrease equipment capabilities even further.
Compared to Soviet-era systems (i.e., the type deployed by the DPRK), modern weapons are
usually two- to four-times as effective. 276
The DPRK still uses a Soviet-style military doctrine that discourages initiative and flexibility,
focusing on high-level decision-making and scripted plans. It is therefore unlikely that mid-level
officers are very capable. While the DPRK has tried to improve training in the past decade, the
faltering economy and shortages have limited the actual implementation of these plans. The
years of indoctrination and party control have likely resulted in highly loyal troops and officers,
while the physical deprivation undergone by many in the DPRK has also likely led to the
resilience and physical toughness of the military. Therefore, while it is doubtful that the DPRK
military would collapse or revolt, years of maltreatment and malnutrition may have affected
morale to some extent. 277
A 2013 IISS study, The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, assessed the
potential DPRK threat to the ROK/USFK in an invasion scenario that illustrates many of the key
issues involved. As has been raised several times earlier in the analysis, the IISS study found that
the terrain of the Korean Peninsula – and the DMZ – makes any large invasion, especially of
heavy armor, difficult to undertake. Manmade barriers (i.e., mines and bridge demolitions) as
well as natural obstacles (i.e., marshes and rivers), when combined with air counterattacks,
would be able to significantly reduce DPRK invasion force strength in a short time. 278
Even if an attack occurred in winter, when the rice fields are frozen and thus can be used as
roads, the IISS noted that several rivers would need to be crossed in order to reach Seoul, all in
the face of US-ROK air, antitank, and artillery counterattacks. 279 Anyone who has experience
with Korean winters also understands how cold and challenging they can be in some areas and
the problems they can present in supplying and sustaining maneuver forces.
For reasons that have been discussed earlier, the IISS study found that US and ROK tanks are
better and more protected than DPRK tanks and should prevail in any altercation. They also have
all-weather and day-night capabilities that provide further advantages. Ground radars and
infrared detection systems, along with reconnaissance satellites and aircraft, can allow the US
and ROK to detect any groupings of armored vehicles in order to counterattack more quickly and
effectively. 280
The IISS and many other analysts have also argued that any DPRK surprise attack on the ROK
could succeed in capturing Seoul. In a potential conflict, the DPRK could initially heavily
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 135

bombard Seoul, using artillery in fortified positions near the DMZ. The artillery could open
corridors while limiting ROK-US defensive reactions, and DPRK armored forces could push
through to Seoul before any strong US-ROK counteraction could be mounted.
While the DPRK could inflict significant damage and casualties, the DPRK’s capabilities would
be reduced by US-ROK air strikes and counter-battery fire. Some analysts also assume the
DPRK Air Force could also undertake substantial surprise attacks against civilian and military
targets. If Seoul was lost, US military planners assessed that four to five carrier battle groups, 10
air force wings, and six ground combat divisions (including army and marine units) would be
necessary to recapture the city. 281
The IISS study notes that Naval and Special Forces could have an impact in a military
provocation. Although the DPRK’s obsolete submarines are only modestly proficient, they could
be effective in delivering Special Forces or mining the coast. Special Forces would have a
limited ability to disrupt ROK-US defenses, though they could use chemical and biological
weapons in cities and military areas to significant effect. Along with the DPRK’s missile and
torpedo vessels – which are also obsolete – the US and ROK would need to neutralize these
assets before US ships could use ports for the delivery of reinforcements. 282
Many US and ROK experts broadly echo the IISS’s analysis of the limits to the DPRK’s forces,
and share its focus on the most challenging scenarios for a DPRK attack in the DMZ area and
Seoul, and the risk of a deeper invasion.
The IISS analysis, does, however, present a ground-force oriented perspective that describes
real-world possibilities. At the same time, by focusing on ground forces, it may sharply
underestimate the ROK’s ability to detect and respond to any DPRK preparation for an attack to
seize Seoul or invade deeply into the ROK, that modern ROK and US strike fighters might be far
more effective against DPRK armor, and that the coercive power of US and ROK strikes deep
into the DPRK, that attacked its already fragile critical infrastructure and economy, would equal
or surpass DPRK capability to coerce the ROK.
Many current analyses conclude US-ROK air superiority would soon be established and
airpower could be far more effective against armor than in the past, along with systems like the
MLRS and “smart” anti-armor cluster munitions. The IISS study estimated that the US and ROK
could be able to “destroy several hundred North Korean armored vehicles per day,” and a fight
for Seoul that involved modern precision weapons, ISR systems, and urban warfare tactics might
make it hard for the DPRK to seize the city – as distinguished from making it a major
battleground. 283
A combination of US cruise missiles and stealth aircraft could also strike critical infrastructure
and leadership targets deep in the DPRK. However, the DPRK’s large chemical – and potentially
biological – weapons stores, discussed further in Chapter 8, would be a significant threat with or
without such strikes, and could be delivered through aerial bombs, short-range missiles, or
artillery shells. 284
US military plans are shifting away from a major deployment of US ground forces – both
because of the limits to such a buildup in terms of time and the current size of US ground forces
– towards support of the ROK with air- and sea-based strike assets. While the US could build up
from one forward-deployed to two light to medium divisions relatively quickly, it can build up
136 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

sea- and land-based air and cruise missile power far more quickly, along with stealth bombers, F-
22 fighters, and perhaps soon, a large inventory of F-35 stealth strike fighters.
Moreover, as the previous force structure comparisons have shown, the ROK Army is no longer
dependent on US ground power. The ROK would face major problems if the DPRK achieved
strategic surprise or if the ROK’s leaders failed to react to the warning signals that the DPRK
was actually acting upon its rhetoric by properly mobilizing and deploying ROK ground and air
forces, but the ROK military today is a very different force from the largely hollow force that
existed at the time of the Korean War.
Accordingly, there is a clear need for more open ROK and US official, realistic discussions of
the “conventional” balance, a justification of military plans based on a net assessment of
deterrent and war fighting capabilities, and a clear discussion of the changes taking place in US
strategy and how they relate to ROK military plans and developments. At present, the DPRK is
being treated by some based on what may be an exaggerated assessment of its capabilities and by
others in terms of public silence.
Military Personnel
As has been raised at the start of this chapter, total manpower numbers have never been a key
measure of military capability. Quality, equipment, leadership, C4I/BM/ISR, and sustainability
have always been more critical in anything but the most static war of attrition. A heavily
militarized DPRK dictatorship that does not have to pay either its people or its military forces
anything like a market wage does, however, have a major advantage in terms of sheer numbers.
The IISS estimates that the DPRK is able to maintain a total active force of around 1,190,100
men, including 1,020,000 Army, 60,000 Navy, 110,000 Air Force, and some 189,000 additional
paramilitary forces – plus some 600,000 reservists and a very large Special Forces command
with a nominal strength of 88,000. Given the economic poverty of the country, it is unclear just
how “special” many elements of such a force really are. 285 DPRK active-service military
personnel represent nearly 5% of the country’s overall population, with roughly two-thirds
deployed close to the DMZ. 286 Most of the DPRK army is deployed on smaller bases throughout
the DPRK, and all urban centers – including large agriculture and industrial developments – have
garrisoned soldiers. 287
On paper, DPRK paramilitary and reserve forces comprise approximately 7.7 million personnel,
or 30% of the 15-60 year old population. The force has been reorganized during the past 10 years
and is comprised of four primary parts: the Worker-Peasant Red Guard (5.72 million people), the
Red Youth Guard (0.94 million), the Reserve Military Training Unit (aka Instruction Guidance;
0.62 million), and other miscellaneous paramilitary forces like the Speed Battle Youth Shock
Troops and the Guard Command (0.42 million). 288
In contrast, the IISS estimates that the ROK has a total active force of around 655,000, including
522,000 Army, 68,000 Navy, 65,000 Air Force, and some 4,500 additional paramilitary forces.
The ROK also has approximately 4,500,000 reserves that have a reserve training obligation of
three days per year. 289 The reserves are organized into the First Combat Forces (Mobilization
Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Homeland Defense Forces) and serve until age
33. 290 Despite the prior military service of all reservists, it is unclear how many are really combat
capable, though enough seem to have unit assignments to make major increases in ROK Army
manning on relative short notice. The ROK also still has a nominal paramilitary force of some
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 137

3,000,000 but it is unclear whether this serves any real military purpose; the IISS indicates that it
is “being reorganized.” 291
Practically speaking, the DPRK’s active manpower base is far larger than its pool of equipment
seems to justify, and much of the active force seems to be primarily an instrument of regime
control over its population, rather than a competent fighting force. The cost-benefit of such large
a force for so small a country, and one with some many economic problems, is questionable at
best, even for a militarized state. The opportunity cost of the added manpower comes at the
expense of equipment sufficiency, modernization, and overall battle readiness.
The army is reported to have placed more emphasis on regular and paramilitary reserve unit
cooperation over the past five years. 292 Once again, however, these forces seem far better suited
to regime control of the population than real-world war fighting. They might add mass and
popular resistance in the face of an ROK invasion – unlikely as this seems to be without the prior
collapse of the DPRK regime – but the numbers are either so great as to represent a totally
hollow force or one where many elements are likely to cost more in resources than its military
benefits are worth.
Recruitment and Training
The DPRK conscription process begins at age 14, when young North Koreans register as
enlistment candidates and have a basic physical exam, with a second physical at age 16. Draft
notices are distributed through high schools, and the average conscript is a high school graduate
aged 17-25. There are a variety of exemptions and disqualifications for scholastic, physical, or
political reasons. 293
Due to the slowly declining general health of the DPRK’s general population and the related
decreasing physical stature and well-being of the average DPRK military recruit, the country has
been forced to lower minimum entry requirements several times. Since the mid-2000s, the
number of females in the KPA has also slowly increased, from an already significant percentage,
indicating a shortage of able-bodied men. 294
One ROK government report discusses the North Korean military service requirement, the
longest in the world – it can last longer than 10 years for men and six years for women, during
which a typical soldier sees his/her family only once or twice. 295 Typically, Army service lasts 5-
12 years, Air Force service 3-4 years, and Navy service 5-10 years. After military service, all are
required to serve in the military part-time until the age of 40, after which they must serve until
age 60 in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard. 296
Figure II.34 depicts the training for military officers, while Figure II.35 shows the usual
activities of the DPRK military throughout the year. An ROK governmental analysis indicates
that, 297
All men in North Korea are required to register for enlistment at the age of 14. Two rounds of physical
examination are conducted when they reach the age of 15 during the final year of middle school, thus
allowing them to join the service after graduation. The minimum requirement for check-up used to be
150cm in height and weight of 48kg, but as youths in North Korea began to grow smaller in size due to
food shortages, this was adjusted to 148cm and 43kg since August 1994. Yet, even such criteria are relaxed
due to the lack of eligible candidates and the decline in the proportion of female soldiers.
Excluded from military service are those who fail physical exams, who have families from the hostile class,
and other delinquents who do not fit in the songbun system (families within the second parental cousin or
first maternal cousin range of those who partook in anti-communist activities or defected to South Korea,
138 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

families of defectors from South Korea or political prisoners, ex-convicts, etc.). Meanwhile, exempt from
military service are those who engage in particular lines of work or beneficiaries of political consideration
(i.e. security officers, scientists, industrial engineers, artists, instructors, administrative officers, college
students who pass military science exams, students of special or elite schools, only sons of aged parents,
etc).
North Korea presented the terms of military service in 1958 issued as Cabinet Decision No. 148 and
mandated army service for three and a half years, navy service for four years. In actuality, however, this
was often extended to a period of five to eight years, and in April 1993, North Korea adjusted mandatory
service to ten years upon Kim Jong-il’s instructions. The 6th session of the 10th Supreme People’s
Assembly also passed a military service law in March 2003, which specifies ten years of obligatory service
for all male candidates, whereas the terms were curtailed for female volunteers to seven years. Yet, this
does not include Special Forces (e.g. light infantry units, sniper units, etc.), who are required to serve for
more than thirteen years, since indefinite period of service is requisite for soldiers under special instructions
or with special skills.
Meanwhile, the percentage of female soldiers in units varies from ten to thirty percent. They are often
assigned to transport and administration, or become medics, signalers and sentries (at bridges or tunnels).
Coastal artilleries, anti-aircraft guns, and small air defense batteries are also often managed by women
soldiers.
Regardless of rank, those who break military discipline face various disadvantages at the workplace after
discharge. During their time in the barracks, all soldiers must follow a ten-point guideline, which Kim
Jong-il himself took part and gave orders to devise.
In North Korea, the General Political Bureau promotes various competitive campaigns to enhance internal
control and unity in the military. The most representative campaigns include winning the following titles:
the Three Revolution Red Flag (at company level), the O Jung-hup 7th Regiment (at regiment level), and
the Gold Star Elite Guard (at division and brigade level). Those who perform well are awarded WPK
membership, field trips, prizes, vacations, and preferential treatment in resource supplies.
…[O]ne-third to half of military service in North Korea on average is dedicated to non-military activities
such as public construction and farming…. Military authorities… have allowed a considerable number of
army units to engage in foreign trade, commercial activities, labor mobilization, and various other profit-
making projects. This being the case, soldiers prefer posts that enable extra income, such as border guards
under the Guard Command. Shortages in supply and daily necessities within the military are generating
aberrations and other offenses that damage civil-military relations.
Military ranks in North Korea are called ‘military titles’ and there are fifteen different levels for officers
and six for those enlisted. The officers are grouped into four categories: ① marshal grade (Grand Marshal,
Marshal, Vice Marshal); ② general grade (General, Colonel General, Lieutenant General, and Major
General) ③ field grade (Brigadier, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and Major) ④ company grade (Captain,
Senior Lieutenant, Lieutenant, and Junior Lieutenant).
The enlisted ranks are categorized in two different categories: ① non-commissioned officers (Warrant
Officer, Sergeant First Class, Staff Sergeant, and Sergeant) and those who choose to remain in service after
their mandatory period (Sergeant First Class, Staff Sergeant, and Sergeant-in-Initial Service). ② enlisted
personnel (Corporal and Private), which are divided into four sub-categories (Lane Sergeant, Corporal,
Lance Corporal, and Private) in order to boost morale and enforce discipline between ranks.…. At present,
around 20 percent of ordinary soldiers are estimated to be WPK members, while about 40 percent in
Special Forces are considered to have party status.
…North Korea’s ground forces consist of fifteen army corps or equivalent units, including nine front and
rear corps, two mechanized corps, the Pyongyang Defense Command, Border Guard Command, Missile
Guidance Bureau, and 11th Corps (formerly known as the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau).
While all recruits go through a special ideological indoctrination program, actual physical
training is very limited. For example, according to the IISS, DPRK pilots average 20 hours of
flying time per year, whereas US pilots receive between 189 (for fighter pilots) and 343 (for
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 139

airlift pilots). DPRK special operations troops receive more physical training than the average
military recruit, with harsher discipline and more intensive political and ideological
indoctrination. Despite their lack of many resources, the results of the system are 298
…tough, intensively trained fighters who can travel farther and faster with more equipment and less food
than most of their counterparts in other armies. They are mentally and physically hardened and disciplined,
ready to obey orders and to suffer privations that would cause mutinies in other armies. They are, however,
woefully undertrained for a modern war based upon rapidly changing tactical and operational situations,
high mobility and advanced technology.
In the early 1990s, the KPA shifted from large-scale field exercises to increased command post
exercises, political training, and ideological indoctrination in an attempt to conserve resources
due to a country-wide, multi-year famine. This led to a decline in combat capabilities. While in
the late 1990s the army increased field exercises, again from 2000-2006, soldiers spent the
majority of their time engaged in agricultural work and KPA enterprises that can earn foreign
currency, instead of engaging in military training. There are often significant shortages of fuel,
military supplies, warm clothes, and food for KPA troops. 299 Since 2006, training has increased,
including large combined arms field training exercises, but this has resulted in an uneven level of
operational readiness in the DPRK military. Jane’s assesses the DPRK Army as, 300
…capable of defending the territory of the DPRK, conducting special operations against the ROK and
Japan, and maintaining internal security. It currently maintains the capability to initiate an extremely
destructive war of reunification against the ROK with little warning; however, it has a reduced capability to
prosecute such a war for an extended period of time.
140 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.34: DPRK Training Program for Military Officers

Rank Training Program Remarks

Draftees Transferred to the military mobilization agency (first to Special Special Forces units and
Forces unit, then in the order of the Navy, Air Force, and special branch of service first
Army)
Recruits Recruit training center at each unit (3 months for general Due to economic difficulties,
troops and 9 months for Special Forces) the period of training for new
recruits is curtailed
Privates Private  Lance Corporal  Corporal  Lance Sergeant Takes 5-7 years
Non- Non-commissioned Officers Academy (3 months)  In general, men are
commissioned Sergeant Staff Sergeant  Sergeant First Class  Warrant discharged from the army as
Officers Officer (Chief Sergeant) Staff Sergeant after 10 years
* After serving 3-5 years, light infantrymen and snipers can be of military service
promoted to the rank of sergeant within 5 years when
recommended on their merits
Second 2 years at the Military Officers Academy (Commanders Class: The ratio between political
Lieutenants Top graduates in the class are commissioned as the and military education in the
Lieutenants) Military Officers Academy is
4 years college class for Lieutenants 5:5, while it is 3:6 in the
Military College
Lieutenants Promoted after 2-3 years
Company Promoted to Commander after 4-6 years
Commanders
Battalion Graduated from Kim Il-sung National War College (3 years)
Commanders after 3-7 years
Regiment Completed the tactics study class at Kim Il-sung National War Generals are promoted at the
Commanders College supreme leader’s order
Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
114.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 141

Figure II.35: DPRK Military Exercises and Activities

Months Type of Training and Activities

January-February Preparation for field tactical training, field maneuvers exercise by each branch,
engineer reconnaissance, deployment exercises
March General shooting exercises with live ammunition at each battalion and division
May Repairing of barracks and roads, planting seedlings in the fields for side dishes (food)
Mid-June Summer exercise begins
Collective Training: political education, lining drill, physical training
Field training: by each branch, in semi-underground tunnel lodging
Mid-July River-crossing during the rainy season, combat swimming, march, offense and defense
exercise, shooting exercises with live ammunition
October Preparation for the winter: harvest, storage of vegetables, collection of firewood,
barracks repair
November Preparation for winter exercises: checking of combat gear
December In the morning: focused on indoor exercises including shooting practice
In the afternoon: long march with full combat g ear, physical training, lining drill, field
shooting exercise
Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
116.

Weapons Systems and Equipment Deficiencies and Capabilities

The most significant deficiencies in the DPRK’s weapons systems and equipment are
“computers, information management; electronic warfare assets; modern Command, Control,
and Communications (C3), fire direction and target acquisition assets; armored fighting vehicles;
anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs); and support vehicles.” 301
Conversely, the North has continued to improve its ability to stage simultaneous strikes on the
ROK’s front and rear flakes, initiate preemptive surprise attacks, and make swift attacks deep
into the ROK. According to an ROK government analysis, the DPRK aims to build the capability
to: 302
[S]tage a quick and decisive war by proceeding to create panic in enemy camps, take the initiative in the
war from the start, while at the same time deploying its mechanized corps equipped with tanks, armored
vehicles and self-propelled artilleries deep into South Korea’s rear in order to overtake the entire peninsula
before U.S. reinforcements arrive.
The North’s strategy of preemptive surprise attacks based on its four- point military guideline involves a
wide range of warfare, from large-scale preemptive attacks by regular armed forces to detour surprise
attacks by irregular troops such as special operation forces…. At present, the North Korean military has
positioned some 70 percent of its ground forces in the forward area south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line,
and the considerable number of these forces in underground tunnels poses a significant threat to South
Korea.
The North has deployed and fortified a large number of long-range artilleries that could pose direct threats
to South Korea’s capital and other metropolitan areas near the front line; including 170mm self-propelled
guns with a range of over 50km and 240mm multiple rocket launchers with a range of over 60km. It has
also dispersed a few dozen air bases across the Northern part of the Korean peninsula.
…This kind of military strategy can be theoretically applied on the Korean peninsula, but in reality, there
are numerous limitations. North Korea may have the military capacity to make provocations or to trigger
conflicts, but attaining its ultimate objective would be a difficult task, given that North Korean forces lack
142 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the capability to sustain warfare. Political indoctrination and topography are not the only factors that decide
the outcome of war; other elements come into play, including the overall environment of battlefields,
educational level of troops, quality of arms, uncertainties, unpredictable conflicts, contingencies, and so
forth.
Key Assets
The DPRK is estimated to have strategic war reserves of two to three months of food,
ammunition, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants; most of these supplies are stored in specially
built and guarded underground facilities. Also, the DPRK maintains a munitions industry of
about 300 factories, along with many civilian factories that can quickly be used as munitions
factories in the event of a war. The better-prepared, elite troops of the 7.7 paramilitary and
reserve forces include the special operations forces, ballistic missile units, Security Command,
and the Guard command. 303
Approximately 70% of active duty KPA ground forces are reported to be stationed along the
DMZ, and there were reports in 2011 and 2012 that the DPRK military was reinforcing coastal
defense artillery units along the Northern Limit Line (NLL). It has been estimated that if the
DPRK decided to initiate hostilities, the US and ROK would have a maximum of 24-36 hours
warning, or as little as 12. 304
Key DPRK military capabilities include 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm self-
propelled guns that can target Seoul. 60 midget submarines and 130 air-cushioned landing crafts
are believed to be available for infiltration or transportation of special operations forces. Among
its aging fleet of combat aircraft are fourth-generation MIG-29 fighters and SU-25 attack aircraft.
A large number of outdated An-2s are also believed to be used to transport SOF personnel. 305
Also, the DPRK maintains an extensive system of fortified bunkers and hardened artillery sites
(HARTS), which include gun emplacements, personnel shelters, ammunition, a center for
directing fire, self-defense trenches, cover locations, communication, and in the event of war,
mixed minefields and protective wire. These HARTS are a very important aspect of DPRK
defense; forward HART sites are located near enough to the DMZ so that 2/3 of the DPRK’s
artillery can reach the ROK. 306
North Korea also has an integrated coastal defense system and “maintains two coastal defense
missile regiments, a large number of coastal surveillance radar companies, and co-ordinates
coastal defense operations with the KPA’s numerous coastal defense artillery units, standard
artillery units, and the Coastal Security Bureau.” There are 1,000 artillery pieces stationed on the
DPRK’s western coast alone. The DPRK also has an extensive system of underground facilities
and tunnels, which will be discussed further in the chapter on asymmetric forces. 307
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 143

Quality vs. Quantity

However, the quality of the DPRK’s equipment should be kept in mind. In particular, much of
the DPRK’s weapons are vastly inferior in technology and capabilities than the ROK’s or the
US’s. For instance, the MiG-21 is the most common fighter jet in the DPRK; however, it was
already becoming outdated in the 1960s and is no match for the F-15K’s used by the ROK. 308
The DPRK’s most recent aircraft procurement was in 1999, when it bought MiGs from
Kazakhstan, and it uses 1940s single engine bi-planes to transport its Special Forces. Most of the
DPRK’s conventional weapons have not been upgraded or updated since the 1970s. 309
Furthermore, while the DPRK has more main battle tanks, this is more than compensated for by
the much more modern tanks of the US and ROK, as well as the fact that many of the DPRK’s
tanks would be taken out by US-ROK air power before the tanks even made it to the DMZ to
engage in tank battles (similar to in Iraq). 310 Furthermore, resources constraints can also have a
significant effect on military readiness; according to one Japanese analyst, “the North does not
have the capability to wage war at the moment as they only have around 400,000 tons of oil for
their military, meaning they can’t fight.” 311
ROK
One needs to be careful about “snapshots” of military capability. The ROK’s current capabilities
will be sharply affected by the changes in US and Chinese forces already underway, by Japanese
willingness to support the US in defending the ROK, and by whether China chooses to intervene
in any conflict in the Koreas. At present, however, the combination of ROK and US capabilities
both offers a strong deterrent to the DPRK and the ability to contain and defeat the North.
The command structure of each ROK service is summarized in Figure II.36. The Army is
organized into the Army Headquarters (HQ), two Field Army HQs, one Operations Command,
the Capital Defense Command, the Special Warfare Command, the Army Aviation Operations
Command, the Army Missile Command, and other support units.
The Defense Mission of the First and Third Field Armies covers the area ranging from the
Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the frontline area of responsibility (AOR). The Second
Operations Command maintains stability in the rear areas. The Capital Defense Command is
responsible for protecting the capital, which includes maintaining the functions of Seoul and
protecting major facilities in the area. The other units’ missions are to carry out special warfare,
aviation operations, logistical support, training and education, etc.
The ROK Army will replace the First and Third Field Armies with the Ground Operations
Command in 2015. In 2005, two out of ten corps were disbanded. Currently, there are eight
corps, including seven regional corps and one mobile corps.
The Navy is organized into the Navy HQ, the Naval Operations Command, the Marine Corps
HQ, and other support units. The ROK Navy will shift toward a mobile force structure by
reducing the number of surface ships and dispatching its middle- and heavy-class ships to
counter various threats, including the threat of the North. The capacity for submarine and air
warfare will also be reinforced. The Marine Corps will be reorganized into an air-to-land mobile
force structure that is applicable to a range of mission types.
A Jane’s study highlights the fact that these forces have several advantages over the DPRK,
along with several limitations: 312
144 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

… in terms of modern weapons, widespread mechanisation and net-centric C3I, thereby permitting non-
linear manoeuvre warfare as an alternative to the historical, bloody war of attrition in the mountains along
the demilitarised zone (DMZ). However, modern manoeuvre and net-centric warfare requires highly
trained, capable and motivated soldiers, which the ROKA is unlikely to adequately achieve with traditional
conscription. The alternative - drastically reducing numbers of conscripts and building a leaner, more
professional and more lethal ROKA would be culturally painful for the army and society at large and no
decision to take that route is likely anytime soon. Meanwhile, two paramount issues loom over the
immediate future of the country and the armed forces that require greater clarity - the state of the economy
and the course of unfolding events in the DPRK.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 145

Figure II.36: Command Structure of ROK Forces

ROK Army Organization

ROK Navy Organization

ROK Air Force Organization

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2012, 53-55.
146 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Responsibilities and Doctrine

The ROK Army has the primary responsibility for defending the ROK, and the deployment of
the ROK armed forces is almost entirely directed to defending against a DPRK invasion. Combat
readiness and capability to respond quickly in a crisis are emphasized as deterrents to both large-
scale DPRK attacks and smaller-scale military incursions. If this fails, the ROK military’s
primary goals are to defend the Seoul metropolitan area, destroy the main forces of the DPRK,
and weaken the DPRK’s will to continue combat operations. 313
In terms of operational art and tactical doctrines, Jane’s observes that, 314
ROKA doctrine traditionally reflects that of the US Army, though with an increasing Korean spin as
military thinking adapts to new capabilities emerging from the acquisition of modern weapons, new C3I
systems and greater mobility under armour. Until recently, the ROKA’s concept of defeating a North
Korean invasion across the DMZ had changed very little from the closing days of the Korean War in 1953 -
hundreds of thousands of massed infantry on a peninsula-wide front fighting a war of attrition from
prepared positions, generally occupying the tops of steep mountain chains and ridgelines, supported by
lavish amounts of direct and indirect firepower, including recoilless rifles, mortars, artillery and prodigious
quantities of tactical air support, much of it American.
The ROKA is now striving to develop and implement modern doctrine that will certainly reflect American
developments and combat experience, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq, incorporating mobile, net-centric,
combined arms task forces and precision long range fires linked to co-operative tactical targeting. The
ROKA must also be studying the post-invasion experience in Iraq, with a view to addressing the complex
tasks associated with a North Korean collapse, particularly the civil-military challenges of occupation while
combating a capable, well-armed insurgency.
Although the ROK Army has an active reserve force of 600,000, the ROK can control a multi-
million-strong reserve force component if fully mobilized, which is the equivalent of another
Army HQ and 23 infantry divisions. In 2010, the total reserve pool of the ROK military was
almost seven million strong, though it is not clear in English-language sources how this is broken
down into the various services. During peacetime, reserves receive yearly training; during
wartime, these reserves are able to create supplementary units to reinforce existing units and
serve as individual replacements for those lost in combat. 315
Indigenous Equipment Development
The ROK has developed and produced many types of military equipment. In 2010, the country
ranked 11th in the world in defense science technology. In 2007, the ROK finished its first
domestically built Aegis-class destroyer, making it the fifth country to use an Aegis destroyer.
The country also indigenously developed the T-50, an Advanced Jet Trainer, making it the 12th
country in the world to build its own supersonic training aircraft. 316
As of 2010, the ROK also domestically developed and/or produced the Korean Military Satellite
Communications System (K-MILSATCOM), The Blue Shark lightweight torpedo, K9 Thunder
self-propelled howitzer, K2 Main Battle Tank, the KT-1 Basic Trainer, the Chiron man-portable
SAM, the K21 infantry fighting armed vehicle/tank, the HaeSeong anti-ship missile, the K11
dual-barrel air-burst weapon, and the Red Shark anti-submarine missile. A stealth fighter plane,
the KF-X, is also under development. The ROK also exports many of these systems abroad. 317
Uncertain Patterns of Conflict and Escalation
As Figure II.37 has shown, relations between the two Koreas have not grown more stable over
time. Recent developments have not made improvements. The DPRK engaged in two major
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 147

military provocations in 2010 – the sinking of the ROK Cheonan and the shelling of a South
Korean island that is located near the Northern Limit Line (NLL). A quick overview of the two
events is given in Figure II.37.
Cheonan
On March 26, 2010, an ROK Navy corvette named the Cheonan sank after being torn in half by
an underwater explosion. Of the 104 sailors on board, 46 were killed in the attack. Some analysts
believe the attack was an effort to bolster Kim Jong-il’s leadership strength in confronting the
South, as well as his authority to select Kim Jong-un as his successor. 318An independent
assessment was performed by an international team of experts 319 that examined the pieces of the
ship’s hull and the weapon brought back from the wreckage site. Taking into account the
physical evidence, personnel statements, medical examinations of the deceased sailors, analysis
of seismic and infrasound waves, simulations of underwater explosions, and ocean current
analysis, the report concluded, 320
Based on all such relevant facts and classified analysis, we have reached the clear conclusion that ROKS
“Cheonan” was sunk as the result of an external underwater explosion caused by a torpedo made in North
Korea. The evidence points overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the torpedo was fired by a North Korean
submarine. There is no other plausible explanation.
China and the DPRK continue to deny DPRK involvement. One reason given by China is that
they were not invited to participate in the expert assessment, though the ROK argued that this
was due to the sensitivity of the military system pieces under examination. China referred
rhetorically to the incident as a “tragedy” – not an attack – and waited five weeks to give official
condolences. Kim Jong-il was also welcomed to China with pomp and circumstance in May
2010, just days after ROK President Lee Myung-bak had been in China lobbying Hu Jintao to
take a stronger stance towards the DPRK. These Chinese actions and reactions deeply offended
the South Korean public.
After the sinking of the Cheonan, the US increased unilateral economic pressure on the DPRK.
Individuals and entities linked to DPRK illicit activities and proliferation were added to the US
government’s black list, and Japan further restricted the remittances allowed to the DPRK. The
ROK cut off almost all bilateral assistance and trade, while also closing sea lanes to DPRK
ships. 321
Yeonpyeong
On November 23, 2010, a DPRK artillery battalion attacked a small ROK island located near the
NLL shown in Figure II.38. According to Jane’s, an unprovoked surprise “time-on-target”
artillery attack on Yeonpyeong began at 14:34, coming from the DPRK peninsula of Kangnyong,
where a KPA 122 mm MRL battalion is located. The barrage lasted for 12 minutes, consisting of
approximately 150 rounds. Of these, approximately 90 fell into the water around the ROK island,
while about 60 landed on ROK marine positions – including three helipads – and two small
villages on the island.
At 14:47 the ROK Marines’ 155 mm K-9 battery initiated counter-battery fire, continuing for
approximately 8 minutes. However, of the six K-9s, only four were combat ready, while the
AN/TPQ-37 Fire Finder counter-battery radar experienced operational issues – meaning that the
remaining K-9s had to fire based on a pre-planned design that called for counter-battery fire
against barracks and command posts on the DPRK island of Mu. The AN/TP1-37 radar was
148 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

repaired after about 50 rounds had been fired, and it identified the 122 mm MRL battery south of
Kuan-gol as being responsible for the initial volleys. About 30 rounds were then directed against
this position. After a 15-minute pause, a second DPRK barrage started, lasting from
approximately 15:10-15:41, and consisting of approximately 20 additional rounds. 322
Overall, two Marines and two civilians were killed in the attack, with 15 Marines and three
civilians wounded. Damage to the DPRK remains unknown, but a spokesman for the ROK Joint
Chiefs of Staff reported that satellite images “show our shells landed on a cluster of barracks in
North Korea, so we presume there have been many casualties and considerable property
damage.” 323
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 149

Figure II.37: The Cheonan Sinking and Shelling of Yeonpyeong

Island (2010)
Sinking of the Cheonan Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island

Type of Torpedo attack from a mini submarine 170 shots by multiple rocket launchers
Attack and coastal artillery guys

Development March 31, 2010 – A civilian-military Joint 14:47-15:15 – ROK Marine Yeonpyeong
of Situation Investigation Group (JIG) was established with 59 unit responded to the attack by firing 50
active service members, 17 government officials, rounds of K-9 self-propelled artillery
and 6 civilians
15:12-15:29 – The DPRK launched the
April 12 – The JIG was reorganized to include 49 second attack with 20 rounds of MRLs
Korean and 24 foreign experts and coastal artillery
May 20 – The JIG made an official announcement 15:25-15:41 – The ROK Marine unit
that the Cheonan had been sunk by a DPRK responded to the second attack with 30
torpedo attack, which generated a shockwave and rounds of K-9 artillery
bubble effect that split and sunk the Cheonan

Damages 48 of 104 crew members killed 2 ROK Marines were killed and 18 were
Caused wounded
2 ROK civilians were killed and many
were wounded
A total of 133 buildings and power
communications were damaged (33
completely destroyed, 9 half-destroyed,
91 partially destroyed); wildfires broke
out at 10 different sites

DPRK’s The DPRK denied its involvement and insisted the The DPRK insisted that it was acting in
Position whole incident had been fabricated by the ROK legitimate self-defense against an ROK
provocation

Measures The ROK government announced the May 24 The ROK government strongly
Taken measures, which completely suspended trade and demanded that the DPRK take
Against the exchange between the two Koreas, and prohibited responsible measures. The ROK
DPRK navigation of DPRK vessels in ROK waters National Assembly defined it as an act of
armed provocation and strongly
On June 17, 2010, the European Parliament
condemned it
adopted a resolution condemning the DPRK
The US, UK, Japan, German, and other
The G8 Summit Meeting also adopted a joint
countries around the world were
statement condemning the DPRK
outraged by the DPRK’s provocation
On July 9, the UN Security Council condemned and condemned it
the sinking of the Cheonan in a presidential
statement

Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
159.
150 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure II.38: The Northern Limit Line and Yeonpyeong Island

The Disputed Maritime Border between the ROK and DPRK in the West Sea

Note: The blue “A” line is the UN-created Northern Limit Line (1953); the red “B” line is the DPRK-declared “Inter-Korean
MDL” (1999). Island “1” is Yeonpyeong.
Source: Wikipedia, “Map of Korean maritime border,” creative commons file, attributed to Amble, 玖巧仔 and Tomchen1989,
November 25, 2010. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_of_Korean_maritime_border.svg.

Map and Graphic Representation of the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island

Source: Wikipedia, “Yeonpyeong shelling,” creative commons file, November 24, 2010.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Yeonpyeong_shelling.png.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 151

Political Fallout
These low-level DPRK attacks followed an all too familiar pattern of DRPK behavior, but did
not intimidate the people of South Korea, or gain the support of China and Russia. In the weeks
following the Yeonpyeong attack, which came just eight months after the Cheonan attack, there
were civil defense drills throughout Seoul. Public outcry over the lackluster and uncoordinated
South Korean response led to the ROK military’s new strategy of (pro)active deterrence, which
has been discussed previously in this report.
A public opinion survey conducted on November 27, 2010 – directly after the Yeonpyeong
artillery attack – assessed the ROK public’s feelings about the attack, their government, the
DPRK, and China: 324
• 66% were dissatisfied with the government’s response
• 80% thought that there should have been a stronger military response
• 41%, in the case of further DPRK provocations, favored a military response while avoiding escalation
to war
• 65% said that there should be no escalation to war under any circumstances, while 33% said they were
willing to risk a war in order to deliver a strong military response
• 58% thought that that aid to the DPRK and cooperation-promoting projects should be suspended until
the DPRK apologized and provided compensation
• 43% thought that the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations were responsible for the
DPRK’S nuclear weapons development; 35% said that the Lee Administration’s hard line policy was
responsible for the DPRK’s nuclear development.
• 76% thought that the November 2010 ROK-US joint naval exercise should take place
• 92% were dissatisfied with the Chinese Response to the DPRK’s attack; 58% thought it was necessary
to send a strong protest message to China, even if it jeopardized damaging ROK-Chinese economic
ties
The ROK Defense Minister quit two days after the incident in the face of widespread public
criticism of the way he handled the attack. 325 Furthermore, the ROK’s countermeasures included
“an increase in military expenditure and deployments, exercises and surveillance; the creation of
a new command to defend the ROK’s north-western islands; and the expansion of military
cooperation with the US. Seoul also explored ways to cooperate militarily with Japan.” 326
As for the US, it provided the ROK with immediate support after the sinking of the Cheonan,
and did the same after Yeonpyeong. The US also held joint exercises with the ROK in May, July,
and late November 2010 to show its support for the ROK in spite of pressure from China.
Chinese and Russian reactions were mixed. Initial Chinese news reports did not place blame,
featuring DPRK claims that the ROK had fired first or that ROK exercises had provoked the
DPRK – and thus, the ROK was to blame for the incident. Overall, China refused to censure the
DPRK for either the Cheonan or Yeonpyeong provocations, instead calling for restraint and a
return to the Six Party process while watering down the UN Security Council statement in the
wake of the Cheonan sinking and blocking Security Council action after the Yeonpyeong Island
attack. 327
Despite this lack of public criticism, the two visits of DPRK leader Kim Jong-il to China in
2010 were strained due to the DPRK’s lack of economic reform and nuclear development. The
152 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Chinese leadership and press did not use the customary terms of friendship, instead using
terminology that suggested a decrease in alliance ties and dissatisfaction. 328
Furthermore, while initially criticizing US military deployment and exercises in the region, the
increase in inter-Korean tensions after the shelling altered Chinese official opinion and led to a
reduction in Chinese criticism of the US. During President Hu Jintao’s January 2011 visit to the
US, the two countries agreed to a joint statement emphasizing concern regarding the DPRK’s
uranium enrichment program and the importance of DPRK-ROK dialogue. 329
Although Russia was initially slow to respond publically, it ultimately censured the DPRK for
the shelling and ongoing nuclear development. Russia also called for an emergency UN Security
Council meeting in December 2010, and was not unopposed to a statement condemning the
DPRK (though Chinese opposition resulted in a shelving of the statement). Russia also noted
“deep concern” after news of the DPRK’s uranium enrichment capacity was released. 330
Additional Issues and Scenarios
North Korea has apparently developed a more hawkish stance with regards to the South in other
areas. According to the ROK 2010 Defense White Paper, 331
Since early 2008, North Korea has taken extreme measures: the North unilaterally deported the South
Koreans in charge of the Office of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation in the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (March 27, 2008), cut off the Panmunjom hot line (November 12, 2008), and blocked
crossing of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) (December 1, 2008). . . . It made various threats and
declared a posture of all-out confrontation (January 17, 2009). It also announced the cancellation of the
military and political agreements (January 30, 2009) while stating that it would ‘turn Seoul into a sea
of fire’ (June 12, 2010). . . . North Korea has taken provocative actions and hard-line measures,
including a navy clash near Daecheong Island, the so-called Daecheong Naval Campaign (November
10, 2009), establishing a ‘no-sail zone’ in the NLL in the west Sea and firing at coastal (January 2010),
and freezing South Korean assets in Mt. Kumgang (April 2010).
While none of these events led to any meaningful form of conflict, they did raise tensions and
illustrate the continuing risk that a provocation could suddenly escalate. The fact both the DPRK
and ROK are always on an ear wartime footing is also a warning that any major incident could
escalate into a struggle for control of the Korean Peninsula, but it is far from clear that this would
be the case.
Pyongyang might conduct a major conventional build-up to pressure the ROK, Japan, and/or the
US. It might do so to deal with internal unrest by trying to focus the nation on a foreign enemy. It
might launch a limited war for the same reasons. Both the DPRK and the ROK, however, would
be under at least initial pressure to keep any conflict limited, find ways to end it, and return to the
status before the conflict began.
It is also possible that Pyongyang might risk an all-out attack, and some experts have postulated
that it might do so if the regime either came under severe internal threat in an effort to unify the
DPRK’s citizens around a foreign threat or if Pyongyang felt it was isolated politically – and that
the US and/or ROK might attack.
It seems more likely, however, that if the DPRK does launch some form of attack, it would use
conventional forces to conduct a limited war for limited objectives. It might try to seize islands
or part of the DMZ, or to demonstrate its capability to threaten and intimidate the ROK through a
limited attack or by launching a major artillery attack across the border on Seoul or another
critical ROK strategic objective. The DPRK might increase the readiness of its conventional
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 153

forces and/or deploy more conventional forces forward in a battle of intimidation and not
escalate beyond a minor border incident, raid, or use of asymmetric forces in a limited attack
somewhere in the ROK or local waters.
It is doubtful that the ROK would initiate a new Korean conventional conflict, but Seoul cannot
be sure what level of escalation would follow any response to a limited incident or attacks of the
kind the DPRK made on the Cheonan and on Yeonpyeong. The ROK might also be confronted
with a DPRK succession crisis or massive suppression of the population of the DPRK, creating a
strong incentive for some form of decisive ROK military action.
Outside powers would initially play a major role in deterring both sides from an escalation of
conventional conflict. The DPRK would have to consider the risk of dragging the US and Japan
into a conventional conflict, and how uncertain the Chinese reaction would be to any clear act of
DPRK aggression. At the same time, the DPRK’s ideological hostility to the ROK and the US
could lead Pyongyang to escalate in ways that are unpredictable and make a “rational bargainer”
approach to scenario planning and predicting escalation highly uncertain.
Both the DPRK and ROK must consider the risks inherent in dragging an outside power into a
conflict. Any major DPRK success on the ground or escalation of a war would almost certainly
lead the US to escalate its forces and to expand its range of targets in the DPRK. It is possible
that Pyongyang might ignore this risk or miscalculate, but that seems unlikely. Similarly, any
ROK success that threatened the existence of the DPRK would confront China with the risk of
losing a key buffer state.
China might or might not choose to intervene at any stage in such a conflict – either to limit or
deter any action against the DPRK or to ensure that ROK and US forces did not “occupy” part of
the DPRK. It is at least possible that this escalation could extend to conventional fighting
affecting Chinese bases as well as US bases and carrier task forces, including those as far away
as Guam and the “outer island chain” that the US might use to base long-range bombers and
stealth aircraft. Moreover, China might put pressure on Taiwan as a means of indirectly
pressuring the US.
Either side might use strategic air and missile power as well as attacks on population centers and
critical infrastructure to support tactical operations. In fact, it seems likely that such escalation
would occur the moment either side perceived it was threatened with major losses or some form
of defeat. The US demonstrated during the first and second Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003), as well
as in its operations in the Republic of Serbia, that strategic air and missile power can play a
critical role in limiting an opponent’s tactical capability, temporarily crippling critical
infrastructure targets in ways that produce little collateral damage and allow the civil economy to
continue functioning. Air-land and air-sea operations are now becoming far more complex than
in the past, and the dividing lines between tactical attacks and interdiction, and tactical and
strategic operations are much less distinct or easy to predict.
The naval dimension of a new Korean War is equally unpredictable. The DPRK could use its
submarines, smart mines, and longer-range anti-ship missiles in a wide variety of ways,
including covert or asymmetric attacks on shipping, and outside Korean waters. It might perceive
a naval war, including some kind of attack or seizure of a US ship (like the USS Pueblo in 1968)
as a safer way of exerting pressure. China might or might not become involved. Japan would
have to decide on its naval posture.
154 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Seen from this perspective, the most important measures in terms of stability may not be arms
reductions or controls on modernization and force change per se, but finding ways to limit the
risks of confrontation and escalation. Confidence-building measures and transparency might do
more to limit risk – measures such as expanding limits on deployment in the border area,
decreasing risk to critical population centers, allowing neutral or mixed observers at exercises,
real time transparency on force movements, and mediation of border, air, coastal, and sea control
disputes.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 155

III. Korean Special, Asymmetric, and

Paramilitary Forces
The DPRK and ROK have long competed in creating effective special and paramilitary forces.
Pyongyang has also developed major capabilities for unconventional warfare in the border/DMZ
area to attack deep into the ROK. The DPRK has mixed attacks by covert and Special Forces
with limited naval and artillery strikes, while using missile and nuclear tests to obtain
asymmetric leverage.
According to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense: 332
The North has been strengthening its special warfare capabilities by deploying light infantry divisions to
the frontline corps and adding an infantry regiment to the frontline. The number of special force troops is
estimated to reach approximately 200,000. It is assumed that these troops have been trained to conduct
composite operations, such as major target strikes, assassination of important figures, and disruption of rear
areas, after infiltrating the rear areas of the South through either underground tunnels or AN-2 planes.
The DPRK was increasingly belligerent throughout 2012 and early 2013, significantly escalating
tensions on the Peninsula. In 2012, in addition to two missile tests, the DPRK also jammed
aircraft and naval GPS functionality using 50-100km range Soviet vehicle-mounted radar
systems. The DPRK continued denial of service cyber attacks on ROK institutions, including
government agencies and the military.
The DPRK also has the world’s third-largest chemical weapons arsenal, the world’s largest
Special Forces, a fleet of mini-submarines, and a significant artillery capability arrayed against
Seoul and other key ROK locations. 333
The sheer variety of each side’s capabilities to conduct irregular or asymmetric warfare, and the
DPRK’s aggressiveness in threats and limited attacks, can be destabilizing and lead to
miscalculation and escalation. Such forces also present a problem for any potential arms control
agreement, since they give the DPRK a potential advantage in threatening and attacking the
ROK that would be enhanced by any general reductions in conventional forces.
Paramilitary, Police, Internal Security, and Special Forces 334
While Paramilitary, police, and internal security forces play an important role in the Korean
balance, making accurate counts of these forces is even more difficult than estimating the size of
more “conventional” forces. It is even harder to estimate the size and role of internal security
forces, although these can play a major part in securing rear areas and forcing soldiers to fight.
The assessments that follow again reflect ROK and Western sources and viewpoints. It was not
possible to find comparable assessments that reflect a DPRK view. Once again, it is important to
note that the DPRK may see its choices as forced upon it by outside threats and pressures. At the
same time, these differences between the DPRK and the ROK act as a warning that the internal
security structures of each state show differences that reflect their ability and willingness to use
force and to escalate.
156 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DPRK
The DPRK has a wide range of forces and activities that support asymmetric warfare as well as
covert operations in peacetime.
Special Forces
The DPRK’s Special Forces are the most important fighting element of its irregular and
asymmetric forces. The North Korean military is proud of these forces and often refers to them
as “human torpedoes” (Navy), the “invincibles” (Air Force), and “human bombs protecting the
centre of the revolution” (Army). 335
The 2010 ROK Defense White Paper notes an increase in DPRK Special Forces to 200,000,
from 180,000 in 2008. 336 The US DOD report on DPRK forces issued in May 2013 notes that, 337
North Korean SOF are likely some of the most highly trained, well-equipped, best-fed, and most motivated
forces in the KPA. As North Korea’s conventional capabilities decline relative to the ROK and United
States, we believe North Korea increasingly regards SOF capabilities as a vital tool for asymmetric
coercion.
Strategic SOF units dispersed across North Korea appear designed for rapid offensive operations, internal
defense against foreign attacks, or limited attacks against vulnerable targets in the ROK as part of a
coercive diplomacy effort. SOF operate in specialized units of light infantry, reconnaissance, airborne and
seaborne insertion, commandos, and other specialties, all emphasizing speed and surprise. SOF may be
airlifted by AN-2 COLT and helicopters (and possibly Civil Air Administration transports), maritime
insertion platforms, overland, and via underground, cross-border tunnels to attack high-value targets like
command and control nodes or air bases.
An ROK estimate of the structure of DPRK Special Forces is shown in Figure III.1. The IISS
estimated that the DPRK’s Special Purpose Forces Command had a total of 88,000 personnel in
2013. The land component reportedly comprised eight (Reconnaissance General Bureau) Special
Forces battalions, 17 reconnaissance battalions, nine light infantry brigades, and six sniper
brigades. The air component had three airborne brigades, one airborne battalion, and two sniper
brigades. The naval component had two amphibious sniper brigades. 338
Jane’s discusses the DPRK Special Forces in more detail; the different types of Special Forces
and their respective missions and roles are depicted in Figure III.2. Most sources – including
ROK and US intelligence and military sources – believe that the DPRK Special Forces number
approximately 200,000 personnel and are divided into two categories: light infantry units
(140,000 troops) and the 11th Storm Corps (60,000 troops).
According to Jane’s, the primary missions of these Special Forces units are: “reconnaissance,
establishing a ‘second front’ within the ROK strategic rear, destruction and disruption of the
ROK/US C4ISR structure, neutralization of ROK and US air bases, and neutralization of ROK
and US missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These missions include operations against US
bases in Japan. Navy sniper brigades have the added mission of capturing the ROK islands along
the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea.” 339
DPRK Special Forces are divided into seven divisions (with an organic light infantry battalion or
regiment), five to seven reconnaissance battalions, and 25 Special Forces brigades, with the latter
composed as follows: 340
• 12 Light infantry/mechanized light infantry
• 3 Reconnaissance brigades
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 157

• 3 Airborne brigades
• 3 General sniper brigades
• 2 Navy sniper brigades
• 2 Air Force sniper brigades
The 11th Storm Corps is the main DPRK military organization that trains and undertakes special
and unconventional warfare. In peace, the 11th Storm Corps likely has administrative control
over all special operations units, while during war it is the primary headquarters for coordination.
USFK Commander General Walter Sharp described the 11th Storm Corps in February 2011 as
“elite special operations units capable of carrying out highly complicated missions,” and ROK
sources believe that Colonel General Choe Kyong-song is the commander. It has been reported
that the cover designation of the 11th Storm Corps is the 630th Large Combined Unit. 341
While the majority of the planes that comprise the Air Force are older models, the DPRK can
deploy Special Force operatives effectively behind ROK front lines in an attack. There are more
than 20 air operation and reserve bases run by the DPRK Air Force, some of which have
underground runways. 342
The 11th Storm Corps Bureau, as well as the Reconnaissance General Bureau, has access to
“specialized high-speed semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (SILC), Yugo, and Yono-
class SSM and Sang-O and K-300 (an improved Sang-O) class SSC.” 343 While technically the
DPRK military can transport approximately 4,000 troops by air and 15,000 troops by sea at one
time, due to the economic difficulties of the past 30 years and the correlated reduction in
operational readiness, it is likely that this capacity has dropped by 20-40%. 344
North Korean special operations units have been expanding urban, night-time, and
mountaineering training from 2003 to the present. These shifts in training have been
accompanied by a reorganization of the ground forces that expanded light infantry forces and
converted seven mechanized infantry divisions into light infantry divisions. 345
Additional Paramilitary and Reserve Forces
The DPRK has an expansive system of additional paramilitary and reserve forces, which are also
summarized in Figure III.3. A ROK Ministry of Unification report notes, 346
According to one of North Korea’s four military guidelines, “to arm the entire population,” the regime has
mobilized around 30 percent of the population between the ages of 14 to 60 to acquire over 7.7 million
reserve forces. Every member of the reserve forces is given various combat gears, including personal arms,
equipment, and crew-served weapons. These forces respond to emergency calls and enter boot camps to
receive 15 to 30 days of military training at least once a year.
Upon the departure of the Chinese army in 1958, North Korea organized its reserve forces and civil defense
corps called the Worker-Peasant Red Guards (WPRG) in January 1959, in addition to reorganizing
discharged soldiers among the WPRG members into the Reserve Military Training Unit (RMTU) in 1963.
The Red Youth Guards (RYG), a military organization for senior middle school students, was created in
September 1970. The RMTU, the core of North Korea’s reserved forces, consists of men between the ages
of 17 and 50, as well as unmarried women volunteers between ages of 17 and 30. Its local units are
organized into either divisions or brigades depending on the size of the administrative unit or workplace….
The RMTU members are given 100 percent of personal arms and equipment as well as 70 to 80 percent of
crew-served weapons, and are required to complete as much as 500 hours of training each year.
The intensity of their training is equivalent to those taken by active-duty soldiers. As the RMTU is
organized, equipped with firearms and undergo intensity of training similar to those of soldiers on active
158 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

duty, they can be immediately mobilized to defend rear areas or called up as reserve forces in case war
breaks out. At present the RMTU accounts for over 600,000 troops.
Meanwhile, the WPRG was renamed as the Worker-Peasant Red Army (WPRA) at the Party Conference
that convened on September 28, 2010, and is expected to play a role similar to that of the regular army. The
WPRA currently consists of those men not belonging to the RMTU who can be mobilized between ages of
17 and 60, as well as of women who are organized at each administrative unit and workplace between ages
of 17 and 30.
Along with the civil defense corps, the WPRA’s basic responsibilities include guarding the workplace and
other important facilities, as well as regional and antiaircraft defense. They are supplied with all personal
arms and equipment and some crew-served weapons. A total of 160 hours of training is required. Their
current numbers stand at 5.7 million.
In addition, the Red Youth Guards (RYG) consists of male and female senior middle school students aged
between 14 and 16. Organized into companies and battalions at each school, RYG members are subject to a
total of 160 hours of on-campus drills every Saturday and seven days of training during vacations,
including a shooting exercise using live rounds at the RGY drill camp. As the royal guards of the regime,
the RYG are mainly responsible for removing anti-revolutionary elements and playing a leading role in
improving North Korea’s combat capability.
In an emergency, they would perform the duties of rear guards or suicide squads to supplement those of
junior army officers. They are supplied with all personal arms and equipment and some crew-served
weapons. They undergo a total of 450 hours of training (substantially increased from 270 hours in the past)
a year. Their current number stands at one million.
North Korea also has about 400,000 reserve troops affiliated with other paramilitary forces, including the
Ministry of People’s Security, the Logistics Mobilization Guidance Bureau, an agency responsible for
providing and managing war supplies, and the Speed Battle Youth Storm Trooper Squad, a team that is
often brought into public work projects. They are on a constant alert for immediate mobilization.

Figure III.1: Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

9,000,000

8,000,000

7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000

3,000,000

2,000,000

1,000,000
Reserve and 0
Paramilitary… South Korea North Korea
3,200,000 7,700,00

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper 2012, 353.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 159

Figure III.2: DPRK Special Operation Forces, Missions and Roles

Type of Special Missions and Roles
Forces
Objectives Attack andd estroy targets, distrub the enemy’s rear area, launch terrorist attacks,
neutralize major strategic and tactical facilities (communication stations, missile bases,
airfields, etc.)
Sniper Brigades Breach the enemy’s major defense lines, disguise as ROK troops and infiltrate, strike
strategic targets with 82-mm mortars and multiple rocket launchers, organize pro-DPRK
sympathizers
Seaborne Sniper Start a guerilla war using hi-speed boats and LCACs, launch a surprise attack on naval
Brigades vessels, radar bases, and supply bases
Air Force Sniper Strike euqipment and facilities in air bases
Brigades
Airborne Infantry Destroy logistics bases, secure strategic strongholds, block reinforcement
Brigades
Army Corps Open secret passages, reconnoiter, kidnap key figures, destroy enemy facilities
Reconnassance
Battalions
Light Infantry Secure key launts, support main units, launch attacks on enemy command posts
Brigades (comprised of a total of 6 battalions, each with 6 companies; each company consists of
120 troops and equipped with 60-mm mortars and portable missile launchers)
Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
122.

Figure III.3: The DPRK’s Reserve and Paramilitary Forces

Type Strength Notes
Reserve Military 60,000 Subject to combat mobilization; men (ages 17-50) and women
Training Unit (ages 17-30)
Worker and Peasant 5.7 million Similar to the ROK’s Homeland Reserve Forces
Red Guard
Red Youth Guard 1 million Military organization of middle school students
Paramilitary units 400,000 Secret Service Command, Speed War Youth Shock Troops,
Ministry of People’s Security Logistics Mobilization
Guidance Bureau
Total 7.7 million
Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
131.

Infiltration Routes
There are a number of different estimates of the efforts the DPRK has made to create tunnels
under the DMZ. Work by Jane’s and GlobalSecurity.org note that the DPRK has created a series
of infiltration tunnels since the 1970s, four of which have been discovered by US and ROK
forces (see Figure III.4 below). Each uncovered shaft was large enough to permit the passage of
an entire infantry division in one hour, though the tunnels were not wide enough for tanks or
vehicles. All the tunnels ran in a north-south direction and did not have branches, and, with each
discovery, engineering within the tunnels has become progressively more advanced. 347
160 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

According to North Korean defectors, Kim Il-sung issued a sweeping order in the early 1970s
that required every Korean People’s Army (KPA) division along the DMZ to dig and maintain at
least two tunnels into South Korea. 348 The existence of such tunnels was reported by Jane’s using
information from a KPA engineer who had defected in 1974. 349
These reports were further confirmed in late November 1974 when an ROK Army patrol
stumbled upon a DPRK tunnel, complete with reinforced concrete slabs, electric power and
lighting, weapons storage, sleeping areas, and a narrow-gauge railway with carts. 350 The tunnel’s
size was about three feet by four feet and, though of unknown length, it was estimated to be large
enough to hide an entire infantry regiment – or to funnel thousands of soldiers into the South in
short order. 351
Another tunnel was discovered in March 1975. It measured 3,300 meters long, and, as Jane’s
reports, 1,100 meters of this length extended into ROK territory. It was dug at a depth of between
50 and 150 meters and measured 2m tall by 2m wide. As many as 8,000 troops may have been
able to move through it in an hour. 352
US and ROK forces uncovered two more tunnels in 1978 and 1990, the latter of which was 145
meters deep and large enough for three armed soldiers to run through side-by-side. The US and
ROK have since made constant efforts to detect any such tunnels and tunneling efforts, but it is
not possible to be certain how many exist, their ___location, or their capacity. Jane’s reports that
there are an estimated 20-25 such tunnels. 353
Other sources agree with Jane’s, placing estimates at around twenty. 354 ROK and US abilities to
detect such tunnels through advanced technology like ground sensing radars, seismic monitors,
and other devices – as well as classic measures like counter-tunneling – is unknown. The threat
posed by any remaining tunnels and their potential to insert combat forces behind ROK-US
forward defenses is substantial. If North Korea does attempt a military attack upon the South, it
could be that the tunnels of the Korean DMZ will play a role in that conflict.
As of 2012, some estimates indicated there were more than 8,200 underground facilities across
the DPRK, including tunnels, underground shelters, and mines. Jane’s reports an “extensive
nationwide system in excess of 11,000 fortified underground facilities.” 355
In addition, the DPRK military has disguised and camouflaged camps and facilities several times
greater in scale than the camps that are not extensively camouflaged. 356 The KPA conducts
camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) operations at all levels; in fact, 2004 was the
“Year of Camouflage” for the KPA: 357
A KPA manual smuggled out of the DPRK in 2010 has instructions concerning camouflage, concealment
and deception of the complete range of military equipment and facilities including “command posts,
foxholes, runways, fighter jet and naval bases, and cave strongholds.” The same manual stated that
“Yugoslavian forces in an exposed camp deployed fake anti-aircraft guns, ground-to-air missiles, aircraft
and tanks made of logs, plywood and cloth, and hid their actual weapons. As a result, NATO forces in fact
destroyed only 13 of the 300 tanks though it claimed to have destroyed 40 per cent of the armoured
targets.” Lessons learned such as those have strongly influenced KPA CCD operations.
The influence of these lessons can be seen in the DPRK’s 2010 provocations. Directly before the
November 2010 attack on Yeonpyeong Island (discussed in Chapter 4), the DPRK’s military 358
…reportedly deployed decoy inflatable or painted plywood 122 mm and 240 mm rocket launchers among
the real launchers to increase the difficulty of counter-battery artillery attacks and retaliation air strikes.
ROK officials have stated that the KPA “is developing sophisticated camouflage and deceptions to avoid
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 161

surveillance and precision bombing by state-of-the-art South Korean and US reconnaissance equipment and
weapons systems... It seems they’ve got all sorts of decoy equipment and facilities, from fake cave
positions of long-range guns and fake naval ships to fake aircraft, fake runways and bogus guns.”
After the attack, the KPA appears to have tried to deceive ROK and US intelligence by
continuously deploying SAM units and then removing them. Furthermore, reportedly the DPRK
military was putting new and improved armored vehicle and fighter plane decoys in the DMZ
corps. 359
Figure III.4: DPRK Infiltration Tunnels Discovered by the ROK,
to Date
Tunnel No 1 Tunnel No 2 Tunnel No 3 Tunnel No 4
Location 8 km northeast of 13 km north of 4 km south of 26 kilometers
Korangpo Chorwan Panmunjon northeast of Yanggu

Invasion route Korangpo- Chorwan- Munsan-Seoul Sohwa-Wontong-

Uijongbu-Seoul Pochon-Seoul Seoul

Troop capacity 4,000/h* 8,000/h 8,000/h 8,000/h

Total length 3.5 km 3.5 km 1.64 km 2.05 km

Length south of Military 1,000 m 1,100 m 435 m 1,030

Demarcation Line

Depth below surface 45 m 50-160 m 73 m 145 m

Discovery date November 1974 March 1975 October 1978 March 1990

* This tunnel has concrete lining.

Source: IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” October 18, 2012,
http://www.janes.com.

Artillery Near the DMZ

The vast majority of North Korea’s military equipment is outdated in comparison with that used
by South Korean and US forces, but the KPA often substitutes numbers and “mass” for
modernization and quality. There are reports that the KPA has created thousands of artillery
emplacements near the DMZ that are capable of inflicting significant damage and civilian
casualties on Seoul.
US General Walter Sharp, a former commander of US troops in South Korea, has said the North
has “an old but very large military that is positioned in a very dangerous place, very close” to
South Korea. 360 In addition to its ballistic missiles, reports indicate that the KPA has
approximately 8,500 artillery pieces (and 5,100 MRLs), the majority of which are located along
the DMZ in natural caves, man-made tunnels, and bunkers (known as Hardened Artillery Sites,
or HARTS). 361
The quality of DPRK artillery forces and their military competence is somewhat questionable.
Despite North Korea’s use of radar in its November 2010 artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong,
the accuracy of the attack was poor. South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) sources
162 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

state that the KPA fired approximately 170 rounds; of these, 90 (53%) impacted the waters
surrounding the island, while 80 (47%) impacted on the island. 362
Although inconclusive, this poor accuracy suggests that KPA artillery troops – at least those in
the IV Corps – are in need of greater training despite DPRK pre-attack planning and exercises.
Additionally, ROK MND sources claim that approximately 25% of the 80 rounds that impacted
the island were duds and failed to detonate on impact (12% if the total of 170 is taken into
consideration). 363 This high failure rate suggests that some DPRK-manufactured artillery
munitions, especially MRL rounds, suffer from either poor quality control during manufacture or
that storage conditions and standards are poor.
Despite the limits to the quality of DPRK artillery, a DPRK artillery attack on the ROK could
still be devastating, especially in the environs surrounding Seoul. Lee Yang Ho, ROK Defense
Minister during the 1994 nuclear crisis, said one computer simulation conducted during his term
projected 1 million dead: “all industry would be destroyed, gas stations, power plants. This is
such a densely populated area that even if North Korean artillery were not very accurate, any
place you would hit there would be huge numbers of casualties.” 364
ROK
The IISS only provides limited data on the ROK’s Special Forces. Its 2013 Military Balance
estimates one (Special Warfare) command with seven Special Forces brigades. The IISS includes
the ROK’s 4,500 man Coast Guard in its count of active paramilitary forces. The ROK Coast
Guard has some 50 Patrol and Coastal Combatants with 5 larger patrol boats, 16 coastal patrol
boats, and 10 small coast ships. It has roughly 30 logistics and support craft, 5-7 smaller
maritime patrol aircraft, 8 helicopters, and 9 light transports. 365
According to Jane’s, the ROK’s Special Forces are approximately 20,000 troops strong. They
are well-trained, modeled on US Special Forces and using US equipment. Each military branch
(Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) has its own special operations units, though the largest
is the Army Special Warfare Command (SWC) with 10,000 troops that “are tasked with
infiltrating deep behind enemy lines for reconnaissance and surveillance, destruction of key
military facilities, sabotage, and kidnapping enemy VIPs. Additionally, they combat terrorism,
protect VIPs, and carry out top-secret operations. Furthermore, the SWC also has brigades whose
specific duty is to engage and eliminate the DPRK’s light infantry troops if they infiltrate the
ROK.” 366
The SWC also prepares for a wide array of potential scenarios, such as DPRK use of WMD,
missiles, terrorist actions, or other provocations to gain concessions. In the case of an internal
DPRK crisis, the SWC also must be ready to handle crises such as an outbreak of civil war,
manmade or natural disasters, large-scale refugee flow, loss of control or transfer of WMD, and
the DPRK’s collapse. In the case of military action on the Peninsula, the SWC would combine
with US Special Operations Korea, currently based in Yongsan, to jointly make the Combined
Unconventional Warfare Task Force. This combined force would then plan and conduct special
operations on the Peninsula. 367
The ROK Navy’s Special Forces unit is modeled on the US’s Underwater Demolition Team unit,
and is similarly intensively trained, competent, and able to undertake operations flawlessly –
such as its rescue of the Samho Jewelry’s 21 crewmembers after the ship was hijacked by Somali
pirates in early 2010. The Air Force also maintains an elite Special Forces group, able to
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 163

infiltrate behind enemy lines in advance of airlift operations or airborne troops, in order to
accurately guide planes in their troop and equipment drops. 368
Counterterrorism, Terrorism, and Low-Level Asymmetric
Warfare
There is no clear dividing line between terrorism and asymmetric warfare. It is also a historical
fact that the side with the stronger regular military forces is either less likely to use such tactics
than the weaker side, or to conceal them in the form of state-sponsored terrorism.
DPRK
The US and ROK feel that the historical record shows that there was nothing new about the
DPRK’s use of limited or asymmetric attacks – some of which the US and ROK have labeled as
terrorism – in 2010. The DPRK has repeatedly challenged the ROK using low-level covert
operations and asymmetric attacks, using these incidents to put pressure on both the ROK and
the US. The DPRK has also deployed large amounts of its force structure for the same purpose,
keeping the ROK under constant pressure. It has created a special balance in the border area by
creating tunnel systems and deploying large amounts of artillery in caves and sheltered positions
within range of Seoul, as discussed above.
The DPRK’s willingness – and inventiveness – in using the threat and reality of such attacks
was so consistent between 1950 and 2007 that it led the Congressional Research Service to
prepare a 36-page chronology which covered 164 examples of armed invasion; border violations;
infiltration of armed saboteurs and spies; hijacking; kidnapping; terrorism (including
assassination and bombing); threats/intimidation against political leaders, media personnel, and
institutions; incitement aimed at the overthrow of the ROK government; actions undertaken to
impede progress in major negotiations; and tests of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 369
The CRS report summarizes these trends as follows:
The most intense phase of the provocations was in the latter half of the 1960s, when North Korea
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK) staged a series of limited armed actions against South
Korean and US security interests. Infiltration of armed agents into South Korea was the most frequently
mentioned type of provocation, followed by kidnapping and terrorism (actual and threatened). From 1954
to 1992, North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3,693 armed agents into South Korea, with
1967 and 1968 accounting for 20% of the total. Instances of terrorism were far fewer in number, but they
seemed to have had a continuing negative impact on relations between the two Koreas. Not counting the
DPRK’s invasion of South Korea that triggered the Korean War (1950-1953), the DPRK’s major terrorist
involvement includes attempted assassinations of President Park Chung Hee in 1968 and 1974; a 1983
attempt on President Chun Doo Hwan’s life in a bombing incident in Rangoon, Burma (Myanmar); and a
mid-air sabotage bombing of a South Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 1987. Reported provocations
have continued intermittently in recent years, in the form of armed incursions, kidnappings, and occasional
threats to turn the South Korean capital of Seoul into “a sea of fire” and to silence or tame South Korean
critics of North Korea. Then, in July 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles into the Sea of Japan, and
in October 2006, it tested a nuclear bomb.
While it was not possible to find comparable assessments from a DPRK viewpoint, it is
important to note that Pyongyang may see the use of unconventional or asymmetric warfare as
the only way it can safely – and effectively – exert military pressure on the ROK and the US and
force the pace of negotiation. In realpolitik, the difference between terrorism and asymmetric
warfare is often a matter of perspective and semantics.
164 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Ties to Outside Actors

The DPRK has also provided financial support and training to Palestinian and Iranian militant
groups in the past. It has directly initiated terrorist attacks, such as the 1987 bombing of a Korean
Air flight. Despite issuing a joint statement with the US in 2000 renouncing terrorism, the
country has continued to collaborate with former terrorist groups in its illegal activities – which
will be discussed further in the next section. The US State Department reported in a 2011
assessment of counterterrorism and terrorism in the DPRK that, 370
Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any
terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. On October 11, 2008, the United States
rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth
in U.S. law, including a certification that the government of the DPRK had not provided any support for
international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances
that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970 continued to live in the
DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals
believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. The DPRK has not yet
fulfilled its commitment to reopen its investigation into the abductions.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: The United States re-certified North Korea as “not cooperating fully”
with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In
making the annual determination designating the DPRK as “not cooperating fully,” the Department of State
reviewed the country’s overall level of cooperation in our efforts to fight terrorism, taking into account U.S.
counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of its capabilities.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) remained concerned about the
DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its regulatory regimes. In January, the DPRK
engaged the FATF to discuss its anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regulatory regimes.
While the FATF welcomed this initial engagement and said it remained open to further engagement, there
were no further contacts. In its public statement in February, the FATF publicly urged the DPRK to
immediately and meaningfully address these deficiencies.
The DPRK’s financial system was opaque and compliance with international standards was difficult to
gauge….
Regional and International Cooperation: In June, the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED) held consultations with the DPRK on strengthening its implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1267/1989, 1988, and 1373. CTED plans to continue to engage the
DPRK to assist in its implementation of those resolutions.
Little changed in the country report the State Department issued in April 2014, 371
Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any
terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States
rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth
in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international
terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would
not support acts of international terrorism in the future.
Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK.
The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed
to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. As of the end of December 2013, the
DPRK had yet to fulfill its commitment to reopen its investigation into the abductions.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, the United States re-certified North Korea
as a country “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms
Export and Control Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of State
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 165

reviewed the DPRK’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into
account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of DPRK capabilities.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The DPRK is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) or the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. North Korea
engaged both the FATF and the APG throughout the year and applied to join the latter as an observer,
although its application was ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, the DPRK failed to demonstrate
meaningful progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism
(AML/CFT) infrastructure, its accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in July notwithstanding. Although the FATF welcomed DPRK’s engagement, it
highlighted a continuing concern about North Korea’s “failure to address the significant deficiencies in its
[AML/CFT] regime,” noting the “serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial
system.” At each of its plenary meetings throughout the year, the FATF renewed its call on members to
“apply effective countermeasures to protect their financial sectors” from the “ongoing and substantial
[AML/CFT]…risks” posed by the DPRK. For further information on money laundering and financial
crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money
Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
It was reported in April 2013 that the DPRK and Iran agreed on a deal to exchange DPRK
mineral resources for Iranian crude oil, a further increase in economic ties between the two
countries. 372
WMD and Missile Exports
The DPRK has also exported missile technology and may develop the potential for exporting
nuclear materials or weapons to other countries or non-state actors – including terrorist
organizations. Reporting by the US Department of Defense cites two possible cases of exporting
missile and WMD-related technology and equipment: 373
• In addition to Iran and Syria, past clients for North Korea’s ballistic missiles and associated technology
have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen. Burma has begun distancing itself from North
Korea but remains a conventional weapons customer.
• In October 2009, the ROK seized North Korean-origin chemical warfare protective suits destined for
Syria.
A US expert reports that, 374
In April 2004 President of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium Kim Yong-nam told visiting
journalist Selig Harrison, “We make a clear distinction between missiles and nuclear material. We’re
entitled to sell missiles to earn foreign exchange. But in regard to nuclear materials, our policy past,
present, and future is that we would never allow such transfers to al-Qaeda or anyone else.” Foreign
Minister Paik Nam-soon added, “We denounce al-Qaeda, we oppose all forms of terrorism, and we will
never transfer our nuclear material to others.” As the nuclear stalemate continued, however, the DPRK
shifted. In 2005 Harrison reported that Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan had warned, “[The United
States] should consider the danger that we could transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, that we have the
ability to do so.” Kim said the regime had no plans to transfer but would not rule it out “if the United States
drives [us] into a corner.” James Kelly, the U.S. State Department’s assistant secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, testified in July 2004 that a similar threat had been made during trilateral talks in April
2003.
The possibility of nuclear material exports should not be exaggerated. Moreover, DPRK-
produced plutonium would not be ideal for terrorist groups lacking in high levels of nuclear
weapons sophistication, as the type of bomb design that can utilize plutonium is difficult to
build, compared to a uranium-based weapon. On the other hand, an operational highly enriched
uranium program could increase proliferation risk. While a uranium bomb would require twice
as much fuel, it is easier to weaponize and thus more attractive to non-state actors or states
166 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

generally lacking in nuclear sophistication. 375

ROK
For the ROK, the State Department reports in 2011 that, 376
Overview: The Republic of Korea strengthened its counterterrorism efforts in 2011. The Republic of
Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), the Korean National Police Agency (KNP), and various
intelligence entities worked in close coordination with U.S. and international counterparts to access and
contribute to multiple counterterrorism databases. The Government of the Republic of Korea reviewed and
strengthened its emergency response plan.
In September 2011, the FBI Legal Attaché Office in Seoul worked jointly with the NIS and KNP to
investigate an international terrorism subject who had relocated to the Republic of Korea. Subsequently,
NIS and KNP provided information and monitored the subject until he departed the country.
Legislation and Law Enforcement: In September 2005, the Republic of Korea signed the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the National Assembly
ratified it in December 2011.
Countering Terrorist Finance: The Republic of Korea is a member of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a FATF-style regional body. The
National Assembly passed the “Prohibition of Financing for Offenses of Public Intimidation Act” in
September, which the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) had submitted in October 2010. Prior to passing the
Act, the National Assembly made important changes to the law. In addition to criminalizing the provision,
collection, and delivering of funds and assets to terrorists and terrorist organizations, the revised act
established a freezing regime that controls the disposition and transfer of movable and immovable assets,
bonds, and other property or property rights.
In December 2010, the FIU submitted a separate bill amending the Financial Transaction Reports Act to
impose stricter penalties on financial institutions that violate reporting requirements. The bill was pending
in the National Assembly at year’s end….
Regional and International Cooperation: South Korea is a member of the United Nations, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Regional Forum,
ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, the Asia-Europe Meeting (an interregional forum consisting of the EC, 27
EU members and 13 members of the ASEAN Plus), Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Forum for East Asia-Latin
America Cooperation, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the G20, and the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. It is also a partner country of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In 2011, the South Korean government organized numerous international conferences to share information
and best practices. It hosted the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism in June, and the Third APEC Seminar on the Protection of Cyberspace in September. South
Korea also hosted the FATF/APG workshop on Money Laundering Typologies in December.
The South Korean government held bilateral consultations on counterterrorism with the United Kingdom,
Japan, China, Russia, Algeria, Uzbekistan, and Israel.
The State Department report issued in April 2014 had few substantive changes, 377
Overview: The Republic of Korea remains committed to its counterterrorism programs and has maintained
strong cooperation with the United States and the international community. The Republic of Korea has not
faced any major domestic terrorist threats, and the various agencies with counterterrorist responsibilities
have remained vigilant in countering what they perceive as emerging threats, such as potential home-grown
terrorism through internet recruitment.
The Republic of Korea is becoming more involved in bilateral and international counterterrorism efforts in
response to the growing exposure of its citizens living and traveling abroad. South Korean and U.S. law
enforcement agencies worked closely on sharing information on known or suspected terrorists,
implementing an agreement passed in 2008 on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC), and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 167

holding joint investigations on known and suspected terrorist encounters that occurred in the Republic of
Korea.
In November, the Republic of Korea and the United States held the Fourth Bilateral Consultation on
Counterterrorism, where the two countries shared information on ways to enhance bilateral cooperation and
expand South Korea’s multilateral engagement.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The National Assembly failed to pass a
comprehensive counterterrorism law, first proposed in 2001, that would have significantly improved the
Republic of Korea’s ability to conduct counterterrorist activities. The Republic of Korea derives its
authority to perform counterterrorist activities from Presidential Directive 47, which was last revised on
May 21, 2013. The revision was mostly administrative and did not add any new authorities.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Republic of Korea is a member of the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. In
accordance with UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), the Republic of Korea is tightening its existing
domestic legislative framework and administrative procedures to combat terrorist financing. For further
information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
Regional and International Cooperation: The Republic of Korea is a member of the UN, APEC,
ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Forum for East Asia-
Latin America Cooperation, OECD, the G-20, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia. South Korea is also a partner country of the OSCE and NATO. In October 2013, the
Republic of Korea hosted the Conference on Cyberspace 2013, where representatives from 87 countries
and 18 international organizations discussed how to combat cyber-attacks and the use of cyberspace for
terrorist activities.
To promote capacity building abroad, the South Korean government has launched development assistance
initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the West Bank and Gaza, which include contributions to
counterterrorism and stabilization programs. Also, various South Korean ministries provide information
and communication technology advancement assistance to developing countries that includes programs to
counter cyber-terrorism and to build a secure information technology infrastructure.

DPRK Drug and Weapons Sales and Other Illegal Activities

The DPRK engages in a variety of illegal and questionable activities in order to raise money for
the continued existence of the regime. After defaulting on its international debts in 1975, the
regime ordered its embassies to finance their own operations. Since this time – starting in 1976 –
the DPRK has become extensively involved in transnational criminal smuggling, including
drugs, counterfeit US currency, endangered species products, counterfeit pharmaceuticals,
counterfeit cigarettes, and has even opened an international chain of restaurants. It has also been
reported that the DPRK is engaged in insurance fraud and human trafficking.
Although it would appear to be secondary to financial incentives, the DPRK does claim
ideological justifications for these criminal acts – explaining them as tools of guerilla warfare
undermining the enemy and as a justified action under the previously explained idea of juche
(self-reliance). 378
Drugs
After the DPRK lost the much support of its Cold War patrons, it significantly increased its
involvement in drug trade and trafficking in the mid-1990s, roughly concurrent with Kim Jong-
Il’s accession to leadership. Drugs, counterfeit currency, and other illegal items were produced in
the country and then transferred to criminal organizations – such as the Official Irish Republican
168 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Army, Japanese Red Army, Russian Mafia, Chinese Triads, Taiwanese organized crime
syndicates, and the Japanese Yakuza – for transport and distribution. Criminal groups also
started to smuggle counterfeit currency and drugs on ships in mismarked or disguised containers,
hiding money in jars of honey, inside the linings of boxes, and inside cigarettes. Customs
officials have discovered these containers in the US, Taiwan, and Japan. 379
DPRK diplomats relied on their diplomatic immunity and used diplomatic pouches to purchase
drugs – mainly opiates – for resale in foreign countries. Diplomats have also been caught
smuggling other objects, such as pharmaceuticals, products made from endangered species, and
gems. Scandinavia ejected most of the DPRK diplomatic corps from the country after a series of
drug seizures linked to DPRK embassies worldwide. 380
After three years of diplomatic relations, Venezuela expelled all DPRK diplomats in 1977 for
trafficking drugs. Russia arrested a DPRK envoy in 1996 with 50 pounds of heroin. Two years
later, Russia arrested another two diplomats with 35 kilograms of cocaine, while Egypt arrested a
diplomat trying to smuggle 500,000 tablets of rohypnol into the country. That same year,
Germany arrested a deputy ambassador in the possession of heroin, and China arrested a
consulate employee with 9 kilograms of opium. 381
Overall, there were at least 50 cases in 20 countries linking the DPRK to drug trafficking, most
of which involve the detention and/or arrest of DPRK diplomats. 382 In the wake of these arrests,
the DPRK has increasingly turned to distribution networks run by organized crime gangs. 383
Bureau 39, one of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee’s offices that obtains luxury
items for DPRK elites, also procures components and technology for weapons programs and sets
up illegal activities to fund its operations. The office, which is entirely outside the jurisdiction of
the DPRK’s cabinet and separate from its national economic planning process, was reportedly
established in 1974 and put the currency it generated into a slush fund of about $5 billion that
was exclusively under the control of Kim Jong-il. 384 It was reported in April 2013 that Kim
Jong-un is believed to have more than $1 billion held in secret bank accounts in Austria,
Switzerland, and Luxembourg. 385
Bureau 39 operates through Korea Workers’ Party-run and government-established front
companies, such as Zokwang Trading Company (Macao) and Daesung Congguk (Austria).
According to defectors, the DPRK regime cannot last without the income generated through
Bureau 39’s illegal activities. 386 Figure III.5 shows a 2010 representation of DPRK government
offices, with Bureau 39 at the top.
The DPRK has also indirectly promoted social stability in other countries through its links to
non-state actors and criminal gangs. For example, the DPRK has assisted guerillas in Myanmar
by acting as a middleman, providing weapons in exchange for drugs. This has resulted in
perpetuation of the insurgency, with the rebels having an increased weapons capacity as well as
money to buy more arms, hold large areas of territory, and continue violence and human rights
abuses, such as the forced recruitment of child soldiers. 387
Defectors have testified that drug production began in the late 1970s, followed later by the
establishment of an experimental farm in 1988-9 in Hamkyung province (where pharmaceutical
plants process it into heroin, as well). There was also a countrywide public order to produce
opium for export in the early 1990s – at which point the police ordered farms to switch from
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 169

grain production to growing poppies. Of course, this undermines subsistence agriculture and
contributes to the North’s famines. 388
The major narcotics produced are heroin and methamphetamines. One refugee described the
DPRK as a “narco-state in which all aspects of the drugs operation – from school children toiling
in poppy fields to government-owned processing plants to state-owned cargo ships and trading
companies – are controlled by Kim [Jong-Il].” State farms and villages have production targets.
Bureau 39 oversees the international distribution of drugs with the help of the military, using
commercial and military vessels, diplomatic personnel, and state-owned businesses to launder
the profits. 389
One CRS report describes the reported drug manufacturing activities of the DPRK as follows: 390
Opiates. According to press reports and North Korean defectors, farmers in certain areas have been ordered
to grow opium poppies in the past. In 2006 congressional testimony, a representative of the State
Department reported that North Korea cultivates 4,000 to 7,000 hectares of opium poppy, producing
approximately 30 to 44 metric tons of opium gum annually. Though such estimates appear reasonable, they
are nevertheless based on indirect and fragmented information. With the caveat that conclusive “hard” data
is lacking, U.S. government investigative agency sources estimate North Korean raw opium production
capacity at 50 tons annually. North Korean government chemical labs reportedly have the capacity to
process 100 tons of raw opium poppy into opium and heroin per year.
Methamphetamine. North Korea’s maximum methamphetamine production capacity is estimated to be 10
to 15 metric tons of the highest quality product for export. This coincides with a time when markets for
methamphetamine are dramatically expanding in Asia, especially in Thailand, Japan, the Philippines, and
more recently in Cambodia and China.
There have been several instances in which drugs linked to the DPRK have been caught en
route: 391
In 2001, the Japanese Coast Guard and a North Korean ship exchanged fire, resulting in the sinking of the
North Korean naval vessel that was operated by North Korean special forces. Japanese authorities
subsequently determined that the North Korean ship entered Japanese waters to deliver methamphetamines
to Japanese Yakuza members. In the following year, Taiwanese authorities stopped and searched a
Taiwanese fishing trawler which contained 174 pounds of heroin that it had received from a North Korean
gunboat. In 2003, Australian police arrested three men in a coastal village west of Melbourne who had
received $50 million of street-ready heroin from a dinghy launched by the state owned North Korean ship,
Pong Su, which lay just off shore. North Korea has used its merchant fleet to act as a middleman for other
groups involved in drug trafficking by bartering other goods, such as weapons, in exchange for drugs. A
North Korean vessel laden with small arms was detained by authorities in Myanmar who believed that local
insurgent groups were intent on trading heroin for the arms.

Pharmaceuticals and Cigarettes

There are reports that the DPRK makes fake Viagra and Cialis in factories in Chongjin and also
produces counterfeit cigarettes. By 2005, the DPRK had become one of the primary sources of
internationally branded cigarettes, producing several brands in approximately 12 factories owned
by both DPRK entities and by Taiwanese- or Chinese-operated companies. 392 From 2002-2005,
DPRK-sourced Marlboros were recovered across the US in over 1,300 incidents. 393
According to a former State Department official, a standard 40-foot container of counterfeit
cigarettes can cost as little as $70,000 to produce but can have a street value of $3-4 million.
Federal charges filed in 2006 document that over a period of several years, criminal gangs
brought one 40-foot container into the US per month; the cigarettes are also sold in other Asian
countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, the Philippines, Belize, Vietnam, and Japan. As early as
170 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

1995, Taiwan seized 20 containers of counterfeit cigarette wrappers on a ship going to the DPRK
that could have been used to produce up to $1 billion (street value) in counterfeit cigarettes.
Defectors have reported factories in several areas in the DPRK, with workers belonging to a
special work force team that receives extract rations. 394
Most of the DPRK-owned enterprises producing cigarettes illegally are located near Pyongyang.
Rajin, a free trade zone port city on the east coast of the DPRK seems to be another main hub of
counterfeit cigarette activity – where many of the factories are reportedly financed and owned by
Chinese criminal organizations. One report indicated that the North Korean regime gives
permission for port usage to certain deep-sea smuggling vessels and also offers a secure delivery
channel for the gangs. According to the CRS, 395
A 2006 article on North Korean cigarette production found that DPRK cigarette manufacturers have been
turning more toward producing domestic low-priced brand cigarettes instead of counterfeit products. The
article states that relative to the price of rice, the price of a package of cigarettes has been falling and their
quality has been rising. In 2007, the DPRK imported $12.95 million ($14.1 million in 2006 and $13.5
million in 2005) in tobacco products from China. Domestic brands now are taking market share from
imports, and North Korean cigarette producers — even the factories operated by the No. 39 Department of
the Workers’ Party, which accumulates and manages Kim Jong-il’s slush funds — reportedly have been
producing more for the domestic market than counterfeits of brands such as Mild Seven, Crown (both
Japanese brands), and Dunhill.
Media reports indicate that Greek authorities seized some four million cartons of contraband cigarettes
through the fall of 2006, of which three million were aboard North Korean vessels. For example, on
September 25, 2006, Greek officials detained a North Korean freighter that was carrying 1.5 million
cartons of contraband cigarettes and arrested the seven seamen on board. According to information from
Greek customs authorities, the ship’s load of counterfeit, duty-unpaid cigarettes would have brought 3.5
million euros in taxes.
Furthermore, state-run factories manufactured pharmaceuticals and processed and packaged
opiates and methamphetamines. DPRK drugs, counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and
pharmaceuticals can be forensically identified as coming from the DPRK and are actually very
high-quality products in both packaging and manufacturing/chemical purity. However, reports
indicate that the DPRK’s criminal network partners now operate their own production and
distribution networks within and outside of the DPRK, for example producing lower-quality
counterfeit currency. 396
Supernotes, Insurance, and Trafficking
DPRK state-run factories also print counterfeit US $100 bills (the “Supernote”). Part of the US-
led 2005 Banco Delta Asia freeze of DPRK funds (discussed later in this report) was to stop
Bureau 39 from laundering Supernotes – which have been described by the US secret Service as
the most sophisticated counterfeits in the world.
These bills, allegedly manufactured in the city of Pyeongseong, use high-tech Japanese
equipment, paper from Hong Kong, and French ink. The Supernote has been found in Las Vegas,
first in 2005 and again in 2007, when a Chinese businessman was arrested laundering the bills in
casinos. One Supernote distribution ring involved the Official Irish Republican Army
distributing the notes to Ireland, Great Britain, Poland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Belarus,
and Russia, making an estimated $28 million; the bills have also reportedly been linked with
DPRK WMD proliferation. 397
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 171

The CRS notes, 398

Media reports indicate that counterfeit $100 bills are used in North Korean markets as currency and are
valued at about the equivalent of $70. It is not clear, however, whether the counterfeit bills circulating are
from existing stocks or are currently being produced. The anti-counterfeiting security features incorporated
into new U.S. bills make counterfeiting much more difficult.
In late 2006, media reports surfaced that the DPRK could be involved in insurance fraud at a
state level. Some experts believe that property damage claims are significantly overstated, claims
are made for deaths that are not due to an accident, and accident circumstances are being
changed. DPRK state-initiated insurance fraud has not been conclusively confirmed, though this
type of activity would fit the DPRK’s criminal patterns. One source estimated that the DPRK’s
2006 fraudulent claims could have been more than $150 million. On the reported insurance fraud
and endangered species trafficking, the CRS reports, 399
A recent example cited in media reports of possible DPRK state involvement in insurance fraud involves a
ferry accident that reportedly occurred in April 2006 near the coastal city of Wonsan. After the accident,
North Korea declared that 129 people had died, all of whom were provided life insurance coverage when
they bought a ticket. It was claimed that most of the victims had died of hypothermia, although weather
data apparently indicated that temperatures were warmer than reported by Pyongyang’s Korea National
Insurance Corporation. In another case, in July 2005, a medical rescue helicopter apparently crashed into a
government owned disaster supply warehouse, setting it on fire. It reportedly took the DPRK authorities
only 10 days to file a claim that included a detailed inventory of hundreds of thousands of items — a task
which insurance industry officials say normally takes most governments many months….
Several reports link North Korean officials with trafficking in endangered species, which is in
contravention to the U.N. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES).55 The DPRK is not a member of CITES; however, DPRK diplomats allegedly have been
caught trafficking in CITES-protected species between treaty member states, including France, Russia, and
Kenya. According to the State Department, known DPRK violations of CITES began in the 1980s and have
mainly involved trafficking in elephant ivory and rhino horn. Although some may argue that cases of
endangered species smuggling by DPRK diplomats may have been for personal use, the sheer size of
confiscated shipments — as much as several hundred kilograms each — suggests that endangered species
trafficking could have been planned by a North Korean government entity.
The CRS also discusses the DPRK’s potential human trafficking activities: 400
According to the State Department, North Korea is a source country for men, women, and children
trafficked for forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation and has been listed by the U.S. government
as a “Tier 3” country for as long as it has been included in the State Department’s Trafficking in Persons
annual reports. As a Tier 3 country, North Korea reportedly does not comply with minimum standards for
eliminating trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.
It remains unclear to what extent DPRK profits from human trafficking activities as a source of revenue.
However, the State Department indicates that North Korea directly contributes to labor trafficking by
maintaining a system of force labor prison camps inside the country, where an estimated 150,000 to
200,000 prisoners are forced to log, mine, and tend crops. According to Mark Lagon, Director of the U.S.
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, the most common form of DPRK trafficking are
North Korean women and children who voluntarily cross the border into China and are picked up by
trafficking rings and sold as brides in China and elsewhere, including Russia and Mongolia. The 2007
Trafficking in Persons report further states that North Korean women and girls may also be lured out of
DPRK with promises of food, jobs, and freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, or
exploitative labor arrangements in China
172 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Illicit Revenue and the DPRK’s Official Stance

The DPRK receives an estimated annual income of $15 million to $100 million from
counterfeiting, $80-160 million from cigarette counterfeiting, and a total annual criminal
activities income of $500 million401 to $1 billion.402
In the past several years, there have been few drug trafficking incidents directly linked to the
DPRK government, leading the State Department to report in 2008 that DPRK drug trafficking
“appears to be down sharply and there have been no instances of drug trafficking suggestive of
state-directed trafficking for five years.” 403 This could be due to increased international attention
to the DPRK’s activities, or because the DPRK has increased its use of criminal gangs instead of
being directly involved in the distribution of its illegal products.
It must be noted that the DPRK denies all such allegations of any state-sponsored criminal acts
and has accused the US of counterfeiting its own currency in an attempt to frame the DPRK.
International and regional powers have either declined to comment on the issue or expressed
skepticism as to the DPRK’s involvement in these types of activities, though recently it would
appear that there has been a subtle shift towards supporting the US’s allegations. 404
Meanwhile, US officials have grown more certain in their conclusions; one State Department
official testified to the Senate in 2006 that, “There’s no doubt that the government of the
[DPRK], the Korean Workers’ Party, and the Korean People’s Army are all involved in criminal
activities.” 405 In addition, there seem to have been recent attempts by the DPRK to control and
cut back on drug trafficking, especially outside of the state’s authority; reports also indicate
increasing drug addiction inside the country: 406
An emerging genre of reports, yet to be substantiated, suggests that as state control of drugs in the DPRK
becomes looser, a growing amount of stimulants for domestic sale and consumption are being produced
privately by scientists in the DPRK and funded by private investors. Some reports suggest drug abuse is
becoming widespread among senior military officials and also among the poor as a means to dull hunger.
Others suggest that drug addiction is spreading among cadres such as the officer corps of the People’s
Army Security Department and high-ranking party officials. A scenario is being presented of drugs sold
openly at farmers markets, at times being used instead of currency in transactions.

Weapons Sales
While the DPRK does import weapons components – such as a jet mill used for missile fuel in
1994 and a blocked shipment of power-control devices that could be used in uranium centrifuges
or missile launches – the country also sells its ballistic missiles and related technologies to other
countries. With the funds it receives from these weapons sales, the DPRK can further develop
missiles. 407 There have also been reports of chemical and biological weapons assistance to Syria
and Iran, though this is far from being conclusively substantiated. 408
The US Department of Defense reports that, 409
North Korea uses a world-wide network to facilitate arms sales activities and maintains a core group of
recipient countries including Iran, Syria, and Burma. North Korea has exported conventional and ballistic
missile-related equipment, components, materials, and technical assistance to countries in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East. Conventional weapons sales have included ammunition, small arms, artillery, armored
vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles.
North Korea uses various methods to circumvent UNSCRs, including falsifying end-user certificates,
mislabeling crates, sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries, and using air cargo
for deliveries of high-value and sensitive arms exports.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 173

• In early July 2013, Panamanian authorities stopped and inspected the North Korean flagged vessel
Chong Chon Gang, finding hidden cargo including two MiG-21 fighter aircraft and associated engines,
SA-2 and SA-3 SAM-related equipment, and unspecified missiles. Cuba issued a statement
acknowledging ownership of the military equipment and claiming it was being sent to North Korea for
overhaul.
• In June 2011, the M/V Light, a vessel bound for Burma suspected of carrying military-related cargo,
returned to North Korea after refusing a U.S. Navy inspection request.

• In February 2010, South Africa seized North Korean-origin spare tank parts destined for the Republic
of Congo.

• In December 2009, Thai authorities impounded the cargo of a chartered cargo plane containing about
35 metric tons of North Korean weapons, including artillery rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and
SAMs.
The DPRK has exported approximately 500 ballistic missiles over the past 20 years, with over
80% of these exports taking place between 1987 and 1993. The country transferred 100-400
Scud-B missiles to Iran in 1987-1988, along with 25-40 to the UAE in 1989. Technical
assistance in the production of Scuds was given to Iran and Libya; the latter also received an
unknown number of Scud-Bs, which were further exported to Ethiopia, Burma, Congo, and
Vietnam. Libya and Egypt both received technical help for Scud-C production, while the DPRK
exported Scud-Cs to Iran, Yemen, Syria, and Libya.
It is likely that the DPRK also provided technical assistance to Iran for Nodong production and
exported Nodongs to Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. Missile components and
related items were found on a DPRK freighter headed to Libya in 1999, while another DPRK
freighter transported Scud missiles to Yemen in 2002. Furthermore, 18 Musudan missiles were
transferred to Iran in 2005. 410 Burma (Myanmar) has also reportedly received DPRK missile
assistance and conventional missile exports, in contravention of UN sanctions on the DPRK. 411
By 1993, the DPRK reportedly had contracts with Libya, Iran, and possibly Syria and Pakistan to
sell the Nodong missile. In 2002, US and Spain intercepted a DPRK ship headed to Yemen with
a cargo of 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of inhibited red fuming nitric
acid, used in Scud missiles. 412 However, DNI Dennis Blair testified to Congress in 2009 that, 413
Pyongyang is less likely to risk selling nuclear weapons or weapons-quantities of fissile material than
nuclear technology or less sensitive equipment to other countries or non-state actors, in part because it
needs its limited fissile material for its own deterrent. Pyongyang probably also perceives that it would risk
a regime-ending military confrontation with the United States if the nuclear material was used by another
country or group in a nuclear strike or terrorist attacks and the United States could trace the material back
to North Korea. It is possible, however, that the North might find a nuclear weapons or fissile material
transfer more appealing if its own stockpile grows larger and/or it faces an extreme economic crisis where
the potentially huge revenue from such a sale could help the country survive.
The economic desperation of the regime, especially in an atmosphere of increasing international
sanctions, could increase the country’s level of acceptable risk – perhaps resulting in nuclear
smuggling, as previously discussed.
If the DPRK does decide to engage in such activities, it would have the channels and capacity to
do so. Experts state that the North has the capability to make either “plutonium metal or
plutonium oxide powder, the two most likely forms for transport;” it would then be possible to
shield six palm-sized pucks of plutonium from sensors. And while the US and its partners have
increased the pressure on the DPRK’s Navy through Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
174 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

interdictions, overland and air smuggling routes have also been developed that can be used for
proliferation purposes. Furthermore, while there were 11 PSI interdictions in 2004, there are an
estimated 65 nuclear smuggling events annually – if the North wanted to proliferate nuclear
materials, it would likely be successful in at least some of its attempts. 414
North Korea has continued its export of conventional arms, such as MANPADs, artillery rockets,
and RPGs, to non-state actors. Footage from Syrian rebels appears to show rebels firing the
Bulsae-2, a North Korean version of the Russian 9K111 Fagot anti-tank guided missile. 415
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 175

Figure III.5: The DPRK’s Legal, illegal, and Illicit Activities

Network (2010)

Source: John Park, “North Korea, Inc.: Gaining Insights into Regime Stability in North Korea from Recent Commercial
Activates,” in Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 2.
176 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

ROK Weapons Sales

Because of force structure reductions and the corresponding likely lack of increase in domestic
procurement demand, the ROK is promoting export of military equipment. Sales abroad reached
$2.4 billion in 2011 416 – higher than the goal of $1.6 billion thanks to the success of the T-50
Golden Eagle aircraft – while domestic sales were $7 billion. 417
The ROK aims to be among the world’s top 8 exporters by 2015 418 and by 2017 total ROK
defense exports are forecast to be $10 billion. 419 Items exported include aircraft engine and wing
assemblies, small-caliber munitions, tank production technology, submarine combat systems,
and wheeled armored vehicles. 420
Figure III.6 shows the increase in numbers of ROK weapons sales and defense companies over
the past several years, along with total defense industry sales. The ROK is hoping to link defense
exports with civilian industries like shipbuilding, exploiting existing export strengths. Regarding
ROK military exports, the IISS reported, 421
South Korea’s aerospace industry is the least developed sector, although the co-development of the T-50
trainer and the FA-50 light fighter variants show longer-term potential. Indonesia signed a contract in May
2011 for 16 T-50s, and the Philippines selected it in August 2012. The largest potential market is in the US,
where the air force’s T-X trainer competition (for up to 350 aircraft) could provide a major boost to the T-
50.
In naval systems, South Korea already produces Aegis destroyers and its own LHDs. In February 2012,
Daewoo Shipbuilding won a contract to build four military oilers for the UK Royal Navy and also won a
US$1.1bn contract to build four submarines for Indonesia. South Korea has established capacity in
manufacturing armoured vehicles, such as the XK-2 tank and K9/10 self-propelled howitzers, which Seoul
hopes to export. Lower labour costs, precision engineering, and South Korea’s military experience have
boosted defence-industrial prospects.

Figure III.6: The ROK Defense Industry in 2010

Source: Republic of Korea Armed Forces, “Innovation Makes Us Powerful,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010, 34-5.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 177

DPRK: Cyber, Electronic Warfare, and SIGINT Capabilities

There are a variety of other North Korean paramilitary and covert activities that also deserve
mention. The DPRK has a significant intelligence program directed towards the ROK: 422
North Korea’s intelligence resources are focused primarily on South Korea and are dedicated to influencing
public opinion, collecting sensitive information on U.S. and Republic of Korea government and military
targets, and in some cases assassinating high-profile defectors and outspoken critics of the North Korean
regime. North Korean intelligence officers and agents for years have infiltrated South Korea by posing as
defectors. Firsthand accounts of confessed North Korean agents describe long-term strategies that can
involve many years of living in South Korea as sleeper agents before being tasked with a mission. North
Korean intelligence activity is likely greatest in East Asia; however, the full extent of activity outside the
Korean peninsula is unknown.

Cyber
As note earlier, DPRK cyber warfare capabilities are a growing problem – and one demonstrated
by its attacks on Sony in December 2014. Former US Forces Korea Commander James Thurman
testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee in March 2012 that “North Korea
employs sophisticated computer hackers trained to launch cyber infiltration and cyber attacks
against Korea and the United States,” showing that the DPRK has stepped up its efforts to
enhance its cyber-attack capacity in recent years.
The IISS summarizes the DPRK’s cyber capabilities and history as follows: 423
Since the 1970s, the North Korean military (the Korean People’s Army – KPA) has maintained a modest
electronic warfare (EW) capability. As a result of strategic reviews following Operation Desert Storm, the
KPA established an information warfare (IW) capability under the concept of ‘electronic intelligence
warfare’ (EIW). Complementing these EIW developments, the KPA is believed to have expanded its EW
capabilities with the introduction of more modern ELINT equipment, jammers and radars. In 1998, Unit
121 was reportedly established within the Reconnaissance Bureau of the General Staff Department to
undertake offensive cyber operations. Staff are trained in North Korea but some also receive training in
Russia and China. In early 2012, activity attributed to Pyongyang included jamming the global positioning
systems of aircraft using Seoul’s main international airports, as well as those of vessels in nearby waters for
two weeks. North Korea also continued to launch distributed denial of service attacks on South Korean
institutions and pursue cyber infiltration against military and other government agencies.
The DOD reported in May 2013 that, 424
North Korea probably has a military computer network operations (CNO) capability. Implicated in several
cyber attacks ranging from computer network exploitation (CNE) to distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks since 2009, the North Korean regime may view CNO as an appealing platform from which to
collect intelligence.
• North Korea was allegedly behind two separate cyberattacks in 2013, which targeted South
Korean banking, media, and governmental networks, resulting in the erasure of critical data.
• According to a ROK newspaper, Seoul’s Central Prosecutor’s office attributed to North Korea
a CNO activity on the ROK’s National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (Nonghyup
Bank) servers in April 2011. Through remote execution, actors rendered the bank’s online
services inaccessible and deleted numerous files concerning customer bank accounts while
removing all evidence of CNO activity in the bank’s servers.
• In the years spanning 2009-2011, North Korea was allegedly responsible for conducting a
series of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against ROK commercial, government
and military websites, rendering them inaccessible.
178 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Technical attribution of cyberspace operations remains challenging due to the internet’s decentralized
architecture and inherent anonymity. Given North Korea’s bleak economic outlook, CNO may be seen as a
cost-effective way to modernize some North Korean military capabilities. As a result of North Korea’s
historical isolation from outside communications and influence, it is likely to employ Internet infrastructure
from third-party nations.
The DPRK is believed to have a cyber warfare unit called “Number 121,” composed of 3,000
elite hackers who break into networks for information and spread viruses – similar to espionage
and vandalism, not warfare. The DPRK is also believed to train these experts as part of its
computer warfare strategies at the electronic warfare department of a military technician training
center. 425
Two DPRK defectors who claimed to have been part of the cyber warfare department reported in
2011 that the department was vast, highly professional, and recruited hackers straight out of
primary school. They are sent to Russia or China for training and receive special treatment by the
DPRK – like housing or other privileges for their families and themselves. This is in part to
reduce the temptation to defect, as they have access to the internet – unlike most other DPRK
citizens – and thus know of the relative prosperity enjoyed by most other countries. 426
One defector provided five reasons why the DPRK had decided to focus energy and resources
into developing a cyber warfare program: cyber military strength is cost effective, provides
higher utility than other forces, the DPRK is confident of its software development capabilities, it
sees the internet as inherently weak and thus an easy target, and cyber warfare is asymmetrically
advantageous for the DPRK. As the country is almost entirely not connected to the internet, it is
much less exposed to such attacks – as opposed to the ROK, which is one of the most connected
societies in the world. 427
The DPRK is suspected of having been behind major cyber attacks on the ROK in 2008, when
the DPRK shut down approximately 400 computers at Lee Myung-bak’s presidential transition
office, and in 2009, when the websites of governmental institutions such as the National
Assembly and the Presidential Office were paralyzed in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attack. 428
The 2009 attack involved 435 different servers in 61 countries. 429 The ROK’s Seoul Central
District Public Prosecutors’ Office announced in May 2011 that its investigation into a network
failure of Nonghyup bank in March 2011 showed the issue was caused by a cyber-attack in
which North Korea was involved. 430 Another early 2011 attack paralyzed the websites of 40
public and financial institutions, including the presidential office. In 2012, a major South Korean
newspaper, JoongAng Ilbo, was also attacked. 431
The DPRK is also suspected to be behind another attack on March 20, 2013 when a hacking
attack originating from a Chinese IP address paralyzed approximately 32,000 computers at the
ROK’s two largest public broadcasters, a news cable channel, and three large banks. 432 The
broadcasters attacked were on a list of ROK media firms denounced by the DPRK in 2012 for
the right-wing manipulation of ROK public opinion. 433
The ROK traced the IP address of the hacker to a registration in Ryugyong-dong in Pyongyang
(the capital of North Korea), and the hacker first accessed the ROK websites weeks before the
March 2013 attack. The methods used in the attack were similar to those used by the DPRK’s
Reconnaissance General Bureau, which has in the past led hacking attempts against the ROK.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 179

To undertake the attack, 76 pieces of malicious code were used; 18 bits of code have been
identified as exclusively used by DPRK hackers in previous attempts. The attack also involved
routing through the US, ROK, and eight other countries in an apparent attempt to disguise its
identity; 49 infiltration routes were used (25 local; 24 foreign), of which 22 were IP addresses
the DPRK has used before in attacks. 434
From 2008-2012, ROK public institution websites have received 73,030 hacking attempts –
though the vast majority have not been conclusively tied to DPRK. ROK officials also say that
DPRK computers were used to distribute malicious software by accessing ROK financial firms’
networks 1,590 times between June 2012 and April 2013. 435
In April 2013, the ‘hacktivist’ group Anonymous claimed to have initiated “Operation Free
Korea,” a series of cyber attacks on the DPRK. The group first hacked the DPRK’s China-based
website Uriminzokkiri.com, took control of the related Flickr and Twitter accounts, and posted a
warning, a manifesto, a series of demands, and a wanted poster of Kim Jong-un with a pig snout
and Mickey Mouse on his chest. 436
The group claimed to have stolen 15,000 membership passwords to the Uriminzokkiri website,
releasing personal details of these accounts. Other, smaller pro-DPRK sites were also hacked,
with personal details of members released. Any ROK citizens whose information is found on
these membership lists could face criminal prosecution. 437
Anonymous also initiated a DDoS attack of DPRK-related websites like Uriminzokkiri.com and
Air Koryo on Kim Il-sung’s birthday in early April 2013. One hacker belonging to the group was
interviewed by an ROK news agency, saying, “Anonymous members not only want to attack the
government’s homepage, but will try to steal personnel data of North Korean leaders, and even
hack into the North’s nuclear facilities.” Although there is no evidence the group has gotten into
DPRK servers or intranet, they claim to have plans to do so. 438
A report from Hewlett-Packard regarding North Korea cyber-capabilities highlights the
difficulties that arise from the nature of the internet in North Korea. 439
North Korea’s Internet infrastructure and the regime’s strict control over its use ensures that there are no
rogue actors and that all officially sanctioned actors exercise careful OPSEC and PERSEC practices in
order to prevent inadvertent information leaks. In other words, there was no significant identifying
information in the form of an OSINT trail left behind by the actors. This hinders collection of original,
actionable threat intelligence and individual actor attribution.
Today North Korea’s air-gapped networks and prioritization of resources for military use provide both a
secure and structured base of operations for cyber operations and a secure means of communications. North
Korea’s hermit infrastructure creates a cyber-terrain that deters reconnaissance. Because North Korea has
few Internet connections to the outside world, anyone seeking intelligence on North Korea’s networks has
to expend more resources for cyber reconnaissance.
The report drew from several government, media, and scholarly sources in order to draw a
picture of the groups and institutions within North Korea that execute and support its cyber-
warfare capabilities.
• Unit 35 – “The Central Party Committee oversees the Central Party Investigative Group, also known as
Unit 35. Unit 35 is reportedly responsible for technical education and training of cyber warriors. The
Unification Bureau’s132 Operations Department is responsible for cyber-psychological warfare,
organizational espionage, and oversight of Unit 204.”
• Unit 204 – “Unit 204’s responsibilities include planning and execution of cyber-psychological warfare
operations and technological research.”
180 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

• Psychological Operations Department of the North Korea Defense Commissions – This institution also
engages in cyber-psychological warfare.
• Unit 121 - Unit 121, North Korea’s premier hacking unit, was estimated to consist of 3000 personnel in
2012. South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency increased that number to 5900 in July 2014. Of these 5900
personnel, about 1200 of them are professional hackers. Yonhap stated that 100 cyberwarriors per year
were trained at North Korea’s Mirim University, though the source for this information could not be
corroborated. 440 While the quality of this training cannot be precisely verified, it is known that the North
Korean school system places heavy emphasis on mathematics, which has led North Korea to feel confident
of its abilities to nurture capable programmers, cryptographers, and security researchers. “Unit 121
comprises both an intelligence component and an attack component. Unit 121’s headquarters is in the
Moonshin-dong area of Pyongyang, near the Taedong Rivber. It also has components that conduct
operations from within China. One of Unit 121’s command posts is Chilbosan Hotel in Shenyang, the
capital of Liaoning Province, which borders North Korea.” 441
• Lab 110 – “Both Unit 121 and an entity known as Lab 110 are reported to maintain technical
reconnaissance teams responsible for infiltrating computer networks, hacking to obtain intelligence, and
planting viruses on enemy networks.” 442
• Office 225 / The 225th Bureau – This institution is “responsible for training agents, infiltration operations in
South Korea, and creation of underground political parties in order to incite disorder and revolution.” 443 It
plays a more traditional intelligence and psychological operations role, rather than focusing on cyber
operations.”
• No. 91 Office – “The No. 91 Office, an office responsible for hacking operates out of the Mangkyingdae-
district of Pyongyang.”
• Korea Computer Center (KCC) - KCC is “North Korea’s leading government research venter for
information technology. KCC has eleven regional information centers and eight development and
production centers. Other countries with KCC branch offices include China, Syria, Germany, and United
Arab Emirates. KCC has a vested interest in Linuz research and is responsible for the development of
North Korea’s national operating system, Red Star OS.” 444 “In 2011, South Korean police arrested five
individuals, including one Chinese national, for allegedly collaborating with North Korean hackers
affiliated with the Korea Computer Center to steal money via online games. According to South Korean
reports, the culprits used an auto-player to quickly progress in the massively multiplayer online role-
playing game (MMORPG) “Lineage” and were able to use the game’s market to obtain real currency. In
2013, South Korean officials released information stating they had found evidence that North Korea was
using games as a medium for infecting machines and launching cyber attacks. North Korea had used game
downloads to infect 100,000 South Korean machines for a botnet used to launch a distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack against Incheon Airport. This clever tactic sought to leverage a seemingly innocent
game as a force multiplier in order to amplify the effects of a DDoS attack on a critical infrastructure target.
However, in this case, there was little impact on the target.”
• Ministry of State Security - “The Ministry of State Security (MSS), also known as the State Security
Department, is North Korea’s primary counterintelligence service. It is considered an autonomous agent of
the regime and reports directly to leader Kim Jong Un….the MSS also reportedly has a communications
monitoring and computer hacking group.” 445
• Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) – “The RGB has a role in both traditional and cyber operations. In
the past, the RGB has sent agents on overseas military assistance missions to train insurgent groups. The
RGB reportedly has a special operations forces (SOF) element118 and oversees six bureaus that specialize
in operations, reconnaissance, technology and cyber matters, overseas intelligence collection, inter-Korean
talks, and service support. Two of these bureaus have been identified as the No. 91 Office and Unit 121.”
• Chongryon and the Liaison Department of the Worker’s Party- This department “oversees a faction of
ethnic North Koreans residing in Japan who are critical to North Korea’s cyber and intelligence programs.
This group, which was established in 1955, is referred to by various names including the Chosen Soren,
Chongryon, and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan… The Chongryon’s underground
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 181

group known as the Gakushu-gumi, or “the study group”, gathers intelligence for North Korea and helps
the regime procure advanced technologies.” 446
In December 2014, Sony suffered a cyber attack that broke into Sony’s computer network and
revealed internal emails and information. The attack was attributed to North Korean retaliation
for a comedy film that Sony produced about American journalists being tasked by the CIA to kill
Kim Jong-un. North Korea denied any involvement, but praised it. Experts believe the hackers
may have been inside Sony’s network for months. Hackers threatened violence at any theaters
that showed the movie, which eventually led Sony to cancel showing the film. 447
As a result of many recent cyber attacks, the Sony incident became the catalyst for the Obama
administration to establish a new agency under the Director of National Intelligence. 448 The
Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center, as articulate in a Presidential Memorandum
released on February 25, 2015, will “provide integrated all-source analysis of intelligence related
to foreign cyber threats or related to cyber incidents affecting US national interests”. 449
Electronic Warfare and SIGINT
Jane’s notes that since the mid-1990s, the DPRK has increased its electronic warfare (EW)
efforts as one of the primary components of an asymmetric warfare strategy against the US and
the ROK. The administration and training of all EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets in
the Army is overseen by the Electronic Warfare Bureau (EWB). The DPRK keeps a police
battalion at the DMZ, composed of eight to 12 police companies, that is in charge of a variety of
ground-surveillance equipment – such as thermal and infrared imaging devices, acoustic and
seismic sensors, and radar. The police force also has a basic SIGINT collection ability, especially
at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. 450
Deployed near the DMZ, division-level SIGINT/EW units have responsibility for operations,
spanning from their forward line to 15-30 km behind the US/ROK force deployment. At the
corps level, SIGINT/EW battalions have responsibility for up to a 75-150 km depth. In addition,
EWB independent units also likely support corps and division efforts. 451
In August 2010, users of Global Positioning System (GPS) in the northwest section of the ROK, including
sections of the West Sea, experienced an unexpected degradation or loss of signal. Subsequent
investigation revealed that the cause for this was jamming - presumably by the KPA - from an emitter
located in the area around Kaesong.
While the DPRK has intermittently conducted jamming operations against ROK/US military and
commercial broadcasts over the years this was the first major incident of GPS jamming. The KPA
reportedly acquired GPS jamming equipment from Russia during the 1990s or early 2000s and
subsequently modified it and began manufacturing two different systems. Subsequent reports indicated that
the KPAs GPS jammers were mobile units mounted on “electronic warfare vehicles.”
Following the November 2010 attack upon the island of Yonp’yong-do the ROK Army deployed UAVs to
monitor KPA activities. The KPA, however, reportedly jammed the UAV’s navigation system, rendering
them ineffective. More jamming occurred in March 2011 during the joint ROK-US ‘Ulchi Freedom
Guardian’ exercises, when the KPA engaged in random GPS jamming harassment by sporadically jamming
at five to 10 minutes intervals.
The jamming originated from the area of Haeju, Kaesong and Kumgang-san and had a range of
approximately 100 km. During March 2011 and the again for 16 days in May 2012 the KPA conducted
GPS jamming operations along the west coast, north of Seoul. The May incident effected the operations of
670 commercial airliners and 110 vessels in the Yellow Sea. These operations are believed to have
conducted by elements of the Reconnaissance General Bureau.
182 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

ROK Cyber Defense

As has been touched upon earlier, South Korea has been increasing its asymmetric capabilities in
order to better defend against new forms of DPRK attacks. In terms of cyber capabilities, the
IISS report stated, 452
South Korea established a Cyber Warfare Command Centre in early 2010, with over 200 personnel, in the
wake of a substantial distributed denial of service attack in 2009. The new centre responds to the attention
given to cyber and information security by the National Intelligence Service and the Defense Security
Command. South Korea published an ‘Internet White Paper’ in 2009.
Other sources indicate the ROK plans to add 1,000 personnel to its Cyber Warfare Command
Center over the 2013-2017 period. Increasing personnel and attention to this area is part of a
much broader cyberwarfare effort by the ROK’s National Intelligence Service and the Defense
Security Command. 453
The DPRK has accused South Korea and the US of carrying out cyber attacks on DPRK
websites; 454 one DPRK state-run paper stated in March 2013, “It is nobody’s secret that the U.S.
and south Korean puppet regime are massively bolstering up cyber forces in a bid to intensify the
subversive activities and sabotages against the DPRK…They are seriously mistaken if they think
they can quell the DPRK’s voices of justice through such base acts.” 455
In response to DPRK cyber attacks, the US and South Korea held the first Korea-US National
Defense Cyber Cooperation Working Group (CCWG) in February 2014. This group provided an
“opportunity for the two countries to share information about cyber threats and enhance the all-
around cooperation of cyber policy, strategy, doctrine, personnel and training,” according to the
South Korean Defense Ministry. 456 This will likely be an early step in South Korea’s efforts to
consolidate its cyber strategy. The Korea Institute for Defense Analysis noted that: 457
…because the South Korean cyber security system is decentralized, each department establishes its own
organization and strategies. The differences among the departments in terms of approaching cyber security
makes it impossible to streamline policy in an efficient manner. Additionally, because of this decentralized
structure, post-incident management for recurrence prevention is difficult to accomplish, which thereby
renders inefficient any comprehensive, preventative policymaking.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 183

IV. Korean Missile Forces

The two Koreas differ sharply in their political and military decisions in creating missile forces.
The DPRK has placed far more emphasis on missile forces, although this may be changing. As
Chapter I and II have explained, long-range artillery, rockets, and missiles help North Korea
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) threaten and deter South Korea (Republic of
Korea or ROK) and the US, and compensate for the weaknesses in DPRK airpower. As Chapter
V will explain, they also provide a potential means to deliver the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction.
Overview of DPRK Missile Developments
The DPRK has given high priority to the development of ballistic missiles for several reasons,
including political and diplomatic considerations, as a means of earning foreign currency, and
efforts to enhance DPRK military capabilities on a regional basis and shape the Korean military
balance in its favor.
According to a US Forces Korea (USFK) report, 458
[T]he North Korean regime continues its efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs
both as a means to ensure the regime’s survival and to manipulate the international community. The
regime’s potential export of weapons of mass destruction material and technology poses a regional and
global threat…. North Korea views its ballistic missile programs as a source of prestige, a strategic
deterrent, a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency. North Korea continues to
build and test missiles of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, thereby bolstering its inventory of
missiles avail-able for internal use or external sale. With as many as 800 missiles in its active inventory, it
seems as though North Korea intends to increase its offensive capabilities. Missile sales further constitute a
vital source of hard currency for the North Korean regime facilitating its continued irresponsible behavior
and repression of its own people.
At the same time, missile tests are very expensive for the DPRK due to its limited technology
and economic base. The ROK Ministry of Unification estimated that the two missile launches in
2012 cost a total of $1.3 billion – with the rockets themselves costing $600 million, launch site
development costing $400 million, and other related facilities costing $300 million. 459 These
funds could have bought 4.6 million tons of corn, enough to feed the DPRK for four or five
years. 460
Arsenal and Capabilities
The DPRK has hundreds of ballistic missiles, along with a significant infrastructure and
institutional arrangement to sustain its missile development program. As of May 2012, the
DPRK had at least nine different types of guided ballistic missiles available or in development,
with some offered for export to other countries; it is often reported in open source material that
the DPRK has operationally deployed 800-1000 missiles. 461 The specifics of each missile will be
discussed later in this chapter, but this section gives a brief overview of the DPRK’s capabilities.
After the short-range Hwasong-5 (a DPRK version of the Soviet Scud-B) was put into serial
production in 1987, DPRK missile development accelerated at a remarkable pace. During a five-
year period (1987–1992), the country began developing the Hwasong-6 (a DPRK version of the
Soviet Scud-C), the medium-range Nodong, the long-range Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2, and
184 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the Musudan (a road-mobile version of the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6 Serb submarine-launched

ballistic missile). 462
North Korea has successfully flight tested the Hwasong-5/6 and the Nodong; however, the
Taepodong-1 was only partially successful in a 1998 test and a variant of the Taepodong-2 was
tested successfully in December 2012 as a space launch vehicle (Unha-3). 463 Figure IV.1
provides a chart assessing the key characteristics of the DPRK’s various missiles.
Sources vary, but many agree that the DPRK possesses between 600–800 Hwasong-5/6s (Scud-
B, -C, and -D) that can strike the ROK – though according to one 2006 source, only 100-150 of
these were deployed and the rest were exported – and 200-300 Nodong missiles (with up to 50
corresponding TELs) that can strike as far as Japan. Long-range missiles, like the Taepodong-
1/2, with the potential to hit the continental US and other international targets, are still under
development. 464
It is possible that the DPRK possesses 20-30 Taepodong-I missiles and perhaps 5 Taepodong-IIs.
All of these missiles, except the Scuds, could also potentially be equipped with nuclear or
chemical capabilities, though sources are far from agreement on this issue. 465 One often-cited
source also reports that up to 50 Musudan missiles are deployed (with 50 TELs), and that the
KN-02 is already in use. 466
How Capable Are the DPRK’s Missiles?
Markus Schiller has conducted an extensive study of DPRK missile developments and has
estimated that the DPRK holds fewer missiles, and with lower capacities, than is usually
assumed. While the DPRK has space launch vehicles and boosters that might launch a small
warhead as far as the US, he concludes that an actual ICBM with re-entry capability is unlikely,
as is the actual full development and deployment of the KN-08. 467
• The Scud B is probably available in large numbers (perhaps hundreds), since the R-17 had a very high
production rate and was produced for three decades, if not longer, and many decommissioned or
mothballed R-17s existed in post-Soviet Russia. The system is combat proven. Its nominal range is 300 km
with a 1 ton warhead. Its real accuracy is probably around 1 km (CEP). Launch procedures are complex,
and only few well-trained crews are expected.
• The Scud C is probably available in smaller numbers (perhaps 100). The system is likely combat proven.
Its range is about 500 km with a 0.7 ton warhead. Its accuracy is worse than that of the Scud B. Launch
procedures are analogous to those for the Scud B, and only few well-trained crews are expected.
• The Scud D is probably available in small numbers (perhaps a few dozen). Its range is about 700 km with a
0.5 ton warhead. Its accuracy is worse than that of Scud C. Launch procedures are analogous to those for
the Scud B, and only few well-trained crews are expected.
• The Nodong is limited to a small number of a few dozen at best. Its range is about 900 km with a one ton
warhead. Its accuracy is worse than that of the Scud B. Launch procedures are comparable with those for
the Scud B, with additional time-consuming fueling procedures once the missile is in vertical position.
• Other Taepodong I prototypes are unlikely to exist.
• One or two more Taepodong II/Unha-2/-3 might exist. Launch procedures are lengthy and easily visible.
• If available at all, the Musudan is only available in small numbers.
• The situation of the KN-02 is hard to judge. It might be available in sufficient numbers. Its accuracy might
be high. Its range with a 0.5 ton warhead is most likely limited to 70 km, but might reach 120 km, if the
newer version of SS-21 found its way to North Korea.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 185

Even assuming an operational deployment of 800-1000 missiles, the DPRK faces several
capacity constraints: 468
• Only a small number of launch crews can be well trained. Even assuming that the production quality of
North Korean–produced missiles is high, or that North Korea’s missiles are all of Soviet design and
production, the lack of crew training will result in moderate results at best, with handling failures and low
accuracy.
• If missiles are produced in North Korea, they are not of excellent reliability and accuracy because of the
lack of firing table creation and lot acceptance tests.
• The number of imported and well-tested Soviet missiles is limited and might be only a fraction of the total
missile force.
Its forces do, however, continue to improve. Former USFK Commander Burwell B. Bell testified
before the House Armed Services Committee in March 2007 that “North Korea is developing a
new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile… [I]n March 2006, North Korea successfully
test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly
than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter
preparation period.” 469 The short-range missile referred to appears to be the Toksa.
The DPRK is also making efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles such as the Hwasong and
Nodong, including an attempt to extend their ranges. 470 See Figures IV.1 to IV.3 for more
detailed comparisons of the missiles, their capabilities, and their likely ranges.
Most analysts believe that the DPRK is nearly self-sufficient in ballistic missile production but
still relies upon some advanced foreign technologies and components, particularly for guidance
systems. The country has an extensive machine tool sector; thus, the DPRK is probably self-
sufficient in the fabrication of airframes, tanks, tubing, and other basic components. 471 However,
the DPRK’s rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a limited number
of test launches could mean that the country imported various materials and technologies from
outside. 472
Officials in the Russian government have admitted that Russian missile experts and nuclear
scientists were in North Korea in the 1990s providing support, but the officials claimed that these
scientists and experts returned to Russia by 1998. During this time period, DPRK missile experts
were also in Iran, where they reportedly showed skills and knowledge that were “very
unimpressive.” 473
Uncertainties
There are as many uncertainties in predicting the nature of the DPRK’s missile programs as there
are in making predictions about its nuclear program. The DPRK’s ambitious missile programs
are still largely in development, and their capabilities are impossible to predict because there
have not been enough tests of the DPRK’s longer-range missiles to provide a clear picture of
their performance.
These uncertainties, along with the fact that the DPRK’s missile testing involves firing the
missiles over the ocean – as opposed to any sort of independently verifiable target – make it
impossible to estimate any of these missiles’ reliability and operational accuracy, or whether the
DPRK has anything approaching some form of terminal guidance technology. 474 Nevertheless,
DPRK advancements in missile technology coupled with its nuclear ambitions do cause deep
186 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

concern among ROK and Western sources. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
warned in January 2010: 475
With the DPRK’s continuing development of nuclear weapons and their development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United States, and we have to take that into
account…I think that North Korea will have developed an intercontinental ballistic missile (within five
years)… Not that they will have huge numbers or anything like that, but they will have—I believe they will
have a very limited capability.
It has been a puzzle to the international community that the DPRK has managed to create such a
large ballistic missile program with so few test launches. This has led many to believe that the
DPRK imported materials, technologies, and designs.
While most analysts concur that the DPRK has reverse-engineered Soviet ballistic missiles,
Markus Schiller of RAND argues that the DPRK’s ballistic missile program is too sophisticated
and has been tested too few times – with too low of a failure rate for so few tests – to be
indigenous. He believes that instead, North Korea either received missiles directly from the
USSR/Russia or had an arrangement for licensed production. Schiller proposes that the DPRK
has been conducting missile tests with Soviet/Russian missiles to appear highly capable, but has
probably not tested indigenously produced or designed missiles. 476
North Korea appears to be gradually developing the capability to launch ballistic missiles from a
submarine. North Korea does have an old Cold War era Golf-II class Soviet ballistic missile
submarine. 38 North analyzed imagery of a new submarine that appeared at the Sinpo naval
yard, which some speculated to be a Golf class submarine. 38 North believes that this is not a
Golf class, noting that it was too small to be a Golf class. 477 Yonhap cited sources within the
ROK Ministry of Defense that said North Korea could complete tests in one to two years. 478 This
is in line with imagery that shows a test stand that appears to be designed to test a vertical launch
tube system for submarines and surface combatants. However, this information says little about
North Korean efforts to develop a sea/submarine launched ballistic missile. No tests of a missile
that could be fired from a naval platform have taken place.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 187

Figure IV.1: DPRK Ballistic Missile Arsenal

Range (km) Payload (kg) Operational Status

Classification
ROK NTI MT.Com ROK NTI MT.Com ROK NTI MT.Com
(2010) (2010)
(2013)

Hwasong-5 300 300 300 1000 1000 -- Operational Deployed, Operational

Exported
[SRBM]

Hwasong-6 500 600 500 770 750 700-770 Operational Deployed, Operational
[SRBM] Exported

Nodong 1 1300 1350- 1300 700 1000 1200 Operational Deployed, Operational
[MRBM] 1600 Exported

Musudan (BM- 3000 2500- 2500- 650 Unknown 1200 Operational Unknown Unknown
25) 4000 4000
[IRBM]

Taepodong-1 2500 2500 2000 500 700 -- Test-fired Likely not Operational
deployed
[IRBM]

Taepodong-2 6700 2-stage: 4000- 650- Unknown 1000- Developmental Testing, Development
7000- 8000 1000 1500 Possibly
[ICBM]
7500 deployed
3-stage:
10000-
10500

Toksa (KN-02) -- -- 160 -- 485 250 or -- -- Operational

485
[SRBM]

Note: “ROK” represents ROK Ministry of National Defense data; “NTI” represents Nuclear Threat Initiative data; “MT.Com”
represents data from MissileThreat.com.
Tactical Missiles (with a range less than 300 km) are under the Artillery Training Guidance Bureau, while Strategic Missiles
(more than 300 km) are under the Strategic Rocket Forces Command.
Source: Appendix 6, in ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010 White Paper; “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” Nuclear
Threat Initiative, May 1, 2010.; “Ballistic Missiles of the World,” MissileThreat.com, accessed February 22, 2013.
http://www.missilethreat.com; IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS
Jane’s, October 18, 2012, http://www.janes.com.
188 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IV.2: ROK Ministry of National Defense Estimates of

DPRK Missile Range

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2012, 35.

Figure IV.3: Japanese Ministry of Defense Estimates of DPRK

Missile Range

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 19.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 189

DPRK Missile Programs

There are extensive reports available on some DPRK missiles, while much less is known about
others – in particular, the DPRK’s potential ICBMs.
The Hwasong and Toksa Programs
The DPRK possesses a large SRBM stockpile primarily based on different versions of the
Russian Scud missile that can easily strike targets within the ROK. They are domestically
produced and have a maximum range of approximately 300-500 km, with the ability to carry a 1
ton warhead. 479 Figures IV.2, IV.3, IV.5, and IV.6 show the capabilities of these missiles.
It would appear that the DPRK indigenously reverse-engineered and improved the Soviet Scud-
B, perhaps receiving the missile as early as 1972, produced the DPRK-version with USSR
assistance or even under license in DPRK factories, or acquired different missile production
technologies from several different foreign sources, incorporating them into its indigenous
missile program. The DPRK’s version is reported to have a slightly improved range and a
slightly increased diameter, as well as use a different rocket fuel. At the very least, it appears that
the DPRK had significant help from several foreign sources, including Egypt, China (People’s
Republic of China or PRC), Russia, and Iran. 480
The first North Korean “indigenously modified Scud” was first reportedly tested in April 1982;
the first confirmed flight tests of Scud-B (Soviet R-17) versions were in April and September
1984. Successful flight tests of the Scud-B (Hwasong-5) and Scud-C (Hwasong-6) – with a
smaller payload (approximately 700 kg) and a longer range (500 km) – were conducted in May
1986 and July 1986 respectively, though it would appear that the first credible report of a
successful Hwasong-6 flight test was in June 1990. 481 Both were subsequently deployed by
1988.
The DPRK made its first sale to Iran of the Hwasong-5 during this same period – a $500 million
agreement in 1987 reportedly included 90-100 Hwasong missiles and other military hardware
exports to Iran (were the missiles were subsequently renamed Shehab-1). Furthermore, a 1985
agreement between the two countries led to DPRK assistance with the construction of a
Hwasong-5 production plant, reportedly operational in 1988. DPRK assistance to Egypt also
reportedly led to the establishment of a Scud-B production plant in 1987 and a Scud-C plant in
1990. 482
A drawing found on a North Korean freighter in 1999 depicts an enlarged Scud, similar to a
Scud-D, and also known as the Scud-ER and Hwasong-7. This missile has a range of
approximately 700 km with what appears to be the same engine as the Scud-B and -C. Similar to
the Nodong, the warhead is separable. The missile is reported to have been available in the
DPRK since 2000. 483
Some estimates indicate that the DPRK’s SRBMs include some 600–800 regular and extended-
range Scud missiles. According to additional estimates, Pyongyang may deploy its missiles in
two belts, with 22–28 bases in the forward area and 12–15 in the rear area. The first is 50–90 km
north of the DMZ, and the second 90–120 km north. A third belt may exist more than 175 km
from the border. 484 These warheads are probably equipped with high-explosive munitions,
though it is also possible they have been fitted with chemical and biological weapons – though
190 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

most likely not nuclear, as the relative crudeness of the Scud design makes it unlikely that the
DPRK would equip it with a nuclear warhead. 485
The DPRK has recently been seeking ways to improve its Scud arsenal and has worked on
developing new short-range missile platforms. A May 2009 CRS report stated that in 2006 the
DPRK tested newer versions of “solid-fuel Scuds, which can be fired quickly, in contrast to
liquid-fuel missiles.” 486 And based on interviews with ROK officials, the International Crisis
Group reported that in 2008:
North Korea also unveiled a new solid-fuelled short-range tactical missile, the “Toksa” (Viper) or KN-02,
but it is unclear whether it has been deployed. It is a North Korean version of the Soviet/Russian Tochka
(SS-21 Scarab) but has a range of only about 120km. However, it is much more accurate than the North’s
other missiles and could strike the Seoul-Incheŏn metropolitan area and possibly US military bases in
P’yŏngt’aek, south of Seoul. 487
Initial production of the Toksa/KN-02, utilizing technology entirely different from that of the
Scud, likely began in 2006. They were displayed during a military parade in April 2007 and
probably entered service in 2008. 488 An ROK military source reported that “A North Korean
military unit on drill test-fired two shots of short-range missiles, presumed to be KN-02 missiles,
into the East Sea” in mid-March, 2013. 489
The Nodong
The DPRK is thought to have started its development of a single-stage medium-range missile
derived from the Soviet Scud, called the Nodong (also known as the Rodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-
D, Nodong-A, and Nodong-1), in the 1990s. It appears the Nodong was first developed and
successfully flight tested in 1993 with an initial production of 18 missiles; the flight tests
reportedly included Iranian and Pakistani observers. 490
Pakistani officials also viewed the Nodong in 1992, while Iranian officials were also present at
the 1998 Taepodong-1 test. 491 Much of the information about the missile stems from a
comparison with the Ghauri-II/Hatf-V missile of Pakistan and the Shahab-3 of Iran, which all
seem to be related missile programs 492 – and results from tests of these missiles appear to have
been shared with the DPRK.
The Nodongs shown at an October 2010 parade in Pyongyang appear to be slightly different than
the Pakistani Ghauri and Iranian Shahab-3, looking more like the Iranian Ghadr-1. However, the
Nodongs in the 2010 parade were clearly mock-ups, not real. The actual Nodong missile
configuration is unknown, at least in open source material, and as such there are no available
reliable technical statements beyond those analyzing the Pakistani and Iranian versions of the
missile. 493
It is reported that Soviet/Russian engineers assisted in development of the missile and that Iran
pledged $500 million to jointly develop missile capabilities. Also, there is evidence that 12-25
Nodong missiles were sold to Pakistan in the late 1990s in return for uranium enrichment
technology/materials, though Pakistan claims to have developed the Ghauri missile indigenously
and denies it imported any Nodongs. 494
There are reports that Iran received 15-20 Nodongs, though both the DPRK and Iran deny this. It
also seems that Iraq made a $10 million down payment on Nodong missiles in 2003 (before the
US invasion), though the missiles were never delivered and the DPRK refused to provide a
refund. 495
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 191

The Nodong is a liquid-fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile, assessed to have a range of
about 1,300-1,600 km with a 1,000 kg payload 496 – within reach of almost all of Japan (see
Figures IV.2, IV.3, IV.5, and IV.6). 497 Nodong missiles are road-mobile (able to be fired from a
Transporter Erector Launcher, or TEL) 498 and liquid-fueled, and are generally stored
underground and transported to sites that are little more than concrete slabs for launch. This
makes it difficult to detect signs of preparation for a launch. 499
Its accuracy is low for a modern missile. It cannot be used to attack point targets with
conventional warheads and would only be effective against large, soft targets like cities, airports,
or harbors. It is uncertain what its single-round reliability is, and this would present problems in
arming it with a nuclear warhead. 500
Some experts feel that DPRK nuclear weapons would likely be launched from the Nodong
missile division headquarters in Yongnim-up, Yongnim-kun, Chagang Province. Some reports
indicate there are three Nodong missile regiments in the division: The first is headquartered in
Sino-ri, Unjon-kun, North Pyongan Province (near the west coast, about 100 km from the
Chinese border); the second is headquartered in Yongjo-ri, Kimhyongjik-kun, Yanggang
Province (in the center of the country, about 20 km from the Chinese border); the third is located
along with the Nodong missile division in Yongnim-up (in the center of the country about 45–50
km from Kanggye City, and about 50–60 km from Huichon City). 501
Approximately 175-200 Nodong missiles are said to be deployed, but the program is still
developmental and requires large numbers of additional, full-range tests to become a mature
program. The Japanese Defense White Paper believes tests are limited to a possible launch into
the Japan Sea in late May 1993, a mix of Scud and Nodong launches on July 5, 2006, and a mix
of launches that might have involved some Nodongs from the Kittareryong district of the DPRK
on July 4, 2009. 502
A Nodong was successfully used in the failed Taepodong-1 1998 test. 503 No unclassified source,
however, provides a clear picture of exactly what happened during these tests or how far the
DPRK has progressed in bringing the system to the final development stage.
The Taepodong Program
The DPRK initiated the development of two ballistic missiles known to the West as Taepodong-
1 (also known as the Scud Mod-E, Scud-X, Moksong-1, Paektusan-1, and Pekdosan-1) and
Taepodong-2 (also called the Moksong-2 and Paektusan-2) in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
respectively. The Taepodongs are not production missiles and have never been successfully
tested as a weapons platform – both have only been tested as space launchers, not as ballistic
missiles. 504
Taepodong-1
192 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The Taepodong-1 was the DPRK’s first multi-stage missile, proving that the DPRK had ICBM
development and deployment technologies. The missile has an estimated range of approximately
1,800-2,000 km and is assumed to be a two- or three- stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic
missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud (Hwasong-5 or -6) as its second stage.
The space launch vehicle (SLV) adds a solid third stage instead of a re-entry vehicle. The
Taepodong-1 has been launched only as an SLV once in August 1998, but it was unsuccessful
in delivering a satellite into orbit as a result of failure in its third stage (see Figure IV.7). 505
Following the test, the Taepodong-1 program was apparently ended, indicating it may have been
a transitory program for the development of the longer-range Taepodong-2. 506 The Taepodong-2,
developed between 1987 and 1992, is a two- 507 or three-stage (the SLV version, the Unha)508
missile with a new booster resembling the Chinese CSS-2 and CSS-3 first stage and a Nodong as
its second stage. 509
The missile integrates more advanced technology and has a much greater range than previous
DPRK missiles. It is currently North Korea’s only true ICBM. Range and payload estimates
vary, and while the missile has very limited accuracy, it is thought to be targeted at major US
population centers in both Alaska and Hawaii – perhaps even as far as California. 510
A 2009 CRS report stated, “The two-stage variant is assessed by some to have a range potential
of as much as 3,750 km with a 700 to 1,000 kg payload and, if a third stage were added, some
believe that range could be extended to 4,000 to 4,300 km. Some analysts further believe that the
Taepodong-2 could deliver a 700 to 1000 kg payload as far as 6700 km.” 511
Taepodong-2
David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists has calculated that the Taepodong-2, used as
a ballistic missile, could deliver a 500 kg payload as far as 9,000 km, putting San Francisco and
all US cities along the Pacific coast to the north within range. 512 While this would be a
significant increase in range over the DPRK’s current missiles, it does not represent, as Wright
states, “a true intercontinental nuclear delivery capability since developing a first generation
warhead and heat shield with a mass of 500 kg or less is likely to be a significant challenge for
North Korea.” 513
The NTI reports that estimates of range are generally from 6,000-15,000 km, with a two-stage
version capable of 7,000-7,500 km and a three-stage variant capable of 10,000-10,500 km. 514
The abilities of the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 can be seen in Figures IV.2, IV.3 and IV.5.
Like the Taepodong-1, the Taepodong-2 has never been launched with an active warhead, and
it is not clear whether its missile engines have been used as an SLV. The Japanese Defense
White Paper of 2010 reported that one failed launch occurred in July 2006 (crashing after forty
seconds of flight).
Victor Cha of CSIS notes that this missile was one of seven missiles fired at the time, headed
on an eastward trajectory – and some of the missile parts landed only 250 km (155 miles) from
Vladivostok. Three of the other six missiles also landed in Russian waters, close to Nakhodka.
After the launch, the head of Russia’s Strategic Rocket forces criticized the DPRK for testing
missiles that did not have any mechanisms for automatic self-destruction in case they travelled
off-course. Russia, though only 150 km (90 miles) from the test site, received little advance
notice of the testing from the DPRK. 515
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 193

The DPRK undertook a second launch in April 2009 in which the DPRK fired a missile that
was most likely a variant of the Taepodong-2, the Unha-2 SLV, at a range over 3,000 km (see
Figure IV.7). 516 Prior to the launch, the DPRK announced the test in advance, even informing
the International Civil Aviation and International Maritime Organizations of its intentions,
providing coordinates of expected stage falling areas. 517
The DPRK hailed the 2009 test as a major success – even bragging that the supposed satellite
payload was now broadcasting patriotic music from space – but military and private experts said
that the launch had failed due to either an unsuccessful separation of the second and third stages
or because the third stage did not fire successfully, citing detailed tracking data that showed the
missile and payload had fallen into the sea. 518
Recent Taepodong launches
The DPRK announced on March 16, 2012 that it planned to undertake an “earth observation
satellite” launch in April; within hours, China’s vice foreign minister “summoned” the DPRK’s
Chinese ambassador to express Chinese “concerns and worries.” Other Chinese attempts to
dissuade the DPRK from undertaking a space launch failed, 519 and on April 13, 2012, coinciding
with huge celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung, the DPRK conducted a satellite
launch of the Gwangmyongsong-3 using a variant of the Taepodong-2, the Unha-3 SLV. It
appeared to have a slightly different third stage than the 2009 launch. The missile flew for over a
minute before breaking into several pieces, with the first stage falling into the sea 102.5 miles
west of Seoul and the remaining two stages failing. 520
Several days after the launch, China supported a UN Security Council presidential statement
condemning the launch as a violation of previous Security Council resolutions and supporting
further Security Council measures in the case of any further DPRK provocations. This is in
contrast to China’s reaction to the 2009 SLV launch, when it emphasized the distinctions
between a missile and a satellite and insisted that the DPRK had a right to the peaceful use of
outer space.
Chinese leaders were in particular angry that the DPRK gave months of advance warning
regarding the launch to the US, but had neglected to inform China. The PRC further supported
the Security Council’s moves to freeze the assets of several DPRK firms involved in financing
nuclear and missile programs, while also initiating preemptive measures to warn the DPRK not
to try another missile test. 521
A further test was successfully undertaken on December 12, 2012, delivering the
Gwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit. Preparations were visible in late November, and in early
December the DPRK announced that it would launch a satellite mid-month, later announcing this
would occur between December 10-22. While previous launch preparations had taken about
eight weeks, the December 2012 launch took approximately 40 days to prepare. The rocket had
three load-bearing stages, and wreckage from the first stage was recovered by the ROK Navy –
including parts of the power plant, a propellant tank, and a second, smaller, and badly damaged
propellant tank. 522 Although the DPRK claims otherwise, it also appears that the satellite is
“tumbling in orbit” and thus is most likely dead. 523
Some ROK officials believe that for this launch, the DPRK may have used foreign scientists to
assist in fixing some of the problems experienced in previous long-range missile tests, such as
194 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

weak engine thrust. The DPRK may have used smuggled technology and/or rogue scientists from
former Soviet republics like Ukraine. Iranian observers were invited to the launch. 524
The Taepodong’s Potential Re-Entry Capabilities
Some experts assess that this missile could be used to deliver WMDs with only minor
modifications to withstand the heat of re-entry. 525 In support of this claim, there is a long-
standing US National Intelligence Estimate that the DPRK could successfully test an ICBM by
2015. 526 It should also be remembered that the DPRK has had re-entry technology for its other
ballistic missiles for over 30 years. 527 Of course, how accurate such a missile would be is an
entirely different matter.
Jane’s Intelligence Review assess that the Taepodong-2/Unha-3 would not be well-suited to
weapons conversion, and more development would be necessary before the Unha SLV could be
turned into a viable weapon system. 528 The IISS also reported in 2011 that the DPRK would
have to undertake “an extensive flight-test program that includes at least a dozen, if not two
dozen, launches and extends over three to five years” – and such testing would be observable. 529
Similarly, a RAND report in 2012 asserted that the Unha-3/Taepodong-2 would be incapable of
carrying a nuclear warhead at an intercontinental range; if the DPRK wants an ICBM, “they have
to develop a new rocket, using different technology. This would take a very long time, require a
lot of work, and cost a lot of money.” 530
The long preparation time necessary prior to a launch – at least several days – would provide
significant advance warning, and the DPRK likely does not have the capability to use
underground silos, which would then be vulnerable to surveillance and attack. In addition, a
launched SLV would only be able to carry one re-entry vehicle, and the required long burn time
and the delayed deployment of potential countermeasures would allow the US or another country
under attack to target and engage missile defense systems in order to shoot down the missile. 531
Michael Ellerman, a senior fellow at the IISS, based on the trajectory of ballistic missile
development in other countries, noted that space launches do not and cannot play a decisive role
in the development of long-range missiles. Furthermore, it is plausible that the DPRK’s missile
launches actually were legitimately satellite launches, as claimed by the DPRK. The trajectory of
the rocket and actual placement of the satellite in orbit, along with the prelaunch notification to
international safety organizations, points to the DPRK actually attempting to conduct satellite
launches. The 1998 Taepodong-1’s trajectory was also consistent with this conclusion, as were
those of the 2009 Unha-2 and April 2012 Unha-3 launches. 532
Ellerman acknowledged that satellite launches and ICBMs are similar in many regards –
powerful rocket engines, payload separation mechanisms, inertial navigation and guidance units,
and lightweight and strong airframes. However, there are also important differences between the
two systems. First, a ballistic missile needs to have re-entry capabilities that protect the payload
from heat and structural stress, which require special materials to be used in the missile – and
which need to be tested and validated under realistic conditions. 533
Secondly, operationally, space launches are prepared over a period of days or weeks, waiting for
ideal weather and checking and verifying subsystems and components. The process can be
delayed and restarted. However, ballistic missiles must be able to reliably be used in a variety of
less-than-ideal circumstances, with very little warning or preparation. This requires a much more
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 195

rigorous validation scheme and extensive testing than has taken place during DPRK SLV
launches. 534
While testing SLVs does assist in developing experience and data that could help in ICBM
development, Ellerman believes that this information is of only limited use. Many of the key
requirements of a ballistic missile cannot be tested during satellite launches, and many tests
would have to be undertaken before a missile could be confidently given combat-ready status.
Often, in fact, ballistic missiles have been converted into SLVs (by the USSR, China, and the
US), not the other way around. 535
At the same time, the DPRK could in theory use the Unha-3 as the basis for a missile, though an
ICBM based on the Unha-3 would way over 90 tons, thus too large and unwieldy to be deployed
on a mobile launch platform. The DPRK would have difficulties concealing a silo launch site,
and due to the DPRK’s geography, any silo would be close enough to the coastline that advanced
military powers – like the US – could destroy them preemptively. Therefore, according to
Ellerman, it is more likely that the DPRK would design a new missile entirely – such as the
mock-ups of the KN-08 displayed during a military parade in April 2012 – than use an SLV as
an ICBM. If the KN-08 used more energetic propellants, it could have an intercontinental range;
but, without testing, it is unknown if that is even a possibility. 536
US, ROK, Japanese, and UN Responses to DPRK Launches
Prior to the DPRK’s launch of a space vehicle in December 2012, Japan, the US, and South
Korea all mobilized ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities to both guard against the
potential DPRK threat and display a show of force: 537
Japan has both land- and sea-based defences and is continuing to develop its BMD capabilities. The Japan
Maritime Self Defense Force has four Kongo-class destroyers, each equipped with the Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defence System. The US-developed system includes the SPY-1 search radar with an estimated
range of 1,000 km, and the SM-3 Block 1A mid-course interceptor. This provides upper tier BMD coverage
for the whole of Japan, designed to intercept a ballistic missile after the boost phase and before re-entry.
Three Kongo-class destroyers – the Kongo, Myoko, and Chokai – were deployed in the East China Sea
around Okinawa and the Sea of Japan ahead of December’s launch. Providing lower tier, point defence are
16 Patriot batteries, which are equipped with PAC-3 interceptors with a range of 15 km that are capable of
engaging short- and medium-range missiles. Detection capability is provided by four new J/FPS-5 Early
Warning 3D AESA Radars, as well as seven older FPS-3 sites that have been upgraded for the BMD role.
The ROK has less of a BMD capacity than Japan. While South Korea does have three KDX-III
destroyers with the Aegis System deployed, able to detect and track missiles, the ships only have
SM-2 missiles, and can thus only intercept low-altitude threats. The ROK also has 48 Patriot
systems with PAC-2 missiles on land, but an October 2012 ROK study found that the missile has
an interception rate of less than 40% against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (PAC-3s
have a 92% success rate). The ROK’s strongest missile defense assets are two Israeli-supplied
Green Pine radars, allowing the ROK to detect and track incoming missiles. These will likely be
an important part of any future ROK missile defense network. 538
The ROK reportedly deployed two KDX-III Aegis-deployed destroyers to track the December
2012 launch, but remains generally dependent on the US for missile defense abilities. The US
deployed a Ticonderoga-class cruiser (the USS Shiloh) and three Burke-class destroyers (the
USS Fitzgerald, McCain, and Benfold) off the Korean Peninsula in response to the DPRK’s
launch plans. All of these ships have the Aegis Combat System and SM-2 and/or SM-3
interceptor missiles. Overall, the US has a TPY-2 radar deployed in northern Japan, the Army’s
196 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Air Defense Artillery regiments have four PAC-3 batteries in the ROK and 12 in Japan, and the
7th Fleet has nine Aegis-equipped vessels based near Japan. 539
In response to the December 2012 test, UN Security Council Resolution 2087 was passed on
January 22, 2013, adding six North Korean entities to the sanctions list – and further upsetting
the DPRK, leading to further regional tensions.
It is probable that the DPRK tested critical technologies during the recent launches, such as
increasing the size of propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and altitude
control. 540 The improvements made to the Taepodong-2 apparent in the 2009 and 2012 tests
show that the DPRK likely has the ability to improve upon current programs as well as build a
new generation of ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets in the continental US.
The Musudan
There are reports that the DPRK has developed a more accurate, longer-range intermediate
ballistic missile called the Musudan (also known as the Nodong-B, BM-25, Taepodong-X, and
Mirim). The single-stage Musudan appears to be based on the design of the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6
missile, an intermediate-range, liquid propellant, submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed
by Russia in the 1960s. 541
It appears that development began in the early 1990s. According to the NTI, 542
In 1992, a large contract between Korea Yon’gwang Trading Company and V.P. Makeyev Engineering
Design Office of Miass, Russia was signed. The agreement stated that Russian engineers would go to the
DPRK and assist in the development of the Zyb Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). Zyb is a term used by V.P.
Makeyev for the R-027/SS-N-6. Later that year a number of Russian scientists and missile specialists were
arrested while attempting to travel to Pyongyang. There are reports that many scientists and missile
engineers were already working in the DPRK.
Reportedly, prototypes were developed in 2000 and it was first deployed as early as 2003 –
though the ROK lists the Musudan as being deployed in 2007, when it was first displayed during
a military parade. However, the October 2010 parade was the first time the missile was shown to
Western audiences. 543
The range of the missile is disputed – Israeli sources identified North Korean SS-N-6-based
missiles in Iran with a range of 2500 km, and American sources have reported a range of 3200
km with a payload of 500 kg. 544 Other sources claim a maximum range of 4000 km. 545 Assuming
a range of 3200 km, the Musudan could hit any target in East Asia (including US bases in Guam
and Okinawa) and Hawaii. 546
Some sources claim that Iran conducted surrogate flight tests of the Musudan in 2006 and 2007.
It was reported in 2005 that the DPRK had sold 18 Musudan assembly kits to Iran. There is also
limited evidence suggesting that North Korea tested the Musudan as part of its July 2006 missile
tests. Furthermore, the Musudan was reportedly used as the Unha-2 SLV’s second stage, or
could be used in future Taepodong-2 or -3 versions. While the Unha-2 failed in April 2009, the
failure occurred after the effective firing of the second stage, indicating that the stage that
potentially contained the Musudan was successful. 547
Although reports indicate that the design of any such missile is borrowed from a Russian
submarine-launched missile, North Korea probably intends to transport and fire the missile using
wheeled transport erector launchers (TEL) units or ship-based launchers. 548 While it is uncertain
whether it is operational, ROK intelligence sources believe the Musudan missile division has
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 197

three regiments and is headquartered in Yangdok-kun, South Pyongan Province, about 80 km

east of Pyongyang. 549
The KN-08/Hwaseong-13
Mock-ups of the KN-08, also known as the DPRK’s road-mobile ICBM, were presented in April
2012 at a parade honoring Kim Il-sung’s 100th birthday. As only mock-ups have been seen, there
are no photos of the real missile or any existence that one even exists – at least not in open
source material. The missile was displayed on Chinese TELs that were too large for the KN-08
missile. If the missile was actually developed and produced, it would offer the DPRK a longer
range than that of the Nodong (maximum 5,000 km), giving it a truly intercontinental reach. 550
There were reports that the DPRK tested an engine for the long-range KN-08 on February 11,
2013, one day before its third nuclear test. One ROK government source stated, “It appears that
North Korea conducted the engine test aimed at extending the range of the KN-08 missile to over
5,000 kilometers.” If the North judged the test successful, it could start operationally deploying
the rockets. 551
A detailed analysis of the KN-08 from 2012 by Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker
concluded that KN-08 mock-ups, 552
…were intended to create the impression of an ICBM that is based on SS-N-6 technology, even though the
designs looks more like a high-end solid-fueled ICBM…A KN-08 design based on Nodong technology has
limited range and performance. A KN-08 design based on SS-N-6 technology offers impressive range and
performance but creates massive operation problems, and production is extremely challenging. Considering
the presented KN-08 design, none of the two options makes much sense from a missile engineer’s
perspective.
Although many analysts have dismissed the KN-08 mock-ups as simply that, Jeffrey Lewis and
John Schilling offered an alternative analysis in 2013. They asserted that mock-ups are important
parts of missile development programs, as demonstrated by mock-ups of previous ballistic
programs like the MX program that led to the Peacekeeper missile. To further support their
claim, they point out that small design differences in initial KN-08 mock-ups, which were key
pieces of evidence that led to the mock-up conclusion, eventually disappeared and designed
converged. Weld and rivet arrangements also matched what was found in North Korea’s
successful Unha-3 launch. Lewis and Schilling directly respond to Schiller and Schmucker’s
assessment: 553
We believe the missile mockups that North Korea displayed in 2012 and 2013 are consistent with an
ongoing development program for a missile with limited intercontinental capability using only existing
North Korean technology. There are a number of plausible configurations of missile engines that North
Korea might use to cobble together a missile that would look like the KN-08. One of us—John Schilling—
has written a lengthy technical analysis in Science and Global Security that considered six different ways
that North Korea could assemble components and technologies it possesses into a missile that matches the
appearance of the parade mock-ups. Not all of these solutions are elegant. For all we know, Werner von
Braun is rolling in his grave. But elegant or not, these options are good enough to produce missiles
with theoretical ranges from 5,500 kilometers to over 11,000 kilometers…North Korea is parading
mockups through the streets of Pyongyang because, like every other country, it built mockups first.
Satellite imagery from 2014 shows what appears to be continued test of the first stage of the KN-
08: 554
198 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IV.4: KN-08 ICBM Related Testing

Imagery Date Activity Test Probability

1/26/14 None

3/6/14 None

5 vehicles on engine test stand and probable

Readying for
3/22/14 KN-08 first and second stages seen at
coming test
Assembly Building

7 vehicles and probable KN-08 first stage

4/3/14 Test in progress
seen on engine test stand

2 vehicle and probable first stage on engine Probable test

5/10/14
test stand concluded

2 vehicles, probable KN-08 first stage and Probable test

5/21/14
prime mover at Assembly Building concluded

5/28/14 None

5 vehicles on engine test stand, probable

6/10/14 Test in progress
KN-08 first stage in front of stand

7/4/14 1 vehicle on engine test stand

Probable KN-08 first stage parked in front Preparing a new

7/6/14
of the engine test stand entrance test
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 199

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Program

North Korea appears to be in the early stages of developing a submarine launched ballistic
missile. A series of events has made this development a point of concern, though very little is
known about the program. North Korea is still several years away from obtaining any sort of
SLBM capability. If this capability is obtained at some point in the future, it would allow North
Korea to better protect its missile arsenal, and presumably its nuclear arsenal. Developing this
SLBM capability into a “second-strike capability,” which is possible with an SLBM, will require
North Korea to expand and develop their SLBMs to a great degree.
In July 2014, satellite imagery reveals a new North Korean submarine at the Sinpo South
Shipyard. A South Korean government source reported to Yonhap that the new submarine was
based off of reverse engineered Soviet-era Golf-class ballistic missile submarines. North Korea
obtained a number of decommissioned Golf class submarines from Russia, ostensibly to be
reduced to scrap metal. It is likely that these submarines were thoroughly studied before they
were scrapped. 38 North challenged the conclusion that the new sub was a Golf class derivative,
arguing that the submarine was “significantly smaller and bear a close resemblance to the former
Yugoslav Sava and Heroj class patrol submarines, neither of which carried ballistic
submarines.” 555
A test stand was constructed at the same shipyard that appeared to be “the right size and design
to be used for the research, development, and testing of the process of ejecting a missile out of a
launch tube as well as evaluating its compatibility with submarines and surface combatants as
well as the missiles themselves.” It is not yet known what type of missile would be used if North
Korea successfully developed the capability to launch a missile in this fashion. The stand is
about 12 meters high. 556
In August 2014, a missile launch tube was reportedly spotted on a North Korean submarine. The
missile tube “may be for a missile large enough to carry a nuclear warhead.” SLBMs are
typically launched using a “cold-launch” system, in which the missile is first ejected out of a
submarine and above the surface of the water using high-pressure gas. The missile’s rocket
engines are ignited once the missile has breached the water’s surface. In order to develop a
“cold-launch” system, Jane’s points to other technology that could help North Korea to develop
this technology. 557
• Golf class ballistic missile submarine: The missile launch tubes of these old Soviet submarines would
be of particular interest, which used a cold-launch system. One of the submarines also contained an R-
27 SLBM, which aided the development of the BM25 Musudan land-mobile ballistic missile. It is not
known whether the BM25 will eventually be used as an SLBM, as the BM25 has not yet been test
fired. This raises serious questions about the reliability of the missile.
• Pon’gae 5/KN-06: This North Korean developed surface-to-air (SAM) system that may use a cold
launch tube similar in size to the tubes used by the Chinese HQ-16A SAM. The HQ-16A is a medium
range SAM.
• Pon-gae 6: This North Korean developed SAM system is larger than the Pon-gae 5 and is similar to the
larger Chinese HQ-9 or Russian S-300 SAM systems. The HQ-9 is based off the S-300, both of which
are long range SAMs that utilize cold-launch systems to launch their missiles
Of the above foreign systems mentioned, only the Golf class is known to have been sold to North
Korea. The S-300, HQ-9, and HQ-16A are not known to have been sold to North Korea.
200 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

In November 2014, North Korea reported it tested an ejection launcher for an SLBM at the
shipyard. 558
Carried out onboard a land-based vertical launch tube, the latest tests suggested the initial stage of firing a
missile out of a submarine launch tube and signified the shift towards underwater missile strike potential
for a future nuclear-tipped missile.
Earlier, the US intelligence agencies reportedly observed ‘two or three’ such trials last month at a facility
claimed to be a major development centre for the North Korea’s SLBM programme, in line with South
Korea’s intelligence over the North’s missile development, Yonhap reported.
The new missile is believed to be either a new anti-ship cruise missile boasting a range of 130km or a new
short-range ballistic missile with 240km range.
As of December 2014, there have been no confirmed reports as to which missile North Korea
may adapt for SLBM use.

Figure IV.5: US Estimates of Primary North Korean Medium-

and Long-Range Missiles

Source: US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 11.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 201

Figure IV.6: Estimates of DPRK Hwasong and Nodong Missile

Range – Northeast Asia

Note: Distances are approximate.

Source: International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, Asia Report No. 168, June 18, 2009, 28,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-
korea/168_north_koreas_nuclear_and_missile_programs.ashx.
202 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IV.7: DPRK Missile Launches through 2009

Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010, 44.

DPRK Missile Facilities

Data are spare on DPRK missile production and launch facilities, but some information is
available. It is believed that the DPRK produces and/or stores chemicals, chemical precursors,
and chemical agents in 12 factories and six major storage depots. 559 The No. 125 Factory, the so-
called Pyongyang Pig Factory in northwestern Pyongyang, reportedly produces Hwasong,
Nodong, and surface-to-ship cruise missiles. Officials from Middle Eastern countries have
reportedly visited the factory, but the extent of their tours is unknown. 560 Additionally,
Mangyongdae Electric Machinery Factory is another reported missile production facility located
in the same general area of Pyongyang as the No. 125 Factory. 561
The No. 7 Factory, located about five miles from the Electric Machinery Factory, is responsible
for the production and testing of missile prototypes prior to the initiation of production at other
plants. 562 This facility is probably the same facility known as the “San’um-dong Factory” or
“San’um-dong Missile Research Center.” 563 The facility is under the Second Natural Science
Academy, the research organization in charge of all weapons development in North Korea,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 203

working on missile design and development as well as the production of prototypes. The
Academy likely draws upon human resources from other scientific institutions under the
Academy of Sciences, but the extent of any such collaboration is unknown. The DPRK is also
reported to have integrated their educational institutions into their missile programs. 564
According to DPRK defectors, the Korea National Defense College in Kanggye, Chagang
Province, has a “Rocket Engine Department,” and the college provides instruction on the
“production, operation procedures, and launching of missiles.” 565 North Korea’s top universities
such as Kim Il Sung University, the Pyongsong College of Science, and Kim Chaek University
of Technology also have programs in engineering and science that could be applied to rocket and
missile development. 566
The DPRK possesses a number of missile bases and launch facilities (see Figure IV.8). The
Missile Division under the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces commands at least 18 ballistic
missile bases in the country, such as the Chiha-ri Missile Base in Kangwon Province and the
Mayang Island Missile Base. Many of these bases likely have several alternative launch pads
near the missile storage site, which in effect increases the number of locations from which they
can launch missiles using mobile TELs. 567
The DPRK had previously used a small, old launch facility in the northeastern part of the country
near Musudan-ri for its launches, called the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground. However, the
DPRK began construction on a new facility close – Sohae, in Tongchang-ri – to the Chinese
border in the Northwest in 2001, which was completed by January 2011. 568
In contrast to the older Tonghae facility which has limited capabilities, the new installation in
Sohae includes a movable launch pad with gantry, a missile assembly building, oxidizer and fuel
storage, and a 10-story tall tower capable of supporting the DPRK’s largest ballistic missiles and
SLVs. The height of the launch tower is unnecessary for any of the DPRK’s Unha/Taepodong
missiles or SLVs, which could indicate that the DPRK is looking to develop larger and more
modern launch vehicles.
The facility incorporates R&D and support facilities, while Saneum-dong Weapons Research
Lab and Yongbyon Nuclear Complex are both less than 50 miles away. Furthermore, the Sohae
site can launch toward the South, reducing missile flight time to the ROK and Japan. The site is
also obscured from direct sea or air observation. It was first used in April 2012 to launch the
Unha-3 rocket; the December 2012 Unha-3 launch was also successfully conducted at this
facility. 569
The Sohae site has seen significant construction activity in 2014 including new road access, rail
access, unidentified domed structures, and the heightening of the rocket gantry. 570 The
heightened gantry, which would be required for launches of larger rockets, also came with a new
roof and new swing arms that were attached to the gantry tower. Fuel tanks near the launch pad
were also moved. By the end of September 2014, the temporary shelters that were used to
support the construction unit had been removed, suggesting that the construction project and
upgrades at the Sohae site had been completed. 571
A new Musudan-ri facility is also being developed, bigger than the Sohae facility, which should
be operational by 2016-17. 572
204 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

A test stand near the Sinpo South Shipyard appears to be appropriate for testing missile ejection
systems for SLBMs. 573 Reports indicate that North Korea has tested such an ejection system,
though it is unclear whether a missile was actually launched.

Figure IV.8: Possible Locations of DPRK Nuclear Warhead and

Missile Facilities

Note: Locations are approximate.

Source: International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, Asia Report No. 168, 30.

DPRK Air Defense and Counter-Space Capabilities

North Korea is said to have one of the densest air defense networks in the world, but its
equipment is primarily Soviet-designed missiles and radars – either made in the USSR or
licensed and produced in the DPRK – developed in the 1950s-1970s. The US has been working
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 205

for decades to develop ways to defeat such weapons, using radar jamming, anti-radar missiles,
and stealth technology; the B-2 and F-22 were designed specifically to evade this type of
defense, and B-52s could take out the DPRK’s air defense system by firing AGM-86 cruise
missiles from beyond the range of DPRK defenses. The DPRK’s inventory includes the SA-2
Guideline, SA-6 Gainful, SA-3 Goa, SA-13 Gopher, SA-16 Gimlet, SA-4 Ganef, SA-5
Gammon, and the SA-17 Gadfly. 574
In his testimony before the Senate, DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. also provided an
overview of DPRK counter-space preparations: 575
North Korea has mounted Soviet-made jamming devices on vehicles near the North-South demarcation line
that can disturb Global Positioning System (GPS) signals within a 50-100 kilometer (km) radius and is
reported to be developing an indigenous GPS jammer with an extended range of more than 100 km.
The DPRK’s satellite program has been discussed previously in this chapter.
ROK Missile Development
For the last thirty years, the United States has discouraged South Korea from developing long-
range ballistic and cruise missiles. In a 1979 memorandum of understanding with the United
States, reiterated in 1990, South Korea voluntarily pledged not to develop ballistic missiles with
ranges exceeding 180 kilometers in return for technical assistance from the US. However, Seoul
has sought to raise that limit since late 1995, resulting in several revisions of the ROK-US
agreement. 576
Recently, the ROK has deployed a series of cruise missiles, the maximum range of which is
1,500 km – capable of reaching as far as Beijing and Tokyo. In addition to their cruise missile
program, the ROK has successfully launched a series of communication satellites in the last
decade, meaning that, while it does not possess a known ballistic missile program, it likely
possesses the know-how to produce a ballistic missile.
The Early Program – The NHK Program
South Korea has made attempts to develop and expand its offensive ballistic missile capabilities
since the 1970s in spite of US pressure. In December 1971, ROK President Park Chung Hee
issued a directive to develop a short-range ballistic missile aimed at countering the ballistic
missile threat from North Korea. In 1975 the ROK successfully reverse-engineered the US Nike
Hercules surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, which could also be used in a surface-to-surface
capacity. 577
Named the NHK-1 (also known as the Paekkom-1, Baekgom-1 and Hyunmu-1), it had a range of
only 150 km (93 miles). 578 Development of the NHK-1 continued into the late 1970s with a
successful test in September 1978; 579 however, fearing an arms race on the Korean Peninsula and
in greater East Asia, the US became leery of a ROK missile program. 580
Under pressure from the US, the ROK agreed in 1979 to restrict its missile range to 180
kilometers with a 500 kg max payload in return for US technical support for ROK missile
systems. 581 In 1983, the ROK developed the NHK-2, incorporating improved technology and a
range of 180 km (112 miles), which could be easily extended to 250 km (155 miles) – but at the
cost of breaking the 1979 agreement. 582
In 2006 it was reported that the ROK would keep the NHK-2 missile in service until 2010;
currently it is not known whether or not the missile has been decommissioned. 583
206 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The 2001 MTCR and the Hyunmu-3 Cruise Missile

Seoul responded to advances in DPRK missile capabilities by notifying Washington in 1995 that
it wished to adjust the restrictions agreed to in 1979. After five years of consultations, the US
backed the ROK’s joining of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in March 2001, a
regime that supersedes the 1979 US agreement. 584 The MTCR seeks to limit the risks of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling exports of goods and technologies
that could make a contribution to delivery systems for such weapons (other than manned
aircraft). 585 In this context, the regime limits the range of rockets and UAVs with a payload over
500 kg to 300 km. 586 The MTCR does not, however, restrict the development of missiles as long
as the warhead does not weigh more than 500 kg. 587
As a result, the ROK began focusing on the development of cruise missiles such as the Hyunmu-
3 series, capable of delivering payloads below 500 kg to targets deep within the DPRK and
beyond. Developed indigenously in the ROK, the Hyunmu-3 system is reportedly similar in
structure and guidance technology to the US Tomahawk but with a shorter range. It uses an
inertial navigation system and technology that matches map images in its computer memory to
the features on the ground below it, giving the missile the ability to hit within three meters of its
target. 588
The Hyunmu-3A deployed in 2006 with a range of 500 km and is capable of striking Pyongyang
– but not the DPRK’s long-range missile sites, including the Musudan-ri site in North
Hamgyeong Province, located more than 300 km from Seoul. 589 In early 2009, the ROK
deployed the Hyunmu-3B, an improvement of the 3A model, which has a range of 1,000 km,
capable of reaching as far as Beijing and Tokyo as well as hitting key targets throughout the
DPRK. 590
The most advanced missile in the ROK arsenal is the Hyunmu-3C, which has supposedly just
entered into the production phase. In July 2010, it was reported that the ROK had begun
manufacturing the Hyunmu-3C with a range of up to 1,500 km (937 miles), capable of reaching
parts of China, Japan, and Russia. 591 If these reports are true, the successful indigenous
development of a long-range cruise missile would put the ROK in the company of only the US,
Russia, and Israel as countries that have developed cruise missiles with ranges of more than
1,500 km. 592
Shin In-kyun, a military expert who heads the Korea Defense Network, told The Korea Herald
that the missile with a 450 kg warhead “measures 6 meters in length and 53–60 centimeters in
diameter and weighs 1.5 tons. It can hit targets in all nuclear facilities and major missile bases in
the DPRK with high precision (a margin of error of less than 2 meters).” 593
However, the development of the long range, highly accurate Hyunmu-3 may not have a
favorable effect on the force balance on the Peninsula. According to Oliver Bloom of CSIS: 594
The South Korean cruise missile development certainly won’t fundamentally alter the military balance on
the Korean Peninsula, nor will it give the South Koreans an incentive to launch a preventive strike
(especially given the number of North Korean missiles and chemical weapons aimed at Seoul), but the new
missile certainly may give South Korea another tool in its box in handling North Korean contingencies. If
the situation on the peninsula deteriorated to open conflict, South Korea would have an independent means
of accurately striking distant North Korean targets without risking aircraft. What’s more, the accurate
cruise missiles would give South Korea a means to preempt an imminent North Korean attack, were such a
thing to develop.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 207

From 2002-2004, the ROK purchased 110 300 km-range US Army Tactical Missile Systems. 595
Further Missile Limitation Agreement Revisions
The US and the ROK agreed on an increase to the range limits on ROK ballistic missiles in
October 2012, due to the increased provocations of the DPRK and the deteriorating security
situation on the peninsula, The negotiations were initiated in September 2010, in the wake of the
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, to allow the ROK enhanced deterrence capabilities
against the DPRK. 596
According to the new agreement, the ROK can deploy ballistic missiles with a payload of up to
500 kg and range of up to 800 km (500 miles), which is enough to reach any target in the DPRK
from the ROK’s central region, is out of firing distance of the DPRK’s long-range artilleries and
KN-02 ballistic missile, while simultaneously does not overly threaten China or Japan. However,
some areas of China and Japan will be in reach of the ROK’s new extended missile range. 597
At shorter ranges, the ROK can also put up to two ton warheads on ballistic missiles. Previously,
the ROK was unable to deploy ballistic missiles with a payload of 500 kg beyond a range of 300
km. 598
The new agreement also gives the ROK the option to use drones that can carry up to 2.5 tons of
weapons and other equipment; prior to the revised agreement, the ROK could not deploy drones
carrying more than half a ton of equipment and weapons. The ROK began using low-flying
reconnaissance drones in 2002. 599
There were no changes to the maximum load weight restrictions for cruise missiles and drones
flying less than 300km, or those that carry less than 500kg. Also, there remain no restrictions on
research and development of missiles and UAVs that go beyond the scope of the current missile
guidelines. 600
Two days after the ROK announced the new missile deal, the DPRK said it had missiles that
could hit US bases in “Japan, Guam and the US mainland.” 601
ROK Missile Defense and Space
South Korea has been increasing its missile defenses and space systems to better defend against
potential DPRK attacks.
Missile Defense
The ROK is rushing to improve its ballistic missile defenses (BMDs) and create a new force to
detect and intercept DPRK ballistic missiles, focusing on a low-tier system. According to
Defense News, this capability is planned to cost a total of 300 billion won ($214 million): 602
Seoul plans to buy new radars which can detect objects up to 1,000 kilometers (600 miles) away for the
new system, which will put the North’s missiles under close watch around the clock, they said…North
Korea has short-range Scuds and Rodongs with a range of 1,300 kilometers, while actively developing
longer-range Taepodong missiles that could reach the United States.
…South Korea in 2007 launched its first Aegis destroyer, which was finally deployed for operational use in
December 2008… The King Sejong, the $1 billion, 7,600-ton KDX-III destroyer, adopts the US-built
Aegis system that allows a ship to combat multiple surface, underwater and aerial threats… South Korea
plans to deploy a second Aegis destroyer and a third for operational use in 2010 and 2012, according to its
navy.
208 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

After the December 2012 DPRK missile test and the February 2013 nuclear test, along with the
October 2012 revision of the missile guidelines previously discussed, the ROK accelerated its
BMD efforts. Having decided not to join the US multi-layered antimissile program, the ROK is
building the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) as a low-layer defense system more
appropriate for the situation on the Korean peninsula, able to shoot down missiles either using
Aegis systems on destroyers or Patriot systems on land. The ROK spent $909 million buying 48
Patriot Advanced Capability 2 (PAC-2) systems from Germany in 2008, but the interception
success rate of this system is below 40%. To achieve an interception rate of above 70%, the
ROK is quickly moving to acquire PAC-3 systems. 603
One ROK analysis of the KAMD by Park Chang-kwoun of the Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses stated, 604
During their Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting held on June 14th [2012] in Washington, D.C., the
ROK and the U.S. agreed to explore ways to strengthen “comprehensive and combined missile defenses” in
response to North Korea’s growing missile capabilities. The two nations aim to strengthen their combined
response capabilities against the North Korean missile threat through effective interworking system
between the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the missile defense system of the United States
Forces Korea (USFK). Establishing the ROK-U.S. combined missile defense system against the North
Korean missile threat is an imperative measure to guarantee the security and reinforce the deterrence
capability of the ROK.
…KAMD is designed to be a Korea-specific missile defense system that only intends to intercept incoming
hostile missiles at the low-altitude (10-30km) for the purpose of local defense.
The U.S., on the other hand, is developing a comprehensive missile defense system that includes high-
altitude missile defense in an integrated manner with its European allies and Japan. As an ally of the U.S.,
South Korea also seeks to join and cooperate with the U.S.-led regional missile defense system.
…The development of the KAMD would be achieved in a gradual manner, considering the limited defense
budget and technological capabilities of South Korea. The U.S. is committing an astronomical amount of
budget to the tune of 1.5 trillion dollars into building its missile defense system for the next decade−yet,
there have been reports that there still remain a number of technical challenges. In fact, South Korea has
only limited defense budget that can be devoted to the establishment of the missile defense system.
…South Korea is planning to launch its Air and Missile Defense cell (AMD-cell), a missile defense
command-and-control center, by the end of this year and to deploy its own missile defense system based on
surveillance platforms such as Green Pine Radars and SPY-1D in Aegis Combat System and interception
platforms such as PAC-2 Gem and SM-2 Block III. The Green Pine Radars, ballistic missile early warning
radars, will be acquired from Israel by the end of this year. In addition, South Korea’s indigenous
antiaircraft missile, the Cheolmae-II will be added to the ballistic missile interception system.
If defense budget permits in the future, South Korea would be able to further strengthen interception
capabilities of the KAMD by acquiring the PAC-3 and the SM-6, which is currently under development.
Moreover, the ROK will begin a task of improving the Cheolmae-II. Since key components of the current
KAMD interception system− the PAC-2, the SM-2, and the Cheolmae-II− were not originally developed as
ballistic missile interception systems and have fragmentation warheads, the KAMD has a certain limitation
in performing ballistic missile interception. Consequently, acquisition of new interception systems
including the PAC-3 and the SM-6 is expected to bolster South Korea’s ballistic missile interception
capabilities.
Meanwhile, the USFK operates a Theater Missile Operations cell (TMO-cell) and has ballistic missile
interception systems including the PAC-2 and the PAC-3 deployed in its major military bases. These
systems allow the USFK to be able to respond to North Korean ballistic missile threats from the early
stages backed by various satellite systems of the U.S. forces. Currently, the missile defense system of the
USFK is designed for effective defense of the U.S. military installations. In case of contingency, however,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 209

the missile defense capabilities of the U.S. forces would be further improved if U.S. Aegis destroyers are
deployed to South Korea’s coastal areas and complement the current missile defense system.
It has also been reported that the ROK has looked into buying Israel’s Iron Dome to protect the
approximately 11 million people who live in Seoul, only 35 miles from the DMZ. South Korea
first offered to buy Iron Dome in January 2012 if Israel bought South Korean fighter jets in
return – but Israel instead decided to buy from Italy. In November 2012, the ROK offered South
Korean ships, potentially to hold Israel’s advanced missile systems, but no deal was announced.
Iron Dome may not be ideal for the ROK. The DPRK has such an extensive artillery and short-
range rocket arsenal – the DPRK could fire 500,000 artillery rounds on Seoul in the first hour of
a conflict 605 – in addition to longer-range missiles, that it would take far too many Iron Dome
batteries to protect Seoul sufficiently, unless the system was focused on just a few high-value
targets. Each Iron Dome battery built to shoot down missiles costs approximately $50 million,
and the interceptor rockets cost $50,000-$80,000 each. 606
Space
The ROK has improved potential ballistic missile capabilities through its successful and
expanding space program. Seoul began development of its own space program in the 1990s,
including the development of a space-launch vehicle (SLV). After numerous delays, the ROK
launched the two-stage Korea Space Launch Vehicle-1 (KSLV-1) rocket on August 25, 2009.
The launch was intended to place an earth and atmospheric monitoring satellite – the Science and
Technology Satellite 2 (STSTAT-2) – into orbit, but after a successful launch, the satellite failed
to successfully re-enter the atmosphere. 607
The partial success of this launch raised concerns that South Korea had sufficient technology for
a long-range ballistic missile system that could deliver WMD payloads, especially given that the
US and ROK were discussing changing the missile limitation guidelines that would allow
missiles with a range of no more than 800 km, as previously discussed. 608
Following the December 2012 successful DPRK satellite launch, the ROK successfully launched
a KSLV-1 rocket and put a satellite into space on January 30, 2013. The launch took place from
Naro Space Center, and the rocket had been designed in partnership with the Khrunichev State
Space Science and Production Center of Russia. The ROK has already begun work on an entirely
domestically developed system with a projected 75 ton rocket engine, to be produced by 2021. 609
The implications of this launch are varied. While it proves that the ROK could successfully
deploy ballistic missiles, perhaps acting as a deterrent to the North, the DPRK could also use the
ROK’s new capabilities to justify its own program. Because the two launches were so similar,
the DPRK will use the ROK’s launch as an excuse to ignore any UN sanctions, potentially
claiming unfair treatment despite the two countries’ similar stated intentions of peaceful space
exploration. Given the ROK’s successful January 2013 launch, it is possible that the ROK could
work to couple their space program with a ballistic missile program to counter the DPRK threat
apparent in its Nodong, Musudan, and Taepodong missile programs. 610
Conclusions
It is important to stress that advanced forms of conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles
can be used to threaten or attack targets and do so with strategic effect. It is unclear how accurate
the DPRK’s missiles are, and it seems doubtful that Pyongyang now has a real-world terminal
210 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

guidance capability to use conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles effectively against
critical point targets. As long as the DPRK does not have such “smart” warheads, conventionally
armed missiles are largely terror weapons. Once the DPRK does have this capability, however,
they potentially could have “weapons of mass effectiveness,” able to destroy high-value and
critical infrastructure targets with conventional warheads.
The US does have conventionally armed, precision-guided, deep-strike SRBMs, however, and
both the US and the ROK have strike aircraft and precision-guided air-to-surface weapons that
targeting patterns in the Balkans conflict and both Gulf Wars show can hit critical infrastructure
targets with strategic effect. This could lead to new patterns of escalation where the US and ROK
use precision guided air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and cruise missiles to destroy critical
DPRK targets, or threaten to use such weapons to deter Pyongyang. The US also can deliver
such weapons with “stealth” strike aircraft and bombers, and Japan and the ROK are likely to
acquire strike aircraft with some “stealth” capability. Alternatively, the US and ROK might
threaten or initiate the use of precision-guided air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and cruise
missiles to destroy critical DPRK targets or to halt a DPRK conventional attack
As is discussed in Chapters VIII and IX, however, missile programs are only part of a far wider
range of important issues in assessing the Korean balance:
• The DPRK has implosion fission weapons. The numbers, weapons yields, and ability to create reliable
bombs and missile warheads are uncertain, but it seems likely it either has warheads or is rapidly moving
toward acquiring them. It almost certainly has programs to develop boosted and thermonuclear weapons,
but their status is unknown.
• The ROK had a covert nuclear weapons program that it halted after quiet negotiations with the US. This,
along with its extensive civilian nuclear power industry, gives the ROK a significant nuclear breakout
capability if it should reverse its decisions.
• Japan is unlikely to have nuclear weapons programs but has all of the technology and material necessary to
rapidly acquire them and develop boosted and thermonuclear weapons.
• The US and China have nuclear-armed aircraft and ICBMs, IRBMs. MRBMs, and SRBMs with boosted
and thermonuclear weapons. The DPRK may have long-range tactical and theater missiles with implosion
nuclear weapons.
• The DPRK is a major chemical weapons state, and probably has advanced chemical warheads and bombs.
China may have stocks of chemical weapons. There is no way to estimate the size, type, and
lethality/effectiveness of their relative stockpiles, or doctrine and plans for using them. It should be noted,
however, that relatively crude mustard gas weapons played a decisive role in area denial and disruption of
Iranian forces in the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and that stocks of persistent nerve gas and so-
called 4th generation chemical weapons are possible. Although Seoul neither confirms nor denies the
existence of a CW program, the ROK is suspected to have a chemical weapons program and may have
covert stocks of chemical weapons.
• The DPRK is strongly suspected to have a biological weapons program and may have stocks of such
weapons. These could range from basic weapons types to genetically modified types. China’s program is
not discussed in unclassified official statements. The ROK may have a program. It should be noted that
China, Japan, the DPRK, the ROK, and the US all have advanced civil biological, food processing,
chemical processing, and pharmaceutical facilities that can be adapted to both chemical and biological
weapons development and production. All have significant capability for genetic engineering of biological
weapons. All would have to develop advanced biological weapons for test purposes to conduct an effective
biological defense program.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 211

• No public details are available on the efforts of any power to develop small or specialized chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons for covert delivery or potential transfer to non-state actors and
third-party countries.
• China and the DPRK have large numbers of conventionally armed long-range missiles capable of hitting
targets in the ROK. The nature of their conventional warheads is not clear, and this is critical since unity
conventional warheads have limited lethality and terminal guidance is needed to provide the accuracy
necessary to strike at high-value, rather than broad-area targets. China and the DPRK may have, and are
certainly developing, ballistic and cruise missiles with some form of terminal guidance.
• The US has large numbers of precision-guided long-range cruise missiles for air and sea launch and
precision-guided long-range multiple rocket launchers. The ROK is also developing an advanced cruise
missile program of its own. US stealth aircraft can deliver precision-guided weapons at stand-off ranges
from most Chinese and DPRK surface-to-air missiles with the exception of the S300/S400 series. China is
developing long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles that can strike large surface ships like US carriers at long
distances. These potentially are “weapons of mass effectiveness” that can be used in devastating strikes
against critical facilities and infrastructure without the use of WMD warheads.
• The US, Japan, and the ROK have some ballistic missile defense capability and are working together to
develop wide-area theater ballistic missile defense systems. China has the Russian S300/S400 series of
advanced surface-to-air missile defenses and is almost certainly seeking more advanced missile defense
capabilities. The DPRK lacks such capabilities but is almost certainly seeking them. The balance of air and
missile defense capabilities plays a critical role in limiting the offensive capabilities of the opposite side
and reducing the risk in using one’s own missiles. This makes air and missile defenses the equivalent of a
major offensive weapon.
• China, the US, the ROK, and possibly the DPRK all have advanced cyber warfare capabilities. China has
some anti-satellite capability and possibly some form of EMP weapon. These, too, are potential “weapons
of mass effectiveness” that can be used in devastating strikes against critical facilities and infrastructure
without the use of WMD warheads.
Current assessments of the Korean balance tend to focus on the DPRK’s nuclear programs, but
such programs are only part of a far more complex and rapidly evolving mix of current and
potential capabilities to deliver weapons of mass destruction or mass effectiveness. The threat
that such weapons may be used also cannot be limited to the Korean Peninsula. It already
extends to Japan and the US bases there, as well as potentially to Alaska and the Pacific coast of
the US. Potential US reactions again raise the issue of what China’s response would be and
whether a crisis could escalate to the point where the US-Chinese strategic and nuclear balance
became relevant – a threat that could force Japan to make hard choices of its own.
The range of uncertainties affecting DPRK capabilities also raises two key issues for DPRK and
Korean Peninsula arms control:
• One is the so-called Nth weapon paradox. It may be possible to reduce a nation’s nuclear weapons, but
it is probably impossible to be certain it does not retain at least a few. The problem for arms control is
that the smaller the stockpile, the more it has to be used in ways that threaten absolutely critical targets
like major population centers rather than a given military target. Arms reductions can easily escalate
targeting.
• The second is the “diversion effect”: the risk that nuclear controls can drive states even more toward
advanced biological and chemical weapons. Advances in biotechnology have made control regimes
virtually impossible, as well as vastly increased the potential lethality of biological weapons to levels
beyond that of even boosted and thermonuclear weapons.
As the next chapter shows, the nuclear threat is only part of the WMD capabilities affecting the
Korean balance. The DPRK has long been a chemical weapons power. It is believed to have
active biological weapons programs, and it clearly has long-range missile programs that can
212 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

target Japan and anywhere in the ROK. These can potentially be armed with a range of CBRN
warheads, but no meaningful unclassified evidence exists of the range of such warheads or their
lethality. The same is true of DPRK bombs and rocket warheads. This means that CBRN
escalation could occur at a wide range of unpredictable levels, including asymmetric, covert, and
terrorist attacks. Moreover, the DPRK is already acquiring missile engines and boosters that will
give it ICBM capabilities to attack targets in the US.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 213

V. Korean WMD Forces

The two Koreas differ sharply in their political and military need for weapons of mass
destruction and missiles. South Korea is now a global economic powerfully integrated into the
international system. North Korea’s economy is close to that of a failed state, and it needs
nuclear weapons and missiles for both political prestige and leverage in negotiating with the US
and its neighbors.
The ROK has examined nuclear options. It has the capability to create nuclear weapons and
possesses a sound base of nuclear technology to build upon. It also can almost certainly design
and build cruise and ballistic missiles that can accurately reach any target in the DPRK – in a
relatively short period of time. It has all of the technology and industrial base to design and build
advanced chemical and biological weapons. This gives the ROK a near breakout capability to
compete with North Korea if it chooses to do so. So far, however, it has chosen to rely on the US
for extended deterrence and has focused more on deploying advanced air and missile defense
systems than offensive capabilities.
The DPRK, in contrast, lacks anything like the ROK’s resource and technical base. Nevertheless,
it is a long-standing chemical weapons power and has tested three nuclear devices – albeit with
mixed success. It is actively developing long-range missiles and almost certainly has researched
biological weapons and has the capacity to build them. So far, it has not seriously modernized its
air defenses or shown that it plans, or is even able, to buy and deploy missile defenses.
Nuclear weapons and long-range missiles offer North Korea the ability to pressure or intimidate
its neighbors. They give international status, they deter ROK and US counterattacks and
escalation, and they are a cheaper alternative than trying to compete with the ROK and US in
modernizing conventional forces. They also give Pyongyang a strong incentive to retain and
expand its asymmetric capabilities. As the 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper notes, “North
Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by
developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-
scale special operation forces.” 611
This mix of political and military factors has made the DPRK’s nuclear programs – and efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles – a source of concern, negotiating
efforts, and arms control attempts for the better part of two decades. Despite these efforts, the
DPRK became the world’s eighth atomic power when it conducted an underground nuclear
weapons test in October 2006, and it currently continues both its nuclear weapons and long-
range missile programs.
An ROK government report adds, “The development of asymmetric capabilities seems to serve
three objectives: to secure military superiority over others, to have an effective bargaining chip,
and to promote internal unity.” 612
US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified to the Senate in January 2014
that: 613
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the United States and to the
security environment in East Asia, a region with some of the world’s largest populations, militaries, and
economies. North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries,
214 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007,
illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the reaffirmation of its commitment in the Second-
Phase Actions for the Implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement not to transfer nuclear
materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology.
In addition to conducting its third nuclear test on 12 February 2013, North Korea announced its intention to
“adjust and alter” the uses of existing nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment facility at
Yongbyon, and restart its graphite moderated reactor that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North
Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment
facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production. North Korea has
publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial
steps towards fielding this system, although it remains untested. North Korea is committed to developing
long-range missile technology that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States. Its efforts to
produce and market ballistic missiles raise broader regional and global security concerns.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on
deterrence and defense. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyang’s view, its nuclear capabilities are
intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We do not know Pyongyang’s
nuclear doctrine or employment concepts
It should be stressed, however, that the DPRK’s nuclear programs are only part of this aspect of
the military balance. Weapons of mass destruction include chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) weapons. The DPRK reportedly possesses a sizable stockpile of chemical and,
possibly, biological weapons as well as the ability to mount them on conventional and
unconventional delivery systems. It is also important to note that the balance also includes the
CBRN weapons of outside actors like the United State and China, which may be a reason why
the ROK has chosen (or been coerced) to maintain little, if any, CBRN stockpiles relative to the
DPRK.
DPRK Chemical and Biological Developments
While Pyongyang openly declares itself to be a nuclear and missile power, it denies possessing
chemical or biological weapons or agents. The DPRK acceded to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) in March 1987, but not to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction (CWC). 614
A wide range of sources raise serious doubts about such DPRK denials. A 2000 Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress stated, 615
We assess North Korea is self-sufficient in the production of chemical components for first generation
chemical agents. They have produced munitions stockpiles…of several types of chemical agents, including
nerve, choking, blister, and blood. We assess that North Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and
weaponize biological warfare agents, to include bacterial spores causing anthrax and smallpox and the
bacteria causing the plague and cholera.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative reports that, 616
…the DPRK is thought to be among the world’s largest possessors of chemical weapons, ranking third only
after the United States and Russia, who are working to destroy their Cold War caches. In its most recent
assessment (2010), the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) estimated the DPRK possesses
between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including phosgene (choking), hydrogen
cyanide (blood), mustard (blister), and sarin (nerve agent).
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 215

As long as the balance of conventional forces continues to be unfavorable for the DPRK,
chemical weapons are likely to remain part of DPRK military strategy, and it seems likely that it
has developed at least some biological agents.
There has been considerable debate among government officials and scholars as to whether or
not the DPRK has the ability to put nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons on their
missiles, especially on any potential ICBMs. While the country almost certainly does possess all
the components – all three weapons types, as well as missiles – it is unlikely that the missiles
could be equipped with WMD: 617
For warheads armed with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, verification of their functionality is a
must. During flight, warheads suffer extreme mechanical loads, vibrations, accelerations, wide temperature
ranges, and pressure differences from near vacuum to extreme dynamic pressures at reentry. Chemical and
biological agents are highly sensitive to temperatures, as are nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon is a
complex mechanical device, and the ejection mechanisms of biological and chemical weapons are complex,
as well.
The same is true for the respective detonators and fuzes. The functionalities of these devices can only be
proven under real conditions, thus requiring flight tests. No test flights with nuclear, biological, or chemical
warheads in North Korea are known. The functionality and reliability of these weapons is therefore
unknown, even to the North Koreans. If these warheads exist, either they have been imported from Russia
or China, which seems highly unlikely, or they are unlikely to perform well once launched.

DPRK Chemical Weapons

A number of sources indicate that the DPRK produced its first experimental chemical weapons
during the late 1950s and early 1960s in the wake of the Korean War. 618 Since then, their
chemical weapons program has increased in scale and lethality, and the DPRK now ranks among
the world’s largest possessors of chemical weapons. Virtually all the fire support systems in the
DPRK inventory could deliver chemical agents and be employed in offensive military
operations. The DPRK is one of only six countries 619 that has neither signed nor acceded to the
Chemical Weapons Convention and is not expected to do so in the near-term due in part to the
intrusive inspection and verification requirements mandated by the agreement. 620
Western Estimates of DPRK Stockpiles and Capacity
According to a 2006 unclassified CIA report, the DPRK is believed to possess a sizable stockpile
of chemical weapons. Since 1989, it has had the ability to indigenously produce bulk quantities
of nerve, blister, choking, and blood chemical agents as well as a variety of different filled-
munitions systems. 621
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) provides similar data, alleging the DPRK’s chemical arsenal
to include four of the five major classes of chemical warfare (CW) agents, including phosgene
(choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister), and sarin (nerve agent). North Korea
does not appear to possess nervous system incapacitants such as BZ. Nerve agents (i.e., Sarin
and VX) are believed to be the current focus of Korean CW production. 622
Additionally, GlobalSecurity.org estimates that the DPRK may also produce tabun and
adamsite. 623 However, it may require imports of some specific precursors to produce nerve
agents that are relatively more difficult to fabricate than the first generation blister, blood and
choking agents. 624 The International Crisis Group (ICG) and IISS also provide estimates of
possible DPRK CW agents.
216 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Other reports indicate that the DPRK appears to have increased its CW agent production capacity
in the last two decades and has been able to develop and deploy a variety of delivery systems.
The country’s arsenal includes thousands of artillery of various calibers and hundreds of
forward-deployed Hwasong-5/-6 missiles and Frog-5/-7 missiles capable of being fitted with
chemical warheads. 625 According to defector accounts, the DPRK ‘s long-range missiles such as
the Nodong and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibers larger than 80 mm are
capable of delivering CW agents, and beginning in 2002 the DPRK began to substantially
increase the number of long-range multiple rocket 280 mm and 320 mm launching systems near
the DMZ. 626
The possible range of DPRK chemical weapons is shown in Figure V.1.

Figure V.1: DPRK Possible CW Agents

AGENT AGENT ID MAJOR EFFECTS

Blister Agents

Lewisite HD Cutaneous (skin): Pain and irritation of eyes and skin followed by blisters
and lesions on the skin. Pulmonary (inhalation): runny nose, hoarseness,
bloody nose, sinus pain, coughs. Intestinal: diarrhea, nausea, vomiting.

Mustard Agents L, H Cutaneous (skin): Pain and irritation of eyes and skin followed by blisters
and lesions on the skin. Pulmonary (inhalation): runny nose, hoarseness,
bloody nose, sinus pain, coughs. Intestinal: diarrhea, nausea, vomiting.

Choking Agents

Phosgene CG Coughing, blurred vision, shortness of breath, nausea, pulmonary edema,

heart failure, death.

Diphosgene DP Coughing, blurred vision, shortness of breath, nausea, pulmonary edema,

heart failure, death.

Vomiting Agents

Adamsite DM Coughing, severe headache, muscle spasms, chest pains, shortness of

breath, nausea, vomiting.

Vomiting Agent DA Headache, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal cramps.

Chloropicrin PS Coughing, severe skin irritation on contact, corneal edema and

liquefaction of the cornea, pulmonary edema.

Tear Gas CN Tears, coughing, mucus, burning in the nose and throat, disorientation,
dizziness restricted breathing, burning of the skin.

Tear Gas CS Tears, coughing, mucus, burning in the nose and throat, disorientation,
dizziness, restricted breathing, burning of the skin.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 217

Blood Agents

Cyanide (Hydrogen ANCK Rapid breathing, dizziness, weakness, headache, nausea, vomiting.
Cyanide/Cyanogen
Chloride)

Nerve Agents

Tabun GA Runny nose, watery eyes, rapid breathing, nausea, unconsciousness,

paralysis, respiratory failure, death.

Sarin GB Runny nose, watery eyes, rapid breathing, nausea, unconsciousness,

paralysis, respiratory failure, death.

Soman GD Runny nose, watery eyes, rapid breathing, nausea, unconsciousness,

paralysis, respiratory failure, death.

VX -- Salivation, runny nose, sweating, shortness of breath, muscle spasms,

unconsciousness, death.

VE -- Salivation, runny nose, sweating, shortness of breath, muscle spasms,

unconsciousness, death.

For further information see:

• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW): http://www.opcw.org/resp/html/cwagents.html
• World Health Organisation (WHO):www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochem_threats.pdf
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:www.ceip.org/files/publications/RegimeAppendix7.asp?p=
• NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations AmedP-6(B):
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/toc.htm
• US Government, the Chemical & Biological Warfare Threat; US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical
Defense, Chemical Casualty Care Division, http://ccc.apgea.army.mil.
Source: International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report No. 167, June 18,
2009, 25, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-
korea/167_north_koreas_chemical_and_biological_weapons_programs.pdf; John Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and
Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, IISS, 2004, 55.

Korean Estimates of DPRK Stockpiles and Capacity

Official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are uncertain, but most agree with
the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), which in its most recent assessment in 2010
indicated that the DPRK could possess between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical
weapons (see Figure V.2). 627 The ROK also estimates that the DPRK is capable of producing
12,000 metric tons. 628
Kwon Yang-Joo of The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) agreed with this analysis
in an October 2010 report, stating that the DPRK was capable of producing “up to 12,000 tons of
chemical weapons,” which could “contaminate about 2,500 square kilometers (950 square
miles), four times the area of Seoul.” 629 This stockpile is not believed to be increasing, however,
because there is no indication of the necessary expansion of storage facilities to do so. 630
218 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Guesstimates of Key Locations

The DPRK maintains a number of facilities involved in producing or storing chemical
precursors, agents, and weapons (see Figures V.3 and V.4). GlobalSecurity.org estimates that
North Korea has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents; however, the
production rate and types of munitions are uncertain. 631
ICG also has reported that the DPRK’s Second Natural Science Academy conducts weapons-
related research and development and that the main CW research facility is co-located with a
production plant in Kanggye City, Chagang Province. 632 In addition, a number of civilian
chemical facilities have been implicated in chemical weapons production, such as the Manpo
Chemical Factory and Aoji-ri Chemical Complex. 633
Chemicals are part of heavy industry and a key component for the DPRK’s economy, especially
in an atmosphere in which military preparedness is strongly emphasized. All chemical
production – and other heavy industry – is militarized in North Korea, though it is unclear
exactly how much of the production is geared towards chemical warfare. According to the NTI,
the DPRK has: 634
4 military bases equipped with chemical weapons
11 facilities where chemical weapons are produced and stored
13 locations where research and development is carried out relating to chemical weapons
2 facilities near the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly equipped for CW agent final preparation
and filling of artillery shells, as well as testing, possibly in large underground facilities
The DPRK’s leadership has traditionally had total control over procedure and policy regarding
armaments production. The National Defense Commission (NDC) is the highest military
industry-related decision-making body, and the Second Economic Committee (SEC) is directly
subordinate to it. Set up in the 1970s, the SEC is key for the majority of DPRK planning,
development, manufacturing, and distribution of ordnance and WMD. The SEC is located in
Kangdong-kun, Pyongyang, and controls eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories. The
Ministry of Chemical Industry is separate from this line of command, but likely coordinates
production and transfer of CW agent intermediaries with the SEC and its subordinate bureaus.
The eight bureaus are: 635
• A general affairs office
• First Machine Industry Bureau: ammunition and small arms
• Second Machine Industry Bureau: armored personnel carriers (APCs) and tanks
• Third Machine Industry Bureau: multi-stage rockets
• Fourth Machine Industry Bureau: guided missiles
• Fifth Machine Industry Bureau: chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
• Sixth Machine Industry Bureau: submarines and battleships
• Seventh Machine Industry Bureau: production and purchase of war aircraft
While the SEC establishes requirements, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is the most
important for chemical and biological weapons in that it carries out the production of the agents.
The Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) is directly subordinate to the General Staff
Department, is responsible for offensive and defensive chemical operations, and is in charge of
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 219

the filling, storage, and handling of munitions. The NCDB works in the research and
development of chemical weapons as well as undertakes chemical and nuclear defense measures.
It is composed of seven department units and two further research institutions: 636
• Operations unit
• Training unit
• Materials unit
• Technology unit
• Reconnaissance unit
• Mining/underground facility operations unit
• Section 32 unit (reportedly working in developing specialized chemical-delivery warheads for the
Nodong-1 missile)
• Section 55 [research institute]: simulating nuclear and chemical contamination for
decontamination operations and training (approximate research staff of 70)
• Section 398 [research institute]: decontamination operations in both nuclear and chemical
environments and is reportedly developing antidotes, masks, and suits (approximately 250
researchers)
Munitions plants located at Ganggye and Sakju are nominally civilian, but are under the control
of the SEC’s General Machine Industry Bureau and the NCDB’s Equipment Department. At
these locations, chemical weapons agents from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are inserted
into artillery shells (including mortar shells) previously received from the Third Machine
Industry Bureau. Also at these two plants, aerial munitions and chemical spray tanks are
prepared and can be used in wartime when filled with chemical agents from bulk storage
facilities located at various airfields. Factory 279 produces defensive equipment, such as
protective suits, detection systems, and decontamination chemicals. 637
After the munitions are assembled and filled, they are taken to the Maram Materials Corporation
(Maram neighbourhood, Yongsong district station, Pyongyang) and the Jiha-ri Chemical
Corporation (in Pangyu-gun, Gangwon province) for storage. It has been reported that DPRK
chemical weapons storage facilities are in underground tunnels, with the agents stored in 12-foot-
high tanks along with Factory 279’s defensive materials. 638
According to an ROK source in 2002, the DPRK has several different chemical troops under
different organizations. The NCDB has eight battalions in its department of operations – the 17th
and 18th battalions are considered active, while the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 27th, and 36th are reserve.
The 18th Nuclear Chemical Defense Battalion is composed of six companies; according to a
DPRK defector, the 18th Battalion has a nuclear/chemical reconnaissance company (the 1st
Company), while the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th companies are “decontamination” units. The 6th
company is flame-throwers and likely obscurant smokes (also referred to as “Smoke Screen
Company”), which had once been located in Sadong district station, Pyongyang, and had been
transferred to the 18th Battalion in 1993. According to the defector, none of these companies
have specific offensive duties, instead being primarily concerned with reconnaissance and
decontamination. 639
220 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Defensive Preparations
The DPRK has devoted considerable resources to defensive measures aimed at protecting its
civilian population and military forces from the effects of chemical weapons. Such measures
include extensive training in the use of protective masks, suits, detectors, and decontamination
systems. 640 The DPRK has chemical defense units at all levels of its forces equipped with
decontamination and detection equipment, and DPRK military units conduct regular NBC
(nuclear-biological-chemical) defensive training exercises in preparation for operations in a
chemical environment. 641 Though these measures seem to be focused on a perceived threat from
US and ROK forces, they could also support the offensive use of chemical weapons.

Figure V.2: Defector Reports on the DPRK CW Program

(as of 2004)
Name Background Defector Comment

Yi Chung Kuk Sergeant in the 18th Nuclear Warned that the DPRK was capable of killing
and Chemical Defense everyone in the ROK with chemical and bacterial
Battalion in the early 1990s. weapons. Linked the Sunchon Vinalon Complex to
Defected in March 1994. the DPRK’s CW program.

Choi Ju Hwal Served in the Ministry of As of 1997, the DPRK had stockpiled over 5,000 tons
Defense from 1968 to 1995. of toxic gases, including nerve gases (sarin, soman,
(Acknowledged that he did tabun, and V agents), first-generation blister gases
not have direct knowledge of (lewisite and mustard gas), and blood agents
the CBW program, but he (hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride). Choi
obtained second-hand identified numerous facilities associated with CW
information from other research and production, including several civilian
officials.) chemical factories involved in vinalon production.

Yi Sun Ok Inmate at a DPRK prison. Said that some 150 fellow inmates died due to a
Defected in 1995. chemical weapons test.

Hwang Chang Secretary of the DPRK’s Claimed that the DPRK had both nuclear and
Yop Workers Party. Defected in chemical armed missiles capable of hitting the ROK
August 1996. and Japan. He quoted the DPRK leadership as saying
that the DPRK ranked third or fourth in the world in
chemical weapons.

Yi Chun Sun Commander of a missile Said that chemical agents are produced in Factory
station. Defected from the 102.
KPA in 1999.

Yi Mi Worked at the Yongbyon Said the 304 Lab mainly worked on nuclear weapons
(pseudonym) nuclear complex. Defected in development but also conducted research and
September 2000. development in chemical weapons.

Source: Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons
Programmes, 54.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 221

Figure V.3: Map of Possible DPRK Chemical Facilities

Note: Locations are approximate.

Sources: International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report No. 167, 23;
Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 50–
52.
222 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.4: Major DPRK Civilian Chemical Production Facilities

(as of 2004)
Aoiji-ri (Haksong-ri) Chemical Complex Production of methanol, ammonia, ammonium bicarbonate, coal
tar derivatives, and liquid fuel products. About 3,500 employees.
Processes 600,000 tons of lignite coal processing per year;
produces 100,000 tons of ammonium bicarbonate and 35,000
tons of methane per year.

April 25th Vinalon Factory (Hamhung) Produces 540,000 tons per year of fertilizer, herbicides, and
pesticides. Other products include ammonia, as well as other
chlorine-based pesticides – probably DDT and chlordane, among
others.

February 8th Vinalon Complex One of the largest chemical facilities in the DPRK. Around
(Hamhung) 10,000 employees. Comprises about 50 large buildings. Produces
50,000 tons of vinalon and 10,000 tons of movilon per year. Also
produces carbide, methanol, sodium hydroxide, livestock feed,
sodium carbonate, vinyl chloride, and agricultural insecticide.

Hamhung Chemical Factory Produces sulphuric acid, nitric acid, ammonia, and fertilizer
products.

Hungnam Chemical Fertilizer Complex Produces ammonium sulphate, ammonium nitrate, phosphate,
(Hamhung) and urea. Employs more than 10,000 people. Production capacity
of 1.4 million tons (unclear whether annual capacity or other time
period).

Institute of Chemistry, Hamhung R&D, education, and training in applied chemistry. Established
in 1960.

Chongjin Chemical Fiber Complex Employs around 3,000 people. Produces 300 tons of pesticides,
10,000 tons of other chemical products, and 30,000 tons of
synthetic fiber per year. Also produces carbonic acid, formalin,
and phenol.

Chongsu Chemical Complex Production of large quantities of calcium carbide and smaller
amounts of phosphate fertilizer and calcium cyanamide.

Hwasong Chemical Factory Produces agricultural chemicals and 2,500 tons of phenol per
year. Unknown iodine capacity.

Hyesan Chemical Factory Produces chemicals such as benzol, phenol, and hydrochloric
acid.

Manpo Chemical Factory Produces ammonia, sodium hydroxide, and sulphuric acid.

Namhung Youth Chemical Complex Produces ammonia, ethylene, fertilizers, fibers, and paper.
Annual production capacity of approximately 500,000 tons.

Sariwon Potash Fertilizer Complex Produces Fertilizers – planned production target of 510,000 tons
per year of potash fertilizer (unclear whether annual capacity or
other time period).
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 223

Shinhung Chemical Complex Produces calcium hypochlorite, caustic soda, dyes, hydrochloric
acid, paints, vinyl chloride, polyvinyl chloride, potassium
carbonate, sodium carbonate, sodium bicarbonate, barium
chloride, ammonium sulphate fertilizer, magnetized fertilizer,
slag fertilizer, and sulphuric acid fertilizer.

Sinuiju Chemical Fiber Complex Produces calcium cyanide, chlorine, sodium hydroxide, sulphuric
acid, synthetic fiber, and paper products. Annual production
capacity of 107,000 tons.

Sunchon Vinalon Complex The DPRK’s largest chemical production facility with about 50
affiliated factories. First stage of construction completed in 1989;
final construction reportedly still not completed as of 2000.
Estimated annual production (if completed) of 100,000 tons of
vinalon, one million tons of carbide, 750,000 tons of methanol,
and 900,000 tons of vinyl chloride.

Sunchon Calcium Cyanide Fertilizer One of the DPRK’s four major fertilizer plants. Produces calcium
Factory cyanide and calcium carbide. Annual chemical production
capacity of 100,000–150,000 tons. Probably a part of the
Sunchon Vinalon Complex.

Source: Based on information from the NTI’s website: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK. This draws on information
from documents such as ‘DPRK Factories Suspected of Producing Chemical Agents,’ FBIS: KPP2001021600106; ‘Alleged
Locations of DPRK Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warfare Facilities Mapped,’ 6 June 2001, FBIS: KPP20010606000075;
‘North Korean Chemical Industry,’ FBIS: FTS19981230001322; and ‘Chemical Engineering, Experts Described,’ 23
December 1999, FBIS: FTS199991223001168. Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)
Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 50.
224 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DPRK Biological Weapons

Much less is known about the North Korean biological warfare program than about its chemical
warfare program. The DPRK acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) in March 1987, but most official estimates conclude that the DPRK possesses the
scientists and facilities for producing traditional infectious biological warfare (BW) agents and
weapons, and has done so since the 1960s. Several DPRK defectors have claimed that the North
tested biological and/or chemical weapons on mentally or physically deficient children and
concentration camp prisoners. 642
Capabilities
An April 2012 ROK official report stated that the DPRK was able to equip its rocket launchers,
mortars, and field artilleries with biological weapons and assessed that botulinum toxins,
smallpox, and anthrax were the most likely to be weaponized. 643 The South Korean government
further estimated that half of the DPRK’s long-range missiles and 30% of its artillery are able to
deliver biological or chemical weapons, though it is unknown if the North is able to equip
missiles/artillery in a way that would allow the biological payloads to survive and effectively
disperse. 644
As the DPRK appears to be focusing on improving its strategically more useful nuclear and
missile capabilities, recent assessments have tended to downgrade the threat of biological
weapons, compared with past assessments. 645
North Korea has dual-use facilities that could be used to produce biological agents and a
munitions industry that could be used to weaponize such agents – a recent Deputy DNI report,
noted that “North Korea has a biotechnology infrastructure that could support the production of
various BW agents.” 646 However, there is not enough information to determine whether
Pyongyang has progressed beyond the research and development stage and actually has stocks of
biological weapons. But while the DPRK may not possess ready-to-use weapons, it certainly has
the technical abilities to produce them.
According to GlobalSecurity.org, Pyongyang’s resources presently include a rudimentary (by
Western standards) biotechnology infrastructure that is sufficient to support the production of
limited quantities of toxins as well as viral and bacterial biological warfare agents. 647 BW agents
are reportedly cultured in both civilian and military-related research institutes in the DPRK, and,
according to NTI, pathogens that have possible utility for BW and that are allegedly being
researched and developed by the DPRK include: Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium
botulinum (botulism), Mycobacterium tuberculosis (tuberculosis), Rickettsia prowazekii
(typhus), Salmonella typhi (typhoid), Vibrio cholerae 01 (cholera), Yersinia pestis (plague),
Korean hemorrhagic fever, Variola major (smallpox), Yellow fever virus (yellow fever),
Dysentery, Brucellosis, Staphylococcus aureus, and Yellow Rain (T-2 Micro Toxins) (see
Figure V.5). 648
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 225

Figure V.5: Possible DPRK Biological Agents

TYPE SYMPTOMS/CHARACTERISTICS STATUS

Bacteria
Pulmonary (inhalation): difficulty breathing, exhaustion,
toxemia, terminal shock. Cutaneous (skin): itching, small lesions
Bacillus anthracis and possible blood poisoning. Intestinal: nausea, fever, diarrhea. Possibly weaponized,
(Anthrax) Mortality (if untreated): Pulmonary 80–95%; Cutaneous 5–20%; with delivery system
Intestinal 25–60%. Incubation period: Symptoms usually occur
with 7 days. Not contagious.
Diarrhea, vomiting, and leg cramps. Rapid loss of body fluids,
Vibrio cholera
dehydration and shock. Mortality (if untreated): 5–10%. Death Unknown
(Cholera)
in 1–3 hours. Not contagious.

Fever, headache, exhaustion, swollen lymph nodes, blood

Yersinia pestis
infection, and pneumonia. Mortality (if untreated): 50–60%. Unknown
(Plague)
Incubation period: 1–3 days, death in 2–6 days. Contagious.

Salmonella Typhi Fever, malaise, chills, stomach pains, headache, loss of appetite,
Unknown
(Typhoid Fever) and rash. Mortality (if untreated): 12–30%. Contagious.

Fever, headache, chills, whole body rash, and general pains.

Typhus Mortality (if untreated): 30–50%. Incubation Period: 6–12 days. Unknown
Not contagious.

Mycobacterium Coughing, chest pain, fatigue, loss of appetite, chills, fever, and
tuberculosis coughing blood. Mortality (if untreated): 30–50%. Incubation --
(tuberculosis) period: 14 days–1 year. Contagious.

Virus

Fever, fatigue, dizziness, muscle aches, exhaustion, internal

Haemorrhagic fever
bleeding, coma, delirium, and seizures. Mortality (if untreated): Unknown
(Korean Strain)
5–15%. Incubation period: 7–17 days. Contagious.

Fever, malaise, aches, rash, and crusting scabs. Mortality (if

Variola (smallpox) Unknown
untreated): 30–40%. Incubation: 7–17 days. Contagious.

High fever, chills, headache, muscle aches, and vomiting; can

Yellow Fever lead to shock, kidney, and liver failure. Mortality (if untreated): --
5–40%. Incubation: 3–6 days. Not contagious.

Toxin

Nausea, weakness, vomiting, and respiratory paralysis. Mortality

Clostridium Botulinum
(if untreated): 60–90%. Incubation: 12–36 hours after inhalation. Unknown
(Botulism)
Death in 24–72 hours. Not contagious.
Note: World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/en/annex3May03.pdf; NATO, Handbook on the
Medical Aspects of NBC Defensive Operations AmedP-6(B), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/fm8-9/2toc.htm;
and US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Medical Management of Biological Casualties Handbook,
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/education/bluebook.html; and Centers for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov.
Source: Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea: Biological,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/biological/;
Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 50.
226 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Facilities
A number of DPRK facilities have been linked to ongoing work in biological weapons research,
development, and manufacture (see Figures V.6 and V.7). Although the indicators involved are
often uncertain, the IISS provides a detailed list and map of possible facilities.
Additionally, the ROK MND estimated in 2001 that the DPRK maintains at least three possible
BW production facilities and six BW or BW-related research centers, including the No. 25
Factory in Chongju, the Central Biological Weapons Research Institute in Pyongyang and a plant
in the City of Munchon, Kangwon Province. One ROK newspaper reported the existence of
more than 10 facilities, while NTI has also reported a number of facilities in addition to the No.
25 Factory linked to BW production. They include: 649
 The Research Institute of the Armed Forces Ministry (synonymous with the Bacterium Research Institute,
Second Academy of Natural Sciences), responsible for developing biological weapons.
 A Biological research facility located in Songch’on County, South P’yongan Province, adjacent to the
Onjong-ni chemical weapons facility; growth media is allegedly supplied (approximately 200 tons per year)
by a facility in Munchon, Kangwon Province.
 A germ-producing facility known as the 25 February Plant (also known as the 25 Plant), located in
Chongju, North Pyongan Province.
 The National Defense Research Institute and Medical Academy (NDRIMA), which conducts studies on
disease pathogens such as the bacteria and viruses that cause anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox,
yellow fever, and others.
Few details are known about these facilities or which, if any, microorganisms have been or are
being weaponized. Regardless, whatever the status of its biological weapons efforts, the DRPK
possesses a number of dual-use biotechnology facilities that could be used to research biological
weapons agents and produce militarily significant quantities of biological agents. 650
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 227

Figure V.6: Civilian DPRK Biological Facilities

Aeguk Compound Microbe Center R&D and production of microbial-based fertilizer supplements.

Aeguk Preventative Medicine Comprised ten laboratories and various workshops devoted to R&D
Production Factory and production of vaccines and medicines. The main product has been
hepatitis B vaccine.

Branch Academy of Cell and Gene One of nine research branches of the Academy of Sciences. Conducts
Engineering research on cellular biology and genetic engineering.

National Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Administers quarantines and provides inoculations against various
Research Center diseases.

Endocrinology Institute Mainly diagnoses and treats diabetes.

Industrial Microbiology Institute R&D and production of microbial cultures.

Munchon Agar Plant Agar (growth media) production. As of 1992, the annual agar
production capacity was 200 tons.

Pharmaceutical Institute of the R&D of medicaments. Reportedly located in Pyongyang.

Academy of Medical Sciences

Pyongyang Pharmaceutical Factory As of August 2000, the factory produced seven drugs, including
antibiotics and multivitamins. Has received raw materials and support
from UNICEF and Diakonie Emergency Aid of Germany.

Synthetic Pharmaceutical Division, R&D of medicaments and clinical diagnostics.

Hamhung Clinical Medicine Institute

Taedonggang Reagent Company R&D of vaccines. Previously known as the November 19 Institute.

Sources: NTI, “North Korea: Biological”; “DPRK’s NAS Pursues Cultivation of Stock Bacteria for Microbial Fertilizers,”
Chungang Ilbo, January 17, 2000; “DPRK Korea Donor Update,” UNICEF Emergency Programs, August 7, 2000,
http://www.reliefweb.int; Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s
Weapons Programmes, 50.
228 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.7: Map of Possible DPRK Civilian Biological Facilities

Source: Chipman, “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Programmes,” North Korea’s Weapons
Programmes, 57.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 229

DPRK Nuclear Developments

US intelligence estimates of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program have long warned that the
DPRK has an active program. It is clear that Pyongyang has effectively ignored or terminated its
past agreements to limit the production of nuclear materials and missile tests, posing very real
concerns not only in the region, but also in the International community. According to a May
2010 UN Security Council report on the DPRK’s nuclear program, “the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea believes…that its nuclear programme can provide the country a way to
achieve its stated goal of becoming a ‘strong and prosperous country’ (kangsongdaeguk) by the
year 2012 without succumbing to what they view as ‘foreign influences.’” 651
Motivations for Acquisition
The broad rationales for the DPRK’s efforts have already been discussed. US officials assess
DPRK nuclear capabilities as “being more for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive
diplomacy than for war fighting, and assess that Pyongyang most likely ‘would consider using
nuclear weapons only under narrow circumstances.’” 652 The DPRK noted in a state-run
newspaper, “The DPRK was left with no option but to choose the way of accessing nuclear
deterrent in order to put an end to the U.S. ever-more intensified nuclear threat and defend the
sovereignty, dignity, and vital rights of the country” – making nuclear weapons a matter of
defense and dignity, not offense. 653
One former DOD official called the DPRK’s nuclear weapons acquisition a “survival game” in
that nuclear weapons are the only reason anyone pays attention to the DPRK, which is necessary
for the regime to gain aid and assistance. As the poorest country in the region, it would receive
little without calling attention to itself so forcefully. 654 Furthermore, 655
It should also be considered that even speculative sources estimate that North Korea cannot have more than
a few nuclear weapons available. If they exist, these devices are very precious to the regime, and it seems
unlikely that they would be mounted on inaccurate and unreliable missile systems—the risk of “loosing” a
weapon is simply too high. Of course, a singular shot can never be totally ruled out, but the chances of
success are very low. And even if this unlikely event was to happen, with North Korea unable to repeat this
feat on short notice, this scenario should be seen more like a terrorist attack than nuclear warfare.
In June 2010, a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that “recent developments” have
underscored the need for the DPRK “to bolster its nuclear deterrent in a newly developed
way.” 656 Given the aggressiveness in the DPRK sinking of the ROK Corvette Cheonan in March
2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November, there may be little possibility that the
DPRK will give up its nuclear weapons program any time soon.
DNI James R. Clapper noted in 2011, 657
Based on the scale of the facility and the progress the DPRK has made in construction, it is likely that
North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time. If so, there is clear prospect that
DPRK has built other uranium enrichment related facilities in its territory, including likely R&D and
centrifuge fabrication facilities, and other enrichment facilities. Analysts differ on the likelihood that other
production-scale facilities may exist elsewhere in North Korea.
Ironically, the Arab Spring may have acted as a further incentive to the DPRK. Some experts feel
that North Korea sees Muammar Qaddafi’s willingness to give up Libya’s nuclear programs as
one reason that the UN and NATO were willing to impose a no-fly zone and make a de facto
effort to remove him from power. It also sees India, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan as examples of
states whose nuclear efforts also give them political and military leverage where they may not
230 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

have had it. Looking at the examples of Libya and Iraq, countries that gave up their WMD
programs, the DPRK state media outlet noted on April 4, 2013 that “the nuclear weapons of
Songun Korea are not something for display and the DPRK is very different from Iraq, Libya
and the Balkans.” 658
In any case, the DPRK’s third nuclear test in February 2013 signaled that it was attempting to
establish itself as a nuclear power or, at the very least, a de-facto nuclear state – like Israel, India,
and Pakistan – a nation that is implicitly recognized as a nuclear state by the international
community, though not formally recognized under the NPT framework. The Institute for Science
and International Security ISIS) also reported in August 2013, that satellite data indicated that
the DPRK might have doubled the area used to enrich uranium at its Yongbyon reactor complex
– its key source of weapons grade material – over the previous months. 659
It is also clear that the DPRK stepped up its nuclear research and production activity in 2014, as
well as gave indications that it planned new nuclear tests in June and November. 660 Gen. Curtis
M. Scaparrotti, the Commander of US forces in the ROK stated publically on October 24, 2014
that he believed that the DPRK had probably developed a nuclear weapon small enough to be
used in a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. 661
Scaparrotti’s public statement at a Pentagon press conference was particularly significant
because of an intelligence incident in April 2013, when the Defense Intelligence Agency had
issued a statement that it had concluded with “moderate confidence” that the DPRK now had the
technology to make a nuclear weapon small enough to fit a ballistic missile warhead. A few days
later, James R. Clapper Jr., the Director of National Intelligence, stated that the DIA’s one-
paragraph assessment had been declassified by mistake, and was inadvertent disclosure that
revealed competing views on the country within the United States’ spy agencies. 662
On November 18, 2014, the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS at Johns Hopkins University, issued a
report that recent commercial satellite imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear facility indicated the
DPRK might be preparing to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to extract weapons-grade plutonium.
When a United Nations committee recommended that the leaders of the DPRK should be
prosecuted for human for rights violations on November 19th, the DPRK threatened to conduct a
fourth nuclear test. 663
Assessments of Capabilities: Plutonium
It is difficult to determine just how large the DPRK’s nuclear program is and how much progress it is
making. The DPRK is an extremely isolated and secretive state and provides few signals of the
existence – let alone the extent – of its nuclear weapons program, which has resulted in substantial
uncertainty about its size and capability. However, a general picture of the program has become
relatively clear over the past two decades.
The US Intelligence Community estimates that Pyongyang see its nuclear capabilities as
intended for “deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy,” and would consider
using nuclear weapons only “under certain narrow circumstances.” 664 In addition, research
centers like Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) have indicated that the DPRK
may be sharing at least some aspects of its nuclear weapons technology with Iran and the
Syria. 665
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 231

CSIS’s Mike Green notes “the danger of horizontal escalation by the DPRK – namely,
transferring weapons to third parties in the event of tensions or conflict. The DPRK directly
threatened the United States with this in March 2003.” 666
While unclassified estimates must depend to some extent on sophisticated guesswork, the DPRK
has probably obtained enough plutonium from its power reactors to have 4-13 nuclear weapons –
even allowing for the material used in its two tests. The DPRK reported in May 2008 that it had
extracted roughly 38.5 kg of weapons-grade plutonium from fuel rods. 667
A February 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that North Korea
had between 30 and 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen
nuclear weapons. 668 In 2011, the NTI estimated that the DPRK had 6-10 kg of weapons-grade
plutonium and another 29-34 kg of plutonium in spent fuel stockpiles that could be reprocessed
and weaponized. 669
ROK MND figures are similar, estimating that the DPRK has secured about 40 kg of plutonium
as a result of three reprocessing procedures (as of 2010). 670 Additionally, the Strategic Studies
Institute (SSI) believes that the DPRK has discharged anywhere from 43 to 61 kg from its 5MWe
reactor since 1989 (see Figure V.8). Furthermore, it has been reported that approximately 3,000
people work on the DPRKs nuclear program, including about 200 key researchers and
scientists. 671
ISIS released a report in mid-2012 warning that, in the best case scenario, the DPRK would use
its uranium centrifuges at Yongbyon to make enough low enriched uranium to have a maximum
of 25 nuclear weapons by 2015 – an increase of two from the ISIS’s current estimate. In the
worst case scenario – the absence of effective sanctions – the DPRK could build as many as 48
nuclear weapons by 2015 (an increase of 25). 672 An additional assessment by ISIS concluded
that the DPRK is now “poised for significant expansion over the next five years” and – at a worst
case scenario – on track to develop up to 100 nuclear weapons by 2020. 673
Some sources indicate that DPRK nuclear technologies and materials appear to be poorly
guarded and could be exploited or stolen by personnel in the security services or military and
transferred to criminal groups, terrorist organizations, and/or other states. After his visits to the
DPRK, Dr. Siegfried Hecker stated that he had seen “little recognition of the safety hazards
posed by primitive nuclear bombs,” likely meaning that security is also minimal. 674
The DPRK has sometimes halted its plutonium production from its 5MWe reactor in Yongbyon,
but it can easily restart plutonium production and weaponization, and the DPRK announced in
March 2013 that it was going to do so. According to a CRS report: 675
In order to produce additional plutonium, the North Koreans would need to restore their 5-MWe reactor or
build a new reactor. Timelines for restoring the 5-MWe reactor are uncertain, although experts estimate
between six months and one year. Rebuilding the cooling tower, which was destroyed in June 2008, could
take approximately six months, but other venting solutions for the reactor could be possible. Additionally,
this aging reactor may be in need of additional parts or repair… After the facilities were operating, they
could produce approximately 6 kg of plutonium per year.

Assessments of Capabilities: Uranium

While North Korea’s weapons program was plutonium-based at the start, intelligence has
emerged in showing that the country is pursuing a second route to obtaining weapons grade
fissile material using highly enriched uranium (HEU). The DPRK confirmed this in June 2009
232 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

when it announced it would commence uranium enrichment, stating “enough success has been
made in developing uranium enrichment technology to provide nuclear fuel to allow the
experimental procedure.” 676
Three months later, DPRK officials announced that experimental uranium enrichment had
entered into the “completion phase.” 677 According to the US Intelligence Community, the exact
intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical
status of the uranium enrichment program. 678
In November 2010, a visit by Dr. Hecker to Yongbyon shed additional light on the DPRK’s HEU
program. On his visit he saw “a small, recently completed, industrial-scale uranium-enrichment
facility” that appeared fully operational, though Dr. Hecker and his colleagues were unable to
confirm whether it was in fact operating at full capacity. 679
These reports were followed by press reports that the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) suspected that the DPRK had at least one additional covert centrifuge site and might
have significant additional sites. 680 These reports mean that the DPRK may have substantial
stocks of enriched uranium as well as plutonium.
At a minimum, this means the DPRK’s future production of weapons-grade material is
impossible to predict and that both targeting and arms control are far more difficult because of
the inability to predict how many dispersed centrifuge facilities the DPRK may have. However,
the DPRK is probably far from having a self-sufficient program. According to ISIS: 681
Whatever North Korea has accomplished in building centrifuges, it faces an ongoing, fundamental
problem. It is not self-sufficient in making and operating centrifuges. It acquired key equipment and
materials abroad and appears to be continuing its overseas procurements. North Korea will undoubtedly
need additional equipment and materials to build and operate large numbers of centrifuges successfully.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 233

Figure V.8: Estimates of DPRK Plutonium Production

(as of 2006)
Plutonium Discharged from 5 M We Weapon
Plutonium Separation
Reactor Equivalents*

Date Amount (kg) Date Amount (kg) (number)

Before 1990 1-10** 1989-1992 1-10 0-2

1994 27-29 2003-2004 20-28 4-7

Spring 2005 0-15 2005-2006 0-15 0-3

In core of 5 M We
5-7 -- -- --
Reactor

Total 43-61 20-53 4-13***

*It is assumed that each nuclear weapon would require 4-5 kg of separated plutonium
**This quantity includes up to 1-2 kg of plutonium produced in the IRT reactor prior to 1994 (see “Early Program”).
***The upper bound of the number of weapons is higher than the sum of the individual upper bounds, because particular
periods list more plutonium than needed to give the upper bound for that period.
Source: Kwang Ho Chun, North Korea’s Nuclear Question: Sense of Vulnerability, Defensive Motivation, and Peaceful
Solution, US Army Strategic Studies Institute, December 28, 2010, 24.

Nuclear Weapons and Warhead Developments

Despite the progress of the DPRK’s nuclear program, it is unclear whether the DPRK has
mastered the ability to efficiently and reliably weaponize a nuclear device it can deploy on a
missile. The detonation of a nuclear explosive device is a significant scientific achievement, but
creating a device that can be included in a small bomb or a missile warhead presents a number of
difficult engineering problems. 682 Theoretically, the DPRK could use an aircraft, a ship, or even
a vehicle to deliver a nuclear weapon, but these platforms are either vulnerable or unreliable.
ROK intelligence believes, however, DPRK engineers were able to make significant progress in
warhead miniaturization between 1999 and 2001, and the national defense ministry – along with
ROK experts – now believes the DPRK has warheads that can be mounted on ballistic
missiles. 683 Furthermore, ROK intelligence sources told the ICG in 2009 they believe the DPRK
has deployed nuclear warheads for Nodong missiles in the northern part of the country. 684 As
noted earlier, US intelligence experts and senior officers also indicate in 2013 and 2014,
however, that the DPRK may have reached the point where it has the technical capability to
deploy a nuclear missile warhead.
It is also unclear how reliable or safe such a warhead would be, what the risks would be if it
might malfunction, how well it could survive an accident, and whether the DPRK could predict
its operational yield in kilotons. 685
234 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The Early Program

North Korea’s strengths and weaknesses in weaponizing and deploying nuclear weapons become
clearer if one examines the full history of its efforts. The origins of the DPRK nuclear program
seem to stem from the gross insecurity felt by then-leader Kim-Il-sung following the near defeat
of his forces in the Korean War. Although nuclear weapons were never used, US political leaders
and military commanders threatened their use during the war. In February 1956, Pyongyang
signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research and began
to send scientists and technicians to the USSR for training shortly thereafter. 686
When the US deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time in 1958, the DPRK
began a rudimentary nuclear program primarily focused on basic training and research, relying
on assistance from the Soviet Union. The program trained North Korean scientists and engineers
and helped to construct basic research facilities, including a small research reactor (the IRT-
2000) in Yongbyon. 687
In the late 1960s, the DPRK expanded its educational and research institutions to support a
nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, DPRK engineers
had begun using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 reactor, and Pyongyang began
acquiring plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union.688 In July 1977, the DPRK
signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000
research reactor and a critical assembly plant in Yongbyon under IAEA safeguards. 689
In 1980, Pyongyang’s nuclear program began a period of expansion to the point that it could
produce substantial amounts of nuclear energy and weapons-grade plutonium. 690 This expansion
included uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5 MW(e) nuclear
reactor, as well as research and development institutions. 691 By the mid-1980s, Pyongyang began
construction on a 50 MW(e) nuclear power reactor in Yongbyon and expanded its uranium
processing facilities. 692
Pyongyang was also exploring the acquisition of light water power reactors (LWRs), and agreed
to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance
in the construction of four LWRs. 693 However, the DPRK refused to sign a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, an obligation under the NPT. 694
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the 1993–1994 Crisis
In September 1991, US President George H.W. Bush announced that the US would withdraw its
nuclear weapons from the ROK, and on December 18, 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae
Woo declared that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons. 695 As a result, the DPRK and ROK
signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the document,
both sides promised to “not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use
nuclear weapons,” “use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes,” and to forgo the possession
of “nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” 696
Following the signing of the Joint Declaration, the DPRK signed an IAEA safeguards agreement
on January 30, 1992. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an “initial
declaration” of its nuclear facilities and materials and allowed IAEA inspectors to verify the
completeness and correctness of the initial declaration. 697 Inspections began in May 1992 and
concluded in February 1993; however, when the IAEA requested access to two suspect nuclear
waste sites, North Korea declared them to be military sites and therefore off-limits. 698 In
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 235

response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 825 on May 11, 1993, urging the DPRK to
cooperate with the IAEA and to implement the 1991 North-South denuclearization accord. 699
Having reached a deadlock with the IAEA and facing sanctions from the UN, North Korea
announced on March 12, 1993 that it intended to withdraw from the NPT. The US responded by
holding political-level talks with the DPRK in early June 1993 that led to a joint statement
outlining the basic principles for continued US-DPRK dialogue and North Korea’s “suspending”
its withdrawal from the NPT before it became legally effective. 700 The agreement was short-
lived. Immediately following the return of IAEA inspectors to North Korea in March 1994, the
DPRK refused to allow the inspection teams to inspect a plutonium reprocessing plant at
Yongbyon, and in May 1993 the IAEA confirmed that North Korea had begun removing spent
fuel – which can be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons – from its 5 MW(e) nuclear research
reactor even though international monitors were not present. 701
Faced with renewed UN sanctions, the DPRK withdrew from the IAEA on June 13, 1994.
Although still a member of the NPT, the DPRK no longer participated in IAEA functions as a
member state and thus refused to allow inspectors to carry out their work under the Safeguards
Agreement. 702
The crisis was defused by then-former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to the DPRK in June 1994.
Four months of negotiations concluded in an Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK
on October 21, 1994. Under the agreement the US committed to arranging for the provision of a
LWR with a generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW(e) in exchange for a DPRK
“freeze” and ultimate dismantlement of its reactors and related facilities. 703 Although the accord
froze North Korea’s plutonium production facilities and placed them under IAEA monitoring,
the US estimated that the DPRK could have recovered enough plutonium for one or two nuclear
weapons before the agreement came into force. 704
The Collapse of the Agreed Framework (1994–2002)
The DPRK’s indigenous plutonium production facilities remained frozen following the
agreement, and its known plutonium stocks were subject to IAEA monitoring. The facilities
subject to the freeze were the 5 MW(e) reactor, the Radiochemical Laboratory (reprocessing),
the fuel fabrication plant, and the partially built 50 and 200 MW(e) nuclear power plants. 705 It
was during this time that the international community discovered the extent of the DPRK’s
plutonium production in the late 1980s and early 1990s. According to the American Federation
of Scientists: 706
A close examination by the IAEA of the radioactive isotope content in the nuclear waste revealed that
North Korea had extracted about 24 kilograms of Plutonium. North Korea was supposed to have produced
0.9 gram of Plutonium per megawatt every day over a 4-year period from 1987 to 1991. The 0.9 gram per
day multiplied by 365 days by 4 years and by 30 megawatts equals to 39 kilograms. When the yearly
operation ratio is presumed to be 60 percent, the actual amount was estimated at 60% of 39 kilograms, or
some 23.4 kilograms. Since 20-kiloton standard nuclear warhead has 8 kilograms of critical mass, this
amounts to mass of material of nuclear fission out of which about 3 nuclear warheads could be extracted.
Estimates vary of both the amount of plutonium in North Korea’s possession and number of nuclear
weapons that could be manufactured from the material. South Korean, Japanese, and Russian intelligence
estimates of the amount of plutonium separated, for example, are reported to be higher—7 to 22 kilograms,
16 to 24 kilograms, and 20 kilograms, respectively—than the reported US estimate of about 12 kilograms.
At least two of the estimates are said to be based on the assumption that North Korea removed fuel rods
from the 5-MW(e) reactor and subsequently reprocessed the fuel during slowdowns in the reactor’s
operations in 1990 and 1991. The variations in the estimates about the number of weapons that could be
236 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

produced from the material depend on a variety of factors, including assumptions about North Korea’s
reprocessing capabilities—advanced technology yields more material—and the amount of plutonium it
takes to make a nuclear weapon. Until January 1994, the Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that 8
kilograms would be needed to make a small nuclear weapon. Thus, the United States’ estimate of 12
kilograms could result in one to two bombs. In January 1994, however, DOE reduced the estimate of the
amount of plutonium needed to 4 kilograms—enough to make up to three bombs if the US estimate is used
and up to six bombs if the other estimates are used.
Despite the freeze, neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or
its implementation. The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards
inspections to verify Pyongyang’s past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the
delayed construction of the LWRs.
Uranium Enrichment, Six Party Talks, and the Banco Delta Asia (2002-2005)
The fact the plutonium route was partly blocked by the Agreed Framework may help explain
why Pyongyang seems to have instigated a secret program in the late 1990s to develop the means
to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium utilizing gas centrifuge technology. 707 These efforts
were brought to light in October 2002 with the announcement by the US that the DPRK had
acknowledged, in talks with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James
Kelly, a “program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.” 708
This led to the conclusion that the DPRK’s program was a violation of the Agreed Framework,
the NPT, the DPRK-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the North-South Joint Declaration on the
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 709 In November 2002 the IAEA adopted a resolution
calling upon North Korea to “clarify” its “reported uranium-enrichment program.” 710 The DPRK
rejected the resolution, saying the IAEA’s position was biased and in favor of the United
States. 711
The United States responded in December 2002 by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North
Korea subsequently retaliated on January 10, 2003 by lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities,
expelling IAEA inspectors, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT. 712 On December 26,
2002, an IAEA press release stated that North Korea had cut all IAEA seals, disrupted IAEA
surveillance equipment on its nuclear facilities and materials, and started moving fresh fuel rods
into the reactor. 713 It was reported in mid-2002 that US intelligence had found evidence of HEU
materials and/or technology transfers from Pakistan to the DPRK, in return for ballistic missile
technology. Furthermore, it was reported in 2004 that the DPRK had been part of the AQ Kahn
network, purchasing gas-centrifuge technology. 714
The US government also established the Illicit Activities Initiative, an attempt to create a parallel
track to diplomacy by increasing efforts to stop the DPRK’s international criminal activities (i.e.,
illicit weapons sales, counterfeiting, drug smuggling, etc – discussed in Chapter III). Japan cut
economic ties with the DPRK, curtailed remittances to the DPRK from the pro-DPRK ethnic
Korean population in Japan, and increased oversight and restrictions on DPRK ships ferrying
between the DPRK and Japan. However, the ROK and China did not introduce any new
sanctions, although there were reports that the PRC briefly stopped energy shipments in March
2003. 715
In terms of arms control, little progress was made following the DPRK’s withdrawal from the
NPT. In early 2003, US intelligence detected activities around Yongbyon, which indicated that
North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary
storage pond. 716 The assessment was reaffirmed in September when a DPRK Foreign Ministry
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 237

spokesman said that reprocessing of this spent fuel had been completed, providing enough
plutonium for approximately four to six nuclear devices. 717 This was confirmed in January 2004
when a delegation of invited US experts, headed by Dr. Hecker, confirmed that the canisters in
the temporary storage pond were empty. 718
In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue involving six nations – the US, ROK, DPRK, China,
Russia, and Japan – began with the aim of ending the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program;
however, little was accomplished. Throughout the Six Party Talks, DPRK officials often
expressed their preference for bilateral engagement with the US rather than the multilateral
forum. After multiple meetings spanning two years, the parties could only agree to a Statement
of Principles. 719 However, due to disagreements over light water reactors and the Banco Delta
Asia sanctions, progress on both the Statement and on further Six Party Talks stalled. 720 Figure
V.9 highlights the progress made during the Talks, while Figure V.10 summarizes the primary
agreements reached.
Throughout the talks, the DPRK had continued its plutonium reprocessing, and when the Six-
Party process stagnated April 2005, the North shut down its 5MW(e) reactor and removed the
spent fuel. 721 The reactor had been operating since February 2003, meaning that it could have
produced enough plutonium for between one and three nuclear devices in its spent fuel. 722
In 2005, the US government, via the Patriot Act, designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA; a small
Macanese bank holding DPRK accounts) as an institution of money laundering concern, based
on Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. 5318A. In the wake of this designation, the
government of Macau froze the DPRK’s accounts at the BDA, totaling approximately $25
million, an action that was quickly followed by other major international financial institutions
refusing to undertake transactions with the DPRK, apparently fearing that they could be cut off
from the US financial system. This was very effective in reducing the DPRK’s access to its
international financial accounts, but at the same time became a major source of tension in the Six
Party Talks – though positively, also contributing to DPRK concessions several years later. The
funds were returned in February 2007. 723 As to the impact of the measures, the CRS reports, 724
In addition to the issue of returning the frozen funds, some analysts claim that the BDA issue brought to the
surface lingering questions about the way the international banking community treats DPRK accounts.
Specifically, the financial effects of the BDA action were larger than expected. It caused a run on accounts
at the bank that compelled the government of Macau to take over BDA’s operations and place a temporary
halt on withdrawals. It also appears to have obstructed some legitimate North Korean financial interests, as
the BDA action caused other banks around the region, including Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese, Thai, and
Singaporean banks, to impose voluntarily more stringent regulations against North Korean account holders.
As North Korean traders and others move forward, some question whether the situation will return to
“business as usual,” “business with caution,” or remain as “no business at all.” In the case of China, a
media report indicates that the country is allowing North Koreans to open bank accounts in China to settle
business transactions in Chinese yuan. This enables them to conduct transactions in the Chinese currency.
The October 2006 Test and 2007 Accords and the Chinese Reaction
The situation continued to deteriorate throughout 2006, reaching a low point in October when
North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Following the underground test, the US Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) issued a press release stating, “Analysis of air samples collected on
October 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an
underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion
yield was less than a kiloton.” 725 North Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4 kiloton yield,
238 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

perhaps indicating that the North Korean plutonium program still had a number of technical
hurdles to overcome before it had a usable warhead. 726
In response, China “used unprecedentedly harsh language to rebuke Pyongyang for ‘flagrantly’
conducting a nuclear test in disregard of the universal opposition of the international
community;” until this point, China had only used the term “flagrantly” to condemn acts of its
adversaries. Furthermore, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which
prohibited states from transferring or providing luxury goods, heavy military equipment, or dual-
use items to the DPRK. 727
After intense diplomatic activity by the Chinese government and others involved in the Six-Party
process, the parties met again, and in February 2007 they agreed on the “Initial Actions for the
Implementation of the Joint Statement.” The DPRK agreed to abandon all its nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards in exchange for
energy assistance and a release of the DPRK’s frozen Banco Delta Asia assets. 728 After the
February 2007 agreement, Pyongyang began shutting down and sealing its main nuclear facilities
at Yongbyon under IAEA supervision. 729
Further progress was made in the Six Party Talks when the parties adopted the second “action
plan” that called on the DPRK to disable its main nuclear facilities and submit a complete and
correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by December 31, 2007. 730 While disablement
activities on the three key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon progressed (see Figure
V.11), Pyongyang failed to meet the December 31 deadline to submit its declaration. Almost six
months past the deadline, on June 26, 2008, North Korea submitted its declaration, which
indicated that North Korea had separated a total of about 30 kilograms of plutonium and used
approximately 2 kilograms for its 2006 nuclear test. 731
However, according to NTI, various media reports claimed that the declaration failed to address
the DPRK’s alleged uranium enrichment program or suspicions of its nuclear proliferation to
other countries, such as Syria. 732 Despite these issues, in return for North Korea’s declaration,
President George W. Bush rescinded the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act toward
Pyongyang and notified Congress of his intention to remove the DPRK from the list of state
sponsors of terrorism after 45 days, in accordance with US law. 733
Following the US government’s action, Pyongyang demolished the cooling tower at the
Yongbyon reactor. 734 Yet, when the 45-day period expired, the US did not carry out the de-
listing. The State Department claimed that the 45-day period was a “minimum” rather than a
deadline. 735 In response, the KCNA released a statement by the Foreign Ministry stating that
because the US had not carried out its commitment to remove the DPRK from the State
Department’s terrorism list, Pyongyang would suspend the disablement of its key nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and consider taking steps to restore them “to their original state.” 736
The next month, the DPRK asked the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance from the
reprocessing plant in Yongbyon. 737 Then in April 2009, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry
indicated that Pyongyang would withdrawal from the Six Party Talks and “would no longer be
bound” by any of its agreements, saying instead that it would “fully reprocess” the 8,000 spent
fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor in order to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons. 738 Two
days later, IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment
and left the country. 739 Although there were moves in mid-2011 to restart the process, the Six
Party Talks have been suspended since late 2008.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 239

While some see the Six Party Talks as useless, one ROK Deputy Foreign Minister has argued
that they are still helpful in dealing with the DPRK. There are actually many bilateral
relationships and working groups formed under the umbrella of the Talks that continue to this
day. Through these meetings, there is still a signaling dialogue going on with the DPRK.
Furthermore, should North Korea decide to return to the negotiating table, the Deputy Foreign
Minister believes that the Six Party Talks have a lot of merit – the intransigence of the DPRK has
been the problem, not the format of the forum. Every major regional player is involved in the
discussions, so any decision reached would have a lot of weight. Furthermore, if the Talks are
able to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue, the forum could continue as an inter-governmental or
multilevel forum for a Northeast Asian security dialogue, a framework that is currently lacking
in the region. 740

Figure V.9: Uncertain Progress in the Six Party Talks

Round Date Major Progress

First August 27-29, 2003 Formation of a consensus on denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula and the principle of peaceful
resolution through dialogue

Second February 25-28, 2004 Reaffirmation of a consensuses on Korean Peninsula

denuclearization and the principle of peaceful resolution

Third June 23-26, 2005 Formation of a consensus on the need for initial actions
for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and phased
process based on the principle of “commitment for
commitment, action for action”

Fourth Session 1 July 26 – August 7, 2005 Adoption of the September 19 Joint Statement

Session 2 September 13-19, 2005

Fifth Session 1 November 9-11, 2005 Affirmation of willingness to fully implement the
September 19 Joint Statement

Session 2 December 18-22, 2006 Reaffirmation of willingness to fully implement the

September 19 Joint Statement and agreement on taking
coordinated steps in implementation

Session 3 February 8-13, 2007 Agreement on first-phase actions for the implementation
of the September 19 Joint Statement (the February 13
Agreement)

Sixth Session 1 March 19-22, 2007 Agreement on the second-phase actions for the
implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement (the
Session 2 September 27-30, 2007 October 3 Agreement)

Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
86.
240 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.10: Key Agreements in the Six Party Talks

Agreement Key Points

Name

Joint Statement • Dismantlement of North Korea’s Nuclear Programs and Removal of North Korea’s Security
(September 19, Concerns
2005)
o North Korea committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear
programs.
o The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and
has no intention to attack or invade North Korea.
o North Korea stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other
parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject
of the provision of light water reactor to North Korea.
• Normalization of Relations
o North Korea and the United States undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist
peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations.
o North Korea and Japan undertook to take steps to normalize their relations.
• International Assistance to North Korea
o The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade
and investment.
o China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US stated their willingness to provide energy
assistance to North Korea.
o The ROK reaffirmed its proposal of July 12, 2005 concerning the provision of 2 million
kilowatts of electric power to North Korea.
• Vision for Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
o The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean
peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.
o The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in
Northeast Asia.
• Principles for Implementation
o The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned
consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for
commitment, action for action.”

Agreement on • Action Plans for Initial Phase: Within first 60 days

February 13,
2007 o North Korea will shut down and seal existing nuclear facilities, including the
reprocessing facility, and invite back IAEA inspectors.
o North Korea will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs.
o North Korea and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at moving toward full diplomatic
relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a
state-sponsor of terrorism and terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy
Act with respect to North Korea.
o North Korea and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their
relations.
o The parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000
tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
• Establishment of Five Working Groups: First WG meetings within next 30 days
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 241

o Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of North Korea-US Relations,

Normalization of North Korea-Japan Relations, Economy and Energy Cooperation,
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.
• Action Plans for Next Phase: After the completion of the initial phase
o North Korea would make a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disable all
existing nuclear facilities.
o The other parties would provide economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance
equivalent of 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
• Ministerial Meeting: After the completion of the initial phase
• Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: The directly related parties will negotiate a
permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

Agreement on • North Korea agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities by the end of year.
October 3, 2007
• North Korea agreed to declare all its nuclear programs by the end of year.
• North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or
know-how.
• The United States would begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
• The United States would advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading
with the Enemy Act with respect to North Korea.
• The United States and Japan would make sincere efforts to normalize their relations with
North Korea.
• The five parties would provide economic, energy and humanitarian assistance equivalent of
one million tons of heavy fuel oil.

Source: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012,
82.
242 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.11: Known Disablement Steps at Yongbyon

(as of January 2013)

Step Facility Status

Discharge of 8000 spent fuel rods to the 5-megawatt reactor 6400 completed as of April 2009
spent fuel pool

Removal of control rod drive mechanisms 5-megawatt reactor To be done after spent fuel removal
completed

Removal of reactor cooling loop and 5-megawatt reactor Tower demolished June 26, 2008
wooden cooling tower interior structure

Disablement of fresh fuel rods Fuel fabrication facility Not agreed to by DPRK; consultations
held Jan. 2009 with ROK on
possibility of purchase

Removal and storage of 3 uranium ore Fuel fabrication facility Completed

concentrate dissolver tanks

Removal and storage of 7 uranium Fuel fabrication facility Completed

conversion furnaces, including storage of
refractory bricks and mortar sand

Removal and storage of both metal casting Fuel fabrication facility Completed
furnaces and vacuum system, and removal
and storage of 8 machining lathes

Cut cable and remove drive mechanism Reprocessing facility Completed

associated with the receiving hot cell door

Cut two of four steam lines into Reprocessing facility Completed

reprocessing facility

Removal of the drive mechanisms for the Reprocessing facility Completed

fuel cladding shearing and slitting
machines

Removal of crane and door actuators that Reprocessing facility Completed

permit spent fuel rods to enter the
reprocessing facility

Source: Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service, February
12, 2013, 18-19.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 243

The May 2009 Test

On May 25, 2009, the DPRK issued the following statement: “The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part
of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way as requested by
its scientists and technicians.” 741 The DPRK also expelled nuclear inspectors and declared it
would “never” return to the Six Party Talks. 742 The US Intelligence Community assessed that the
DPRK probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of Punggye with an
explosion yield of approximately a few kilotons. 743
Most yield estimates were in range of 4 to 5 kilotons, but an initial Russian statement gave a
much higher estimate of 20 kilotons. 744 The test produced seismic signals characteristic of an
explosion, indicating that they were generated by human activity, but no radioactive materials
were reportedly detected, in contrast to the first test. 745
Verification technology experts such as Professor Paul Richards considered the scenario of a
bluff – the creation of a nuclear explosion-like seismic signal using conventional explosives –
but while technically possible, he stated that it was highly implausible, seeing as “several
thousand tons of conventional explosives to be fired instantaneously would have been virtually
impossible under the prevailing circumstances and would not have escaped detection.” 746 It is
generally agreed that the test suggested the DPRK had the capability to produce nuclear weapons
with a yield of roughly a couple kilotons TNT equivalent. 747
In response, China condemned the test using critical language, while a spokesperson for the
Foreign Ministry described DPRK-Chinese relations as “normal state-to-state relations” that
were similar “with any country around the world” – in contrast to its past official references to
the DPRK as a traditional ally and friend. Also, China voted in favor of UN Security Council
Resolution 1874, which tightened financial sanctions and trade restrictions on the DPRK while
also calling on all countries to inspect vessels believed to be carrying prohibited cargo, in ports
and on the high seas, and to seize and dispose of such cargo if it was identified. 748
Furthermore, in March 2010, the DPRK announced plans to construct a 25-30 MW(e) light-
water reactor, which US nuclear expert Siegfried Hecker confirmed during his November visit.
The reactor could be operational by 2014. Hecker also reported DPRK construction of a uranium
enrichment facility at Yongbyon with 2,000 P-2 centrifuges in six cascades, claimed by the
DPRK to be used for producing low-enriched uranium to fuel the light water reactor under
construction. This enrichment facility would be able to make up to 40 kg – enough for one or
two nuclear warheads – of HEU each year. 749
The Leap Day Agreement
After a series of bilateral meetings with the US beginning in the summer of 2011, on February
29, 2012, the US and the DPRK prepared for resumption of the Six Party Talks by announcing
the Leap Day Agreement. The DPRK promised to halt uranium enrichment and missile testing as
well as resume international monitoring of its nuclear sites, while the US committed to 240,000
tons of food aid, at an estimated cost of $200-250 million. The two countries released separate
statements regarding the agreement: 750
The United States announced that the two countries would hold further talks to finalize details on a
“targeted U.S. program consisting of an initial 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance with the
prospect of additional assistance based on continued need.” The U.S. statement also emphasized several
244 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

wider security issues, such as its continued commitment to the 1953 armistice agreement and desire to
increase people-to-people contacts with the DPRK.
The DPRK statement included a reference to a “discussion of issues concerning the lifting of sanctions on
the DPRK and provision of light water reactors” as priorities once the Six-Party Talks have resumed. The
United States did not include those issues in its statement, and they are likely areas of continued
disagreement between the parties. In the past, U.S. officials have not supported the lifting of sanctions until
after full denuclearization and a determination by the U.N. Security Council, and have supported only
“discussion” of light-water reactors in the 2005 Six Party statement.
During the meetings, “U.S. negotiators verbally warned their North Korean counterparts that any
missile testing, including under the guise of a peaceful satellite launch, would violate the terms
of the agreement, but this message was not received or was ignored by Pyongyang.” 751
Two and a half weeks later, on March 16, the DPRK announced it would be conducting another
satellite launch, undertaking the test the following April, while also proclaiming itself a “nuclear
armed state” and revised its constitution accordingly. The US suspended the promised food aid
and cancelled another outreach program that had planned to resume US-DPRK missions to
search for missing US soldiers’ remains from the Korean War, 752 and the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 2087 condemning the rocket launch. A further satellite test launch was
conducted in December 2012, which has been discussed previously in this report.
The February 2013 Test and Continued Tensions
After widespread speculation, the DPRK followed its December launch with a third nuclear test
on February 12, 2013. Since mid-2012, activity at the Punggye nuclear test site had given
analysts advance indication that the DPRK was likely planning another nuclear test. After the
test, the DPRK official news organ announced a “successful” underground detonation, while
seismic monitoring equipment in the vicinity registered a 5.1 magnitude earthquake with waves
similar to the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. According to the CRS, 753
The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that the test yield was between 6 and 7 kilotons. North
Korea claimed that the February 12, 2013, nuclear test was to develop a “smaller and light” warhead. At a
minimum, the test would likely contribute to North Korea’s ability to develop a warhead that could be
mounted on a long-range missile. It is unclear what impact a third nuclear test would have on future
negotiations, but it would make their success far less likely, and the UN Security Council was discussing
additional sanctions measures.
Observers are also waiting for evidence from test emissions that might show whether the North Koreans
tested a uranium or plutonium device. This information could help determine the type and sophistication of
the North Korean nuclear warhead design about which little is known. Two U.S. experts, Hecker and
Pabian, have assessed that North Korea used plutonium in both the 2006 and 2009 tests, and that without at
least one additional successful plutonium test, the North would not have confidence in its miniaturized
plutonium design. Other experts believe North Korea may choose to test highly enriched uranium-based
devices. Testing of a uranium device might indicate a clandestine supply of highly enriched uranium,
potentially from an enrichment facility in North Korea. If venting of the nuclear test site has occurred, air
samples could indicate what kind of material was used.
The earthquake magnitude of the 2006 test was 3.9, the 2009 test was 4.4, and the February 2013
test was 5.0-5.1, according to the US Geological Survey. 754 At a yield of approximately 6
kilotons, the test was larger than the first test (less than a kiloton of power) and the second test
(approximately two kilotons). However, this is small compared to other countries – for example,
China’s first three nuclear tests were measured at 22 kilotons, 35 kilotons, and 250 kilotons. 755
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 245

One Western diplomat said that Iranian scientists may have witnessed the nuclear test – indeed,
Iran may have paid the DPRK tens of millions of dollars (in Chinese currency) to gain access to
the test. 756
Moves toward Sanctions
In an immediate response, all UN Security Council members approved a press statement
condemning the test and pledging further action – setting the stage for negotiations over a fourth
round of sanctions. While Russia announced it was ready to support additional sanctions on the
DPRK’s nuclear program, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister said it would “oppose any
sanctions damaging normal trade and economic relations with North Korea.” 757
Furthermore, in a 15-0 vote on March 7, the UN Security Council passed sanctions that further
constrained DPRK trade, travel, and banking, while imploring countries to search any suspect
DPRK cargo. The vote came just hours after the DPRK, angry with the proposed resolution and
annual US-ROK joint military exercises, threatened for the first time to carry out “a pre-emptive
nuclear strike” on the ROK and the US. 758
According to UN Security Council diplomats, the latest resolution is intended to make the DPRK
sanctions regime similar to the tough sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program – which they
argue have been more effective than previous DPRK sanctions – using the Iranian sanctions used
as a model. 759 However, similar US sanctions on Iran have been judged to be ineffective, at least
in stopping Iran from nuclear development, according to US Central Command head General
James Mattis.760
One of the most important aspects of the sanctions, however, is that China participated in the
three-week drafting process – suggesting that China is losing patience with its ally. China’s
Foreign Ministry has repeatedly condemned the DPRK’s recent actions: 761
Beijing’s reaction was strong and swift. Immediately after the test, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
summoned the North Korean Ambassador and ‘lodged a solemn representation’ over the test. He said that
China ‘was strongly dissatisfied with and firmly opposed to’ the test. Chinese media carried editorials and
essays expressing frustration and opposition to the North Korean action — even the Global Times, known
for its critical stance against the west, issued an editorial arguing that China should reduce aid to North
Korea and that if Pyongyang is not happy, so be it. Pyongyang’s ill-conceived criticism of China’s
agreement to an UN resolution condemning the test further fuelled Chinese frustration with Pyongyang. It
is against this background that the debate in China has changed from one about whether China should work
with other countries to impose sanctions against North Korea to one about the kind of sanctions China
should endorse.
Conversely, Russian officials and the general public did not react sharply to the DPRK’s third
nuclear test. The US, ROK, and Japan all believe that Russia should be more proactive regarding
the DPRK nuclear issue, but for several likely reasons, Russia does not agree. One is that
Russian policy-makers do not actually think that the DPRK would ever attack Russia or use
nuclear arms against it. Russia has maintained a stable relationship with the DPRK and has never
called for regime change. Second, though missile and nuclear tests are carried out near the
DPRK-Russian border, Russia does not see these as particularly dangerous. Radiation has stayed
at normal levels, and while a missile could theoretically crash into Russia in a failed launch, the
low population density in Eastern Russia means that not much damage would be done. 762
Third, the US would not likely reduce its missile defense buildup even if the DPRK did give up
its nuclear weapons and missiles, and Russia is more worried about European-area US missile
246 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

defense. Also, Russia has not accused the DPRK of missile and nuclear trafficking, unlike other
Western countries. Finally, Russia perceives a rising “geopolitical pressure on Russia on behalf
of the United States and its allies,” according to Russian Federal Security Service chief
Alexander Bortnikov, meaning that it likely is more concerned about a potential confrontation
with the US. 763
In March 2013, the US Treasury imposed its own financial sanctions on the Foreign Trade Bank
of North Korea, the DPRK’s primary foreign exchange institution. The Treasury Undersecretary
also visited the ROK, Japan, and China to persuade the countries to adopt similar measures, in an
attempt to apply further pressure on the DPRK to disrupt their nuclear development. 764 In
addition, the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) elevated the USARPAC Commander position from
a three-star to a four-star general, because the DOD saw a war on the Korean Peninsula as
increasingly likely – in which case a four-star general would be better-equipped to lead
USARPAC forces. 765
Two weeks after the DPRK’s third nuclear test, one Chinese academic, Deng Yuwen, the deputy
editor of a respected journal published by a Party school, published an article in a British
newspaper entitled, “China should abandon North Korea.” Several other leading Chinese
academics have made similar calls. Deng wrote that the DPRK’s third nuclear test was a good
time for the PRC to re-evaluate the DPRK-PRC alliance, and there were several good reasons for
China to withdraw its support of North Korea and instead support reunification of the
Peninsula: 766
• Basing a state-to-state relationship on ideology is dangerous.
• The DPRK no longer holds much value as a geopolitical ally – especially if the US launched a
preemptive strike, with the Chinese then being obligated to respond and in turn engage the US
military.
• The DPRK will not and likely cannot reform and it cannot continue indefinitely in its current state,
so why should China keep a relationship with a country and leadership that will ultimately fail?
• The DPRK is repudiating its relationship with China. During the Korean War, hundreds of
thousands of Chinese soldiers were killed while supporting the DPRK, so China views the
bilateral relationship as cemented by this shared sacrifice. However, starting in the 1960s, the
DPRK rewrote the history of the war – and left the Chinese out. Kim Il-sung took all the credit,
and many cemeteries with Chinese soldiers’ remains were leveled.
• The DPRK could use its nuclear weapons as a means of blackmail against China. According to
one Chinese scholar, during President Clinton’s 2009 visit to the DPRK, the North Koreans
blamed China’s “selfish” strategy and American sanctions for their economic poverty. During the
same visit, Kim Jong-il also hinted that the DPRK had withdrawn from the Six Party talks in order
to gain more independence from China, and that if the US agreed to help the DPRK, North Korea
could become a strong fortress against China.
Overall, Deng concluded that the DPRK should think about abandoning the DPRK, or at least
trying to force the country to start acting more accommodating to the PRC and/or give up nuclear
weapons: 767
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons is, in part, based on the illusion that it can achieve an equal
negotiating position with the US, and thereby force Washington to compromise. But it is entirely possible
that a nuclear-armed North Korea could try to twist China’s arm if Beijing were to fail to meet its demands
or if the US were to signal goodwill towards it.
Considering these arguments, China should consider abandoning North Korea. The best way of giving up
on Pyongyang is to take the initiative to facilitate North Korea’s unification with South Korea. Bringing
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 247

about the peninsula’s unification would help undermine the strategic alliance between Washington, Tokyo
and Seoul; ease the geopolitical pressure on China from northeast Asia; and be helpful to the resolution of
the Taiwan question.
The next best thing would be to use China’s influence to cultivate a pro-Beijing government in North
Korea, to give it security assurances, push it to give up nuclear weapons and start moving towards the
development path of a normal country.
In response, Deng was given a month-long suspension from his job. Other Chinese
commentators, especially those linked to the security and military establishment, argue that
China should strengthen relations with the DPRK – and Russia – to counterbalance the US pivot
to Asia. One recent commentary in the main military newspaper, the People’s Liberation Army
Daily, argued: “The main reason why North Korea is bent on developing nuclear weapons is
basically the threat that the U.S. poses to its security.” 768
At the same time, China announced that it would not abandon the DPRK and that support of
tougher sanctions should not be interpreted to mean that China’s basic attitude was changing or
that it did not still believe that dialogue was the best way to persuade the DPRK to abandon its
nuclear weapons program. 769 In late March 2013, one state-run Chinese newspaper ran an
editorial supporting the DPRK and blaming the US for the nuclear situation on the Korean
Peninsula: 770
It is time for both sides to take a step back and let cooler minds prevail to avoid any escalation of the
situation. The US has long adopted a punishment heavy approach in dealing with ties to the DPRK. It has
imposed rounds after rounds of severe sanctions against Pyongyang… the approach has only heightened
Pyongyang’s seeds of insecurity and forced it to resort to more extreme actions to defend itself… Both the
DPRK and the US should tone down their rhetoric and work with Beijing for an early return to the long
stalled six-party talks.
There are indications that China was increasing DPRK-bound cargo inspections in the wake of
the March 2013 UN sanctions while it was setting up back-channel negotiations with the
DPRK. 771 Other reports note that prices of rice and other produce rose sharply as Chinese
customs and border control impose more stringent inspections on exports to the DPRK. A
Japanese newspaper reported that the price of rice had increased 50%, from 6,000 to 9,000 won
per kilogram. 772 It also appears that Chinese exports of rice to the DPRK dropped to zero in
January, then rebounded in February, while exports of crude oil also dropped to zero in February.
It is not clear if these are cyclical declines or signs of a changing policy in China. 773
Traders in Jilin Province, a northeastern Chinese province next to the DPRK, reported there was
no noticeable slowdown of goods passing across the border, and no crackdown on smugglers. 774
It does, however, appear that increased border controls by both the DPRK and China have
resulted in a significantly decreased number of DPRK defectors to China – compared with the
first several months of 2012, there have been approximately 57% fewer in 2013. 775 It was also
reported in early May 2013 that the state-controlled Bank of China had ended all dealings with a
key DPRK bank. Experts evaluated this move as the strongest public PRC response to the
DPRK’s continued development of its nuclear and missile programs to date. 776
Though China and Russia both supported the March 2013 UN Security Council sanctions, Russia
has very little trade with or control over the DPRK, meaning it has little influence. China has in
the past voted for sanctions against the DPRK, followed them for several months, and then
quietly returned to assisting the Kim regime. Although China has said it wanted to see “full
248 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

implementation” of the March sanctions, 777 it remains to be seen if that will happen this time
around.
Key Current Issues, Weapons Design, and Further Tensions
Decades of talks and arms control negotiations sometimes delayed the DPRK’s nuclear
programs, but scarcely stopped them. The DPRK has unfrozen its plutonium program and
instigated a highly enriched uranium program in violation of the 1991 North-South
denuclearization agreement, the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the basic tenants agreed upon in
the Six Party Talks. As a result, the value of further arms control negotiations us uncertain.
According to Dr. Christopher Ford, “there seems to be increasing agreement across the breadth
of the US policy community that there is little to be gained from further engagement.” 778
This makes an assessment of the DPRK’s progress in weapons design even more important. As
has been noted earlier, there is no way to be certain of the DPRK’s progress in weaponizing its
nuclear capabilities. Moreover, experts debate the number of nuclear weapons it could now make
and can acquire in the near term, and there are critical areas of uncertainty like its access to
Chinese designs and the level of technology sharing with Iran and Syria.
According to an ROK government report discussing DPRK nuclear and strategic weapons, 779
As early as in the 1960s, North Korea had sent its nuclear scientists to the largest nuclear research institute
in the Soviet Union, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. The number of professionals
currently working in the North Korean nuclear industry is known to be about 3,000, including over 200 top-
class experts. North Korea is also known to have about 4 million tons of uranium in recoverable deposits….
Over 300 scientists and engineers are known to have been stricken with atomic-related diseases during the
course of their work.
It is important to note that the DPRK has so far only conducted three low-yield nuclear tests – on
October 9, 2006 with a yield of less than one kiloton, one on May 25, 2009 with a yield of a few
kilotons, and a third on February 12, 2013 with a yield of approximately six kilotons (a 5.1
magnitude seismic shock in the area was reported by the US Geological Service). This compares
with a yield that would have been at least three to five times higher (20 kilotons) in an efficient
fission weapons system.
This helps explain why US officials cannot be certain whether the DPRK can weaponize its
arsenal to the point it can put low yield fission weapons on ballistic missile. 780 It also helps
explain the assumption is that Pyongyang’s current nuclear weapon designs are, or will be, based
on a first-generation implosion device, the logical choice for states in the initial stage of nuclear
weapon development. 781 Data collected from the DPRK’s May 2009 and February 2013 nuclear
tests suggest the DPRK has the capability to produce nuclear weapons with a yield of roughly
five or six kilotons TNT equivalent. 782
It also indicates that it may be years before the DPRK can develop high-yield boosted weapons
or the megaton and thermally dominated yields of fusion weapons. This is a major issue in
assessing the DPRK program where few unclassified data are available. While low-yield fission
weapon are still extremely lethal, they are very different in war-fighting lethality and deterrent
impact from a high-yield weapon and presents further substantial problems if the DPRK deploys
long-range missiles with operational accuracy that can be more in tens of kilometers than several
hundred meters.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 249

Miniaturization
Most experts estimate that the primary objective of the DPRK’s nuclear program’s is to develop
a nuclear warhead capable of being mounted on intermediate- and long-range missiles. This
would require miniaturization – making the nuclear warhead small enough to be mounted on a
missile – and would likely require further missile and nuclear tests. Most experts believe that the
DPRK has not yet achieved miniaturization of its nuclear arsenal. However, it has been reported
that the DPRK received materials/assistance from the AQ Khan network, potentially providing
the DPRK with a Chinese HEU-based nuclear weapon design that could help the DPRK create a
reliable ballistic missile warhead – robust, small, and light.
The assessment by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 2013, made “with moderate
confidence, that the DPRK had nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missile” – was
qualified by the statement that the weapon would have “low reliability.” It is imp0ortant to note,
however, that it later became clear that the DIA had been making somewhat similar assessments
since 2005. As noted earlier, DNI James R. Clapper issued a statement that the DIA assessment
did not reflect consensus of the US intelligence community, commenting, “North Korea has not
yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile.” Secretary
of State John Kerry responded similarly, and the Obama Administration downplayed the report.
Accordingly the October 2014 statement by General Curtis Scaparrottii, commander of US
Forces Korea, that North Korea “has had the right connections and technology” to develop a
miniaturized nuclear weapon that could be launched by a missile is significant. The general
stated: 783
I think given their technological capabilities, the time that they been working on this, that they probably
have the capabilities to put this together. I don’t believe that they have. I don’t know that they have at this
point.
These are important qualifications. Even if the DPRK has the necessary technology, the
reliability and yield of a miniaturized North Korean nuclear weapon will be in question until it is
actually tested.
Fuels – Plutonium and the Potential for Uranium
There has also been speculation about whether – and how soon -- the DPRK can create bombs
using uranium. Scientists believe that first two nuclear tests conducted used bombs made of
plutonium, although no radioactive gas signatures were able to be collected after the second test.
In a CSIS assessment, Victor Cha and Ellen Kim commented, 784
A uranium-fueled test would suggest several disturbing new problems in the effort to denuclearize North
Korea. First, it would mean that the DPRK has not one, but two ways to make a bomb which doubles the
problem. Second, highly enriched uranium is much easier to hide than plutonium. It can be made in [sic]
from centrifuges operating in buildings the size of a warehouse unlike the big and easily identifiable
footprint of a plutonium nuclear plant facility. Third, the North can potentially produce a lot more uranium
than it can plutonium and proliferate horizontally to others (like Iran) who may not need to test a device
and feel confident that it has acquired a working device. Moreover, if this is proven to be a test of a
miniaturized device as the North claims, then they will have crossed another technological threshold in
[making] a nuclear warhead with a long-range ballistic missile that could threaten U.S. security and that of
its allies. Basically, none of this is good at all.
As mentioned, the DPRK displayed uranium reprocessing facilities to Dr. Hecker in 2010,
claiming it had the ability to convert plutonium reactor rods into uranium. According to the CRS,
the DPRK has 785
250 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

…industrial-scale uranium mining and plants for milling, refining, and converting uranium; it also has a
fuel fabrication plant, a nuclear reactor, and a reprocessing plant – in short, everything needed to produce
Pu-239/ It has recently been built a uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon that could produce HEU for
weapons, or LE7U reactor fuel which could be irradiated for plutonium production. In its earlier 5 MWe
nuclear reactor, North Korea used magnox fuel – natural uranium (>99%U-238) metal, wrapped in
magnesium-alloy cladding to produce plutonium for weapons. About 8,000 fuel rods constitute a fuel core
for the reactor.
Although the DPRK has announced it had finished reprocessing these 8,000 fuel rods, it is
technically possible that the third nuclear test in February 2013 was of a uranium weapon. Like
the second nuclear test, sensors were unable to pick up any gas radioactive gas signatures after
the test, so no open-source information is available regarding whether the third test was of a
plutonium or uranium weapon.
While the UN’s Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization announced on April 23,
2013 that it had detected traces of radioactive materials from the February 2013 test, giving the
first conclusive evidence that the test was of a nuclear weapon – and not just a large amount of
conventional explosives – it remains unclear what type of fuel was used. 786 One ROK analyst at
a government-sponsored think tank, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, wrote that “it is more
likely that North Korea detonated HEU-based nuclear weapons in the third nuclear test.” 787
In addition to the 8,000 claimed reprocessed fuel rods, the DPRK still has 2,400 5-MWt and
12,000 50-MWt fresh fuel rods stored at Yongbyon. 788 It is also assessed that, if the February
2013 test was a plutonium weapon, the DPRK has used up a significant amount of their available
plutonium, and would thus need to produce more or make sure its uranium enrichment programs
were working.
Early 2013 Escalation
The DPRK’s reported expansion of its facility at Yongbyon in 2013 needs to be put in a broader
context. In late January 2013, the DPRK proclaimed the 1992 Joint Declaration on
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to be null and invalid.789 In late February, the chief
delegate of the DPRK military mission to the DMZ (Panmunjom mission), Pak Rim-su, in a rare
direct message to USFK Commander General James Thurman, warned that, “If your side ignites
a war of aggression by staging the reckless joint military exercises… at this dangerous time,
from that moment your fate will be hung by a thread with every hour” and that US forces would
“meet a miserable destruction.” 790
In early March 2013, the DPRK said the 1953 Korean War armistice was null and void and that
it would also cut off the DPRK-USFK hotline, with the DPRK Foreign Ministry announcing that
a “second Korean War is unavoidable.” 791 The two sides normally speak twice a day during the
week on the hotline, which was established in 1971. 792 The DPRK has also shut down the Red
Cross hot lines with the ROK, and it decided in late March to further cut off military hot lines
with the ROK – although it was reported that one dialogue channel, a hotline between civil
aviation authorities, still remained. 793
Citizens in the DPRK were seen covering up buses and trains with camouflage in an attempt to
be ready for war, while some citizens were evacuated into tunnels with emergency provisions. 794
Kim Jong-un continued his visits to DPRK military installations and commented, “Once an order
is issued, you should break the waists of the crazy enemies, totally cut their windpipes and thus
clearly show them what a real war is like.” 795 On March 30, the DPRK proclaimed it had entered
“a state of war” with the ROK. 796
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 251

At the same time, the DPRK announced that it would “exercise the right to a preemptive attack”
if US-ROK military exercises went ahead. 797 The three-star general and Vice Defense Minister
of the DPRK, Kang Pyo-yong, also claimed, “With their targets set, our intercontinental ballistic
missiles and other missiles are on a standby, loaded with lighter, smaller, and diversified nuclear
warheads… If we push the button, they will blast off and their barrage will turn Washington, the
stronghold of American imperialists and the nest of evil, and its followers, into a sea of fire.” 798
The DPRK also declared a no-fly, no-sail zone off of its costs – suggesting possible short-range
rocket testing 799 – and the DPRK army “ratified” a potential “diversified nuclear strike” against
the US. 800
The DPRK argued that the armistice was a military document, not a peace treaty. DPRK state
media further argued that the country had made repeated demands for peace talks since the
1970s, only to be rebuffed by the US – further justifying a unilateral nullification of the
armistice. However, the armistice states that any change must be agreed to by all signers, and
that unilateral declarations are unacceptable. 801
This was the seventh time the DPRK had said it would nullify the armistice. 802 The DPRK has
also cut off, and later restored, the military hotline at least six times in the past when it wanted to
raise tensions. The DPRK last cut off all military hotlines during US-ROK military drills in
2009. 803 In fact, the ROK and DPRK have together formally accused each other of more than 1.2
million armistice violations: 804
Since the end of the war, South Korea has accused North Korea repeatedly of violating the armistice by
sending armed spies across the border, infiltrating submarines in South Korean waters, kidnapping
hundreds of South Korean fishermen and still holding them there and launching an artillery attack on a
South Korea island in 2010 that killed four people. Thousands of men from both sides, including many
American soldiers, are believed to have died or remain missing,
As of the mid-1990s, North Korea had violated the truce 420,000 times, according to American and South
Korean military data. North Korea alleged more violations by its enemies; until recently it has routinely
accused them of sending spy planes into its airspace and bringing heavier weapons into the Demilitarized
Zone along the border than allowed.
At the same time, the DPRK announced, “If they think we have acquired our nuclear weapons to
trade them for some economic benefits, it will be nothing but an utterly absurd miscalculation…
as long as the United States does not abandon its hostile policy, we have no intention of talking
with it, and we will stick fast to our course under ‘songun.’” This is in contrast to its until-
recently stated ultimate goal of ridding the Korean Peninsula of all nuclear weapons. 805 In
response, the US has announced on multiple occasions that the US would not accept the DPRK
as a nuclear state. 806
Further DPRK-ROK-US Tensions
While initial reports indicated no sign of imminent DPRK military action accompanying the
February 2013 nuclear test, by March 29, extra troop and vehicle movements at the DPRK’s
mid- and long-range missile sites were reported in the South Korean news. On March 28, the US
had flown two radar-evading B-2 spirit bombers over South Korea, flying from the US and back,
dropping inert munitions as a practice run in the South for the first time.
The following day, the DPRK put its missile units on standby to attack US military bases, with
Kim Jong-un reportedly signing a plan to technically prepare the country’s strategic rockets to be
on standby. In previous periods of US-ROK joint military exercises, the DPRK has similarly put
252 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

its military on highest readiness to fight, and Kim Jong-un has also previously given “final
orders” for the DPRK military to wage revolutionary war with the ROK. 807
At the end of March, the DPRK announced a “new strategic line” to build both its nuclear
arsenal and its economy simultaneously – because a growing nuclear deterrent would allow the
DPRK to reduce military spending and invest more resources into light industries and the
agricultural sector. In order to promote the new guidelines, the Central Committee of the ruling
Workers’ Party met for the first time since 1993, with Kim Jong-un presiding; the next day the
Supreme People’s Assembly – the DPRK’s rubber-stamp Parliament – was expected to follow
up and pass the guidelines. 808
In early April 2013, the DPRK passed a decree at the 7th session of the 12th Supreme People’s
Assembly on “further consolidation of the self-defense nuclear power status.” 809 The North also
announced that, as part of a plan to put all of its nuclear facilities to use in expanding its nuclear
arsenal, it would restart its plutonium reactor at Yongbyon, the cooling tower of which had been
destroyed pursuant to the Six Party Talks in 2007 – and continue construction on other reactors.
The DPRK also cited the need to generate more electricity as a motivation for its actions.
Siegfried Hecker noted that it could take six months to a year for the DPRK to restart the aging
plutonium reactor, and another three years to reprocess and extract enough fissile material for
more weapons. Hecker has stated that the DPRK could do so without needing foreign materials
or equipment, and, once operational, could produce 6 kg of plutonium per year. 810
Simultaneously, the US reported that an Aegis-class warship had been moved to the ROK’s
southwest coast, and an SBX-1 sea-based radar platform was being moved to the western Pacific
to monitor the DPRK as well. 811
In addition, the DPRK moved what appeared to be two Musudan missiles (unveiled in 2010 but
not yet tested) and seven mobile launchers to its east coast in early April, and a ROK military
source noted on April 21, 2013 that satellite images showed that the DPRK had moved an
additional two short-range Scud mobile missile launchers to South Hamgyeong Province (also on
the east coast). These missiles appeared to have been removed by early May 2013. 812
In response to the Musudan missiles on the east coast, Japan deployed ballistic missile
interceptors near Tokyo. 813 The US repositioned two Aegis missile destroyers – the John McCain
and the Decatur – in waters near the Korean Peninsula, and announced it would deploy a second
TPY-2 missile-defense tracking radar in Japan, 814 along with the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system – a land-based missile defense system that includes a truck-mounted
launcher, a component of interceptor missiles, an AN/TPY-2 tracking radar, and an integrated
fire control system – to Guam within the next several weeks. 815
The US deployed B-2 and B-52 planes, both with nuclear capabilities, over the ROK, and used
F-22s in drills with the ROK. 816 On April 10, ROK-US combined forces raised their alert level to
Watchcon 2 to increase surveillance monitoring, while the ROK had raised its alert level to “vital
threat,” as it appeared that at least one of the Musudan missiles was fuelled and ready for
launch. 817
The US also announced that it would deploy additional ballistic missile interceptors in California
and Alaska, increasing the number of ground-based interceptors from 30 to 44 at a cost of just
under $1 billion. While the system has only been successful in 50% of tests, the weapons send a
signal of credible deterrence, showed the ROK and Japan that the US remained committed, and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 253

also warned Beijing to restrain the DPRK or face an expanding US military focus in the Asian-
Pacific region; according to one senior government official, “We want to make it clear that
there’s a price to be paid for letting the North Koreans stay on the current path.” The missiles
could also be used to deter Iran. 818 At the same time, in an attempt to avoid misperception by the
DPRK, a long-scheduled test of Minuteman-3 ICBMs was delayed. 819
Several foreign companies operating in the ROK announced they were considering contingency
plans for their employees’ safety, 820 while the ROK stock market was negatively affected by the
growing tension on the Peninsula. One expert noted that the DPRK was attempting to use
extreme propaganda to damage foreign direct investments in South Korea, a type of
asymmetrical psychological warfare attack on the ROK’s economic strength. 821 While on a visit
to China, Secretary of State John Kerry attempted to garner increased Chinese support of the US
position towards the DPRK – meaning, a reduction in Chinese support of the North – and
reportedly offered to reduce US missile defense in the Asia-Pacific if the DPRK abandoned its
nuclear program. 822
However, in early 2015 the US made it increasingly clear to the ROK that it should install the
THAAD system as a deterrent to the DPRK’s missile threats. This issue brought increased
tension between Seoul and Beijing because China worries that the THAAD system would
compromise its own strategic deterrent capabilities by having US radar sensors extend deeper
into Chinese territories. 823
Future Nuclear Capabilities Projections
On February 26, 2015, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a
report by David Albright that analyzed estimated inventories of separated plutonium and
weapons-grade uranium to forecast three possible scenarios of DPRK’s future nuclear arsenal
through 2020. He drew from previous assessments of possible stockpiles and analyzed current
construction of facilities and reactors, the evolution of recent nuclear weaponization efforts, and
Kim Jong-un’s stance on nuclear weapons development – among other factors – to provide the
following projections: 824
Over the next several years, North Korea could pursue quantitative and qualitative improvements in its
nuclear weapons stockpile. This section lays out a set of projections through 2020 that capture the
boundaries of North Korea’s possible nuclear arsenal futures.
Regardless of the specific projections, North Korea is expected to continue developing its nuclear weapons
capabilities. At the March 31, 2013 plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Jong Un said that
North Korea “should increase the production of precision and miniaturized nuclear weapons and the means
of their delivery and ceaselessly develop nuclear weapons technology to actively develop more powerful
and advanced nuclear weapons.” He implied in this speech that North Korea would seek more precise
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles able to reach the United States.
In this context, North Korea’s nuclear program may focus on:
• Increasing production of fissile material and the size of its overall stockpile;
• Conducting more nuclear tests;
• Increasing the explosive yield of its nuclear weapons, including more advanced designs using composite
cores or thermonuclear materials to achieve higher yields;
• Achieving additional miniaturization of warheads without sacrificing yield;
• Reducing the amount of plutonium or WGU needed in a nuclear weapon;
254 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

• Increasing the safety, security, and reliability of its nuclear weapons although it is highly unlikely to
achieve the levels, for example, in the US arsenal;
• Continuing seeking a range of goods abroad for its nuclear programs, including classified and proprietary
information; and
• Increasing level of self-sufficiency in order to avoid restrictions imposed by sanctions and export
controls.
Key factors that will affect their ability to make these improvements are:
• Level of political and economic commitment;
• Overcoming technical barriers; and
• Level of foreign assistance.
Three projections through 2020 are developed in this section:
• Low-End Projection through 2020: Progress is slow as economic and technical constraints are
numerous (including no further nuclear tests); difficulties are encountered in advancing current nuclear
efforts and the North’s political commitment wanes.
• Medium Projection through 2020: This projection assumes moderate growth based on a continuation of
its current nuclear trajectory and development practices as well as political and economic commitment.
The program is a mixture of successes and failures. Efforts to acquire technology/assistance from abroad
make slow progress as does Pyongyang’s effort to achieve self-sufficiency.
• High-End Projection through 2020: The general assumption underlying this projection is that nuclear
weapons progress is steady and successful. North Korea steps up its commitment to build a nuclear
arsenal, vigorously pursues technology development through, in part, increasing the number of nuclear
tests and faces few economic constraints. Pyongyang also achieves a high level of success in acquiring
technology/assistance from abroad as well as in achieving self-sufficiency.
Low-End Projection through 2020
North Korea’s production of fissile material is limited to the 5 MWe reactor and centrifuge plant at
Yongbyon. It either does not or cannot militarize the ELWR to make weapons-grade plutonium. The
centrifuge plant is limited to 3,000-4,000 P2-type centrifuges, and North Korea does not deploy any more
advanced than the P2-type. Moreover, the North will need to produce LEU for the ELWR. The centrifuges
operate with poor efficiency, as they have done up through 2014. The 5 MWe reactor will experience
outages and poor operational efficiencies, limiting production to an average of 2-3 kg per year of weapons-
grade plutonium.
In this scenario, Pyongyang does not conduct any further nuclear tests. Nonetheless, it would make limited
advances in its nuclear weapons skills and designs, such as achieving some additional miniaturization of
warheads without sacrificing the explosive yield. However, the North would not be able to reduce the
amount of plutonium or WGU needed in a nuclear weapon. Marginal improvements would be made in the
safety, security and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Finally, without testing there would be limits to
developing more advanced weapons. The North would be limited in using shells of fissile material or other
shapes for the core that would permit significant additional miniaturization. It would be unable to develop
boosted or thermonuclear weapons as well as a reliable source of tritium for thermonuclear devices.
North Korea’s arsenal would be limited to fission-only weapons made from either plutonium or WGU. The
explosive yields would not be high, likely on order of 10 kilotons. Its arsenal would involve a small number
of weapon designs, or physics packages, and they would be adapted to various delivery systems, such as
the Nodong and possibly longer-range missiles.
While Pyongyang will require foreign goods for its various nuclear programs, such as vacuum equipment,
pumps, instrumentation, sophisticated computer-numerical control (CNC) machine tools and specialized
chemicals and metals, it will experience difficulty procuring them. These procurement challenges will
reduce the efficiency of its centrifuges and 5 MWe reactor. Moreover, the North will not succeed in
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 255

procuring nuclear weapons data or designs overseas that would help further modernize its stockpile. Any
nuclear cooperation with other countries—such as Iran—would be minimal and achieve few results.
Low-End Nuclear Arsenal. By 2020, North Korea would modestly increase the size of its nuclear arsenal,
which would be comprised of fission weapons with explosive yields of about 10 kilotons. Miniaturization
would allow the North to mount nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles but limited to existing types like the
Nodong and a Taepodong deployed as an ICBM. Each weapon would be made from either separated
plutonium or weapons-grade uranium. The stockpile would not include any composite cores or
thermonuclear nuclear weapons.
To derive the total amounts of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium through 2020, the amounts of
plutonium and weapons-grade uranium produced through 2014 under Scenario 2 (one centrifuge plant) are
added to the values from the period 2015-2020, where the assumptions above are used to derive inventories
in the latter period with the Crystal Ball™ software.
The median of the total plutonium estimates through 2020 is 50 kg with a standard deviation of 2 kg. The
median of the WGU estimate through 2020 is 280 kg with a standard deviation of 60 kg. Assuming that
each weapon contains either plutonium or WGU, the median of the number of nuclear weapon equivalents
is 29 with a standard deviation of 5. About half of these weapons contain plutonium and half contain WGU.
From 2014 through 2020, the number of weapon equivalents grows at an average rate of about 2.3 weapons
equivalent per year.
Only a percentage of plutonium and WGU is used in the actual weapons—some will be tied up in the
manufacturing process, lost to waste, or held in a reserve. In the low-end projection, with about 70 percent
of the plutonium and WGU used in the weapons, the DPRK’s total arsenal will consist of approximately 20
fission nuclear weapons at the end of 2020.
Medium Projection through 2020
North Korea operates the 5 MWe reactor reasonably well, producing an average of about 3-4 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium per year. The ELWR is partially militarized and makes a moderate amount of
weapons-grade plutonium—5 to 10 kg—each year. The plutonium from the ELWR will become available
starting in 2018.
North Korea operates two centrifuge plants limited to a total of 6,000-7,000 P2-type centrifuges throughout
this period. Moreover, the Yongbyon plant will need to produce LEU for the ELWR. The centrifuges will
continue to work with relatively poor efficiency, but better than in the low-end projection. North Korea will
conduct development work on a centrifuge similar to the Pakistani P3-type centrifuge, which has four
maraging steel segments and three bellows, giving an output double the P2-type centrifuge. Nonetheless,
during this period the North does not deploy any advanced centrifuges.
In this scenario, North Korea conducts nuclear tests at its current rate of about one every 3-4 years.
Advances are made in nuclear weapons development skills and designs, such as achieving additional
miniaturization of warheads without sacrificing explosive yield. The North makes progress in using shells
of fissile material instead of solid core designs and developing non-spherical shapes of the plutonium or
WGU core, allowing further miniaturization. However, it does not reduce the amount of plutonium or
WGU needed in a weapon. Improvements are also achieved in the safety, security and reliability of the
North’s stockpile.
The North develops and deploys an additional weapon design that contains plutonium and weapons-grade
uranium in the same core, allowing a significant increase in the weapon’s explosive yield up to 50 kilotons.
Fission weapons with either plutonium or weapons-grade uranium will remain the majority of its stockpile.
However, their yields are larger on average, in the range of 10-20 kilotons, another benefit of continued
nuclear testing and advances in design skills.
By the end of 2020, advances in miniaturization will result in a stockpile of warheads that can be deployed
on missiles of various ranges beyond those in the low-end projection, including shorter-range ballistic
missiles for battlefield use or more modern intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ICBMs such
as the Musudan and KN-08 road-mobile missiles.
256 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

In addition, Pyongyang will develop a more advanced nuclear weapon design although it will not be fully
tested or deployed by 2020. It will develop a reliable but small source of tritium and deuterium. Both could
be used to boost the explosive yield of a fission weapon and to achieve a one-stage thermonuclear weapon,
which uses tritium, deuterium and lithium within a composite core of plutonium and weapons-grade
uranium. The North will be able to test these designs, likely with a reduced yield because of test site
limitations.
North Korea will continue to require foreign goods for its various nuclear programs but will experience
only mixed success in procuring them. Progress will be made in producing some key materials and
equipment domestically. Nonetheless, overseas procurement failures will reduce the efficiency of its
centrifuges, reactors, and nuclear weapons program, but not as severely as in the low-end projection. While
the North will not succeed in procuring nuclear weapons data or designs overseas, it will benefit from
limited nuclear cooperation with Iran, which will aid Pyongyang’s centrifuge program and procurement
efforts.
Medium Nuclear Arsenal. By 2020, North Korea would increase the size of its nuclear arsenal several
fold. The arsenal would consist of mostly fission weapons with explosive yields of about 10-20 kilotons.
Several will have composite cores. These weapons could be mounted on a wide range of delivery systems.
The total amounts of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium is based on the amount of plutonium and
weapons-grade uranium produced through 2014 under Scenario 1 (two centrifuge plants) added to the
values from the period 2015-2020, where the assumptions above are used to derive inventories in the latter
period with Crystal Ball™ software. The median of the total plutonium estimates through 2020 is 80 kg
with a standard deviation of 5 kg. The median of the WGU estimate through 2020 is 790 kg with a standard
deviation of 105 kg. Assuming that each weapon contains either plutonium or WGU, the median of the
number of nuclear weapon equivalents is 69 with a standard deviation of 8. About one-third of these
weapons contain plutonium and two-thirds contain WGU. From 2014 through 2020, the number of weapon
equivalents grows at an average rate of almost eight weapons equivalent per year.
In this scenario, less fissile material is assumed to be tied up in-process or lost in waste than in the low-end
estimate. In addition, some of the plutonium and WGU will be in nuclear weapons composite cores (say <5
weapons), reducing the total number of weapons as derived above, where each weapon is assumed to
contain only plutonium or WGU. On balance, in the medium projection, the number of nuclear weapons is
assumed to be about 75 percent of the nuclear weapons equivalent, giving an arsenal of about 50 nuclear
weapons.
High-End Projection through 2020
In this projection, North Korea operates the 5 MWe reactor efficiently, making use of overseas
procurements that allow an increase in reactor power to 25 MWth and effective maintenance. The result is
an average production of about 5-6 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year. Pyongyang militarizes the
ELWR, enabling it to produce more weapons-grade plutonium than in the previous scenario, 15-20 kg each
year. Also, the plutonium would become available two years earlier, starting in early 2016.
North Korea will operate two centrifuge plants with a combined 8,000-9,000 P2-type centrifuges. One will
be the Yongbyon centrifuge plant with a capacity of 4,000 P2-type centrifuges starting at the beginning of
2015. The other will be an upgraded centrifuge plant at another ___location containing 4,000-5,000 P2-type
centrifuges operating at this level in early 2015. As before, the Yongbyon centrifuge plant will need to
produce LEU for the ELWR. The reactor will achieve higher capacity factors than in the medium scenario.
The centrifuges will work with better efficiency than in the previous projections. Moreover, the North will
complete development work on a new centrifuge similar to the Pakistani P3-type, with an output that is
double that of the P2-type centrifuge. The first 2,000 P3-type centrifuges will become operational at the
start of 2019. These centrifuges will be in addition to 8,000-9,000 P2-type centrifuges already in operation.
Under this scenario, nuclear weapons tests are increased to a rate of one per year enabling the North to
make significant advances in its nuclear weapons skills and designs. It develops smaller diameter, lighter-
weight nuclear weapons able to fit an increasing variety of shorter range missiles for battlefield use.
Pyongyang is able to make further reductions in the amount of plutonium and WGU used in a nuclear
weapon. It makes significant improvements in the safety, security and reliability of its nuclear weapons,
allowing nuclear weapons to be deployed more easily.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 257

As in the medium scenario, additional designs that contain plutonium and weapons-grade uranium in the
same core are developed and deployed, allowing a significant increase in explosive yield up to 50 kilotons.
The North also continues to field weapons with either plutonium or weapons-grade uranium, as in the two
other projections. But in the high-end scenario, it increases the average yield of its fission weapons to 20 or
more kilotons.
While developing a reliable source of tritium and deuterium for nuclear weapons development, the North
makes significant progress in using both to boost the explosive yield of a fission weapon. A new boosted
yield design is tested and incorporated into a significant number of composite core weapons although the
bulk of the stockpile remains centered on weapons using either plutonium or uranium.
Pyongyang also develops a one-stage thermonuclear weapon, which uses tritium, deuterium and lithium
within a composite core of plutonium and large quantities of weapons-grade uranium. One such device is
tested by 2020, with a yield of about 100 kilotons. However, this one-stage weapon is too large for missile
delivery, but North Korea is aiming to make it deployable as soon as possible. Work is done on designing
and developing a two-stage thermonuclear weapon but not tested by 2020.
North Korea will be very successful in procuring foreign goods for its various nuclear programs and will
achieve greater self-sufficiency in making key materials and equipment domestically. Procurements,
whether domestic or abroad, will be adequate and not interfere with the programs’ progress. Moreover,
Pyongyang will succeed in procuring nuclear weapons data and an advanced weapon design overseas,
making an important contribution to speeding up the North’s nuclear weapons developments. It cooperates
actively with Iran on all nuclear areas, reducing inefficiencies in facilities and bottlenecks in procurements.
High-End Nuclear Arsenal
By 2020, North Korea would increase the size of its nuclear arsenal many fold. The arsenal would still
consist of mostly fission weapons but the explosive yields would average 20 kilotons or more, which is
greater than in the medium estimate. Several will have composite cores and North Korea will be working to
deploy one-stage thermonuclear weapons with yields of about 100 kilotons. With the exception of
thermonuclear weapons, the North’s arsenal could be mounted on a wide range of delivery systems from
short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to the newer road-mobile Musudan IRBM to possibly the KN-08
ICBM currently under development.
To derive the total amounts of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium through 2020, plutonium and
weapons-grade uranium produced through 2014 under Scenario 1 (two centrifuge plants) are added to the
values from the period 2015-2020, where the above assumptions are used to calculate inventories in the
latter period. The median of the total plutonium estimates through 2020 is 154 kg with a standard deviation
of 8 kg. The median of the WGU estimate through 2020 is 1,230 kg with a standard deviation of about 110
kg. Assuming that each weapon contains either plutonium or WGU, the median of the number of nuclear
weapon equivalents is about 125 with a standard deviation of 13. About 40 percent of these weapons
contain plutonium and 60 percent contain WGU. From 2014 through 2020, the number of weapon
equivalents grows at an average rate of about 17 per year.
In this projection, much less fissile material is assumed to be tied up in-process, lost to waste, or held in
reserve than in the medium scenario. However, a couple factors reduce the number of weapons made from
plutonium and WGU. An increased number of composite cores, namely 5-10, will contain plutonium and
WGU, and one test of a single-stage thermonuclear device will have used several tens of kg of WGU. On
balance, the number of nuclear weapons is taken as 80 percent of the nuclear weapons equivalent. The end
result is an arsenal of about 100 nuclear weapons.
It is highly uncertain what the DPRK’s nuclear weapons posture will look like in five years, but
David Albright’s assessment provides a spectrum of possibilities that would give a greater
chance of predicting its nuclear arsenal in the coming decade. While an assessment of
Pyongyang’s push for improved nuclear technology and weaponization could be seen as part of
its overall escalated rhetoric, it is important to note that such a capability could be used on
various delivery systems and pose a significant threat to the ROK and Japan. 825
258 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Halting Operations at the ROK-DPRK Joint Industrial Complex at

Kaesong
On April 3, 2013, the DPRK shut down the ROK-DPRK joint industrial complex at Kaesong,
followed shortly thereafter by a pull-out of 53,000 workers. It blocked border traffic three times
before – in 2009 – the longest of which was for three days; 826 the April 2013 closing has been
the longest period since the facility was first installed. The factories in Kaesong produced
approximately $470 million annually in textiles and other labor-intensive products. 827 A basic
map of Kaesong’s ___location can be seen in Figure V.12.
However, there reportedly was friction within the DPRK’s ruling elite over the decision, with the
military demanding an immediate shut-down of the complex and some Workers’ Party officials
arguing instead that a shutdown would affect 50,000 DPRK workers’ livelihoods, as well as their
200,000 family members. If the complex closes permanently, the total loss to ROK business
owners, the ROK government, and investors would be approximately $5.3 billion. 828 North
Korea, which makes approximately $2 billion annually in trade due to the complex ($90 million
in wages alone), 829 remarked in its state-run press, 830
But the puppet group of south Korea, its dutiful media and hack writers are saying that “the north does not
take up the issue of the zone because it is a source for its foreign currency income” and talking about “two
faces of the north”. They are even insulting the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK.
It is an extremely unusual thing that the Kaesong Industrial Zone is still inexistence under the rave situation
in which the north-south relations have plunged into a deadlock and the Korean Peninsula is on the verge of
a war due to the U.S. and the south Korean warmongers’ vicious moves for igniting a nuclear war against
the DPRK
Under the situation, the South Korean puppet forces are left with no face to make complaint even though
we ban the south sides’ personnel’s entry into the zone and close it.
But we have exercised self-restraint, taking into consideration that the closure of the zone on which the
livelihood of small and medium businesses of south Korea hinge can leave those businesses bankrupt and
lots of people jobless. In fact, it is the puppet group and small and medium businesses of south Korea, not
the DPRK, which benefit from the zone.
By the middle of April 2013, the 123 ROK companies that had operations at Kaesong were
beginning to feel the effects. Several companies reported that their foreign business partners had
cancelled contracts and asked for their investments to be returned, while others indicated they
might move their factories to China. 831 On April 24, ROK President Park Geun-hye announced a
financial aid package of $8 billion in special loans and $14.3 million in bank loans with
government-assisted postponed repayments. Two weeks later, this was enlarged to a $270
million emergency loan fund. The companies would also receive tax relief and unemployment
allowances if they had to lay off workers because of the Kaesong troubles. 832
Two days later, the ROK announced it would pull out the remaining 175 factory managers from
Kaesong, hours after the DPRK rejected the ROK’s proposal for talks about the future of the
Kaesong Complex despite the ROK’s threat of a “grave measure” if its proposal was rejected.
President Park reportedly told her cabinet that she had no intention of “waiting forever” for the
DPRK to change its mind about the industrial complex. One DPRK analyst stated that the DPRK
was likely to confiscate the assets of the ROK companies in Kaesong – which had happened after
operations at the joint tourism resort on Diamond Mountain were suspended in 2008 following
the fatal shooting of a 53-year-old ROK tourist. The ROK’s Unification Minister warned the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 259

DPRK not to seize ROK assets at Kaesong, which had cost the ROK almost $1 billion to build
after an agreement was reached in 2000 to begin the project. 833
The ROK’s decision to evacuate Kaesong was fully supported by the US, but criticized by
Chinese media. The PRC’s official Xinhua News Agency ran an article asserting that a total
shutdown would cost the ROK $1 trillion annually, while the DPRK would lose $87 million per
year – and the livelihoods of the 300,000 people living there would be directly affected. 834 While
the DPRK attempted to tell the residents of the city that the shutdown was temporary, it was
reported that workers – who had been earning $134 monthly – and residents were increasingly
discontent and voicing their complaints. 835
Experts in the ROK believe that the DPRK was trying to pressure the ROK over Kaesong as a
way to avoid dialogue, but that the move backfired due to President Park’s strong response. The
DPRK was judged to be likely to “await a pretext to revive the Kaesong complex depending on
the situation, such as a special envoy from China or improvement in relations with Washington,”
according to one ROK-based expert. 836
On April 23, several days after hundreds of leaflets supporting the DPRK and threatening ROK
Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin were distributed near the Defense Ministry, Kim received a
letter containing a suspicious white powder – which was concluded to be wheat flour – and a
leaflet in the mail. The leaflet threatened to “punish” Kim if he dared to challenge the DPRK’s
“highest dignity” and instigate war on the Korean Peninsula. The Minister is known for his tough
stance on the DPRK and has often promised to respond harshly to any provocation; in turn, the
DPRK’s state media has called him a “war maniac,” a “traitor,” and published pictures of DPRK
soldiers shooting paper targets with his likeness. Although it is unclear who sent the letter, the
Defense Ministry called it “an attempted act of terrorism.” 837
The results of the early 2013 DPRK provocations on South Korean public opinion can be seen in
Figure V.13. It is interesting to note that while most ROK citizens viewed their current security
situation as not particularly positive, many had a much higher perception of future security – and
thus, it appears that South Koreans do not believe that the DPRK’s provocations would be
particularly lasting or have a significant effect on the future. 838
Attempted De-escalation
The US responded by working with the ROK on a Counterprovocation plan, calling for an
immediate but proportional “response in kind” to any potential DPRK attack, and as discussed
earlier, delayed a planned missile defense test. 839
China consistently called for both sides to engage in dialogue, arguing that this was the only
want to ease tensions on the Peninsula. In mid-April 2013, the ROK made a conditional offer of
talks to the North, but these were rejected as a “crafty trick.” The US said it was willing to talk to
the North – but only if the DPRK upholds its previous disarmament agreements, meaning
providing a promise to give up nuclear weapons, 840 something at which the North scoffs.
The DPRK reacted by releasing its own conditions for negotiations through its state-run
newspaper on April 18, 2013, along with its own analysis of ROK and US offers for talks: 841
The preconditions for dialogue raised by them include a stop to “provocative” remarks which the DPRK
has so far been engaged in and demonstration of its intention to realize denuclearization and suspend
missile launch. These are absurd ones…. It is another provocation against the DPRK that the U.S. urged the
former to show the “will for denuclearization” as a precondition for dialogue.
260 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The U.S. and the south Korean puppet regime should make a bold decision to take the following practical
measures if they want to shirk off the historical responsibility for the prevailing grave situation on the
Korean Peninsula, escape sledge-hammer retaliatory blows of the army and people of the DPRK and if they
truly stand for dialogue and negotiations:
First, they should immediately stop all their provocative acts against the DPRK and apologize for all of
them. As the first phase, they should take the measure of retracting the UNSC’s “resolutions on sanctions”
cooked up under absurd pretexts. They should bear in mind that doing so would be a token of good will
towards the DPRK. The south Korean puppet forces should promptly halt all their anti-DPRK rackets, not
linking their own mishaps such as Cheonan warship sinking incident and the “March 20 hacking case” to
the north.
Second, they should give formal assurances before the world that they would not stage again such nuclear
war drills to threaten or blackmail the DPRK. Dialogue can never go with war actions. Frequent nuclear
war maneuvers will only strain the situation and totally block the way of dialogue.
Third, they should make a decision to withdraw all nuclear war means from south Korea and its vicinity
and give up their attempt to reintroduce them as their immediate duty. They should bear in mind that the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula… may lead to the global denuclearization.
The chief of Chongwadae should not forget that the prospect of south Korea may be rosy when the north’s
nukes are considered as a property common to the nation but south Korea is bound to go to ruin when it
remains under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
A ROK Foreign Ministry spokesman rejected these, responding, “North Korea’s demands are
totally incomprehensible. It’s absurd.” 842
The North issued several threats in late April 2013, claiming that the DPRK was “one click away
from pushing the launch button” (Strategic Rocket Force Commander Kim Rak-gyom) and
“Stalwart pilots, once given a sortie order, will load nuclear bombs, instead of fuel for return, and
storm enemy strongholds to blow them up” (Air and Anti-Air Force Commander Ri Pyong-
Chol). 843 Chinese Chief of the General Staff General Fang Fenghui also stated on April 22 that a
fourth DPRK nuclear test was a possibility. 844
As has been described earlier, no progress was made in 2014. North Korea was reported to be
making preparations for a fourth test, and threatened to carry out such a test in November 2014.
Time was, however, imposing other changes. In July 2014, General Jon Pyong Ho, a key figure
in North Korea’s ballistic missile, nuclear weapons, and space programs, passed away. As
Michael Madden notes, His death was part of a generational shift that is taking place within the
community developing North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. “North Korea’s plans to develop new
nuclear weapons designs, produce more fissile materials for a larger stockpile, and launch bigger
and better rockets will depend largely on the capabilities of its next generation of WMD
scientists and technicians. 845
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 261

Figure V.12: Inter-Korean Transportation Corridors

Source: Statement of General Leon J. LaPorte, Commander United Nations Command, Commander, Republic of Korea–United
States Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea before the 108th Congress House Armed Services
Committee, March 12, 2003, 108th Congress, 1st sess., http://armedservices.house.gov/openingstatementsandpress
releases/108thcongress/03-03-12laporte.pdf.; in Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “The Future of US Airpower on the Korean Peninsula,”
Air & Space Power Journal, September 2005. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/bechtol.html.

Figure V.13: South Korean Positive Perceptions of National

Security (Present and Future), March 2013

Source: Kim Jiyoon and Karl Friedhoff, The Asan Public Opinion Report, Asan Institute, March 2013.
262 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Command and Control

Experts estimate that no DPRK nuclear bombs have been transferred to the KPA. Kim Jong-un
apparently maintains control of all fissile material, possibly through the Second Economic
Committee, which is responsible for the production of weapons and military equipment –
including missiles and nuclear weapons. 846
DPRK Nuclear Facilities
The DPRK possesses numerous known and suspected nuclear facilities – completed, under
construction, or in planning (see Figures V.14 to V.17). Most of the facilities are in Yongbyon
county, including a small nuclear research reactor (the IRT-2000), a 5 MW(e) gas-graphite
moderated reactor, an unfinished 50 MW(e) reactor, waste storage sites, and a spent fuel
reprocessing facility. The cooling tower of the 5MW(e) facility was demolished in 2008, but
construction of a light water reactor and uranium enrichment facility have since begun. There is
also a testing site at Punggye and an unfinished, abandoned 200 MW(e) reactor in Taechon
country (the same province as Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province). 847
The DPRK’s newest facilities are working with uranium enrichment – such as the facility
revealed in 2010. A light-water reactor is also under construction near Yongbyon and could be
operational by 2014. As Figure V.17 shows, there are also a variety of milling, mining, testing,
research/development, industrial, and educational facilities around the country. 848
According to the World Nuclear Association, 849
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, aka North Korea) generated 34 TWh in 2002 and 19
TWh in 2003, 71% from hydro and 29% from fossil fuels. Per capita consumption in 2002 was 1364 kWh.
Recent estimates suggest that operable generating capacity is 2000-3000 MWe. In 1985, it brought into
operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled “Experimental Power
Reactor” of about 25 MW (thermal) at Yongbyon. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium production
reactor for weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe as an incidental feature. North Korea also
made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a
prototype of about 200 MWt (potentially 50 MWe) at Yongbyon, and a full-scale version of about 800
MWt (potentially 200 MWe) at Taechon.
DPRK Nuclear Reactors 850
The DPRK has an 8 MWth-capacity nuclear research reactor, the IRT-2000, constructed by the
USSR and completed in 1965. It originally used 10% enriched uranium as fuel, but was
upgraded to use highly enriched uranium; the USSR provided fuel rods until 1973. In 1992,
DPRK officials admitted that 300 mg of plutonium had been separated in 1975; since 1992, due
to a lack of fuel, the IRT-2000 has operated only intermittently. As it was not covered by the
1994 Agreed Framework, it was not frozen and continues to operate on occasion.
Construction on the Yongbyon 5 MWe reactor began in 1979, and the reactor was operational by
1986. It uses natural uranium as a fuel source. Although the DPRK claimed it was for electricity
generation, it can easily produce weapons-grade plutonium – with which the DPRK has
conducted nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. The reactor was shut down under the
1995 Agreed Framework, and the cooling tower was demolished in 2008 as part of a 2007 Six
Party agreement. As of 2010, it appears to be inactive – though DPRK officials told US experts
that it was in stand-by status and received regular maintenance. The DPRK has threatened to
restore the reactor, most recently in April 2013.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 263

The Yongbyon 50 MWe reactor was started in 1985/1986 and was due to be completed in 1995.
It would have been able to produce approximately 55 kg of plutonium per year. Construction was
frozen within a year of completion under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Dr. Hecker reported in
2010 that it was being dismantled with large cranes and remains unfinished and abandoned.
The DPRK began construction of a 200 MWe reactor in Taechon in 1989 with an expected
completion date of 1996. When completed, it could have been capable of producing about 220
kg of plutonium annually. Construction was frozen in 1994 under the US-DPRK Agreed
Framework, and it appears to remain unfinished, without any significant changes since 2002.
The Geumho-Jigu Light Water Reactor site in Hamgyeongnam province was part of the 1994
Agreed Framework between the DPRK and the US. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established to oversee the construction of two 1,000 MWe light water
reactors (LWRs). While excavation began in 2001 and construction in mid-2002, the project was
suspended in late 2003 due to the DPRK’s suspected uranium enrichment and expelling of IAEA
inspectors. The project, only 35% completed, was officially terminated in May 2006.
An experimental LWR (25-30 MWe / 100 MWth) at Yongbyon is apparently under construction.
According to visiting US experts in 2010, the site was described as a “large excavated pit...
roughly 40 meters by 50 meters by 7 meters deep” where “a concrete foundation 28 meters
square with round concrete preforms for the reactor containment vessel was visible.”
Construction was reportedly begun in July 2010 with a target completion of 2012, though experts
saw this as highly optimistic and instead projected an operational start date of 2014-15. The
reactor will be fueled with 4.5% enriched U02 fuel, and all components of the reactor – and the
fuel – will be manufactured domestically. The DPRK says this reactor will be used for electricity
production.
A US expert analysis of satellite imagery on May 2, 2013 indicated that the DPRK was in the
final “cleanup” stage of completing the reactor, and it appeared that the DPRK could begin
startup activities “in the coming weeks.” 851
Recent Developments
The visit by Dr. Hecker to the DPRK in November 2010 shed additional light on developments
in the DPRK’s nuclear program, especially regarding the DPRK’s potential uranium enrichment
programs. Highlights of the information gleaned from his trip included:
A small, recently completed, industrial-scale uranium-enrichment facility. The sight of 2,000 centrifuges
and an ultramodern control room stunned Dr. Hecker. “Instead of finding a few dozen first-generation
centrifuges, we saw rows of advanced centrifuges, apparently fully operational.” 852
Initial construction on a small, experimental LWR designed to deliver roughly 25 to 30 megawatts of
electric power. “The construction of the reactor raises a number of policy issues: an LWR requires enriched
uranium, and once enrichment capabilities are established for reactor fuel, they can be readily reconfigured
to produce HEU bomb fuel.…The centrifuge facility…is most likely designed to make reactor, not bomb,
fuel, because it would not make sense to construct it in a previously inspected site and show it to foreign
visitors. However, it is highly likely that a parallel covert facility capable of HEU production exists
elsewhere in the country.” 853
The 5 MWe reactor had not been restarted since it was shut down in July 2007. No new fuel had been
produced and the fresh fuel produced prior to 1994 (sufficient for one more reactor core) is still in storage.
Pyongyang apparently decided not to make more plutonium or plutonium bombs for the time being. Dr.
Hecker’s assessment was that they could resume all plutonium operations within approximately six months
and make one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year for some time to come. 854
264 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Dr. Hecker’s report was followed by press reports that the IAEA suspected that the DPRK had at
least one additional covert centrifuge site and might have significant additional sites. 855 These
reports mean that the DPRK may have sizeable stocks of enriched uranium as well as plutonium.
A December 2010 CRS report held that, all together, with all facilities operating, the DPRK
could produce approximately 6 kg of plutonium per year and an unknown amount of HEU per
year, depending on the status of their uranium enrichment program. 856
Significant future growth in North Korea’s arsenal would be possible only if larger reactors were
completed and operating, and growth would also depend on any progress in the reported uranium
enrichment program. At a minimum, this means the DPRK’s future production of weapons-grade
material is impossible to foresee, and that both targeting and arms control are far more difficult
because of the inability to predict how many dispersed centrifuge facilities the DPRK may have.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 265

Figure V.14: North Korean Nuclear Power Reactor Projects

(as of January 2011)

Location Type/Power Capacity Status Purpose

Yongbyon Graphite-moderated Currently shut-down; cooling Weapons-grade plutonium

Heavy Water tower destroyed in June 2009 as production
Experimental Reactor/5 part of Six-Party Talks; estimated
MWe restart time would be 6 months

Yongbyon Graphite-moderated Never built; Basic construction Stated purpose was electricity
Heavy Water Power begun; project halted since 1994 production; could have been used for
Reactor/50 MWe weapons-grade plutonium production

Yongbyon Experimental Light- US observers saw basic Stated Purpose was electricity
Water Reactor/100 MWT construction begun in November production; could have been used for
(25-30 MWe) 2010 weapons-grade plutonium production

Taechon Graphite-moderated Never built; Basic construction Stated purpose was electricity
Heavy Water Power begun; project halted since 1994 production; could have been used for
Reactor/200 MWe weapons-grade plutonium production

Sinp’o 4 Light-water Never built; part of 1985 deal Stated purpose is electricity
reactors/440 MWe with Soviet Union when DPRK production; could have been sued for
signed the NPT; canceled by weapons-grade plutonium production
Russian Federation in 1992

Sinp’o 2 Light-water reactors Never built; part of 1994 Agreed Electricity production
(turn-key)/1000 MWe Framework, reactor agreement
concluded in 1999; Project
terminated in 2006 after DPRK
pulled out of Agreed Framework

Source: Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service, February 12,
2013, 7.
266 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.15: List of Major North Korean Nuclear Sites

Hagap The US Defense Intelligence Agency reported an underground nuclear-facility under

construction in 1993, to be finished possibly by 2003. Commercial satellite images show
tunnel entrances, but not other indications of the facility’s use.
Hamhung This branch of the Academy of Defense Science is known for training engineers and
chemists, and is also near a site with uranium deposits.
Musudan On the east coast, a long-range rocket was fired from here in April 2009.
Pakchon Location of uranium mine and milling facility (known as the April Industrial Enterprise),
declared to the IAEA in 1992. The uranium milling facility reportedly processes ore from
mines in the Sunchon area. Current status is unknown.
Punggye This is the site of the DPRK’s underground nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013.
Pyongsan Location of uranium mining and a uranium milling facility, which reportedly processes ore
from the Pyongsan and Kumchon uranium mines. Current status is unknown.
Pyongyang Laboratory-scale hot cells provided by the Soviet Union in the 1960s where believed to be
used to extract small quantities of uranium; also in Pyongyang are the Colleges of Nuclear
Physics at Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology.
Sinpo Location of two 1,000 MWe light water reactors constructed by the Korean Energy
Developmental Organization (KEDO); under the terms of the Agreed Framework, given to
the DPRK in return for freezing its nuclear program. Construction was halted and site
abandoned after the outbreak of another crisis in late 2002.
Sunchon Location of an important uranium mine.
Taechon Location of incomplete 200MWe graphite-moderated nuclear power reactor. Construction
began in 1989 and was frozen in 1994 (under the 1994 Agreed Framework). Current status
is unknown.
Tongchang-ri This site, on the Northwest coast, is where the new Sohae launch pad is located. The DPRK
is getting ready to fire long-range rockets from this launch pad, and fired a rocket mounted
with a satellite (SLV) from here in April, 2012.
Yongbyon Location of a Nuclear Research Center, comprising a 5MWe graphite moderated prototype
power reactor, reprocessing facility, uranium conversion plant, fuel fabrication plant, and
spent fuel and waste storage facilities. Also ___location. Also Location of a Soviet-supplied
IRT research reactor and radioisotope laboratory, and where the DPRK revealed a uranium
enrichment facility under development in 2009. Satellite imagery from early 2012 showed
progression in construction. Also located here are a 5 MWe, a 50 MWe reactor, and a
plutonium reprocessing facility that has been shut down.
Youngdoktong Reported ___location of site (active in the 1990s) for nuclear weapons-related high-explosive
testing. In 2003, the CIA reportedly detected an advanced nuclear testing site, but ROK
experts were skeptical.
Source: Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 46; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.ceip.org;
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org; NTI, http://www.nti.org; and David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, Solving
the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, Institute for Science and International Security, 2000); “North Korea nuclear test prompts
neighbours to mobilize militaries and scientists,” CRS, February 2013.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 267

Figure V.16: Map of Major North Korean Nuclear Sites

Note: Locations on map are approximate.

Source: Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 45.
268 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.17: Map of Possible DPRK Nuclear, Biological, Missile,

and Chemical Sites

Source: “Interactive North Korea Facilities Map,”

http://www.nti.org/gmap/?place=39.1195,127.2055,8&layers=nuclear,missile,biological.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 269

ROK and US Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs

As part of its new (pro)active deterrence strategy – the ROK has responded in kind to the
DPRK’s elevated rhetoric. While dismissing DPRK threats as propaganda, the ROK MoD told
reporters that, “If North Korean attacks South Korea with a nuclear weapon, Kim Jong-un’s
regime will perish from the earth.” 857 The ROK military also warned that if it was provoked by
the DPRK, it would strike the North’s “command leadership.” 858 At the same time, many
analysts, as well as the ROK government, believe that Kim Jong-un is attempting to create an
atmosphere of crisis within his country in order to enhance his own prestige and consolidate his
leadership. 859
ROK President Park Geun-hye stated in early April 2013 that, “Our military exists to defend our
nation and its people from such threats… If [the North] stages any provocation against our
people, you [the ROK MoD] should make a strong and swift response in initial combat without
any political considerations.” The ROK MoD also unveiled a plan to accelerate the setup of a
missile system called “Kill Chain” that works to pre-emptively detect, target, and destroy missile
and military installations in the DPRK, as well as its command structure – in the event signs of
an attack are detected. Although there was no update on the timeframe for deployment of the
system, the ROK had previously announced it would be implemented by the end of 2015. The
ROK also announced it would strengthen Cyberwarfare forces and develop measures to counter
DPRK cyberattacks. 860
To underscore its commitment to the ROK, the US flew B-52 bombers over the Peninsula in
mid-March, leading the DPRK to threaten to attack US military bases in Japan and Guam.
Several days later, the DPRK announced that all of its long-range artillery and strategic rockets
“are assigned to strike bases of the U.S. imperialist aggressor troops in the U.S. mainland and on
Hawaii and Guam and other operational zones in the pacific as well as all the enemy targets in
South Korea and its vicinity.” 861
In response, the ROK MoD vowed a “thousandfold, ten-thousandfold retaliation” against any
Cheonan-like provocation, while government officials stated that the ROK would retaliate by,
among other measures, launching missiles at gigantic statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il –
to which the DPRK strongly reacted, saying that the monuments were “symbols of the dignity of
the supreme leadership” and that the DPRK would in return “destroy the den of confrontation,
including Chongwadae [the ROK presidential office], hotbed of all evils.” 862
These developments highlight the risk that the ROK may eventually deploy nuclear-armed
aircraft and missiles. Few argue that the ROK and Japanese lack the capability to build long-
range missiles and nuclear weapons, and doing so with minimal – if any – testing. In fact, the
ROK would already have nuclear weapons if the US had not pressed the ROK to not continue its
nuclear development, reaching an agreement on the matter with South Korea in 1975 – as
previously discussed.
If the US wishes to prevent this, it may have to find new ways to support the ROK. The US faces
the reality that the risks of a growing DPRK nuclear force – coupled to a large stock of
chemically armed bombs and missiles and possible biological weapons – means it cannot simply
let a key ally like the ROK bear a one-sided threat or leave Japan in the position where it, too,
has no balancing force. While arms control options are not impossible, it is also all too clear that
they offer even less chance of success than negotiations with Iran.
270 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

This leaves the US with several alternatives, none of which offer the prospect of lasting stability,
but which are similar to the options the US might use against Iran and would put pressure on
both North Korea and China:
• The US could turn to China and say the US will offer extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and the ROK
unless China can persuade the DPRK to halt and roll back its nuclear programs. It could confront China and
aid the ROK with two major options:
o The most “quiet” or discrete extended deterrence option would be nuclear armed submarine- or
surface-launched cruise missiles backed with the deployment of conventionally armed cruise or
ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems capable of point attacks on North Korea’s most
valuable civil and military assets.
o The most decisive extended deterrence options would be the equivalent of the combination of
Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles that were land-based, had US operating crews
both deep inside South Korea and in or near its major cities, and had both nuclear and precision
conventional warheads. The DPRK would be faced with the inability to strike at key ROK
population centers without striking at US forces and still see mobile US nuclear armed forces in
reserve. It also could not use conventional warheads without facing a more accurate and reliable
US strike force in return.
• The US could work with the ROK to create the same kind of layered defenses against missiles and rockets
being developed in Israel, and use the ROK model to help create layered defenses in the Gulf, allowing an
indirect form of cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states without overt ties or relations.
As is the case in the Gulf, the US does not have to support proliferation by either South Korea or
Japan. Experts may argue the timing, but none argue over ROK and Japanese capability in
building long-range missiles and nuclear weapons, and doing so with minimal – if any – testing.
In fact, the ROK would already have nuclear weapons if the US had not pressed the ROK to not
continue its nuclear development, reaching an agreement on the matter with South Korea in 1975
– as previously discussed.
The US can put pressure on both the DPRK and China in ways that would allow several years for
negotiation while not seriously opposing the ROK in any way that would bind or sanction its
ally. While Japan is far less likely to take a decision to go nuclear, particularly in the near-term,
the US could decide that the Missile Technology Control Regime had essentially outlived its
usefulness – binding the US without binding China – and encourage Japan to create precision
strike conventional missiles as well as missile defenses.
This would confront both the DPRK and China with the reality that once such a Japanese force
was created, Japan could quickly arm them with nuclear weapons if it came under increasing
North Korean or Chinese pressure. Such options would give the US, the ROK, and Japan
growing leverage to pressure China to restrain the DPRK as well as deter and contain the
expansion of Chinese nuclear forces.
In fact, one way to put pressure on China would be to start a dialogue that could be either official
or think tank, including discussions of both missile defense and extended deterrence, and
encourage the ROK and Japan to surface the nuclear option. If this succeeded in pushing China
into far more decisive pressure on North Korea, there would be no need for either extended
deterrence or ROK or Japanese nuclear forces. Along these lines, and in response to recent ROK
Foreign Ministry suggestions, on April 25, 2013 China signaled that it was “positively”
considering holding a trilateral, informal US-China-ROK “1.5-track” security dialogue – which
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 271

would include both government officials and academics – to discuss policy and security issues
related to the DPRK. 863
Moreover, such options could be used to lever Chinese restraint in transferring missile
technology to Iran. There also is no reason that the US, the ROK and Japan could not offer quid
pro quos in terms of incentives for a North Korean roll back, including some formal agreement
on all sides for a local WMD-free zone and economic incentives for a more open DPRK.
At the same time, the US may have to at least tacitly encourage ROK and Japanese creation of at
least precision-guided conventional missile forces and possibly nuclear forces as a local regional
counterbalance to the Chinese nuclear effort. This is scarcely a desirable option, or one that can
easily be kept stable, but the DPRK is only part of the problem and the US should not passively
allow itself to be trapped into a Chinese-US nuclear relationship. It should be clear to China that
it faces other potential nuclear powers if its nuclear forces grow too much and are even indirectly
linked to Chinese pressure on maritime and island disputes in the Pacific.
The Japanese Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs
Japan has also made it clear that it feels threatened, but Japan is less likely to take a decision to
go nuclear than the ROK, particularly in the near-term. Once again, extended deterrence is an
option, but the US could also decide that the Missile Technology Control Regime had essentially
outlived its usefulness and encourage Japan to create precision strike conventional missiles as
well as missile defenses.
Such a Japanese action would confront both the DPRK and China with the reality that once such
a Japanese force was created, Japan could quickly arm them with nuclear weapons if it came
under increasing North Korean or Chinese pressure. Such options would give the US, the ROK,
and Japan growing leverage to pressure China to restrain the DPRK as well as deter and contain
the expansion of Chinese nuclear forces.
Missile defense is another important option. In March 2013 the Japanese government was
reportedly planning to give orders to intercept any DPRK missiles, while Aegis destroyers
carrying SM-3 missiles were deployed to the northwest of Japan – as has happened in all
previous DPRK missile launches. 864
In early April 2013, Prime Minister Abe put the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), already mobilized
for missile defense, on “full alert status” due to the DPRK threat. The Navy deployed two Aegis
destroyers to the Sea of Japan, and the Air Force readied its land-based PAC-3 missile
interceptors. This is the fourth time that Japan has undertaken its highest state of defense
readiness in response to DPRK missile threats, with the first in March 2009 and the second and
third in response to 2012 missile launches. The April 2013 orders were the first time Japan had
gone to full alert status without any DPRK-stated intention to launch a missile. 865
The DPRK’s bellicosity has also allowed Abe to call for a build-up in Japan’s military – a move
the US has encouraged, so that Japan can play a larger role in the region’s security. According to
Abe, Japan would be unable to shoot down any potential DPRK-launched missile aimed at the
US, as it would not be in self-defense – and thus against the Japanese constitution. Other
potential scenarios that are constitutionally forbidden but Abe argues should be permissible
include defending US military vessels under attack during joint US-Japan operations and
providing logistical support to nations and/or protecting allied troops under attack while engaged
in peacekeeping missions. 866
272 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

According to Abe, Japan’s military should have more latitude to fight a broader range of threats
to Japan’s allies in a new doctrine of “collective self-defense.” Abe has other proposals, in
addition to building up the Japanese military – including increasing Japanese military spending
for the first time in 11 years (by .8%) and increasing the number of SDF personnel.
Japan’s new military budget also calls for enhanced weapons – including F-35s, an attack
submarine, amphibious troop carriers, and funding to develop new anti-ship missiles. Increased
Japanese command and control in joint US-Japan military exercises is one manifestation of this
trend. One newspaper poll found that 54% of respondents supported Abe’s moves to increase the
defense budget, while 36% were opposed. Military officials in both Japan and the US say that
new DPRK threats justify a broader re-examination of long-standing Japanese regional defense
policies. Japan is also worried about increasing tensions with China over disputed islands. 867
The Russian and Chinese Response to DPRK Nuclear Programs
Russia has not taken a strong stand against DPRK nuclear weapons, but has expressed concern
about the risk of escalation on the Korean Peninsula – at least in the period before the Ukraine
crisis in 2014. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin remarked in early April 2013 that, “I would make
no secret about, we are worried about the escalation on the Korean peninsula because we are
neighbors… And if, God forbid, something happens, Chernobyl which we all know a lot about,
may seem like a child’s fairy tale. Is there such a threat or not? I think there is… I would urge
everyone to calm down… and start to resolve the problems that have piled up for many years
there at the negotiating table.” 868
As has been discussed previously, there seems to be a debate among Chinese citizens,
government officials, and academics as to how much the DPRK’s nuclear program should affect
China’s support of the DPRK. While one Chinese academic was suspended from his job after
publishing an article pushing for abandonment of the DPRK – as discussed previously in this
chapter – Xi Jinping, China’s new president, said in an early April speech that no Asian country
“should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gain,” an
indirect though clear criticism of the DPRK. 869
According to US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Martin E. Dempsey, the Chinese
government wants to limit the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions though it remains unclear what China
would do to realize that goal. General Dempsey stated, “Chinese leadership is as concerned as
we are with North Korea’s march toward nuclearization and ballistic missile technology. And
they have given us an assurance that they are working on it, as we are. But I didn’t gain any
insights into particularly how they would do that.” 870 His interlocutor, Chief of the General Staff
Gen. Fang Fenghuim, said Beijing is firmly opposed to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program
and believes it should be addressed through dialogue. 871
It was also reported that the Chinese and ROK Foreign Ministers agreed in late April 2013 to set
up a 24-hour hotline to facilitate policy consultations on the DPRK. 872
ROK Chemical Weapons Developments
The ROK has the technology base to create advanced chemical and biological weapons. It has
conducted research on defense in both areas, and much of such research is indistinguishable from
research on weapons. There are no meaningful indicators, however, that the ROK now has, or is
seeking, stockpiles of such weapons.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 273

The ROK signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, ratified it in April 1997,
and began destroying its CW stocks in 1999. It completed the destruction of its stockpile in July
2008 – the second CWC member to do so. 873
The South’s destruction of its CW stocks has largely gone unnoticed because Seoul has a
confidentiality agreement with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) and neither confirms nor denies the existence of its abandoned CW program. 874 The
issue is sensitive in the ROK, and the government is divided. Diplomats in the Foreign and Trade
Ministries generally favor disclosure, but the Defense Ministry prefers ambiguity because of the
supposed residual deterrent effect on Pyongyang. 875
According to many reliable sources, the ROK declared possession of several thousand metric
tons of chemical warfare agents and one chemical weapons production facility to the OPCW
upon its ratification of the CWC.876 Paul Walker, security and sustainability chief at Global
Green USA, said that discussions with informed sources and his own research indicate that the
ROK probably held between 3,000 and 3,500 metric tons of chemical warfare material, likely
including 400 to 1,000 metric tons of sarin nerve agent in artillery shells. 877 The rest could have
been binary agents that would have become dangerous when mixed together. 878
After the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the South Korean National Emergency Management
Agency provided 1,300 gas masks for the residents of the islands near the NLL and an additional
610,000 masks for the civil defense corps. The agency also reported that it would renovate
subway stations and underground parking structures to better provide shelter in the case of a
chemical attack. Yet, these measures could be more to mitigate public fears than legitimately
protect civilians, as the gas masks would not be of much use in that the masks do not protect
against many of the chemical weapons believed to be possessed by the DPRK. 879
ROK Biological Weapons Developments
The ROK ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in June 1987, and
while the country possesses a well-developed pharmaceutical and biotech infrastructure – the
ROK was the 12th largest pharmaceutical market in the world in 2005 valued at USD 7.7 billion
– which could serve as the basis for a biological weapons program, there is no evidence that
Seoul has an offensive biological weapons (BW) program. 880 Though the 2006 Defense White
Paper, citing a biological threat from North Korea, stated the need for the ROK to conduct
defensive BW research and development, including the development of vaccines against anthrax
and smallpox, this research was not discussed in the 2010 Defense White Paper. 881
ROK Nuclear Developments
As has been touched earlier, nuclear weapons present a different case. The ROK once had an
ambitious nuclear weapons program of its own, although it currently does not seem to have one.
Initial Weapons Research
The ROK formally initiated nuclear activities when it became a member of the International
Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. In 1958 the Atomic Energy Law was passed, and in 1959 the
Office of Atomic Energy was established by the government. The first nuclear reactor to achieve
criticality in South Korea was a small research unit in 1962. 882
274 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The ROK apparently began considering developing nuclear weapons in the late 1960s when it
began to have worries about the strength of its US alliance guarantees as a result of the US’s
problems in Vietnam and regional reductions in the US military presence under the Nixon
Doctrine. 883 ROK President Park Chung Hee reportedly decided in 1970 to begin a nuclear
weapons program, including the creation of a “Weapons Exploitation Committee,” after US
President Richard Nixon announced the withdrawal of 26,000 American troops from the
ROK. 884 Park is said to have decided to pursue a plutonium bomb, and in 1973 the ROK sought
to acquire a reprocessing facility from France and a research reactor and heavy water reactor
from Canada to produce bomb-grade plutonium. 885
Seoul’s weapons program ran into difficulties, however, when some of its supply arrangements
fell through amidst international concern over India’s 1974 nuclear test – which, inconveniently
for Seoul, was just the sort of misappropriation of dual-use plutonium technology that the ROK
hoped to achieve for itself. 886
US officials soon threatened to cancel US alliance guarantees if Seoul continued its weapons
program and pressured France into not delivering the reprocessing facility, effectively ending the
ROK’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons. 887 Soon thereafter, the ROK ratified the NPT under
pressure from the US. Seoul formally abandoned its program and signed the Treaty on the NPT
in April 1975 before it had produced any fissile material and later became a state party to the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). President Park also stated in 1977 that Seoul
would not develop nuclear weapons so long as the US nuclear umbrella continued to cover Seoul
against Soviet and DPRK aggression, although it is believed he continued a clandestine program
that only ended with his assassination in October 1979. 888
Some ROK nuclear activities seem to have continued despite US security assurances and Park’s
assassination. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) contracted with the
Youngnam Chemical Corporation to import phosphate compounds with a high level of uranium
in the early 1980s. KAERI specifically selected phosphate rock with high uranium content for
extraction and conversion, and between 1981 and 1984, yellow cake (U3O8) was converted to
uranium oxide (UO2), which was used to produce fuel rods for the Wolsong-1 Nuclear Power
Reactor in 1985. 889
Reprocessing and Enrichment Activities
Seoul continued to conduct several nuclear-related experiments in the 1990s dealing primarily
with reprocessing and uranium enrichment. ROK scientists conducted a series of laboratory-scale
experiments, allegedly without the government’s knowledge, up to 2000, all without properly
declaring them to the IAEA. 890
Once the IAEA discovered these experiments, Seoul cooperated with the IAEA and no evidence
emerged that the work had formed part of a possible nuclear weapons program, that the program
had been continued since the 1970s, or that anything more than basic research was involved.891
According to interviews of US diplomats conducted in 2004 by the Washington Post, during
these experiments, ROK scientists enriched uranium to levels four times higher than had their
counterparts in Iran (as of 2004). 892
Further information on the ROK’s nuclear efforts was brought to light in August 2004 when the
ROK’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) reported to the IAEA that South Korea had
conducted experiments to enrich uranium, extract plutonium, and had produced uranium
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 275

metal. 893 The Laboratory for Quantum Optics at KAERI conducted experiments to enrich
uranium three times during January and February 2000. 894 The experiments yielded about 0.2
grams of uranium enriched to an average of 10% in the three experiments, with the peak level of
enrichment in the experiments reaching 77%. 895
The ROK is interested in developing an indigenous, plutonium fuel cycle for its civilian power
program and had negotiated with the IAEA and the US Department of Energy over safeguards
for a “partially constructed, pilot pyroprocessing facility” that it wanted to complete by 2012,
with a semi-commercial facility in place by 2025. While ROK officials have claimed that the
desire for such a facility was the result of “scientific curiosity” or part of plans to localize the
production of nuclear fuel, it should be noted that these actions do have applications for weapons
development, and questions remain about past activities that appear to have had more direct
weapons applications.
The ROK’s experiments in plutonium extraction and uranium enrichment were technically
violations of Seoul’s NPT safeguards commitments that had been in effect since 1975 as well as
a violation of the 1992 North and South Korean Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, but it is important to understand that they do not appear to have been part of a
robust program to develop nuclear weapons.
As Daniel Pinkston has observed, while the experiments “provided data and experience that
could be applied to a bomb program or to a peaceful nuclear fuel cycle that could later be part of
a ‘virtual bomb program’ under certain contingencies, […] the experiments were insignificant in
terms of bomb production.” 896 However, the ROK’s past and current experiments, along with the
recent ROK development of long-range land-attack cruise missiles 897 and pursuit of a space-
launch capability, 898 will not help alleviate suspicions in Pyongyang or the region. This is
another factor making it difficult to achieve a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
2010-2014 and the ROK Nuclear Development Debate
The creation of an ROK nuclear weapons program also became the subject of a new political
debate after the DPRK’s new military provocations in 2010. Conservatives of the Saenuri party
wanted the US to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons, while an August 2011 survey of 2,000
South Koreans revealed that 63% supported the idea that the ROK should indigenously develop
nuclear weapons to counteract the DPRK.
A similar survey in 2010 reported that 56% supported such development. In 2012, 66% were in
favor of a weapons program; approximately the same results were seen in a 2013 poll that was
taken several weeks after the DPRK’s third nuclear test. From 2010 to 2012, the number of those
who “strongly supported” such a program rose from 13% to 25%. At the same time, the 2013
poll results show that the “most salient” issue facing the country was job creation (40%), not
North-South relations (8-15%). 899
Outgoing President Lee Myung-bak gave qualified support for the idea in mid-February, saying,
“There are some people saying South Korea should also have nuclear weapons. Those remarks
are patriotic and I think highly of them. I don’t think the comments are wrong because they also
serve as a warning to North Korea and China.” Yet Lee still added, “It is premature and improper
for our government to discuss nuclear armament because the ultimate goal is for Pyongyang to
give up its nuclear program through international cooperation, in spite of the DPRK
announcement that it was no longer interested in denuclearization. 900 This announcement meant
276 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the ROK could make a case that the 1992 Korean Peninsula denuclearization agreement was
dead.
Some ROK analysts have argued that the DPRK’s third nuclear test was the ROK’s Cuban
missile crisis. Many in the South are now convinced that the DPRK may never give up its
nuclear weapons, leading some to argue that the ROK should either develop its own or the US
should restore the nuclear balance on the Peninsula by reintroducing US nuclear weapons, which
had been removed in 1991. 901
A small but growing number of South Koreans are concerned that the US, either because of
budget cuts or a lack of will, might not provide its nuclear umbrella indefinitely – perhaps even
pulling out of the country, like in Vietnam. Koreans are also frustrated that the US and
international community has been unable to end the DPRK’s nuclear program. 902
One prominent national assemblyman (and the controlling interest in Hyundai) recently spoke at
the April 2013 Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, arguing that the ROK could
potentially think about temporarily withdrawing from the NPT. As the US was not stopping the
DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, and the US would not trade Seattle for Seoul, Chung
argued that the ROK might need to develop nuclear capabilities of its own. It has also been noted that
if there was not powerful (government) support for his comments in the ROK, he would not be
saying such things in a public forum. 903
Facing an extraordinary threat to national security, South Korea may exercise the right to withdraw from
the NPT as stipulated in Article X of the treaty. South Korea would then match North Korea’s nuclear
program step by step, while committing to stop if North Korea stops… South Korea should be given this
leeway as a law-abiding member of the global community who is threatened by a nuclear rogue state….
The alliance has failed to stop North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Telling us not to consider any
nuclear weapons option is tantamount to telling us to simply surrender.
Yet, developing nuclear weapons would create major problems for the ROK’s nuclear program
and energy security. The ROK would run out of nuclear fuel and might not be able to access
imported fossil fuels, while the US might remove its security guarantee as punishment. The ROK
would also have to drop out of the NPT, freezing relations with China, Japan, and Russia, and
correspondingly increasing the likelihood of a DPRK attack. 904
The ROK possesses a large and extensive civilian nuclear power industry – the world’s fifth-
largest, with 21 reactors providing almost 40% of the ROK’s electricity. 905 It has plans for a total
of 40 reactors providing 59% of the ROK’s electricity by 2030. Coupled with past weapons
research, some estimate this technology could serve as a basis for any plans to develop nuclear
weapons in the future should it feel that DPRK nuclear threats or a potential downturn in the US-
ROK alliance warrant such a move.
The ROK is also interested in developing an indigenous, plutonium fuel cycle for its civilian
power program and had negotiated with the IAEA and the US Department of Energy over
safeguards for a “partially constructed, pilot pyroprocessing facility” that it wanted to complete
by 2012, with a semi-commercial facility in place by 2025. 906 While ROK officials have claimed
that the desire for such a facility was the result of “scientific curiosity” or part of plans to localize
the production of nuclear fuel, it should be noted that these actions do have applications for
weapons development, and questions remain about past activities that appear to have had more
direct weapons applications. 907
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 277

Bill Gates visited the ROK in April 2013 to meet with President Park Geun-hye in order to
promote his project of developing a next-generation nuclear reactor. His plan is for his nuclear
start-up (TerraPower) and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute to jointly develop a 600
megawatt prototype by 2022, after which a final decision could be made on the feasibility of
more large-scale production. Gates argued that it could be an effective means of dealing with the
ROK’s nuclear waste stockpiles – discussed further in the following sections – and that
TerraPower was developing a safer and more economical next-generation reactor.
One ROK nuclear expert with links to the current administration said it agreed to do a three-
month feasibility study with Gates. The reactor is called a “traveling wave reactor,” similar to the
ROK’s sodium-cooled fast reactor development project. Both types use spent fuel from
conventional reactors, and can greatly reduce the volume of nuclear waste and its toxicity,
compared to existing reactors. 908
Civilian Facilities and the 123 Agreement
It is important to understand just how developed the ROK’s nuclear power program is. The ROK
possesses the world’s fifth-largest civilian nuclear power industry, with 21 reactors providing
almost 40% of the ROK’s electricity and plans for a total of 40 reactors providing 59% of the
ROK’s electricity by 2030. It is projected that ROK nuclear energy capacity will increase by
56% to 27.3 GWe by 2030 and 43 GWe by 2030. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP)
expects to spend 4.7 trillion won ($3.68 billion) on nuclear plants in 2009 and complete 18
nuclear power plants by 2030 at a cost of 40-50 trillion won ($32 to 40 billion). 909 The country
plans to invest $1.3 billion in research and development of a 150 megawatt fourth-generation
reactor by 2028. 910 Currently, the ROK has four nuclear power reactor complexes and four
nuclear research reactors.
Nuclear Power Reactors 911
The Kori Complex, located near Busan, houses eight reactors, though only five are currently
operational. Three more are under construction, and an additional two are currently projected to
be start construction in 2014. Kori-1, which commenced operation in 1978 and is planned to be
closed in 2017, is a 576 MWe two-loop pressurized light water reactor (PWR). It was South
Korea’s first nuclear power reactor.
Kori-2 (1983) is a 637 MWe two-loop PWR and the ROK’s second nuclear power reactor. Kori-
3 (1985) produces 1007 MWe and is a three-loop PWR, as is Kori-4 (1986). Shin (New) Kori-1
(2011) is a 1000 MWe PWR, as is Shin Kori-2 (2011). Shin Kori-3, the ROK’s first advanced
PWR with a 1400 MWe capacity, is expected to begin operations in the end of fall 2013. Shin
Kori-4, also an advanced PWR with a 1400 MWe capacity, is expected to commence operations
by the end of 2014.
The Uljin Complex, located in North Gyeongsang province, is comprised of six power reactors,
all of which are operational. Ulchin-1 (1988 – 945 MWe) and Ulchin-2 (1989 - 942 MWe) are
both three-loop PWRs. Ulchin-3 (1998) is a two-loop PWR, as is the 998 MWe Ulchin-4 (1998).
Ulchin-5 (2004) is a 1001 MWe PWR, and Ulchin-6 (2005) is a 996 MWe PWR.
Wolsong Complex is also located in North Gyeongsang province and has six reactors, four of
which are operational and two of which are under construction. Wolsong-1 (1983) is a 597 MWe
pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR), Wolsong-2 (1997) is a 710 MWe PHWR, Wolsong-3
(1998) is a 707 MWe PHWR, and Wolsong-4 (1999) is a 708 MWe PHWR.
278 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Shin (New) Wolsong-1 (2011) is an indigenously designed 960 MWe PWR, as is Shin Wolsong-
2, which was expected to commence in late 2012 but does not yet seem to be connected to the
grid. Plans for Shin Wolsong-3 and Shin Wolsong-4 are in place, but construction has not yet
been scheduled. They will be Advanced Pressurized Reactors with a 1400 MW(e) generating
capacity and have estimated operational dates of 2020 and 2021, respectively.
Yonggwang Complex, located in South Jeolla province, also has six reactors, all of which are
operational. Yonggwang-1 (1986) is a 953 MWe PWR, Yonggwang-2 (1987) is a 947 MWe
PWR, Yonggwang-3 (1989) is a 997 MWe PWR, Yonggwang-4 (1996) is a 994 MWe PWR,
Yonggwang-5 (2002) is a 988 MWe PWR, and Yonggwang-6 (2002) is a 996 MWe PWR.
Nuclear Research Reactors 912
The Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics Mark II (TRIGA-Mark II) Research Reactor
was the ROK’s first research reactor and is located in Seoul at the former ___location of the Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). The reactor began operations in 1960 and cost
$73,000 (of which $35,000 was provided by the US). The original 100 KWth capacity was
upgraded to a 250 KWth capacity in 1969. It used 20% enriched uranium for fuel. It was shut
down at the end of 1995 and currently is part of a memorial display.
TRIGA-Mark III was South Korea’s second research reactor, also under the aegis of KAERI; it
used 70% enriched uranium fuel and had a capacity of 2 MWth. In the early 1980s, ROK
scientists conducted plutonium extraction experiments in violation of the ROK’S NPT
commitments, extracting .7 grams of fissile PU-239. Along with TRIGA-Mark II, TRIGA-Mark
III was shut down in 1995 and completely dismantled by 2009.
The Aerojet General Nucleonics Model Number 201 (AGN-201) Research Reactor, located at
Kyung Hee University (Suwon), was the ROK’s first educational research reactor, donated by
Colorado State University in 1976, becoming operational in 1982. The reactor uses 20%
enriched uranium for fuel and has a 0.1 MWe capacity. The High-Flux Advanced Neutron
Application Reactor (HANARO) has a capacity of 30 MWth. It began operations in 1996, and
uses low-enriched uranium as fuel (19.75%).
Figure V.18 shows the reactors currently operating in the ROK, along with their type, date of
initial operation, and net capacity. Figure V.19 shows the ROK reactors that are either under
construction or in the planning process, along with their type, start date of construction, projected
date of operation, and capacity. Because the previous discussion of reactors and the figures
below come from different sources, the declared net capacity of the various reactors may be
slightly different.
The 123 Agreement
The possibility of an ROK weapons program could also affect the implementation of the ROK-
US peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement. The 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement was initially
signed 40 years ago and was renewed in April 2014. 913 Under the existing regime, the ROK
works with US government agencies and companies to build a nuclear power infrastructure,
including almost 20 reactors that generate 30% of the nation’s electricity. 914
The ROK is building more reactors and also has facilities for nuclear waste treatment, disposal,
equipment manufacture, engineering, research, medicine, and fuel fabrication – all together, the
ROK’s nuclear assets are likely worth several billion dollars. Korean firms are now partnering
with American businesses to develop nuclear power plants based on US technology in the ROK,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 279

China, and the US, as well as working to sell to other countries. The ROK currently has a
contract to build reactors in the UAE. 915
One ROK Assemblyman asked Bill Gates, during the latter’s April 2013 trip to the ROK, to play
a role in persuading the US government to let the ROK have more capabilities in its peaceful use
of nuclear energy; without the revision in the 123 Agreement, Gates’ plan to cooperate with the
ROK in the development of next-generation nuclear technology would be difficult. 916
However, an updated agreement was not reached despite two years of negotiations. The ROK
asked it be allowed to extract uranium and plutonium from its thousands of tons of spent fuel,
which originally came from the US. The ROK argued that reprocessing would be useful in
reducing the used fuel stockpiles at its power plants, producing new fuel, and gaining public
acceptance for building new reactors by showing it has a solution for nuclear waste issues. 917
South Korea also argued that even though the ROK had no current plans to build a
pyroprocessing facility, it wanted a US commitment that when the ROK does decide to start
construction, the US would support it. 918 Furthermore, the ROK asserted that this capability – the
ability to offer full nuclear fuel cycle services – is key to its competitiveness in the strategic
export of nuclear services. 919 President Park Geun-hye’s Foreign Minister noted that the
negotiations would be an important test of “trust” between the two countries. 920
The ROK plans that nuclear services will become a significant export for the country in the
future, 921 with the government claiming that South Korea can enrich uranium more cheaply than
others and that it plans to export 80 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years (equivalent to
20% of the international market). Industry leaders, alternatively, believe it is more likely that
approximately 10 reactors could be exported over that time frame. Especially in a post-
Fukushima context, the market for reactors is saturated, and the industry is not a huge money-
maker in any event. 922 It is unlikely that the ROK would be able to reach the government’s
export goals; but, if the US refuses to allow pyroprocessing, the US becomes the scapegoat when
the export goal fails, resulting in increased alliance tensions and hurting ROK public opinion of
the US. 923
The US has several problems with the ROK’s request. It is unsure if pyro-processing is the most
suitable method for the ROK to treat nuclear waste, 924 and it does not want other countries
enriching spent fuel because the same technology allows countries to produce the explosive core
of a nuclear weapon. 925 It has never granted reprocessing consent to countries that did not
already have prior enrichment and reprocessing facilities.
Allowing the ROK to add this capability would set a precedent that others – like Taiwan, which
also has a significant civilian nuclear program and waste issues – would also want to be allowed
this capacity. Also, if the ROK is allowed to develop reprocessing, the DPRK (and Iran) could
use this as an excuse to keep their programs, claiming equal treatment.
China’s reaction to such an increase in ROK nuclear capabilities is uncertain. Continuation of the
DPRK’s program also pressures the ROK and Japan to withdraw from the NPT and develop their
own nuclear deterrent – and ROK defense officials see a reprocessing capability as a shortcut to
a potential nuclear option if future ROK-DPRK relations become worse. 926 The US would like to
wait for the results of the 10-year joint feasibility study recently undertaken and then revisit the
issue. 927
280 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

There are also significant elements of pride and nationalism. South Korea argues that just
because it did not have these capabilities 30 years ago when the initial agreement was negotiated,
that shouldn’t mean that they remain denied the capabilities – what the ROK sees as being
relegated to a permanent second class status. 928
Furthermore, the US-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement gives Japan the right to separate the
plutonium from its spent fuel, and thus the ROK believes that it should be given the same right.
On the other hand, the US-Japan agreement was signed in 1988 – when the Asia-Pacific had
fewer nationalized territorial conflicts, the Cold War superpowers worked together against
nuclear proliferation, and the DPRK was an NPT member without nuclear weapons. 929 The ROK
also likely sees India as another case that should be applicable to its situation. 930
It was announced on April 24, 2013 that the deadline to renegotiate the agreement had been
delayed until 2016, though unconfirmed reports of the deadline delay had been circulating for
several days in the ROK. While a spokesman for the ROK Foreign Ministry said that the two
countries had agreed to a treaty extension in order to give the negotiators more time to sort out
“the complexity of details and technologies,” the ROK media was not as supportive. One
editorial in the JoongAng Ilbo stated, “Washington does not seem to trust South Korea as much
as it reiterates blood-tight relations… Just because the pact has been extended for two years does
not assure that the two will narrow their differences. It is merely a makeshift move to avoid a
dispute.” 931
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 281

Figure V.18: Nuclear Power Reactors Operating in the ROK

Reactor Type Net Capacity Commercial Planned
Operation Close

Kori 1 PWR (Westinghouse) 576 MWe 4/1978 2017

Kori 2 PWR (Westinghouse) 637 MWe 7/1983

Wolsong 1 PHWR (Candu 6) 666 MWe 4/1983 2036

Kori 3 PWR (Westinghouse) 1007 MWe 9/1985

Kori 4 PWR (Westinghouse) 1007 MWe 4/1986

Yonggwang 1 PWR (Westinghouse) 953 MWe 8/1986

Yonggwang 2 PWR (Westinghouse) 947 MWe 6/1987

Ulchin 1 PWR (Framatome) 945 MWe 9/1988

Ulchin 2 PWR (Framatome) 942 MWe 9/1989

Yonggwang 3 PWR (Syst 80) 997 MWe 12/1995

Yonggwang 3 PWR (Syst 80) 994 MWe 3/1996

Wolsong 2 PHWR (Candu) 710 MWe 7/1997

Wolsong 3 PHWR (Candu) 707 MWe 7/1988

Wolsong 4 PHWR (Candu) 708 MWe 10/1999

Ulchin 3 OPR-1000 994 MWe 8/1998

Ulchin 4 OPR-1000 998 MWe 12/1999

Yonggwang 5 OPR-1000 988 MWe 5/2002

Yonggwang 6 OPR-1000 996 MWe 12/2002

Ulchin 5 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 7/2004

Ulchin 6 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 4/2005

Shin Kori 1 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 2/2011

Shin Kori 2 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 7/2012

Shin Wolsong 1 OPR-1000 1001 MWe 7/2012

Total: 23 20,787 MWe

Source: “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, updated February 2013, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/South-Korea/.
282 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure V.19: ROK Nuclear Power Reactors under Construction

or Planned
Reactor Type Gross Capacity Construction Start Commercial
Operation
(Planned)

Shin Wolsong 2 OPR-1000 1050 MWe September 2008 10/2013

Shin Kori 3 APR-1400 1350 MWe October 2008 12/2013

Shin Kori 4 APR-1400 1350 MWe August 2009 9.2014

Shin Ulchin 1 APR-1400 1350 MWe July 2012 4/2017

Shin Ulchin 2 APR-1400 1350 MWe September 2013 2/2018

Shin Kori 5 APR-1400 1350 MWe August 2014 12/2019

Shin Kori 6 APR-1400 1350 MWe August 2015 12/2020

Shin Ulchin 3 APR-1400 1350 MWe 6/2021

Shin Ulchin 4 APR-1400 1350 MWe 6/2022

Total 12,250 MWe (~11,580

MWe net)

Note: “Start construction” in bold means the reactors are already under construction.
Source: “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, updated February 2013, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/South-Korea/.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 283

VI. Korean Peninsula Military Modernization

Trends
Military modernization efforts are a key variable when assessing the Korean Peninsula, and one
where the shifting strategies and military efforts of the US and China play an increasingly
important role. The modernization trends of all the countries involved in the region have great
significance in determining the types of engagement that could be fought. Modernization affects
deterrence and assessments of the potential course of any engagement, as well as estimate of
types of forces the US needs to commit to the region, both in times of peace and in times of
tension.
There are serious limits to the unclassified data available for comparisons of Northeast Asian
military modernization – especially for China and the DPRK. Unclassified sources do not
include many smart munitions, they only cover a limited amount of other weaponry, and they do
not reflect investments in logistics and transport. They also often do not include battle
management, ISR, or Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) assets. These
are becoming steadily more critical aspects of military modernization.
Later in this section, Figure VI.1 to Figure VI.5 do show, however, that the ROK has
modernized more rapidly and with more advanced equipment than the DPRK, while Pyongyang
has focused on force expansion. The ROK has almost achieved a massive lead in modern aircraft
and surface-to-air missiles. The figures also show that the ROK has an effective plan for force
modernization through 2020 – a plan it has upgraded since 2005. There is no unclassified DPRK
equivalent.
DPRK
The DPRK has limited economic means to support modernization and force expansion. As
previously discussed, the CIA estimated in June 2014 that the DPRK had a 2011 GDP of
approximately $40 billion (106th in the world), while the ROK’s 2012 GDP was approximately
$1.62 trillion (13th), 40 times greater. The DPRK had an estimated GDP per capita of $1,800
(197th in the world), while the ROK’s GDP per capita was about $33,200 (42nd), more than 18
times greater. 932
This, however, has not stopped the regime from devoting major resources to force expansion and
modernization. The first annual DOD unclassified report on North Korean forces was issued in
May 2013. The second report, released February 2014, described the DPRK’s modernization
programs as follows: 933
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) – an umbrella organization comprising ground, air, naval, missile, and
special operations forces – ranks in personnel numbers as the fourth largest military in the world. Four to
five percent of North Korea’s 24 million people serve on active duty, and a further 25-30 percent are
assigned to a reserve or paramilitary unit and subject to wartime mobilization.
The KPA fields primarily legacy equipment, either produced in, or based on designs of, the Soviet Union
and China, dating back to the 1950s, 60s and 70s, though a few systems are based on more modern
technology.
284 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

…During military parades held in Pyongyang in October 2010 and April 2012, a number of new weapon
systems were displayed for the first time, highlighting continued efforts to improve the military’s
conventional capabilities, despite financial hardships.
Ground. The parades featured several newly identified North Korean tanks, artillery, and other armored
vehicles. New infantry weapons have been displayed as well. The display of these systems shows that
North Korea continues to produce, or at least upgrade, limited types and numbers of equipment.
Air and Air Defense. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) operates a fleet of more than 1,300 aircraft,
primarily legacy Soviet models. The NKAF’s most capable combat aircraft are its MiG-29s, procured from
the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. North Korea’s most recent aircraft acquisition was in 1999 when it
surreptitiously purchased used Kazakh MiG-21s.
As the NKAF’s aircraft continue to age, it increasingly relies on its ground-based air defenses and hiding or
hardening of assets to counter air attacks. During the 2010 military parade, North Korea introduced a new
vertical launched mobile surface-to-air missile launcher and accompanying radar. It bears external
resemblance to the Russian S-300 and Chinese HQ-9.
North Korea publicized a March 2013 military live-fire drill that for the first time featured an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) in flight. The drone appeared to be a North Korean copy of a Raytheon MQM-107
Streaker target drone. North Korean press coverage of the event described the UAV as being capable of
precision strike by crashing into the target. The drill also featured the UAV as a cruise-missile simulator,
which was then shot down by a mobile SAM.
Naval. The North Korean Navy (NKN) has displayed very limited modernization efforts, highlighted by
upgrades to select surface ships and a continued program to construct small submarines. The submarine
force, unsophisticated but durable, demonstrated its capabilities by covertly attacking and sinking the ROK
warship CHEONAN with an indigenously produced submarine and torpedo.
Special Operations. In addition to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) wartime mission of deep strike
infiltrations combined arms peninsular attack, SOF may also conduct limited asymmetric attacks for
political aims,.
Ballistic Missile Force. North Korea has an ambitious ballistic missile development program and has
deployed mobile theater ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets throughout the ROK, Japan, and the
Pacific theater. Since early 2012, North Korea has made efforts to raise the public profile of its ballistic
missile command, now called the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Kim Jong Un’s reference to the SRF
during an April 15, 2012 speech seemed to elevate the command to a status on par with the Navy and Air
Force. During heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula In March 2013, North Korea made the SRF the
focus of its threat to launch a nuclear attack on U.S. and ROK targets. The targets included the U.S.
mainland, Hawaii, Guam, U.S. bases in the ROK, and the ROK President’s residence.
North Korea displayed what it refers to as Hwasong-13 missiles, which appear to be intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), on six road-mobile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) during military parades
in 2012 and 2013. If successfully designed and developed, the Hwasong-13 likely would be capable of
reaching much of the continental United States, assuming the missiles displayed are generally
representative of missiles that will be fielded. However, ICBMs are extremely complex systems that
require multiple flight tests to identify and correct design or manufacturing defects, and the Hwasong-13
has not been flight-tested. Without flight tests, its current reliability as a weapon system would be low.
North Korea continues to develop the TD-2, which could reach the United States if configured as an ICBM.
In April and December 2012, North Korea conducted launches of the TD-2 configured as a Space-Launch
Vehicle (SLV). The April launch was a failure but the December launch was a success.
Developing an SLV contributes heavily to North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile development, since
the two vehicles have many shared technologies. However, a space launch does not test a reentry vehicle
(RV). Without an RV capable of surviving atmospheric reentry, North Korea cannot deliver a weapon to
target from an ICBM.
North Korea showcases its ballistic missile force in high-level national celebrations. Most of North Korea’s
ballistic missiles were paraded in July 2013. In addition to the Hwasong-13, they unveiled an intermediate-
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 285

range ballistic missile (IRBM) and a version of the No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)
fitted with a cone-cylinder-flare payload at parades during the last three years. To date, the IRBM, like the
new mobile ICBM, has not been flight-tested and its current reliability as a weapon system would be low.
Development also continues on a solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).
Advances in ballistic missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technology discussed
in Chapter 5, are in line with North Korea’s stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. homeland.
North Korea followed its February 12, 2013 nuclear test with a campaign of media releases and
authoritative public announcements reaffirming its need to counter perceived U.S. hostility with nuclear-
armed ICBMs. North Korea continues to devote scarce resources to these programs, but the pace of its
progress will also depend, in part, on how much technology and other aid it can gain from other countries.
Cyberwarfare Capabilities. North Korea probably has a military offensive cyber operations (OCO)
capability. Implicated in malicious cyber activity and cyber effects operations since 2009, North Korea may
view OCO as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence and cause disruption in South Korea.
• From 2009 to 2011, North Korea was allegedly responsible for a series of distributed denial of
service attacks against South Korean commercial, government, and military websites, rendering
them briefly inaccessible.
• North Korea was allegedly behind two separate cyber attacks in 2013, which targeted South
Korean banking, media, and governmental networks, resulting in the erasure of critical data.
Given North Korea’s bleak economic outlook, OCO may be seen as a cost-effective way to develop
asymmetric, deniable military options. Because of North Korea’s historical isolation from outside
communications and influence, it is also likely to use Internet infrastructure from third-party nations. This
increases the risk of destabilizing actions and escalation on and beyond the Korean Peninsula.
Outside sources sometimes assess the DPRK’s modernization efforts more favorably. For
example, Jane’s World Armies reports that the DPRK has initiated a wide range of efforts in
reorganization, reequipping, forward deployment, restructuring, and upgrading of forces since
1995. It reports that the KPA slowly worked to mechanize its forces starting in 1998, in
particular the artillery. Key developments included: 934
[T]he production and deployment of small numbers of new tanks and long-range self-propelled artillery
systems (240 mm and 300 mm multiple rocket launchers (MRL), 170 mm self-propelled guns, etc); the
restructuring of two mechanised corps, one tank corps and one artillery corps into divisions; the expansion
of existing light infantry units, the establishment of a number of mechanised/motorised light infantry
brigades and the conversion of the Ballistic Missile Testing Guidance Bureau into the Strategic Rocket
Forces Command.
Jane’s notes KPA acquisition and possible production of lasers: 935
Since the 1990s, and possibly earlier, the KPA has employed both laser range-finding and laser-designating
equipment. In March 2003, however, the KPA demonstrated a new capability, employing a Chinese
manufactured ZM-87 antipersonnel laser against two US Army Apache helicopters flying along the
southern side of the DMZ. While none of the crew members were injured, the ZM-87 is capable of causing
serious injury to the human eye at 2-3 km and less serious injuries out to 10 km. It is unclear how, and
when, the KPA acquired the ZM-87. It is unknown whether the DPRK is attempting to produce this or
similar antipersonnel lasers. Defectors have identified the Mangyo Jewel Processing Factory,
Man’gyongdae-ri, P’yongyang-si, as a facility that produces lasers for precision-guided weapons. It is
likewise unknown if the acquisition or production is the responsibility of the First Machine Industry
Bureau, a component of the Second Academy of Natural Sciences, or the Nuclear-Chemical Defence
Bureau.
However, US experts feel that the DPRK is unable to undertake extensive military modernization
due to a weak economy and easy access to modern foreign arms: 936
286 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

North Korea’s large, forward-positioned military can attack South Korea with little or no strategic warning,
but it suffers from logistic shortages, aging equipment, and poor training. It has attacked South Korean
forces in/near disputed territories in the past and maintains the capability for further provocations.
Pyongyang is making some efforts to upgrade conventional weapons, including modernizing certain
aspects of its deployed missile forces – short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems.

Key Force Upgrades

The KPA has focused its resources on expanding and further developing its asymmetrical
capabilities, including WMD, special operations forces, ballistic missiles, and
electronic/information warfare. For the DPRK leadership, these capabilities can project a greater
threat at a smaller cost than conventional capabilities. Asymmetric capabilities will be discussed
further in the latter chapters of this report. 937
The DPRK has deliberately pursued an asymmetric strategy to enhance its long-range strike
capability against civilian and military targets to compensate for declining conventional
capabilities. Specific attention has been focused on self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket
launchers, and ballistic missiles. More reliance has also been given to the Special Forces, tasked
with stealthy infiltration of the ROK rear. 938
According to the 2010 ROK White Paper, DPRK Special Forces have been augmented to a
200,000 end-strength, up from 180,000 in 2008. The DPRK has scarcely, however, halted its
efforts to increase its conventional forces. Figure VI.1 provides a summary of DPRK
modernization trends based on IISS data. Figures VI.2 to VI.5 show how DPRK equipment
trends compare with those of the ROK. In virtually every case, the DPRK has been able to
acquire more systems than the ROK, though scarcely of the same quality.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 287

Figure VI.1: Key DPRK Equipment Modernization, 2000-2014

Army
Type 2000 2014 Remarks
MBTs 3,500 3,500+ IISS reported no changes in DPRK
MBT holdings but the 2010 ROK
White Paper noted the introduction of
the Pokpung-Ho (Storm Tiger),
believed to be modeled on the T-72

Air Force (and Air Defense)

Type 2000 2014 Remarks
SAMs 45 SA-2 179+ SA-2 Major reported increase in DPRK
7 SA-3 133 SA-3 SAM holdings
2 SA-5 38 SA-5
Combat 16 MIG-29 Fulcrum 18+ MIG-29A/S
Aircraft Fulcrum
UAV Pchela-1 Shmel Introduced in 2005.
Attack 20 Mi-24 Hind
Helicopters

Navy
Type 2000 2014 Remarks
Submarines 26 SSK PRC Type- 20 SSK PRC Type- Aggregate decrease in total DPRK
031/FSU Romeo 031/FSU Romeo submarines with 4 SSKs either retired
or not operational in 2013, increase in
230 SSC Sang-O SSC and SSW (midget) submarines
2+ SSC Sang-O II
20+ SSW Yugo and
Yeono
Source: All figures unless otherwise noted are based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2014.
288 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.2: ROK Estimates of DPRK Equipment Trends from

2004 to 2012
DPRK

River Crossing Equipment

MRL

Field Artillery

Armored Vehicles

Tanks

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
Armored River Crossing
Tanks Field Artillery MRL
Vehicles Equipment
2012 4200 2200 8600 4800 3000
2010 4100 2100 8500 5100 3000
2008 3900 2100 8500 5100 3000
2006 3700 2100 8500 4800 2200
2004 3700 2100 8500 5000 2200

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

ROK

Helicopters

Guided Weapons

Field Artillery

Armored Vehicles

Tanks

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

Armored
Tanks Field Artillery Guided Weapons Helicopters
Vehicles
2012 2300 2600 5300 30 600
2010 2300 2500 5200 30 600
2008 2300 2400 5400 30 600
2006 2300 2500 5300 30 600
2004 2300 2400 5300 30 600

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 289

Figure VI.3: ROK Estimates of DPRK and ROK Navy Equipment

Trends from 2004 to 2012
DPRK

Helicopters
Guided Weapons
Field Artillery
Armored Vehicles
Tanks

0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000

Armored Guided
Tanks Field Artillery Helicopters
Vehicles Weapons
2012 2300 2600 5300 30 600
2010 2300 2500 5200 30 600
2008 2300 2400 5400 30 600
2006 2300 2500 5300 30 600
2004 2300 2400 5300 30 600

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

ROK

Helicopters/Maritime Patrol

Support Vessels

Combat Vessels

Submarines

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Helicopters/Mariti
Submarines Combat Vessels Support Vessels
me Patrol
2012 10 140 20 60
2010 10 140 20 30
2008 10 140 40 50
2006 10 120 20 40
2004 10 140 20 50

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
290 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.4: ROK Estimates of DPRK and ROK Air Force

Equipment Trends from 2004 to 2010
DPRK

Helicopters
Training Aircraft
Air Mobility Aircraft
Reconaissance Aircraft
Combat Aircraft

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Reconaissance Air Mobility
Combat Aircraft Training Aircraft Helicopters
Aircraft Aircraft
2012 820 30 330 170 300
2010 860 30 520 300
2008 820 30 510 310
2006 840 30 330 180 310
2004 820 30 330 170 300

Source: Based primarily on material provided from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006,
2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

ROK

Helicopters

Training Aircraft

Air Mobility Aircraft

Reconaissance Aircraft

Combat Aircraft

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Reconaissance Air Mobility
Combat Aircraft Training Aircraft Helicopters
Aircraft Aircraft
2012 460 40 40 100 40
2010 460 60 40 180
2008 490 70 30 170 30
2006 500 40 40 160 40
2004 530 40 40 160 40

Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of Defense, Defense White Papers 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012. Some equipment figures
are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 291

ROK
The ROK provides a great deal more data on its modernization, spending, and force development
efforts. As a result, there are a wide range of useful South Korean and outside estimates of
current trends.
ROK Modernization Plans
The ROK is committed to significant future defense reforms, especially in light of increased
DPRK provocations over the past several years, and particularly in terms of military hardware. It
has “obtained additional stealth air-to-surface missiles and advanced cluster bombs and is
developing deep-penetrating ‘bunker-buster’ bombs capable of destroying fortified artillery in
the event of a new shelling attack.” Furthermore, the Defense ministry requested approximately
2.5 trillion won (about $2.1 billion) over a five year period to improve missile capabilities. 939
According to the IISS, 940
South Korea’s armed forces have to enhance deterrence, war-fighting and intelligence capabilities across
the full range of contingencies vis-à-vis the North, while also taking into account the systematic military
modernisation of key neighbouring powers.
Moreover, as the armed forces prepare for the transfer of OPCON, the South Korea–US Combined Forces
Command has to be reconfigured. At the same time, Seoul’s military intelligence, C4ISR, network-centric
warfare, and cyber-security capabilities all require upgrades.
Jane’s highlights some of the ROK’s recent modernization achievements and focuses: 941
Recent developments will improve overall ROKA operational effectiveness in the near term. These include
converting infantry formations into mechanised forces with significantly enhanced mobility and firepower,
improving tactical C3I and redesigning the cumbersome corps and division structure dating from the
Korean War into more flexible division and brigade task forces based on newly empowered combined arms
mechanised brigades. Other improvements include the introduction of new self-propelled howitzers, new
main battle tanks (MBTs) and armoured infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and a decision to introduce nearly
600 new attack, surveillance and utility helicopters.
Figure VI.5 summarizes key equipment modernizations.
A Series of Defense Reform Plans
In 2005, the ROK introduced the National Defense Reform Plan 2020, which focused on
modernizing the military structure and force size and expanding the civilian base for national
defense. Conceived during the Sunshine Policy era, the key premise was that the increasing
absence of a DPRK military war threat meant that a large number of ROK forces to balance this
threat would not be needed. As described by USFK, 942
Three phases have been established that will allow for a quicker force that can operate more precisely in an
ever-changing global environment. This includes a force that relies less on manpower and more on
technology. This change in focus results in a shift from the fixed and slow moving force focused on threat-
based situations to a rapidly deployable, capability-based force.
The current Defense Reform Plan 2020 includes downsizing of the military force, reducing the active
components to 500,000 personnel and the reserve components to 1.5 million. These represent reductions in
forces by 27 percent and 52 percent respectively. The expenses saved in personnel will be dedicated to
develop a more technologically sophisticated force. By having already enhanced its ability to manufacture
and produce weapons and equipment resulting from fulfilling the 1974 through 1981 Force Improvement
Plan, the Korean government is able to use much of its military investments to enhance its industrial base
and further establish a more self-reliant defense system.
292 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The plan was amended in June 2009 with the “Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009-2020),” further
refining the modernization and civilian base expansion goals while also reducing the previously
planned force strength reduction (from a projected 500,000 to 517,000) and introducing the
possibility of preemptive strikes against DPRK missile and nuclear facilities. Figure VI.6
portrays the Mid-Term Force Improvement Plan covering the first period of reform from 2011 to
2015, and Figure VI.7 shows the relocation of ROK forces into a more condensed network of
bases, to be completed by 2020.
The following measures were prioritized to prepare for DPRK threats: 943
(1) Organize frontline troops in a manner that allows them to exercise their combat strength immediately after
the outbreak of war to secure the security of the metropolitan region;
(2) Boost surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception capabilities in order to block and
eliminate North Korea’s asymmetric threats in enemy areas to the utmost extent;
(3) Secure strong reserve mobile power for each unit in order to counter enemies with a numerical advantage;
and
(4) Secure combat sustainability by stabilizing noncombat zones and nurturing elite reserve forces.
In late 2009, President Lee commissioned 15 experts to reexamine and redesign the ROK
Defense Reform Plan due to the changing geostrategic environment. One year later, the
Presidential Committee for Defense Reform submitted proposals for modifying 71 of the
Defense Reform Plan projects. Based on these proposals, the Ministry of National Defense
(MND) released an updated version, focusing on military structure and the defense management
system, to be implemented in short-, mid-, and long-term projects. This plan, entitled Defense
Reform Plan 307, also took into account the ROK experiences with recent DPRK provocations
(Cheonan and Yeonpyeong) and President Lee approved it in March 2011. After going through
the legislative process, the proposal became the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2012-2030). 944
In a report describing the changes envisioned by the plan, the MND foresaw a reinforcement of
its troops and reforms in the chain-of-command. Three priority areas were identified: increasing
the integrity of the ROK armed forces through military restructuring, ensuring active deterrence
capabilities, and maximizing the efficiency of the national defense administration and force
structure. Early warning and surveillance capabilities, including increasing the number of UAVs,
were also emphasized. Furthermore, eight priority issues were identified: 945
(9) Reorganization of the armed forces’ chain-of-command
(10) Establishment of an island defense command for the northwest (Yellow Sea)
(11) Improvement of the national defense training structure
(12) Organization of a priority order for strengthening military power
(13) Response to North Korea’s special forces and cyber threats
(14) Enhancement of mental strength and assistance for educating national citizens about security
(15) Improvement of the national defense personnel management system
(16) Bettering the efficiency of the national budget
Previously, the ROK military strategy had “placed greater emphasis on deterring North Korea’s
intention to provoke by mainly acquiring defensive capabilities,” also termed “defense by
denial” – whenever the DPRK made a provocation, the ROK would try to contain the action and
prevent further escalation, maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. 946
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 293

Conversely, the updated 2012-2030 Plan focused on enabling the South Korean military to
retaliate immediately, proportionally, and in a focused way against the DPRK based on enhanced
offensive capabilities – so that the DPRK would cease provocations. The ROK Minister of
National Defense at the time stated, “[i]f the enemy attacks our people and territory, I will use
force to punish the enemy to make sure it doesn’t even dare to think about it again. The enemy
should be punished thoroughly until the source of hostility is eliminated.” 947
According to the ROK Deputy Minister for Defense Reform at the MND, the updated Plan
“clearly reflects the guideline that a proactive deterrence, rather than a simple deterrence, is
needed even during times of relative peace in order to deter North Korean provocations.” The
ROK’s goal is to create deterrence based credible intimidation to dissuade the adversary from
even planning provocations. In particular, special combat units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force
would be newly activated or reorganized in response to the asymmetric threats.
The ROK had previously relied on three mutually reinforcing strategic pillars: forward active
defense, defensive deterrence, and alliance with the US. Now, force reorganization is intended to
provide a capability to increase proactive deterrence: 948
In the case of the Army, the mountain brigade will be set up in response to the potential infiltration of the
North Korean Special Operational Forces (SOF), which are currently estimated to number around 200,000
men. The Mountain brigade will be supplied with lightweight equipment and will operate in the
mountainous region of the eastern front.
As for the Navy, the Submarine Command will be established as a part of the submarine modernization
plan, by expanding the existing submarine group. Moreover, a next generation Korean destroyer, KDDX
will be constructed and deployed after 2020. The size of this new destroyer will be between that of the
currently operating 4,200-ton KDX-Ⅱ and the Aegis Destroyer KDX-Ⅲ, and will be assigned to a naval
task force.
The Marine Corps will activate the Jeju Unit and become responsible for the integrated civil-governmental-
military defense operations in the vicinity of Jeju Island in lieu of the Jeju Defense Command currently
under the command of the Navy. Moreover, in order to reinforce the defense of the northwestern frontline
Islands and to strengthen the Marines’ amphibious capabilities, the Marine Aviation Group equipped with
amphibious maneuverability and attack helicopters will also be activated.
The priority of the Air Force is to first establish the Air Intelligence Group by the year 2017, which will be
responsible for aerial reconnaissance and intelligence support. The Air Intelligence Group will operate
reconnaissance aircraft, mid- to high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as intelligence
acquisition equipment for imagery intelligence (IMINT) and electronic signals intelligence (ELINT).
Furthermore, the Satellite Surveillance Control Squadron responsible for the surveillance of military and
civilian satellites passing over the Korean peninsula is also planned to be established by the year 2019. The
satellite reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities will not only provide greater air and space operations
capabilities but will also help the ROK military to detect any potential threats against the ROK in advance,
to prevent any contingencies and to increase the effect of their response.
Finally, the ROK military is reorganizing its force structure in preparation against North Korea’s SOF and
cyberspace threats. The Ministry plans to reinforce rear area operation units and strengthen our homeland
defense divisions. In order to improve their execution capabilities, the ROK military decides to upgrade
rear area C2 & strike system. Furthermore, the ROK military is increasing the number of personnel
allocated to the Cyber Command in response to asymmetric threats.
Cyber-warfare staffing was planned to increase by 1,000 in order to better prepare for the rising
cyber-security threat. 949 The ROK also committed to improving force structure capabilities to
better respond to the DPRK’s missile threats, while also reorganizing the command and
personnel structures: 950
294 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

In addition to the reorganization plan for field units, plans for the development and allocation of weapons
systems have been developed in order to effectively respond to enemy attacks. The plans include
development of ballistic missile capabilities, procurement of ballistic missile detection radars in response to
North Korea’s ballistic missile threats, and development and deployment of mid-range surface-to-air
missiles (M-SAMs) and long-range surface-to-air missiles (L-SAMs). Hereby, the capacity and
competencies of the Missile Command will be significantly improved.
North Korea holds a higher strategic ground against South Korea in terms of missile and long-range
artillery capabilities since it is currently assessed to be in possession of, and to have fielded mid-range
Nodong (range: 1,300 km) and Musudan (range: 2,500 to 4,000 km)missiles, and to be developing a long-
range missile, the Taepodong 2 (range: 6,000 km). Moreover, while there are some practical constraints on
South Korea’s ability to exercise its proactive deterrence strategy in reality, North Korea can strike any
place, anywhere in South Korea as it targets. Hence, the extension of South Korea’s missile range is
imperative. Furthermore, acquiring deterrent capabilities to directly strike North Korean core facilities such
as nuclear facilities and missile operating bases even during the armistice is of vital importance.
The ROK military intends to restructure its operational command structure. Under a new streamlined
structure, the ROK military will unify its operational command and support by allowing the three Service
Headquarters to directly participate in the operational chain of the ROK Chairman of the JCS. The purpose
of restructuring operational command system lies in reducing inefficiency and ensuring more effective
operational execution in any given theater. The Armed Forces Organization bill to realize such an idea was
introduced to the National Assembly on September 24, 2012.
Under the proposed bill, the currently top-heavy command structure will be streamlined by integrating the
Headquarters and Operations Command of individual Services. And, in turn, more personnel will be able to
be assigned to the tactical units where they are most needed so that the ROK military can be transformed
into a stronger warfighting force. A reduction in the overall number of flag officers is also planned. Such a
reduction, however, is not intended to be a unilateral reduction. Rather, those areas more pertinent to actual
combat operations will see an increase in the number of flag officers.
In anticipation of the effects of the low birth rate on the nation’s population growth as well as reduced
budget and the changing battlefield environment, the personnel structure reform characterized by down-
sized troops and increased number of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) will be implemented.
The overall manpower will be reduced from the current level of 636,000 to 522,000 service members by
the year 2022. While the number of seamen, airmen, and marines will be maintained at the current level of
41,000, 65,000 and 28,000 respectively, that of the soldiers of the Army will be reduced in numbers from
approximately 500,000 to 387,000. Moreover, the number of corps and divisions will also be reduced from
eight to six and 42 to 28, respectively.
In order to guarantee that the reduction in the number of service members does not lead to any reduction of
actual strength of the forces, the MND will acquire high-tech weaponry and equipment and progressively
promote the officers and NCOs, mainly through expansion of the NCO’s recruitment volume. Accordingly,
the average proportion of officers and NCOs in individual Services is expected to be increased from the
current level of 29.4 percent to 42.5 percent by the year 2025. In addition, the completion of the increase in
the number of female service members, which was previously planned for the year 2020, will be completed
by the year 2017. Consequently, the average percentage of female officers and NCOs will increase up to 7
percent and 5 percent, respectively. Also, additional Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) such as
artillery, armor and air defense will be opened to female service members.
Meanwhile, in light of the changes in the military structure followed by the deactivation of the First and
Third ROK Armies scheduled in 2015, a new operations execution system focusing on corps level units
will be established. As for the battalion level, a special emphasis will be placed on strengthening the
combat execution capabilities of infantry battalions responsible for frontline operations. Mid-range anti-
tank guided weapons, dual-caliber air-burst assault rifles, and small UAVs will be provided to battalion
level units. The number of officers and NCOs at the battalion level will also be increased from the current
level of 90 to 152.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 295

In order to carry out these reforms, the deputy minister estimated that the 2012-2016 defense
budget would require 187.9 trillion won along with a continuing annual budget increase of 6-8%.
The total cost would be 59.3 trillion won for force improvement programs with an annual
estimated increase rate of 8.8%, and 128.6 trillion won for operations and maintenance.
The ROK also released a Mid-Term Defense Plan 2013-17, focusing on measures to counter the
DPRK’s growing nuclear, ballistic missile, cyber, and long-range artillery capabilities. 951
The top priority lies in deploying the Hyunmu 2A SSM and the Hyunmu-3C cruise missiles after
configuration tests are completed between 2012 and 2014. The ministry also stressed the need to deploy
mid- and long-range surface-to-air missiles against North Korea’s growing ballistic-missile inventory; the
so-called L-SAM programme (a Korean Patriot variant) is due to begin development in 2013, with an initial
cost of some US$87m. In total, the ministry plans to spend some US$5.3bn up to 2016 in meeting current
military threats from the North. Critics have said, however, that by focusing on countering near-term North
Korean threats, South Korea has under-emphasised some emerging risks.
The mid-term defence plan also called for the general-purpose forces to be reduced from 636,000 to
520,000 by 2022, leaving 387,000 in the ground forces; 65,000 in the air force; 40,000 in the navy; and
28,000 Marines. By 2020, the army will reduce to eight corps and 37 divisions, and fall further to six corps
and 28 divisions by 2030. Meanwhile, a Mountain Brigade will be created by 2020, together with extra
ATGW units and short-range UAVs. The navy has announced a range of capability developments intended
to better meet North Korean and regional contingencies and has said it will establish new marine, ground-
defence and attack-helicopter units.
296 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.5: Key ROK Equipment Modernization, 2000-2014

Army
Type 2000 2014 Remarks
Battle Tanks 800 Type-88 (K1) 1484 K1/K1A1 Armor holdings increased from about 2,130
to 2,410 by 2010 with an emphasis on
shifting toward third-generation MBTs
APCs 300 Bv206; 1700 KIFV
Artillery 300 K-9 Thunder Introduced in 2005, the K-9 self-propelled
howitzer was designed to replace the aging
M109A2 and significantly increase the
ROK’s artillery capacity.
SAMs 110 MIM-23B I- Chung Ma Pegasus (SP)
HAWK 158 MIM-23B I-HAWK;
48 Patriot PAC-2

Navy
Type 2000 2014 Remarks
Submarines 3 KSS-1 Dolgorae 9 Chang Bogo 8 SSI Dolphins were phased out within this
3 SSK Son Won-ill period
2 KSS-1 Dolgorae
Destroyers 3 King Kwanggaeto 6 Chungmugong Yi Sun- To reach their goal to become a blue-water
3 Kwang-Ju Jhin KDX-II navy by 2020, the decade saw major
developments with new lines of indigenous
destroyers being deployed. Older surface
ships appear to have been retired.
Cruisers 3 Sejong KDX-III
Frigates 3 Gwanggaeto
Daewang KDX-I; 1
Incheon; 9 Ulsan
Corvettes 9 Gumdoksuri
21 Po Hang
4 Dong Hae
Naval Aviation 23 combat capable fixed- 16 combat capable Decrease in total naval aviation. Fixed-
wing aircraft (15 S-2Es, fixed-wing aircraft (8 P- wing holdings fell from 23 to 16 and
8 P-3C Orion) 3C Orion, 8 P-3CK armed helicopters from 47 to 24. ASW
12 Lynx (ASW) Orion) capabilities were however doubled, with
24 Lynx MK99/MK99A further increases anticipated.
(ASW)

Air Force
Type 2000 2014 Remarks
Combat Aircraft 88 KF-16C/D Fighting 60 F-15K Eagle Aircraft numbers remained stable but
Falcon 164 KF-16C/D Fighting the F-4s were phased out in favor of
130 F-4D/E Phantom Falcon fourth-generation fighters
REECE/ISR 4 Hawker 800RA;
Aircraft 20 KO-1
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 297

17 RF-4C Phantom II
EW/ELINT/SIGINT 4 Hawker 800SIG
UAVs (ISR) 3 Searchers Night Intruder
3 Searcher
100 Harpy
Source: All figures unless otherwise noted are based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2014.

Figure VI.6: ROK Mid-term Force Improvement Plan

The MND will pursue a total of 290 force improvement projects from 2013 to 2017. It continues its
196 existing projects, including the K-21 IFV, and second batch of F-15Ks, and about 94 new
projects, including the next generation destroyer and tanker aircraftprograms.
Classification Continuing Projects New Projects
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, • Airborne Warning and Control • Harbor Surveillance System
Command and Control System • Mobile Underwater Surveillance
Capabilities • Ground Tactical C4I System Sonar
Maneuver and Fire Capabilities • K21 Infantry Fighting • Korean Utility Helicopter
Vehicles • Improving the performance of
• K-9 Self-propelled artillery K-55 Self-propelled artillery
Marine and Landing Capabilities • Kwanggaeto the Great III class • The 2nd Minesweeper Project
destroyer [Aegis] • Next-generation mine laying
• Jangbogo II class submarine ship
Air Combat Capabilities • F-15K Fighter • Improving the performance of
• Advanced Trainer (T-50) the C-130H
Research and Development Intermediate-altitude unmanned UAVs, division-level UAVs
Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 146–147.

At the end of 2009, South Korea began its plan to decrease the number of military installations. The
plan entails a reduction from the current 1,900 to 700 by the year 2020 when the restructuring of the
military will be completed in accordance with the defense reform.
298 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.7: Relocation of ROK Forces

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 281.

Key Force Upgrades

The ROK has been confronted with a number of major challenges during the last decade,
including reductions in manned US units on its territory, a greater desire for autonomy within the
US-ROK alliance, and a hostile threat environment. These trends have pushed the ROK to
increase its capabilities in areas previously overseen by US forces, notably in surveillance,
reconnaissance, and early warning. In 2005 the ROK MND released “The Defense Reform 2020
Initiative,” which outlined the ROK strategy to create a slimmer and more “self-reliant” military
focused on technological improvements. 952
An estimate of the ROK’s modernization plans by Bruce Bennett of the RAND Corporation is
shown in detail in Figure VI.8. Some key goals in the “The Defense Reform 2020 Initiative,”
included procuring advanced aircraft and transforming a largely coastal patrol force into a blue-
water navy. 953 The ROK has focused on modernizing the Navy and Air Force to establish an
omnidirectional military posture able to deal with all types of threats. The Navy has introduced
domestically built destroyers, large transport ships, and submarines. The first mobile corps, with
one Aegis-equipped vessel and six destroyers with plans for future expansion, was introduced in
February 2010. The primary missions are to protect sea lanes, deter North Korea, and support the
ROK’s external policies. Air Force promotion of domestic missile production is also likely. 954
Furthermore, the Air Force has examined fielding F-15K fighters and developing a next-
generation fighter program that includes stealth capabilities, such as the KF-X fighter, a medium-
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 299

sized two-engine aircraft similar to the Eurofighter Typhoon. 955 The plane has been under study
for 14 years and is still waiting for full-scale development authorization. In September 2014,
there were media reports that the DAPA agreed to a deal for 40 F-35A fighters worth WON 7.3
trillion. This deal would include technology transfer in 17 sectors for use in KF-X. They
included flight control and fire suppression technologies, which were an important aspect of the
KF-X design. 956
If the deal becomes firm, the KF-X may be operational by the mid-2020s – athough a foreign
partner would be needed for production. The KF-X is planned to initially deploy with, and then
replace the KF-16. The goal is to promote domestic development and production by advancing
the ROK defense industry as well as give the ROK better control over its configuration and
systems. 957
Some reports indicate the government estimates the project will cost approximately 6 trillion
won ($5.5 billion), though KIDA argues it would be at least 10 trillion won to develop.
Constructing 120 units would cost 8 trillion won, and 30-year operation costs would be $9
trillion. Experts for Jane’s believe that 220-676 planes could be exported if priced at
approximately $70-90 million each, compared to Lockheed Martin’s F-16 ($70 million each) and
the Boeng F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the Eurofighter Typhoon, and the Dassault Rafale ($83-132
million each). Countries in South East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America have been
proposed as potential customers. There remain significant hurdles to the actual development of
the plane, especially technological readiness. 958
The hostilities the DPRK began in 2010 have also pushed the ROK to amend its reform plans
and pursue a more aggressive strategy to guard against future DPRK hostilities. These have
included increased militarization in the Yellow Sea to convert the ROK’s five islands into
“fortresses,” 959 reducing the magnitude of the proposed troop cut to retain army manpower at
517,000 instead of 500,000, increasing anti-submarine warfare helicopters in the wake of the
sinking of the Cheonan, and strategizing means to combat the DPRK’s irregular warfare
tactics. 960
Other examples of how the ROK’s modernization plans grew after the DPRK’s November 2010
Yeonpyeong artillery attack include:
 ROK government sources indicated in January 2011 that they have pushed for expedited purchase of fifth
generation stealth fighters by 2015 with a targeted introduction date of 2016–2020. Contenders include the
Boeing F-15, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and EADS Eurofighters. 961
 Seoul has been lobbying for revisions to a bilateral accord that limits their ballistic missiles to a 300-
kilometer range and 500kg payload (See Section 6).
 Growing reports that the ROK is interested in substantially increasing defense-related deals with Israel to
buy drones, missiles, radars, and possibly missile defense systems, 962 such as a $29 million deal with
Israel’s Elbit systems in January 2011 to supply Airborne Electric Warfare (EW) Suites and Missile
Warning Systems for the ROKAF CN-235 transport aircraft. 963
 The ROK MND announced in December 2010 that it would create a new Joint Forces Command to reform
the top military command structure and increase operability between branches. 964
300 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Key Procurement Plans

Reporting by Jane’s further highlights the ROK Army’s current procurement efforts, which
focus on attempts to increase armored capabilities and the ability to conduct maneuver
warfare: 965
Main Battle Tanks (MBTs)
• The Active Protection System (APS) that automatically detects and shoots down approaching
rockets or missiles, developed for the indigenously produced K-2 MBT, was announced in
February 2012 to have been successfully developed. It is reported to take 3/10 of a second to
detect, track, and fire counter-rockets.
• In 2003, the K2 ‘Black Panther’ Main Battle Tank’s development was initiated by a subsidiary of
Hyundai Group. This tank will replace K1s and M48s.
o It utilizes “a German MTU 1500 hp Europowerpack engine, a 55-caliber 120 mm main gun
with autoloader and the latest self-protection and targeting equipment, such as a laser
detection system, anti-missile grenade launchers, reactive armour and an all-weather sensor
package.” Its maximum speed is 70 km/hr, and it also has the ability to cross rivers as deep as
4.1 meters via a snorkel.
o The production line has been idle since 2010 while indigenously developed components are
prepared. It was announced that it would go back into production in 2012, using foreign
components if necessary.
o The ROK had originally announced procurement of more than 500 K2 MBTs (for
approximately $2.5 billion), but reduced the order to about 400 due to budget cuts. Further
order reductions are possible.
• After problems with an indigenous engine and transmission in 2012, deliveries of an initial batch
of K2’s with foreign engines and transmissions began in June 2014. The ROK Army said that it
planned deploy 100 K2’s with indigenous engines and transmission by 2017. 966
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
• The ROK’s K21 Infantry Fighting Vehicle entered into service in late 2009 and has a planned final
production of approximately 500 units.
o The K21 cost approximately $96 million and took seven years to develop.
o It has “a mounted, stabilised 40 mm L/70 Bofors automatic gun, a 7.62 mm machine gun
and a launcher for anti-tank guided missiles. It has an advanced river-crossing capability,
can carry three crew members and a squad of nine soldiers and travels at up to 70 km/h
on land and 7.8 km/h in water.” 967
o It is the ROK’s first indigenously produced IFV and will cost $1-3.5 million less than the
M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle.
Mine-Protected Ambush Vehicles (MRAPs)
• The ROK requested 10 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) from the US in January 2010,
though it is unknown if these have been delivered.
K9 Thunder [Artillery]
• After the Yeonpyeong Island attacks (see Chapter 4), the ROK MND was considering additional
procurement – seeking an extra $228 million (264 billion won) in the 2011 defence budget – of
Samsung Techwin 155 mm/52 cal K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers. The budget had already
contained almost twice that amount (485 billion won) for K9 purchases.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 301

• The K9 is the primary ROK platform to offset the DPRK’s numerical advantage in artillery. The
ROK requires more than 500 systems and at least 300 had been purchased by 2010; deliveries
were scheduled to be finished by 2012, though the exact number purchased has not been revealed.
• In deployment, for approximately every three to six K9s, one K10 ammunition resupply vehicle is
provided.
EVO-105 truck-mounted howitzer
• “The ROKA plans to acquire 800 EVO-105 truck-mounted howitzers, with fielding to commence
in 2017. The EVO-105 consists of a standard South Korean KM500 (6Ú6) five tonne truck chassis
with the rear cargo area modified to accept the upper assembly and tube from existing 105 mm
M101 towed howitzers, with the addition of the fire control system from Samsung Techwin’s 155
mm/52-calibre K9 Thunder tracked self-propelled gun. The EVO-105 is quicker to deploy, fire,
and reload than towed 105 mm guns and has a maximum rate of fire of 10 rounds a minute with a
crew of five.” 968
M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) [Artillery]
• Hanwha was granted a license in 2003 to domestically produce the Lockheed Martin 227 mm
M270 MLRS rocket. Since 2005, approximately 4,000 missiles annually have been produced,
worth around 600 billion won each year. The MLRS can also fire 300 km-range army tactical
missile systems (ATACMS) that the ROK buys from the US. MLRS systems are assisting the
ROK in OPCON transfer (discussed in Chapter 5), allowing the ROK to hit ground targets behind
the DMZ.
• In April 2011, it was announced that a new multiple rocket launcher (MRL) was under
development, with the initial prototype likely to be completed by 2013. It was projected to have an
80 km range and increase the ROK’s artillery capability.
Indigenous Multiple Rocket Launcher (Chunmoo MRL?)
• “The Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) announced in April 2011 that it is
developing a new multiple rocket launcher (MRL), with the first prototype expected in 2013.
According to officials, the locally developed MRL will have a range of 80 km and will boost the
artillery capability of the ROKA. Neither the details of the calibre, type of rocket, or warhead it
will launch have been released, nor whether it will be based on a tracked or wheeled chassis.”
• This MRL may be the Chunmoo MRL, which is produced by Hanwha. According to Hanwha, the
Chunmoo can fire 130mm rocket at a maximum range of 80km and 230mm rockets at a maximum
range of 160km. This multi-caliber system can also fire the 227mm rockets used by the M270.
The Chunmoo is intended to replace the older K136 MLRS system. 969 Another report be
DefenseNews, gives the maximum range of the 130mm rocket as 36km. 970 The Chunmoo was first
unveiled in 2013, which falls in line with DAPA’s announcement in 2011.
Air Defense
• The ROK developed a MANPAD system in 2003 to replace its older MANPADs. The Chiron (aka
the Singung or KP-SAM) was initially deployed in 2005, with approximately 2,000 in service.
• The ROK Air Force purchased 24 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) surface-to-air missile
systems from Germany in 2008 and an additional 24 in 2010. The ROK now has two Patriot
battalions, each consisting of three firing batteries – each battery with eight launchers and a
command center. The equipment – including the radars, missiles, ground-control equipment, and
launchers – cost $1 billion. Upgrade kits were also ordered, and 64 missiles in total were upgraded
from PAC-2 to GEM-T standard.
Anti-Tank [Infantry]
• The ROK’s LIGNex1 Co Ltd was contracted to indigenously develop a Medium Range Infantry
Missile (MRIM), as reported in May 2011. Development is projected to be finished by 2013, with
production by 2014 and the first units in service in 2015.
302 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

• The MRIM will be deployed with a firing post and a vehicle-mounted launcher, though it is
designed to be shoulder-fired. It is being developed to be comparable with Rafael’s Spike and
Raytheon’s Javelin.
Battlefield Missiles [Infantry]
• By September 2011, the ROK had purchased Spike non line-of-sight (NLOS) battlefield missiles
from Israel’s Rafael; they will likely be deployed on Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong islands in
fixed positions to be used against coastal artillery positions, though they can also be used from
ground vehicles, surface ships, or helicopters. Up to 67 could have been in service by the end of
2011.
Small Arms [Infantry]
• The K11 rifle entered service in mid-2010 and is capable of firing 20mm high-explosive grenades
– utilizing a laser tracking system – and 5.56 mm rounds using a single trigger. The rifles cost
approximately $16,000 each and the ROK Army is expected to provide each 10- or 12-man squad
with two K11s.
C4ISR [Infantry]
• Delivery of six Saab Artillery Hunting Radar (ARTHUR) Weapon Locating Radar systems,
costing $120 million, likely started in 2010. The system can, within seconds, find firing artillery
weapons – such as DPRK long range artillery – and send the data through command and control
systems.
Korean Attack Helicopter [Army Aviation]
• A July 2011 contract was awarded for the initial development phase of a 4-ton attack helicopter as
part of the ROK’s plans to deploy 200 indigenously produced attack helicopters. The production
contract is likely to be awarded in 2013, and the ROK has announced it requires 207 attack
helicopters by 2020.
• The ROK is also going to order 36 additional heavy-attack AH-X helicopters. It announced in
May 2012 that it was deciding between the AH-64D, AH-1Z and the Turkish T129 (AW729). The
estimated cost of the aircraft and associated parts, training, and support was $2.6-3.6 billion,
though the ROK had initially planned only $800 million in expenditures.
• In 2010, the prototype KAI Surion Korean Utility Helicopter was unveiled, with delivery from
2011. It was approved for combat in mid-2012, and by the end of that year six had been delivered
to the Army. By 2020, more than 200 of these helicopters are planned to be deployed. Other
variants – such as medevac, maritime, and combat search and rescue – are also being developed. It
is crewed by two pilots and two gunners, and can transport 11 troops and their equipment.
Bi Ho [Anti-Aircraft]
• The ROK army contracted with Doosan to develop a newer version of the self-propelled Bi Ho
(Flying Tiger) twin 30 mm anti-aircraft gun – planned to be fitted with the Chiron (Singung) (New
Bow) surface-to-air missile – likely in mid-2010.

Modernization and Military Effectiveness

Although the ROK military is less than half as large as the DPRK’s in terms of force structure,
personnel, and major equipment holdings, the equipment itself is significantly more
technologically advanced. The two countries have quantitatively comparable naval and air
forces, though the ROK’s are much superior.
The ROK’s primary shortcomings are in precision munitions, biological and chemical defense,
communications and control, and command. Due to a constrained budgetary atmosphere, the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 303

ROK has had to cut or delay several modernization programs. The IISS analyzes the impact of
modernization on the ROK’s forces as follows, 971
South Korea’s army consists of 11 corps, with 52 divisions and 20 brigades. They can deploy some 2,300
main battle tanks, 2,500 armoured personnel carriers and light tanks, 4,500 heavy-calibre artillery pieces,
6,000 mortars, an estimated 600 air defence guns, over 1,000 surface-to-air missiles, and about a dozen
short-range surface-to-surface missiles. Usually, 12 army divisions are deployed along the DMZ in heavily
fortified positions. The South Korean air force has 538 combat aircraft and 117 attack helicopters.
Meanwhile, the South Korean navy includes 39 principal surface combatants, 20 submarines, 84 patrol and
coastal combatants, 15 mine warfare ships, 12 amphibious vessels, and 60 naval combat aircraft. South
Korea’s defence expenditure is several times more than that of North Korea. In 2002, as at average annual
exchange rates, South Korea’s defence budget amounted to $13.2bn. However, this figure needs to be
balanced as manpower costs in the South are greater.
… South Korea’s ground combat weapon capabilities are rated higher than those of North Korea because of
South Korea’s qualitative edge. By the same measure, its air capabilities, when factoring in attack
helicopters, are also superior – totaling about 2.5 F-16 wing equivalents. With the acquisition of the US
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Block 1-A, due in service this year, South Korea’s armed forces
will increase their capabilities significantly. The missile system has a range of 300km and can target
command and communications facilities, intelligence assets, and missile launching sites.
304 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK

Modernization – Part One
Comparison of the ROK Army, 2004 versus 2020
2020 Force; Equipment
Force Type 2004 Reduced Sustained
Army active-duty 560,000 370,000 390,000-400,000
personnel
Forward ground forces
Top echelons 2 armies, 8 corps 1 command, 6 corps
Active divisions 5 mechanized, 17 3 mechanized, 10 5 mechanized, 8
infantry motorized motorized
Reserve divisions 6 HRDs, 9 MRDs 5 HRDs [+4 MRDs]
Heavy brigades 4 armor 3 armor, 1 mechanized
Light brigades 3 infantry 4 security
Rear ground forces
Divisions 7 HRDs, 3 MRDs 6 HRDs
Brigades 3 commandos 1 commando
Reserve personnel 3,000,000 1,500,000
Tanks 2,300 1,700 2,300
Armor vehicles 2,400 1,900 2,400
Artillery/multiple 5,300 3,700 5,300
rocket launchers
Missiles 30 ~50?
Helicopters 600 400? 600?
Note: HRD = Homeland Reserve Division; 2020 forces estimated where possible; based on ROK National assembly data, 2004
Defense White Paper, IISS Military Balance 2005, Jane’s World Armies 2005.
Source: Bruce Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan” (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 305

Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK

Modernization – Part Two
Comparison of the ROK Navy and Marine Corps, 2004 versus 2020
Force Type 2004 2020
Navy/Marine Corps personnel 67,000 64,000
Surface Combatants
Destroyers 3 KDX I, 2 KDX II 3 KDX I, 6 KDX II, 6 KDX III
Frigates 9 Ulsan 17 FFX
Corvettes 28 0
Patrol 82 40 PKM-X
Submarines
KSS-3 0 9?
KSS-2 (Type 214) 0 6
Type 209 9 3
Mini-subs (KSS-1) 11 0
Mine warfare 17 10?
Amphibious ships 4 LSTH, 4 LST 5 LPD, 7? LSTH
Major support ships 6 8?
Aircraft 8 P-3C, 8 S-2A, 5 Caravan 16 P-3C, 5 Caravan
Navy helicopters 30 Lynx 30 Lynx, 8 Mine Hunter, 60 KHP?
Marine divisions 2 2
Marine brigades/regiments 2 0
Tanks 60 K-1 60 K-1A1
Other armor 100 100
Artillery 150 150
Helicopters 6 SA-316 60 KHP?
Note: Based on ROK National assembly data, 2004 Defense White Paper, IISS Military Balance 2005, Jane’s Fighting Ships
2005.
Source: Bruce Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan” (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.
306 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.8. Defense Reform 2020 (2005) Plans for ROK

Modernization – Part Three
Comparison of the ROK Air Force, 2004 versus 2020
Force Type 2004 2020
Air Force personnel 64,000 65,000
Fighter aircraft 0 high end 60 KF-15, 60 KF-X
150 F-16 170 KF-16
380 F-4, F-5, A-37 130 A-50?
Forward air control 30 O-1, O-2 20 KO-1
Reconnaissance 27 RF-4C, RF-5, Hawker 24 RKF-16, Hawker
Search and rescue 6 CH-47, 3 AS-232 7 Ka-32
Airborne early warning and 0 4
control (AWACS)
Tankers 0 4
Training aircraft 18 Hawk, 30 T-38, 15 T-41, 54 F- 90 KT-50, 80 KT-1
5, 25 T-33, 55 KT-1
Transport helicopters 3 UH-60 ?
UAVs 3 Searcher, 100 Harpy More numerous, diverse
Air defenses 200 Nike, 110 I-Hawk SAM-X, M-SAM
Note: Based on ROK National assembly data, 2004 Defense White Paper, IISS Military Balance 2005, Jane’s Sentinel Security
Assessments 2005.
Source: Bruce Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan” (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2006).
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.

Other Estimates of Modernization Trends and Spending

The IISS discussion of the broad trends in ROK modernization spending indicates that the ROK
MND has judged that several areas of defense capability and policy need special attention: 972
• Improve C4ISR capabilities
• Enhance the ‘jointness’ of the armed forces
• Plan for the 2015 OPCON transfer (discussed in Chapter 6)
• Continue to follow the Basic Defense Reform Plan 2012-30 (discussed earlier in this chapter)
o Upgrade military command-and-control structures
o Increase R&D spending by 7%
o Build up information-security and cyber-warfare capacity
• Streamline procurement and undertake other reforms to save $400 million annually during the
2013-17 Mid-Term Defense Program
o In addition, improved processes and standards, manpower and organization restructuring,
outsourcing, and better financial efficiency should also help save money
• The 2012 military budget was split into 70% for force maintenance and 30% for force
modernization; by 2017, modernization should increase to 33% of the budget
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 307

In terms of procurement, the ROK’s short-term goal is to increase deterrence against the DPRK’s
long-range artillery and ballistic missile capabilities. To do this, the ROK plans to develop
medium- and longer-range SAMs, while also introducing a cruise missile (the Hyunmu-3C) and
a surface-to-surface tactical ballistic missile (the Hyunmu-2A). The Navy is working to provide
more integrated capabilities by 2020 – especially in the areas of surface, submarine, and naval-
aviation capacities – and will develop six new destroyers (KDX-11A). The Navy also plans to
create a Submarine Command by 2015 and increase procurement of Type-214 submarines. 973
The ROK Air Force plans to increase surveillance systems significantly, especially after the
OPCON transfer in 2015 (as discussed in Chapter II) – such as by developing electronic- and
signals-intelligence systems, medium- and high-altitude UAVs, an airborne early warning unit in
2017 and a satellite surveillance control center in 2019. Air Force modernization is primarily
oriented towards the FX-3 fighter replacement program – costing approximately $7.6 billion; 40
aircraft will be delivered starting in 2016. The announced candidates were the Eurofigher
Typhoon, Lockheed Martin’s F-35, and Boeing’s F-15SE. The ROK also wants to replace its F-
4s and F-16s. 974
There was news in early April 2013 that the US was selling 60 F-35s to the ROK for $10.8
billion and 60 F-15s for $2.4 billion. Although actual delivery of the F-35s would not take place
until many years in the future. 975 Later reports in September 2014, indicated that the ROK would
buy 40 F-35 fighters for 7.34 trillion won ($7.06 billion) for delivery in 2018-2021. 976
It was also reported on April 17, 2013 that the ROK Army, in order to modernize its aging
helicopter fleet, had agreed to a $1.6 billion contract with Boeing for 36 AH-64E Apache
Guardian attack helicopters to be delivered by 2018, accompanied by related logistical support
and training. 977 In early May 2013 the US Congress agreed to sell four Global Hawk spy UAVs
to the ROK – eight years after they were requested – though it is uncertain if the ROK still wants
the equipment. 978 On the FX-3, the IISS notes, 979
However, air-force modernisation is dominated by the FX-3 fighter replacement programme. This is the
armed forces’ largest procurement programme, with a budget of some US$7.6bn for a total of 40 combat
aircraft, to be introduced from 2016. Seoul is seeking to replace its ageing F-16s as well as its older F-4s.
Reportedly, the latter are virtually inoperable. The three contenders for the FX-3 are Boeing’s F-15SE,
Lockheed Martin’s F-35, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration
(DAPA) has insisted that war-fighting capabilities, cost and maintenance efficiency, associated technology
transfers, and interoperability will be the key criteria in the final decision. The original plan was for DAPA
and the ministry to decide the winner by the end of October 2012 – a deadline that was not met.
A South Korean analysis of these trends by Paek Jaeok of the Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses states, 980
In 2012, investment priorities [see Figures VI.9 and VI.10] associated with defense capability
improvement expenditure are “securing core combat capability against the possibility of provocations form
the North, the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK in 2014, and bolstering defense R&D.…”
In 2012, new procurement programs include Geomdoksuri-B (PKX-B) special warfare support
ships/special infiltration boats; next-generation figure planes (F-X); large-sided attack helicopters (AH-X);
production of Korean-type maneuver helicopters in large quantities; offshore operation helicopters;
surveillance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); Cheolmae-II (mid-range surface-to-air missiles); multi-
purpose precision guided cluster bombs; and GPS-guided bomb-2. New R&D programs involve wheeled
combat vehicles; ground tactical data link (KVMF); and 2.75-inch guided rockets. New performance
improvement programs include K1A1 tank, KJCCS, and Cheolmae-II performance improvement. These
new programs are targeted as investment priorities for defense capability improvement in 2012….
308 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Securing core combat capability [see Figure VI.11] against the possibility of provocation from the
North and the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK.
“Core combat capability against the possibility of provocation from the North” refers to the early detection
of enemy’s surprise attacks, advanced surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and precision strike
capability against the origin of attack.
As to readiness against the north’s local provocations, the ROK puts priority on enhancement of combat
capability (e.g. anti-artillery radars, sound-based target detection equipment, K-9 self-propelled guns,
small-sized mid-range GPS-guided bombs, etc) in the northwestern islands close to the North, and the
overall reinforcement of tactical units.
The Army will bolster its infantry battalions by equipping troops with advanced equipment such as single-
eye night vision goggles, individual firearms with sighting telescopes, K-11 rifles, etc.
The Navy will focus on expanding and improving its coastal operations thought increased use of
Geomdoksuri-A, special warfare support ships/special infiltration boats, offshore helicopters, detection
radar placed on patrol boats/convoy ships.
The Air Force will prioritize enhancement of precision strike capability with the use of small-sized mid-
range GPS-guided bombs, mid-range GPS-guided kits, JDAM, JASSM, etc. The military’s primary tactical
response of coping with the threat of the north’s long-range artillery is by reinforcing its
identification/detection capability (e.g. anti-artillery radar, sound-based detection equipment, division-level
UAVs), command/control readiness, and counter-strike ability (K-9 self-propelled guns, multi rocket
launchers, JDAM, etc).
The transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK scheduled for 2015 necessitates the refinement of
certain core command, tactical and logistic capabilities in order to adequately prepare for ROK-led all-
theater-level operations, including the ability for surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning, operation
of a command/control system for all theater operations, precision strike, and continued provision of support
(particularly wartime ammunition). The C4I (Command Control, Communications, Computer and
Intelligence) system currently stands in place for the operational linkage between the ROK military and the
USFK.
Accordingly, the country will seek to reinforce surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning ability
encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula with the expanded use of AWACs aircrafts, ballistic guided
missiles, early warning and long-range radar, the ability to collect image-based information from
neighboring countries, including the North (through multi-purpose utility satellites, mid- and HUAVs,
corps-level UAVs), and the ability to collect three dimensional signal-based information.
For adequate provision of support, all-theater operational command/control requires a proper system
allowing for timely command, control and decision which will be facilitated through performance
improvement of the Allied Korea Joint Command and Control System (AKJCCS) and KJCCS, as well as a
robust infrastructure communications system for real-time information dissemination [supported through
the Military Satellite Communications System and the Joint Tactical Data Link System (JTDLS)].
The ability to strike core positions in the North with precision strike capability will be enhanced with the
use of laser-guided bombs (GBU-24), GPS-guided bombs (JDAM), bombs for destroying underground
facilities (GBU-28), long-range guided missiles (JASSM), and mid-range GPS-guided kits, along with the
system for carrying such weapons (KDX-II/III, KSS-II, F-15K, F-X). Finally, the country aims to maintain
at least 30 days worth of wartime ammunition, for continued provision of support.
In 2012, the defense R&D budget amounts at 2,321.0 billion won, up 12.8% over the preceding
year…. [see Figure VI.12] Investment priorities in defense R&D systems development are aimed at the
following six areas: surveillance/reconnaissance, command/control, information/electronic warfare,
precision strike, new/special guided weapon capability, and infrastructure combat capability. Investment
priorities in core technology development are placed on the following eight areas: sensors,
information/communication, control/electronic, chemical-biological-radioactive warfare, and materials….
In reviewing the investment priorities for the 2012 defense budget, the factors shown to exert the most
crucial impact on defense budget operation and allocation are: maintaining a proper ratio of officers and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 309

NCOs; the timely securing of combat capability against the possibility of provocation from the North and
in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK in 2015; and the efficient
promotion of defense R&D. These are also tasks to be carried out under the Basic Defense Reform Plan.
…[T]he mid-term (2012-2016) investment for improvement of defense capability is focused on how to
cope with the North’s local provocations and asymmetrical threats as well as the return of wartime
operational control to the ROK in 2015. The South should first reinforce its command/control and
precision strike systems to secure core military capability prior to the return of the wartime
operational control by securing sufficient defensive capability improvement expenditure….

Figure VI.9: Investment Priorities Related to Improvement of

Defense Capabilities (KRW Billions or Percent)
2006-2011 2012-2016 Mid-term Defense Plan
Amount Share Increase/ Amount Share 982 Increase/
(Won) (%) Decrease 981 (won) (%) Decrease
TOTAL 47,581 100 + 10.9 60,752 100 + 7.5
Surveillance/ 2,044 4.3 - 57.7 2,094 3.4 + 6.7
Reconnaissance
Precision Strike and 6,063 12.7 -26.6 5,153 8.5 -8.2
New/Special Guided
Weapons
Firepower/Ammunition 5,795 12.2 -20.1 8,486 14.0 + 5.7
Maneuverable Combat 4,788 10.1 -15.6 5,974 9.8 +2.0
Capability
Defense R&D 9,190 19.3 -13.8 13,737 22.6 -10.1
Ships 7,924 16.7 + 9.8 9,251 15.2 +0.8
Airplanes 9,129 19.2 + 0.8 13,789 22.7 -17.2
Command/Control/ 1,742 3.7 + 16.2 1,289 2.1 -62.4
Communication
Source: Paek Jaeok, “The ROK’s 2012 Defense Budget,” Korea Defense Issue & Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses,
May 11, 2012.
310 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.10: 2012 Defense Capability Improvement Expenditure

(KRW Hundred Millions or Percent)
Description 2011 2012 2012 Increase/Decrease Line item Number
Budget Government Budget (amount) percentage of of
Proposal increased/decreased relevant
amount programs
TOTAL 96,935 101,350 98,938 2,003 2.1 216
Command, 625 384 369 -256 -41 5
Control, and
Communication
Maneuver 9,719 10,990 10,772 +1,053 +10.8 21
Combat
Capability
Ships 17,336 17,941 16,665 -681 -3.9 17
Airplanes 14,749 15,951 15,951 +1,202 +8.2 13
Firepower and 14,145 14,261 14,561 +416 +2.9 8
Ammunition
Surveillance 6,862 5,474 5,148 -1,714 -25.0 12
and
Reconnaissance
Precision 8,872 7,453 7,031 -1,841 -20.7 23
Strike/New
Special Guided
weapons
Defense R&D 17,216 18,248 18,279 +1,063 +6.2 64
Performance 6,289 9,410 8,928 +2,639 +41.9 30
Improvement
Other 1,122 1,238 1,244 +122 +10.8 23
Source: Paek Jaeok, “The ROK’s 2012 Defense Budget,” Korea Defense Issue & Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses,
May 11, 2012.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 311

Figure VI.11: 2012 Defense Budget and Combat Capability

Operation Expenditures (KRW hundred millions or Percent)
Description 2011 2012 2012 Increase/Decrease Percentage
budget Government Budget (amount) increase/decrease
Proposal
Defense Budget 314,031 331,552 329,576 15,545 + 5.0
* Combat 217,096 230,202 230,638 13,542 + 6.2
Capability
Operation
-- Troop Operation 128,185 134,674 134,923 6,738 + 5.3
- Personnel expense 111,725 117,579 117,579 5,854 + 5.2
(including legal
reserve)
- Food 13,237 13,486 13,735 498 + 3.8
- Clothing 3,223 3,609 3,609 386 + 12.0
-- Maintaining 88,911 95,528 95,715 6,804 + 7.7
Combat Capability
- Defense-related 4,726 5,008 5,006 280 + 5.9
Informatization
- Enhancement of 2,159 2,450 2,478 319 + 14.8
Servicemen’s Health
and Welfare
- Logistics Support 37,329 38,704 38,752 1,423 + 3.8
and Collaboration 983
- Personnel Affairs, 4,491 5,068 5,062 571 + 12.7
Education/Training
- Facility 23,547 25,626 25,646 2,099 + 8.9
Construction and
Operation
- Reserve Combat 1,355 1,360 1,457 102 + 7.5
Capability
Management
- Operation of 779 845 869 90 + 11.6
Military Institutions
- Policy Planning and 8,088 8,186 8,186 98 + 1.2
International
Collaboration 984
- Defense 6,437 8,281 8,259 1,822 + 28.3
Administrative
Support 985
*Defense Capability 96,935 101,350 98,938 2,003 + 2.1
Improvement
Source: Paek Jaeok, “The ROK’s 2012 Defense Budget,” Korea Defense Issue & Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses,
May 11, 2012.
312 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.12: Trends in Defense R&D Expenditures, 2004-2012

(Percent)
Share of Share of Basic Share of Core Share of Projects Share of Projects
Technological Research in Technology in Led by Businesses- Led by Private
Development in Technological Technological Universities- Businesses in
R&D Expense Development Development Research institutes Systems
in Core Development
Technologies Expense
2004 22.0 0.9 28.1 -- 28.8
2009 29.4 1.6 33.9 35.9 47.1
2012 27.9 1.9 39.0 40.5 56.9
Source: Paek Jaeok, “The ROK’s 2012 Defense Budget,” Korea Defense Issue & Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses,
May 11, 2012.

Comparing the Military Resources Shaping the Korean

Balance
It is not possible to make reliable comparisons of DPRK and ROK military expenditures using
unclassified data. No government provides unclassified official comparisons based on its own
intelligence data and net assessments, and neither the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS) nor the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) make estimates for the
DPRK. Estimates of Chinese military expenditures are highly controversial and raise major
questions regarding the extent to which definitions of such estimates are comparable in terms of
both what is included and prices. Moreover, there is no clear way to relate US military spending
to the Korean balance, although US military capabilities play a major role in that balance.
In the past, the US Department of State (DOS) issued comparable unclassified estimates of
military efforts and arms transfers based on US intelligence models that estimated the size of
each military effort based on comparable prices. These reports have long been discontinued,
however, and no think tank or NGO has the resources or access to intelligence to make such
estimates on its own.
It is still possible, however, to make some broad comparisons of the economic bases and military
expenditures of the primary countries that shape the Korean military balance, including the
DPRK.
In spite of the uncertainties in the data, it is clear that the ROK has a far greater capacity to
develop and support its forces than the DPRK. As Figure VI.13 shows, the CIA estimated in
June 2014 that the DPRK had an economy that was far less developed than that of the ROK. 986
Over the past decade, the DPRK’s rankings in these key economic indicators have been
decreasing, while those of the ROK have been steadily increasing.
Furthermore, the CIA estimated that the DPRK had a total population of 24.6 million in 2012,
while the ROK’s population was 48.8 million, or more than 2.1 times that of the DPRK. It
estimated the median age of the DPRK’s population at 33 years, and that of the ROK at 39 years.
Finally it estimated that the DPRK had 6.5 million males available for military service and
207,737 young men entering military age each year, while the ROK had 13.2 million available
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 313

males and 365,760 males entering military age. 987 The length of military service for the ROK is
approximately 2 years, while that of the DPRK is approximately 5-10.
All of these data show that the ROK has far more resources to use in supporting its national
security structure than the DPRK and that overall trends will remain significantly in the ROK’s
favor. The World Bank and UN make somewhat different estimates of the size of the ROK and
DPRK’s resources, but all agree that the ROK has a vastly larger economy, far better income
distribution and personal wealth, and far more personnel that can be devoted to military service.
The ROK’s disadvantages in this area are that its population has much higher expectations, it
must pay far more for manpower, it must price military investment in market rather than
command terms, and it is harder for the ROK to command popular sacrifices in the name of
enhanced security.

Figure VI.13: Comparisons of Key Country-Level Indicators

Country GDP (PPP) 988 GDP Total Median Total Males Males
(in $US (PPP) per Population population available for entering
Trillion), capita (millions), age military service military age
(year) ($US) (year) (aged 16-49) each year
(millions) (millions)

China 13.39 (2013) 9,800 1355.6 (July 36.7 385.8 10.4

2014 est.)

Japan 4.72 (2013) 37,100 127.1 (July 46.1 27.3 .6

2014 est.)

Russia 2.55 (2013) 18,100 142.5 (July 38.9 34.7 .7

2014 est.)

US 16.72 (2013) 52.8 318.8 (July 37.6 73.2 2.2

2014 est.)

ROK 1.66 (2013) 33,200 49.0 (July 40.2 13.2 .4

2014 est.)

DPRK .04 (2011) 1,800 24.8 (20July 33.4 6.5 .2

2014 est.)

Source: CIA, World Factbook, 2014, accessed October 28, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/.
314 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Korean and East Asian Military Spending – Less the DPRK

In spite of the problems in comparing military expenditures, it seems likely that the IISS is
broadly correct in estimating that Asian nominal defense spending overtook NATO Europe’s
spending in 2012. The IISS estimates Asian spending rising from $268.4 billion in 2011 to
$287.4 billion, while NATO spending fell from $290.0 billion to $262.7 billion over the same
period.
Asian spending also exceeded official European defense spending in 2012, including non-NATO
countries. Excluding Australia and New Zealand, nominal defense spending in Asia rose from
$261.7 billion in 2010 to $321.8 billion in 2013, a 23% increase. Real defense spending in Asia
rose “with real 2013 defense outlays 13.2% higher than in 2010.” 989 The most the CIA provides
in the military expenditures section of its World Factbook is an estimate that the ROK spends
2.8% of its GDP on defense, a statistic from 2012. 990 The CIA presents no date or information
for North Korea. 991
Unfortunately, the numbers presented in open sources are often questionable and/or lack
comparability, and data are often missing for the DPRK:
• Figure VI.14 depicts the IISS’s estimates of national defense spending as a
percentage of GDP for 2008-2012.
• Figure VI.15 shows SIPRI’s estimates of the military expenditures of the countries
involved on the Korean Peninsula as a percentage of GDP over 2000-2012.
• Figure VI.16 gives the IISS’s estimates of defense expenditures from 2007-2012.
• Figure VI.17 assesses SIPRI’s military expenditures data from 2000-2012.
• Figure VI.18 shows the IISS’s estimates of per-capita defense expenditures during
2007-2012.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 315

Figure VI.14: IISS Estimate of National Defense Budgets as a

Percentage of GDP, 2008–2014

ROK

DPRK

Japan

China

Russia

US

0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
US Russia China Japan DPRK ROK
2008 4.88 2.52 1.32 0.95 2.59
2009 4.68 3.06 1.41 0.99 2.10
2010 4.76 2.84 1.30 1.00 2.48
2011 4.56 2.79 1.24 1.02 2.54
2012 4.12 3.06 1.24 0.99 2.52
2013 3.70 3.08 1.24 0.99 2.53
2014 3.34 3.40 1.24 1.00 2.37

Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2009, 2014, 2015.

316 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.15: SIPRI Estimate of Military Expenditures as a

Percentage of GDP, 2000–2013
5.0%

4.5%

4.0%

3.5%

3.0%

2.5%

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
China 1.9% 2.1% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Japan 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
DPRK
ROK 2.6% 2.6% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6% 2.6% 2.8% 2.9% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.80%
Russia 3.7% 4.1% 4.4% 4.3% 3.8% 3.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 4.6% 4.3% 4.1% 4.4% 4.10%
US 3.0% 3.0% 3.4% 3.7% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 4.0% 4.3% 4.8% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 3.8%

Based on data provided by 2013 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Data for North Korea is unavailable.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 317

Figure VI.16: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Defense

Expenditures, 2007–2013 (US$ billions)
700.0

600.0

500.0

400.0

300.0

200.0

100.0

0.0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
2007 46.2 41.0 26.6 32.2 625.9
2008 60.1 46.0 24.1 40.5 696.3
2009 70.4 50.3 4.4 22.5 38.3 661.0
2010 76.4 54.4 25.1 42.0 690.9
2011 90.2 59.8 28.3 51.6 687.0
2012 102.4 59.4 29.0 59.9 645.7
2013 112.2 51.0 31.8 68.2 600.4

Source: Based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2009 and 2014. Only 2009 data were available for North
Korea.
318 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.17: SIPRI Estimate of Northeast Asian Military

Expenditures, 2000–2012 (in constant 2011 US$ billions)
1200.0

1000.0

800.0

600.0

400.0

200.0

0.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
US 394.2 397.3 446.1 507.8 553.4 579.8 588.8 604.3 649.0 701.1 720.4 711.4 668.8 618.7
Russia 32.5 36.1 40.1 42.7 44.4 50.5 56.4 61.8 68.0 71.6 72.9 78.3 90.6 84.9
ROK 20.0 20.6 21.2 21.9 22.9 24.7 25.6 26.8 28.5 30.1 29.9 30.9 31.5 32.4
DPRK
Japan 60.3 60.3 60.7 61.5 61.2 61.3 60.9 60.6 59.1 59.7 59.0 59.6 59.2 59.4
China 37.0 45.4 52.8 57.4 63.6 71.5 84.0 96.9 106.7 128.9 136.5 146.2 157.6 171.4

Source: Based on data provided by 2013 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. Data for North Korea is unavailable.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 319

Figure VI.18: IISS Estimate of Northeast Asian Per Capita

Defense Expenditures, 2007–2013 (US$)
2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
China Japan DPRK ROK Russia US
2007 35 322 551 228 2077
2008 45 362 500 288 2290
2009 54 400 183 460 272 2153
2010 57 426 515 468 2241
2011 67 469 581 362 2205
2012 76 467 593 420 2057
2013 83 401 650 479 1898
Source: Based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2009 and 2014. Only 2009 data were available for North
Korea.
320 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DPRK
Even though the DPRK is one of the most militarized countries in the world, the previous
Figures have already shown how difficult it is provide any analysis of the scope of its spending.
Some trends, however, are clear.
Militarizing a Crippled Economy
Regardless of the uncertainties in some of the data, it is clear that the DPRK’s limited financial
resources are a key factor in assessing what types of strategies it may employ in the case of any
escalation on the Peninsula. The CIA draws a sharp contrast between the economies of the
DPRK and the ROK: 992
North Korea, one of the world’s most centrally directed and least open economies, faces chronic economic
problems. Industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment, shortages
of spare parts, and poor maintenance. Large-scale military spending draws off resources needed for
investment and civilian consumption. Industrial and power output have stagnated for years at a fraction of
pre-1990 levels. Frequent weather-related crop failures aggravated chronic food shortages caused by on-
going systemic problems, including a lack of arable land, collective farming practices, poor soil quality,
insufficient fertilization, and persistent shortages of tractors and fuel.
Large-scale international food aid deliveries have allowed the people of North Korea to escape widespread
starvation since famine threatened in 1995, but the population continues to suffer from prolonged
malnutrition and poor living conditions. Since 2002, the government has allowed private “farmers’
markets” to begin selling a wider range of goods. It also permitted some private farming - on an
experimental basis - in an effort to boost agricultural output.
In December 2009, North Korea carried out a redenomination of its currency, capping the amount of North
Korean won that could be exchanged for the new notes, and limiting the exchange to a one-week window.
A concurrent crackdown on markets and foreign currency use yielded severe shortages and inflation,
forcing Pyongyang to ease the restrictions by February 2010.
In response to the sinking of the South Korean destroyer Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island,
South Korea’s government cut off most aid, trade, and bilateral cooperation activities, with the exception of
operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In 2012, KIM Jong Un’s first year of leadership, the North
displayed increased focus on the economy by renewing its commitment to special economic zones with
China, negotiating a new payment structure to settle its $11 billion Soviet-era debt to Russia, and
purportedly proposing new agricultural and industrial policies to boost domestic production.
The North Korean government often highlights its goal of becoming a “strong and prosperous” nation and
attracting foreign investment, a key factor for improving the overall standard of living. Nevertheless, firm
political control remains the government’s overriding concern, which likely will inhibit fundamental
reforms of North Korea’s current economic system.
In terms of the DPRK’s capacity for military action, an IISS study notes, 993
Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s precise intentions or aspirations, its forces are deployed
along the DMZ in such a manner that they could support an invasion of South Korea. In particular, the
percentage of North Korean forces deployed within 100km of the DMZ has significantly increased during
the past two decades. Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 65% of its military units, and up to
80% of its estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of the DMZ. This inventory includes
approximately 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems and 2,000 tanks. Because of these forward
deployments, North Korea could theoretically invade the South without recourse to further deployments
and with relatively little warning time.
Thus, it has been argued that North Korea’s military strategy is designed around plans to launch an
invasion of South Korea. At the same time, North Korea’s armed forces are also positioned in order to deter
an attack, being deployed to deliver a pre-emptive strike against the South if Pyongyang believes that an
attack is imminent or to retaliate with overwhelming force if the North is attacked. This posture is dictated
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 321

by the doctrine that ‘attack is the best form of defence’, a formulation that defined Soviet forward
deployments in East Germany during the Cold War. The mass forward deployment of North Korean forces
also helps to strengthen domestic political support for Pyongyang’s ‘military first’ policy and heavy
internal security apparatus.

Guesstimating the DPRK’s Military Spending

The DPRK does everything possible to disguise the level of its military effort, and this makes it
difficult to find any unclassified estimates of the DPRK’s annual military spending. There are,
however, some useful unclassified estimates. A report by Jon Grevatt in Jane’s Defense Weekly
in 2009 provides some information, but must again be treated as a rough estimate: 994
The DPRK’s defense budget reached nearly USD 9 billion in 2009, around 15 times more than the official
amount declared by Pyongyang, the [ROK] state-run Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (“KIDA”) has
said in a report…The KIDA report—cited by the [ROK] state-funded Yonhap news agency on 18
January—said North Korea had previously announced a USD 570 million defense budget, although the real
expenditure, calculated on an exchange rate based on Purchasing Power Parity (“PPP”) terms, was USD
8.77 billion… Yonhap quoted the report as saying, “In spite of its economy shrinking since the mid-2000s,
North Korea has gradually increased its military spending.”
According to KIDA, official North Korea figures state that the defense budget increased to USD 570
million in 2009 from USD 540 million in 2008, USD 510 million in 2007 and USD 470 million in 2006,
although these figures do not reflect PPP … Previous estimates have indicated that DPRK defense spending
is equal to at least 15 per cent of [Gross Domestic Product] (“GDP”). In 2008 Pyongyang said it was
allocating 15.8 percent of GDP on defense although it has not released any GDP figures for a number of
years. In 2009 the US Department of State stated that the DPRK’s defense spending was more than 22
percent based on its estimate that the DPRK’s GDP in 2009 was USD 40 billion based on PPP… How
much North Korea is allocating towards defense procurement is similarly contested but it is thought to be at
least 40 per cent of its expenditure, with most of these finances directed at centrally controlled indigenous
programs: a consequence of the DPRK’s impoverished economy and its international isolation. 995
The ROK’s state-run Korean Institute of Defense Analyses [KIDA] reported that the total gross
national income of the DPRK in 2009 was approximately $25 billion, meaning that the DPRK
spent about a third of its national income on its military. 996
The 2014 Japanese Defense White Paper noted that, 997
Although North Korea has been facing serious economic difficulties and has depended on the international
community for food and other resources, tit seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities
and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most
of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s
Assembly in April 2014, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2014 national budget was 15.9%,
but it is believed that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.
Again, it must be stressed that these numbers are little more than educated guesses, though they
are almost certainly correct in indicating that the DPRK is willing to devote far more of its total
economy to national security expenditures than the ROK. Given a DPRK GDP that experts
estimate is around $40 billion and the size of the DPRK’s forces, it also seems likely that
Western, ROK, and Japanese estimates that DPRK military spending is close to $9-11 billion are
far more accurate than the DPRK’s official military budget of $1 billion. 998
The DPRK’s Defense Industry
In spite of its weak economy, the DPRK still maintains a significant defense industry, following
the ideas of juche and songun described in Chapter I. A recent ROK think tank analysis by Tak
Sung Han provides an overview of the history and current status of this sector. The development
322 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

of the defense industry started in the 1950s with the “preparation stage,” as the DPRK built or
rebuilt factories and produced munitions and small arms with the help of the USSR and China.
The 1960s saw the “foundation stage,” when the DPRK expanded its production base, initiating
development and increased production of conventional firearms by copying Chinese and Soviet
models. The “expansion stage” of the 1970s increased the emphasis on quality and modern
technology, moving to indigenous production of many weapons types – such as tanks, self-
propelled artillery, and combat vessels. 999
Since the 1990s, the DPRK 1000
…has maintained or increased the production level of its ammunitions, missiles, nuclear weapons, strategic
materials, and other export-oriented products, and accelerated the technological development in spite of
overall production reduction in the defense industry. As a result, North Korea has achieved the top-class
level in certain military technologies including missiles, nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Moreover,
North Korea displays high-level military technologies in ammunitions, artilleries, and maneuvering
equipment. Even though North Korea’s technological level in aircraft, communications, and electronics is
quite low, there has been substantial progress in digital weapons and jamming devices.
The “sophisticated development stage” spanned the 1980s and 1990s, when the DPRK further
improved quality and modern technology. During this period, North Korea developed and
produced missiles, nuclear weapons, and aircraft. In the 2000s, the DPRK “accelerated its efforts
to improve existing weapons systems, develop GPS jamming devices, and advance asymmetric
weapons technologies such as missiles and nuclear weapons, rather than increasing the quantity
of conventional weapons that have already reached a saturation point.” 1001
There are three primary economic sectors in the DPRK – civilian, military, and “royal.” The
latter two receive national priority in manpower and resources. In particular, the defense industry
is the foundation of the DPRK’s military power and identity, employing approximately 500,000
workers and accounting for 25-75% of the economy. While the DPRK’s defense industry
operated at 80% of capacity in the 1980s, this fell to 38% in the early 1990s and 22% in the late
1990s. Over the past decade, operating capacity has recovered somewhat and currently stands at
approximately 30%. Production peaked at $3-4 billion in the 1980s and is likely currently around
$1-1.2 billion. 1002
Since the 1990s, the DPRK’s economic development can be divided into three periods: “Arduous
March” (1990-98), economic recovery (1999-2005), and now economic stagnation (2006-
present). In each period, the DPRK tried to boost the defense industry despite economic hardship
– as shown in Figure VI.19. In spite of the -4.18% average economic growth rate over 1990-98,
the DPRK still maintained a 30.5% defense industry operating rate, compounding and
prolonging the country’s economic crisis. From 1999-2005, economic growth reached 2.74%,
during which time the defense industry’s operation rate was 24.9%. From 2001-06, economic
growth dropped to .05%, and the industry’s operating rate rose back to 30.9%. 1003
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 323

Figure VI.19: The DPRK’s Economic Growth Rate and the

Defense Industry’s Average Operating Rate

Source: Tak Sung Han, “North Korea’s Defense Industry: An Assessment and Its Growth Prospect,” ROK Angle, Korea Institute
for Defense Analyses, March 28, 2013.

ROK
The ROK makes a sharp contrast to the DPRK. It has become one of the most advanced
economies in Asia and now has a technology base that, in some areas, rivals that of the most
advanced economies in the world. As Figure VI.13 has shown, the CIA estimates that the
DPRK’s 2011 GDP was roughly $40 billion (103rd in the world), and the ROK’s 2012 GDP was
40 times higher, approximately $1.62 trillion (13th in the world). The DPRK had an estimated
GDP per capita of $1,800 (197th in the world), while the ROK’s GDP per capita was 18 times
higher, at $32,400 (40th in the world). 1004 While the DPRK was the more developed of the two
for several decades after the Korean War, the ROK has now vastly outpaced its rigid, over-
militarized rival.
Defense Economics
The CIA portrays South Korea’s economy in a far more positive light than that of the DPRK: 1005
The ROK has, however, had to devote significant resources to defense spending and military
modernization. The economy’s capacity to continue such development is essential for ROK
preparedness in a potential conflict on the Peninsula.
324 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

South Korea over the past four decades has demonstrated incredible growth and global integration to
become a high-tech industrialized economy. In the 1960s, GDP per capita was comparable with levels in
the poorer countries of Africa and Asia. In 2004, South Korea joined the trillion-dollar club of world
economies, and is currently the world’s 12th largest economy. Initially, a system of close government and
business ties, including directed credit and import restrictions, made this success possible. The government
promoted the import of raw materials and technology at the expense of consumer goods, and encouraged
savings and investment over consumption.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 exposed longstanding weaknesses in South Korea’s development
model including high debt/equity ratios and massive short-term foreign borrowing. GDP plunged by 6.9%
in 1998, and then recovered by 9% in 1999-2000. South Korea adopted numerous economic reforms
following the crisis, including greater openness to foreign investment and imports. Growth moderated to
about 4% annually between 2003 and 2007. South Korea’s export focused economy was hit hard by the
2008 global economic downturn, but quickly rebounded in subsequent years, reaching 6.3% growth in
2010.
The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement was ratified by both governments in 2011 and went into effect in
March 2012. Throughout 2012 and 2013 the economy experienced sluggish growth because of market
slowdowns in the United States, China, and the Eurozone. The administration in 2014 is likely to face the
challenge of balancing heavy reliance on exports with developing domestic-oriented sectors, such as
services. The South Korean economy’s long term challenges include a rapidly aging population, inflexible
labor market, dominance of large conglomerates (chaebols), and heavy reliance on exports, which comprise
about half of GDP.

Defense Spending and Defense Reform

Figure VI.20 shows past ROK and Japanese estimates of ROK defense spending and annual
growth rates over 2006-2010. Figure VI.21 compares the data in the ROK’s 2013 defense
budget to reporting on the overall ROK government budget and GDP from 2009-2013, showing
spending by key category in the 2013 budget.
According to SIPRI, the ROK’s military expenditures in 2013 amounted to $32.3 billion, or
approximately 2.8 percent of the country’s GDP, while the IISS reports government spending at
$31.8 billion, or $650 per person. 1006 The ROK’s FY2014 defense budget showed an increase of
approximately 3.5% over the previous year, the 15th consecutive year-on-year rise. 1007 The 2012
budget totaled 32.9 trillion won, accounting for 14.8% of the government budget and 2.4% of
ROK GDP. This was the fourth largest national spending category, after healthcare, welfare, and
labor; general public administration; and education. The year-on-year increase amounted to
1,554.5 billion won, which is focused on troop operation expenses, maintenance of combat
capability expenses, and defense capability improvement expenses.
The steadily rising levels of ROK defense spending reflect that fact the ROK is undergoing a
defense reform project with an ultimate goal, according to the ROK Ministry of National
Defense (MND) Deputy Ministry for Planning and Coordination, “to build a ‘slim but strong
military.” The government plans to maintain fiscal soundness in budgeting, seeing mid- and
long-term defense spending as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage of the government
budget remaining approximately the same. 1008
There still is not a great deal of unclassified commentary on the 2013 budget, but past
commentary on the 2012 budget helps explain current trends and how they affect the balance. An
analysis by Kim Kwang-woo, Deputy Minister for Planning and Coordination at the ROK MND,
writing for the government-supported Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), explained
the 2012 budget’s force maintenance and force improvement projects in detail: 1009
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 325

In order to foster a “combat-oriented” military, the Force Maintenance budget for the year 2012 prioritizes
maximizing war-fighting capability by tightening military operation and watch systems on the front line
and expanding scientific combat training equipment and personal combat equipment. It also focuses on
improving the working and living conditions for military service members as well as boosting their morale
and welfare by advancing military medical services and improving their living quarters. Consequently, the
expenses for military uniforms, military service member health and welfare enhancement, military
personnel management, and training and education show a rapid year-on-year increase of more than 10
percent.
The budget for dispatching ROK Forces overseas was set at KRW 22.6 billion, with 21.6 billion allotted for
sending troops to multi-national forces (MNF) and 1 billion for PKO activities. The overseas deployments
of the Cheonghae Unit (Somali Waters), the Danbi Unit (Haiti) and the Dongmyeong Unit (Lebanon),
scheduled to end in late 2011, will continue their PKO activities with the ROK National Assembly
approving a bill to extend the dispatch period for the three Units by one year until the end of 2012. As of
January 1st, 2012, there are 1,448 Korean troops deployed in 18 areas of 15 countries.
Meanwhile, the cost for defense cost-sharing under the Special Measures Agreement on Defense Cost-
sharing from 2009 to 2013 amounts to KRW 746.1 billion, taking into account past budget execution
results and the estimated size of future spending.
The 2012 Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) budget prioritizes reinforcement of deterrence capabilities
to actively cope with North Korean infiltration/local provocation as well as the threat of long-range
artillery. Additionally, in preparation for the OPCON transition in 2015, the budget prioritizes on
improving the command and control capacity of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and strengthening core
combat capabilities of each service. North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong-do, an island within the territory
of the Republic of Korea, on November 23, 2011. Since the YP-do shelling incident, the ROK Armed
Forces have further fortified emergency shelters and protective facilities to ensure sustainability and
survivability in the northwestern frontline islands.
To actively cope with various future threats, the ROK Armed Forces aim to secure strategic capabilities.
Accordingly, projects for acquiring advanced fighter aircrafts, new submarines, and modernized destroyers
are being planned. Along with projects to introduce new weapons systems, the ROK Forces are also
improving existing ones. Performance improvement for the K1A1 tank, maritime patrol aircrafts, and KF-
16 fighter jets are also underway.
Meanwhile, to prepare for the OPCON transition, the ROK Armed Forces are planning to newly develop or
upgrade modeling & simulation systems and war-gaming simulation facilities, which are mainly led by the
ROK Armed Forces, and expenses for such performance improvements are reflected in the 2012 defense
budget. In a bid to develop ability to produce indigenous advanced weapons systems, the investment in
defense R&D has been expanded to 7.0 % of the total defense budget, up from 6.4 % in the previous year.
Although the need for local economic stimulus did lead to defense cuts in 2014, the defense
budget still increased by a substantial 3.5%. Analysis from KIDA analyzed the details of the
2014 budget as follows: 1010
The 2014 ROK defense budget was drawn up with a focus on the following objectives: maintenance of
steadfast military readiness posture by strengthening the combat capability of frontline units and providing
necessary logistics support, enhancement of military personnel welfare to boost their morale, and
reinforcement of core combat capabilities to counter asymmetric threats and local provocations.
Simultaneously, great efforts were made to eliminate waste and economize budget use.
South Korea’s 2014 defense budget comes to about KRW 35.7 trillion, a 3.5% increase over that of 2013
(based on supplementary budget). It also accounts for 2.5% of the GDP (based on estimated figures) and
14.4% of the government budget (general accounts). The defense budget is the fourth largest after the
budgets for health, welfare, and employment (KRW 97.4 trillion), general and provincial administration
(KRW 55.8 trillion), and education (KRW 49.8 trillion), among the 12 categories of the government
budget.
326 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

By item, the Force Operating Costs, which fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense
(MND), stand at KRW 25.19 trillion, a 3.6% year-on-year increase, and Force Improvement Budget2),
which falls under the responsibility of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), amounts
to KRW 10.5 trillion, a 3.3% year-on-year increase. Defense capability improvement expenses were
increased by 3% in the 2014 budget, compared to increases of a little over 2% for the past two years,
despite a deep cut (KRW 366.4 billion) in the budget for the next-generation fighter aircraft projects caused
by a delay in determining the final candidate. Apparently, this increase in Force Improvement Budget was
the result of positive efforts made to enhance defense capabilities by the Government and the National
Assembly. Another indicator of the positive view held by the National Assembly members regarding the
need for a stable defense budget is a significantly reduced cut of KRW 94.5 billion in the defense budget
deliberation process this year, compared to a cut of KRW 189.8 billion in the 2013 budget.
The 2014 Force Operating Costs focus on enhancing the troops’ combat survival ability and maximizing
their combat capability by improving the quality of uniforms and equipment and furnishing more training
equipment and supplies. The monthly salary for enlisted soldiers was increased by 15% over the preceding
year, and the basic meal expense was increased by 6.5%. These expense increases reflect the need to
improve the barracks and recreation facilities in order to improve military welfare.
The 2014 defense budget also considered the need to replace or update exiting combat support facilities in
order to ensure adequate logistics support capability and a higher rate of operation of recently adopted core
equipment, such as AWACS, by securing maintenance expenses. As a result of these considerations,
logistics support and collaboration programs showed a 7.2% year-on-year increase in funding, far
exceeding the percentage of year-on-year increase of the entire Force Operating Costs.
The 2014 budget for troops dispatched overseas, including the Araw Unit dispatched to the Philippines in
December 2013 to provide disaster relief, comes to KRW 126.8 billion, a KRW 31.7 billion increase from
2013. Amounts of KRW 78.7 billion and KRW 48.1 billion were allocated for the dispatch of ROK troops
to the Multinational Force and the UNPKO, respectively. As of January 1, 2014, the number of ROK troops
dispatched overseas stands at 1,690 in 17 areas in 16 different countries.
As for the Force Improvement Budget, priority was given to the early establishment of the Kill Chain and
the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system to counter the North’s asymmetric threats, including
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The 2014 defense budget includes the installation of artillery
locating radar systems, next-generation thermal imaging cameras and surveillance systems, and the GOP
Scientific Guard System in an effort to deter the North’s local provocations and enhance the country’s
capability to deal with any provocations.
The ROK military plans to strengthen its future-oriented defense capabilities to counter diverse potential
threats. Such efforts include adoption of next-generation Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and
high-performance jet fighters, new submarine projects, and additional procurement of AEGIS warships, in
addition to improving the performance of its KF-16 fighter jets.
Part of the budget has also been allocated to securing the country’s endogenous weapons system through
defense R&D. The 2014 defense budget includes a plan for the development of next-generation Korean-
made fighter jets and small-sized gunships. The budget also shows a drastic increase in funding for the
development of core technologies and military and civilian “dual use technologies,” which is in step with
the Park Geun-hye government’s goal of creating a “creative economy.”
The 2014 Special Accounts allocated to the MND include funding for the relocation of defense and military
facilities (KRW 356 billion), the relocation of USFK bases (KRW 641.8 billion), and the construction of an
‘Innovative City’(KRW 26.9 billion).
As for the Special Account for the relocation of USFK bases, an amount, which was increased by KRW
188.2 billion over the preceding year, is earmarked for full-fledged promotion of the said relocations. The
Special Account also includes the Phase-2 Project for the relocation of USFK bases to Pyeongtaek, the
Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the support programs for Pyeongtaek, and a project to investigate and deal
with environmental pollution associated with the relocation of USFK bases. The Phase-2 Project for the
relocation of USFK bases to Pyeongtaek concerns the base in Yongsan, Camp Nimble/H-220 (in
Dongducheon), Camp Market (in Bupyeong), and Camp Kim (in Seoul). Its work progress stands at 62.1%
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 327

as of the end of 2013, and a total of 26 USFK bases have been returned to the ROK government, with 21
more USFK bases to be returned in the future.
Special Account for the construction of the ‘Innovative City’ includes the project for the relocation of the
National Defense University (KNDU) to Nonsan, Chungnam-do, by 2016.
Independent evaluations by groups like the IISS describe the trends in the ROK’s military
spending as follows: 1011
Defence outlays over the next five to ten years will be driven by the need to meet threats from North Korea,
modernisation imperatives, reducing the size of the armed forces, and moving to a ‘leaner’ and ‘smarter’
force. The armed forces’ ability to achieve the latter two objectives depends on balanced investments
between the services, given the historic army lead. As Seoul prepares for the transfer of full OPCON in
2015, some analysts think that it may be called on to shoulder an increased portion of the defence burden
shared with the US. Defence exports are one area of potential growth, though South Korean firms will have
to compete in an era of reducing budgets.
The 2012 defence budget amounted to US$29bn or 14.8% of the central government budget and 2.5% of
GDP. There is a growing consensus that defence spending should increase to at least 2.7% of GDP. The
‘Mid-Term Defense Plan 2013–17’ called for increased spending on capabilities including surface-to-
surface missiles, stand-off precision-guided weapons and airborne electronic-attack systems. However,
additional outlays will be constrained by annual growth rates that, due to the country’s maturing economy,
will likely hover around 2–3%, as well as by calls for increased social-welfare spending by presidential
election candidates.
328 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VI.20: ROK Defense Budget and Annual Growth, 2006-

2012
Korean Estimate in 2010

Source: The Republic of Korea Armed Forces, “Innovation Makes Us Powerful,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010, 29.

Japanese Estimate in 2012

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010, 24.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 329

Figure VI.21: The ROK 2014 Defense Budget (KRW Billions)

Spending: 2009-2014
Classification 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP 1,065,037 1,173,275 1,237,128 1,308,642 1,399,076 1,413,978
Government 203,550 201,283 209,930 223,138 236,225 247,203
Budget
Defense 28,980 29,563 31,403 32,958 34,345 35,706
Budget ($22.3) ($25.7) ($27.3) ($30.8) ($30.4) ($31.9)
(Billion $)
YoY Increase 8.7 2.0 6.2 5.0 4.2 3.5
%
As % of GDP 2.72 2.52 2.54 2.52 2.45 2.53
As % of 14.24 14.69 14.96 14.77 14.54 14.4
Government
Budget

Break Out of Spending by Category

Classification 2014 Spending Share (%)

Defense Budget 35,705.6 100

* Force Improvement Program 10,509.6 29.4

* Force Maintenance 25,196.0 70.6

- Personnel Expense 12,871.5 36.0

- Food & Clothing 1,969.4 5.5

- Defense Informatization 516.5 1.4

- Service Members Welfare 246.9 0.7

- Logistics Support 4,522.7 12.7

- Training & Education 487.3 1.4

- Installation Construction 2,483.3 7.0

- Others 2,098.4 5.9

Source: ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Defense Budget,” accessed December 15, 2014.
330 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

VII. Northeast Asian Military Modernization

Trends
As noted earlier, the DPRK and ROK exist in a security environment in which the US and China
share a common interest in avoiding serious conflict, and both the US and China have a reason to
cooperate in deterring any use of force by the DPRK and the escalation of any conflict that does
occur. This common interest would likely limit the scope of any potential conventional war.
The balance of DPRK and ROK “conventional” forces cannot be separated from the role US
forces would play in a conflict, from Japan’s willingness to support US basing and staging into
Korea, and from the role China would play in trying to limit any threat to the DPRK as a buffer
state. It seems likely that US airpower, seapower, cruise missiles, stealth, precision strike
capability missile defenses, and ISR assets would be used to support the ROK immediately after
any serious DPRK attack.
Moreover, the DPRK’s ideological hostility to the US could lead Pyongyang to escalate in ways
that are unpredictable and make a “rational bargainer” approach to scenario planning and
escalation prediction highly uncertain, because the perceptions of both sides can differ so much
in any given scenario.
The perceptions and roles of external actors are uncertain and much of their individual reactions
would depend on the actions of the others. US support of the ROK – coupled with any ROK
military success that threatened the existence of the DPRK – would confront China with the risk
of losing a key buffer state. China might or might not choose to intervene at any stage in such a
conflict – either to limit or deter any action against the DPRK or to ensure that ROK and US
forces did not “occupy” part of the DPRK.
Either side might try to use strategic air and/or missile power in support of its tactical forces,
particularly if it appeared to be losing a more conventional conflict or came under serious
military pressure from the opposing side. It is possible that a conflict could escalate to
conventional fighting affecting Chinese bases as well as US bases and carrier task forces,
including those as far away as Guam and the “2nd island chain,” which the US may use to base
long-range bombers and stealth aircraft. Moreover, China might put pressure on Taiwan as a
means of indirectly pressuring the US.
The naval dimension of any new Korean War is equally unpredictable. Pyongyang could use its
submarines, smart mines, and longer-range anti-ship missiles in a wide variety of ways,
including covert or asymmetric attacks on shipping, possibly even outside Korean waters. It
might perceive a naval war, including some kind of attack or seizure of a US ship – such as the
USS Pueblo in 1968 – as a safer way of exerting pressure. China might or might not become
involved, and Japan would have to decide on its naval posture.
Japan and Russia are also significant nearby military powers. Though both have histories of
involvement with the Peninsula, they are not likely to become directly involved in a Korean
conflict; but their policies will have a major impact and their forces might become involved if a
conflict escalated beyond control. Moreover, the build-up of North Korean and Chinese forces,
and disputes over islands and maritime rights in the region, may push Japan towards a more
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 331

active role in shaping the Asian balance in spite of the constitutional restrictions that have kept
its role largely defensive in the past.
China
China does not have a military presence in North Korea, but might well support the DPRK in any
conflict it felt could threaten the survival of the DPRK’s regime, totally defeat the DPRK’s
forces, and/or bring ROK and US forces near the DPRK-Chinese border. The disposition of
Chinese military forces near the Koreas can be seen in Figures VII.1 to VII.4, and Figure VII.4
shows the command structure of the Chinese military. It is clear that China can already deploy
massive amounts of ground and air forces in a Korean conflict if it chooses to do so, but faces
major qualitative limits relative to the forces the US can project into the Koreas and the overall
US power projection capabilities in the Pacific.
At the same time, China has strong incentives to avoid and contain any conflict in the Koreas or
Northeast Asia that would lead to such a confrontation with the US, just as the US and ROK
have equally strong reasons to avoid any conflict that would lead China to intervene on the
DPRK’s behalf. Such scenarios seem both unlikely and worst case contingencies which all three
powers have every reason to avoid.
China also is aware that the US rebalancing of its forces in Asia and China’s expansion of its
sea-air-missile forces to deal with its many disputes over territory in the Pacific and to cover the
outer island chain of US bases and forces has already altered the balance. The analyses of
Chinese modernization efforts and missile developments show that the balance of forces in both
the Pacific and the Koreas will be altered even more significantly in the future.
China’s efforts to create a blue water navy are fully underway. China plans to build two nuclear
aircraft carriers by 2020 and reinforce submarine warfare capabilities. 1012 At the same time, the
PLA Army and Air Force have been modernizing as well, increasing the capabilities of their
aircraft and ground forces. Chapter IX shows the PRC has been making major efforts to
modernize and build up conventional missile forces with a wide range of precision strike
capabilities. Moreover, China has already made major progress in converting from a defensive
land power to a modern military power with major air, sea, and missile capabilities.
The US View of the Direction of Chinese Military Modernization
US official views take careful note of these Chinese developments. In 2011, the US DOD
commented that Chinese modernization was at least partly driven by the fact China’s leaders
follow the policy that great power status in the long term is best achieved by avoiding
confrontation in the short term. Their goals were reaching critical military and economic
benchmarks by 2020 and becoming a world-class military and economic power by 2050. Thus,
the PRC followed a pragmatic approach of modernizing the military, strengthening the economy,
and solidifying the Communist Party’s power. Overall, China’s military modernization program
was successful: “despite continued gaps in some key areas, large quantities of antiquated
hardware, and a lack of operation experience, the PLA is steadily closing the technological gap
with modern armed forces.” 1013
The DOD report on Chinese military power for 2012 provided a summary of then-current US
official views of Chinese military modernization, noting that China still focused on Taiwan as its
332 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

primary military priority but was expanding its power projection capabilities and broader role in
Asia: 1014
To advance its broader strategic objectives and self-proclaimed “core interests,” China is pursuing a robust
and systematic military modernization program.
In 2011, Taiwan remained the PLA’s most critical potential mission, and the PLA continued to build the
capabilities and develop the doctrine necessary to deter the island from asserting its sovereignty; deter,
disrupt, or deny effective third-party (including U.S.) intervention in a potential cross-Strait conflict; and
defeat Taiwan forces in the event of hostilities.
The PLA’s modernization efforts focus primarily on building a force capable of fighting and winning “local
wars under conditions of informatization” — conditions in which modern military forces use advanced
computer systems, information technology, and communication networks to gain operational advantage
over an opponent. The character used for “local war” can also be translated as “regional war.”
There is a debate over which translation is more accurate. In the course of developing, refining, and
assimilating these technologies, the basic tenets of China’s military strategy and warfighting doctrine have
displayed strong continuity. The PLA in turn has ensured that its information technologies have been
developed, refined, and integrated to ensure continuity with China’s military strategy.
China’s “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period,” completed in 1993 and revised as recently as
2004, contains the overarching strategic and operational guidance that directs the training, development,
and employment of China’s armed forces. The key operational component of these guidelines is known as
“active defense,” which serves as the highest-level operational guidance to all PLA services on how to fight
and win wars. The warfighting principles embedded in active defense emphasize using precise and well-
timed offensive operations, gaining and retaining the initiative, attacking only under favorable conditions,
and exploiting an opponent’s most vulnerable weaknesses.
It noted that China had concentrated naval weapons investment on anti-air and anti-surface
capabilities in order to achieve periodic and local sea and air superiority within the first island
chain. China had sea trials for its first aircraft carrier in 2011, which was commissioned in 2012
and will serve as a training platform. However, it did not yet have an operational fixed-wing air
regiment, and likely would not for several years. Other US officials concluded that the PLA Air
Force was becoming capable of both offshore defensive and offensive roles, such as strike, air
and missile defense, reconnaissance and early warning, and strategic mobility. 1015
In March 2013, DNI James R. Clapper reported to the Senate that, 1016
China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization designed to enable China’s armed
forces to achieve success on a 21st century battlefield. China’s military investments favor capabilities
designed to strengthen its nuclear deterrent and strategic strike, counter foreign military intervention in a
regional crisis, and provide limited, albeit growing, capacity for power projection. During 2012, China’s
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) introduced advanced weapons into its inventory and reached milestones
in the development of key systems, thereby sustaining the modernization program that has been under way
since the late 1990s. For example, in August, the PLA Navy commissioned the Liaoning, China’s first
aircraft carrier, which Beijing probably sees as a significant step in developing a military commensurate
with great-power status. Additionally, China has continued to develop advanced ballistic missiles.
Developments in Chinese military capabilities support an expansion of PLA operations to secure Chinese
interests beyond territorial issues. To expand operations—specifically in the Indian Ocean—China is
pursuing more effective logistical support arrangements with countries in the region. Beijing is also
maintaining a multi-ship antipiracy task force in the Gulf of Aden for the fourth straight year to protect
commercial shipping. The task force operates independently of international efforts, but is making a
tangible contribution to protecting shipping through this heavily pirated area.
China is also supplementing its more advanced military capabilities by bolstering maritime law
enforcement (MLE) activities in support of its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. In the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 333

territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan last year, the Chinese Navy stayed over the horizon as
MLE vessels provided Beijing’s on-scene presence and response.
The DOD’s 2014 edition of Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China went into a new level of depth in discussing these issues. It noted both the links
between strategy and modernization discussed in this chapter and the major advances in missile
and nuclear forces discussed in Chapter IX. It also described many changes and priorities
affecting the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia: 1017
Although preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the focus and primary driver of
China’s military modernization program, steadily increasing tensions in the East China and South China
Seas, along with growing interests and influence abroad, have caused a substantial uptick in the PLA’s
preparations for a range of missions beyond China’s immediate periphery.
China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve extended-range power projection
and operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and electronic warfare. Current trends in
China’s weapons production will enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia well
beyond China’s traditional territorial claims. Key systems that either have been deployed or are in
development include ballistic missiles (including anti-ship variants), anti-ship and land-attack cruise
missiles, nuclear submarines, modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier. The need to ensure trade,
particularly oil supplies from the Middle East, has prompted the PLA Navy to join international
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Tensions with Japan over maritime claims in the East China
Sea and with several Southeast Asian claimants to all or parts of the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the
South China Sea have increased. In the coming years, instability on the Korean Peninsula could produce a
regional crisis involving China’s military. The desire to protect energy investments in Central Asia, along
with potential security implications from cross-border support to ethnic separatists, could provide an
incentive for military investment or intervention in this region if instability surfaces.
In addition to developing new capabilities to protect security and energy interests regionally, China’s
political leaders have charged the PLA with developing capabilities for missions in non-traditional security
areas, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and counterterrorism operations. Then-
President Hu Jintao’s 2004 announcement of the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” for example, promoted:
increased PRC participation in UN peacekeeping missions; greater PLA involvement in humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief exercises; deployment of China’s ANWEI-class military hospital ship (the PEACE
ARK) throughout East Asia and to the Caribbean; PLA participation in four joint military exercises with
SCO members, the most prominent being the PEACE MISSION series, with China and Russia as the main
participants;, and China’s continued counterpiracy deployments to the Gulf of Aden that began in
December 2008.
China refers to these new missions to message its aspirations for a global leadership role and to garner
international respect. At the same time, these non-traditional missions likely serve as a key testing ground
for the PLA: the experience gained and problems overcome on these missions will improve the operation of
new capabilities in traditional security missions as well. The new capabilities may also increase China’s
options for military influence to press its diplomatic agenda, advance regional and international interests,
and resolve disputes in China’s favor. (p. 27-28)
Military Equipment Modernization Trends. China’s defense industry resource and investment
prioritization and allocation favors missile and space systems, followed by maritime assets and aircraft,
and, lastly, ground force materiel. China is developing and producing increasingly advanced systems,
augmented through selected investments into foreign designs and reverse engineering. However, China’s
defense industries are increasing the quality of output in all of these areas as well as increasing overall
production capacities. Over the past decade, China has made dramatic improvements in all defense
industrial production sectors and is comparable to other major weapon system producers like Russia and
the European Union in some areas. (p. 45-6)
Missile and Space Industry. China’s production of a range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air
missiles for the PLA and for export has likely been enhanced by upgrades to primary final assembly and
rocket motor production facilities over the past few years. China’s space launch vehicle industry is
334 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

expanding to support satellite launch services and the manned space program. The majority of China’s
missile programs, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, is comparable to other international top-
tier producers, while its surface-to-air missile systems lag behind global leaders. China’s missile industry
modernization efforts have positioned it well for the foreseeable future. (p. 46)
Naval and Shipbuilding Industry. Shipyard expansion and modernization have increased China’s
shipbuilding capacity and capability, generating benefits for all types of military projects, including
submarines, surface combatants, naval aviation, and sealift assets. Collaboration between China’s two
largest state-owned shipbuilders, China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and China Shipbuilding
Industry Corporation (CSIC), in shared ship designs and construction information will likely increase
shipbuilding efficiency. China continues to invest in foreign suppliers for some propulsion units, but is
becoming increasingly self-reliant. China is among the top ship-producing nations in the world and is
currently pursuing an indigenous aircraft carrier program. To date, China has not produced a non-carrier
surface combatant larger than a destroyer, but is outfitting these ships with increasingly sophisticated anti-
surface, -air, and -subsurface defensive and offensive capabilities. China is using more sophisticated ship
design and construction program management techniques and software. (p. 46)
Armaments Industry. There have been production capacity advances in almost every area of PLA ground
forces systems, including production of new tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense artillery systems
and artillery pieces. However, China still relies on foreign acquisition to fill gaps in select critical technical
capabilities, such as turbine aircraft engines. China is capable of producing ground weapon systems at or
near world standards, though quality deficiencies persist with some export equipment. (p. 46)
Aviation Industry. China’s commercial and military aviation industries have advanced to produce
indigenously improved versions of older aircraft and modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, which
incorporate low- observable technologies, as well as attack helicopters. China’s commercial aircraft
industry has invested in high-precision and technologically advanced machine tools, avionics, and other
components that can also be used in the production of military aircraft. However, production in the aircraft
industry will be limited by its reliance on foreign sourcing for dependable, proven aircraft engines.
Infrastructure and experience for the production of large-body commercial and military aircraft are believed
to be limited, but growing with continued investments. (p. 47)
It highlighted several fields that China is particularly interested in pursuing. 1018
Basic Research. As part of a broad effort to expand basic research capabilities, China identified five areas
that have military applications as major strategic needs or science research plans requiring active
government involvement and funding:
o Material design and preparation;
o Manufacturing in extreme environmental conditions;
o Aeronautic and astronautic mechanics;
o Information technology development; and,
o Nanotechnology research.
In nanotechnology, China has progressed from virtually no research or funding in 2002 to being a close
second to the United States in total government investment.
Leading-Edge Technologies. China is focusing on the following technologies for rapid development:
o Information Technology: Priorities include intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc networks,
and virtual-reality technologies;
o New Materials: Priorities include smart materials and structures, high-temperature
superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies;
o Advanced Manufacturing: Priorities include extreme manufacturing technologies and intelligent
service advanced machine tools;
o Advanced Energy Technologies: Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 335

alternative fuels, and advanced vehicle technologies;

o Marine Technologies: Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring
technologies, fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies, and deep-sea operations
technologies; and,
o Laser and Aerospace Technologies: Priorities include development of chemical and solid laser
state technologies to field a weapon-grade system ultimately from ground-based and airborne
platforms.
Outside analysts agree that the Chinese Navy and Air Force give priority to increasing their
ability to support their strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region. As one expert notes, China is
developing stronger anti-air force and anti-navy capabilities, using missiles – often land based –
to threaten naval bases, carrier strike groups, and regional air bases. At the same time, the
country is improving its integrated air defense system to make it difficult to penetrate and strike
these missiles. The intention is to deter the US from entering important near-seas areas and force
US forces back beyond their armaments and platforms ranges. 1019
Moreover, both services have emphasized other aspects of force modernization, aside from
equipment development and acquisition: 1020
Modernization (xiandaihua) of hardware is only one component of PLA development and reform. The
others are regularization (zhengguihua) and revolutionization (geminghua). Revolutionization refers to the
need to ensure that the PLA remains a Chinese Communist Party-controlled military even as it becomes
more specialized and proficient. Regularization, or what U.S. specialists term software modernization,
entails standardization and improvement of rules and regulations as well as organization to increase the
PLA’s ability to employ its hardware.
…Since the late 1990s, increasingly realistic training and organizational reforms (including downsizing of
personnel, streamlining of bureaucratic structures, and reconfiguration of logistics and maintenance) have
facilitated regularization of China’s navy and air forces. Facilities, faculty, curricula, and research at
military educational institutions are being improved, in part through increased funding and even monetary
rewards. Consolidation and merging of institutions may also be in store, particularly for PLAAF and PLAN
aviation. Officers of unprecedented intellectual and technical caliber are being recruited…. The quality and
education level of noncommissioned officers remains a problem, however, necessitating targeted remedial
education.
Overall, US sources agree that the PLA is becoming increasingly modern: 1021
The PLA has gradually increased its technological research and development, as well as its military and
educational exchanges, and has conducted various combined exercises with such advanced militaries as
those of Russia and Turkey. China’s naval and air forces are receiving a larger proportion of PLA
personnel and funding as the PLA becomes a leaner, more technology-intensive force through successive
personnel reductions, particularly of ground forces.
Some analysts also feel China believes it can structure its modernization efforts in ways that
exploit the US-PRC asymmetry of interest in near-sea disputes and overall regional influence.
The PRC is using military, economic, and political carrots and sticks regionally to convince the
US and its neighbors that PRC interests should be respected, that any attempts to restrain the
PRC will fail, and that in this reemergence, the PRC is the natural leader of East Asia. China
hopes that it can use military development to speed up their political goals without having to
actually use the military in a battle. 1022
Given the systems that China is developing and acquiring, the PLA appears to have a different definition of
“modern.” At present, for instance, it does not need high-end power-projection capabilities. The PLA
already possesses cutting-edge missile technology and systems. It is not yet capable of sophisticated joint
operations or complex real-time command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
336 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

and reconnaissance (C4ISR), but for high-priority near-seas missions, work-arounds may be available
involving land-basing, temporal and spatial deconfliction of assets, and communications through secure
fiber optic cable networks and high-powered line-of-sight. Such approaches may already be sufficient to
convince leaders in Taiwan that the PLA has the capability to coerce the island while deterring U.S.
intervention.
That said, for China to continue to improve its A2/AD capabilities, it must surmount several hurdles…
Together with avionics and flight-control systems to some degree, [aeroengines] technology remains a
major gap in Chinese aircraft development and production capabilities… Coordination of aircraft and
surface-to-air missile operations represents another possible challenge… Other potential hurdles include the
mastery of antisubmarine warfare and amphibious operations…. To enable truly robust out-of-area
operations, China must increase its capabilities in satellite navigation and C4ISR, antisubmarine warfare,
area air defense, long-range air power, production of military ships and aircraft, at-sea replenishment,
remote repair, operational readiness, doctrine, training, human capital, and overseas facilities. Thus far,
Beijing has many limitations in these areas; some voluntary, some less so. These will be key indicators to
monitor.

A Transformation Underway: The Chinese View

The 2010 Chinese Defense White Paper discusses Chinese plans for military modernization in
some detail. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is working on switching from a focus on
scale, quantity, and manpower to efficiency, quality, and technology. The military aims to field
high-technology weapons and develop into a more agile, smarter fighting force. In addition, the
concept of “informationization” is emphasized, with a goal of integrating information systems
into combat, support, and service support functions.
While the Army appears to be declining in importance, air, naval, and defense roles are projected
to expand. In addition, the Second Artillery is explicitly acknowledged as having responsibility
for both conventional and nuclear missiles; the branch plans to enhance strategic deterrence and
thus increase emphasis on its nuclear capacity. The 2010 White Paper states, 1023
To meet the new and changing needs of national security, the PLA tries to accentuate modernization from a
higher platform. It strengthens the building of a new type of combat capability to win local wars in
conditions of informationization, strengthens the composite development of mechanization and
informationization with the latter as the leading factor, focuses informationization on raising its fighting
capabilities based on information systems, and enhances the capabilities in fire power, mobility, protection,
support and informationization.
…In line with the strategic requirements of mobile operations and tri-dimensional offense and defense, the
PLA Army (PLAA) has invested additional efforts in reform, innovation and development, and advanced
the overall transformation of the service. The PLAA has emphasized the development of new types of
combat forces, optimized its organization and structure, strengthened military training in conditions of
informationization, accelerated the digitized upgrading and retrofitting of main battle weaponry,
organically deployed new types of weapon platforms, and significantly boosted its capabilities in long-
distance maneuvers and integrated assaults.
…The PLAA has made great progress in strengthening its arms. The armored component has strengthened
the development of digitized units, accelerated the mechanization of motorized units, and improved its
combat system, which combines heavy, light, amphibious and air-borne assault forces. The artillery
component has been working on new types of weapons, equipment, and ammunition with higher levels of
informationization, forming an operational and tactical in-depth strike system, and developing the capacity
to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities.
The air defense component has stepped up the development of new types of radar, command information
systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles. It has formed a new interception system
consisting of anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, and possesses enhanced capabilities of medium- and low-
altitude air and missile defense operations. The PLAA aviation wing has worked to move from being a
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 337

support force to being a main-battle assault force, further optimized its combat force structure, and
conducted modularized grouping according to different tasks. It has upgraded armed helicopters, transport
and service helicopters, and significantly improved its capabilities in air strike, force projection, and
support. The engineering component has accelerated its transformation into a new model of integrated and
multi-functional support force which is rapid in response and can be used both in peacetime and in war. It
has also strengthened its special capabilities in emergency rescue and disaster relief.
In this way, capabilities in integral combat support and military operations other than MOOTW missions
have been further enhanced. The chemical defense component has worked to develop an integrated force
for nuclear, biological and chemical defense which operates both in peacetime and in war, combines
civilian and military efforts, and integrates systems from various arms and services. It has developed
enhanced permanent, multi-dimensional and multi-terrain defense capabilities against nuclear, biological
and chemical threats.
In line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) endeavors to accelerate
the modernization of its integrated combat forces, enhances its capabilities in strategic deterrence and
counterattack, and develops its capabilities in conducting operations in distant waters and in countering
non-traditional security threats.
It seeks to further improve its combat capabilities through regularized and systematic basic training and
actual combat training in complex electromagnetic environments. By organizing naval vessels for drills in
distant waters, it develops training models for MOOTW missions. New types of submarines, frigates,
aircraft and large support vessels have been deployed as planned. The PLAN enhances the construction of
composite support bases so as to build a shore-based support system which matches the deployment of
forces and the development of weaponry and equipment. The Navy has accelerated the building of surface
logistical platforms… and is working to further improve its surface support capabilities. The Navy explores
new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime missions….
To satisfy the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations, the
modernization and transformation of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) follows a carefully structured plan. It
strengthens and improves the PLAAF development and personnel development strategies, and enhances its
research into the operation and transformation of air forces in conditions of informationization. The
PLAAF is working to ensure the development of a combat force structure that focuses on air strikes, air and
missile defense, and strategic projection, to improve its leadership and command system and build up an
informationized, networked base support system. It conducts training on confrontation between systems in
complex electromagnetic environments, and carries out maneuvers, drills and operational assembly training
in different tactical contexts.
The PLAAF strengthens routine combat readiness of air defenses, taking the defense of the capital as the
center and the defense of coastal and border areas as the key. It has carried out MOOTWs, such as air
security for major national events, emergency rescue and disaster relief, international rescue, and
emergency airlift. It has gradually deployed airborne early warning and control aircraft, third-generation
combat aircraft, and other advanced weaponry and equipment.
Following the principle of building a lean and effective force, the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF)
strives to push forward its modernization and improves its capabilities in rapid reaction, penetration,
precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in
strategic deterrence and defensive operations. It continues to develop a military training system unique with
the strategic missile force, improve the conditions of on-base, simulated and networked training, conduct
trans-regional maneuvers and training with opposing forces in complex electromagnetic environments.
It has set up laboratories for key disciplines, specialties and basic education, and successfully developed
systems for automatic missile testing, operational and tactical command and control, strategic missile
simulation training, and the support system for the survival of combatants in operational positions. It has
worked to strengthen its safety systems, strictly implement safety regulations, and ensure the safety of
missile weaponry and equipment, operational positions and other key elements. It has continued to
maintain good safety records in nuclear weapon management. Through the years, the PLASAF has grown
into a strategic force equipped with both nuclear and conventional missiles.
338 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

…The PLA takes the building of joint operation systems as the focal point of its modernization and
preparations for military struggle, and strives to enhance its fighting capabilities based on information
systems.

The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper

China described its military force structure in depth for the first time in its 2013 Defense White
Paper. It reported that it had a total of 850,000 officers in the Army, 235,000 officers in the
Navy, and 398,000 officers in the Air Force. The Army had 18 corps in seven military
commands (Beijing, Chengdu, Shenyan, Jinan, Nanjing, Guahngzhou, and Lanzhou). The Air
Force had the same seven military areas, while the Navy had three fleets: the Beihai, Donghai,
and Nanhai.
The 2013 Defense White Paper also noted that China’s Second Artillery Force is crucial for
China’s “strategic deterrence” and is at the same time “primarily responsible for deterring other
countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks and
precision strikes with conventional missiles.” 1024
Key passages do much to explain China’s emerging forces and the role they might play in
deterring, containing, or escalating a Korean conflict: 1025
China’s armed forces are composed of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police
Force (PAPF) and the militia. They play a significant role in China’s overall strategies of security and
development, and shoulder the glorious mission and sacred duty of safeguarding national sovereignty,
security and development interests.
Over the years, the PLA has been proactively and steadily pushing forward its reforms in line with the
requirements of performing its missions and tasks, and building an informationized military. The PLA has
intensified the strategic administration of the Central Military Commission (CMC). It established the PLA
Department of Strategic Planning, reorganized the GSH (Headquarters of the General Staff)
Communications Department as the GSH Informationization Department, and the GSH Training and Arms
Department as the GSH Training Department.
The PLA is engaged in the building of new types of combat forces. It optimizes the size and structure of the
various services and arms, reforms the organization of the troops so as to make operational forces lean,
joint, multi-functional and efficient. The PLA works to improve the training mechanism for military
personnel of a new type, adjust policies and rules regarding military human resources and logistics, and
strengthen the development of new- and high-technology weaponry and equipment to build a modern
military force structure with Chinese characteristics.
The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is a core force for China’s strategic deterrence. It is mainly
composed of nuclear and conventional missile forces and operational support units, primarily responsible
for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear
counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. Following the principle of building a lean
and effective force, the PLASAF is striving to push forward its informationization transform, relying on
scientific and technological progress to boost independent innovations in weaponry and equipment,
modernizing current equipment selectively by applying mature technology, enhancing the safety, reliability
and effectiveness of its missiles, improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional
missiles, strengthening its rapid reaction, effective penetration, precision strike, damage infliction,
protection and survivability capabilities. The PLASAF capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear
counterattack and conventional precision strike are being steadily elevated. The PLASAF has under its
command missile bases, training bases, specialized support units, academies and research institutions. It has
a series of “Dong Feng” ballistic missiles and “Chang Jian” cruise missiles.
The 2013 White Paper also emphasized sea control and coastal security, along with the role of
the PLA Air Force: 1026
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 339

The PLAN strengthens maritime control and management, systematically establishes patrol mechanisms,
effectively enhances situational awareness in surrounding sea areas, tightly guards against various types of
harassment, infiltration and sabotage activities, and copes promptly with maritime and air incidents and
emergencies. It advances maritime security cooperation, and maintains maritime peace and stability, as
well as free and safe navigation.
Within the framework of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), the Chinese and US
navies regularly exchange maritime information to avoid accidents at sea. According to the Agreement on
Joint Patrols by the Navies of China and Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf, the two navies have organized joint
patrols twice a year since 2006.
The border public security force is an armed law-enforcement body deployed by the state in border and
coastal areas, and at ports. It assumes important responsibilities of safeguarding national sovereignty, and
maintaining security and stability in border, coastal and sea areas, as well as entry and exit order at ports. It
carries out diversified tasks of maintaining stability, combating crimes, conducting emergency rescues and
providing security in border areas…. The border public security force takes strict and coordinated measures
against cross-border fishing activities, strengthens law enforcement by maritime
The PLAAF is the mainstay of national territorial air defense, and in accordance with the instructions of the
CMC, the PLAA, PLAN and PAPF all undertake some territorial air defense responsibilities. In peacetime,
the chain of command of China’s air defense runs from the PLAAF headquarters through the air commands
of the military area commands to air defense units. The PLAAF exercises unified command over all air
defense components in accordance with the CMC’s intent. China’s air defense system is composed of six
sub-systems of reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, aerial defense, ground air defense,
integrated support and civil air defense.
China has established an air defense force system that integrates reconnaissance and early warning,
resistance, counterattack and protection. For air situation awareness means, air detection radars and early
warning aircraft are the mainstay, supplemented by technical and ECM reconnaissance. For resistance
means, fighters, fighter-bombers, ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery troops are the mainstay,
supplemented by the strengths from the PLAA air defense force, militia and reserves, as well as civil air
defense. For integrated protection means, various protection works and strengths are the mainstay,
supplemented by specialized technical protection forces.
…The PLAN is improving the training mode of task force formation in blue water. It organizes the training
of different formations of combined task forces composed of new types of destroyers, frigates, ocean-going
replenishment ships and shipborne helicopters. It is increasing its research and training on tasks in complex
battlefield environments, highlighting the training of remote early warning, comprehensive control, open
sea interception, long-range raid, anti-submarine warfare and vessel protection at distant sea.
Finally, the 2013 White Paper discussed joint training and exercises with other nations’
militaries. Joint Navy, Army, Air Force, and health services provision training and exercises
have all been increasing steadily, expanding in both depth and breadth. China has also conducted
nine bilateral and multilateral anti-terrorism military exercises within the framework of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. 1027
In adherence to the principles of being non-aligned, non-confrontational, and not directed against any third
party, as well as the guidelines of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity, the PLA has held, together with
other countries, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training featuring multiple levels, domains, services
and arms. Since 2002, the PLA has held 28 joint exercises and 34 joint training sessions with 31 countries
in accordance with relevant agreements or arrangements. This is conducive to promoting mutual trust in the
political and military fields, safeguarding regional security and stability, and accelerating the PLA’s
modernization.

China’s Improving Conventional Capabilities

As is discussed in this chapter, China’s offensive military and power projection capabilities have
been steadily improving. China’s first aircraft carrier (Liaoning) was commissioned in
340 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

September 2012, and it appears that sea-training of pilots is underway; prototype J-15 aircraft –
indicating a potential multi-role capability, as opposed to solely air defense – and Z-8 AEW
helicopter landings and takeoffs have been documented. The JZY-01, a carrier-borne, fixed-wing
AEW aircraft, is also under development. The carrier has significant weapons (such as two 12-
tube anti-submarine rocket launchers and four 18-cell FL-3000N missile systems) and radar
(such as the Sea Eagle 3D search radar and an active phased array radar) systems installed. 1028
Other new systems like the DH-10 land-attack cruise missile launch tubes are now equipping a
test vessel, while an air-launched version of the missile has been under development for over five
years and may soon be deployed. A ship-based version of the DH-10 would be able to provide
significant sea-based land-attack capabilities. An air-launched version of the DH-10, the CJ-10,
is being fielded on China’s fleet of upgraded H-6 bombers (H-6K), giving the bombers a very
long range land attack capability. Two new Type-052D destroyers have also been developed,
indicating that the PLAN desires to enhance blue-water capabilities, though it remains unclear
whether many ships will be built. Combined with other classes of ships as well as the Type-
052Cs, the PLAN could develop a globally deployable destroyer fleet. 1029
China has growing regional security interests, focusing on disputed territories, Taiwan, and the
Korean Peninsula. The PRC has been developing corvettes that are geared towards this focus –
such as the Type-056 that is to replace the outdated Jianghu-I frigates. It was developed quickly
and six were launched in six months in 2012.1030
This suggests the Type-056 will be utilized in significant numbers, while simultaneously closing
China’s anti-submarine warfare capability gap that regional countries have been trying to exploit.
It also appears the country is developing a maritime patrol aircraft, the Shaanxi Y-8 MPA, which
“will improve China’s surveillance over its littoral and its ability to detect the growing number of
submarines in the region.” 1031
Informationization and Realistic Training for Joint Warfare
China’s enhanced conventional capabilities are being built under the doctrine of fighting “local
wars under conditions of informationization.” 1032
Chinese military writings describe informationized warfare as an asymmetric form of warfare used to
defeat a technologically superior, information-dependent adversary through dominance of the battlefield’s
information space. Information operations encompass defensive and offensive military actions and focus on
defending PLA information systems, while disrupting or destroying an adversary’s information systems.
Chinese writings view informationized warfare as a way to weaken an adversary’s ability to acquire,
transmit, process, and use information during war and discuss it as a way to force an adversary to capitulate
before the onset of conflict.
Joint warfare plays a prominent role in this doctrine, and the PLA has emphasized realistic
training in a joint warfare context. The 2014 DOD report on Chinese military developments
described what this training has entailed to date. 1033
In 2013, the PLA emphasized training under “realistic combat scenarios” and the ability to execute long-
range mobility operations. This type of training was highlighted by the MISSION ACTION 2013 series of
exercises and the MANEUVER 5 PLA Navy exercise involving all three PLA Navy fleets. MISSION
ACTION 2013 was a multi-week exercise led by the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions (MRs) and
the PLA Air Force. The exercise emphasized multiple PLA objectives including long-distance mobility and
logistics, joint air-ground, and joint air-naval operations under realistic, high-tech conditions, and a series
of amphibious landing operations.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 341

Almost all of the PLA’s 2013 exercises focused on operating in “informationized” conditions by
emphasizing system-of-systems operations, a concept that can be viewed as the Chinese corollary to U.S.
network-centric warfare. This concept requires enhancing systems and weapons with information
capabilities and linking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable
of unified action. These operational training reforms are a result of the Outline of Military Training and
Evaluation (OMTE), which was last published in mid-2008 and became standard across the PLA on
January 1, 2009. Since that time, the PLA has pushed to achieve OMTE objectives by emphasizing realistic
training conditions, training in complex electromagnetic and joint environments, and integrating new
technologies into the PLA force structure.
A result of these changes is a more flexible year-round training cycle, which is a departure from the Soviet-
style conscript-dependent training cycles that were prominent throughout the PLA in previous decades.
During 2013, the PLA continued its push toward year-round military training and aligned its recruiting
cycle with China’s post-secondary academic calendar to attract better educated recruits. The recruiting
period now begins in August rather than October. (2014, p. 10)
The PLA conducts military exercises simulating operations in complex electromagnetic environments and
likely views conventional and cyber operations as a means of achieving information dominance. The PLA
GSD Fourth Department (Electronic Countermeasures and Radar) would likely use jamming and electronic
warfare, cyberspace operations, and deception to augment counterspace and other kinetic operations during
a wartime scenario to deny an adversary’s use of information systems. “Simultaneous and parallel”
operations would involve strikes against U.S. warships, aircraft, and associated supply craft, as well as the
use of information attacks to hamper tactical and operational communications and computer networks.
These operations could have a significant effect upon an adversary’s navigational and targeting radars.
(2014, p. 32-33)
Improving the quality of military education is another aspect of the PLA’s efforts to enhance the
training of its personnel. Not only does this include emphasis on proficiency of use of new
technology, but also on the development of joint command skills.1034
Additionally, the PLA is laying the foundation for future changes in military doctrine. To develop a new
cadre of officers, the PLA is reshuffling its academies to cultivate junior officers proficient with and
capable of leveraging technology in all warfighting functions for joint operations. The National University
of Defense Technology, for example, launched a yearlong joint operations staff officer course to serve as a
pilot for a future national-level program. The course allows junior officers to rotate to the command
elements of other PLA services to enhance their skills in joint operations planning and preparation.

Ground Forces
Recent Chinese official descriptions of each service do not address the risk of conflict in the
Koreas or the rest of Northeast Asia, focusing instead on the general role of forces or operations
other than war. They do, however, provide some insights into the Chinese view of how such
forces might be used in the Koreas and Northeast Asia.
The Chinese Defense White Paper for 2013 focused on the readiness and joint warfare
capabilities of the PLA and the internal security functions of Chinese paramilitary forces. This
discussion often deals with Chinese ground forces in different sections, but if all of these sections
are assembled together, they provide a considerable amount of detail on the overall structure of
both the Chinese army and other elements of Chinese ground forces: 1035
People’s Liberation Army (PLAA)
The PLA Army (PLAA) is composed of mobile operational units, border and coastal defense units, guard
and garrison units, and is primarily responsible for military operations on land. In line with the strategic
requirements of mobile operations and multi-dimensional offense and defense, the PLAA has been
342 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

reoriented from theater defense to trans-theater mobility. It is accelerating the development of army
aviation troops, light mechanized units and special operations forces, and enhancing building of digitalized
units, gradually making its units small, modular and multi-functional in organization so as to enhance their
capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special
operations.
The PLAA mobile operational units include 18 combined corps, plus additional independent combined
operational divisions (brigades), and have a total strength of 850,000. The combined corps, composed of
divisions and brigades, are respectively under the seven military area commands (MACs): Shenyang (16th,
39th and 40th Combined Corps), Beijing (27th, 38th and 65th Combined Corps), Lanzhou (21st and 47th
Combined Corps), Jinan (20th, 26th and 54th Combined Corps), Nanjing (1st, 12th and 31st Combined
Corps), Guangzhou (41st and 42nd Combined Corps) and Chengdu (13th and 14th Combined Corps).
…The PLA has a regular system of combat readiness. It improves infrastructure for combat readiness,
carries out scenario-oriented drills, and earnestly organizes alert duties, border, coastal and air defense
patrols and guard duties. It keeps itself prepared for undertaking operational tasks and MOOTW at all
times. Based on different tasks, the troops assume different levels of readiness (Level III, Level II and
Level I, from the lowest degree of alertness to the highest).
The routine combat readiness work of the PLAA serves to maintain normal order in border areas and
protect national development achievements. Relying on the operational command organs and command
information system, it strengthens the integration of combat readiness duty elements, explores joint duty
probability within a theater, and optimizes the combat readiness duty system in operational troops at and
above the regiment level. It ensures the implementation of combat readiness work through institutionalized
systems and mechanisms. It creates a combat readiness system with inter-connected strategic directions,
combined arms and systematized operational support. Thus, the PLAA keeps sound combat readiness with
agile maneuvers and effective response.
The PLA takes scenario-based exercises and drills as the basic means to accelerate the transition in military
training and raise combat capabilities. It widely practices in training such operational concepts in
conditions of informationization as information dominance, confrontation between different systems,
precision strike, fusion, integration and jointness. It organizes training based on real combat needs,
formations and procedures. It pays special attention to confrontational command training, live independent
force-on-force training and training in complex battlefield environments. Thus, the warfighting capabilities
based on information systems have been thoroughly improved.
Carrying out trans-MAC training. To develop rapid-response and joint-operation capabilities in
unfamiliar environments and complex conditions, the divisions and brigades of the same specialty with
similar tasks and tailored operational environments are organized to carry out a series of trans-MAC live
verification-oriented exercises and drills in the combined tactical training bases. In 2009, the Shenyang,
Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou MACs each sent one division to join long-distance maneuvers and
confrontational drills. Since 2010, a series of campaign-level exercises and drills code-named “Mission
Action” for trans-MAC maneuvers have been carried out. Specifically, in 2010 the Beijing, Lanzhou and
Chengdu MACs each sent one division (brigade) led by corps headquarters, together with some PLAAF
units, to participate in the exercise. In 2011, relevant troops from the Chengdu and Jinan MACs were
organized and carried out the exercise in plateau areas. In 2012, the Chengdu, Jinan and Lanzhou MACs
and relevant PLAAF troops were organized and carried out the exercise in southwestern China.
Highlighting force-on-force training. The various services and arms are intensifying confrontational and
verification-oriented exercises and drills. Based on different scenarios, they organize live force-on-force
exercises, online confrontational exercises and computer-simulation confrontational exercises.
Joint army training is gradually being increased in breadth and depth. Since 2007, the PLAA has conducted
a number of joint training sessions with its counterparts of other countries. The PLAA joined the “Hand-in-
Hand 2007” and “Hand-in-Hand 2008” joint anti-terrorism training sessions with the Indian army,
“Peacekeeping Mission-2009” joint peacekeeping exercise with the Mongolian army, “Cooperation-2009”
and “Cooperation-2010” joint security training exercises with Singapore, “Friendship Operation-2009” and
“Friendship Operation-2010” joint military training of mountain troops with the Romanian army, and joint
SOF unit training with the Turkish army. The PLAA special forces held the “Strike-2007,” “Strike-2008”
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 343

and “Strike-2010” joint anti-terrorism training with their Thai counterparts, “Sharp Knife-2011” and “Sharp
Knife-2012” joint anti-terrorism training with their Indonesian counterparts, “Friendship-2010” and
“Friendship-2011” joint anti-terrorism training with their Pakistani counterparts, and “Cooperation-2012”
joint anti-terrorism training with their Colombian counterparts. In November 2012, joint anti-terrorism
training was held with the Jordanian special forces and a joint humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief
tabletop exercise with the US army.
Border and Coastal Defense Forces
…The border and coastal defense forces of the PLAA are stationed in border and coastal areas, and on
islands. They are responsible for defense and administrative tasks such as safeguarding the national
borders, coastlines and islands, resisting and guarding against foreign invasions, encroachments and
provocations, and assisting in cracking down on terrorist sabotage and cross-border crimes. The border and
coastal defense forces focus on combat-readiness duties, strengthen the defense and surveillance of major
directions and sensitive areas, watercourses and sea areas in border and coastal regions, maintain a rigorous
guard against any invasion, encroachment or cross-border sabotage, prevent in a timely fashion any
violation of border and coastal policies, laws and regulations and changes to the current borderlines, carry
out civil-military joint control and management, and emergency response missions promptly, and
effectively safeguard the security and stability of the borders and coastal areas.
…The border public security force is an armed law-enforcement body deployed by the state in border and
coastal areas, and at ports. It assumes important responsibilities of safeguarding national sovereignty, and
maintaining security and stability in border, coastal and sea areas, as well as entry and exit order at ports. It
carries out diversified tasks of maintaining stability, combating crimes, conducting emergency rescues and
providing security in border areas. The border public security force establishes border control zones along
the borderlines, establishes maritime defense zones in the coastal areas, establishes border surveillance
areas 20 to 50 meters in depth along land border and coastline areas adjacent to Hong Kong and Macao,
sets up border inspection stations at open ports, and deploys a marine police force in coastal areas.
In recent years, regular strict inspections, management and control in border areas and at ports have been
carried out to guard against and subdue separatist, sabotage, violent and terrorist activities by the “three
forces” or hostile individuals. The border public security force takes strict and coordinated measures
against cross-border fishing activities, strengthens law enforcement by maritime security patrols, and
clamps down on maritime offenses and crimes. Since 2011, it has handled 47,445 cases, seized 12,357 kg
of drugs, confiscated 125,115 illegal guns, and tracked down 5,607 illegal border-crossers.
Militia Forces
The militia takes an active part in combat readiness duties, joint military-police-civilian defense efforts,
post duties, and border protection and control tasks in the border and coastal areas. Militia members patrol
along the borders and coastlines all year round.
…The militia is an armed organization composed of the people not released from their regular work. As an
assistant and backup force of the PLA, the militia is tasked with participating in the socialist modernization
drive, performing combat readiness support and defensive operations, helping maintain social order and
participating in emergency rescue and disaster relief operations. The militia focuses on optimizing its size
and structure, improving its weaponry and equipment, and pushing forward reforms in training so as to
enhance its capabilities of supporting diversified military operations, of which the core is to win local wars
in informationized conditions. The militia falls into two categories: primary and general. The primary
militia has emergency response detachments; supporting detachments such as joint air defense, intelligence,
reconnaissance, communications support, engineering rush-repair, transportation and equipment repair; and
reserve units for combat, logistics and equipment support.
…In peacetime, the PAPF’s main tasks include performing guard duties, dealing with emergencies,
combating terrorism and participating in and supporting national economic development. In wartime, it is
tasked with assisting the PLA in defensive operations. Based on the national information infrastructure, the
PAPF has built a three-level comprehensive information network from PAPF general headquarters down to
squadrons. It develops task-oriented weaponry and equipment and conducts scenario-based training so as to
improve its guard-duty, emergency-response and counter-terrorism capabilities. The PAPF is composed of
the internal security force and other specialized forces. The internal security force is composed of
344 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

contingents at the level of province (autonomous region or municipality directly under the central
government) and mobile divisions. Specialized PAPF forces include those guarding gold mines, forests,
hydroelectric projects and transportation facilities. The border public security, firefighting and security
guard forces are also components of the PAPF.
The 2013 and 2014 DOD reports on Chinese military power provide more detail on both Chinese
regular ground forces and China’s internal security forces: 1036
The PLA is investing heavily in its ground force, emphasizing the ability to deploy campaign-level forces
across long distances quickly. This modernization is playing out with wide-scale restructuring of PLA
ground forces that includes a more rapid, flexible special operations force equipped with advanced
technology; improved army aviation units using helicopters armed with precision-guided munitions; and
C2 capabilities with improved networks providing real-time data sharing within and between units. In
addition, the PLA has focused its modernization efforts on transforming from a motorized to a mechanized
force, as well as improving the ground force’s armored, air defense, aviation, ground-air coordination, and
electronic warfare capabilities. PLA ground forces have benefited from increased production of new
equipment, including the Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters, and from new air defense equipment including
the PLA ground force’s first medium-range SAM, the CSA-16, as well as domestically produced CSA-15s
(a copy of the Russian SA-15) and a new advanced self-propelled air defense artillery system, the PGZ-07.
(2014, p. 10)
The ground force is a proponent of joint operations since it requires transport from other forces to operate
beyond China’s borders. To assist with its power projection needs, PLA ground forces have practiced using
commercial transport assets such as roll-on–roll-off ships, to conduct maritime crossing operations.
However, broader joint operations capability are still the primary goal for the ground force, a goal that is
now a mandate for all the military services following the General Staff Department’s (GSD) December
2011 creation of the Military Training Department to oversee all PLA training, ensuring all military
services realize the “prominence of joint training.” (2013, p. 9)
China’s internal security forces primarily consist of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Ministry of
Public Security (MPS), and the PLA. The PAP is a paramilitary organization whose primary mission is
domestic security. It falls under the dual command of the CMC and the State Council. Although there are
different types of PAP units, such as border security and firefighting, the largest is internal security. PAP
units are organized into “contingents” in each province, autonomous region, and centrally administered
city. In addition, 14 PLA divisions were transferred to the PAP in the mid- to late- 1990s to form “mobile
divisions” that can deploy outside their home province. The official budget for China’s internal security
forces exceeds that of the PLA. (2014, p. 41)
The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and
order” with duties including anti-rioting and anti-terrorism. There are about 1.9 million MPS police officers
spread throughout local public security bureaus across the country.
The PLA’s principal focus is on preserving the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party. As such,
the PLA may be used for internal or external stability missions as needed. For example, the PLA may
provide transportation, logistics, and intelligence. China may also task the military to assist local public
security forces with internal security roles, including protection of infrastructure and maintaining public
order.
Chinese leaders perceive threats to the country’s internal security coming from popular protests regarding
social, economic, environmental, and political problems. China also perceives a security challenge from
external non-state actors, such as the separatist East Turkestan Islamic Movement and its alleged
connection with ethnic Uighur nationalist movements in the Xinjiang region.
In 2013, China continued to follow the pattern of using security forces to quell incidents ranging from anti-
foreign sentiment to socio-economic protests. PAP units, particularly the mobile security divisions, also
continued to receive extensive equipment upgrades. China activated security forces several times in 2013 in
response to incidents of violence and also in preparation of sensitive anniversaries such as the July 5
anniversary of the 2009 Uyghur riots in Urumqi. In April, China dispatched more than 1,000 paramilitary
police to Xinjiang after riots resulted in the death of 21 people. Later in June, at least 1,000 paramilitary
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 345

police shut down large sections of Urumqi and conducted 24-hour patrols in military vehicles after clashes
left 35 people dead. In October, paramilitary police were deployed to Biru County in the Tibet Autonomous
Region to crack down on Tibetans who protested an order to fly the Chinese national flag at home. (2014,
p. 41)
The 2014 DOD report made an interesting cut in the 2013 text for reasons that do not seem to
track with Chinese developments. The 2013 report noted that “PLA ground force restructuring is
highlighted by the development of brigades as a key operational echelon for combat in diverse
terrain and under complex electromagnetic conditions.” 1037 Although the paragraph that contains
this statement is nearly identical to one in the 2014 report, this key statement is left out. Ground
force restructuring is a key part of the PLA’s push towards integrated joint operations and
building a force that is more mobile. But the PLA’s vision of a likely future combat scenario is
prominently characterized by what it calls “complex electromagnetic conditions,” in this
statement. These conditions are part of what the PLA classifies as “limited wars under
informationized conditions,” and the PLA is rigorously training its military to fight under this
perceived environment.
The IISS Military Balance for 2013 reported that China was modernizing its Army in order to
make it a more flexible and quick-reaction force. This could allow it to significantly improve its
capability to reinforce the DPRK if it chose to do so: 1038
…[T]he army is continuing to reorganise and receive substantial investment, in efforts to make it a more
flexible, leaner force capable of rapid combined-arms operations. At the heart of this transformation is the
‘brigadisation’ process, whereby regiments and divisions have been recast as combined-arms brigades. By
early 2012, PLA army aviation regiments and armoured divisions were reforming as brigades. …The
development of ‘heavy’, ‘medium’ and ‘light’ formations, along with the brigadisation process of ‘create,
test and adjust’ is similar to the Russian experience of army reform and arguably mirrors the experiences of
Western armed forces; the same can be said of the developing capabilities of the PLA ground forces, with
increased emphasis on platforms capable of adapting to differing firepower, protection and mobility
demands.
The IISS Military Balance for 2014 highlighted continued development in this direction, and
pointed towards China’s efforts at rectifying its rotary-lift shortfall. This suggests continuing
efforts to build a more flexible ground force. 1039
In the latest phase of the PLA’s ground forces restructuring, eight of the nine remaining armoured divisions
have been broken up, and two regiments from each used as the basis for 16 new brigades – eight armoured
and eight mechanised. One of the new mechanised brigades has been designated the PLA’s first dedicated
OPFOR formation. By contrast, the mechanised infantry divisions – and the Beijing based 6th Armoured
Division – remain untouched; these unreformed formations will continue to provide an insurance policy of
sorts for the PLA as it gradually adapts to a brigade-based structure. These organisational changes have
also seen a considerable redistribution of new and existing equipment in an attempt to standardise tank,
armoured vehicle and artillery holdings in the new brigades. Surplus armoured vehicles have been used to
upgrade some previously motorised brigades to light mechanized status. Armoured vehicle production
appears to have settled into two streams, with the high-end Type-99A MBT, Type-04A AIFV and Type-09
APC being built in smaller numbers for select units, and the Type-96A MBT, Type-86A AIFV and Type-
92 APC allocated to the rest. Given the scale of the task, it is likely that the ageing Type-59 MBT and
Type-63 APC will continue to form a substantial part of the PLA’s AFV inventory for some time. The
appearance of a new light tank, which seems to be a combination of Type-99A-style turret with a smaller
chassis and main gun, could herald the final retirement of the Type-62. The PLA had also begun to address
its longstanding deficiency in rotary lift. Continuing production of the Z-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters,
and the Z-8B transport helicopter, has allowed the expansion of several aviation regiments into full
brigades with larger inventories.
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Naval Forces
China’s Navy has undergone significant expansion over the past decade – driven in part by the
1995-6 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which convinced the PRC leadership of the importance of naval
power to balance US interests in the region. In general, China is developing its maritime
capabilities – including its large and expanding merchant marine, significant offshore energy and
minerals exploration, development in the global shipbuilding markets, an increasing fishing fleet,
and its rapidly modernizing Navy.
The 2013 Chinese Defense White Paper highlighted the expanding “blue water” range of
Chinese naval forces, improved readiness and training, and joint warfare capabilities – all of
which increased Chinese capabilities to project power and execute area denial activities. If all of
the various sections in the White Paper that deal with the PLAN are assembled together, they
provide a considerable amount of detail on both current PLAN capabilities and the trends in
these forces: 1040
The PLA Navy (PLAN) is China’s mainstay for operations at sea, and is responsible for safeguarding its
maritime security and maintaining its sovereignty over its territorial seas along with its maritime rights and
interests. The PLAN is composed of the submarine, surface vessel, naval aviation, marine corps and coastal
defense arms. In line with the requirements of its offshore defense strategy, the PLAN endeavors to
accelerate the modernization of its forces for comprehensive offshore operations, develop advanced
submarines, destroyers and frigates, and improve integrated electronic and information systems.
Furthermore, it develops blue-water capabilities of conducting mobile operations, carrying out international
cooperation, and countering non-traditional security threats, and enhances its capabilities of strategic
deterrence and counterattack. Currently, the PLAN has a total strength of 235,000 officers and men, and
commands three fleets, namely, the Beihai Fleet, the Donghai Fleet and the Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has
fleet aviation headquarters, support bases, flotillas and maritime garrison commands, as well as aviation
divisions and marine brigades. In September 2012, China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning was
commissioned into the PLAN. China’s development of an aircraft carrier has a profound impact on
building a strong PLAN and safeguarding maritime security.
…The PLAN strengthens maritime control and management, systematically establishes patrol mechanisms,
effectively enhances situational awareness in surrounding sea areas, tightly guards against various types of
harassment, infiltration and sabotage activities, and copes promptly with maritime and air incidents and
emergencies. It advances maritime security cooperation, and maintains maritime peace and stability, as
well as free and safe navigation. Within the framework of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
(MMCA), the Chinese and US navies regularly exchange maritime information to avoid accidents at sea.
According to the Agreement on Joint Patrols by the Navies of China and Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf, the
two navies have organized joint patrols twice a year since 2006.
…Intensifying blue water training…The PLAN is improving the training mode of task force formation in
blue water. It organizes the training of different formations of combined task forces composed of new types
of destroyers, frigates, ocean-going replenishment ships and shipborne helicopters. It is increasing its
research and training on tasks in complex battlefield environments, highlighting the training of remote early
warning, comprehensive control, open sea interception, long-range raid, anti-submarine warfare and vessel
protection at distant sea. The PLAN organizes relevant coastal forces to carry out live force-on-force
training for air defense, anti-submarine, anti-mine, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, coastal defense, and island
and reef sabotage raids. Since 2007, the PLAN has conducted training in the distant sea waters of the
Western Pacific involving over 90 ships in nearly 20 batches. During the training, the PLAN took effective
measures to respond to foreign close-in reconnaissance and illegal interference activities by military ships
and aircraft. From April to September 2012, the training vessel Zhenghe completed global-voyage training,
paying port calls to 14 countries and regions.
To fulfill China’s international obligations, the Chinese navy carries out regular escort missions in the Gulf
of Aden and waters off Somalia. It conducts exchanges and cooperation with other escort forces to jointly
safeguard the security of the international SLOCs. As of December 2012, Chinese navy task groups have
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 347

provided protection for four WFP ships and 2,455 foreign ships, accounting for 49% of the total of escorted
ships. They helped four foreign ships, recovered four ships released from captivity and saved 20 foreign
ships from pursuit by pirates.
Chinese navy escort task forces have maintained smooth communication with other navies in the areas of
joint escort, information sharing, coordination and liaison. They have conducted joint escorts with their
Russian counterparts, carried out joint anti-piracy drills with naval ships of the ROK, Pakistan and the US,
and coordinated with the European Union to protect WFP ships. It has exchanged boarding visits of
commanders with task forces from the EU, NATO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the ROK, Japan
and Singapore. It has exchanged officers for onboard observations with the navy of the Netherlands. China
takes an active part in the conferences of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS)
and “Shared Awareness and Deconfliction” (SHADE) meetings on international merchant shipping
protection.
Since January 2012, independent deployers such as China, India and Japan have strengthened their convoy
coordination. They have adjusted their escort schedules on a quarterly basis, optimized available assets, and
thereby enhanced escort efficiency. China, as the reference country for the first round of convoy
coordination, submitted its escort timetable for the first quarter of 2012 in good time. India and Japan’s
escort task forces adjusted their convoy arrangements accordingly, thereby formulating a well-scheduled
escort timetable. The ROK joined these efforts in the fourth quarter of 2012.
…The routine combat readiness work of the PLAN serves to safeguard national territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests. It carries out diversified patrols and provides whole-area surveillance in a
cost-effective way. The PLAN organizes and performs regular combat readiness patrols, and maintains a
military presence in relevant sea areas. All fleets maintain the necessary number of ships patrolling in areas
under their respective command, beef up naval aviation reconnaissance patrols, and organize mobile forces
to conduct patrols and surveillance in relevant sea areas, as required.
Joint maritime exercises and training are being expanded. In recent years, the Chinese navy has taken part
in the “Peace-07,” “Peace-09” and “Peace-11” multinational maritime exercises hosted by Pakistan on the
Arabian Sea. The PLA and Russian navies held the “Maritime Cooperation-2012” military drill in the
Yellow Sea off China’s east coast focusing on joint defense of maritime traffic arteries. Chinese and Thai
marine corps held the “Blue Strike-2010” and “Blue Strike-2012” joint training exercises. During mutual
port calls and other activities, the Chinese navy also carried out bilateral or multilateral maritime exercises
and training in such tasks as communications, formation movement, maritime replenishment, cross-deck
helicopter landing, firing at surface, underwater and air targets, joint escort, boarding and inspection, joint
search and rescue and diving with its counterparts of India, France, the UK, Australia, Thailand, the US,
Russia, Japan, New Zealand and Vietnam.
…In combination with its routine combat readiness activities, the PLAN provides security support for
China’s maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and oil and gas exploitation. It has established mechanisms to
coordinate and cooperate with law-enforcement organs of marine surveillance and fishery administration,
as well as a joint military-police-civilian defense mechanism. Further, the PLAN has worked in
coordination with relevant local departments to conduct maritime survey and scientific investigation; build
systems of maritime meteorological observation, satellite navigation, radio navigation and navigation aids;
release timely weather and sea traffic information; and ensure the safe flow of traffic in sea areas of
responsibility.
Together with the marine surveillance and fishery administration departments, the PLAN has conducted
joint maritime exercises and drills for protecting rights and enforcing laws, and enhanced its capabilities to
coordinate command and respond to emergencies in joint military-civilian operations to safeguard maritime
rights. The “Donghai Collaboration-2012” joint exercise was held in the East China Sea in October 2012,
involving 11 ships and eight planes.
As an important armed maritime law-enforcement body, the border public security force exercises
jurisdiction over both violations of laws, rules and regulations relating to public security administration and
suspected crimes committed in China’s internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zones and continental shelf. In recent years, the border public security force has endeavored to
guarantee the security of sea areas, strengthened patrols, surveillance and management along the sea
348 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

boundary in the Beibu Gulf and around the Xisha sea areas, and effectively maintained maritime public
order and stability.
The DOD report on Chinese military power for 2012 summarized the capabilities that the PLA
Navy was prioritizing, 1041
The PLA Navy primarily focuses on improving anti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities, as well as
developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent. “Additional attack submarines, multi-mission surface
combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve sea superiority
within the first island chain and counter any potential third party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.
China is also developing a near-continuous at-sea strategic deterrent with the JIN-class SSBN program. The
JIN-class SSBN was built as a follow-on to China’s first generation XIA-class SSBN. The PLA Navy is
also acquiring ships capable of supporting conventional military operations and HA/DR missions, including
several amphibious transport docks and the ANWEI-class (Peace Ark) hospital ship.
The 2014 DOD report described a wider range of naval developments in the PLA Navy. 1042
The PLA Navy has the largest force of major combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in
Asia. China’s naval forces include some 77 principal surface combatants, more than 60 submarines, 55
medium and large amphibious ships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped small combatants. The PLA Navy
continues to expand its operational and deployment areas further into the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The
October MANEUVER-5 exercise in the Philippine Sea, which included participation from all three PLAN
fleets – the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet – was the largest PLAN open-ocean
exercise seen to date. (2014, p. 7)
With refurbishment of the Soviet KUZNETSOV-class aircraft carrier completed in 2012, China has named
the vessel CV-16, LIAONING, and now has an initial means to conduct carrier operations. During 2013,
China focused on integrating the LIAONING with its J-15 aircraft as well as working out other carrier
operations. Although the LIAONING is serving in what officials describe as an “experimental” capacity,
they also indicate that China will build additional carriers possessing more capability than the ski-jump-
configured LIAONING. Such a carrier force would be capable of improved endurance and of carrying and
launching more varied types of aircraft, including electronic warfare, early warning, and anti-submarine, to
increase the potential striking power of a Chinese “battle group” in safeguarding China’s interests in areas
outside China’s immediate periphery. The carriers would most likely perform such missions as patrolling
economically important sea lanes and conducting naval diplomacy, regional deterrence, and humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief. (2014, p. 36)
…LIAONING (CV-16) shifted home ports from Dalian, where it was located since 2001, to the PLA
Navy’s Yuchi Naval Base, located in the North Sea Fleet. The LIAONING continued flight integration
training throughout 2013, but it is not expected to embark an operational air wing until 2015 or later. In
November 2013, the LIAONING deployed out of area for the first time to the South China Sea, where it
conducted local training near Hainan Island with surface ships. China also continues to pursue an
indigenous aircraft carrier program (the LIAONING is a refurbished ship, purchased from Ukraine in 1998)
and likely will build multiple aircraft carriers over the next decade. The first Chinese-built carrier will
likely be operational sometime at the beginning of the next decade. (2014, p. 7)
The PLA Navy places a high priority on the modernization of its submarine force. China continues the
production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Three JIN-class SSBNs
(Type 094) are currently operational, and up to five may enter service before China proceeds to its next
generation SSBN (Type 096) over the next decade. The JIN-class SSBN will carry the new JL-2
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with an estimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-class and the
JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. China is likely to conduct its first
nuclear deterrence patrols with the JIN-class SSBN in 2014.
China also has expanded its force of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). Two SHANG-class SSNs
(Type 093) are already in service, and China is building four improved variants of the SHANG-class SSN,
which will replace the aging HAN-class SSNs (Type 091). In the next decade, China likely will construct
the Type 095 guided-missile attack submarine (SSGN), which may enable a submarine-based land-attack
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 349

capability. In addition to likely incorporating better quieting technologies, the Type 095 will fulfill
traditional anti-ship roles with the incorporation of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).
The mainstay of the Chinese submarine force remains the diesel-powered attack submarine (SS). In
addition to twelve KILO-class submarines acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, eight of which are
equipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM, the PLA Navy possesses 13 SONG-class SS (Type 039) and 12
YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). The YUAN-class SSP is armed similarly to the SONG-class SS, but also
includes a possible air-independent power system. China may plan to construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.
Since 2008, the PLA Navy has embarked on a robust surface combatant construction program, including
guided missile destroyers (DDGs) and guided missile frigates (FFGs). During 2013, China continued series
production of several classes, including construction of a new generation DDG. Construction of the
LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued with three ships under various stages of construction and
sea trials, which will bring the total number of ships of this class to six by 2015. Additionally, the first
LUYANG III-class DDG (Type 052D), which will likely enter service in 2014, incorporates the PLA
Navy’s first multipurpose vertical launch system, likely capable of launching ASCMs, land-attack cruise
missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and anti-submarine missiles. China is projected to build
more than a dozen of these ships to replace the aging LUDA-class destroyers (DD). China has continued
the construction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A), with 15 ships currently in the
fleet and five or more in various stages of construction, and yet more expected. These new DDGs and FFGs
provide a significant upgrade to the PLA Navy’s area air defense capability, which will be critical as it
expands operations into “distant seas” beyond the range of shore-based air defenses.
To augment the PLA Navy’s littoral warfare capabilities, especially in the South China Sea and East China
Sea, China developed the JIANGDAO-class corvette (FFLs) (Type 056). Nine corvettes entered service in
2013. China may build an additional 20 to 30 vessels of this class. These FFLs augment the 60 HOUBEI-
class wave-piercing catamaran missile patrol boats (PTGs) (Type 022), each capable of carrying eight YJ-
83 ASCMs, for operations in littoral waters. No significant amphibious construction was observed in 2013.
However, it appears likely that China will build its first amphibious assault ship during this decade. (2014,
p. 9)
In a near-term conflict, PLA Navy operations would likely begin in the offshore and coastal areas with
attacks by coastal defense cruise missiles, maritime strike aircraft, and smaller combatants and extend as far
as the second island chain and Strait of Malacca using large surface ships and submarines. As the PLA
Navy gains experience and acquires larger numbers of more capable platforms, including those with long-
range air defense, it will expand the depth of these operations further into the western Pacific. The PLA
Navy may also develop a new capability for ship-based land-attack using cruise missiles. China views
long-range anti-ship cruise missiles as a key weapon in this type of operation and is developing multiple
advanced types and the platforms to employ them for this purpose. (2014, p. 31)
China would face several shortcomings in a near-term conflict, however. First, the PLA’s deep-water anti-
submarine warfare capability seems to lag behind its air and surface warfare capabilities. Second, it is not
clear whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch
platforms in time for successful strikes against targets at sea beyond the first island chain. Chinese
submarines do, however, already possess some capability to hold surface ships at risk, and China is
working to overcome shortcomings in other areas. (2014, p. 32)
The PLA Navy continues the development and deployment of ship-, submarine-, and aircraft-deployed
ASCMs – a mix of Russian- and Chinese-built missiles – which extend China’s strike range. Additionally,
China may develop the capability to arm the new LUYANG Class-III DDG with LACMs, giving the PLA
Navy its first land attack capability. In late October, Japan observed Chinese H-6 bombers and Y-8
reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Miyako Strait to the western Pacific Ocean. The PLA Navy Air
Force continues to make incremental improvements in its air power projection capabilities. (2014, p. 36)
The PLA Navy remains at the forefront of China’s military efforts to extend its operational reach beyond
the western Pacific and into what China calls the “far seas.” Missions in these areas include: protecting
important sea lanes from terrorism, maritime piracy, and foreign interdiction; providing humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief; conducting naval diplomacy and regional deterrence; and training to prevent a
third party, such as the United States, from interfering with operations off China’s coast in a Taiwan, East
350 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

China Sea, or South China Sea conflict. The PLA Navy’s ability to perform these missions is modest but
growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced
platforms. The PLA Navy’s goal over the coming decades is to become a stronger regional force that is
able to project power across the greater Asia-Pacific region for long-term, high-intensity operations.
However, logistics and intelligence support remain key obstacles, particularly in the Indian Ocean. (2014,
p. 37)
In the last several years, the PLA Navy’s distant seas experience has derived primarily from counterpiracy
missions in the Gulf of Aden and long-distance task group deployments beyond the first island chain in the
western Pacific. China continues to sustain a three-ship presence in the Gulf of Aden to protect Chinese
merchant shipping from maritime piracy. This operation is China’s first enduring naval operation beyond
the Asia region.
Additionally, the PLA Navy continues to conduct military activities within its nine-dash line and the
claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of those coastal states.
For example, in March 2013, sailors aboard a group of surface combatants reportedly performed an oath-
taking ceremony at James Shoal. The United States considers military activities in foreign EEZs to be
lawful and notes that similar PLA Navy activity in foreign EEZs undercuts China’s decades-old position
that such activities in China’s EEZ are unlawful.
The PLA Navy has made long-distance deployments a routine part of the annual training cycle. In 2013, it
deployed task groups beyond the first island chain nine times with formations as large as eight ships. These
deployments included a three-ship surface action group deployment to South America, the first-ever such
deployment. Deployments such as these are designed to complete a number of training requirements,
including long-distance navigation, C2, and multi-discipline warfare in deep sea environments beyond the
range of land-based air defense.
The PLA Navy’s force structure continues to evolve, incorporating more platforms with the versatility for
both offshore and long-distance operations. China is engaged in series production of the LUYANG III-class
DDG, the JIANGKAI II-class FFG, and the JIANGDAO-class FFL. China might begin construction on a
new Type 081-class amphibious assault ship within the next five years. China will probably build multiple
aircraft carriers over the next 15 years.
Limited logistical support remains a key obstacle preventing the PLA Navy from operating more
extensively beyond East Asia, particularly in the Indian Ocean. China desires to expand its access to
logistics in the Indian Ocean and will likely establish several access points in this area in the next 10 years.
These arrangements likely will take the form of agreements for refueling, replenishment, crew rest, and
low-level maintenance. (2014, p. 38)
The PLA Navy is improving its long-range surveillance capability with sky-wave and surface wave over-
the-horizon (OTH) radars. In combination with early warning aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
and other surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, the radars allow China to carry out surveillance and
reconnaissance over the western Pacific. These radars can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance
satellites to locate targets at great distances from China, thereby supporting long-range precision strikes,
including employment of ASBMs. (2014, p. 40)
China’s Approach to Maritime Security
During the 2012 Scarborough Reef and 2013 Senkaku Islands tensions, the China Maritime Surveillance
(CMS) and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships were responsible for directly asserting
Chinese sovereignty on a daily basis, while the PLA Navy maintained a more distant presence from the
immediate vicinity of the contested waters. China prefers to use its civilian maritime agencies around these
islands, and uses the PLA Navy in a back-up role or as an escalatory measure. China’s diplomats also apply
pressure on rival claimants. China identifies its territorial sovereignty as a core interest and emphasizes its
willingness to protect against actions that China perceives challenge Chinese sovereignty. China almost
certainly wants to assert its maritime dominance without triggering too harsh of a regional backlash.
In 2013, China consolidated four of its maritime law enforcement agencies into the China Coast Guard
(CCG). Subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security, the CCG is responsible for a wide range of
missions, including maritime sovereignty enforcement missions, anti-smuggling, maritime rescue and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 351

salvage, protecting fisheries resources, and general law enforcement. Prior to the consolidation, different
agencies were responsible for each of these mission sets, creating organizational redundancies and
complicating interagency coordination.
In the next decade, a new force of civilian maritime ships will afford China the capability to patrol its
territorial claims more robustly in the East China and the South China Seas. China is continuing with the
second half of a modernization and construction program for the CCG. The first half of this program, from
2004 to 2008, resulted in the addition of almost 20 ocean-going patrol ships. The second half of this
program, from 2011 to 2015, includes at least 30 new ships for the CCG. Several less capable patrol ships
will be decommissioned during this period. In addition, the CCG will likely build more than 100 new patrol
craft and smaller units, both to increase capability and to replace old units. Overall, The CCG’s total force
level is expected to increase by 25 percent. Some of these ships will have the capability to embark
helicopters, a capability that only a few MLE ships currently have. The enlargement and modernization of
China’s MLE forces will improve China’s ability to enforce its maritime sovereignty. (2014, p. 38)
A separate analysis by Andrew Erikson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord reports that, 1043
The platforms and weapons systems that have emerged… are asymmetric in nature and anti-access in
focus; they target a full spectrum of vulnerabilities inherent in CSGs and other power-projection platforms.
Navigation satellites, new-generation submarines, sea mines and cruise and ballistic missiles promise to
give China an ability to defend its maritime periphery in ways that were simply impossible 15 years ago. It
is unlikely, however, that the Chinese think they can or should prepare to challenge the United States in a
head-to-head clash of major surface forces in the Pacific. For the time being, they value the U.S. Seventh
Fleet as a means to reassure regional stability that underwrites Chinese commerce and costs China nothing.
However, they have recently shown signs of moving beyond a maritime strategy heavily reliant on
submarines and land-based air and missile attack… toward one that also includes major surface
combatants….
…[C]ommerce protection and the importance of sea lines of communication clearly resonate with the
Chinese leadership. As China has become more dependent on seaborne oil imports from the Persian Gulf
and Africa in recent years—a dependence that no amount of overland pipeline construction is likely to
reduce anytime soon—it is plainly worried about a potential threat to its oil tankers in transit through the
Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean… it appears to be in the process of helping to develop facilities and
infrastructure of various kinds (most notably, the deep-water port at Gwadar in Pakistan) in friendly
countries throughout this region.
China has worked to develop its submarine force with both conventional and nuclear submarines
over the past 15 years; Andrew S. Erickson summarizes such developments as follows: 1044
China’s submarine force is one of its core strengths, but it contains considerable variety. On the nuclear-
powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) front, three Type 094 hulls are already in service. Their
armament awaits deployment of the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which is currently
undergoing flight testing. The underground base at Yalong Bay on Hainan Island, which is emerging as a
likely center of Chinese SSBN operations, offers proximity to deep water in otherwise cluttered and
possibly closely monitored water space. The Office of Naval Intelligence’s most recent unclassified report
characterizes the Type 094 as relatively noisy compared to equivalent Russian platforms. This noisiness,
and the lack of an operational SLBM, leave it unable as yet to take full advantage of its South China Sea
___location. Follow-on variants of both hull and missile, as well as further training and operational experience,
may be required before the system as a whole is capable of effective deterrence patrols. Moreover,
command and control issues inherent in successful SSBN operations may give Beijing pause and slow
development. Meanwhile, China’s land-based, partially mobile nuclear-missile forces are already extensive
and highly capable. Their stealth is greatly enhanced by use of decoys and secure fiber-optic
communications, options unavailable to submarines. While China is heading toward a nuclear dyad
(Second Artillery and PLAN), it is likely to be a slow and cautious road.
For current nonnuclear operations, the key platforms are not SSBNs but rather conventional and nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSN). The relative emphasis between them is an important indicator of
China’s prioritization of near-seas versus far-seas operations. China’s conventionally powered submarines,
352 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

already quiet but constrained by the speed and power limitations of their type, are relevant primarily to
near-seas operations. This applies even to the advanced Yuan-class, whose likely air-independent
propulsion (AIP) would permit several weeks of low-speed submerged operations without snorkeling,
which makes antisubmarine warfare against them more difficult. AIP also saves batteries to support several
hours of high-speed engagement and escape maneuvers. SSNs, by contrast, are important for far-seas
power projection because of their unparalleled power and endurance. China’s numbers and capabilities
remain limited here, but this will be an important indicator to watch.
Erickson also provides useful background on China’s commissioning of its first aircraft carrier
on September 25, 2012: 1045
According to China’s Ministry of National Defense, Liaoning will facilitate PLAN integrated combat force
modernization, help address sovereignty issues, and advance new historic missions by “developing far seas
cooperation” and capabilities to deal with nontraditional security threats. Particularly important is its future
significance for “enhancing protection operations capabilities” (zengqiang fangwei zuozhan nengli) by
using air power to cover vessels operating out of area.
While Liaoning will initially serve as a training and test platform, and cannot threaten capable forces such
as the U.S. Navy or the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, PLAN-affiliated experts advocate using its
formidable symbolism and potential for future air power to deter smaller neighbors such as Vietnam from
pursuing competing claims in the South China Sea. [C]arriers will constitute part of… lower-intensity
tertiary layer of Chinese naval and air power development… China will probably develop multiple aircraft
carriers so that one can always remain at sea while the others are undergoing refitting or being used for
training.
Liaoning is a short takeoff but arrested recovery (STOBAR) carrier, which combines an un-catapulted,
rolling takeoff assisted by a ski jump with a traditional arrested recovery system that permits the landing of
fighter aircraft in short deck space. The STOBAR design entails several major limitations…. To increase its
deck aviation capabilities substantially, China must develop a catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested
recovery (CATOBAR) carrier; the question is how soon it will actually do so. It is uncertain whether China
has started “indigenous construction,” and how that might be defined. Chinese shipyards may already be
working on components. More broadly, will China seek to construct its own version of Liaoning first?…
Alternatively, might China wait to master more complex processes, and then construct a CATOBAR
carrier? The nature of China’s second indigenously constructed aircraft carrier will tell much about its deck
aviation trajectory.
Chinese naval modernization includes operations as well. In 2011, the Chinese Navy undertook
its first operational deployment to a distant part of the world (Africa and the Mediterranean) to
protect its citizens, also its largest noncombatant evacuation operation, when it dispatched the
frigate Xuzhou to Libya to support and protect Chinese citizen evacuation, most of which
occurred on chartered merchant vessels, chartered aircraft, military aircraft, and overland buses.
The operation involved a significant level of interagency cooperation along with private industry
assistance. It also indicates that the Chinese military is becoming more proficient in long-range
operations, while transport logistics and the political will to send forces overseas have also risen
markedly. 1046 The success of this operation will also likely increase naval procurement and the
government’s investment in more robust long-range naval capability in general, as well as the
aircraft carrier program. 1047
The DOD reports that, 1048
China continues to support counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, a commitment that began in
December 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navy deployed its twelfth escort formation, which included two
guided missile frigates and one oiler, and these ships made a port call in Vietnam in January 2013 when
returning to China. In April 2013, after its departure from the Gulf of Aden, the PLA Navy’s thirteenth
escort formation made port calls in Malta, Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, and France. In August 2013, the
fourteenth escort formation participated in a joint counterpiracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden with the U.S.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 353

Navy. As of late December, the sixteenth escort formation had relieved the fifteenth escort formation,
which subsequently conducted port visits in Africa before returning to China. The sixteenth escort
formation assumed counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden while one unit, a JIANGKAI II guided
missile frigate (FFG), repositioned into the Mediterranean to support the escort of ships transporting
removed chemical weapons from Syria.

Air and Air Defense Forces

The Chinese Defense White Paper for 2013 focused on the expanded mission capabilities of
Chinese air and air defense forces and key aspects of their modernization and joint warfare
capabilities. Once again, this discussion dealt with Chinese forces in different sections; if all of
these sections are assembled together, they provide a considerable amount of detail on the
overall structure of Chinese air and air defense forces: 1049
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is China’s mainstay for air operations, responsible for its territorial air
security and maintaining a stable air defense posture nationwide. It is primarily composed of aviation,
ground air defense, radar, airborne and electronic countermeasures (ECM) arms. In line with the strategic
requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations, the PLAAF is strengthening the
development of a combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance and early warning, air strike, air
and missile defense, and strategic projection. It is developing such advanced weaponry and equipment as
new-generation fighters and new-type ground-to-air missiles and radar systems, improving its early
warning, command and communications networks, and raising its strategic early warning, strategic
deterrence and long-distance air strike capabilities. The PLAAF now has a total strength of 398,000 officers
and men, and an air command in each of the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) of Shenyang,
Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. In addition, it commands one airborne corps.
Under each air command are bases, aviation divisions (brigades), ground-to-air missile divisions (brigades),
radar brigades and other units.
…The PLAAF is the mainstay of national territorial air defense, and in accordance with the instructions of
the CMC, the PLAA, PLAN and PAPF all undertake some territorial air defense responsibilities. In
peacetime, the chain of command of China’s air defense runs from the PLAAF headquarters through the air
commands of the military area commands to air defense units. The PLAAF exercises unified command
over all air defense components in accordance with the CMC’s intent. China’s air defense system is
composed of six sub-systems of reconnaissance and surveillance, command and control, aerial defense,
ground air defense, integrated support and civil air defense. China has established an air defense force
system that integrates reconnaissance and early warning, resistance, counterattack and protection. For air
situation awareness means, air detection radars and early warning aircraft are the mainstay, supplemented
by technical and ECM reconnaissance. For resistance means, fighters, fighter-bombers, ground-to-air
missiles and antiaircraft artillery troops are the mainstay, supplemented by the strengths from the PLAA air
defense force, militia and reserves, as well as civil air defense. For integrated protection means, various
protection works and strengths are the mainstay, supplemented by specialized technical protection forces.
The PLAAF organizes the following routine air defense tasks: reconnaissance and early warning units are
tasked with monitoring air situations in China’s territorial air space and surrounding areas and keeping
abreast of air security threats. Command organs at all levels are tasked with assuming routine combat
readiness duties with the capital as the core, and border and coastal areas as the key, and commanding air
defense operations at all times. Routine air defense troops on combat duty are tasked with carrying out air
vigilance and patrols at sea, conducting counter-reconnaissance in border areas and verifying abnormal and
unidentified air situations within the territory. The air control system is tasked with monitoring, controlling
and maintaining air traffic order so as to ensure flight safety.
…The PLAAF focuses its daily combat readiness on territorial air defense. It follows the principles of
applicability in both peacetime and wartime, all-dimension response and full territorial reach, and maintains
a vigilant and efficient combat readiness. It organizes air alert patrols on a regular basis to verify abnormal
and unidentified air situations promptly. The PLAAF command alert system takes PLAAF command posts
as the core, field command posts as the basis, and aviation and ground air defense forces on combat duty as
the pillar.
354 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

…The PLAAF creates complex battlefield environments based on its training bases, organizes
confrontational exercises on “Red-Blue” war systems under informationized conditions, either between
MAC air forces or between a combined “Blue Team” and MAC air force (“Red Team”).
Joint air force training is also making progress. The PLAAF contingent held the “Shaheen-1” joint training
of operational aerial maneuvers with its Pakistani counterpart in March 2011. China’s airborne commandos
and their Venezuelan counterparts held the “Cooperation-2011” urban joint anti-terrorism training in
October of the same year. China’s airborne troops joined their Belarusian counterparts in the joint training
code-named “Divine Eagle-2011” and “Divine Eagle-2012” respectively in July 2011 and November 2012.
The DOD report on Chinese military power for 2014 details Chinese progress in air and space
modernization as follows: 1050
The PLAAF is the largest air force in Asia and the third-largest air force in the world, with approximately
330,000 personnel and more than 2,800 total aircraft, not including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Of
these PLAAF aircraft, approximately 1,900 are combat aircraft (includes fighters, bombers, fighter-attack
and attack aircraft), 600 of which are modern. The PLAAF is pursuing modernization on a scale
unprecedented in its history and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum
of capabilities including aircraft, command and control (C2), jammers, electronic warfare (EW), and data
links. Although it still operates a large number of older second- and third-generation fighters, it will likely
become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. (2014, p. 9-10)
To bolster its tactical air forces, China is attempting to procure the Su-35 advanced Flanker aircraft from
Russia along with its advanced IRBIS-E passive electronically scanned array radar system. If China does
procure the Su-35, these aircraft could enter service in 2016 or 2018.
China is also vigorously pursuing fifth-generation capabilities. Within two years of the J-20 stealth fighter’s
first flight in January 2011, China tested a second next-generation fighter prototype. The prototype, referred
to as the J-31, is similar in size to a U.S. F-35 fighter and appears to incorporate design characteristics
similar to the J-20. It conducted its first flight on October 31, 2012. At present, it is unclear if the J-31 is
being developed for the PLAAF or the PLA Navy Air Force, or as an export platform to compete with the
U.S. F-35.
China continues upgrading its H-6 bomber fleet, which was originally adapted from the late-1950s Soviet
Tu-16 design, to increase operational effectiveness and lethality by integrating new stand-off weapons.
China also uses a modified version of the H-6 aircraft for aerial refueling. The H-6G variant, in service
with the PLA Navy Air Force, has four weapons pylons that are probably for ASCMs. China has developed
the H-6K variant with new turbofan engines for extended range. It is believed to be capable of carrying six
LACMs. Modernizing the H-6 into a cruise missile carrier has given the PLA Air Force a long-range stand-
off offensive capability with precision-guided munitions.
The PLA Air Force possesses one of the largest forces of advanced SAM systems in the world, consisting
of a combination of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300PMU1/2) battalions and domestically produced CSA-9
(HQ-9) battalions. China may become the first country to import Russia’s S-400/Triumf SAM system as a
follow-on to the SA-20, while simultaneously developing its indigenous HQ-19 which appears to be very
similar to the S-400.
China’s aviation industry is testing a large transport aircraft (referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s
fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft.
The Y-20 made its maiden flight during January 2013 and is reported to be using the same Russian engines
as the IL-76. These heavy-lift transports are intended to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial
refueling, and reconnaissance operations, as well as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. (2014,
p. 9-10)
China has developed a national integrated air defense system (IADS) to defend key strategic cities and
borders, territorial claims. Overall, China’s IADS represents a multilayered defense consisting of weapon
systems, radars, and C4ISR platforms working together to counter air threats at various ranges and
altitudes. One of China’s primary goals is to defend against precision strike munitions such as cruise and
ballistic missiles, especially those launched from long distances. Defense against stealth aircraft and
unmanned aerial vehicles is also a growing priority. (2014, p. 69-70)
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 355

Air Defense Weapons. China’s air force and navy employ land- and sea-based SAMs and air defense
artillery (ADA), and its ground forces employ short- and medium-range SAMs and ADA in extensive
numbers. The PLA Air Force employs one of the largest forces of advanced SAMs, including Russian-built
SA-20 (S-300 PMU1/PMU2) and domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) battalions. China has shown
interest in Russia’s newest long-range SAM, the SA-X-21b (S-400) TRIUMF, but a contract has not been
signed. Russian officials have stated China would not receive the S-400 until at least 2017. This SAM can
target aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Early Warning Network. Another element of China’s multilayered IADS is its extensive ground-based
radar network. In the past, this ground-based early warning network and China’s Russian-acquired SAMs
primarily protected Beijing and other key strategic locations in the eastern part of the country. China has
since developed the KONGJING-2000 (KJ-2000) airborne early warning aircraft to provide coverage at
long ranges and low altitudes for faster response and command targeting to weapon systems. In the future,
China may expand its national early warning network to protect China’s territorial air space and waters
farther from the mainland, as well as to provide space defense. This effort would include China’s growing
constellation of reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communications satellites. China is also
improving reconnaissance technologies to include infrared, multiple-spectrum, pulsed Doppler, phased
array, and passive detection. Over-the-horizon skywave radar is also an important component of China’s
improvement in its strategic early warning capabilities.
C4ISR Network. China’s IADS also includes a C4ISR network to connect early warning platforms, SAM
and ADA, and command posts to improve communication and response time during operations. The
network is intended to include battle damage assessment capability. China continues to make progress on
command, communication, and control systems. China’s air defense brigades are training to use this
information network and mobile command and control platforms to connect the operations of different
types of weapon systems by sending automated targeting information to them simultaneously. China is also
using simulation systems to attempt to train for command of air defense operations in realistic operational
conditions, including network warfare. China has deployed air defense brigades employing its newest SAM
system to the western part of China to train for long-distance mobility and operations in high-altitude
conditions, including operations under the conditions of network warfare. (2014, p. 69-70)
China’s development of fifth-generation stealth combat aircraft has led to the J-20 and the J-31,
which have attracted much international attention. The 2014 DOD report described the following
Chinese goals for its stealth aircraft.
The PLA seeks to develop aircraft with low observable features, advanced avionics, super-cruise engines,
and stealth applications as demonstrated by the January 2011 flight test of the J-20 prototype and recent
observations of a second indigenously produced aircraft with stealth features, referred to as the J-31. China
seeks to develop these advanced aircraft to improve its regional power projection capabilities and
strengthen its ability to strike regional airbases and facilities. China’s first fifth-generation fighter, the
multi-role J-20, is not expected to enter service prior to 2018, and China faces numerous challenges to
achieving full operational capability, including developing high-performance jet engines. China’s second
fifth-generation fighter, the smaller but likely also multi-role, J-31, conducted its first flight in October
2012. The PLA Air Force has observed how foreign militaries employ stealth aircraft and views this
technology as critical to its transformation from a predominantly territorial air force to one capable of
conducting both offensive and defensive operations. The PLA Air Force believes that stealth provides an
offensive operational advantage that denies an adversary the time to mobilize and conduct defensive
operations.
Though both planes display stealth design features, their true capabilities in terms of radar-
absorbing coatings, censors, and other stealth attributes remain unknown. It is also unknown
when or if either plane will enter production. 1051 There is also a possibility that the J-31 will be
produced for export to compete with the F-35, though this is also uncertain. 1052
According to the IISS from its Military Balance 2013, 1053
356 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

In September 2012, China’s aerospace ambitions were again confirmed when images emerged of a twin-
engine medium fighter manufactured by the Shenyang Aero-space Company, unofficially identified as
either the J-21 or J-31. Unlike the Chengdu J-20 heavy fighter, unveiled in January 2011 and gauged by
some analysts as of possibly Russian heritage, the J-21 reflects US designs, with echoes of the F-22 and the
F-35. This has led to speculation of industrial espionage during its development. As with the J-20, Beijing
has yet to comment formally on the nature or specific purpose of the J-21 project. The J-21 airframe has
almost all the hallmarks of a low observable design, and is missing the large canards that feature on the J-
20. That said, the aft quadrant and engine nozzles do not appear optimised to minimise radar and infrared
signatures, although this may reflect its prototype status.
The extent to which the structural materials used are appropriate for a low-observable design remains un-
clear, as does the degree to which the sensor suite would support stealth operations. It is widely speculated
that the first aircraft could be fitted with the Russian RD-93 engine, which is being exported to China for
Pakistan-bound JF-17 light fighters. The J-21 is smaller than the J-20, and it may be intended to
complement the larger aircraft. At the end of 2012, however, it remained unclear which of the services was
the project’s initial sponsor, or indeed whether the design began as a competitor to the J-20. The Shenyang
prototype also features characteristics of a carrier-borne fighter. However, the PLAN already has a carrier-
borne multi-role fighter under development, in the Shenyang J-15. The J-15 is based on the locally
produced variant of the Su-27, while Chinese industry may also have benefitted from the purchase of a
proto-type Su-33 from Ukraine. At least five J-15 prototypes are being tested.
The Chinese defense industry has also been developing a diverse portfolio of new aircraft
designs, including modernizing its traditional fighters and developing indigenous fourth-
generation – and potentially fifth-generation – fighters. 1054
These important advances owe to the implementation of a multi-pronged strategy across the sector’s largest
defence-industrial group, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and its five core prime
contractors: Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation, Shenyang Aircraft Corporation, Hongdu Aviation
Industry Group, Xi’an Aircraft Company and Changhe/Hafei Aviation. This strategy has included
corporate reforms and organisational restructuring, coupled with sustained investment and expansion.
China’s aeronautic development strategy has also focused on key projects, such as indigenous platform and
critical sub-system programs, and on building research, development and innovation capacity. Finally, this
strategy has aimed to integrate civil and military aircraft manufacturing and leverage international
commercial partnerships and acquisitions.
As AVIC upgrades its existing third- and fourth-generation fighters, it is also focusing on next-generation
stealth fighters (J-31) and strategic transport aircraft (Y-20), designed to complement the PLA’s long-term
military transformation. These programs are currently in their development stages and have yet to
overcome technical hurdles — AVIC is finding it particularly difficult to integrate reliable high-
performance power plants. Nevertheless, these programs represent the Chinese defence industry’s growing
potential for innovation.
However, China still lacks the sophisticated technology required for highly advanced innovation
in military equipment – in particular, in material selection, process standardization, quality
control, and ensuring structural strength. When combined with integration, systems design, and
management problems, the result has been cost overruns, extensive testing and delays, and many
modifications of the design. Furthermore, the fragmented corporate structure of AVIC makes it
difficult for the group to gain compliance from its sub-units. 1055
US analyst Andrew S. Erickson assessed China’s stealth prototype developments in further
depth. In particular, Chengdu Aircraft Corporation’s (CAC) production and design abilities are
growing, and the company’s Project 718 J-20 could become the PRC’s first fifth-generation (or,
in Chinese terminology, fourth-generation) aircraft – meaning it would include high
maneuverability, supercruise, helmet-mounted sights, thrust vectoring, low observability, and
sensor fusion characteristics. The J-20 prototype – which resembles the F-22 – is also large and
has a significant weapons bay; when combined with China’s strategic goals (as discussed in
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 357

Chapter I), it is likely that the plane could have several different, important to attack aircraft and
strike fighter missions. 1056
One of these missions could be offensive counter-air, meaning that it would be able to strike
high-value airborne assets due to its low-detection capabilities. The J-20 could also be used to
destroy key targets in heavily defended areas inside an air-defense system. This capability could
be used against both land-based targets – like air-defense radars – or ship-based assets. However
to achieve these potential capabilities, the plane needs to overcome difficulties with avionics,
engine design, and systems integration. One PLAAF deputy commander projected 2017-19 as a
possible first deployment for the plane. 1057
Shanghai Aircraft Corporation (SAC) is also working on its own stealth aircraft prototype, which
has been called the F60, J-31, and J-21 in various sources. The plane could be exported, as well.
A scale model was presented in 2010, and in 2012 photographs and videos – allegedly of the
prototype – appeared online, depicting a plane with “31001” painted on it, indicating that J-31 is
likely the best name for the plane until something more official is announced. The plane is the
second significant fighter aircraft produced by SAC in less than a year. The other is the J-16, a
plane that is similar to the Russian Su-30MKK and the US F-15E – a two-seat version of the
Chinese J-11B. The J-31 is likely to be a multirole combat aircraft that can be used in both air-to-
air and air-to-surface roles requiring modern precision munitions.1058
Because both the J-20 and the J-31 prototypes were completed at roughly the same time, it seems
likely that CAC and SAC have developed a competitive relationship, instead of the previous
geographic division of labor. Or, the J-31 could simply be a lighter J-20 (similar to the US F-35
as a complement to the F-22, or the Chinese J-10 is a complement to the J-11B). A key point,
however, is that “Beijing has finally decided that it can sustain multiple overlapping advanced
programs, with SAC alone currently working on four major fighter aircraft: the J-31 and the
aforementioned J-16, as well as the J-16’s single-seat parent the J-11B and the carrier-borne J-
15, also based on the J-11B.” 1059
China is also working on the development of unmanned aerial vehicles. It would appear that
China’s ability to sustain multiple overlapping advanced programs in its shipbuilding and
aviation industries could be an important strategic breakthrough for the Chinese. 1060
Finally, China is developing a wide range of information, ISR, and battle management systems
to support all of its services, including its Air Force. The broad goals of this effort are described
in Chapter I, and the space-related efforts in Chapter IX. The US Department of Defense does
note, however, that they involve a new and much broader Chinese interest in electronic warfare
that would affect Chinese tactical operations in any Korean or Northeast Asian contingency: 1061
The PLA believes electronic warfare (EW) is one method to reduce or eliminate U.S. technological
advantage. Chinese EW doctrine emphasizes using electromagnetic spectrum weapons to suppress or
deceive enemy electronic equipment. PLA EW strategy focuses on radio, radar, optical, infrared, and
microwave frequencies, in addition to computer and information systems.
Chinese strategy stresses that EW is a vital fourth dimension to combat and should be considered equal to
ground, sea, and air, and that it can be decisive during military operations. The Chinese see EW as an
important force multiplier and would likely employ it in support of all combat arms and services during a
conflict.
PLA EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations, testing the military’s understanding
of EW weapons, equipment, and performance, which helped improve confidence in conducting force-on-
force, real-equipment confrontation operations in simulated EW environments. The advances in research
358 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

and deployment of EW weapons are being tested in these exercises and have proven effective. These EW
weapons include jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems and GPS. EW
systems are also being deployed with other sea and air-based platforms intended for both offensive and
defensive operations.

Figure VII.1 Chinese Military Forces and Regions (Japanese 2012

Summary)

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 31.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 359

Figure VII.2: Chinese Ground Forces by Region – Part One (US

2012 Summary)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2012, Department of Defense, May 2012, 30,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.
360 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.3: Chinese Ground Forces by Region – Part Two (US

2013 Summary)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, Department of Defense, May 2013, 77,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 361

Figure VII.4: Chinese Naval Forces by Region (US 2012

Summary)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2012, 31.
362 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.5: Chinese Air Forces by Region – Part One (US 2012
Summary)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2012, 32.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 363

Figure VII.6: Chinese Air Forces by Region – Part Two (US 2012
Summary)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, 77.
364 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.7: The Chinese High Command (as of 2011)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2011, Department of Defense, March 2011, 11,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 365

Figure VII.8: PLA Modernization Areas, 2000-2010

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2011, 43.
Note: For surface combatants “modern” is defined as multi-mission platforms with significant capabilities in at least two warfare
areas. “Modern” for submarines is defined as those platforms capable of firing an anti-ship cruise missile. For air forces,
“modern” is defined as 4th generation platforms (Su-27, Su-30, F-10) and platforms with 4th generation-like capabilities (FB-7).
“Modern” SAMs are defined as advanced, long-range Russian systems (SA-10, SA-20), and their PRC indigenous equivalents
(HQ-9).

Japan
Japan’s public modernization plans are affected by its internal political debates, and have not yet
fully reacted to the increasing DPRK missile and nuclear threat, the uncertainties in the US
“rebalance” to Asia, or the latest developments in China’s strategy and military modernization
efforts. However, there are clear shifts in Japan’s defense policy that point to a more complete
reaction to the security developments in Northeast Asia. Permission of collective self-defense,
permission of arms exports, and updated guidelines for the US-Japan alliance are signs of
Japan’s shifting security stance and outlook.
Japan is constitutionally limited as to how militarized it can be – it cannot have an offensive
force, but can provide for its own self-defense. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution renounces
war, the possession of war potential, and the state’s right of belligerency. At the same time,
Japan may defend itself – which the government interprets as having the minimum level of
armed forces necessary for self-defense.
The exact limit of this ‘minimum level’ varies based on available technology, the international
situation, and other factors, and is discussed and decided annually by the Japanese Diet during
budget considerations. Offensive weapons whose sole capability is massive destruction of
another country – such as ICBMs or long-range strategic bombers – are not permissible. It
should be stressed, however, that these conditions may change strikingly in the future in reaction
366 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

to China’s ongoing force modernization and the level of US-Chinese military cooperation or
competition.
The Japanese government sees exercising the right of self-defense as legitimate if three
conditions are met: 1062
(1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is
in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger
to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.
(2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its
people
(3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.
The 2014 Japanese Defense White Paper explains the legal basis for the “use of force.” The most
notable change in interpretation is the permission of collective self-defense under certain
conditions. 1063
The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in
all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in
the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their
(all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in
governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from
taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such
measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful
situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned
due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of
force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic
logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force”
exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document
“Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the
Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.
To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an
“armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment
surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global
power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass
destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually
threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.
…As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At
the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood
separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is,
under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes
those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under
the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring
Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan.
Although self-defense is not necessarily confined to the boundaries of Japanese land, water, and
airspace, the Constitution is interpreted to not permit armed troops to be sent to other countries
with the purpose of using force – such as overseas troop deployments. 1064 As a result, Japan’s
defense policy is now shaped by policies and laws that limit its military capabilities.
Japan’s Basic Policy for National Defense was adopted in 1957, with the objectives of preventing
indirect and direct invasions, eliminating any threat of invasion, and protecting Japan’s democratic
status, peace, and independence. The Policy also describes four tenets as the basic way to achieve
these objectives: 1065
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 367

(1) Support the activities of the United Nations, cooperate with other nations, and aim to achieve world
peace.
(2) Establish the foundation necessary to ensure a stable quality of life for the people, boost nationalism,
and guarantee the nation’s safety.
(3) Progressively develop efficient national defense capabilities to the necessary limit for self-defense in
accordance with national power and circumstances.
(4) Deal with foreign invasions of Japan based on security arrangements formed with the United States
until the United Nations becomes able to effectively prevent the said threats.
In addition, Japan is unable to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy
Basic Law and has ratified the NPT. The country adheres to The Three Non-Nuclear Principles -
Japan will not have, produce, or allow into the country nuclear weapons. The military is also
under civilian control, meaning that the Japanese diet decides budgets and laws related to the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF), such as the number of personnel and principal SDF institutions.
National defense is part of the Cabinet’s executive power – and Cabinet ministers are required by
the Constitution to be civilians. The Prime Minister is the commander-in-chief, while the
Minister of Defense has general control over SDF activities, and the Cabinet’s Security Council
discusses important national defense issues. 1066
The Roles of the Japanese Self Defense Forces
The Japanese SDF plays a variety of roles, concentrating on ISR activities and quick responses in
the case of any uncertain situation. Priorities include: 1067
(1) Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan,
(2) Response to attacks on offshore island,
(3) Response to cyber attacks,
(4) Response to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces,
(5) Response to ballistic missile attacks,
(6) Response to complex contingencies, and
(7) Response to large-scale and/or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters.
In its efforts to maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific, Japan plans to: 1068
○ Promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as well as joint training and
exercises in a multilayered manner.
○ In the field of non-traditional security, Japan will promote practical cooperation by utilizing SDF
capabilities including disposal of land mines and unexploded shells.
○ Development and strengthening of regional cooperation practice and capacity building support for
nations in the region.
In order to “improve the global security environment,” Japan will conduct the following: 1069
○ International peace cooperation activities, including peace building such as humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance and ceasefire monitoring
○ Arms control and disarmament, nonproliferation, and capacity building support.
○ Tackling international terrorism, securing the safety of maritime traffic, and maintaining maritime order.
368 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Japanese Security Policies

Japan has a variety of policies to defend itself; and combined Japan-US capabilities are a
significant part of this defense. However, Japan recognizes that its own efforts are the primary
force behind achieving its basic security goals. Japan’s “National Defense Program Guidelines,”
(NDPG) “set forth the basic policies for Japan’s security,” and the directions for SDF
development. 1070 The 2010 NDPG calls for the nation to undertake strategic and integrated
activities as follows: 1071
a. The improvement of intelligence collection and analysis capabilities in the government ministries and
agencies, a strengthened cross-governmental information security system, the promotion of space
development and use of outer space from the perspective of information gathering, communications, and
comprehensive strengthening of the posture and response capability to deal with cyber attacks.
b. Cooperation among government organizations under normal conditions; integrated response by the
government in the occurrence of various contingencies; examination of functions and systems related to
governmental decision making and response through initiatives such as regular simulations and
comprehensive training and exercises; and consideration of necessary actions including legal measures.
c. Establishment of a body in the Prime Minister’s Office which will be responsible for national security
policy coordination among relevant ministers and for providing advice to the Prime Minister after
examination of organization, functions, and structure of the cabinet regarding security issues, including the
Security Council.
d. Improvement of systems for responding to various disasters and for civil protection; and close
cooperation between national and local governments to ensure an appropriate response.
e. Cooperation among governmental organizations in the efforts to improve the global security
environment; participation in international peace cooperation activities in an efficient and effective manner
through collaboration and cooperation with non-governmental organization and other entities; review and
consideration of the five principles for participation in peacekeeping operations and other policies
regarding Japan’s participation in consideration of actual situation of U.N. peacekeeping operations.
f. Efforts to make Japan’s security and defense policies easier to understand; and strengthened overseas
information dissemination to further deepen international community’s understanding of Japan’s security
and defense policies.

The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper

At the same time, the Japanese military is now undergoing a major period of modernization and
reorganization. The 2012 Japanese Defense White Paper discusses some basics of the
organizational structure, which can also be seen in Figure VII.9.
As discussed previously, Japan is working to develop a “Dynamic Defense Force” to better
handle any threat to the country. The Japanese-US Alliance is acknowledged as vital, while the
US’s military presence in Japan, as a deterrent against and responder to any potential military
situation, provides security to the Asia-Pacific region. The US’s presence also allows Japan to
participate in multilateral security cooperation and more effectively respond to any global
security challenges. Japan is working to develop and deepen the Alliance by: 1072
(1) Continuous engagement in strategic dialogue and specific policy coordination with the United States,
including bilateral assessment of the security environment and bilateral consultations on common strategic
objectives, and roles, missions and capabilities.
(2) The promotion of cooperation in existing fields, including intelligence cooperation, deepening of
bilateral contingency planning, various operational cooperation including that upon situations in areas
surrounding Japan, ballistic missile defense and equipment and technology cooperation, as well as
consultations to improve the credibility of extended deterrence and information security.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 369

(3) Studying measures to enhance Japan-U.S. cooperation with the United States in order to strengthen the
U.S. forces’ deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies.
(4) Strengthening various regular cooperation, such as joint training and joint/shared usage of facilities, and
promote regional and global cooperation through international peace cooperation activities, maintenance
and enhancement of global commons such as outer space, cyberspace and sea lanes, as well as in the field
of climate change.
Japan is also working with the US regarding US force posture and the burden of US military
presence on local communities. The country is also committing to provide more support for US
forces stationed there.
The 2014 Japanese Defense White Paper and the New NDPG
2013 and 2014 saw significant shifts in Japanese Defense Policy. These years saw the permission
of collective self-defense, permission of defense exports, a revision of the Guidelines for Japan-
US Defense Cooperation, and an updated National Defense Program Guidelines called the “new
NDPG.” The new NDPG was composed after an assessment of Japanese security environment
that concluded: 1073
• Deepening “interdependence among countries,” which leads to a “growing risk that unrest in the
global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately
develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community.”

• An “increase in the number of so-called “gray zone” situation, that is, neither pure peacetime nor
contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests.”

• “Cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas due to piracy acts as well as coastal
states unilaterally asserting their rights and taking actions.”

• Growth of Asia-Pacific militaries, particularly Chinese military development with little

transparency, and North Korean missile and nuclear development.

• The increasing difficulty of “securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace,” as
technological innovation progresses rapidly.

• Recognition of the need to prepare for large-scale disasters and other emergencies.

Figure VII.12 outlines past Japanese security assessments and the subsequent NDPGs. Figure
VII.13 details the new NDPG along with the National Security Strategy associated with it.
The core of the new NDPG is the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. The Japanese
Defense Ministry believed that “optimal defense capabilities buildup has not been carried out for
the SDF as a whole,” due to a capability assessments methodology that assessed the SDF
services individually, rather than from a joint perspective. 1074
As a result, the new NDPG carry with it great significance because it identifies functions and capabilities of
particular emphasis from a comprehensive viewpoint based on capability assessments focused on the
functions and capacities of the entire SDF, strictly focusing on the basic approach of responding to various
situations by joint operations By advancing defense capability buildup based on the results of these
capability assessments, it has become possible to realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability
buildup, overcoming the boundaries of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces more easily than
ever. (2014, p. 211)
370 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The new NDPG call for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, in place of the Dynamic Defense
Force from the 2010 NDPG, as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security. (2014, p.
210)
The new NDPG…calls for the enhancement of deterrent and response capabilities by pursuing further joint
operations, improving the operational standards of defense equipment, and further increasing defense
activities, as well as ensuring the necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of defense capabilities
underpinning various activities. Additionally, it requires the building of the most effectively operational
posture, which will be accomplished through further enhancing the logistical support foundation on a
broader scope.
The 2014 White Paper highlighted differences between the Dynamic Joint Defense Force of the
new NDPG and the Dynamic Defense Force of the 2010 NDPG. 1075
Compared to the 2010 NDPG, the new NDPG calls for the establishment of a wider-ranging logistical
support foundation. For example, SDF camps and bases will become important deployment staging
grounds for the dispatch for disaster relief, and to minimize damages to these camps and bases, it is
essential to improve survivability1 including recovery capabilities. Additionally, failure to provide
adequate accommodations for personnel or family support measures will make it impossible to respond
immediately during a situation and fully ensure readiness. In addition, taking into consideration a variety of
elements, including “skills,” “experience,” “physical strength,” and “morale,” it is necessary to ensure the
edge of SDF troops.
As such, it is important to carry out rigorous training and exercises in peacetime as well as
comprehensively carry out personnel education measures, such as recruitment and support for re-
employment, including the further utilization of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel. Furthermore,
the collaboration and cooperation with local governments and relevant organizations as well as
understanding and cooperation of the general public is indispensable to enabling the SDF to respond
appropriately to various situations.
As a result, it is extremely critical to actively strengthen collaboration with local communities and boost
communication capabilities. Given the vital importance of fundamentally enhancing the wide-ranging
logistical support foundation compared to the 2010 NDPG to effectively carry out various activities, as
explained above, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of infrastructure for enabling a broad range of
defense capabilities to be exhibited, such as training, exercise and operational infrastructure, personnel and
education, defense production and technological bases, efficient acquisition of equipment, research and
development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancing of
intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense.
[Some] characteristics prioritized by the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, “resiliency” and “connectivity”
which had not been expressed in the previous NDPG, are newly pointed out. This is based on the result of
reviewing functions and capability to be especially prioritized from a comprehensive perspective after
implementing capability assessments based on joint operations. Specifically, “resiliency” refers to
necessary and sufficient securing of “quality” and “quantity” of defense capabilities that underpin various
activities, and further strengthen the basic foundation for SDF. “Connectivity” refers to the strengthening of
posture to collaborate with relevant ministries and offices, local governments, private sector, and to
cooperate with the U.S., to seamlessly respond to various situations, from peacetime to contingencies.
In order to build the Dynamic Joint Defense Force, the White Paper set a series of broad goals
and requirements.
“allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a
comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments against various
situations.”
“Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and
swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further
escalation of a situation. At the same time, new NDPG states that minimizing damage in dealing with
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 371

situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy and air superiority is
essential.”
“Japan will attempt to enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable
rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint
operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that
underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.”
“the new NDPG states Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and
hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology
and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s
operation.”
Following the release of new NDPG, the new Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP, covering
FY2014-FY2018) was also released in December 2013 and outlines a plan for realizing the new
NDPG goals in national defense capabilities. The MTDP “paves the way for the realization of a
Dynamic Joint Defense Force that follows the philosophy laid out in the new NDPG.” 1076 Figure
VII.14 outlines the details of the MTDP. The 2013 version has six fundamental objectives in
order to develop Japan’s defense capacities: 1077
• Address particularly important functions and capabilities
o ISR capabilities, intelligence capabilities, transport capabilities, C3I capabilities, response to an
attack on remote islands, response to ballistic missile attacks, response to outer space and cyber
space threats, large-scale disasters, international peace cooperation efforts
• Development of Capacities to Ensure Maritime Supremacy and Air Superiority as well as Rapid
Deployment Capabilities
• Efficiently Secure Defense Capabilities Adequate Both in Quantity and Quality
• Promote Measures to Reform the Personnel System
• Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-US Alliance
• Achieve Greater Efficiencies and Streamline the Buildup of the Defense Forces
The 2014 White Paper continued to highlight deepening cooperation with the United States
through the US-Japan alliance. Areas for enhanced cooperation that were noted in the revision of
the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation included: 1078
• Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Cooperation: The Ministers confirmed their intention to designate
the Air Self-Defense Force base at Kyogamisaki (Kyotango City, Kyoto Prefecture) as the deployment
site for a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system.
• Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Ministers stressed the need for close coordination with the private
sector, recognized the need to promote a whole-of-government approach to shared threats in
cyberspace, and welcomed the signing of a Terms of Reference for a new Cyber Defense Policy
Working Group (CDPWG).
• Cooperation in Space: The Ministers welcomed the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Space Situational
Awareness (SSA) Sharing Agreement, and welcomed the commitment of both countries to an early
realization of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA) provision of SSA information to the
United States.
• Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Activities: The Ministers welcomed the
establishment of a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group.
• Joint/Shared Use of Facilities: The Ministers welcomed the efforts of the Joint/Shared Use Working
Group in order to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces posture in areas, including Japan’s Southwestern
372 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Islands. Progress in realizing the joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and areas strengthens
the Alliance’s deterrent capabilities while building a stronger relationship with local communities.
• Bilateral Planning: The Ministers welcomed progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed initiatives
toward refining bilateral plans.
• Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation: The Ministers welcomed the new linkage
established between bilateral discussions at the Systems and Technology Forum and dialogue on
Roles, Missions, and Capabilities. Through collaboration such as the participation of Japanese
industries in the production of the F-35 aircraft, bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology
should deepen as Japan examines its Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy
guidelines.
• Extended Deterrence Dialogue: The Ministers noted with satisfaction the meaningful outcome of
bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogues. The Ministers also confirmed their Governments’ continued
commitment to holding the dialogue on a regular basis.
• Information Security: The SCC members welcomed the serious initiatives by Japan in establishing a
legal framework for further ensuring information security.
• Joint Training and Exercises: The Ministers decided to take advantage of various opportunities to
increase training outside of Okinawa, including in mainland Japan, which should reduce the amount of
time located and training in Okinawa of MV-22 Osprey.
• Host Nation Support: The Ministers affirmed the continuing importance of the Host Nation Support
(HNS) provided by Japan.
The broader objectives of the revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, which were
announced in the Joint Statement of the October 2013 “2+2” meeting, included: 1079
1. Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of
Japan-U.S. defense cooperation;
2. Expanding the scope of cooperation, to reflect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,
encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement;
3. Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and
values;
4. Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more flexible, timely,
and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations;
5. Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of
mutual capabilities;
6. Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective,
efficient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges
in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and
7. Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared
objectives.

Organization, Equipment, and Disposition of the SDF under the

New NDPG
The 2014 White Paper assesses the Japanese SDF’s Specific Forces, especially in terms of their
operational capabilities and disposition, as follows: 1080
The new NDPG states that based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability
buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air
superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 373

defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment
of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support
foundation.
At the same time, the new NDPG states that in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of
large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
The GSDF needs to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore
islands and various other situations. Therefore, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic
operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division)
furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile
operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform amphibious and other
operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training
environment there.
The GSDF will review the organization and equipment with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and
rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately,
according to geographical characteristics.
The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the
end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel available to respond to major disasters or other
situations.
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)
The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers from 48 in the 2010 NDPG (12 escort divisions) to 54
(14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions
and have more compact designs and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the
defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped
destroyers5 will be added, bringing the fleet to eight.
The MSDF regularly carry out information gathering and warning and surveillance activities undersea and
at sea. It will also maintain the augmented submarine fleet as well as patrol aircraft units in order to patrol
surrounding waters6 and carry out defense operations effectively.
Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)
The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space
over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense
command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as
establish one new squadron in the air warning unit.
As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit
will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it
a two-squadron architecture.
The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan
against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in
tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF.
Figure VII.15 shows the force structure of the SDF under the new NDPG. Figure VII.16 shows
how force structure has changed over past NDPG’s.
Furthermore, Japan is increasing collaboration with other countries in defense research and
industry. According to the IISS, 1081
In late 2011, Japan also eased its long-standing defence-export regulations and restrictions on the
participation of its domestic defence industry in collaborative international defence-industrial programmes.
In June 2012, Japan signed an MoU with the United Kingdom that included an under-taking to cooperate
on joint R&D and defence-equipment production. Later, in September 2012, Japan announced a similar
374 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

bilateral agreement with Australia, which aimed to expand defence research ties and exchange information
on areas of defence technology of common interest.

Figure VII.9: Operational System of the SDF and the Roles of the
Chiefs of Staff

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 192.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 375

Figure VII.10: Japanese Estimates of Japanese Self-Defense

Forces

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 131.

376 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.11: Personnel, Tanks, and Artillery under Japanese

NDPGs, 1976-2010

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 122.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 377

Figure VII.12: Changes of Japanese Views Regarding Defense

Capability and Subsequent NDPG’s

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 206.

378 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.13: Japan’s National Security Strategy and the New

NDPG

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 196.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 379

Figure VII.14: Details of the New MTDP

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 231.

380 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.15: Force Structure under the New NDPG

(Annex Table of the New NDPG)

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 221.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 381

Figure VII.16: Comparison of NDPG’s

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 221.

382 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Russia
Russia’s military modernization is now being reshaped by the Ukraine crisis, its focus on the
Color Revolution and strengthening its military ties with China and other nations outside the
West, and the economic crisis caused by US and EU sanctions over Ukraine and the sharp cuts in
its petroleum export revenues that began with a sharp cut in oil prices in late 2014.
The 2013 IISS Military Balance provides the following summary of the Russian military’s
capabilities before the Ukraine crisis began: 1082
Russia remains a significant continental military power, and is in the process of renewing its nuclear
arsenal. The first of the Borey-class SSBNs, the Yury Dolgoruky, formally joined the fleet at the beginning
of 2013, and is intended as part of a broader recapitalisation of the country’s nuclear capability. The
Russian armed forces are undergoing a reform process, begun by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in
2008. His replacement by Sergey Shoigu in November 2012 raised questions about the future of the reform
process. However, main elements, such as the initiative to transform the army towards a combined arms
brigade-based structure, appear to continue. Though pay rates were increased in 2012, the recruitment of
contract personnel in adequate numbers remains a challenge, particularly for NCOs and specialist roles; this
is also a reflection of demographic issues. The warrant officer rank cut by the Serdyukov reforms – a class
of long-serving specialists usually in roles demanding technical or administrative skills – was reinstated
and an ambitious 50,000 recruitment target set. Conventional re-equipment continues with all three services
taking delivery of modern combat systems, if sometimes in modest numbers. Force restructuring – such as
the establishment of the Special Operations Command – is intended to improve capability amid smaller
armed forces. The deployment of the Russian Mediterranean Task Force in response to the 2013 Syria
crisis and the Western naval presence was a significant show of maritime power. Deployments in Eurasia
and on UN missions continue.
While the Russian Military Doctrine of 2010 lacks specifics regarding its armed forces and does
not discuss any role they might play in Asia and the Koreas, it does provide some useful general
guidelines as to what roles the Russian military were expected to play: 1083
The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime are:
a) to defend the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the integrity and inviolability of its
territory;
b) to ensure strategic deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts;
c) to maintain the composition and state of combat and mobilizational readiness and training of the
strategic nuclear forces, forces and resources that support their functioning and use, and command
and control systems at a level guaranteeing the infliction of the required damage on the aggressor
whatever the conditions of the situation;
d) to provide timely warning to the supreme commander in chief of the Russian Federation Armed
Forces of an air or space attack and notification to the organs of state and military administration
and the troops (forces) about military dangers and military threats;
e) to maintain the capability of the Armed Forces and other troops for the timely deployment of
groupings of troops (forces) in potentially dangerous strategic salients, and also to maintain their
readiness for combat use;
f) to ensure the air defence of the Russian Federation’s most important military facilities and
readiness to rebuff strikes by means of air and space attack;
g) to deploy and maintain, in the strategic space zone, orbital groupings of space devices
supporting the activities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces;
h) to protect important state and military facilities, facilities on lines of communication, and
special cargoes;
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 383

i) to maintain the infrastructure of the Russian Federation’s territory and prepare lines of
communication for defence purposes, including the construction and modernization of special-
purpose facilities and the construction and major refurbishment of highways of defence
significance;
j) to protect citizens of the Russian Federation outside the Russian Federation from armed attack;
k) to participate in operations in the maintenance (restoration) of international peace and security,
to adopt measures to avert (eliminate) a threat to peace, and to suppress acts of aggression
(violation of the peace) on the basis of decisions of the UN Security Council or other bodies
authorized to adopt such decisions in accordance with international law;
l) to combat piracy and ensure the safety of shipping;
m) to ensure the security of the economic activities of the Russian Federation on the high seas;
n) to combat terrorism;
o) to prepare for carrying out territorial defence and civil defence measures;
p) to participate in the protection of public order and the safeguarding of public security; q) to
participate in the elimination of emergencies and the restoration of special-purpose facilities;
r) to participate in securing a state of emergency.
… The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops during a period of direct threat of aggression are:
a) to implement of a package of additional measures aimed at lowering the level of the threat of
aggression and increasing the level of combat and mobilizational readiness of the Armed Forces
and other troops with a view to carrying out mobilizational and strategic deployment;
b) to maintain the nuclear deterrence potential at the established degree of readiness;
c) to participate in maintaining a martial law regime;
d) to fulfill the Russian Federation’s international commitments with regard to collective defence
and he rebuffing or prevention, in accordance with the norms of international law, of an armed
attack on another state that has made the corresponding request to the Russian Federation.
… The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in wartime are to rebuff aggression against the
Russian Federation and its allies, to inflict defeat on the aggressor’s troops (forces), and to force him to
cease hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.
Figure VII.17 shows the Russian military districts and provides a chart of the primary force
numbers and capabilities for each military branch, according to 2012 Japanese estimates.
Furthermore, Figure VII.18 shows the Russian forces that are stationed near the North Korean
border – meaning, those that would be available in the short-term if a militarized situation
escalated on the Peninsula.
In broad terms, Russia seems far more likely to use its diplomatic influence and military power
to try to deter, limit, and end a Korean conflict than play a direct military role. It has far too
many economic interests in the stability of Northeast Asia and few military or territorial
ambitions. While a more direct role is possible, the odds are strongly against it and it would take
radical shift in the regional power struggle that directly threatened Russian interest to cause the
country to intervene in a war in the Koreas.
Modernization of Russian Forces
The 2010 Military Doctrine also discusses Russian plans for military modernization before the
Ukraine crisis began. It focuses on the need to improve Russia’s ability to fight a high-precision
conventional war using command-and-control networks and sophisticated communications. The
384 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

document also urges the military to use its resources more efficiently and for the defense and
intelligence communities to better anticipate future wars and the characteristics of such conflicts.
It stresses the need for a high-technology defense industrial capacity to supply both the Russian
military and foreign customers. 1084
In terms of modernization goals, the Doctrine declares, 1085
The tasks of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with armaments and military and specialized
equipment are:
a) to comprehensively equip (reequip) with up-to-date models of armaments and military and
specialized equipment the strategic nuclear forces, permanent-readiness large formations and troop
units of the general-purpose forces, antiterrorist formations, engineering and technical troop
formations, and roadbuilding troop formations, and to maintain them in a condition that will
support their combat use;
b) to create multifunctional (multirole) systems of armaments and military and specialized
equipment using standardized components;
c) to develop forces and resources for information warfare;
d) to improve the quality of means of information exchange on the basis of the use of up-to-date
technologies and international standards, as well as the single information field of the Armed
Forces and other troops as part of the Russian Federation’s information space;
e) to ensure the functional and organizational-technical unity of the arms systems of the Armed
Forces and other troops;
f) to create new models of high-precision weapons and develop information support for them;
g) to create basic information management systems and integrate them with the systems for
command and control of weapons and the automation systems of command and control organs at
the strategic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical levels.

Western Analyses
In March 2013, DNI James R. Clapper provided the following summary of Russian military
issues to the US Congress, summarizing some of Russia’s larger modernization efforts: 1086
Russian military forces, both nuclear and conventional, support deterrence and enhance Moscow’s
geopolitical clout. Since late 2008 the Kremlin has embraced a wide-ranging military reform and
modernization program to field a smaller, more mobile, better-trained, and high-tech force during the next
decade. This plan represents a radical break with historical Soviet approaches to manpower, force structure,
and training. The initial phases, mainly focused on force reorganization and cuts in the mobilization base
and officer corps, have been largely implemented and are being institutionalized. The ground forces alone
have reduced about 60 percent of armor and infantry battalions since 2008, while the Ministry of Defense
cut about 135,000 officer positions, many at field grade.
Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and professionalization. In 2010, a
10-year procurement plan was approved to replace Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with a
balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities. However, funding,
bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles—coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base
that deteriorated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse—complicate Russian efforts.
The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to
more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet space,
but they will not—and are not intended to—enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive operations
against NATO collectively. In addition, the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of
the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant capital to modernize its conventional forces.
At least until Russia’s high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility, Moscow will
embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its defense planning. It still views its nuclear forces as
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 385

critical for ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage and for offsetting its military
weaknesses vis-à-vis potential opponents with stronger militaries.
DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. provided an overview of Russia’s military modernization
efforts in his 2012 Senate testimony: 1087
The Russian military’s most comprehensive reform since World War II continues. The goal is to create
more agile, modern, and capable forces. General purpose forces will be smaller, more mobile, and combat
ready. They will be better suited to respond to threats along Russia’s periphery, win local conflicts, and
quickly end regional wars. Russia will rely on its robust nuclear arsenal to deter and, if necessary, engage in
larger regional or worldwide conflicts.
Russia has moved from division- to brigade-centric ground forces, disbanded most of its Soviet-era ground
force mobilization bases, and consolidated air force units and bases. To better control general purpose
forces in regional conflicts, it has formed the first peacetime joint strategic commands – West, East, South,
and Center. Additionally, the military has established an Aerospace Defense Command under General Staff
control, which will perform integrated air, missile and space defense missions.
Moscow’s 10-year modernization plan is a top priority for the armed forces, but it faces funding and
implementation risks owing in part to a possible decline in the price of oil. The federal budget is set to
increase spending by more than 55 percent in 2014 from 2011 spending levels. Competing demands to sell
arms abroad, Russia’s aging industrial base, insufficient resources, plus corruption and mismanagement
most likely will keep modern equipment below those levels.
New equipment for the general purpose forces will increase in 2012, but deliveries will be small and
Soviet-era weapons will remain the standard. Russia also will buy selected foreign systems, such as
France’s Mistral amphibious assault ship and Italian light armored vehicles, and will integrate foreign
technology and sustain joint production programs. Russia will continue to field the SS-26 short-range
ballistic missile, with the first deployed unit being fully supplied recently. Development of the PAK-FA,
Russia’s new fifth-generation fighter, will continue, though deployment will not occur for several years.
…. Military readiness is generally increasing in Russia’s new units, but demographic trends, the one-year
conscription policy, and contract personnel recruitment problems will complicate efforts to fill the ranks
adequately. Programs to build a professional military are proceeding slowly because they are expensive and
Moscow’s current priority is rearmament.
A 2013 IISS report gave a more detailed overview of Russian modernization efforts and
potential. In general, reform processes continue, both in terms of bureaucracy and practical
matters such as training and exercise regimens. The military plans to professionalize its forces by
increasing contract troops while keeping some proportion of the conscription system intact,
although it remains unable to attract enough non-commissioned officers and contract personnel
at the same time as overall troop levels continue to decrease. Furthermore, 1088
The pattern of the structural reform process generally remains as before: design, test, and then adjust or
adapt if required. Some analysts believe that key elements of the reform process are largely complete, such
as the initiative to transform the army towards a combined-arms brigade-based structure, though
adjustments are still to be made, largely in the internal formation of these units. Some units retain
established structures: the Airborne Forces (VDV) remain a divisional-level formation, and the 18th
Machine Gun Artillery Division continues to be stationed in the Kuril Islands. There are some outstanding
issues: changes in unit-level combat training are still under development; there is a lack of clarity over how
the Joint Strategic Commands… which are planned to operate in Military Districts in times of war, will
actually work when activated; and the armed forces are still waiting for an integrated and automated
command and control (C2) system to emerge. But the army has already changed substantially, while the
armed forces in general have become more compact and mobile and have benefitted from improved
frequency of training. Whether this translates directly into improved ‘readiness’ is less clear.
The authorities in Moscow increasingly see rearmament as a second stage in the reform process. The
administration maintains its ambitions to field more and newer equipment, though in recent years budgetary
386 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

problems as well as changing requirements have meant that some programmes have not been realised on
schedule, if at all. The latest programme, The State Armaments Programme 2011–2020, was signed by
then-President Dmitry Medvedev on 31 December 2010. It saw around R19 trillion ($US610bn) out of the
programme’s total R20tr allocated to the Ministry of Defence; the remainder going to other forces.
Generating the industrial capacity to address new as well as established procurement ambitions remains a
major problem…
The 2014 IISS Military Balance broke down modernization service and highlighted restructuring
of forces: 1089
Two elite army divisions, the 4th Tamanskaya and the 5th Kantemirovskaya divisions, were re-established
in May 2013 having previously been ‘reformed’ into brigades. However, there was little indication during
2013 of any increase in personnel or equipment holdings to reflect this change in status, indicating that the
defence ministry is not reconsidering the move to brigade-based structures more generally.
Considerable work remains to be done in establishing brigade structures within ground forces. Moves to
create light, medium and heavy brigades remain at an experimental level. Nonetheless, the ministry is
persisting with the plan, as analysis of combat-training exercises with these formations apparently shows
that while they are far from ideal, they are better that the current ‘New Look’ motorized and tank brigades.
The division structure is to be retained within the Airborne Forces and Strategic Missile Forces.
Air force reform and development is following three themes: improving command-and-control,
modernising the combat aircraft fleet, and increasing the types and number of air-launched precision guided
weaponry. Deliveries of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have increased in the past few years, allowing units
to be re-equipped fully with new or upgraded platforms.
One of the most significant revisions to the Serdyukov reforms so far concerns air-force structure. Air
Force Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev initiated a shift away from the ‘air base’
(aviabaza) approach, which often involved hosting multiple types of aircraft at single airfields, towards a
‘one airfield, one regiment’ formula. This will in effect reinstate a division and regiment structure. The
Serdyukov reforms eliminated air armies, divisions and regiments, replacing these with the aviabaza as the
basic unit of air-force formations. These were divided into first- and second-class categories. First-class air
bases comprised 5–8 wings, while second class-bases had 1–2 wings. Each wing consisted on average of
three squadrons, each with different aircraft types. Before the reforms, an air regiment consisted of not
more than two squadrons, each equipped with one aircraft type.
The navy is in the midst of recapitalising its infrastructure, while also bringing into service more modern
designs to replace ageing Soviet-era platforms due to be decommissioned. Refurbishment work is also
under way at most main bases, with infrastructure upgrade and construction a key objective for shore
facilities, as well as for ancillary vessels such as tugs and auxiliaries.
Mediterranean deployments also attracted attention. During the Soviet era, the navy’s Fifth Squadron
operated in the area and although naval vessels returned to the Mediterranean in 2012, the deployment of a
Mediterranean Task Force in June 2013 was seen as a key event. Ships are to be rotated through the task
force deployment, and the squadron consists of vessels from the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Northern and, in
some cases, Pacific fleets.
Russian Airborne Forces are due to be bolstered by the end of 2013 with three air-assault brigades from
the Eastern and Southern Military Districts (under Decree 776, signed by Putin on 11 October 2013). The
brigades will become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s reserve. This shift reflects the armed forces’
desire, discussed and approved by the defence ministry in May, to be able to provide rapid deployment
forces as a core capability, with airborne units used as a crisis-reaction force. Along with airborne units,
rapid-deployment forces are also scheduled to include special taskforce brigades, marine units and special
operations personnel. Meanwhile, a Special Operations Command (SOC) was established in 2013, in an
attempt to unify special forces capabilities at the command level. The SOC is viewed as part of the
Supreme Commander-in- Chief’s reserve, alongside airborne units.
Sustaining and renewing Russia’s nuclear forces remains a near-term priority. Lieutenant-General Sergey
Karakayev, the Strategic Rocket Forces commander, claims that Russia has two new ICBM designs
capable of penetrating missile-defence systems: one a solid-propellant missile, the other a long-discussed,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 387

liquid-fuelled model. Some media reports indicate that the liquid-fuelled design may be intended to replace
the R36M (SS-18 Satan). The intent is that by 2021 almost all strategic missiles should be of new or recent
design. There is also renewed interest in a rail-mobile system to succeed the Molodets, which was
withdrawn from service in 2007. However, missile programmes continue to suffer development problems.
A test firing of the Bulava (SS-NX-32) SLBM failed again in September 2013, prompting further concern
over the project.
The Aerospace Defence Forces and associated air- and missile-defence systems are due to be fully
integrated into the command-and-control system between 2016 and 2020. A key programme is the S-500
(Triumf-M) SAM system. Introduction into service of the S-500 is now promised for the beginning of 2018,
but this date remains open to doubt, as the facilities for building the system are still under construction. The
A-135 Amur ballistic-missile defence system for Moscow is also to be replaced with the A-235 Samolyet-
M. As of the end of 2013 it appeared that the A-235 would use an improved variant of the 53T6 missile
used in the A-135. The interceptor is intended to be capable of a kinetic kill, while also retaining the
capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.
388 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.17: Russian Military Districts and Major Forces

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 51.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 389

Figure VII.18: Russian Forces Arrayed Near the North Korean

Border

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 53.

390 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Chinese Military Expenditures and Resources

China now dominates Asian military spending and is becoming the largest regional military
power in terms of power projection as well as total forces. China maintains an alliance with and
is a key material supporter of the DPRK. China will be a key player in shaping the pattern of any
potential military escalation on the Korean Peninsula, as it was in the Korean War.
Moreover, an assessment of China’s defense spending and modernization efforts show that it not
only plans to radically improve virtually every relevant aspect of its conventional and
asymmetric warfare capabilities that affect the Koreas, but every aspect of its sea-air-missile-
nuclear capabilities that affect US power projection capabilities and potentially Japan’s
willingness to support US action in defense of the ROK.
Critics of Chinese military spending and China’s lack of transparency often do not discuss the
strategic context in which Chinese military modernization and growth is taking place. Chinese
analysts point to the surrounding environment and other countries’ military budgets as major
drivers of defense spending; two leading analysts, Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, point
out that, 1090
First, in Beijing’s view China faces numerous internal threats to stability ranging from secessionist
movements in Tibet and Xinjiang to widespread – if localized – “mass incidents,” i.e. anti-government
protests. While there is no open-source evidence of PLA involvement in PAP operations other than the
March 2008 suppression in Lhasa, continued domestic security concerns necessarily affect military
prioritization. Second, China has land borders with 14 nations – including four nuclear weapons states –
and territorial disputes with two of them (primarily India, also Bhutan). Third, China retains maritime
boundary or island disputes with all its maritime neighbours.
Thus, Beijing’s political relations with all major military powers in its neighbourhood are, at best, tepid.
Combined with Taiwan’s unresolved status, this makes the Near Seas and their immediate approaches a
critical area of strategic contention and assertion for China. Fourth, for these and other reasons, China has
tense, albeit not unstable, political and military relations with the world’s sole superpower (the US), whose
leaders will probably remain suspicious of China’s intentions as long as it retains an authoritarian political
system. Despite increasingly global security interests of the kind often used to justify US defence policy
(e.g. secure sea lanes of communication for safe passage of the resources and commerce) and sincere
concerns about its external environment, China’s defence budget increases remain focused on irredentist
but regional concerns, however controversial the means and desired ends of that approach may be to other
states with interests in the region.
In March 2015, a spokeswoman for the National People’s Congress announced that China’s
military budget would rise about 10 percent in 2015 to invest in high-tech equipment and further
modernize the world’s second largest military spender. 1091
Still, China has not provided much meaningful transparency regarding its overall military
spending or details of much of its military modernization. This makes it difficult to assess both
China’s military capacity and how it influences the balance of forces in the Koreas and Northeast
Asia.
Capacity for Military Efforts and Official Chinese Reporting
The abilities of a country to sustain a military, undertake modernization, and increase defense
spending are all important variables when assessing the balance of potential forces on the Korean
Peninsula. The CIA describes China’s growing economic capacity to support its military forces
as follows, 1092
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 391

Since the late 1970s China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented
one that plays a major global role - in 2010 China became the world’s largest exporter. Reforms began with
the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices,
fiscal decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, creation of a diversified banking system,
development of stock markets, rapid growth of the private sector, and opening to foreign trade and
investment.
China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion. In recent years, China has renewed its support for
state-owned enterprises in sectors it considers important to “economic security,” explicitly looking to foster
globally competitive national champions. After keeping its currency tightly linked to the US dollar for
years, in July 2005 China revalued its currency by 2.1% against the US dollar and moved to an exchange
rate system that references a basket of currencies. From mid 2005 to late 2008 cumulative appreciation of
the renminbi against the US dollar was more than 20%, but the exchange rate remained virtually pegged to
the dollar from the onset of the global financial crisis until June 2010, when Beijing allowed resumption of
a gradual appreciation.
The restructuring of the economy and resulting efficiency gains have contributed to a more than tenfold
increase in GDP since 1978. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis that adjusts for price
differences, China in 2012 stood as the second-largest economy in the world after the US, having surpassed
Japan in 2001. The dollar values of China’s agricultural and industrial output each exceed those of the US;
China is second to the US in the value of services it produces. Still, per capita income is below the world
average.
The Chinese government faces numerous economic challenges, including: (a) reducing its high domestic
savings rate and correspondingly low domestic demand; (b) sustaining adequate job growth for tens of
millions of migrants and new entrants to the work force; (c) reducing corruption and other economic
crimes; and (d) containing environmental damage and social strife related to the economy’s rapid
transformation. Economic development has progressed further in coastal provinces than in the interior, and
by 2011 more than 250 million migrant workers and their dependents had relocated to urban areas to find
work.
One consequence of population control policy is that China is now one of the most rapidly aging countries
in the world. Deterioration in the environment - notably air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the
water table, especially in the North - is another long-term problem. China continues to lose arable land
because of erosion and economic development. The Chinese government is seeking to add energy
production capacity from sources other than coal and oil, focusing on nuclear and alternative energy
development.
Several factors are converging to slow china’s growth, including debt overhang from its credit-fueled
stimulus program, industrial overcapacity, inefficient allocation of capital by state-owned banks, and the
slow recovery of China’s trading partners. The government’s 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted in March 2011
and reiterated at the Communist Party’s “Third Plenum” meeting in November 2013, emphasizes continued
economic reforms and the need to increase domestic consumption in order to make the economy less
dependent on fixed investments, exports in the future. However, China has made only marginal progress
toward these rebalancing goals. The new government of President Xi Jinping has signaled a greater
willingness to undertake reforms that focus on china’s long-term economic health, including giving the
markets a more decisive role in allocating resources.
Although historically the PRC has not often publically discussed its defense budgeting in depth,
the 2010 Chinese Defense White Paper does address military spending: 1093
With the development of national economy and society, the increase of China’s defense expenditure has
been kept at a reasonable and appropriate level. China’s GDP was RMB31,404.5 billion in 2008 and
RMB34,090.3 billion in 2009. State financial expenditure was RMB 6,259.266 billion in 2008 and
RMB7,629.993 billion in 2009, up 25.7 percent and 21.9 percent respectively over the previous year.
China’s defense expenditure was RMB417.876 billion in 2008 and RMB495.11 billion in 2009, up 17.5
percent and 18.5 percent respectively over the previous year. In recent years, the share of China’s annual
defense expenditure in its GDP has remained relatively steady, while that in overall state financial
expenditure has been moderately decreased.
392 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

…In 2010, confronted by the residual impact of the global financial crisis and other uncertainties, the
tension between revenue and expenditure in China’s finances persists. Giving priority to socially beneficial
spending in agriculture, rural areas and farmers, as well as in education, science and technology, health,
medical care and social security, China has increased its defense expenditure moderately as needed.
China’s defense budget for 2010 is RMB532.115 billion, up 7.5 percent over 2009. The growth rate of
defense expenditure has decreased.

US Analyses of Chinese Defense Budgets

The US DOD has long questioned Chinese reporting on the size of its defense budgets, issuing
higher estimates of the growth in Chinese military spending.
According to the DOD, China increased military spending by 12.7% in 2011; over the period
from 2000-2010, China’s official military budget grew at an average of 12.1% in inflation-
adjusted terms. At the same time, due to overall economic growth of 10.2% over the same
period, the actual burden on the economy of the increased official defense budget appears to
have been negligible.
There are a variety of problems when attempting to assess China’s actual defense spending. For
one, China’s official military budget does not include major categories of defense-related
expenditures, while including line items that are not usually included in other countries’ military
budgets. In addition, China still maintains a semi-command economy and a lack of accounting
transparency.
The DOD estimated that China’s actual military-related spending for 2010 was over $160
billion.1094 The DOD estimated China’s actual military spending at $120-180 billion in 2011,
compared to the official figure of $91.5 billion. China argues that its defense budget expands in
parallel with its economic growth, and is not directed at any other country. One Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister remarked, “Strengthening China’s defense capability will be conducive to
further stability in the region and will be conducive to world peace.” 1095
In his 2012 testimony before the Senate, DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess Jr. provided the
following commentary on China’s reported defense spending: 1096
DIA estimates China spent as much as $183 billion on military-related goods and services in 2011,
compared to the $93 billion Beijing reported in its official military budget. This budget omits major
categories, but it does show spending increases for domestic military production and programs to improve
professionalism and the quality of life for military personnel.
The Chinese Ministry of Finance retroactively announced that the 11.2% increase in the 2012
military budget had been “used to improve living and training conditions for our troops, support
the military in promoting IT application, strengthen development of new- and high-technology
weapons and equipment, and enhance the country’s modern military capabilities.”
The 2012 edition of the DOD report on Chinese Military Power noted that, 1097
Chinese military investments … have led to the fielding of equipment and capabilities that support the
PLA’s traditional set of core missions (such as defending China’s security, sovereignty and territorial
integrity), and an expanding array of new missions at home and abroad.
On March 4, 2012, Beijing announced an 11.2 percent increase in its annual military budget to roughly
$106 billion. This increase continues more than two decades of sustained annual increases in China’s
announced military budget. Analysis of 2000-2011 data indicates China’s officially disclosed military
budget grew at an average of 11.8 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 393

Estimating actual PLA military expenditures is difficult because of poor accounting transparency and
China’s still incomplete transition from a command economy. Moreover, China’s published military budget
does not include several major categories of expenditure, such as foreign procurement. Using 2011 prices
and exchange rates, DoD estimates China’s total military-related spending for 2011 ranges between $120
billion and $180 billion.
According to the Twelfth National People’s Congress, the 2013 budget was to “be used to
support efforts to improve the working and living conditions of officers and enlisted personnel,
make the armed forces more mechanized and information-based, and safeguard national
security.” 1098 In early March 2013, China released its 2013 national budget, forecasting a
military expenditure of 720.2 billion yuan ($114.3 billion), a 10.7% increase. Official military
spending in 2012 was approximately $106 billion, an 11.2% rise over 2011.
The 2013 edition of the DOD report drew similar conclusions about these figures as in previous
years: 1099
On March 5, 2013, Beijing announced a 10.7 percent increase in its annual military budget to $114 billion,
continuing more than two decades of sustained annual defense spending increases. Analysis of data from
2003 through 2012 indicates China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 9.7 percent
per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period. China has the fiscal strength and political will to
support defense spending growth at comparable levels, despite lowering its economic growth forecast in
2012 to 7.5 percent from 8 percent in 2011. Continued increases will support PLA modernization efforts
and facilitate China’s move toward a more professional force. (p. 45)
…Using 2012 prices and exchange rates, the DoD estimates that China’s total actual military-related
expenditure for 2012 falls between $135 billion and $215 billion. However, it is difficult to estimate actual
PLA military expenses due to China’s poor accounting transparency and incomplete transition from a
command economy. China’s published military budget omits several major categories of expenditure, such
as procurement of foreign weapons and equipment. (p. 45)

Outside Assessments of Chinese Military Spending

Outside experts also question China’s reporting. Figure VII.19 shows the 2013 IISS’ analysis of
China’s defense budget trends and estimates over 2009-2011. The IISS projected a possible
future convergence with US spending under a variety of scenarios that could take place as early
as 2022 or as late as 2050, 1100
…[O]fficial Chinese defence budget figures probably underestimate the true extent of Beijing’s defence
spending. Although official figures include personnel, operations and equipment expenditure, it is widely
held that other military-related expenditures are omitted – such as allocations for R&D and overseas
weapons purchases. A fuller account of China’s true military-spending levels should also include funding
allocated to the People’s Armed Police (PAP)… [I]f estimates of these additional items are included,
Chinese defence spending rises by a factor of approximately 1.4–1.5 relative to officially published figures,
to an estimated RMB883.3bn (US$136.7bn) using market exchange rates (MER). If these higher estimates
of Chinese spending are projected into the future, convergence with US defence spending could occur as
early as 2023 (if US FY13 proposed spending levels are accepted) or 2022 (if sequestration is instituted).
Of course, several factors might delay or even prevent such convergence. A lower trajectory of economic
growth in China as the global economy slows, or a downshift in economic activity as the country attempts
to move away from an export-oriented growth model, or economic turbulence as China attempts to
modernise its fledgling financial markets and uncompetitive banking sector – these are all factors that could
diminish economic growth, limiting the resources available for defence and, at the very least, delaying the
date of convergence.
A US analysis by Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson reached somewhat different conclusions
and provided the data on Chinese military spending shown in Figures VII.20 and VII.21. It also
summarized the issues in measuring the trends in Chinese defense spending. In particular, while
394 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the official Chinese defense budget has nominally increased at an average annual rate that
exceeds 10% since 1990, there are important qualifications when assessing real spending. One
qualification is the rampant inflation in the country, which has decreased that real-world impact
of what look like large budget increases. Calculating China’s defense budget at constant prices –
and thus accounting for inflation effects – shows that China’s effective defense spending growth
rate has been much lower. 1101
The differences between the nominal (current price) and real (constant price) average annual growth rates
are remarkable: 1.6 per cent vs. –3.2 per cent (1980–1989); 15.7 per cent vs. 7.8 per cent (1990–1999); 16.5
per cent vs. 12.5 per cent (2000–2009); and 10.4 per cent vs. 3.1 per cent over the 2010–2011 period. In
other words, when calculated in real terms the average annual increases in the budget exceeded 10 per cent
during only one of the ten-year periods in [see Figure II.12]: 2000–2009. This all suggests that unqualified
statements along the lines of “China’s official defence budget has increased by double-digits since year
19XX,” while in most cases technically true in nominal terms, may exaggerate the real-world effects of
these budget increases.
Furthermore, the PRC’s official defense budget growth has consistently been outpaced by even
bigger increases in total national financial expenditures – both of which are roughly correlated
with China’s large yearly GDP growth. The official defense budget’s proportion of state
expenditures has still decreased from 9.5% in 1994 to 5.5% in 2011. Therefore, Chinese
investment in its military forces has comprised a decreasing percentage of government spending,
providing some support to official Chinese statements that China’s principal objective is
economic development – and thus that defense modernization is subordinate to that goal. 1102
A Lack of Transparency
Western analysts sometimes criticize this lack of Chinese defense budget transparency and the
exclusion of significant defense-related spending from the official budget, arguing that China
underreports actual military spending intentionally. Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson provide
an excellent summary of the issues involved; a list of things excluded from the official Chinese
defense budget includes: 1103
o The budget of the 660,000-strong People’s Armed Police (PAP);
o Some domestic procurement and research and development expenses;
o Overseas purchases of major weapons and platforms;
o Contributions from regional and local governments;
o Extra-budgetary revenues and resources from a limited number of military commercial
enterprises (such as hospitals, and strategic infrastructure);
o Militarily relevant portions of China’s space programme;
o Central and local government defence mobilization funds;
o One-time entrance bonuses for college students;
o Authorized sales of land or excess food produced by some units;
o Personnel for motion pictures; and
o Donations of goods, services and money by local governments and enterprises to units and
demobilized personnel.
One of the biggest exclusions from the official Chinese defense budget is the PAP. However,
this force’s primary focus is domestic, with responsibilities like firefighting, border security,
and natural disaster relief. In the event of a war, the PAP would support the PLA in local
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 395

defense, but neither supports the other in domestic operations in peacetime. The PAP’s
budget is categorized under public security expenditures, not national defense expenditures
(where the PLA’s budget is located). 1104
Specific weapons and equipment procurement costs from domestic defense industries and
defense-related R&D funds given to civilian defense contractors and PLA armament research
institutions are also not publically released. This funding likely comes from several different
parts of the government, such as the State Administration for Science, Technology, and
Industry. Although much of PLA procurement is domestic, a significant cost-based
percentage is imported – in particular, advanced weapons technology and some weapons
platforms. The PRC both imports completed weapons systems and promotes foreign-assisted
development, licensed production, and reverse engineering. It is believed that these exports
are paid for from special accounts controlled by the State Council and thus are not part of the
official defense budget. It seems likely that China will continue to rely on such imports for at
least several more years due to continuing difficulties in developing key technologies. 1105
Chinese weapons exports, though small relative to its demographic and geographic size, have
been increasing rapidly; from the 2002-2006 period to the 2007-2011 period, they rose 95%.
SIPRI announced in early 2013 that China had become the 5th largest arms exporter by
volume in the world. 1106
China’s defense budget also does not include provincial defense-related spending like
military base operating costs. It is believed that this money comes from local governments
and the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The former also contributes to militia and reserve expenses,
including civilians working for some PLA departments. However, a 2010 government
statistic showed that only 2.94% of defense expenditures were paid for by local governments,
meaning that the exclusion of this spending from the official budget does not significantly
affect the real spending numbers. 1107
Overall, these items and areas excluded from the official defense budget make guesstimating
real Chinese defense spending relatively difficult; as Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson
note, 1108
China’s general lack of transparency about how its official defence budget is calculated makes judging the
validity of these Western criticisms very difficult. However, the potential significance of the above
exclusions for assessing the size of China’s actual defence budget is suggested in three important studies
conducted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). In 2006, IISS estimated that including
the costs of foreign weapons purchases, subsidies, R&D spending, new product expenditures, arms exports
and PAP funding revealed a 72 per cent gap (in RMB terms) between China’s FY2005 official defence
budget and “actual” (i.e. IISS-estimated) defence spending. In 2010, IISS estimated a roughly 39 per cent
difference between the FY2008 official defence budget and “actual” (i.e. IISS-estimated) defence spending.
In 2012, the estimated gap for the FY2010 budget was 41 per cent. It should be noted that, although large,
the disparity between the official budget and IISS’s estimates declined significantly over the initial three-
year period before stabilizing. As argued in the next section, this shrinking gap, which is consistent with
similar trends in estimates by the US Department of Defense, suggests that in recent years an increasing
percentage of “actual” PLA funding has been placed “on the books”; that is, officially reported figures
increasingly reflect actual spending.
…Although the exclusion of major items from China’s official defence budget is undoubtedly an issue of
concern, less widely known is that the budget also includes some items that are not included in those of its
Western counterparts. For example, the PLA still engages in some infrastructure construction projects,
although many are designed to be dual-use and paid for from local and national non-defence funds. It
provides some medical help to civilians in remote areas and provides some support to domestic security
396 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

operations (e.g. during the 2008 Olympics). The PLA also engages in disaster relief, such as the dispatch of
over 200,000 personnel in response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake – the largest deployment of Chinese
armed forces since the 1979 war with Vietnam. There are legal provisions for it to be reimbursed for these
operations, but the processes, delays and extent of such reimbursements remain unclear. In Western
countries, such tasks are assigned primarily to non-military organizations. The PLA also provides
perquisites for retired senior officers (offices, assistants, cars, drivers, cooks, caregivers, and special
hospital facilities) that their better-salaried Western counterparts do not receive.

The Chinese Response

Chinese commentators respond to Western criticisms of PRC military transparency in three
different ways: 1109
(1) emphasise that there is no universal standard for military transparency; (2) compare the current level of
transparency favourably to even greater opacity previously; or (3) contend that “the most fundamental and
most important form of transparency” is the transparency of China’s strategic intentions, as opposed to the
transparency of military capabilities or doctrine.
Western organizations and experts have tried to overcome this murky transparency by
independently estimating “actual” defense spending – though many of these estimates are
inconsistent for three primary reasons: (1) the difficulty of defining “defense spending”; (2)
conversion of China’s RMB-denominated budget into US dollars, especially because of
problems with the official exchange rates, application of PPP rates, and inflation and
strengthening of the RMB since 2005 – meaning that conversions based on current exchange
rates make recent budget increases look larger than they really are; and (3) the lack of
transparency regarding the actual costs of individual items and which specific spending
categories are already included in the official budget further complicates estimates of actual PLA
military expenditures. 1110
…[I]n 2009, the US Department of Defense estimated China’s “actual” FY2008 defence budget at
US$105–150 billion: 1.8–2.6 times the official figure of US$57.2 billion (RMB417.8 billion) and 2.5–3.6
per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s estimate that
year was much lower: US$84.9 billion – 1.48 times the officially released figure. The difference between
SIPRI’s estimate and the upper bound of the Department of Defense’s estimate was US$65.1 billion, a
difference larger than China’s entire official defence budget that year.
While significant defence-related spending is undoubtedly excluded from China’s official defence budget,
some of the items included in foreign estimates of the “actual” figure are controversial. For example, some
Western institutions include expenditures for the (domestically focused) PAP in their calculations, labeling
it one of the largest extra-budgetary sources of defence spending. But they do so without offering explicit
justification. This single line-item can inflate estimates of the budget by as much as one-fifth above the
official figure. Take the 2010 figures as an example: adding only official PAP expenditures (RMB93.4
billion) to the official budget (RMB533.4 billion) results in an estimate of “actual” Chinese defence
spending 18 per cent higher.
Furthermore, many other nations, including the US, also have defense-related spending that is
outside of their official defense budgets: 1111
For example, the US 051 (Department of Defense) budget excludes a significant amount of defence-related
spending. In fact, one analysis of US “total defence-related spending” based on similar metrics to those
regularly used by Western organizations to estimate China’s “actual” defence budget found a US$187
billion gap between the United States’ official FY2006 defence budget and what this group of American
PLA experts calculated as “actual” US defence-related spending that year.
The parallels they draw are intriguing: China is criticized for excluding some funding for officer pensions
from its official defence budget, yet the Department of Veterans Affairs’ entire budget, retirement costs
paid by the Department of Treasury, and veterans’ re-employment and training programmes paid by the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 397

Department of Labor are not included in Department of Defense’s budget. China is criticized for excluding
funding for its nuclear and strategic rocket programmes from its official defence budget, yet atomic energy
activities related to defence are funded by the Department of Energy and fall outside the Department of
Defense’s budget. Finally, China is criticized for excluding the PAP’s budget and various defence activities
that are paid for by local governments from its official defence budget, yet neither the Department of
Homeland Security budget nor state funding for some US National Guard functions is included in the
Department of Defense’s budget… [I]t is important to also stress that while “actual” US defence spending
is larger than the official figure, most other relevant spending is relatively transparent, and can be
assembled by a knowledgeable analyst. This is significantly less true of China’s defence spending.
Therefore, when viewed in context, it appears that the PRC’s limited military transparency is
unlikely to be an attempt by its leadership to obscure its strategic intentions. Other countries in
the region with similar economic development levels – such as India, which is a similar size and
is also growing quickly – have similar transparency in their military spending, meaning that
China is not necessarily an exception in this regard. 1112
398 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.19: Chinese Defence Budget Trends and IISS

Estimates: 2009-2013
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Chinese GDP (RMB, billions) 34,090 40,151 47,156 51,900 57,700

Chinese GDP Growth 9.2% 10.4% 9.2% 7.80% 8.04%

Official Defense Budget (RMB, 495.1 533.3 583.0 648.0 718.0

billions)

Nominal Percentage Change 18.5% 7.7% 9.3% 11.1% 10.8%

Real Percentage Change 19.2% 1.8% 4.7%

Official Defense Budget as a 6.5% 5.9% 5.3%

Percentage of Total Outlays

Official Defense Budget as a 1.45% 1.33% 1.24%

Percentage of GDP

Total Estimated Defense Spending 671.8 753.4 883.3 923

(RMB, billions)

Nominal Percentage Change 16.3% 12.1% 17.2%

Real Percentage Change 17.0% 6.0% 9.1%

Total Estimated Defense Spending as 8.8% 8.4% 8.1%

a Percentage of Total Outlays

Total Estimated Defense Spending as 1.97% 1.88% 1.87%

a Percentage of GDP

Official Defense Budget (USD, 72.5 78.7 90.2 103 112

billions)

Total Estimated Defense Spending 98.4 111.1 136.7

(USD, billions)

Total Estimated Defense Spending 6.83 6.78 6.46

Source: IISS, Military Balance 2014, 230.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 399

Figure VII.20: PRC Defense Spending-related Comparative

Statistics, 1980-2011
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2011
(annual average) (annual average) (annual average) (annual average)
Defense budget growth
rate…
… At current prices 1.6% 15.7% 16.5% 10.4%
… At constant prices -3.2% 7.8% 12.5% 3.1%
(base year of 1980)
GDP growth rate 9.8% 10.0% 10.3% 9.8%
State financial
expenditures growth rate
(aggregate – central and
local)…
… At current prices 8.6% 16.8% 19.3% 19.5%
… At constant prices 3.5% 8.8% 15.1% 11.6%
(base year of 1980)
Source: Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,”
China Quarterly, March 2013, 8.
400 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VII.21: PRC Official Defense Budget Annual Data, 2002-

2012
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*

GDP growth rate at current 9.1% 10.0% 10.1% 11.3% 12.7% 14.2% 9.6% 9.2% 10.4% 9.2% N/A
prices

Defense budget (RMB

billions)…

… At current prices 170.8 190.8 220.0 247.5 297.9 355.5 417.9 495.1 533.3 602.7 670.0

… At 2002 constant prices 170.8 186.0 200.6 217.1 251.8 279.1 304.4 362.9 366.6 385.3 N/A

… As % of GDP 1.42% 1.40% 1.38% 1.34% 1.38% 1.34% 1.33% 1.45% 1.33% 1.28% N/A

Defense budget growth rate…

… At current prices 18.4% 11.7% 15.3% 12.5% 20.4% 19.3% 17.6% 18.5% 7.7% 13.0% 11.2%

… At 2002 constant prices 18.5% 11.4% 14.0% 11.0% 17.2% 15.2% 12.8% 13.6% 5.3% 8.3% N/A

Note: 2012 defense budget is an estimated figure reported in Xinhua.

Source: Adam P. Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the Aggregate,”
China Quarterly, March 2013, 10.

Chinese Arms Imports and Exports

The PRC both imports completed weapons systems and promotes foreign-assisted development,
licensed production, and reverse engineering. It is believed that these exports are paid for from
special accounts controlled by the State Council and thus are not part of the official defense
budget. It seems likely that China will continue to rely on such imports for at least several more
years due to continuing difficulties in developing key technologies. 1113
These are partly offset by exports, Chinese weapons exports, though small relative to its
demographic and geographic size, have been increasing rapidly; from the 2002-2006 period to
the 2007-2011 period, they rose 95%. SIPRI announced in early 2013 that China had become the
5th largest arms exporter by volume in the world. 1114
The US Department of Defense has estimated that from 2008 to 2012, 1115
From 2008 to 2012, China signed approximately $10 billion in agreements for conventional arms
worldwide. In 2013 and the coming years, China’s arms exports will likely increase modestly as China’s
domestic defense industry improves. Chinese defense firms are marketing and selling arms worldwide, with
the bulk of their sales to Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. In 2012, China unveiled the Yilong
tactical UAV, which will probably be marketed to developing countries.
Pakistan remains China’s primary customer for conventional weapons. China engages in both arms sales
and defense industrial cooperation with Islamabad, including co-production of the JF-17 fighter aircraft, F-
22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, F-7 fighter aircraft, early warning and control aircraft, tanks,
air-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, and cooperation on main battle tank production.
Sub-Saharan African and developing Latin American countries view China as a provider of low-cost
weapons with fewer political strings attached compared to other international arms suppliers. China uses
arms sales as part of a multifaceted approach to promote trade, secure access to natural resources, and
extend its influence in the region.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 401

At the same time, the DOD states that China goes far beyond the normal character of arms
imports, 1116
China relies on foreign technology, acquisition of key dual-use components, and focused indigenous
research and development (R&D) to advance military modernization. The Chinese utilize a large, well-
organized network to facilitate collection of sensitive information and export-controlled technology from
U.S. defense sources. Many of the organizations composing China’s military-industrial complex have both
military and civilian research and development functions. This network of government-affiliated companies
and research institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies or
knowledgeable experts under the guise of civilian research and development. The enterprises and institutes
accomplish this through technology conferences and symposia, legitimate contracts and joint commercial
ventures, partnerships with foreign firms, and joint development of specific technologies. In the case of key
national security technologies, controlled equipment, and other materials not readily obtainable through
commercial means or academia, China has utilized its intelligence services and employed other illicit
approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and export controls. (p. 12)
A high-priority for China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy is its Civil-Military Integration policy
to develop an innovative dual-use technology and industrial base that serve both military and civilian
requirements. China’s defense industry has benefited from integration with its expanding civilian economy
and science and technology sectors, particularly sectors with access to foreign technology. Examples of
technologies include: advanced aviation and aerospace (hot section technologies, avionics and flight
controls), source code, traveling wave tubes, night vision devices, monolithic microwave integrated
circuits, and information and cyber technologies. (p. 12)
Differentiating between civil and military end-use is very challenging in China due to opaque corporate
structures, hidden asset ownership, and the connections of commercial personnel with the central
government. Some commercial entities are affiliated with PLA research institutes, or have ties to and are
subject to the control of government organizations such as the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission. (p. 12)
…China utilizes a large, well-organized network of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research
institutes, and computer network operations to facilitate the collection of sensitive information and export-
controlled technology, as well as basic research and science that supports U.S. defense system
modernization. Many of the organizations comprising China’s military-industrial complex have both
military and civilian research and development functions. This network of government-affiliated companies
and research institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies or
knowledgeable experts under the guise of civilian research and development. The enterprises and institutes
accomplish this through technology conferences and symposia, legitimate contracts and joint commercial
ventures, partnerships with foreign firms, and joint development of specific technologies. (p. 51)
As in previous years, China utilized its intelligence services and employed other illicit approaches that
involve violations of U.S. laws and export controls to obtain key national security technologies, controlled
equipment, and other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia. Based on
investigations conducted by the law enforcement agencies of the Department of Defense, Department of
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Commerce, China continues to engage in
activities designed to support military procurement and modernization. These include economic espionage,
theft of trade secrets, export control violations, and technology transfer. (p. 51)
• In August 2010, Noshir Gowadia was convicted of providing China with classified U.S. defense
technology. This assisted China in developing a low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of
rendering a cruise missile resistant to detection by infrared missiles.
• In September 2010, Chi Tong Kuok was convicted for conspiracy to illegally export U.S. military
encryption technology and smuggle it to Macau and Hong Kong. The relevant technology included
encryption, communications equipment, and Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment used by U.S.
and NATO forces.
• In September 2010, Xian Hongwei and Li Li were arrested in Hungary and later extradited to the
United States for conspiring to procure thousands of radiation-hardened Programmable Read-Only
402 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Microchips, classified as defense items and used in satellite systems, for the China Aerospace and
Technology Corporation. Both defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced in September 2011 to
two years in prison.
• In January 2012, Yang Bin was arrested in Bulgaria and later extradited to the United States based on a
December 2011 criminal indictment related to the attempted export of military-grade accelerometers
used in “smart” munitions, aircraft, and missiles.
• In July 2012, Zhang Zhaowei, a naturalized Canadian citizen, was arrested while entering the United
States, based on a sealed January 2011 indictment alleging Zhang attempted to illegally acquire and
export military gyroscopes used in unmanned aerial systems and for tactical missile guidance.
• In September 2012, Zhang Mingsuan was arrested in the United States and indicted after attempting to
acquire up to two tons of aerospace-grade carbon fiber. In a recorded conversation, Zhang claimed he
urgently needed the fiber in connection with a scheduled Chinese fighter plane test flight.
• In addition, multiple cases identified since 2009 involved individuals procuring and exporting export
controlled items to China. These efforts included attempts to procure and export radiation-hardened
programmable semiconductors and computer circuits used in satellites, restricted microwave amplifiers
used in communications and radar equipment, export-restricted technical data, and thermal imaging
cameras. There were also at least two cases in 2011 in which U.S. companies working on Department
of Defense contracts subcontracted manufacturing work on small arms and replacement parts to
Chinese companies in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.
• In March 2012, Hui Sheng Shen and Huan Ling Chang, both from Taiwan, were charged with
conspiracy to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act after allegedly intending to acquire and pass
sensitive U.S. defense technology to China. The pair planned to photograph the technology, delete the
images, bring the memory cards back to China, and have a Chinese contact recover the images.
• In June 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC), a subsidiary of U.S. aerospace firm and defense
contractor United Technologies Corporation (UTC), pleaded guilty to illegally providing military
software used in the development of China’s Z-10 military attack helicopter.
• UTC and two subsidiaries agreed to pay $75 million and were debarred from license privileges as part
of a settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice and State Department.
• PWC “knowingly and willfully” caused six versions of military electronic engine control software to
be “illegally exported” from Hamilton Sundstrand in the United States to PWC in Canada and then to
China for the Z-10, and made false and belated disclosures about these illegal exports.
• In September 2012, Sixing Liu, aka “Steve Liu,” was convicted of violating the U.S. Arms Export
Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and possessing stolen trade
secrets. Liu, a Chinese citizen, returned to China with electronic files containing details on the
performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and unmanned aerial
vehicles. Liu developed critical military technology for a U.S. defense contractor and stole the
documents to position himself for employment in China.
• In December 2012, federal prosecutors indicted Chinese nationals Yuan Wanli and Song Jiang for
export-control and money laundering violations in connection with a scheme to obtain U.S. dual-use
programmable logic devices tested to military specifications. While operating from China, Yuan used a
fake website and e-mail addresses created using the name of a legitimate New York-based company to
conceal his identity and mislead U.S. suppliers. Yuan is associated with China Wingwish Group Co.,
Ltd., a China-based company involved in the procurement of dual-use technology.
• In March 2013, Chinese national Liu Sixing received 70 months in prison for lying to Federal agents,
transporting stolen property, and violating the Arms Export Control Act, the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations, and the Economic Espionage Act. Despite his training in U.S. export control laws,
Liu stole thousands of files from his U.S. employer in 2010 detailing the performance and design of
guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and unmanned aerial vehicles and transported
them to China. While there, Liu delivered presentations describing the technology at several Chinese
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 403

universities, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and conferences organized by Chinese government
entities.
• In May 2013, Chinese national Ma Lisong pled guilty to violating the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act after attempting to export weapon-grade carbon fiber to China. Based in China
and using an alias, Ma e-mailed a U.S. undercover agent in February 2013 and negotiated the purchase
of five tons of export-controlled carbon fiber. Authorities arrested Ma in the United States after he
attempted to ship a sample he requested back to China.
• In August 2013, Chinese national Zhang Mingsuan pled guilty to violating the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act by attempting to export thousands of pounds of high-grade carbon
fiber for use by the Chinese military. During a recorded conversation in 2012, Zhang claimed he
urgently needed the fiber in connection with a scheduled test flight of a Chinese fighter plane.
Although China’s defense industry is much less reliant on foreign imports than before, there are
still niche areas where China still seeks advanced foreign systems: 1117
Key areas where China continues to supplement indigenous military modernization efforts through targeted
foreign technologies include engines for aircraft and tanks, solid state electronics and microprocessors,
guidance and control systems, and enabling technologies such as cutting-edge precision machine tools,
advanced diagnostic and forensic equipment, and computer-assisted design, manufacturing, and
engineering. China often pursues these foreign technologies for the purpose of reverse engineering or to
supplement indigenous military modernization efforts.
China seeks some high-tech components and certain major end items, particularly from Russia, that it has
difficulty producing domestically. China is pursuing advanced Russian defense equipment such as the SA-
X-21b (S-400) surface-to-air missile system, Su-35 fighter aircraft, and a new joint-design and production
program for diesel-electric submarines based on the Russian PETERSBURG/LADA-class. Between 2011
and 2012, Russia agreed to sell China IL-76 transport aircraft and Mi-171 helicopters. Russia’s concerns
about intellectual property protections affect the types and quantities of advanced arms or associated
production technologies it is willing to transfer to China. China also has signed significant purchase
contracts with Ukraine in recent years, including contracts for assault hovercraft and aircraft engines.

Japanese Military Expenditures and Resources

Japan has long treated military issues in terms of a purely defensive posture. Its constitution
sharply limits the ways in which it can use military force, and it has kept military spending very
low as a percentage of its economy. Yet, although Japan’s defense capabilities are limited by its
constitution, Japan may amend the document to include some allowance for offensive
capabilities – or loosen the definition of “defense” in practice. Japan’s proximity to the Peninsula
(the DPRK launched a missile over Japan in 1998), alliance with the US, and growing
cooperative relationship with the ROK show that Japan is increasingly involved in, and worried
about, possible conflicts that involve the DPRK and ROK.
The Impact of the Japanese Economy
In 2014, the CIA summarized the state of Japan’s economy and ability to support military forces
as follows: 1118
In the years following World War II, government-industry cooperation, a strong work ethic, mastery of
high technology, and a comparatively small defense allocation (1% of GDP) helped Japan develop a
technologically advanced economy. Two notable characteristics of the post-war economy were the close
interlocking structures of manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors, known as keiretsu, and the guarantee
of lifetime employment for a substantial portion of the urban labor force. Both features are now eroding
under the dual pressures of global competition and domestic demographic change. Japan’s industrial sector
is heavily dependent on imported raw materials and fuels. A small agricultural sector is highly subsidized
404 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

and protected, with crop yields among the highest in the world. While self-sufficient in rice production,
Japan imports about 60% of its food on a caloric basis.
For three decades, overall real economic growth had been spectacular - a 10% average in the 1960s, a 5%
average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s. Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s, averaging just
1.7%, largely because of the after effects of inefficient investment and an asset price bubble in the late
1980s that required a protracted period of time for firms to reduce excess debt, capital, and labor. Modest
economic growth continued after 2000, but the economy has fallen into recession three times since 2008.
A sharp downturn in business investment and global demand for Japan’s exports in late 2008 pushed Japan
into recession. Government stimulus spending helped the economy recover in late 2009 and 2010, but the
economy contracted again in 2011 as the massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake and the ensuing tsunami in
March disrupted manufacturing. The economy has largely recovered in the two years since the disaster, but
reconstruction in the Tohoku region has been uneven.
Prime Minister Shinzo ABE has declared the economy his government’s top priority; he has overturned his
predecessor’s plan to permanently close nuclear power plants and is pursuing an economic revitalization
agenda of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and structural reform. Japan joined the Trans Pacific
Partnership negotiations in 2013, a pact that would open Japan’s economy to increased foreign competition
and create new export opportunities for Japanese businesses. Measured on a purchasing power parity (PPP)
basis that adjusts for price differences, Japan in 2013 stood as the fourth-largest economy in the world after
second-place China, which surpassed Japan in 2001, and third-place India, which edged out Japan in 2012.
The new government will continue a longstanding debate on restructuring the economy and reining in
Japan’s huge government debt, which is exceeding 230% of GDP. To help raise government revenue and
reduce public debt, Japan decided in 2013 to gradually increase the consumption tax to a total of 10% by
the year 2015. Japan is making progress on ending deflation due to a weaker yen and higher energy costs,
but reliance on exports to drive growth and an aging, shrinking population pose other major long-term
challenges for the economy.

Japanese Defense Spending

Japan can still, however, easily afford to make major improvements in its forces if it chooses to
do so. Japanese defense spending has been kept at approximately 1% of GDP for quite some
time, although Prime Minister Abe increased defense spending by 0.8% in early 2013, the first
increase in 11 years – to 4.68 trillion yen ($51.7 billion), according to the Japanese Defense
Ministry. Including funds for relocating US troops and assisting Okinawan residents (where 75%
of US bases in Japan are located), the total defense budget will be 4.8 trillion yen. Furthermore,
the Coast Guard budget will increase 1.9% to 176.5 billion yen, its first expansion in six years –
primarily in response to increased tensions with China over disputed islands. Overall, military
outlays account for approximately 5% of Japan’s budget. In comparison, social spending
accounts for almost 30% and debt servicing requires almost a quarter of the budget. 1119
Japanese defense spending for 2009-2013 is shown in Figure VII.22. According to the IISS, 1120
…[T]he JSDF has only been able to make incremental investments in new capabilities for its ‘dynamic
defence force’ concept. However, with the government promising to protect all of Japan’s seas and
territories, the budget request announced in September 2012 does cover procurements relating to maritime
security and the defence of outlying islands. The MSDF has requested ¥72.3bn (US$912m) for a new 5,000
tonne anti-submarine destroyer; it will buy one extra submarine, and has started procuring the Kawasaki P-
1 maritime patrol aircraft.
The GSDF has announced plans to buy four amphibious assault vehicles (AAV), costing ¥2.5bn (US$32m)
– an acquisition suggesting an attempt to generate an, albeit limited, amphibious assault capability, perhaps
with an eye to any contingency on Japan’s outlying islands. That said, the advanced age of the equipment
and the low numbers could instead indicate that the procurement is designed so that Japan can learn about
amphibious operations. The MoD is further investing around ¥21bn (US$260m) in the creation of a 100-
strong cyber defence force.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 405

Figure VII.22: IISS Assessment of Japanese Defense-Related

Expenditures (in billions of yen), 2009-2012
FY 2009/10 FY 2010/11 FY 2011/12 FY 2012/13
Personnel & Provisions (Percentage of 2,077 (43.5%) 2,285 2,092 2,070
Total) (45.8%) (43.8%) (43.9%)
Equipment Procurement (Percentage of 825 (17.3%) 774 (15.5%) 780 (16.3%) 757 (16.0%)
Total)
Maintenance (Percentage of Total) 1,034 (21.7%) 1,018 1,071 1,106
(20.4%) (22.4%) (23.5%)
Research & Development (Percentage of 120 (2.51%) 159 (3.18%) 85.1 (1.78%) 94.4 (2.0%)
Total)
Other Expenditure
Facility Improvements 133 132 120 100
Base Countermeasures 440 437 434 442
SACO-Related Projects 11.2 16.9 10.1 8.6
US Military Realignment 60.2 90.9 103 60
Other Miscellaneous Outlays 74.4 76 80.9 76.9
Other Expenditure Total (Percentage of 718 (15.0%) 755 (15.1%) 747 (15.6%) 687 (14.6%)
Total)
Total 4,774 4,990 4,775 4,714
Source: IISS, Military Balance 2013, 269.

Russian Military Expenditures and Resources

Russia shares a border with the DPRK and has a history of involvement on the Peninsula – not
the least in supporting the DPRK during the Korean and Cold Wars. In the case of an escalation
on the Peninsula, Russian capacity for military efforts could potentially be important for the
ultimate resolution of any conflict. The CIA describes Russia’s current economic capacity to
support its military efforts as follows: 1121
Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, moving from a globally
isolated, centrally planned economy to a more market-based and globally integrated economy. Economic
reforms in the 1990s privatized most industry, with notable exceptions in the energy and defense-related
sectors. The protection of property rights is still weak and the private sector remains subject to heavy state
interference.
Russian industry is primarily split between globally competitive commodity producers. In 2011, Russia
became the world’s leading oil producer, surpassing Saudi Arabia; Russia is the second-largest producer of
natural gas; Russia holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves, the second-largest coal reserves, and the
eighth-largest crude oil reserves. Russia is also a top exporter of metals such as steel and primary
aluminum. Russia’s reliance on commodity exports makes it vulnerable to boom and bust cycles that
follow the volatile swings in global prices.
The government since 2007 has embarked on an ambitious program to reduce this dependency and build up
the country’s high technology sectors, but with few results so far. The economy had averaged 7% growth in
the decade following the 1998 Russian financial crisis, resulting in a doubling of real disposable incomes
and the emergence of a middle class. The Russian economy, however, was one of the hardest hit by the
406 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

2008-09 global economic crisis as oil prices plummeted and the foreign credits that Russian banks and
firms relied on dried up.
According to the World Bank the government’s anti-crisis package in 2008-09 amounted to roughly 6.7%
of GDP. The economic decline bottomed out in mid-2009 and the economy began to grow in the third
quarter of 2009. High oil prices buoyed Russian growth in 2011-12 and helped Russia reduce the budget
deficit inherited from 2008-09. Russia has reduced unemployment to a record low and has lowered
inflation below double digit rates. Russia joined the World Trade Organization in 2012, which will reduce
trade barriers and help open foreign markets for Russian goods. At the same time, Russia has sought to
cement economic ties with countries in the former Soviet space through a Customs Union with Belarus and
Kazakhstan, and, in the next several years, through a new Russia-led economic bloc called the Eurasian
Union.
Russia has had difficulty attracting capital and has suffered large capital outflows in the past several years,
leading to official programs to improve Russia’s international rankings for its investment climate. Russia’s
long-term challenges also include a shrinking workforce, intractable large- and small-scale corruption, and
underinvestment in infrastructure.
The CIA’s assessment of the Russian economy continued to be bleak, as falling oil prices and
sanctions following Russia military intervention in Ukraine, hurt growth prospects. 1122
Slowly declining oil prices over the past few years and difficulty attracting foreign direct investment have
contributed to a noticeable slowdown in GDP growth rates. In late 2013, the Russian Economic
Development Ministry reduced its growth forecast through 2030 to an average of only 2.5% per year, down
from its previous forecast of 4.0 to 4.2%. In 2014, following Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine,
prospects for economic growth declined further, with expectations that GDP growth could drop as low as
zero.

Russian Military Spending

As is the case with China and North Korea, it is difficult to estimate the true cost of Russian
military efforts since the state can manipulate many costs through its control over given sectors
of the economy, and there is no easy way to compare the price of professional and conscript
forces.
Figure VII.23 shows an IISS estimate of Russian military spending trends over 2005-2015,
which is almost certainly correct in reflecting a high level of growth over the last decade –
although there is no way to know its level of accuracy in terms of the given figure shown or its
comparability to other countries.
Russian defense spending as a share of GDP has been increasing in recent years, due in large part
to the implementation of an ambitions State Armaments Program 2011-2020. It was reported in
one source that Russian military spending rose 16% in 2012. 1123
While the Russian military has not invested much in new equipment since the 1990s, the recent
global financial crisis makes it hard for the military to carry out the necessary modernization.
Contracts for the weapons systems called for in the Program have led to tension between the
Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the defense industry due to the complexity of the process.
The MoD has instituted a policy that primary contractors may have a maximum rate of profit of
20%, while their suppliers cannot charge more than 1%. This rule has led to increased tensions.
It was reported that almost all the major contracts through 2020 had been completed by late
2012. Although the 3-year draft budget had not been completed by late 2012, provisional details
indicate that total military expenditure will be higher than 5% of GDP if military-related
spending in other budget areas is considered, while the national defense share of GDP, without
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 407

other budget chapters included, is likely to increase to almost 3.8%. The IISS also provided the
following supporting assessment of Russia’s defense economics in 2013: 1124
…[B]etween 2006 and 2008 spending under the budget heading ‘National Defence’ (essentially MoD
outlays on personnel, operations, construction, procurement and R&D; the development and production of
nuclear munitions; participation in peacekeeping operations; state programmes of ‘military-technical
cooperation’; and allocations for maintaining the mobilisation preparedness of the economy) was held at
approximately 2.5% of GDP. Following the brief war with Georgia in August 2008, far-reaching military
reforms were launched and it was decided to speed up re-equipment of the forces. In 2009, when Russia
was most severely affected by the global economic crisis, defence spending rose to more than 3% of GDP,
then fell back to 2.8% in 2009 and 2010 as the economy began to recover. But with the start of the new ten-
year state armaments programme, signed off by Medvedev on 31 December 2010, spending began to
increase more rapidly.
The state armaments programme to 2020 was based on an optimistic pre-crisis forecast of annual GDP
growth averaging more than 6%. Total spending under the programme is more than R20tr (US$610bn), of
which more than R19tr is for the armed forces under the MoD, the balance for other forces. Of the total
funding, 31% is to be disbursed during the five years to 2015, 69% during 2015–20. Whereas the preceding
armaments programme to 2015 allocated sizeable shares of funding to R&D and the modernisation and
repair of existing arms, the current programme prioritises procurement of new weapons and other military
hardware. There is also a parallel ten-year targeted federal programme to develop the defence industry,
with total allocated funding to 2020 – not all from the budget – of R3t (more than US$90bn). This is
intended to improve production capacities deemed essential for the manufacture of a new generation of
armaments….
Economic challenges continued to constrain Russian defense spending in 2014: 1125
The country’s political and military leadership have shown considerable continued commitment to the
ambitious State Armaments Programme to 2020, notwithstanding faltering economic performance.
Spending on the programme is now nearly half of all expenditure under the ‘National Defence’ budget
chapter, compared with less than one-third in 2005. The optimistic economic forecasts on which the
programme was originally based – average annual GDP growth of at least 6% – have not been achieved.
Instead, economic growth has slowed, from 4.3% in 2011 (the first year of the programme’s
implementation) to barely 2% in 2013. Consequently, the government has had little choice but to alter its
budgetary priorities to permit a steadily growing share of defence spending as a proportion of GDP. This is
now projected to rise from 2.72% of GDP in 2011 to 3.15% in 2013 (see Table 4). The draft three-year
budget for 2014–16, sent to the Duma at the end of September 2013, envisaged that this share would
eventually rise to 3.9% of GDP by 2016, with a significant ramping up of real defence spending over the
2012–15 period. To fund the programme, the authorities have resorted increasingly to state-guaranteed
credits. This is, in effect, a non-budgetary means of increasing spending, although the finance ministry has
indicated that there will be no new credits after 2015.
Furthermore, Russia is working to rebuild the capacity of its defense industry for both domestic
supply and international export. An IISS estimate of Russian arms procurement trends can be
seen in Figure VII.24, showing that Russia is both increasing its military capabilities in Asia and
overall capacity to support its military efforts. Although the domestic defense industry is running
into problems with investment, old equipment, worker shortage and skills, quality, reliability,
and cost, the industry is working to solve these issues. 1126
Some of the domestic defense industry’s new projects seem to have been successful (i.e., the
Yars (RS-24/SS-X-29) ICBM and the Lainer (R-29RMU2) submarine-launched missile), while
others have not gone as well. The Borei class strategic submarine’s new Bulava missile had not
completed testing as of late 2012, meaning that the entry to service of the first two boats could be
delayed to 2013. A fifth-generation fighter (T-50) prototype remains in development, though
three aircraft are currently being tested; the third includes an active electronically scanned array
408 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

radar. The Air Force plans to procure 60 aircraft based on the T-50 over the 2016-2020 period.
Russian domestic ability to design and produce UAVs is still uncertain; recently the country has
twice bought Israeli UAVs to use for trials and Russia is now assembling them under license at a
domestic factory. There are two projects to develop a new strike UAV under development, with
the government having announced that it would allocate R400 billion to these projects. 1127
Russia is also investing in imported weapons systems such as “the Mistral amphibious assault
vessel, the first of which is now under construction in France, and the Rys (Iveco LMV M65)
armored vehicle, now being built at Voronezh under license, with an initial order for over
3,000.” But 2014 was a problematic year for Russia’s high-profile order of two Mistral-class
amphibious assault ships from France. After Russian involvement in Ukraine and its separatist
movement, France suspended the delivery of the ships indefinitely. 1128
At the same time, government policymakers have indicated that Russia does not have any
intention of becoming a significant arms importer, instead increasing domestic development at
the same time: 1129
…[The] volume of new arms procurement, especially of aircraft, is now increasing steadily although still
modest in scale. In 2011, the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, which oversees arms
exports, reported record post-Soviet deliveries of US$13.2bn (compared to US$10.4bn in 2010) and has
confidently forecast a similar volume of sales in 2012. However, these data need to be treated with some
caution, as annual totals do not refer only to arms transfers. Thus, the Federal Service for Military-
Technical Cooperation has revealed that the export of end-product weapons represents around 60% of the
total, systems and components around 20%, and spares 10%, leaving another 10% for various military
services. Recent developments suggest that a slowdown, or even contraction, of Russian arms sales is now
possible. Major orders have been lost, for example air-defence systems to Libya and Iran, and new
contracts with Syria must be in doubt, though new orders were announced with Iraq in 2012. Sales to
Algeria, Venezuela and Vietnam have helped maintain overall export volumes….
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 409

Figure VII.23: Russian National Defense Expenditure Trends,

2005-2015
Year GDP (R Real GDP National Defense Percent Change in National Defense
billion) Change (%) Expenditure (R Real Defense as a Percentage
billion) Expenditure (%) of GDP (%)
2005 21,610 6.4 581.14 13.3 2.69
2006 26,917 8.2 681.80 1.8 2.53
2007 33,248 8.5 831.88 7.2 2.50
2008 41,277 5.2 1040.86 6.0 2.52
2009 38,807 -7.1 1188.17 12.0 3.06
2010 45,173 4.2 1276.51 -3.6 2.83
2011 54,586 4.3 1515.96 2.4 2.78
2012 61,238 3.5 1864.15 13.4 3.04
2013 66,515 3.7 2345.70 20.2 3.53
2014 73,993 4.3 2771.60 10.7 3.75
2015 82,937 4.3 2864.70 -3.7 3.45
Source: IISS, Military Balance 2013, 206.

Figure VII.24: Russian Arms Procurement (2010-2012) and

Approximate State Armaments Program 2020 Objectives
2010 2011 2012 2020
Planned Actual Planned Actual Planned Actual
ICBMs 30 27 36 30 -- -- 400+
Military Satellites 11 6 5 2 -- -- 100+
Fixed-wing Aircraft 28 23 35 28 58 -- 600+
Helicopters -- 37 109 82 124 -- 1100+
S-400 Air Defense -- -- 2 2 2 2 56
Systems
(Divisions)
Strategic Nuclear 2 0 2 0 2 -- 8
Submarines
Multi-role Nuclear 1 0 1 0 1 -- 7
Submarines (estimated)
Surface Combat -- 0 6 2 5 -- 50+
Ships (estimated)
Tanks 61 61 0 0 0 0 2300+
Note: “--” indicates insufficient data
Source: IISS, Military Balance 2013, 207.
410 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

VIII. US Forces in Korea and the Pacific

As has been discussed in Chapter I, US forces serve a variety of roles in aiding the ROK. The US
plays a critical role in a wide range of scenarios ranging from limited DPRK probes to all-out
war. In peacetime, they act as a tripwire in case of DPRK aggression. The ROK military also
relies heavily on US capabilities in several areas, such as military intelligence – in particular,
signals and imagery intelligence and analysis. US presence allows the ROK to counterbalance
pressure and deter potential military intervention from nearby major powers, such as China or
Japan, in the event of DPRK collapse and/or Korean reunification. Finally, US forces have also
contributed to ROK economic development by reassuring foreign countries and investors that the
ROK is a stable country. 1130 The US can also offer the ROK extended deterrence in the face of
DPRK nuclear and missile threat.
The US Forces Korea (USFK) described their mission as follows in a 2010 report, 1131
Our mission remains to deter North Korean provocations and aggression and, if deterrence fails, to fight
and win. We accomplish our mission with forward-stationed, agile, well-trained forces on the Korean
peninsula, ready to fight tonight and defeat aggression side by side with our Korean allies… Should our
deterrence options fail, we are prepared to defeat any aggression against the ROK.

USFK-ROK History
The United States has long seen the ROK as a critical ally; the US also has legal obligations to
the country under UN Security Council Resolutions passed in 1950 that make the US the head of
the United Nations Command, as well as under the ROK-US Mutual Security Agreement of
1954, which committed both nations to assist each other in case of attack from outside forces.
The US is part of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) established in 1978. At that
time, the lead role for defense and control of the ROK forces was transferred from the UN to the
CFC. ROK and US national command authorities give guidance and direction to the CFC
Commander through a bilateral Military Committee Meeting and a Security Consultative
Meeting.
The Commander of USFK serves as Commander-in-Chief of both the UN Command
(CINCUNC) and the CFC and is responsible for maintaining the armistice agreement that
suspended the Korean War on July 27, 1953. Figure VIII.1 provides a graphic representation of
how the ROK-US alliance has progressed.
In 1994, armistice control of ROK military forces was returned to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff,
though the US retained operational control in the event of armed conflict. Armistice control
includes the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff taking responsibility for organizing, training, equipping,
and operating ROK military forces, as well as controlling daily defensive land, sea, and air
missions.
In 2003, the US and ROK agreed to a realignment of US forces from the center and north of
Seoul to south of the city. The two countries also agreed to a dismantlement of the US-ROK
CFC and a transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff
by April 2012, though this was pushed back to 2015 and subsequently reevaluated to allow the
transition to happen based on certain conditions met by both countries.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 411

At a US-ROK summit meeting in June 2009, the two countries announced the “Joint Vision for
the Alliance of the United States of America and Republic of Korea,” which promoted the
evolution of the alliance through an expansion of the territorial scope and a widening of the
partnership into non-military areas.
Figure VIII.1: The ROK-US Alliance

Source: US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 9.

The Current Status of the USFK-ROK Alliance

After new DPRK military provocations in 2010, OPCON transfer was delayed to December 1,
2015. This will result in a change from the current “joint defense system” to a situation of ROK
forces leading and US forces supporting, especially in key capability areas. Reasons given by the
ROK Ministry of National Defense for the delay were: 1132
(1) The change of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula, including an increase in
military threats from North Korea.
(2) A time of leadership change in and around the Korean Peninsula, including the
presidential election of the Republic of Korea; and
(3) Public demand, noting the necessity to adjust the period of the transfer, and the reflection
of financial conditions necessary to fulfill future military capabilities.
A joint statement resulting from the October 2010 42nd Security Consultative Meeting described
guidelines for US-ROK defense cooperation. The US-ROK Strategic Alliance 2015, a
framework for OPCON transfer, was also signed at this time.1133 It plans for synchronized and
enabling initiatives to enhance ROK capabilities to take over OPCON for a smooth transition in
the combined defense of the ROK: 1134
412 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The key elements of Strategic Alliance 2015 consist of the following: refining and improving our combined
ROK-U.S. defense plans, defining and developing new organizational structures required for the ROK to
lead the war effort, implementing more realistic exercises based on the North Korea of today and the future,
preparing for the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in late 2015, and
consolidating U.S. military units within the two enduring hubs as part of the Yongsan Relocation Program
and Land Partnership Program. United Nations Command will continue to enforce and maintain the
Armistice Agreement even after the full implementation of SA 2015.
The goal of all ROK and U.S. Alliance initiatives, as laid out in the plan, is to build adaptive capabilities to
deter and defeat future provocations and fight and win on the peninsula, should deterrence fail.
In terms of organizational structure and command and control, United States Forces Korea will become the
United States Korea Command, or U.S. KORCOM, providing the necessary manpower for the command’s
supporting relationship to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The KORCOM commander will maintain operational control of United States military forces and the ROK
JCS Chairman retains full operational control of the ROK military forces. The ROK and U.S. national
commands will function in a doctrinally supporting to supported relationship with ROK JCS in the lead.
The Republic of Korea will continue to strengthen and reinforce its intelligence, operations planning and
execution, and joint battlefield management capabilities. The operational control transition time-line
provides the Republic of Korea the time needed to field many critical, organic systems in their internal
defense reform plan that will enable them to lead the war effort.
Strategic Alliance 2015 also provides renewed focus on ensuring realistic training that fully takes into
account the current threat environment.
This was the driving focus in planning the recent annual Ulchi Freedom Guardian 2010 exercise,
demonstrating the ROK and U.S. militaries are ready to address the full range of North Korean actions and
provocations. Finally, the plan better synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts, such as the relocation of
U.S. forces in Korea, to ensure all ongoing initiatives are aligned and mutually supportive.
The new bilateral plan reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the ROK and the region and ensures both nations
are prepared to swiftly counter, deter, and defeat any North Korean provocations and aggression. This
Strategic Alliance 2015 plan continues to build an even stronger ROK-U.S. partnership and alliance.
The two countries also agreed to an Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) to
institutionalize deterrence cooperation in October of 2010. In October 2011, the two countries
drew up a “South Korea-United States Counter Provocation Plan,” in which both “agreed to
develop ‘combined readiness capabilities’ along South Korea’s disputed maritime border with
North Korea, the Northern Limit Line (NLL). It was agreed that a new consultative body called
the Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD) would be established to oversee
collaboration efforts between the US and South Korea” – including the EDPC, the Security
Policy initiative, and the Strategic Alliance 2015 Working Group. 1135
In November 2011, the EDPC held a tabletop strategy exercise and further discussed a counter-
provocation agreement in January 2012. At the first KIDD meeting in April 2012, the two
countries’ militaries discussed operational scenarios for possible DPRK nuclear attacks. Bilateral
security exercises – like Foal Eagle and Key Resolve – continued, with Max Thunder held in
May 2012; it was the largest air defense exercise to date, including 60 military aircraft. Also, the
ROK has been participating in US missile defense exercises for years and is working to develop
its own missile defense system by 2015. 1136 The US has also committed to “providing specific
bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities, and to contribute to
enduring capabilities for the life of the Alliance.” 1137
The most recent KIDD was in Washington, DC, from February 21-22, 2013: 1138
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 413

The KIDD comprised the executive meeting, the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), the Strategic Alliance
2015 Working Group (SAWG), and the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC). Over the course
of the two-day KIDD, ROK Deputy Minister for Policy Lim, Kwan-bin met with Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy James Miller, Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Mark Lippert, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Helvey. The key results and significance of the
meetings are as follows:
• The ROK and the U.S. agreed to enhance collaboration for deterrence and mutual response against
North Korean nuclear threats.
• The ROK and the U.S. defined the North Korean nuclear test as a serious act of provocation and
agreed to strengthen tailored deterrence for each nuclear situation.
• Alliance issues such as the USFK base relocation are on track.
• The ROK and the U.S. will continue to develop a future-oriented strategic alliance in
commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the Alliance
In the course of OPCON transition, ROK forces have gradually assumed responsibility for an
increasing number of mission areas previously undertaken by US forces, including: 1139
…front-line control along the DMZ and control of the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom, maritime
counter-infiltration operations, rapid mine-laying, search and rescue, rear-area chemical and biological
decontamination, military police operations and battlefield counter-battery artillery operations.
Despite speculation that the DPRK’s early 2013 provocations would lead to another delay in
OPCON transfer, on April 22, 2013, the ROK Defense Ministry reaffirmed its commitment to
keep to the scheduled 2015 transfer. The US Eighth Army commander, Lt. General John
Johnson, also reaffirmed that OPCON transfer preparations were on track and that the US would
help deter DPRK aggression even after the ROK takes control. At the same time, public opinion
is increasingly supporting a delay in the process. 1140
The tensions between the ROK and DPRK also led to a new US emphasis on the US-ROK
alliance in the spring of 2013. Presidents Obama and Park both cited the strength of the US-ROK
alliance at a joint press conference in Washington on May 7, 2013 and provided clear statements
of each country’s policies regarding the DPRK.
President Obama stated, 1141
President Park, in your first months in office South Korea has faced threats and provocations that would
test any nation. Yet you’ve displayed calm and steady resolve that has defined your life. Like people
around the world, those of us in the United States have also been inspired by your example as the first
female President of South Korea. And today I’ve come to appreciate the leadership qualities for which you
are known—your focus and discipline and straight-forwardness. And I very much thank you for the
progress that we’ve already made together.
Today… We agreed to continue modernizing our security alliance. Guided by our joint vision, we’re
investing in the shared capabilities and technologies and missile defenses that allow our forces to operate
and succeed together. We are on track for South Korea to assume operational control for the alliance in
2015. And we’re determined to be fully prepared for any challenge or threat to our security. And obviously
that includes the threat from North Korea.
If Pyongyang thought its recent threats would drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States, or
somehow garner the North international respect, today is further evidence that North Korea has failed
again. President Park and South Koreans have stood firm, with confidence and resolve. The United States
and the Republic of Korea are as united as ever. And faced with new international sanctions, North Korea
is more isolated than ever. In short, the days when North Korea could create a crisis and elicit
concessions—those days are over.
414 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Our two nations are prepared to engage with North Korea diplomatically and, over time, build trust. But as
always -- and as President Park has made clear -- the burden is on Pyongyang to take meaningful steps to
abide by its commitments and obligations, particularly the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
And we discussed that Pyongyang should take notice of events in countries like Burma, which, as it
reforms, is seeing more trade and investment and diplomatic ties with the world, including the United
States and South Korea.
For our part, we’ll continue to coordinate closely with South Korea and with Japan. And I want to make
clear the United States is fully prepared and capable of defending ourselves and our allies with the full
range of capabilities available, including the deterrence provided by our conventional and nuclear forces.
As I said in Seoul last year, the commitment of the United States to the security of the Republic of Korea
will never waver.
More broadly, we agreed to continue expanding our cooperation globally. In Afghanistan -- where our
troops serve together and where South Korea is a major donor of development assistance -- we’re on track
to complete the transition to Afghan-led operations by the end of next year. We discussed Syria, where both
our nations are working to strengthen the opposition and plan for a Syria without Bashar Assad. And I’m
pleased that our two nations -- and our Peace Corps -- have agreed to expand our efforts to promote
development around the world.
…President Park and myself very much share the view that we are going to maintain a strong deterrent
capability; that we’re not going to reward provocative behavior. But we remain open to the prospect of
North Korea taking a peaceful path of denuclearization, abiding by international commitments, rejoining
the international community, and seeing a gradual progression in which both security and prosperity for the
people of North Korea can be achieved.
If what North Korea has been doing has not resulted in a strong, prosperous nation, then now is a good time
for Kim Jong-un to evaluate that history and take a different path. And I think that, should he choose to
take a different path, not only President Park and myself would welcome it, but the international
community as a whole would welcome it.
And I think that China and Russia and Japan and other key players that have been participants in Six-Party
talks have made that clear. But there’s going to have to be changes in behavior. We have an expression in
English: Don’t worry about what I say; watch what I do. And so far at least, we haven’t seen actions on the
part of the North Koreans that would indicate they’re prepared to move in a different direction.
President Park replied, 1142
First of all, the President and I shared the view that the Korea-U.S. alliance has been faithfully carrying out
its role as a bulwark of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and that the
alliance should continue to serve as a linchpin for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia.
In this regard, I believe it is significant that the joint declaration on the 60th anniversary of our alliance we
adopted spells out the direction that our comprehensive strategic alliance should take.
Next, the President and I reaffirmed that we will by no means tolerate North Korea’s threats and
provocations, which have recently been escalating further, and that such actions would only deepen North
Korea’s isolation. The President and I noted that it is important that we continue to strengthen our
deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear and conventional weapons threat, and shared the view that in this
respect, the transition of wartime operational control should also proceed in a way that strengthens our
combined defense capabilities and preparations being made toward that way as well.
We also shared the view that realizing President Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons
should start on the Korean Peninsula and we stated that we would continue to strongly urge North Korea, in
close concert with the other members of the Six-Party talks and the international community, to faithfully
abide by its international obligations under the September 19th Joint Statement and the relevant Security
Council resolutions.
Korea and the U.S. will work jointly to induce North Korea to make the right choice through multifaceted
efforts, including the implementation of the Korean Peninsula trust-building process that I had spelled out.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 415

I take this opportunity to once again send a clear message: North Korea will not be able to survive if it only
clings to developing its nuclear weapons at the expense of its people’s happiness. Concurrently pursuing
nuclear arsenals and economic development can by no means succeed.
This is the shared view of the view of the other members of the Six-Party talks and the international
community. However, should North Korea choose the path to becoming a responsible member of the
community of nations, we are willing to provide assistance, together with the international community.
The President and I also had in-depth discussions on ways to enhance our global partnership. First, we
noted together that Northeast Asia needs to move beyond conflict and divisions and open a new era of
peace and cooperation, and that there would be synergy between President’s Obama’s policy of rebalancing
to Asia and my initiative for peace and cooperation in Northeast Asia as we pursue peace and development
in the region. We shared the view about playing the role of co-architects to flesh out this vision.
Furthermore, we decided that the Korea-U.S. alliance should deal not just with challenges relating to the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, but confronting the broader international community.
…recently North Korea seems to be deescalating its threats and provocations -- what seems to be behind
that? You asked these two questions. In fact, North Korea is isolated at the moment, so it’s hard to find
anyone that could really accurately fathom the situation in North Korea. Its actions are all so very
unpredictable. Hence, whether the Syrian situation would have an impact is hard to say for sure.
Why is North Korea appearing to deescalate its threats and provocations? There’s no knowing for sure. But
what is clear and what I believe for sure is that the international community with regard to North Korea’s
bad behavior, its provocations, must speak with one voice -- a firm message, and consistently send a firm
message that they will not stand, and that North Korea’s actions in breach of international norms will be
met with so-and-so sanctions and measures by the international community. At the same time, if it goes
along the right way, there will be so-and-so rewards. So if we consistently send that message to North
Korea, I feel that North Korea will be left with no choice but to change.
And instead of just hoping to see North Korea change, the international community must also consistently
send that message with one voice to tell them and communicate to them that they have no choice but to
change, and to shape an environment where they are left with no choice but to make the strategic decision
to change. And I think that’s the effective and important way.
With regard to the North Korea issue, Korea and the United States, as well as the international
community—the ultimate objective that all of us should be adopting is for North Korea to abandon its
nuclear weapons and to induce it to become a responsible member of the international community. This
serves the interest of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the world, and it also serves the interest of North
Korea’s own development as well. That is my view.
And so, in order to encourage North Korea to walk that path and change its perceptions, we have to work in
concert. And in this regard, China’s role, China’s influence can be extensive, so China taking part in these
endeavors is important. And we shared views on that.
With regard to China and Russia’s stance, I believe that China and Russia -- not to mention the
international community, of course -- share the need for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and are
cooperating closely to induce North Korea to take the right path. In the case of China, with regard to North
Korea’s missile fire and nuclear testing, China has taken an active part in adopting U.N. Security Council
resolutions and is faithfully implementing those resolutions.
And with regard to Russia, Russia is also firmly committed to the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. And with regard to the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea, it has
been very active in supporting them. And they’ve also worked very hard to include a stern message to
North Korea in the joint statement of the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting. Such constructive efforts on the
part of China and Russia are vital to sending a unified message to North Korea that their nuclear weapons
will not stand, and encouraging and urging North Korea to make the right decision.
…If North Korea engages in provocations, I will fully trust the judgment of our military. So if our military
makes a judgment which they feel is the right thing, then they should act accordingly. And this is the
instruction that I had made.
416 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

And North Korea has to pay a price when it comes not only with regard to provocations, but also with
regard to the recent Kaesong industrial complex issue, where, based on agreements between the two sides,
companies had believed in the agreement that was made and actually went to invest in the Kaesong
industrial complex, but they suddenly completely dismissed and disregarded this agreement overnight, and
denied various medical supplies and food supplies to Korean citizens left in that industrial complex,
refusing to accept our request to allow in those supplies, which is what prompted us to withdraw all of our
citizens from that park. This situation unfolded in the full view of the international community.
So who would invest, not to mention Korean companies, but also companies of other countries, who would
invest in North Korea in a place that shows such flagrant disregard for agreements, and how could they,
under those circumstances, actually pull off economic achievement? So I think in this regard, they’re
actually paying the price for their own misdeeds.
These close US and ROK relations at the official level have not always been mirrored at the
popular level, but much depends on the circumstances at the time. Korean popular attitudes
towards the US have been mixed, and much depends on the poll being referenced. The ROK’s
Asan Institute conducted a 2012 poll that showed that 94% of South Koreans supported the US-
ROK alliance, only 67% supported a long-term US military presence, and just 57% had a
favorable overall view of the US. In addition, only 40% thought that the US took ROK interests
into proper consideration when making international policy disputes, and 19% thought that the
US had taken a fair position during ROK-Japan territorial disputes in late 2012. 1143
A Pew poll at a time of crisis in ROK-DPRK relations in April 2013 found that some 78% of
South Koreans had a favorable opinion of the US and confidence in President Obama’s
leadership – almost double Obama’s approval rating in the US (45%) – and that this percent had
not changed since President Obama took office in 2009. This is compared with a 70% favorable
opinion at the end of President George W. Bush’s second term, in itself a large increase from
only 46% after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 1144
Polls of American attitudes towards the ROK also vary, depending in part on the level of US
tension with the DPRK at the time. One March 2013 poll found that 21% of Americans believed
that the DPRK was not a threat, and only 41% hold a favorable view of the ROK – the same
percentage as has a favorable view of China. 1145 Another Gallup poll in April 2013 found that
the majority of Americans (55%) said the United States should use its military forces to help
defend the South, while only 34% said the U.S. should not do so. 1146
These results must be interpreted in light of the fact that only 7 of 10 Americans said they
followed the development of issues in the Koreas. While 43% said it was likely the ROK and
DPRK might have a clash or conflict in the next six months, 44% said it was not likely.
Moreover, an earlier poll had found that 83% of Americans saw the DPRK’s nuclear efforts as a
threat, even though the poll was taken shortly before the DPRK’s third test. 1147 A Pew poll in
May 2013 found that 36% of Americans were following the news on the Koreas “very closely” –
and 56% saying the US should take the threat “very seriously.” But these attitudes appear to be
largely because 47% of Americans thought the DPRK could already launch a nuclear missile at
targets in the US – a threat that does not actually exist. 1148
In practice, public opinion polls on national security issues often do more to reflect the fact no
current action is being debated or called for at a senior political level than provide insight into
the strength of an alliance in a crisis.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 417

US Forces in Korea
The major US force elements now stationed in Korea include the Eighth US Army, US Air
Forces Korea (Seventh Air Force), and US Naval Forces Korea. At one point the US occupied
some 85 active installations in the ROK, but it has cut its total military manning by over a third
from about 44,200 personnel in 1990 and 36,300 personnel in 2000 to the current agreed force
level of 28,500. US Army forces in the ROK are under the Eight US Army. The only combat
formation remaining in the ROK is the 2nd Infantry Division, with one infantry Brigade Combat
Team and an aviation brigade. 1149
Figure VIII.2 shows a brief Japanese estimate of how the forces the US still maintains in the
ROK compare with those of the DPRK and the ROK. As has been noted previously, the Japanese
data provides a useful estimate of how small the US forces in the ROK now are and shows that
they have been reduced to a size that is largely demonstrative, providing a basis for rapid US
power projection as well as a de facto trigger force in the face of a major DPRK attack.
As has been noted in the previous chapters, the US does not announce the details of its current
equipment holdings in the ROK, nor does the IISS provide this information. Global Security
estimates that US equipment now includes some 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored
vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs as well as a wide range of surface-to-
surface and surface-to-air missiles (i.e., Patriot), and 70 AH-64 helicopters. 1150 These estimates
seem dated and may exaggerate some aspects of the equipment in active US forces.
Global Security also estimated that US Air Forces Korea possessed approximately 100 aircraft:
advanced fighters, (i.e., 70 F-16s), 20 A-10 anti-tank attack planes, various types of intelligence-
collecting and reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s, and the newest transport aircraft. This
number may not reflect recent force cuts, and the Japanese estimate of 60 US combat aircraft
(including 40 modern F-16s) seems more correct. Of course, if necessary, US air strength could
be rapidly reinforced by the Seventh Fleet and the Seventh Air Force Command. 1151
ROK Ministry of Defense estimates of US equipment in Korea are shown in Figure VIII.3. A
recent Brookings report, shown in Figure VIII.4, also provides an estimate of US military
resources, with numbers similar to the Japanese figures. The report’s brief comparison of US-
ROK forces with DPRK forces is given in Figure VIII.5.
US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea are
small headquarters and power projection support elements in peacetime. However, the US
Pacific Command (USPACOM) can rapidly provide reinforcements. Depending on how a crisis
unfolds in Korea, the US reinforced forces will act according to either the Flexible Deterrence
Option (FDO) or the Force Module Package (FMP). 1152 The FDO is the diplomatic, intelligence,
military, and economic option to be implemented for the purpose of deterring war – should it
appear imminent. The FMP refers to the major combat units and support units that will be
reinforced in the early phase of a war. Included in the FMP reinforcements are major forces, such
as immediate deployment of aircraft and the aircraft carrier battle group.
418 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VIII.2: Japanese Estimates of US, ROK, and DPRK Forces

in the Korean Peninsula

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 14.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 419

Figure VIII.3: ROK Reporting on Major Organizations and

Assets of the USFK

Source: The Republic of Korea Armed Forces, “Innovation Makes Us Powerful,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010, 27.
420 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VIII.4: American Military Assets in the ROK

Asset Number
Army troops ~18000
Air Force troops ~8400
U-2r [Aircraft] 3
F-16 [Aircraft] 60
A-10 [Aircraft] 21
AH-64 D Apache [Helicopter] 24
M2A1 Bradley IFV [Tank] 66
M1A2 Abrams [Tank] 48
M109 SP Howitzer [Artillery] 16
Stryker [Armored Fighting Vehicle] 900

Source: Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American
Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” Brookings, September 23, 2012.

Figure VIII.5: A Comparison of ROK, Combined US-ROK, and

DPRK Military Assets

Platform ROK Total ROK-US 1153 DPRK Total

Total
Multirole Fighters 400 686 74
Ground Attack and Bombers 70 103 162
Attack Helicopters 60 94 20
Main Battle Tank 2,414 2,483 3,500
Armored Combat Vehicle 220 1,163 2,500
Expeditionary/Fighting Vehicles 2,850 2,912 560
Towed and Self-Propelled Artillery 11,038 11,108 21,000
Source: Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for American
Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” Brookings, September 23, 2012.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 421

Comparative Capabilities
General Walter L. Sharp, former Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK, provided the following
overview of the capabilities of DPRK and US-ROK forces, as well as the ongoing US force
changes, in a speech to the East Asia Institute on July 9, 2010: 1154
…2010 has proven to be a very fast paced year. I’d like to begin our discussion today by sharing with you
three things which I think greatly influence and impact our efforts: First, the North Korean threat, second,
the North Korean attack on the Cheonan, and third, our combined transformation efforts.
First, North Korea poses a serious asymmetric threat to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. While the
responsible nations of the world are looking to reduce their weapons of mass destruction, North Korea is
continuing its development of these weapons systems and their delivery vehicles. Clearly this is a
dangerous situation, not just for the United States, not just for the Republic of Korea, but also for the entire
region.
Another unconventional threat posed by North Korea is in the size and disposition of their special
operations forces. Even in armistice, North Korea has displayed the willingness to use these forces. The
threats of the North Korean forces have shown themselves in their attack on the Cheonan, and the
assassination team targeting the senior most individual to have defected from North Korea.
North Korea also continues to build their conventional capabilities and threaten their use as a means to
manipulate the world community. One of North Korea’s largest capabilities, in terms of quantity and
disposition, exists in the form of artillery and missile forces. This poses an asymmetric threat, one that
holds at risk the capital of one of the world’s most important economies right here in Seoul.
While North Korea remains a potent military threat, they do not have the ability to reunify the peninsula by
force. However, as demonstrated by the attack on the Cheonan and the asymmetric aspects of the North
Korean threat that I discussed earlier, this merely changes the nature of the threat and how we are prepared
to deter and defeat it. Let me be clear, by no means does North Korea’s inability to reunify the peninsula by
force equate to an absence of a serious military threat. Rather, North Korea maintains a range of
capabilities to engage in provocations. However these provocations and North Korea’s irresponsible
behavior in the international arena to include events such as the continued oppression of its own people, the
seizure of ROK assets at the Mt. Kumgang Resort, the sinking of the Cheonan, and the development of
nuclear capabilities have significantly eroded their ability to effectively use other means to exercise
national power in the region.
With very few diplomatic, informational, and economic options available, North Korea is forced to rely
almost exclusively on military instruments when it decides to engage in provocations and we must
therefore be ever vigilant.
Sun Tzu once said, “Thus the highest form of generalship is to attack the enemy’s strategy; the next best is
to attack his alliances; the next, in order, is to attack the enemy’s army in the field…” More so than ever
before, North Korea knows that they cannot defeat our strong and well prepared armies, air forces, navies,
and marines, so they are now attacking us in other ways.
…However, the ROK-US Alliance needs more from the entire international community and all countries in
the region, in particular China, to work with us in responding to North Korean provocations. We strongly
desire Chinese cooperation in addressing North Korea’s aggressive behavior, and in particular would
welcome Chinese action, even if behind the scenes, to assist in convincing North Korea that its path to
security and prosperity lies in stopping its provocative behavior, better relations with its neighbors, and
complete, irreversible denuclearization.
It is important that we be willing to have detailed discussions with the Chinese about interests related to the
Korean peninsula. I believe it is safe to say that the US and ROK are willing and eager to engage in
discussions about each of our interests. We hope that China will do the same. The more we can talk and
reach a common understanding about regional security challenges, the better we are able to maintain
stability and prosperity in this region. America’s five bilateral treaty alliances in Asia have long
underpinned regional stability and prosperity. In Northeast Asia, our relationships with Korea and Japan
422 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

serve as a foundation for American efforts to provide regional stability and prosperity. We look forward to
the continued strengthening of these Alliances and the contributions that they make to the region.
I would now like to spend a little bit of time discussing where the ROK-US Alliance is heading in the next
few years. From what I mentioned earlier, it is clear that North Korea has increased their efforts to attack
our Alliance and our strategic objectives. In addition, the security environment requires that we continue to
prepare for any possible threats. To do this, we are continuing to strengthen the Alliance through our
ongoing transformation initiatives. We will first demonstrate to the North Koreans that our Alliance and
our collective Armed Forces remain strong and cannot be broken. Secondly, we will continue to modify our
strategy to create adaptive, agile plans and combat forces that can anticipate and defeat our enemy’s
provocations, deter aggression, and if deterrence fails, to fight and win.
The decision to delay the transition of wartime operational control until late 2015, as announced by
President Lee and President Obama at last weekend’s G-20 meeting in Toronto, Canada, demonstrates the
strength and agility of this Alliance. Although the ROK and US militaries were on track for OPCON
transition in 2012, this adjustment will provide us with additional time to look at OPCON in a broader
construct and to further synchronize the various Alliance initiatives and focus on meeting the established
timelines for these initiatives. It also allows us to ensure each of the initiatives are mutually supportive and
that they collectively support the Joint Vision Statement signed by President Lee and President Obama in
2009.
We will proceed very rapidly to develop a new OPCON Transition plan. This new plan, a plan for the
Alliance of 2015, will help align all of our transformation initiatives we have worked on. It will truly be an
overarching plan for the Alliance of 2015. Detailed discussion will start at this month’s 2+2 talks here in
Seoul and be approved at the autumn Security Consultative Meeting between the Secretary of Defense and
the Minister of Defense.
The goal of all of our ROK and US transformation efforts is to build adaptive capabilities to deter and
defeat any future provocations and to fight and win on the peninsula if this deterrence fails. Transformation
efforts consist of the preparation for the transfer of Wartime Operational Control; refining and improving
our combined plans; the definition and development of new organizational structures and command and
control relationships; the procurement, and integration of Republic of Korea capabilities to lead the
warfight; more realistic training based on the North Korean threat of today and the future, as well as
continued support for exercises and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations in the region; the
consolidation of US military units into two enduring hubs; and lastly, tour normalization for US forces here
in Korea.
Let me talk briefly about each of these elements, because these are the elements we will synchronize
between now and 2015. To move to the Alliance of 2015, we will seek to better align in our planning
efforts. We are taking the opportunity to review our plans and ensure they are realistic based upon the full
scale of possible scenarios. This includes North Korean provocations, instability, or full-scale war on the
peninsula. We will also ensure that our plans properly address the KORCOM to ROK JCS supporting to
supported command and control structures. By doing so, we will ensure that we have the correct and most
up-to-date plans in place to guarantee security and stability in the region.
Next, we will be continuing our transformation efforts in the areas of organizational structure and
command and control. US Forces Korea will become the United States Korea Command or US KORCOM,
providing the necessary manpower for our supporting relationship with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a
result of the OPCON transition, the KORCOM staff will be dual-hatted as Combined Forces Command,
much the same way the US Forces Korea staff is dual hated in CFC
At the same time the United States is transforming our organizational structures, the ROK will also
continue to strengthen and build on the “JCS centric operational execution system” which will ensure and
reinforce its intelligence, operations planning and execution and joint battlefield management capabilities.
The Republic of Korea JCS is developing the command and control systems capable of real time battlefield
management and enhanced warning and target acquisition. In turn, the ROK Army is transforming its
forces and creating a Ground Forces Operations Command. This command will be stood up a certified by
2015 before OPCON transition takes place.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 423

In support of their planned defense reform, the ROK is already undergoing a process of procuring
equipment, and training and organizing forces to lead the warfight. Until these capabilities exist, the United
States will provide the agreed upon bridging and enduring capabilities. If OPCON transition had occurred
in 2012, ROK forces would have had to rely on some US bridging capabilities, but by adjusting OPCON
transition to 2015, the Republic of Korea will have time to field many of the critical organic systems in
their Defense Reform plan that will enable them to lead the warfight.
The new Alliance 2015 plan improves our overall readiness by allowing time for these key war- fighting
headquarters to be established and the Republic of Korea to acquire critical Command and Control systems
and capabilities. The final hand off of wartime Operational Control will be smoother and the end result will
be better command and control of Alliance forces. The Strategic Alliance plan for 2015 also gives us the
ability to better synchronize and improve our exercises…more robust and realistic exercises that will be
based on the North Korean threat of today and the future.
…The decision to adjust OPCON transition also allows us to synchronize the movement of US forces on
the peninsula. Currently, US forces are undergoing two major infrastructure moves as part of this
transformation. The major southward moves to US Army Garrison-Humphreys will begin in 2012 and will
accomplish several goals. First, the relocation allows the United States to give back land, including the
Yongsan Garrison here in Seoul, back to the Republic of Korea. Second, it allows for a consolidation of US
forces into two hubs and will reduce the KORCOM footprint from 110 installations down to 48. The
KORCOM headquarters will remain at in Seoul until after the OPCON transition is complete. These two
milestones are synchronized with the rest of the strategic Alliance plan for 2015, and will greatly increase
KORCOM’s ability to command and control US forces and support Korean forces.
The US is committed to ensuring all elements of the new Alliance plan are in place to facilitate its
completion by late 2015. We are also reaffirming our commitment through the Tour Normalization
program, which directly affects our ability to be able to fight across the full spectrum of conflict that I
spoke about earlier. Since the beginning of the summer of 2008, the number of families in Korea has
increased from 1,700 to over 4,200 with a goal of almost 5,000 families here by the summer of 2011.
Moving forward, we will begin to assign families to Korea for three years, while unaccompanied and
…I am absolutely confident that our new bilateral plan to get us to 2015—the strategic alliance of 2015—
will better synchronize our ongoing transformation efforts, it will reaffirm the US commitment to the ROK
and the region; ensure both nations are even better prepared to swiftly counter, deter, and defeat any North
Korean provocations and aggression; and will ultimately result in a much stronger Alliance.

USFK Relocation
The USFK is undergoing force repositioning, consolidating and relocating the US forces in the
ROK into two areas south of Seoul – a southwest and a southeast hub – as a result of these shifts.
These changes are shown in detail in Figure VIII.6. 1155
The Southwest hub at Osan Air Base and U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys is to be the future centerpiece of
the U.S. force structure within Korea. The southwest hub is already home to 7th Air Force headquarters and
as U.S. forces realign south of the Han River, it will become home to the future U.S. KORCOM, 8th Army
headquarters and 2nd Infantry Division. The Southeast hub at Daegu, Chinhae and Busan serve as the
logistics distribution center and storage ___location for wartime and contingency preposition stocks. The two
enduring hubs will be transformed into world-class enduring installations, promoting the Republic of Korea
as an “assignment of choice.”
Two major ROK-U.S. bilateral agreements enable the consolidation and relocation effort: the 2002 Land
Partnership Plan (LPP) and the 2004 Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP). The LPP consolidates and relocates
those U.S. forces north of the Han River, excluding forces from the greater Seoul metropolitan area,
provides U.S. forces dedicated time on the ROK training areas and ranges, and ensures safety easements
are provided and enforced. The YRP agreement relocates a majority of U.S. forces and UNC activities from
Seoul to the USAG Humphreys. The YRP agreement also calls for a residual element to remain in Seoul to
facilitate communications and maintain existing relationships with the ROK and other government and
non-government agencies in the Seoul area.
424 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The implementation of these plans will be accomplished in two phases - Phase 1 Consolidation and Phase 2
Relocation.
The ROK-U.S. Alliance is currently in Phase 1. As part of the U.S. relocation and camp consolidation
efforts, the U.S. has returned an approximately 13.6 thousand acres of land that has been vacated by U.S.
forces. In turn, the ROK procured approximately 3.5 thousand acres of land for U.S. use in expanding
facilities within the two enduring hubs. Particularly important was the ROK’s grant of an initial 913 acres
of land at USAG-Humphreys, enabling the ROK-U.S. Alliance to begin designing, planning and
coordinating construction efforts. Funds required for land, facilities, moving services, and other expenses
directly related to the YRP implementation are provided by the ROK, while the costs of LPP are shared
between the ROK and U.S.
Approximately $1.2 billion of facilities and infra-structure are under construction at USAG-Humphreys
with an additional $2.9 billion in facilities and infra-structure under design. The major facilities to be
constructed are: medical facilities like the hospital, dental clinic and troop medical clinics; headquarters
facilities (KORCOM, 8th Army, 2nd Inf. Div. and Installation Management Command-Korea); family
housing and schools; a communications center and the operational and support facilities necessary for the
relocation of 2nd Inf. Div.
The success of the planned relocation is predicated upon sustaining the U.S. force’s readiness to “fight
tonight.” Units will be packaged and moved in manageable components. Throughout the realignment, units
will maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Force relocation is a win-win for
the Alliance as it optimizes ROK-U.S. use of land and enhances U.S. force protection, readiness, quality of
life, safety and ultimately the ROK-U.S. mutual defense.
In summary, U.S. priorities remain focused on transforming to meet future security demands and to
strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Critical to the strategy is the repositioning and consolidation of forces.
The repositioning of U.S. forces is a major signal of continued U.S. military commitment to the ROK-U.S.
Alliance. The consolidation of these forces increases readiness, efficiency and cost savings; enhances
quality of life; increases training opportunities, and offers a less intrusive presence.
The ROK is providing significant support for this relocation, guaranteeing the commercial rights
of the construction contractors for the next 45 years. Overall, the US and the ROK are working
closely on a number of related issues through a variety of channels: 1156
The Special Measures Agreement (SMA) negotiation concerning South Korea’s payment of part of the
expenses for the USFK14; the transfer of wartime operational control to the ROK military on December 1,
2015 as agreed between President Lee Myung-bak and President Barrack Obama at a summit on June 26,
2010; the development of the Strategic alliance 2015 adopted at the 42nd ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) held in Washington, D.C. on October 8, 2010; the development of the Extended Deterrence
Policy Committee(EDPC) designed to heighten the effectiveness of extended deterrence; preparations for
the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Seoul in March 2012; and ways to enhance the efficacy of ROK-
U.S. combined exercises.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 425

Figure VIII.6: Relocation of US Forces in Korea from 2006

Source: US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 27.

Military Exercises
The ROK military engages in military exercises with the US and other countries on a regular
basis. Major joint/combined exercises and training include ‘Foal Eagle’ (US-ROK), ‘Hoguk’
(US-ROK), ‘Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration’ (US-ROK), ‘Ulchi Focus
Lens’ (ROK-US), and ‘Khaan Quest’ (US-ROK-Mongolia). 1157
US-ROK joint military exercises have led to DPRK protests for many years. The North’s
reaction to Foal Eagle and Key Resolve in 2013 has been especially extreme. Key Resolve lasted
from March 11-21 and worked to improve ROK and US combined forces’ “operation
capabilities, coordinating and executing the deployment of US reinforcement forces, and
maintaining the ROK military’s combat capabilities,” according to a USFK statement. 2013 was
the first year that the exercise was led by the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of the CFC.
Approximately 10,000 ROK and 3,500 US forces participated. 1158
Foal Eagle is an annual two-month long ROK-US military exercise, one of the largest and
longest exercises in the world, in which the US and ROK practice responding to an invasion.
According to the Pentagon, Foal Eagle is purely a way to train for a defensive operation, utilizing
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations forces. In the 2013 Foal Eagle – spanning March
and April – approximately 10,000 US troops are directly involved. Another purpose of the
exercises is for ROK and US troops to meet their counterparts. As such, the exercise involves
community service, tours, sports tournaments, and liaison exchange. 1159
426 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

In the first phase of the joint exercises, the US and ROK practiced deploying and coordinating
their air forces; on the US side, equipment included F-16s, A-10s, E-3s – from Kunsan (8th
Fighter Wing), Osan (51st Fighter Wing), and Kadena (18th Fighter Wing) Air Bases. Later in
March, F-22 Raptors, B-2 stealth bombers, and B-52s also joined the exercises. According to
USPACOM, “Th[e] mission by two B-2 Spirit bombers assigned to 509th Bomb Wing, which
demonstrates the United States’ ability to conduct long range, precision strikes quickly and at
will, involved flying more than 6,500 miles to the Korean Peninsula, dropping inert munitions on
the Jik Do Range, and returning to the continental U.S. in a single, continuous mission.” 1160
In response to a war with the DPRK, the F-22s could be one of the initial aircraft used by the US
to escort bombers and/or destroy the North’s artillery – reportedly without being detected.
According to one report, 1161
…[F]or the recent show of force, the U.S. Air Force simply put the advanced stealth fighters on “static
display,” meaning they were parked while senior South Korean military leaders -- very publicly -- reviewed
America’s premier fighter up close and personal. They also received an orientation and “familiarization
training,” said Col. Kathy Wilkinson, a Pentagon spokeswoman. That training “includes pilots talking
about how they fly to planners talking about integrating that asset into combined arms operations.”
The Navy was also involved in the exercises; by the middle of March four Arleigh Burke-class
guided-missile destroyers had arrived in the ROK – the USS Fitzgerald, John S. McCain, Lassen,
and McCampbell. The ships, hailing from the Japan-based Destroyer Squadron 15, conducted
naval drills with ROK vessels. Furthermore, a Los Angeles-class fast attack submarine, the USS
Cheyenne, conducted naval exercises and made port calls. While the submarine did not have
nuclear weapons, it was equipped with Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles,
and Mark-48 torpedoes, which can be used against both land and sea targets, at close and far
ranges. 1162
Aside from exaggerated propaganda over the threat of invasion and national security concerns,
the DPRK also protests against US-ROK military exercises for a more practical reason – when
the US and ROK undertake joint exercises, this forces the DPRK military to be on high alert and
undertake military exercises in return. This, in turn, drains a significant amount of resources
from the country – such as fuel for planes and tanks – which the DPRK cannot afford. 1163
Military Operation Plans
The current US-ROK military operation plan (OPLAN) 5027 has gone through many variations
over the past 50 years, with different potential contingencies resulting in different responses. In
the event of a DPRK invasion, OPLAN 5027 calls for the US to increase the number of ground
troops by as many as 690,000, fighter planes by 2,000, and warships by 160. However, these are
worst-case sizing requirements.
The current OPLAN has five different stages, including “first deploying the U.S. military’s
flexible deterrence power, destroying strategic targets in the North, entering the north,
controlling the military of the occupied territory and finally, unification of the peninsula under
the control of the South Korean government.” 1164
Both countries realize, however, that such a large number of ground troops may not be necessary
or practical and that a Korean War-type of major war of attrition may not be necessary or even
likely. Since 2010, both the ROK and the US have been developing a new OPLAN better-suited
to modern battlefield conditions, with ROK forces taking the lead and US forces providing
support. 1165 These changes will be a key part of the planned OPCON transfer in 2015.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 427

The US and the ROK have also been working over the past decade to transition a conceptual
plan (CONPLAN) for a DPRK regime collapse, CONPLAN 5029, into an operational plan
(OPLAN 5029). 1166 According to one South Korean article, OPLAN 5029 prepares for five or
six different scenarios of DPRK upheavals, such as a civil war due to a coup d’état or regime
change, a ROK hostage incident, a large natural disaster, the outflow of WMD, and a large-scale
DPRK citizen defection. One ROK news source reported, 1167
The efforts to flesh out OPLAN 5029 are prompting some observers to comment that one of the most
problematic aspects of the OPLAN 5029 discussion is that it places the CFC and not the South Korean
government as the main agency in charge with handling the “sudden change” in North Korea, an issue that
led to a dispute in 2005 between South Korea and the U.S.
A senior foreign policy and national security official from the Roh administration said, “The Roh Moo-
hyun administration determined that a major issue with OPLAN 5029 involved the sovereignty of South
Korea and thus halted drafting the plan in agreement with then-U.S. President George W. Bush during the
June 2005 South Korea-U.S. summit.” This official also said that in the working plan discussed by South
Korean and U.S. military authorities at the time, the CFC commander would take the initiative in
responding to all situations, not just ones in the military sector, in the event of a North Korean upheaval.
The official added, “If an upheaval takes place in North Korea, it is natural that the South Korean president
should have the authority to lead the response, and it is appropriate that the South Korean president
responds by giving directions to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
It was reported in February 2013, however, that US-ROK negotiations had stalled. Instead, there
might be a new OPLAN 5015 developed that would replace both 5027 and 5029, incorporating
strategies in both. The two countries were also reported to have had different opinions on how to
deal with the DPRK after its December 2012 missile launch and February 2013 nuclear test. The
ROK military requested USFK to include in OPLAN 5015 a counterplan against DPRK
provocation and a plan for a pre-emptive strike against the DPRK’s nuclear test site(s). However,
the US military maintained that in the case of DPRK provocation, OPLAN 5015 should focus on
preventing the war from spreading in order to reduce the likelihood of an intervention by the
Chinese military. 1168
It should also be noted that some sources report that China has developed a contingency plan for
sudden changes in the DPRK, entitled “the Chick plan.” Reportedly, this plan involves security
measures to protect the areas near the DPRK-Chinese border. It was also reported that the
Chinese have already invested in bridges across the Yalu and Tumen rivers to support its
planning, while gathering PLA Army troops in nearby Shenyang. 1169 China has deployed four
rapid deployment forces near the Korean Peninsula that can be used, among other things, in the
event of a contingency situation on the Peninsula. 1170
A Preemptive Strike Option?
Some US media and analysts outside the US government have suggested that that the US could
preemptively strike the DPRK, forcing regime change. In an analysis of this potential option, the
IISS writes that despite US and ROK qualitative superiority, the allies were not “confident of
winning an offensive war against North Korea without sustaining heavy military and collateral
casualties.” 1171
Even a surprise US-led attack would not be able to prevent significant artillery bombardment of
Seoul, located approximately 40 kilometers from the DMZ – where about 70% of DPRK artillery
and forces are located. Many DPRK political and military leaders would be able to hide in the
428 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

DPRK’s many underground, making it hard to find and attack them. Nor is there a clear line of
approach to Pyongyang. 1172
Moreover, the DPRK’s armed forces – a total active-duty strength of over one million – seem to
be determined, loyal, and believe in the DPRK regime’s political legitimacy. As such, they likely
would not collapse or surrender in large numbers, requiring a correspondingly large number of
US-ROK ground troops to sustain a strike. Furthermore, the DPRK has a large arsenal of
ballistic missiles and unconventional weapons – discussed later in this report – which could be
used against allied forces. An IISS analysis notes, 1173
Due to these considerations, a full scale pre-emptive attack to remove the North Korean regime is
considered by Washington, Seoul and Tokyo to be an impractical option. More limited pre-emptive options
include air strikes against known or suspected North Korean nuclear facilities, chemical weapons storage
sites, missile launchers and firing bunkers, or North Korean artillery locations near the DMZ. But, these
limited options suffer two basic disadvantages. Firstly, from a practical standpoint, it would be difficult to
conduct a fully effective first strike, given the uncertainty and multiplicity of targets….Secondly, a limited
pre-emptive attack runs the risk of provoking North Korean retaliation.
…[T]here is little enthusiasm in Washington, and much less in Seoul and Tokyo, for a surprise ‘surgical
strike’ to knock out North Korea’s key military assets. However, if the allies believed that war was
inevitable and that North Korea was preparing to attack, a pre-emptive strike would hold great advantages.
Likewise, if Pyongyang feared an attack on its critical military assets, it would be under pressure to use its
weaponry before these assets could be destroyed on the ground.
While senior US military officers and intelligence analysis are not on public record regarding
these views, many seem to agree with the IISS’ analysis of the risks involved.
US Forces Japan (UFJ)
The 50th anniversary of the Japan-US Security Treaty took place in 2010, and Japan 2010 White
Paper describes Japan’s intention to implement deepening military cooperation in the coming
years. These areas of bilateral cooperation included extended deterrence, information security,
missile defense, and space, as well as individual security areas including humanitarian
assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues. US forces stationed in Japan serve as a deterrent and
can function as an offensive “spear” in the event of armed aggression against the country. In the
wake of early 2013 DPRK provocations and Japan’s increased threat perception, the US and
Japan agreed on increased missile defense cooperation as well as coordination to monitor and
respond to any DPRK escalations. 1174
US Deployments in Japan
Figure VIII.7 shows a Japanese estimate of the US forces in Japan. This estimate demonstrates,
US forces in Japan are larger than US forces in the ROK. More importantly, Japan provides the
US with critical basing and staging facilities for any serious Korean conflict.
The IISS 2013 edition of the Military Balance has different figures. It estimates a total of 36,700
personnel, with 2,500 on the US Army 9th Theater Area Command (Zama), 6,750 in the 7th Fleet
Command (Yokosuka). The naval forces include a carrier group with one carrier, two guided
missile cruiser, seven guided missile destroyers, four mine warfare vessels, an amphibious
command ship, and three amphibious warfare ships. 1175
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 429

In addition, the IISS reports 12,500 personnel in the USAF 5th Air Force which is headquarter at
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa with forces that include 18 F-16C/D, 2 E-3B, and 24 F-15C/Ds. It
reports 14,950 US Marines and associated air units of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in
Okinawa. 1176
These forward deployed forces make Japan a critical partner in any US effort to aid the ROK by
building up US forces in Korea, and sustain a US presence in the event of war. Japan’s security
does depend on both US security guarantees and Japan’s willingness to show it will support the
US and ROK in any confrontation, crisis, or conflict with the DPRK.
Moreover, US ability to use Japan to stage its power projection forces would, however, be as
important in a crisis as the force normally stationed there. Accordingly, the US “rebalancing” of
its force posture throughout Asia will be critically dependent to some degree on the US and
Japanese strategic alliance.
The Strengths and Weakness of the US-Japanese Alliance
An analysis by the US Congressional Research service summarizes the strengths and weakness
of the US strategic relationship with Japan as follows, 1177
Japan and the United States are military allies under a security treaty concluded in 1951 and revised in
1960. Under the treaty, Japan grants the United States military base rights on its territory in return for a
U.S. pledge to protect Japan’s security. Although defense officials had hoped that the 50th anniversary of
the treaty would compel Tokyo and Washington to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, a rocky start by
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government generated concern about the future of the alliance.
The coordinated response to the March 2011 disaster by the U.S. and Japanese militaries made a strong
statement about the strength and the value of the bilateral alliance, and commitment from top U.S.
leadership to assist the nation in its recovery may have assuaged fears that the alliance was adrift after a
series of public disagreements.
On the other hand, the crisis response did little to change the fundamental challenges of the thorny base
relocation issue in Okinawa. Although the governments have now amended the plan to allow several
thousand marines to depart Okinawa in order to ease local frustrations, fundamental questions about the
existence of problematic military facilities and the political sustainability of the Marine Corps presence on
the island remain.
…The relocation of Futenma air station is the largest and most controversial part of a broad overhaul of
U.S. force posture in Japan and bilateral military activities, but it is not the only element. In 2002, the U.S.
and Japanese governments launched the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to review force posture
and develop a common security view between the two sides. With the exception of the Henoko relocation,
the plan has been largely successful. A training relocation program allows U.S. aircraft to conduct training
away from crowded base areas to reduce noise pollution for local residents.
U.S. Carrier Air Wing Five is being relocated from Atsugi Naval Air base to the Iwakuni base, where a
new dual-use airfield is operational. In 2010, U.S. Army Japan established at Camp Zama (about 25 miles
southwest of Tokyo) a forward operational headquarters, which can act as a bilateral joint headquarters to
take command of theater operations in the event of a contingency.
The SDF Air Defense Command facility at Yokota U.S. Air Base was recently completed. Since 2006, a
bilateral joint operations center at Yokota allows for data-sharing and coordination between the Japanese
and U.S. air and missile defense command elements. In June 2011, Japan announced a long-sought
agreement to allow the transfer of jointly developed missile components to third parties, representing an
exception to Japan’s ban on arms exports.
…Several legal factors restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States. The most
prominent and fundamental restriction is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American
officials during the post-war occupation, that outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the
430 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never
be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted this clause to mean that it can maintain a military for
national defense purposes and, since 1991, has allowed the SDF to participate in non-combat roles overseas
in a number of U.N. peacekeeping missions and in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.
The principle of “collective self-defense” is also considered an obstacle to close defense cooperation. The
term comes from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provides that member nations may
exercise the rights of both individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs. The Japanese
government maintains that Japan has the sovereign right to engage in collective self-defense, but a 1960
decision by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau interpreted the constitution to forbid collective actions because
they would exceed the minimum necessary use of force to defend Japan itself. Participation in non-combat
logistical operations and rear area support of other nations, however, has been considered outside the realm
of collective self defense.
Prime Minister Abe has repeatedly proposed that this restriction be reconsidered, a move that has been
welcomed by U.S. officials in the past.
During the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq, the interpretation prevented the SDF from defending
other nations’ troops. Some Japanese critics have charged that Japanese Aegis destroyers should not use
their radar in the vicinity of American warships, as they would not be allowed to respond to an incoming
attack on those vessels. As the United States and Japan increasingly integrate missile defense operation, the
ban on collective self-defense also raises questions about how Japanese commanders will gauge whether
American forces or Japan itself is being targeted. Under the current interpretation, Japanese forces could
not respond if the United States were attacked.
…In December 2010, Japan agreed to continue Host Nation Support (HNS), the funds provided to
contribute to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, at current levels for the next five years, starting in
FY2011. The agreement came as a compromise, as the government of then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan had
been pressured to cut Japan’s contribution due to Japan’s ailing fiscal health. Japan pays for most of the
salaries of about 25,000 Japanese employees at U.S. military installations. The current agreement calls for
Japan to pay about 188 billion yen annually (about $2.2 billion at 82 yen to one USD) through FY2016 to
defray the costs of stationing troops in
Japan. The agreement also commits to reducing the number of Japanese nationals working for the U.S.
military and affirms that the proportion of utility costs paid by the Japanese government will fall from 76%
to 72% over a five-year period.
…Another source of strategic anxiety in Tokyo concerns the U.S. extended deterrence, or “nuclear
umbrella,” for Japan. The Bush Administration’s shift in negotiations with Pyongyang triggered fears in
Tokyo that Washington might eventually accept a nuclear armed North Korea and thus somehow diminish
the U.S. security guarantee for Japan. These anxieties have persisted despite repeated statements by both
the Bush and Obama Administrations to reassure Tokyo of the continued U.S. commitment to defend
Japan. However, Japan’s sense of vulnerability is augmented by the fact that its own ability to deter threats
is limited by its largely defensive-oriented military posture. Given Japan’s reliance on U.S. extended
deterrence, Tokyo is wary of any change in U.S. policy—however subtle—that might alter the nuclear
status quo in East Asia
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 431

Resolving the Okinawa Issue?

As a Congressional Research Service report notes, many of the tensions between the US and
Japan over the basing of US forces in Japan have centered around Japanese objections to the
deployment of US forces in Okinawa, the size of the US Marine base there and its air activities,
its proximity to civilians, and crimes by US military personnel. These issues seem to have been
resolved in April 2013 – although the long history of the disputes involved indicates that more
depends on actual implementation than agreement on a plan. A report by the US DOD notes
that, 1178
The realignment, including consolidation, of U.S. forces within Okinawa is a significant effort by the U.S.
and Japanese Governments which recognize the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support
for the security alliance, which contributes to a sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in
Japan as stated in the October 29, 2005 document of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) entitled
“U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future”.
When implemented, the realignment will ensure a life-of-the-Alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan as
stated in the May 1, 2006 document of the SCC entitled “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment
Implementation” (Realignment Roadmap) and will maintain deterrence and mitigate the impact of U.S.
forces on local communities.
In order to realize the realignment, the U.S. and Japanese Governments have developed and will implement
this consolidation plan. This consolidation plan, including sequencing steps, was jointly developed for
facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa.
The U.S. and Japanese Governments reaffirm their commitment to the steady implementation of the
realignment. The U.S. Government (USG) remains committed to return lands on Okinawa as designated
U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa, and as facilities become available for units and other
tenant activities relocating to locations on Okinawa.
The Government of Japan (GOJ) noted its responsibility to relocate all functions and capabilities that are
resident in U.S. facilities designated for return, and that are required by U.S. forces remaining in Okinawa,
including the housing necessary to support the remaining U.S. Marine Corps units, in coordination with the
USG.
In the April 27, 2012 SCC Joint Statement, the U.S. and Japanese Governments confirmed that the total or
partial return of the six facilities and areas designated in the Realignment Roadmap remains unchanged and
that the land of aforementioned facilities and areas utilized by U.S. forces are eligible for return in three
categories, as follows:
1) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of necessary procedures;
2) Areas eligible for return once the replacement facilities in Okinawa are provided; and,
3) Areas eligible for return as U.S. Marine Corps forces relocate from Okinawa to locations
outside of Japan.
This consolidation plan was developed reflecting the precepts that regular training and exercise, as well as
the availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure the readiness,
employability, and interoperability of U.S. forces, and that adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is
necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels plays a critical and strategic role in
meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability
toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
In addition, in the April 27, 2012 SCC Joint Statement, it was noted that the effort to develop this
consolidation plan should consider the possible impact of the joint and shared use of facilities located on
Okinawa and that joint and shared use of facilities was a key objective of the Realignment Roadmap. The
U.S. and Japanese Governments confirmed that joint and shared use by Japan Self-Defense Forces will
continue to be discussed at a variety of fora, including the Joint/Shared Use Working Group, which was
432 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

established in December 2010. The discussion at this working group will be reflected in master planning
for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa to implement this consolidation plan.
Timelines for completing the implementation of this consolidation plan are event-driven. Recognizing the
strong desires of Okinawa residents, this consolidation plan is to be implemented as soon as possible while
ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The U.S. and
Japanese Governments agree that no further significant changes will be required for the foreseeable future.
The USG will implement this consolidation plan subject to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA), including continuing to observe
the needs for facilities and areas for the purposes of SOFA. Timelines for the return of facilities and
areas…of this consolidation plan will be updated by the U.S. and Japanese Governments and publicly
released every three years.
If is its implemented, the “Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” will
consolidate and close dozens of US military bases and US-controlled locations across Okinawa.
This will put an end to negations that began with a 2006 road map. The Plan calls for 2,500 acres
of land to be returned to Japan, including six major facilities and several smaller areas, while a
coastal US Marine base would be expanded to include a new V-shaped runway built out into the
sea. A US senior defense official remarked, “This is important because it lays out the plan for us
to have a long-term presence in Okinawa, and one that is politically sustainable.” 1179 However,
in late 2014, voters of the Okinawa prefecture overwhelmingly voted for a governor that strongly
opposed the relocation of the US Marine airbase and he later said, “my victory clearly shows
prefectural residents will not let the base be built… I’d like to convey the message to the
governments of Japan and the United States.” 1180
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 433

Figure VIII.7: Japanese Estimates of US Forces Japan (USFJ) in

2012

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 228.

434 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

United States Pacific Command (US PACOM)

The USPACOM strategy clearly defines its role in dealing with the DPRK, defending the ROK,
and in seeking cooperation with China: 1181
The U.S. regards coercive activities by North Korea, in particular its pursuit of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile capabilities, to comprise the most urgent security threat in the region. USPACOM is fully
committed to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with our allies and other
regional states to deter and defend against North Korean military provocations, weapons proliferation, and
illicit trafficking; and to support enforcement of international sanctions restricting North Korean arms trade
and other prohibited activities.
…North Korea’s ongoing efforts to engage in WMD-related proliferation and arms sales in defiance of UN
sanctions make it a primary actor of concern with respect to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In
addition, terrorist groups may leverage WMD-related expertise, technologies, dual-use material, and other
resources to acquire chemical or biological weapons. This situation requires USPACOM, acting with
domestic and foreign partners, to continue to enhance its capabilities to effectively counter the development
and proliferation of WMD.
…USPACOM will enhance interoperability with allies and partners and develop the capacity of partners to
cooperatively address regional challenges. This effort will move beyond traditional relationships to include
security cooperation with China and others when there are shared interests and where cooperation can
produce mutual benefits.
…The United States believes that a strong U.S.-China partnership is essential for peace, prosperity, and
both regional and global security. The U.S. continues to welcome a prosperous and successful China that
plays a greater role in global affairs, but China’s growing military capabilities coupled with its lack of
transparency is concerning. Therefore, the United States and China must continue to pursue a more
transparent, enduring, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship by maintaining a consistent and
meaningful dialogue to prevent miscommunication or miscalculation. We see opportunities for cooperation
in areas such as humanitarian relief and disaster response, counter-piracy efforts, non-proliferation,
counter-terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), military medicine, and maritime safety.
Such opportunities will enhance our bilateral relationship with China as we work toward common goals,
candidly address our differences, and demonstrate mutual commitment to the security and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region.

The Prelude to “Rebalancing”

While the rebalancing of US forces in Asia has already been described in detail, it is important to
note that the reinforcing and repositioning US troops in the Pacific that is part of the new US
strategy described in Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century – and
made public in January 2012 – has long been a US goal.
Admiral Willard, former US PACOM Commander, summarized both the US role in the Pacific
and the need to strengthen it, in his annual testimony to the Senate Armed Service Committee on
March 24, 2010: 1182
Five of our nation’s seven mutual defense treaties are with nations in the Asia- Pacific region. We continue
to work closely with these regional treaty allies—Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the
Philippines and Thailand—to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance security within the
region.
…The US–ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General
Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance
undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General Sharp’s testimony to provide the details of our
relationship on the Peninsula, but note that General Sharp’s progress in handling the transition of wartime
Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military has been exceptional as has his leadership of US Forces
Korea.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 435

The transformation of the US–ROK alliance will ultimately assist the ROK to better meet security
challenges both on and off the peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in
support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation
Enduring Freedom, including demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial
Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the evolving trilateral security
cooperation between the US, ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed in
realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning
ability to address complex contingencies throughout the region make this trilateral partnership a goal worth
pursuing.
…Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent
challenges related to US basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall alliance, remain
strong…That being said, we must make every effort—particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of
the alliance—to remind the citizens of both the US and Japan of the importance of our alliance to enduring
regional security and prosperity.
US Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative
(DPRI). Initiated by the US Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in 2002,
progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the execution of the 2006 Roadmap for
Realignment are critical next steps. Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include:
relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier air wing from urbanized to rural areas; co-
locating US and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying US missile defense capabilities to
Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; improving operational coordination between US and
Japanese forces; and adjusting the burden sharing arrangement through the relocation of ground forces.
The rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a key element of the
Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa,
will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR.
Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marines Corps aviation assets in Okinawa;
an action which is directly linked to the relocation of Marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land
area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review by May of this year. The US remains
committed to the 2006 DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries.
The Japan Self-Defense Force is advancing its regional and global influence. In the spring and early
summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for
counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling mission recently ended, Japan
remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian
efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable future.
Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan Self-Defense Forces
continue their regular bilateral interactions with the US, and in some multi-lateral engagements with the US
and our other allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of
several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a yearlong study of
contingency command and control relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to maintain over $4 billion in annual
Host Nation Support (HNS) to our Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic
pillar of respective US and Japanese alliance commitments.

The 2012 Shifts in Strategy

It is import to note, however, that no US strategy document ever used the term pivot or called for
a major build-up of US forces. The text of Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the
21st Century stated that, 1183
U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the
Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving
challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security
globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies
436 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing
alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security.
We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to
ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. The United States is also investing
in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor
and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the
Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against
provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
PACOM issued a strategic guidance for US priorities and engagement with the region in early
2012. The current PACOM Commander, Samuel J. Locklear III, outlined five priorities in
implementing the program: 1184
• Strengthen and advance alliances and partnerships;
• Mature the US-China military-to-military relationship;
• Develop the US-India strategic partnership;
• Remain prepared to respond to a Korean Peninsula contingency; and
• Counter transnational threats.
Locklear identified North Korea as the most important trouble spot in the region, commenting
that “If there is anything that keeps me awake at night, it’s that particular situation… We have to
ensure that we maintain as much of a stable environment on the Korean Peninsula as we
can.” 1185
The Total Size of PACOM Forces
Figures VIII.8 and VIII.9 show that US forces in Japan are only part of the resources the US
could bring to bear assuming it relied on total PACOM forces. A PACOM estimate in May 2013,
summarized force strength as follows: 1186
U.S. military and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM number approximately 330,000, or about one-
fifth of total U.S. military strength. U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of approximately 180 ships (to include five
aircraft carrier strike groups), nearly 2,000 aircraft, and 140,000 Sailors and civilians all dedicated to
protecting our mutual security interests. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific possesses about two-thirds of U.S.
Marine Corps combat strength, includes two Marine Expeditionary Forces and about 85,000 personnel
assigned. U.S. Pacific Air Forces is comprised of approximately 43,000 airmen and more than 435 aircraft.
U.S. Army Pacific has more than 60,000 personnel assigned, including five Stryker brigades. Of note,
component command personnel numbers include more than 1,200 Special Operations personnel.
Department of Defense Civilians employees in the Pacific Command AOR number about 38,000.
Additionally, the U.S. Coast Guard, which frequently supports U.S. military forces in the region, has
approximately 27,000 personnel in its Pacific Area.
It is important to note that while these force levels are impressive, they again represent a major
cut in US forces and presence since 1990, cuts that have taken place during a period in which
both China and the DPRK have made major increases in their conventional and WMD
capabilities. There has been a steady downward trend in the total numbers of personnel, combat
aircraft, and major combat ships from the end of the Cold War in 1991 onwards.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 437

Figure VIII.8: US Forces in the Pacific in 2013, Equipment by

Type and Location
Pacific Command (PACOM) Headquartered in Hawaii
Guam
Equipment Type Quantity

Submarine, nuclear powered 3

Japan
Equipment Type Quantity
Carrier, nuclear powered 1
Cruiser, with guided missiles 2
Destroyer, with guided missiles 7
Amphibious command ship 1
Mine countermeasures 4
Amphibious assault ship 1
Landing ship, dock 2
Landing platform, dock 1
Aircraft, fighter 54
Aircraft, airborne early warning 2
Aircraft, transport 13
Aircraft, CSAR 8
Aircraft, tanker 12
Helicopter, transport 34
438 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

ROK
Equipment Type Model
Main battle tank M-1 Abrams
Main battle tank M-2/M-3 Bradley
Main battle tank M-109
Helicopter, attack AH-64 Apache
Helicopter, transport CH-47 Chinook
Helicopter, utility UH-60 Black Hawk
Artillery, multiple rocket launcher MLRS
Air defense, surface-to-air missile MIM-104 Patriot
Air defense, surface-to-air missile FIM-92A Avenger
Aircraft, Fighter F-16C/D
Aircraft, Fighter/Ground Attack A-10C Thunderbolt II
Aircraft, ISR U-2s

Pacific
Equipment Type Quantity
Submarine, nuclear powered, with ballistic 8
missiles
SSN, with dedicated, non-ballistic missiles 19
Submarine, nuclear powered 8
Carrier, nuclear powered 5
Cruiser, with guided missiles 11
Destroyer, with guided missiles 24
Frigate, aviation 12
Mine countermeasures 2
Amphibious assault ship 4
Landing platform, dock 3
Landing ship, dock 4

Source: Based primarily on material in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2013 (London:
Routledge, 2013). Figures do not include equipment used for training purposes. All equipment figures represent equipment in
active service.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 439

Figure VIII.9: US Forces in the Pacific in 2013, Forces by Role

and Location
Japan
Quantity Role
Army
1 HQ (9th Theater Army Area Command) – Zama
Navy
1 HQ (7th Fleet) – Yokosuka [1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at
Yokosuka]
Air Force
1 HQ (5th Air Force) – Okinawa-Kadena
1 FTR WING with:
2 FTR SQN with a total of 18 F-16 Fighting Falcon – Misawa
1 FTR WING with: - Okinawa-Kadena
1 AEW&C SQN with 2 E-3B Sentry
1 CSR SQN with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk
2 FTR SQN with a total of 24 F-15C/D Eagle
1 LIFT WING with 10 C-130H Hercules
2 C-12J
1 TPT WING with 10 C-130H Hercules - Yakota
1 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J)
1 Special Ops GRP – Okinawa-Kadena
Marines
1 DIV (3rd)
1 FTR SQN with 12 F/A-18D Hornet
1 TKR SQN with 12 KC-130J Hercules
2 TPT HEL SQN with 12 CH-46E Sea Knight
1 TPT HEL SQN with 12 MV-22B Osprey
3 TPT HEL SQN with 10 CH-53E Sea Stallion

ROK
Quantity Role
Army
1 HQ (8th Army) – Seoul
1 HQ (2nd Inf Div) – Tongduchon
1 HBCT
1 CBT AVN BDE
1 ARTY BDE
1 AD BDE
Air Force
1 HQ (7th Air Force) – Osan
440 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

1 FTR Wing, with

1 FTR SQN with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon – Osan
1 1 FTR SQN with 24 A-10 Thunderbolt II
1 ISR SQN withU-2S – Osan

1 FTR Wing, with

1 FTR SQN with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon – Kunsan
1 Special Ops SQN

Source: Based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2013. Figures do not include equipment used for training
purposes. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.

The US and Extended Regional Deterrence

The shifts in the wider military balance affecting both the Koreas and the rest of Asia help
explain the fact that the US is simultaneously seeking arms control and examining developments
for a new approach to regional extended deterrence as an alternative approach to enhancing
regional stability.
As the US Nuclear Posture document issued in 2010 makes clear, this could involve further
major changes in the military balance: 1187
The United States is committed to the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The President has
directed a review of potential future reductions in US nuclear weapons below New START levels. Several
factors will influence the magnitude and pace of such reductions.
…[A]ny future nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential regional adversaries,
strategic stability vis-à-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners.
This will require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements; further improvements in US, allied, and
partner non-nuclear capabilities; focused reductions in strategic and non- strategic weapons; and close
consultations with allies and partners. The United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of
any potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be
far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response.
…Accordingly, the United States is fully committed to strengthening bilateral and regional security ties and
working closely with its allies and partners to adapt these relationships to emerging 21st century
requirements. We will continue to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security and to
demonstrate this commitment not only through words, but also through deeds. This includes the continued
forward deployment of US forces in key regions, strengthening of US and allied non-nuclear capabilities, and
the continued provision of extended deterrence. Such security relationships are critical not only in deterring
potential threats, but can also serve our non-proliferation goals—by demonstrating to neighboring states that
their pursuit of nuclear weapons will only undermine their goal of achieving military or political advantages,
and by reassuring non-nuclear US allies and partners that their security interests can be protected without
their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. Further, the United States will work with allies and partners to
strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, especially the implementation of existing commitments within
their regions.
Security architectures in key regions will retain a nuclear dimension as long as nuclear threats to US allies
and partners remain. US nuclear weapons have played an essential role in extending deterrence to US allies
and partners against nuclear attacks or nuclear-backed coercion by states in their region that possess or are
seeking nuclear weapons. A credible US “nuclear umbrella” has been provided by a combination of means—
the strategic forces of the US Triad, non- strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and
US-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies.
The mix of deterrence means has varied over time and from region to region…During the Cold War, the
United States forward-deployed nuclear weapons in both Europe and Asia, and retained the capability to
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 441

increase those deployments if needed. At the end of the Cold War, a series of steps were taken to
dramatically reduce the forward presence of US nuclear weapons. Today, there are separate choices to be
made in partnership with allies in Europe and Asia about what posture best serves our shared interests in
deterrence and assurance and in moving toward a world of reduced nuclear dangers.
…In Asia and the Middle East—where there are no multilateral alliance structures analogous to NATO—the
United States has mainly extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and security relationships and
through its forward military presence and security guarantees. When the Cold War ended, the United States
withdrew its forward-deployed nuclear weapons from the Pacific region, including removing nuclear
weapons from naval surface vessels and general purpose submarines. Since then, it has relied on its central
strategic forces and the capacity to re-deploy non-strategic nuclear systems in East Asia, if needed, in times
of crisis.
The Administration is pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and the Middle
East to determine how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security architectures to enhance peace and
security, and reassure them that US extended deterrence is credible and effective.
Unless dramatic shifts take place to limit the DPRK nuclear and missile efforts, they are almost certain to
lead to some new mix of US, Japanese, and ROK efforts to build up radically more effective air and missile
defenses, offer at least enhanced conventional deterrence in the form of weapons of mass effectiveness, and
possibly include a more structured form of US theater nuclear umbrella.
Barring major new limits to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile efforts, these developments are
almost certain to lead to some new mix of US, Japanese, and ROK efforts to build up radically
more effective air and missile defenses, offer at least enhanced conventional deterrence in the
form of weapons of mass effectiveness, and possibly include a more structured form of US
theater nuclear umbrella or “extended deterrence.”
US
The rate of US modernization is critical to assessing the likely types of escalation on the
Peninsula, as well as the likely outcomes. As has been discussed, the US is now making major
cuts in its planned defense spending and reassessing its strategic “rebalance” of its forces from
Europe to Asia. In spite of the pressures on US defense spending described in the previous
chapter, however, the FY2016 defense plan and budget that President Obama submitted in
February 2015 preserve most US force levels and still call for major levels of investment in US
military modernization.
Much depends on whether the Congress supports such funding levels, and whether the
Department of Defense can improve its use of defense funds to actually execute the programs it
plans at the costs it claims. There is no clear way to assign probabilities to either set of actions,
but it should be stressed that the analysis that follows assumes the Congress and Department of
Defense will provide the necessary funding and effectiveness. There are a number of US and
outside analysts that regard such assumptions as a triumph of hope over experience.
Restructuring, and “Rebalancing” US Forces for Asia and the
Pacific
The US initiated a rebalance towards Asia after its announcement in 2011 and made it clear to
allies and potential rivals that the US will increase its involvement in regional security. While the
US is cutting total military spending and forces, it still has a force structure and resource pool to
draw upon. The IISS estimates that the US accounted for 36.1% of global defense spending in
2014, more than the next top 9 countries combined. 1188 Additionally, in 2013 the IISS noted that
“the pending end of a decade of complex wars centered on the land environment gave the US a
442 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

chance to reassess force structures, roles and inventories,” for Asia and the Koreas with the aim
of reducing force size and relying more on technological capabilities. 1189 However, by the
beginning of FY2015 the DOD’s strategy, as assessed by IISS, “became more crowded… [with]
the possible return of sequestration in FY2016; the Ukraine crisis and its effect on relations with
Russia as well as on broader European security; the Ebola outbreak in Africa; and the increase in
violence in Syria and Iraq – particularly the territorial gains made by the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS).” 1190
The proposed FY2016 US defense budget that President Obama submitted to Congress in
February 2015 continued the US focus on rebalancing US forces to provide more capability in
Asia and to support the ROK, but made less emphasis on the overall Asia-Pacific rebalance as it
had in previous years.
The US FY2016 budget submission made it clear that the US was giving equal priority to
maintaining and improving capability in the Middle East and Europe, while improving its
capabilities in Asia and the Pacific. It was restructuring its force to emphasize power projection
to key allies like the ROK rather than conducting a major build-up or making major shifts out of
Europe to forward positions in Asia and the Pacific.
Planned US force levels are shown in Figure VIII.10 and will maintain the basic power
projection capabilities of every US force element with the exception of the size of total active
and reserve ground forces. It is important to note that the US budget maintains readiness in every
key area of forward deployed forces as well as the kinds of power projection that would be
critical to rapid US intervention in the Koreas. It also places a major emphasis on the kind of
joint exercises that support a US strategy based on partnership, rather than reliance on US forces.
At the same time, rebalancing of US forces to Asia will not mean any major military buildup in
forward deployments. The overall capabilities of US forces will improve in spite of currently
planned cuts in the total US defense effort. These points tend to be lost in the debate over US
defense spending, but in many ways the current cuts really reflect the fact the US is adjusting its
force posture as most combat forces have left Afghanistan, placing a new emphasis on regional
partners and more attention on high technology forces and air and sea power.
The primary focus of US rebalancing will be to improve its air and sea capabilities to support its
allies. The Air Force will make major improvements in Strike fighter capabilities, stealth, ISR,
and seek a new manned bomber. The Navy plans to keep some 52 ships forward deployed in the
PACOM area and slowly increase the number in future years. The IISS reported that “the current
plan is to base ten of the planned 32 Littoral Combat Ships in the region, four of which will be in
Singapore on a rotational basis. A fourth nuclear-powered attack submarine will deploy to Guam
in FY15. Also expected in 2015 is the deployment of amphibious-assault ship USS Wasp with a
squadron of F-35Bs. Navy forces in Japan will also be reinforced by two BMD [ballistic missile
defense] capable destroyers in FY17, while 7th Fleet will also receive the first Zumwalt-class
destroyer, expected to commission in FY16.” 1191 The US planned to reduce total US Army and
Marine Corps forces to pre-2001 levels over the coming years while planning to increase
presence around the Pacific Rim. 1192
The US FY2016 defense budget outlined three strategic priorities maintained from the DOD’s
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 1193
Protect the homeland to deter and defeat threats to the nation and to mitigate the effects of potential
attacks and natural disasters. This means making selective investments in missile defense, nuclear
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 443

modernization, and cyber capabilities. It also means sustaining capacity to protect U.S. airspace and shores,
as well as reshaping the ability of the military forces to provide support to civil authorities when needed. (p.
2-1)
Build security globally to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and
cooperate with others to address common security challenges. In practice, this means continuing to
rebalance the Department’s posture and presence to the Asia-Pacific while maintaining a focus on the
Middle East. It also means working closely with European partners to strengthen their capabilities,
maximizing the impact of a relatively small U.S. presence in Africa, and working with interagency partners
to counter illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal organization activity. (p. 2-1)
Project power and win decisively to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Sustaining superior forces remains a top priority for force
planning and development, so the following focus. (p. 2-1)
The DOD continued to describe its rebalancing efforts in its FY2016 budget overview, but it did
so in the context of a changing security environment and placing less emphasis on its
contributions to the Asia-Pacific “pivot”. 1194
Rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict. Future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies
against non-state actors to high-end conflicts against states armed with weapons of mass destruction and/or
advanced anti-access and area-denial capabilities. To address this diverse range of challenges, the U.S.
military will broaden its capabilities to the full spectrum of possible operations. While preserving hard-won
expertise in counterinsurgency and stability operations, the Joint Force must also be prepared to battle
sophisticated adversaries employing advanced warfighting capabilities, to include space and cyber
capabilities. The Department will sustain robust investments in science, technology, research, and
development in areas most critical to meeting future challenges or where there is greatest potential for
game-changing advances. (p. 2-2)
Rebalancing and sustaining presence and posture abroad to protect U.S. national security interests.
In meeting its priorities, the Department will continue to rebalance and sustain its global posture. The
Department will continue its contributions to the Asia-Pacific rebalance, while remaining fully committed
to the security of allies and partners in the Middle East. The Department will continue to work with allies
and partners in Europe to promote regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, enhanced military
capability, and enhanced interoperability. Across the globe, DoD will ensure that the Joint Force is properly
manned, trained, and equipped in the event of a crisis. (p. 2-2)
Rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the Joint Force. After more than 10 years of
conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force’s full spectrum readiness capabilities have
atrophied. Taking the prudent steps outlined in the QDR will improve the Department’s ability to meet
national security needs. (p. 2-2) Key force structure decisions in this QDR include:
• Sustaining a world-class Army capable of conducting the full range of operations on land including
prompt and sustained land combat by maintaining a force structure that it can train, equip, and keep ready.
Under the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department will rebalance within the Army, across the
Active, Guard, and Reserve components. The active component of the Army will reduce its planned post-
war end strength from the 490,000 soldiers proposed in the budget for FY 2015 to 450,000 personnel by the
end of FY 2018. The Army National Guard will reduce its planned force structure from 350,200 in FY
2015 to 335,000 soldiers by the end of FY 2017. If the Department returns to the funding levels in the
Budget Control Act of 2011, the Army will be forced to downsize to 420,000 Active Component soldiers
and 315,000 Reserve Component soldiers. These drawdowns would be detrimental to meeting the defense
strategy outlined in the QDR. (2-2/3)
• Providing stability in shipbuilding to affordably deliver warfighting requirements. The FY 2016 budget
includes construction of 48 ships across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), including the steady
production of destroyers and submarines; construction of ten ships of each type is funded through FY 2020.
The Department of the Navy will build 14 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in the FYDP, the last 5 of which
will be of the modified LCS configuration. The modified configuration program begins in FY 2019 with no
gap from earlier LCS production; it provides improvements in ship lethality and survivability, delivering
444 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

enhanced naval combat performance at an affordable price. The FYDP shipbuilding construction program
also includes one aircraft carrier; one LHA replacement; one Landing Ship, Dock replacement (LX(R));
five T-ATF(X) fleet ocean tugs; one afloat forward staging base platform; and four T-AO(X) fleet oilers.
The FY 2016 budget also funds the overhaul/life extension of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (CVN-
73), its Carrier Air Wing, and associated force structure. If the Department returns to sequester-level
funding, the Navy will be forced to retire this carrier and air wing, and it will be unable to procure
approximately 9 ships and 35 aircraft over the FYDP. These cuts would jeopardize the Navy’s
modernization and recapitalization plans, threatening both readiness and the industrial base. (2-3)
• Maintaining the role of the Marine Corps as a vital crisis response force, protecting its most important
modernization priorities and ensuring readiness but reducing from 184,100 end strength in FY 2015 to a
planned end strength of 182,000 active Marines by the end of FY 2017. If sequester-level cuts return, the
Marines would continue their drawdown to an end strength of 175,000 by 2019, which would be
detrimental to meeting the defense strategy outlined in the QDR. (2-3)
• Maintaining an Air Force with global power projection capabilities and modernizing next generation Air
Force combat equipment — to include fighters, bombers, and munitions — particularly against increasingly
sophisticated air defense systems. To make resources available for these programs and preserve
investments in critical capabilities, the Air Force will reduce capacity in some single-role aviation
platforms by the end of the FYDP. A return to sequester-level funding would necessitate additional force
structure reductions plus cuts to flying hours and weapon sustainment that would delay readiness recovery.
(2-3)
• Achieving the right balance between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve Component (RC) is
critical to the Department’s overall efforts to size and shape the future joint force. The RC provides
capabilities and capacity that complement those of the AC and bolster the ability of the joint force to
execute the national defense strategy. As the Department reshapes the joint force, it will continue to rely on
the RC to maintain those complementary capabilities and capacity. (2-3)
As the joint force rebalances to remain modern, capable, and ready — while reducing end strength—the
Department will take the following additional steps that are consistent with the President’s Budget
submission to protect key capability areas:
• Air/Sea. The Department will increase the joint force’s ability to counter advanced anti-access and area-
denial capabilities by continuing to invest in fifth-generation fighters and long-range strike aircraft,
survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare capabilities.
• Nuclear Deterrence. The DoD will continue to invest in modernizing the triad’s essential nuclear
delivery systems, command and control, and, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, nuclear
weapons and supporting infrastructure.
• Space. The DoD will move toward less complex, more affordable, more resilient systems and system
architectures and pursue a multi-layered approach to deter attacks on space systems.
• Missile Defense. The DoD will make targeted investments in defensive interceptors, discrimination
capabilities, and sensors.
• Cyber. The Department will continue to invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces to
operate and defend DoD’s networks, enhance its ability to conduct cyberspace operations, support military
operations worldwide; and to counter cyber-attacks against the U.S.
• Precision Strike. The DoD will procure advanced air-to-surface missiles that will allow fighters and
bombers to engage a wide range of targets and a long-range anti-ship cruise missile that will improve the
ability of U.S. aircraft to engage surface combatants in defended airspace.
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The DoD will rebalance investments toward
systems that are effective in highly contested environments while sustaining capabilities appropriate for
more permissive environments in order to support global situational awareness, counter-terrorism, and
other operations.
• Counter-Terror and Special Operations. The DoD will slightly increase Special Operations Forces
growth to an end strength of 69,900 personnel, protecting DoD’s ability to sustain persistent, networked,
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 445

distributed operations to defeat al Qa’ida and other terrorist networks, counter other emerging transnational
threats, counter weapons of mass destruction, build the capacity of U.S. partners, and support conventional
operations.
If the Department returns to sequester-level funding, the ability to hedge against future risk with these
investments in key capability areas would be put at risk. The ability to hedge against near-term risk by
bolstering readiness will also be undermined.
Rebalancing tooth and tail. The Department continues to rebalance internally to prioritize spending on
combat power. Key ongoing activities include reducing the Department’s major headquarters’ operating
budgets by 20 percent and reducing intelligence analysis and production at Combatant Commands.
The DoD will remain committed to increasing productivity in defense acquisition. The Better Buying
Power initiative seeks to achieve affordable programs by incentivizing productivity and innovation in
industry and government, eliminating unproductive processes and bureaucracy, promoting effective
competition, improving tradecraft in contracted acquisition of services, and improving the professionalism
of the total acquisition workforce.
The Department must eliminate unneeded infrastructure; it already has more infrastructure than needed,
and the excess will increase as DoD reduces its end strength. The best way to eliminate unneeded
infrastructure is through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Congress has denied the
Department’s request for another BRAC in each of the past 3 years. If the Department is to make more
effective use of taxpayer dollars, Congress must approve the Department’s request to authorize another
BRAC round in 2017. The need to reduce unneeded facilities is so critical that, in the absence of
authorization of a new round of BRAC, the Administration will pursue alternative options to reduce this
wasteful spending. (2-4/5)
In spite of coming reductions in the total size of the US Army, there will also be changes that
improve its power projection capabilities: 1195
The Army is fundamentally changing the organization and management of its forces. Its focus is on
building rapidly deployable contingency capabilities in support of the Combatant Commanders while at the
same time reducing its end strength across all components. These adaptations are informed by wartime
experiences since 2001, which include operations in an increasingly joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
and multinational environment. Key initiatives include:
Army Contingency Force (ACF): In the near-term, the Army is rebuilding readiness from FY 2013
sequester shortfalls while facing the challenges of limited funding and continued demand for Army forces.
The FY 2015 budget enables the Army to realize the Chief of Staff’s intent to develop a contingency
response force which provides Combatant Commanders an initial response capability that can achieve early
objectives for most contingency plans. This force consists of a mix of infantry, armor, and Stryker BCTs,
an aviation task force, and associated enabling units. This budget funds the highest training level for the
ACF BCTs and sustains or improves the readiness in critical enabling formations.
Regionally Aligning Forces: As the Army transitions, it must restore and even increase its level of
commitment to Combatant Commanders to better provide presence, shape the environment, and win
decisively. Regional alignment aids in deterring aggression and provides increased responsiveness to and
focus on specific regional requirements, while preserving the strategic flexibility necessary to respond to
emergent requirements. In FY 2013, the Army began to align forces regionally with the goal of increasing
both the quantity and quality of forces available to Combatant Commanders. Simply described, the Army
aligns units with specific geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) based on existing assignments, State
Partnership Program, or anticipated demand. In doing so, the Army establishes operational and planning
associations between aligned units and the combatant commands. Training is tailored to include an
understanding of the languages, cultures, geography and militaries of the countries where the units are most
likely to be employed. The Army’s initial regionally aligned force began its relationship in 2013 with the
assignment of a BCT to the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). The Army estimates by the end of
2015, GCCs will be able to plan for increased use of their assigned forces.
BCT Re-organization: The Army is continuing its comprehensive re-organization of Army units to
provide more lethal, better aligned force structure with increased capability. This action serves to provide a
446 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

fiscal situation that requires a more economical force structure driven by current and future fiscal reality.
The centerpiece of this re-organization will be the enhancement of BCTs by adding maneuver, fires, and
engineer organizations. Over half of the Active Component units will be directly impacted by this re-
organization, either through realignment, unit moves, conversion, or inactivations. The BCT re-
organization and inactivation combined with the effects of fiscal reductions and continued global demand
for Army forces reduces the opportunity to build readiness in FY 2014 and FY 2015. However, only by
quickly changing force structure can the Army once again begin to achieve balance among force structure,
modernization, and readiness. The FY 2015 budget continues to support this transition by funding the
movement of Soldiers and equipment, providing sustainment services, continuing reset, redistribution of
equipment from Afghanistan, and funding logistics readiness centers.
Aviation Restructure: The Army is also undertaking a comprehensive Aviation restructure that optimizes
the aviation force to better respond to contingencies at home and abroad. The Army must at once reduce its
legacy fleet, modernize its primary aircraft, maintain readiness to meet operational demand, and balance
active and reserve structure. The Kiowa Warrior will be divested, and the armed aerial scout mission will
be assumed by the AH-64 Apache teamed with unmanned aerial vehicles. This comprehensive restructure
not only ensures the timely modernization of the National Guard’s existing aircraft, but also provides
additional UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters that enable both Title 32 and Title 10 missions. The training
fleet will be replaced with aircraft the Army already owns – the LUH-72, and aviation brigades will be
streamlined into a single configuration. This approach will ensure Soldiers on the ground, and the entire
Joint Force, continue to benefit from world-class aviation support.
Despite less emphasis on the Asia-Pacific rebalance in the FY2016 budget request, the US issued
a report in April 2013 that described specific programs for its rebalancing in Asia. It is important
to compare the FY2016 strategic goals and budgetary requests with the intended goals for the
Asia-Pacific rebalance in the 2013 report. The 2013 report stated that the rebalancing in Asia
included the following steps: 1196
• Creating a more operationally resilient Marine Corps presence in the Pacific, undertaking key presence
initiatives in Australia, and investing in Guam as a joint strategic hub… DoD invested in Pacific bases
in Guam and Pearl Harbor to enhance our capacity for submarine and CSG operations and to support
our rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region…The Department added $78 million in FY 2014 to enable
basing of another fast-attack submarine in Guam… The Department also added $300 million across the
FYDP to dredge Pearl Harbor to ease aircraft carrier access…The Department will procure a second
Virginia-Class attack submarine in FY 2014; this will lessen the impact from the retirements of Los
Angeles-Class attack submarines in the 2020s.
• Adding electronic attack EA-18Gs (Growlers) to offset the loss of retired Marine Corps EA-6B
(Prowler) squadrons
• Investing in an array of critical munitions, particularly for countering anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
strategies. Our military’s weapons must be invulnerable to countermeasures and be able to out-reach
our enemy’s defenses. Potential adversaries continue to improve their capabilities, challenging our
ability to project power, especially in anti-access environments. In order to preserve tactical,
operational, and strategic advantages, the FY 2014 submission increased investments in munitions that
overcome and resist adversary countermeasures, outrange enemy weapons, and strike difficult targets.
For example, this budget:
• Increased procurement of advanced blocks of air-to-air missiles like AIM-9X
• Funded development and production of a new highly capable, long-range anti-ship cruise missile
designed to out-range and resist adversary countermeasures
• Increased procurement of extended range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM-ER) to
enhance our arsenal of advanced long-range strike missiles
• Funded improvements to weapons designed to destroy or defeat hard and deeply buried targets, such as
the BLU-109 and BLU-113 penetrators
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 447

• Funded development of a new increment of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS)
designed to strike targets at range from the ground
• Funded a service life extension for the existing Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) to bridge
the gap until the new GMLRS increment is fielded and comply with our cluster munitions policy
• Integrated advanced Small Diameter Bombs (SDB-II) with all-weather and moving target capability on
additional Navy aircraft
• Funded development and demonstrations of alternative uses of existing capabilities, expanding
delivery platform options as well as broadening the type of targets munitions are able to strike
• Adjusted the apportionment of munitions around the globe to align with the strategy, emphasizing our
shift to the Asia-Pacific region
• We also enhanced capability and effective capacity by integrating munitions on a broader set of
platforms, funding demonstrations to expand applications of existing munitions, and ensuring that the
right munitions were strategically located around the world. For example, we:
o Integrated long-range air-launched JASSM-ERs on additional aircraft
o Integrated advanced Small Diameter Bombs (SDB-II) with all-weather and moving target
capability on additional Navy aircraft
o Funded development and demonstrations of alternative uses of existing capabilities, expanding
delivery platform options as well as broadening the type of targets munitions are able to strike
o Adjusted the apportionment of munitions around the globe to align with the strategy, emphasizing
our shift to the Asia-Pacific region
o Increasing our joint and combined training capacity in and around Guam
This is only a small part of the measures the US has underway, however the US still faces major
uncertainties as to what level of restructuring and systems it can afford, and has much to do in
defining its future posture in the ROK and Asia. It is maintaining its stance toward the DPRK as
a result of the cyber attack to Sony Pictures in late 2014 and continued tests of their short range
missile capability in March 2015. 1197
Former USFK Commander General Walter Sharp discussed some of the issues involved at a
CSIS forum in March 2013. He argued that the US and ROK should both increase defensive and
offensive capabilities against the DPRK, as the North has become increasingly threatening and is
approaching the capability to attack anywhere in the world with nuclear missiles. He proposed
that the US and ROK develop layered, robust missile defense systems that could quickly strike
anywhere in the DPRK; construct regional intelligence sharing systems, such as the December
2014 intelligence sharing agreement 1198, and increase sharing of military secrets to better
monitor the North; and continue tightening economic and diplomatic pressures on the DPRK. 1199
448 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VIII.10: US Total Force Plans, FY2015-FY2016

Active Manning (in thousands)

Reserve Forces (in thousands)

Total Forces

Source: Adapted from OSD Comptroller, FY2016 DoD Budget Request Overview,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 449

The Pace of Modernization

The US is slowing the pace of military modernization through program cuts, delaying the arrival
times of new equipment, and cutting the size of total future buys. However, the proposed levels
of US investment in military modernization are shown in Figure VIII.11, and would still lead
the world in terms of total modernization. If Congress largely accepts the President’s proposals,
the plans will not halt the US rebalancing to Asia or stop the US from modernizing key elements
of its forces that directly affect the Korean balance and US capabilities in the rest of Asia.
OSD Comptroller describes the pace of US modernization investment and summarizes the new
cuts made in the FY2016 budget as follows: 1200
The Department maintains a healthy Science and Technology (S&T) program of $12.3 billion to invest in
future technologies. The overall Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) portfolio of $69.8
billion includes an increase of $6.3 billion compared to the enacted FY 2015 appropriations. The
procurement portfolio of $107.7 billion includes an increase of $14.1 billion from the enacted FY 2015
appropriations.
Terminations and Restructures: The Department has determined that there are sufficient JSOW C (fixed
target) and JSOW C-1 (maritime moving target) weapons in inventory, and that other weapons will provide
a much more formidable capability in future near-peer surface warfare engagements. The JSOW is an air-
to-surface glide weapon with a standoff capability. The JSOW C-1 is the only variant in production; it has
been limited to Minimum Sustaining Rates since FY 2013.
The following changes in US modernization efforts will affect missile defense capabilities,
although it is far from clear that the end result will not lead to more solid and effective
modernization efforts: 1201
The FY 2016 President’s Budget funds the development and deployment of robust ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capabilities to support the Administration’s priorities: protecting the U.S. homeland, deployed
forces, allies, and partners. The budget includes $9.6 billion for missile defense, including $8.1 billion for
the Missile Defense Agency.
For homeland defense, the budget request maintains the commitment to increase the number of deployed
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to 44 by FY 2017; continue development of the Redesigned Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicle (REKV); and proceed with the development of the Long-Range Discrimination
Radar (LRDR). When combined with the planned GBI reliability and system engineering improvements,
these improvements will enable the homeland missile defense system to deal effectively with the maturing
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea and a potential ICBM threat from Iran.
The FY 2016 President’s Budget also reflects the Department’s commitment to building the regional
missile defense forces that are interoperable systems deployed by international partners.
The Department continues to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed
to protect U.S. deployed forces and allies in Europe from ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.
The budget request supports the implementation of Phase 3 of the EPAA, to include the deployment of
Aegis Ashore to Poland in the FY 2018 timeframe. The Aegis Ashore will be capable of launching
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Blocks IA, IB, and IIA (delivery in 2018) variants.
The FY 2016 President’s Budget request:
• Provides additional funding for key capabilities to meet the maturing threat from North Korean ICBMs
and the potential threat from Iranian ICBMs, including GBI reliability and system engineering
enhancements, GBI modifications to address the root causes of recent flight test failures, and operation of
the Sea-Based X-band radar.
• Provides funding for advanced technologies to meet the future threat, including discrimination
improvements, directed energy research, and multiple kill technologies.
450 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

• Provides funding for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Extended Range concept
development; and procures 30 THAAD interceptors in FY 2016.
• Procures 80 new Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles. The MSE is a significant evolutionary
improvement over the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile, and provides greater agility and
lethality.
• Continues U.S. contributions to the Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and rockets.
Continues support for the Arrow Weapon System and the David’s Sling Weapon System.
• Continues conversion of Aegis ships to provide BMD capability and procures 40 SM-3 Block IB missiles
to be deployed on Aegis BMD ships and at the Romania Aegis Ashore site.
While the US is cutting back in areas that affect the Korean balance and its total power
projection capabilities, it is also now focusing on the kind of force structure, modernization, and
readiness that affect its ability to both fight on the Korean Peninsula and project power in
Northeast Asia. The US will also continue several key areas of modernization that will
significantly increase its power projection capabilities: 1202
While the United States and coalition team have had a distinct precision attack advantage in recent
operations, such as Afghanistan, potential adversaries are leveraging technologies to improve existing
airframes with advanced radars, jammers, sensors, and more capable surface-to-air missile systems.
Increasingly sophisticated adversaries and highly contested environments will challenge the ability of Air
Force legacy fighters and bombers to engage in heavily defended areas. To stay ahead of these challenges,
the Air Force’s FY 2016 budget balances needed precision strike capabilities with fiscal constraints. It
funds modernization of legacy fighters, the B-1B Lancer, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter development and
procurement, development of a new Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) capability, and continued
investment in preferred air-to-ground munitions. (8-17)
Nuclear Deterrence: Strengthening the nuclear enterprise remains the number one mission priority within
the Air Force. The Air Force continues its actions to deliver safe, secure, and effective nuclear capabilities
within its Nuclear Deterrence Operations (NDO) portfolio. The Air Force’s intercontinental ballistic
missiles and heavy bombers provide two legs of the Nation’s nuclear TRIAD. Dual-capable fighters and
bombers extend deterrence and provide assurance to allies and partners. The Air Force continues its efforts
to further the skills and leadership of its NDO-Airmen and institutionalize improvements and capitalize on
gains made since the Air Force began reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise in 2008. (8-17)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM): The FY 2016 budget funds additional investments to sustain
and modernize the ICBM force. These investments include: ICBM Fuze replacement, Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) flight system development, the addition of officer Assignment Incentive Pay
and enlisted Special Duty Assignment Pay, and various security upgrades to include replacement of the
nuclear warhead Payload Transporter Van and the addition of Remote Visual Assessment II to the missile
fields. (8-17)
Manpower Supporting the Nuclear Enterprise: The FY 2016 budget funds 1,120 additional military and
civilian billets across the nuclear enterprise as part of the Secretary of the Air Force directed Force
Improvement Program. Additionally, 158 technical and engineering staff positions at Hill Air Force Base,
Utah, were added in support of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrence initiative to recapitalize the
Minuteman III infrastructure. (8-17)
Nuclear Helicopter Support: The FY 2016 budget fields a replacement for the Vietnam era UH-1N fleet
to address U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) validated nuclear security gaps. This program
purchases U.S. Army UH-60A Black Hawk models and converts them to UH-60L models using existing
government contractor services. (8-17)
Legacy Aircraft/Weapons: The Air Force continues to modernize global strike fighter aircraft to support
long-range interdiction capabilities. The FY 2016 budget funds the F-15E Strike Eagle radar replacement
with Active Electronically Scanned Area (AESA) radars and improves access in contested environments
with a modern Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS). The EPAWSS includes a
digital radio frequency memory jammer, an advanced radar warning receiver, and an improved chaff and
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 451

flare dispenser with towed decoy to promote aircraft survivability against modern threats. (8-17)
The Air Force continues to modernize its bomber fleet to extend the life of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 aircraft
until the Long Range Strike Bomber recapitalization program is complete. In FY 2016, the Air Force will
upgrade the B-52 aircraft to the Combat Network Communication Technology (CONECT) system, upgrade
the internal weapons bay to allow internal carriage of smart weapons, and add smart weapon decoy-jammer
and stand-off missile technologies to the external pylons. Additionally, the Air Force will replace the
Global Positioning System (GPS) Interface Unit to enhance GPS-aided navigation, advanced targeting pod
display and control, cryptographic key handling, route screen generation, and operation of the CONECT
computer. (8-17)
The FY 2016 budget continues funding for the B-2 Defensive Management Systems-Modernization (DMS-
M), the Common Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency Receiver (CVR) and Flexible Strike programs. The
DMS-M will enable penetration of dense threat environments while CVR adds survivable communications
capability to the platform. The FY 2016 budget funds the continuation of the B-1 Integrated Battle Station
contract, which concurrently procures and installs Vertical Situation Display Upgrade (VSDU), Central
Integrated Test System (CITS) and Fully Integrated Data Link (FIDL) to address obsolescence, diminishing
manufacturing sources, and enhance line-of-sight/beyond line-of-sight Link 16 communications. (8-17)
The FY 2016 budget funds sustainment of Nuclear Command, Control, Communication and upgrades.
Specifically, the Air Force will upgrade the Strategic Automated Command and Control System and Very
Low Frequency cabling upgrades to ICBM systems. Additional funding items include Global Aircrew
Strategic Network Terminal increments 1 and 2, and B-2 AEHF. (8-17)
Fifth Generation Aircraft: To counter the challenge of highly contested environments, the Air Force is
procuring the F-35A Lightning II aircraft, one of the top three acquisition priorities for the Air Force. The
FY 2016 budget includes funding for Block 4 of the F-35 program, in addition to research and development
funds for nuclear dual capability for the aircraft. (8-17)
Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B): The LRS-B aircraft is also one of the Air Force’s top three
acquisition priorities and is currently in the development phase. The LRS-B aircraft must be able to
penetrate highly contested environments, have top-end low observability characteristics, and loiter
capability. The Air Force’s FY 2016 budget request includes funding to continue the development of an
affordable, long range, penetrating aircraft that incorporates proven technologies. This follow-on bomber
represents a key component to the joint portfolio of conventional and nuclear deep-strike capabilities.(8-17)
A Modern Army: To meet the strategic vision and improve global responsiveness and regional
engagement, the Army will develop and field new capabilities or sustain, improve, or divest current
systems based on operational value, capability shortfalls, and available resources. The Army’s
modernization efforts will prioritize Soldier-centered development, cyber tools, and procurement of proven
technologies to ensure that Soldiers and teams have the best weapons, equipment, and protection to
accomplish every mission, including a robust, integrated tactical mission command network. To ensure
readiness, the budget request does not invest fully in longer term modernization, but will maintain science
and technology investments at FY 2014 levels to support the development of breakthrough technologies,
counter rapidly emerging threats, and provide Army formations with a decisive advantage and tactical
overmatch across the full range of military operations. The Army will employ a resource-informed
approach to materiel innovation to support the enduring relevance of land power. (8-5)
The Army budget request includes limited OCO investments to continue the reset and transition of the
previous generation of rapidly deployed, non-standard items into the base force while continuing the
replacement, integration and standardization of equipment recently returned from Afghanistan. (8-5)
The Army is involved in operations around the world against adaptive threats able to take advantage of the
ever-increasing pace of technological change. Science and technology efforts will be a key contributor to
enabling strategic land power and serves as a hedge against an uncertain future. Science and technology
efforts will foster innovation, maturation, and demonstration of technology-enabled capabilities that
empower, unburden, and protect the Soldier of the future while exploiting opportunities to transition
increased capability to the current force. Army science and technology efforts continue the strategic
investments and the shifts implemented in FY 2015 and are aligned with DoD direction and rebalance
towards the Pacific. Areas of emphasis include efforts associated with congested/contested environments
452 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

(Assured Position, Navigation, and Timing, Cyber, and Long Range Precision Fires); and future programs
of record (Joint Multi-Role Demonstrator, Degraded Visual Environment, Next Generation Future Fighting
Vehicle, and Red Teaming/Vulnerability Analysis). (8-6)
To meet the demands of the future strategic environment and win in a complex world, the Army must make
formations leaner while retaining capability, become more expeditionary, and preserve overmatch.
Increasing lethality, agility and expeditionary capacity in the Army of 2025 will result from targeted
science and technology investment, agile acquisition, and rapid integration of commercial off-the-shelf
technologies to provide modernized Army units to the Nation. Force 2025 will harness scientific
innovations in order to identify and develop the most promising new technologies and solutions. (8-6)
While the Army will delay some new system development and invest in the next generation of capabilities,
the FY 2016 budget request also provides for incremental upgrades to increase capabilities and modernize
existing systems. In addition to Aviation Restructure Initiative-informed investments in Apache AH64E
and Blackhawk UH60M, the Army will sustain investments for Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle
Command System, Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement, and Indirect Fire Protection Capability. The FY
2016 budget request will allow the Army to fund tactical mission command network integration as well as
survivability, lethality, mobility and protection improvements to the Abrams tank, Bradley Infantry
Fighting Vehicle, and Paladin self-propelled howitzer fleets. The FY 2016 budget also funds development
of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace the obsolete M113 family of vehicles, and the Joint Light
Tactical family of vehicles. The Army continues to lead DoD’s transition to advancing enterprise network
infrastructure and services, employing enhanced security, capacity, and capability to modernize the
network from the tactical edge to the installation. Through scalable modernization, the Army will reduce
network gaps to support global mission reach back demands and envisioned end states, such as distributed
operations and live/virtual/constructive training. (8-6)
Navy Overview: As the Nation’s forward deployed expeditionary force, the Navy and Marine Corps
provide the Nation’s most responsive capability for emergent security threats. The FY 2016 President’s
budget funding level reflects the resources required in today’s security environment featuring sustained
pressure to rapidly respond to a diverse scope of requirements spanning extremist organizations, pandemic
diseases and natural disasters, while continuing to deter assertive actors across the globe through our
expeditionary presence and dominant warfighting capability. (8-10)
To maintain this force, the DoN balances the required force structure with proper training. The FY 2016
President’s budget request balances current readiness needed to execute assigned missions while sustaining
a highly capable fleet, all within a tough fiscal climate. This budget reflects a DoN Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) from 2016 to 2020 of $828.4 billion, $5.1 billion higher than the FYDP presented with
the FY 2015 budget; the FY 2016 budget is $161.0 billion, an increase of $1.5 billion. (8-10)
The FY 2016 budget includes construction of 48 ships across the FYDP. Providing stability in shipbuilding
to deliver warfighting requirements affordably, the budget supports steady production of destroyers and
submarines; 10 of each are constructed through FY 2020. The DoN will build 14 Littoral Combat Ships
(LCS) in the FYDP, the last five of which are of the modified LCS configuration. The modified
configuration program begins in FY 2019 with no gap from earlier LCS production. The modified LCS
provides improvements in ship lethality and survivability, delivering enhanced naval combat performance
at an affordable price. The FYDP shipbuilding construction program also includes one aircraft carrier, one
LHA replacement, one LX(R), five T-ATS(X) fleet towing, salvage, and rescue vessels, one afloat forward
staging base platform, and four T-AO(X) fleet oilers. The FY 2016 budget also funds USS GEORGE
WASHINGTON (CVN-73), its Carrier Air Wing, and associated force structure. (8-10)
The budget supports a balanced manned and unmanned aviation procurement plan of 492 aircraft over the
FYDP. The successful underway testing of the carrier variant (CV) of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) on USS
NIMITZ (CVN-68) in 2014 continues the JSF program progression; 121 JSF aircraft are procured across
the FYDP. The Marine Corps invests heavily in rotary wing aircraft, accelerating the procurement of the
final 109 AH-1Z-1/UH-1Y helicopters, and procures 37 MV-22 Ospreys. The first 24 Navy V-22 Carrier
Onboard Delivery (COD) aircraft will be procured starting in FY 2018. Investment in unmanned systems
includes 18 MQ-4 Triton Unmanned Aircraft Systems through FY 2020, with the first deployment to the
Pacific in FY 2017, and the procurement of 10 MQ-8C Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
Aviation investments also include procurement of airborne early warning aircraft (24 E-2D), multi-mission
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 453

helicopters (29 MH-60R), presidential helicopters (12 VXX), heavy lift helicopters (26 CH-53K), aerial
refueling tankers (10 KC-130J), and the final 47 P-8A Poseidon multi-mission maritime aircraft. (8-11)
The FY 2016 budget includes a fleet of 282 Battle Force Ships. This baseline budget maintains
Navy/Marine Corps flying hours at a T-2.5/2.0 rating, with the exception of the F/A-18 A-D aircraft that
are constrained by depot level throughput. Baseline funding for ship and aviation depot maintenance meets
80 and 77 percent of the requirements, and Marine Corps ground equipment maintenance is funded at 84
percent of requirement. Facility sustainment levels for Navy are funded to 84 percent of the sustainment
model and the Marine Corps funded to 81 percent in this baseline budget. (8-11)
To provide the required ability to deter aggression, respond to emerging security threats - including
extremist organizations, and providing humanitarian assistance during pandemic diseases, and natural
disasters — the U.S. must maintain the proper force capacity. The Navy will grow to 329,200 and while the
Marine Corps will remain at 184,000 in FY 2016. The Marines will continue returning to their
expeditionary roots, with an enhanced ability to operate from sea. Civilian personnel levels will remain
steady, strongly supporting the force as engineers, scientists, medical professionals, and skilled laborers. (8-
11)
The Department has been challenged to meet combatant commander demand for forces, and associated
higher-than-planned operational tempo, while dealing with the reality of reduced resources. Forces
available for surge requirements have decreased due to increased maintenance on aging platforms, a
reduction in aircraft and weapons procurement, and risks taken against support infrastructure. This budget
continues to put a priority on readiness while maintaining the minimum investment necessary to maintain
an advantage in advanced technologies and weapons systems. While the Department has accepted some
risk in weapons capacity and delayed certain modernization programs, this budget provides the DoN with a
plan to keep the Navy and Marine Corps as a ready, balanced force. (8-11)
The FY 2016 President’s Budget funds the priority findings in the Nuclear Enterprise Review, including
shipyard capacity, infrastructure, and training, and nuclear weapons support manning. The Department’s
budget submission added approximately $2.2 billion across the FYDP for these efforts. Key elements
include increasing shipyard capacity by funding a total end strength of 33,500 Full-Time Equivalents by
FY 2018; accelerating investments in shipyard infrastructure and Nuclear Weapons Storage facilities;
funding additional manpower associated with nuclear weapons surety at the Strategic Weapons Facilities,
Strategic Systems Program Office, and at both East and West Coast Type Commander Headquarters; and
funding key nuclear weapon training systems to include another missile tube simulator and associated
sustainment to ballistic missile submarine sailors. (8-11)
Overall, the Department’s investments in readiness and infrastructure in the FY 2016 budget request are
essential to generating the combat ready forces that support the DoD rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, and
enable critical presence in the strategic maritime crossroads spanning the Middle East, Europe, Africa, the
Western Pacific, and South America. (8-11/12)
It is important to note that the US stresses a far higher degree of partnership with key allies like
the ROK and Japan. It is also focusing on ISR, air and sea power projection capabilities, and
Special Forces that can reinforce partners like the ROK rather than trying to fight a war by
relying on US forces. These trends are reflected in the different summaries each service provided
of their procurement plans for the FY2016 budget submission, shown in Figure VIII.12.
This does increase some risks, but it also reflects the underlying realities of the Korean balance.
Unless the US deployed most of its ground forces to Korea, it would face major time problems in
deploying massive ground reinforcements to the Peninsula.
Past US plans called for a ground force build-up that took more time than most scenarios allow.
While increased reliance on partnership, ISR, stealth, and precision strike have their limits, they
also offer the ability to rapidly support a key ally, increase deterrence in the areas where the
DPRK has been most provocative, and offset the DPRK’s advantages along the DMZ relative to
454 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the ___location of Seoul and other key Korean population and economic centers by creating a US
deep strike capability that the DPRK cannot defend against or match.
This does not mean that the US will not have to adapt to any changes in DPRK forces that
involve further major increases in its deployments near the border or ground attack capabilities,
or the overall mix of forces that might be deployed if China intervened on the DPRK’s behalf. At
the same time, the ROK is now capable of supporting the conventional forces needed to deal
with the DPRK threat and assume the lead in the US-ROK partnership.

Figure VIII.11: US Military Investment Spending

Source: Adapted from OSD Comptroller, FY2016 DoD Budget Request Overview,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 455

Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part One (US Army)

Source: Adapted from MGen Thomas A. Horlander, Director, Army Budget, and Mr. Davis E. Welch, Deputy Director, Army
Budget, Army FY2016 Budget Overview, February 2015.
456 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Two (US Navy)

Shipbuilding

Aviation

Source: Adapted from RADM William K. Lescher, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget, US Department of
the Navy, FY 2016 President’s Budget, February 2, 2015.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 457

Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Three

(US Marine Corps)
FY2014 FY2015 FY2016

Source: Adapted from RADM William K. Lescher, USN, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Budget, US Department of
the Navy, FY 2016 President’s Budget, February 2, 2015.
458 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure VIII.12: Procurement Plans – Part Four (US Air Force)

Source: Adapted from US Air Force, FY2016 Budget Overview, SAF/FMB, February 2016.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 459

US
The US is a key ally of both Korea and Japan and would become involved in any military
conflict that occurred on the Korean Peninsula – as the increased US military equipment sent to
the region in March and April of 2013 in response to North Korean threats has shown. The US is,
however, cutting its military expenditures as a response to the economic crisis that began in 2008
as well as cutting its forces in a post-Afghanistan and post-Iraq atmosphere of budget constraints
and reduced spending.
Some US allies and regional partners are worried about the future US ability to maintain its
current force levels and “rebalance” its military posture in Asia. US defense economics and
military spending trends have become important not only as a measure of the force levels the US
can commit to the Koreas and the Asia-Pacific region, but also as a measure of US capability to
reassure its allies and deter potential enemies.
It is difficult to put these concerns in perspective. The US budget submission for FY2016
indicates that the US can fund effective forces for Asia and only a global basis. This does,
however, require a far more efficient use of resources by the US Department of Defense. It also
requires the Congress to support President Obama’s request for higher defense spending levels
that are currently authorized by the acts shaping US legislation on sequestration and future US
defense spending ceilings.
Pressure on the US Economy: A CIA Assessment
It is interesting to compare the CIA assessment of the US economy to the assessments of the
other economies that shape the Korean balance: 1203
The US has the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, with a per capita GDP of
$49,800. In this market-oriented economy, private individuals and business firms make most of the
decisions, and the federal and state governments buy needed goods and services predominantly in the
private marketplace. US business firms enjoy greater flexibility than their counterparts in Western Europe
and Japan in decisions to expand capital plant, to lay off surplus workers, and to develop new products. At
the same time, they face higher barriers to enter their rivals’ home markets than foreign firms face entering
US markets. US firms are at or near the forefront in technological advances, especially in computers and in
medical, aerospace, and military equipment; their advantage has narrowed since the end of World War II.
The onrush of technology largely explains the gradual development of a “two-tier labor market” in which
those at the bottom lack the education and the professional/technical skills of those at the top and, more and
more, fail to get comparable pay raises, health insurance coverage, and other benefits. Since 1975,
practically all the gains in household income have gone to the top 20% of households. Since 1996,
dividends and capital gains have grown faster than wages or any other category of after-tax income.
Imported oil accounts for nearly 55% of US consumption.
Crude oil prices doubled between 2001 and 2006, the year home prices peaked; higher gasoline prices ate
into consumers’ budgets and many individuals fell behind in their mortgage payments. Oil prices climbed
another 50% between 2006 and 2008, and bank foreclosures more than doubled in the same period. Besides
dampening the housing market, soaring oil prices caused a drop in the value of the dollar and a
deterioration in the US merchandise trade deficit, which peaked at $840 billion in 2008. The sub-prime
mortgage crisis, falling home prices, investment bank failures, tight credit, and the global economic
downturn pushed the United States into a recession by mid-2008. GDP contracted until the third quarter of
2009, making this the deepest and longest downturn since the Great Depression.
To help stabilize financial markets, in October 2008 the US Congress established a $700 billion Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). The government used some of these funds to purchase equity in US banks
and industrial corporations, much of which had been returned to the government by early 2011. In January
460 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

2009 the US Congress passed and President Barack Obama signed a bill providing an additional $787
billion fiscal stimulus to be used over 10 years - two-thirds on additional spending and one-third on tax cuts
- to create jobs and to help the economy recover. In 2010 and 2011, the federal budget deficit reached
nearly 9% of GDP.
In 2012 the federal government reduced the growth of spending and the deficit shrank to 7.6% of GDP.
Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required major shifts in national resources from civilian to military purposes
and contributed to the growth of the budget deficit and public debt. Through 2011, the direct costs of the
wars totaled nearly $900 billion, according to US government figures. US revenues from taxes and other
sources are lower, as a percentage of GDP, than those of most other countries. In March 2010, President
Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health insurance reform that was
designed to extend coverage to an additional 32 million American citizens by 2016, through private health
insurance for the general population and Medicaid for the impoverished.
Total spending on health care - public plus private - rose from 9.0% of GDP in 1980 to 17.9% in 2010. In
July 2010, the president signed the DODD-FRANK Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a
law designed to promote financial stability by protecting consumers from financial abuses, ending taxpayer
bailouts of financial firms, dealing with troubled banks that are “too big to fail,” and improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system - in particular, by requiring certain financial
derivatives to be traded in markets that are subject to government regulation and oversight.
In December 2012, the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced plans to purchase $85 billion per month of
mortgage-backed and Treasury securities in an effort to hold down long-term interest rates, and to keep
short term rates near zero until unemployment drops below 6.5% or inflation rises above 2.5%. In late
2013, the Fed announced that it would begin scaling back long-term bond purchases to $75 billion per
month in January 2014 and reduce them further as conditions warranted; the Fed, however, would keep
short-term rates near zero so long as unemployment and inflation had not crossed the previously stated
thresholds. Long-term problems include stagnation of wages for lower-income families, inadequate
investment in deteriorating infrastructure, rapidly rising medical and pension costs of an aging population,
energy shortages, and sizable current account and budget deficits.

Pressures on US Defense Spending through FY2016

For several years, these pressures have led to cuts in US spending plans and led the US to rethink
the best ways to reduce spending while maintaining a capable force. An IISS analysis published
in early 2015 described the US defense budgetary issues in 2014 with three themes: 1204
Firstly, near-term US defence-spending plans seemed to stabilise in 2014 after several years of budgetary
uncertainty, with the base budget avoiding sequestration and settling at real-terms levels higher than those
seen during previous defence drawdowns.
Secondly, the Pentagon seemed to have brought its plans in line with statutory spending caps, despite
considerable political rhetoric in Congress about the dangers of lower defence-spending levels.
Thirdly, the war-related budget looked set to remain in place to fund overseas operational requirements
(despite the downscaling in Afghanistan operations for which it was initially created), but with a broader
and more flexible interpretation than had been used in previous years. This could potentially open up a
second, semi-permanent budget line to channel defence funding, which may in future be used to offset
statutory pressures on the base budget.
As a result of spending pressures, the US Army plans to reduce its Active Component from the
proposed 490,000 troop level in FY2015 to 450,000 by the end of FY2018. The Army warned
Congress in its FY 2016 Budget Request that if the fiscal austerity measures from the Budget
Control Act of 2011 return, then the Army will be forced to reduce troop levels to 420,000.
Likewise, the Marines will contract from 184,100 to 182,000 by the end of FY2017 and warns
that if sequester level funding returns then they will be forced to reduce to an end-strength of
175,000. 1205
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 461

During 2014, the Army continued its program to reduce the overall number of Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs) and redistribute its assets to increase the remaining BCT’s maneuver battalions to
three in each BCT. 1206 Of the Army’s 32 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), two will be disbanded
by FY2016. While the Marines will a cut in force structure, procurement will slightly
increase. 1207
The US Navy has maintained an enduring posture and procurement plan while undertaking
significant research in unmanned aircraft and vessels. While the Navy struggles to define the role
requirements for some future programs, it has made considerable progress with the Unmanned
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike project, the LX(R) amphibious ship, and
small surface combatant. 1208
For the Air Force, 1209
For the first time in over two decades, the USAF was considering the potential erosion of its technical edge,
as other nations developed and fielded increasingly capable air-combat and air-defence systems. It was also
contemplating an air-combat platform to follow the F-22 Raptor, with seed funding allocated in FY2015
for air dominance beyond 2030. Future equipment priorities centered on recapitalizing ageing fighter,
bomber and tanker fleets. The average airframe age within the fighter fleet, excluding the F-22, was 25
years; in the bomber fleet it was 32 years.
The Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), which will form part of the USAF’s nuclear capability, has an
anticipated initial operational capability of 2024–26. Given this compressed development timescale, it was
perhaps surprising that a prime contractor was yet to be selected as of the end of 2014. However, the
funding profile led some, including the Congressional Research Service, to suggest that some elements of
the aircraft’s research and development, and perhaps the aircraft itself, have existed as classified projects
for some time.
Budgetary pressures resulted in the planned withdrawal from service of the A-10 Thunderbolt II close-air-
support aircraft during FY2015, while the U-2 ISR aircraft was slated to be withdrawn from FY2016. The
capability provided by the U-2 was planned to be met partly by the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV, while the
low-observable RQ 180 ISR UAV, developed as a classified project, was as of late 2014 likely nearing
entry into service.

Ongoing Cuts but Still Funding the World’s Largest Military Power
The impact of potential sequestration cuts in FY2016 should not be exaggerated if the Congress
supports the funding levels laid out in President Obama’s FY2016 budget proposal and FY2016-
FY2020 Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). As Figure VIII.13 shows, the projected levels of
US spending are still extremely high by global standards and by those of the other powers that
shape the Korean balance. The FY2016 budget request also did not call for all the cuts called for
in the sequestration legislation, set to begin once more in FY2016 if Congress does not change it,
because the President sought to ease the pressure on defense spending through other measures
like cuts in entitlement spending and additional tax revenues. 1210
The Department’s fiscal environment remains uncertain. Beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the
Department began a $487 billion, 10-year reduction in spending, compared to the projections in the FY
2012 budget, to adhere to spending limits established by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The
subsequent failure of the Joint committee on Deficit Reduction resulted in a sequestration mechanism that
triggered annual reductions to the discretionary caps established in the BCA.
In FY 2013, as a result of sequestration, the DoD base budget was reduced by $30 billion from the original
base budget request. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 amended the BCA to provide modest relief from
sequestration in FY 2014 and 2015 but, unless Congress acts, annual sequestration cuts are set to begin
once more in FY 2016.
462 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

To protect the nation’s security interests while maintaining the national security imperative of deficit
reduction, the President’s Budget proposes a Defense budget approximately $36 billion above the
sequestration level in FY 2016, and about $155 billion above estimated sequestration levels over a 5-year
period, to provide a balanced and responsible path forward. The base budget request is approximately $38.2
billion above the Department’s FY 2015 enacted appropriations.
There is no way to predict the outcome. The US is now debating and revising every aspect of its
strategy and defense plans as part of the far broader debate over US government spending that
could take place regarding sequestration and the final shape of the FY2016 budget and outyear
plans. Figure VIII.10 does, however, show the broad trends in US forces in the President’s
budget submission for 2016.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 463

Figure VIII.13: US Military Spending

Total Spending: FY2001 to FY2016

Baseline (minus OCO) Spending: FY2016 to FY2020

Source: Adapted from OSD Comptroller, FY2016 DoD Budget Request Overview,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.
464 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

IX. The Broader Balance of Missile, WMD,

and Strategic Forces
It is unclear that China and the US will ever directly confront each other in a conflict in the
Koreas, but both countries are developing a mix of new conventional missile, precision strike,
nuclear-armed missile, nuclear weapon, and space warfare capabilities that have a major impact
on the balance in the Koreas, Northeast Asia, and the entire Pacific region.
The interactions between these forces are growing steadily more complex and cannot be
separated from the other patterns of force modernization summarized in Chapters VI and VII.
Like the differences between “conventional” and “asymmetric” warfare, the differences between
conventional precision strikes and nuclear strikes can also be exaggerated; both can be involved
as elements in deterrence, limiting escalation, or a nuclear-conventional conflict.
Any assessment of the balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia must consider just how
important it is to emphasize Chinese and US cooperation that will avoid any confrontation or
conflict that could escalate to the use of such forces, the potential impact that a DPRK-ROK use
of missile and WMD forces could have on Chinese and US tension and escalation, and the reality
of the impact that US rebalancing and Chinese emphasis on sea-air-missile capabilities for
A2AD can have under worst case conditions.
Both China and the US have every strategic and economic reason to show restraint, negotiate,
and avoid such worst cases. Cooperation will not be easy, but the following analysis makes it all
too clear that every effort needs to be made to avoid repeating the mistakes that drove the US and
China into the Korean War and the “worst case” miscalculations that led to World War I and
World War II. Even some Asian repetition of the Cold War, and even one limited to
conventional air and missile combat, would be a costly tragedy of incredible proportions.
China’s Evolving Force Mix and Strategy
The US has long been a power with extensive conventional precision-strike, space-based, and
nuclear capabilities. China, however, is rapidly modernizing and expanding its capabilities in all
these areas. China does formally oppose all forms of nuclear, biological, and chemical
proliferation in the Koreas. Its 2010 White Paper states that, 1211
China firmly opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery,
and consistently deals with non-proliferation issues in a highly responsible manner. China maintains that, in
order to prevent proliferation at source, efforts should be made to foster a global and regional security
environment featuring mutual trust and cooperation, and the root causes of WMD proliferation should be
eliminated. It holds that non-proliferation issues should be resolved through political and diplomatic means.
It holds that the authority, effectiveness and universality of the international non-proliferation regime
should be upheld and enhanced.
The international community should ensure fairness and prevent discrimination in international non-
proliferation efforts, strike a balance between non-proliferation and the peaceful use of science and
technology, and abandon double standards. China has joined all international treaties and international
organizations in the field of non-proliferation, and supports the role played by the United Nations in this
regard, and has conscientiously implemented any relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 465

China advocates resolving the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula peacefully through dialogues and
consultations, endeavoring to balance common concerns through holding six-party talks in order to realize
the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and maintain peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and
the Northeast Asia. China, always considering the whole situation in the long run, painstakingly urges
related countries to have more contacts and dialogues in order to create conditions for resuming six-party
talks as early as possible…
The 2013 Chinese white paper provided relatively little substantive data on China’s policies and
strategy regarding the use of nuclear weapons, but did describe China’s strategic missile forces
as follows, 1212
The PLA Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) is a core force for China’s strategic deterrence. It is mainly
composed of nuclear and conventional missile forces and operational support units, primarily responsible
for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear
counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. Following the principle of building a lean
and effective force, the PLASAF is striving to push forward its informationization transform, relying on
scientific and technological progress to boost independent innovations in weaponry and equipment,
modernizing current equipment selectively by applying mature technology, enhancing the safety, reliability
and effectiveness of its missiles, improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional
missiles, strengthening its rapid reaction, effective penetration, precision strike, damage infliction,
protection and survivability capabilities.
The PLASAF capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack and conventional precision strike
are being steadily elevated. The PLASAF has under its command missile bases, training bases, specialized
support units, academies and research institutions. It has a series of “Dong Feng” ballistic missiles and
“Chang Jian” cruise missiles.
…The PLASAF keeps an appropriate level of readiness in peacetime. It pursues the principles of
combining peacetime needs with wartime needs, maintaining vigilance all the time and being ready to fight.
It has formed a complete system for combat readiness and set up an integrated, functional, agile and
efficient operational duty system to ensure rapid and effective responses to war threats and emergencies. If
China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the CMC, go into a
higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to deter the enemy from using nuclear
weapons against China. If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the PLASAF
will use nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack either independently or together with the
nuclear forces of other services. The conventional missile force is able to shift instantly from peacetime to
wartime readiness, and conduct conventional medium- and long-range precision strikes.
The most striking aspect of the 2013 Defense White Paper was that it not only omitted China’s
previous commitments to “no first use” of nuclear weapons, but it also omitted any description of
the fact China was making major improvements in its nuclear strike capability. China is
improving its missile forces, is developing missile defense and counterspace capabilities, and is
upgrading its nuclear capabilities in ways that affect the US and Chinese nuclear balance as well
as the balance in the Koreas.
Growing Chinese Deterrent and A2AD Capabilities
Chinese military analysts publicly explore a wide range of innovative strategies designed to use
missile and precision strike forces to deter or limit US military capabilities in the region,
although many of these forces are now deployed in ways that focus on Taiwan. China already
has conventionally armed missiles with terminal guidance systems and has improved such
systems under development, including ballistic anti-ship missiles that pose a long-range strategic
threat to US carrier task forces.
As Bonnie S. Glaser, a leading US expert on Chinese military forces, notes, “these strategies are
laid out in publications by military academies and scholars on questions of military strategy and
466 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

doctrine, including multiple editions of Zhanlue Xue (The Science of Strategy) and Zhanyi Xue
(The Science of Campaigns) as well as Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan (Campaign Theory Study
Guide).” 1213
The US DOD put heavy emphasis on these “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2AD) capabilities
– and their potential impact on US power projection capabilities in the Koreas and Northeast
Asia – in its report on Military and Security Developments Affecting the People’s Republic of
China for 2011 and 2014. A combination of excerpts from these reports provides a good
summary of what Chinese A2/AD capabilities entail. 1214
As part of its planning for military contingencies, China continues to develop measures to deter or counter
third-party intervention, particularly by the United States. China’s approach to dealing with this challenge
is manifested in a sustained effort to develop the capability to attack, at long ranges, military forces that
might deploy to or operate in the western Pacific, which the Department of Defense characterizes as “anti-
access and area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities. China is pursuing a variety of air, sea, undersea, space and
counterspace, and information warfare systems and operational concepts to achieve this capability, moving
toward an array of overlapping, multilayered offensive capabilities extending from China’s coast into the
western Pacific. (2014, p. 30)
An essential element, if not a fundamental prerequisite, of China’s emerging A2/AD regime is the ability to
control and dominate the information spectrum in all dimensions of the modern battlespace. PLA authors
often cite the need in modern warfare to control information, sometimes termed “information blockade” or
“information dominance,” and to seize the initiative and gain an information advantage in the early phases
of a campaign to achieve air and sea superiority. China is improving information and operational security to
protect its own information structures and is also developing electronic and information warfare
capabilities, including denial and deception, to defeat those of its adversaries. China’s “information
blockade” likely envisions the use of military and non-military instruments of state power across the
battlespace, including in cyberspace and outer space to deny information superiority to its adversaries.
China’s investments in advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems, counterspace weapons, and computer
network operations (CNO) – combined with propaganda and denial through opacity – reflect the emphasis
and priority China’s leaders place on building capability for information advantage. (2014, p. 30-31)
In more traditional domains, China’s A2AD focus appears oriented toward restricting or controlling access
to the land, sea, and air spaces along China’s periphery, including the western Pacific. For example,
China’s current and projected force structure improvements will provide the PLA with systems that can
engage adversary surface ships up to 1,850 km from the PRC coast. These include:
• Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles: Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) designed to target forces
at sea, combined with overhead and over-the-horizon targeting systems to locate and track moving
ships.
• Conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines: KILO, SONG, YUAN, and SHANG-class
attack submarines capable of firing advanced ASCMs.
• Surface combatants: LUZHOU, LUYANG I/II, SOVREMENNY-II-class guided missile
destroyers with advanced long-range anti-air and anti-ship missiles.
• Maritime Strike Aircraft: FB-7 and FB-7A, B-6G, and the SU-30 MK2, armed with ASCMs to
engage surface combatants. (2011, p. 28-29)
Similarly, current and projected systems such as the J-20 stealth fighter and longer-range conventional
ballistic missiles could improve the PLA’s ability to strike regional air bases, logistical facilities, and other
ground-based infrastructure. PRC military analysts have concluded that logistics and power projection are
potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, given the requirements for precision in coordinating
transportation, communications, and logistics networks. China is fielding an array of conventionally armed
ballistic missiles, modern aircraft, UAVs, ground- and air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, special
operations forces, and cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at risk throughout the region. (2011, p. 28-
29)
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 467

The development of China’s conventionally armed missiles has been rapid, even in the context of overall
Chinese military modernization. As recently as ten years ago, several hundred short-range ballistic missiles
might have ranged targets in Taiwan, but China effectively had no capability to strike many other locations
in or beyond the first island chain (such as U.S. bases in Okinawa or Guam). Today, however, China has
more than 1,000 conventionally armed ballistic missiles. U.S. bases on Okinawa are in range of a growing
number of Chinese MRBMs, and Guam could potentially be reached by air-launched cruise missiles.
(2014, p. 31)
The DOD provided further data in its 2014 updates to Military and Security Developments
Affecting the People’s Republic of China. It described China’s missile developments as
follows: 1215
China has prioritized land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs to extend its strike warfare
capabilities further from its borders. It is developing and testing several new classes and variants of
offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile systems, and developing
methods to counter ballistic missile defenses. (2014, p. 36)
The Second Artillery controls most of China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles. It is developing
and testing several new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units,
upgrading older missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
By November 2013, the Second Artillery possessed more than 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) in its inventory. China is increasing the lethality of this missile force by fielding new
conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to improve its ability to strike not only Taiwan but
other regional targets.
China is fielding a limited but growing number of conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missiles,
including the CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The CSS-5 Mod 5 gives the PLA
the capability to attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean. The CSS-5
Mod 5 has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a maneuverable warhead. (2014, p. 6-7)
The development of China’s conventionally armed missiles has been rapid, even in the context of overall
Chinese military modernization. As recently as ten years ago, several hundred short-range ballistic missiles
might have ranged targets in Taiwan, but China effectively had no capability to strike many other locations
in or beyond the first island chain (such as U.S. bases in Okinawa or Guam). Today, however, China has
more than 1,000 conventionally armed ballistic missiles. U.S. bases on Okinawa are in range of a growing
number of Chinese MRBMs, and Guam could potentially be reached by air-launched cruise missiles.
(2014, p. 31)

Chinese Conventional Missile Capabilities

China is acquiring the ability to project conventional missile power deep into the Pacific in ways
that make the traditional discussion of “blue water” navies increasingly less relevant. The issue
today is the overall mix of sea-air-missile-space capabilities and how they interact with both
conventional forces and asymmetric forces, including new forms of conflict like cyberwarfare.
One can only speculate on the pace of change that these shifts will trigger in US, Chinese, and
other regional powers over the coming decades, but they are already a major new aspect of the
balance.
Moreover, China’s emerging missile proficiencies include both conventional and nuclear strike
capabilities in ways that interact even if China and the US never openly threaten to use nuclear
forces. Chinese nuclear capabilities can deter or limit the US response to China’s use of
conventionally armed missiles, and even a worst case escalation to the use of nuclear armed
missiles may still lead China to use conventionally armed precision strike systems against US or
politically sensitive targets in ways intended to limit or shape the process of escalation.
Declassified US intelligence estimates of China’s missile strength are shown in Figure IX.1.
468 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The DOD notes in its 2012 report on Chinese military power that: 1216
The PLA Second Artillery Corps is modernizing its short range ballistic missile force by fielding advanced
variants with improved ranges and payloads. It is also acquiring and fielding greater numbers of
conventional medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to increase the range at which it can conduct
precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s
shores beyond the first island chain. (p. 7)
Similarly, China continues to produce large numbers of advanced ground-launched cruise missiles capable
of standoff, precision strikes. The PLA Second Artillery Corps faces several challenges in its force
structure, including integrating both new and planned systems. (p. 7)
The DOD report for 2014 discusses the interlocking relationships between China’s full range of
missile and other precision strike systems in supporting the A2AD mission – all of which can
potentially affect China’s capabilities if it intervenes in a Korean conflict as well as have an
effect in shaping the broader balance in Northeast Asia: 1217
• Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (< 1,000 km): The Second Artillery had more than 1,000 SRBMs at the end
of 2013. The Second Artillery continues to field advanced variants with improved ranges and accuracy in
addition to more sophisticated payloads, while gradually replacing earlier generations that do not possess
true precision strike capability.
• Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km): The PLA is fielding conventional MRBMs to increase
the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships (including aircraft
carriers) operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.
• Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,000 km): The PLA is developing conventional IRBMs that
increase its capability for near-precision strike out to the second island chain. The PLA Navy also is
improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability with sky wave and surface wave OTH radars,
which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from
China (thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).
• Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launched LACMs for stand-off,
precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20. China recently
revealed the CM-802AKG LACM.
• Ground Attack Munitions: The PLA Air Force has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles
(ASMs) as well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation
missiles and laser-guided bombs. China is developing smaller-sized ASMs such as the AR-1, HJ-10 anti-
tank, Blue Arrow 7 laser-guided and KD-2 in conjunction with its increasing development of UAVs. China
is also adapting GPS-guided munitions such as the FT-5 and LS-6 that are similar to the U.S. Joint Direct
Attack Munitions (JDAM) to UAVs.
• Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: The PLA Navy deploys the domestically produced ship-launched YJ-62 ASCM;
the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class
DDGs acquired from Russia; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM on China’s Russian-
built KILO SS. It has, or is acquiring, nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2
to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B. The pace of ASCM research, development, and
production has accelerated over the past decade. In addition, the PLA Navy Air Force employs the YJ-83K
ASCM on its JH-7 and H-6G aircraft. China has also developed the YJ-12 ASCM for the Navy. The new
missile provides an increased threat to naval assets, due to its long range and supersonic speeds. It is
capable of being launched from H-6 bombers.
• Anti-Radiation Weapons: China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-
17) known as the YJ-91 into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY UAVs and
Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.
• Artillery-Delivered High-Precision Munitions: The PLA is developing or deploying artillery systems with
the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300 mm multiple-
rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliber MRL (out to 220 km).
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 469

The Second Artillery Corps has continued “expanding its conventional MRBM force,” and is
“developing IRBMs to extend the distance from which it can threaten other countries with
conventional precision or near-precision strikes.” 1218
Work by Andrew S. Erickson further highlights the fact that these Chinese efforts have led to the
development of a DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM): 1219
China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is no longer merely an aspiration. Beijing has
successfully developed, partially tested and deployed in small numbers the world’s first weapons system
capable of targeting the last relatively uncontested U.S. airfield in the Asia-Pacific from long-range, land-
based mobile launchers. This airfield is a moving aircraft carrier strike group (CSG), which the Second
Artillery, China’s strategic missile force, now has the capability to at least attempt to disable with the DF-
21D in the event of conflict. With the ASBM having progressed this far, and representing the vanguard of a
broad range of potent asymmetric systems, Beijing probably expects to achieve a growing degree of
deterrence with it.
In December 2010, then-PACOM Commander Admiral Robert Willard stated, “The anti-ship
ballistic missile system in China has undergone extensive testing. An analogy using a Western
term would be ‘Initial Operational Capability (IOC),’ whereby it has—I think China would
perceive that it has—an operational capability now, but they continue to develop it. It will
continue to undergo testing, I would imagine, for several more years.” 1220
In January 2011, Vice Admiral David Dorset said that the PLA “likely has the space-based
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control structure, and ground
processing capabilities necessary to support DF-21D employment...[and also] employs an array
of non-space based sensors and surveillance assets capable of providing the targeting
information,” several days later adding that the PRC had tested the DF-21D missile system over
land “a sufficient number of times that the missile system itself is truly competent and capable…
they have ISR, they have sensors onboard ship that can feed into the targeting aspect of it. So
could they start to employ that and field it operationally? Yes, I think so.” In March 2011, it was
reported by the Taiwanese National Security Bureau Director-General that the PLA had already
tested and started deploying the DF-21D in 2010. 1221
Reportedly, China conducted another test of its missile interceptor system on January 27, 2013 in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. China has again stated the defensive nature of the
test. In all likelihood, the system is a reconfigured DF-21C or DF-25 (KS/SC-19) – both of
which are two-stage medium-range (1500-1700 km) ballistic missiles capable of carrying a 600
kg payload – in this case, an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. 1222
As the estimates in Figure IX.2 show, this anti-ship ballistic missile is just one part of the
interlocking extension of Chinese precision strike capabilities that affect the Koreas, Northeast
Asia, and Pacific region. China can now use precision strike systems against US bases as far out
as Guam and the rest of what is sometimes called the “second island chain.”
470 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.1: Chinese Missile Forces, 2010-2012

2010 estimate

Ballistic and Cruise

China’s Missile Missiles Launchers Estimated Range

Inventory

CSS-2 15-20 5-10 3,000+ km

CSS-3 15-20 10-15 5,400+ km

CSS-4 20 20 13,000+ km

DF-31 <10 <10 7,200+ km

DF-31A 10-15 10-15 11,200+ km

CSS-5 85-95 75-85 1,750+ km

CSS-6 350-400 90-110 600 km

CSS-7 700-750 120-140 300 km

DH-10 200-500 45-55 1,500+ km

JL-2 Developmental Developmental 7,200+ km

Note: China’s Second Artillery maintains at least five operational SRBM brigades; an additional two brigades are subordinate to
PLA ground forces – one garrisoned in the Nanjing MR and the other in the Guangzhou MR. All SRBM units are deployed to
locations near Taiwan.

2012 Estimate
Chinese Missile Force

System Missiles Launchers Estimated Range

ICBM 50-75 50-75 5,500+ km

IRBM 5-20 5-20 3,000-5,500 km

MRBM 75-100 75-100 1,000-3,000 km

SRBM 1,000-1,200 200-250 <1,000 km

GLCM 200-500 40-55 1,500+ km

Source: Based on Appendix 1 in Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Department of Defense, August 2010,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012, 29.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 471

Figure IX.2: Range of Chinese Precision Strike Capabilities – Part

One (US 2013 Estimate)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, 82.
472 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.2: Range of Chinese Precision Strike Capabilities – Part

Two (US 2012 Estimate)

Note: Conventional Counter-intervention Capabilities. The PLA’s conventional forces are currently capable of striking targets
well beyond China’s immediate periphery. Not included are ranges for naval surface- and sub-surface-based weapons, whose
employment distances from China would be determined by doctrine and the scenario in which they are employed.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2012, 42.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 473

Chinese Nuclear-Armed Missiles

China has a large variety of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and is currently transitioning its
arsenal from liquid-fuelled, relatively inaccurate, silo- or cave-based missiles (such as the DF-3,
DF-4, and DF-5) to solid-fuel, more accurate, mobile missiles (like the DF-11, DF-15, DF-21,
DF-31 ICBM, and JL-2 SLBM). Japanese and US estimates of the ranges of these systems are
shown in Figure IX.3.
Some of these newer missiles could eventually be equipped with multiple independent targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. In December 2012, China successfully conducted a second
test of its DF-31A missile, allowing it to reach any city in the US. The missile is believed to have
three warheads per missile and a range of approximately 7,000 miles. While the Chinese CSS-4
has similar capabilities, the CSS-4 requires a stationary launch pad and contains only one nuclear
warhead. In contrast, the DF-31A is portable and can be launched from the back of a truck, train,
or tank. 1223 China appears to have supplied missiles to Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan,
Syria, and North Korea. 1224 These exported missiles have been shorter range missiles, with the
one notable exception of DF-3A’s (range of over 3000km) to Saudi Arabia.
The US assessment of China’s military capabilities has long focused on China’s growing nuclear
and missile forces and increasing capability to target the US and Japan in ways that directly
affect the Korean balance and the potential risk of US and Japanese involvement in a Korean
crisis or conflict. The DOD report on Military and Security Developments Affecting the People’s
Republic of China for 2011 stated that, 1225
China has prioritized land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs. It is developing and testing several
new classes and variants of offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, upgrading older missile
systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, many of which have ranges in
excess of 185 km. This includes the domestically produced, ground-launched DH-10 land-attack cruise
missile (LACM); the domestically produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM); the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s
SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from Russia; and, the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic
ASCM on China’s Russian-built, KILO-class diesel-electric attack submarines.
China is modernizing its nuclear forces by adding more survivable delivery systems. In recent years, the
road mobile, solid propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-
range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200
km, can reach most locations within the continental United States.
…China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of approximately 55-65 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), including the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and 2 (DF-
31 and DF-31A); and the more limited range CSS-3 (DF-3). This force is complemented by liquid-fueled
CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21D) MRBMs for
regional deterrence missions. The operational status of China’s single XIA-class ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) and medium-range JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) remain questionable.
By 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include additional CSS-10 Mod 2s and enhanced CSS-4s. The first of
the new JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN appears ready, but the associated JL-2 SLBM has faced a number of
problems and will likely continue flight tests. The date when the JIN-class SSBN/JL-2 SLBM combination
will be fully operational is uncertain. China is also currently working on a range of technologies to attempt
to counter U.S. and other countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuvering re-entry
vehicles, MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. PRC
official media also cites numerous Second Artillery Corps training exercises featuring maneuver,
camouflage, and launch operations under simulated combat conditions, which are intended to increase
474 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

survivability. Together with the increased mobility and survivability of the new generation of missiles,
these technologies and training enhancements strengthen China’s nuclear force and enhance its strategic
strike capabilities.
The introduction of more mobile systems will create new command and control challenges for China’s
leadership, which now confronts a different set of variables related to deployment and release authorities.
For example, the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and the PLA
Navy has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear
warheads mated to missiles. Land-based mobile missiles may face similar command and control challenges
in wartime, although probably not as extreme as with submarines.
Beijing’s official policy towards the role of nuclear weapons continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear
force structure able to survive an attack, and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage
on the enemy. The new generation of mobile missiles, maneuvering and MIRV warheads, and penetration
aids are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in
U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; precision
strike; and missile defense capabilities.
Beijing has consistently asserted that it adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use
nuclear forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of two stated
commitments: China will never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear-weapon state, and China will
never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free
zone. However, there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply,
including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high altitude
bursts would constitute a first use.
Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China
might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the
survival of China’s nuclear force, or of the regime itself. However, there has been no indication that
national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s “no first use” doctrine.
Beijing will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited nuclear force, also
referred to by some PRC writers as “sufficient and effective” to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging
retaliatory nuclear strike.
The DOD provided further updates in the 2013 and 2014 editions of Military and Security
Developments Affecting the People’s Republic of China, describing China’s latest nuclear-armed
missile developments as follows: 1226
China’s new generation of mobile missiles, with payloads consisting of Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, are intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic
deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russian strategic ISR, precision
strike, and missile defense capabilities. The PLA has deployed new command, control, and
communications capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability
to command and control multiple units in the field. Through the use of improved communications links,
China’s ICBM units now have better access to battlefield information and uninterrupted communications
connecting all command echelons, and unit commanders are able to issue orders to multiple subordinates at
once, instead of serially, via voice commands.
China will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited, survivable, nuclear force
(sometimes described as “sufficient and effective”) to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging retaliatory
nuclear strike.
Land-Based Platforms. China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the
solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mod 1 and Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited-range
CSS-3 (DF-4). This force is complemented by road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMs for
regional deterrence missions. By 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include additional CSS-10 Mod 2s.
(2014, p. 28)
Sea-Based Platforms. China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with three already delivered and as
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 475

many as two more in various stages of construction. The JIN-class SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2
submarine-launched ballistic missile with an estimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will
give the PLA Navy its first long-range, sea-based nuclear capability. After a round of successful testing in
2012, the JL-2 appears ready to reach initial operational capability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based at
Hainan Island in the South China Sea would then be able to conduct nuclear deterrence patrols. (2013, p.
31-32)
…Future Efforts. China is working on a range of technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and other
countries’ ballistic missile defense systems, including MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, and thermal
shielding. China’s official media also cites numerous Second Artillery training exercises featuring
maneuver, camouflage, and launch operations under simulated combat conditions, which are intended to
increase survivability. Together with the increased mobility and survivability of the new generation of
missiles, these technologies and training enhancements strengthen China’s nuclear force and enhance its
strategic strike capabilities. Further increases in the number of mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBN
deterrence patrols will force the PLA to implement more sophisticated command and control systems and
processes that safeguard the integrity of nuclear release authority for a larger, more dispersed force. (2014,
p. 29)
Outside sources provide further insights into these developments. The IISS reported in 2013, 1227
In July 2012, unnamed US officials reportedly said that China had test-fired a DF-41 intercontinental
ballistic missile, although little information was provided. The DF-41 would, if deployed, be the first land-
based missile able to reach the entire continental United States. The July test was reported to include a
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), though it is unclear whether MIRVed warheads
have yet been deployed on China’s current longest-range ICBM, the DF-31A. This continues to be
produced, with satellite imagery from 2011 suggesting that the 809 Brigade in Datong was receiving DF-
31s in place of DF-21s. Taiwan’s 2010 report on Chinese military power claimed that the Second Artillery
had also deployed a few new DF-16 MRBMs.
Within a month, China also conducted a successful test of the JL-2 ballistic missile. The JL-2 is the
submarine-launched version of the DF-31 road-mobile ICBM, to be deployed on the Type-094 nuclear-
ballistic-missile submarine. Successful development and deployment of the hitherto troubled JL-2 would
give China a more secure second-strike deterrent, as the four Type-094 submarines currently in the water
would then be able to provide continuous at-sea deterrence.
476 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part One (2012

Japanese Estimate)

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 33.

 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 477

Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part Two (2013

US Estimate)

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, 82.
478 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.3: Chinese Ballistic Missile Ranges – Part Three (2012

US Estimate)

Note: Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. China is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the
region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and JL-2 will
give China a more survivable nuclear force.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the
People’s Republic of China 2013, 43.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 479

Chinese Missile Defense Capabilities

The 2010 Chinese Defense White Paper argued against international missile defense programs.
The paper also included sections on the desire to prohibit biological and chemical weapons,
prevent an arms race in outer space, promote military expenditure transparency, and work
towards conventional arms control. In the section on non-proliferation, the PRC wrote, 1228
China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic
balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on
the process of nuclear disarmament. China holds that no state should deploy overseas missile defense
systems that have strategic missile defense capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international
collaboration.
The 2013 Paper mentioned missile defense but did not really address it. In contrast, the 2013
DOD report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
2013 noted that, 1229
China is pursuing ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to provide further protection of China’s
mainland and strategic assets. China’s existing long-range SAM inventory offers limited capability against
ballistic missiles. The SA-20 PMU2, the most advanced SAM Russia offers for export, has the advertised
capability to engage ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,000 km and speeds of 2,800 meters per second
(m/s). China’s domestic CSA-9 long-range SAM system is expected to have a limited capability to provide
point defense against tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 500 km. China is pursuing research and
development of a missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic energy intercepts at exo-atmospheric
altitudes (>80 km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper
atmosphere. In January 2010, China successfully intercepted a ballistic missile at mid-course using a
ground-based missile. (p. 34)
China tested an advanced missile defense system on January 11, 2010. The test, entitled the Test
of the Land-based Mid-course Phase Anti-ballistic Missile Interception Technology, targeted a
missile during the mid-course phase when the target was exoatmospheric. According to press
reports, the US DOD stated: “We detected two geographically separated missile launch events
with an exoatmospheric collision also being observed by space-based sensors.” 1230
Reportedly, China carried out a second land-based mid-course missile interception test on
January 27, 2013 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Although no other information
was given, the Chinese Defense Ministry remarked that the test was “defensive in nature” and
appeared to be successful. In all likelihood, the system is a reconfigured DF-21C or DF-25
(KS/SC-19), both of which are two-stage medium-range (1500-1700 km) ballistic missiles
capable of carrying a 600 kg payload – in this case, an exoatmospheric kill vehicle. However,
China likely remains far from an operational anti-missile shield. 1231
China is also working to increase its tactical ballistic missile defense capabilities – which add
another level of deterrence and defense capabilities. China is beginning to produce its own
variants of the S-300 and may be able to deploy significantly more advanced theater missile
defense systems in the mid-term.
Chinese Counterspace Capabilities
China is developing counterspace capabilities that affect the entire spectrum of warfighting
capabilities, from the tactical to the strategic levels. Both China and Russia “continue developing
systems and technologies that can interfere with or disable vital U.S. space-based navigation,
communication, and intelligence collection satellites.” 1232 China has tested anti-satellite weapons
480 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

that could also have a massive impact on US battle management and ISR systems, and may have
some capability to use EMP weapons.
The DOD’s 2014 report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China notes that, 1233
PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems – and to deny adversaries access to space-
based systems – as central to enabling modern, “informationized” warfare. Although PLA doctrine does not
appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations form an integral
component of other PLA campaigns and would serve a key role in enabling A2/AD operations. A PLA
analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations reinforced the importance of operations in space to enable
“informationized” warfare, claiming that “space is the commanding point for the information battlefield.” ,
PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s
reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and
early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition military operations also states that “destroying or capturing
satellites and other sensors … will deprive an opponent of initiative on the battlefield and [make it difficult]
for them to bring their precision guided weapons into full play.”
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s space and counterspace capabilities. In
addition to directed energy weapons and satellite jammers, China demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic kill
capability against satellites in low Earth orbit when it destroyed the defunct Chinese FY-1C weather
satellite during a test in January 2007. (2014, p. 32)
China conducted anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons tests in January 2007 and 2010.
Space
China is expanding its own space-based systems in ways that will enhance its deterrent, missile,
and other military capabilities in the Koreas and Northeast Asia. The new Party leadership has
emphasized such activities as long-range missiles and other aerospace programs in its military
modernization push. Chinese companies are also looking at increasing domestic development
and production through the acquisition of parts manufacturers, leasing businesses, cargo airlines,
materials producers, and airport operators. However, many of these Chinese companies that are
pursuing joint ventures and technical cooperation agreements alongside acquisitions have deep
ties to the military, raising issues for American regulators: 1234
The main contractor for the country’s air force, the state-owned China Aviation Industry Corporation,
known as Avic, has set up a private equity fund to purchase companies with so-called dual-use technology
that has civilian and military applications, with the goal of investing as much as $3 billion. In 2010, Avic
acquired the overseas licensing rights for small aircraft made by Epic Aircraft of Bend, Ore., using
lightweight yet strong carbon-fiber composites — the same material used for high-performance fighter jets.
Provincial and local government agencies in Shaanxi Province, a hub of Chinese military aircraft testing
and production, have set up another fund of similar size for acquisitions. Last month, a consortium of
Chinese investors, including the Shaanxi fund, struck a $4.23 billion deal with the American International
Group to buy 80 percent of the International Lease Finance Corporation, which owns the world’s second-
largest passenger jet fleet.
The 2014 DOD report on China cited earlier remarks that, 1235
In 2013, China conducted at least eight space launches to expand its space-based intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, meteorological, and communications satellite constellations. In addition to expanding its
in-orbit assets, China successfully launched its first “Kuaizhou” (“quick vessel”) space launch vehicle
(SLV), which is designed to launch a small satellite of the same name quickly into a low-Earth orbit to
support “natural disaster monitoring.” Chinese media also reported development of a second Chinese
responsive space launch vehicle dubbed the Long March 11 (LM-11). The LM-11 will provide China with
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 481

“a vehicle to rapidly enter space and meet the emergency launching demand in case of disasters and
contingencies,” and could be launched as early as 2014 and no later than 2016. In parallel, China is
developing a multi-dimensional program to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-
based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.
China continues to develop the LM-5 SLV, designed for lifting heavy payloads into space. The LM-5 will
more than double the size of payloads China may place into geosynchronous orbits. More than just a single
heavy-lift launch vehicle, the LM-5 has propulsion technologies that are reconfigurable to produce the LM-
6 light-lift- and LM-7 medium-lift launch vehicles. The Wenchang Satellite Launch Center, designed to
host these new launch vehicles, is expected to be complete in time for the first LM-7 launch in late-2014.
The first LM-5 launch, delayed by recent manufacturing difficulties, is expected no sooner than 2015
(2014, p. 10-11).
China is the third country to develop an independent human spaceflight program, and early in
2012 the PRC achieved its first manned space docking at an orbital laboratory. The country has a
stated goal of building a 60-ton space station for future missions. China has traditionally been
relying on its manned Shenzhou spacecraft, capsule-based vehicles. It would appear that China is
in the test-flight stages of a new Shenlong space plane, a drone that is similar to, though less
capable than, the US’s X-37B. 1236
China’s growing space capabilities translate into military capabilities that affect all aspects of
conventional and nuclear targeting, ground-air-sea operations, precision conventional strike
capacities, and missile defense. China is also using it intelligence collection efforts to improve
technological capacity. In his 2012 Senate testimony, DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr.
remarked, 1237
China is beginning to develop and test technologies to enable ballistic missile defense. The space program,
including ostensible civil projects, supports China’s growing ability to deny or degrade the space assets of
potential adversaries and enhances China’s conventional military capabilities. China operates satellites for
communications, navigation, earth resources, weather, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
in addition to manned space and space exploration missions. China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-
satellite weapon (ASAT) missile and is developing jammers and directed-energy weapons for ASAT
missions. A prerequisite for ASAT attacks, China’s ability to track and identify satellites is enhanced by
technologies from China’s manned and lunar programs as well as technologies and methods developed to
detect and track space debris. Beijing rarely acknowledges direct military applications of its space program
and refers to nearly all satellite launches as scientific or civil in nature.
China has used its intelligence services to gather information via a significant network of agents and
contacts utilizing a variety of methods to obtain U.S. military technology to advance their defense
industries, global command and control, and strategic warfighting capabilities. The Chinese continue to
improve their technical capabilities, increasing the collection threat against the U.S. The Chinese also
utilize their intelligence collection to improve their economic standing and to influence foreign policy. In
recent years, multiple cases of economic espionage and theft of dual-use and military technology have
uncovered pervasive Chinese collection efforts.
One example of Chinese space technologies is the Beidou satellite position, navigation, and
timing system, which has been in development and regional use since 2000. The second
generation version has been operational in the region since 2012 and is planned to be available
globally by 2020. The system will “enable subscribers outside of China to purchase receivers and
services that give civilian and military applications greater redundancy and independence in a
conflict scenario that employs space assets.” 1238 The 2014 DOD Report addressed the Beidou
development: 1239
During 2013, China focused on testing the current constellation of Beidou navigation satellites
(NAVSATs) and released the Beidou signal interface control document to allow for the production of
482 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

ground receivers. Beidou NAVSAT launches will likely resume in 2014, with a global NAVSAT
constellation expected to be completed by 2020. China launched five new remote sensing satellites in 2013,
which can perform both civil and military applications. China also launched one communications satellite,
four experimental small satellites, one meteorological satellite, and one manned space mission.
Over the next several years, China plans to put more than 20 new navigational satellites in
medium-earth orbit to improve the functionality of its Beidou system. An editorial in the state-
run Global Times stated, “it is necessary for China to have the ability to strike US satellites. This
deterrent can provide strategic protection to Chinese satellites and the whole country’s national
security.” 1240
Anti-Access/Area Denial Sea-based Space Programs
China’s A2AD programs rely on a mix of space-based systems. China is relying on land and sea
launch capabilities as well as sea-based systems that utilize “Long View” space support ships to
perform tasks like monitoring and tracking space vehicles – such as spacecraft, missiles, and
rockets – while also coordinating and communicating with ground-based assets. This system can
increase space operations and situational awareness while also providing potential military
applications.
In a conflict, ship-based C4ISR capabilities could have advantages over ground-based
installations. Again, Andrew S. Erikson provides a history and more in-depth description of the
program, which began in 1965 with Premier Zhou Enlai and was further developed in the 1970s
under Project 718. In order to support Chinese ICBM sea tests, the Yuanwang program was
initiated, though it was soon delayed by subsequent political events. It was jointly designed and
developed by the Seventh Academy of the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building, the Seventh
Ministry of Machine Building, and the Commission of Science and Technology for National
Defense’s concept-study team. 1241
Design and development of the Yuanwang started in 1974, with construction from 1975 and the
first ships ready for trials in the late 1970s. Though six were originally built, only three are in
operation today. It appears that the Yuanwang-class ship was first used in 1980 to retrieve the
instrument package from China’s first successful DF-5/CSS-4 ICBM test – showing that the
ships were able to successfully track missiles from the sea. The ships were further deployed in
support of civilian and military space launches and tracking of space operations, including
communications satellites, ballistic missile tests, and manned spacecraft (the Shenzhou). The
fleet complements the PRC’s two Tianlian data-relay satellites and many ground stations,
facilitating communication between satellites and these stations. 1242
The Yuanwang fleet was technologically upgraded starting in the 1980s; for example, the ships
were initially able to track almost 25,000 miles above Earth, later increasing to almost 250,000
miles. Better radars improved the communication and tracking systems; most of the ships in the
fleet have C- and S-band monopulse tracking radar, velocimetry systems, cinetheodolite laser
ranging and tracking systems, computers, and navigation and positioning approaches. A variety
of communications systems can secure data transfer, and the ships can operate in any maritime
environment except polar areas. The ships could be used to detect and track foreign satellites and
provide support to any PRC attempt to threaten them. 1243
While a ship-based tracking system has advantages such as flexibility, there are also
disadvantages – it is expensive to operate and maintain, and during longer missions the lack of
necessary engineers and equipment could make repairs difficult. Deploying such critical systems
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 483

overseas makes them vulnerable targets, and any signals interference – or PRC supporting
vessels – could affect their operation. Their sea-based nature also makes advanced
communications connectivity difficult, especially during bad weather. There are still
technological issues, such as calibration and stabilization that frustrate the ships’ operations. 1244
As of mid-2008, the fleet had “completed 68 maritime space-tracking missions, sailed more than
1.4 million nautical miles safely, and performed more than 7,600 days of operations at sea….
During 2011-12, Yuanwang ships 3, 5, and 6 completed a cumulative 120,000-nautical-mile,
539-day trip to provide space-tracking and control support for the docking of the Tiangong-1
space-lab module and Shenzhou-8 spacecraft.” There have also been reports that a seventh ship
was under construction; in 2006 the chief engineer of Yuanwang 6 noted that another boat was in
the pre-research stages and could potentially be used in deep-space exploration missions. There
has also been significant research on ship-based multi-target simulators to track and control
satellite launches or missiles, which the PLA sees as a key capability. The Yuanwang could also
provide support to PRC development of ground-based laser and kinetic anti-satellite capabilities.
Overall, Andrew S. Erikson notes, 1245
In reapplying indispensable positioning information and controlling space assets overseas, the Yuanwang
fleet represents a vital node in China’s aerospace infrastructure. The construction and proliferation of these
ships over the past four decades underscores their importance and utility to the country’s space and military
operations. Space-tracking vessels have successfully participated in full-range ICBM tests, submarine-to-
shore guided-missile underwater-launch tests, communications-satellite launches, manned and unmanned
space-vehicle launches, and an Antarctic visit. They have played a significant role in the development and
testing of technologies and weapons…. Chinese research literature also points to a larger role for space
TT&C ships as the nation’s space operations continue to expand.
Anti-Access/Area Denial Land-based Space Programs
China also has a broad range of land-based stations that enhance its space warfare capabilities in
ways that can threaten or attack US power projection capabilities: 1246
China has three satellite launch centers and stations: Jiuquan (also known as Base 20 and Dongfeng Space
City), Xichang (Base 27), and Taiyuan (Base 25). The country is currently constructing a station in
Wenchang (also known as Wenchang Space City and Wenchang Satellite Launch Center), which should be
operational in 2013. Additionally, it has two control facilities: an Aerospace Command and Control Center
in Xi’an (also known as Base 26). The Aerospace Telemetry Oceanic Ship Base is a crucial ground station,
as it tracks Yuanwang data on both commercial satellites and spacecraft. Established in 1978 in Jiangyin,
Jiangsu Province, the base sends the ships it operates primarily to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. China
operates three integrated land-based space-monitoring and control network stations in Kashi, Jiamusi, and
Sanya….
China has overseas tracking stations in Karachi, Pakistan; Malindi, Kenya; and Swakopmund, Namibia.
The Malindi station, in an Indian Ocean coastal town, became operational in July 2005 to support the
Shenzhou 6 mission. In Swakopmund, the station works in conjunction with Yuanwang 3 to provide
telemetry, tracking and command (TT&C) support during Shenzhou spacecraft landings. China also had a
ground station in Tarawa, Kiribati; but it was dismantled in 2003 after Kiribati recognized Taiwan. Beijing
plans to construct three ground-control stations in South America by 2016 for deep-space network support.
Additionally, China reportedly shares space-tracking facilities with France, Sweden, and Australia.

US Missile Forces
The US does not discuss details of the use of missile warfare in Asia in its unclassified military
literature and has not made this a major part of its discussion of force rebalancing in Asia. It is
clear, however, that conventional and nuclear missile capabilities are as important to the US side
of the sea-air-missile-space balance as they are to China and the Koreas, that they sharply affect
484 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

the land balance in terms of joint warfare, and that the degree of future US and Chinese
cooperation or competition will affect every aspect of the Korean, Northeast Asian, and Pacific
balances.
The US has a variety of liquid- and solid-fueled cruise and ballistic missiles that affect the
military balance in any region in the world. Most of the longer-range US missile systems are
nuclear-armed. These include the forces shown in Figure IX.4.
According to the NTI, nuclear-armed US missile forces now include: 1247
The United States produces highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles as well as cruise
missiles. According to a detailed breakdown of the New START data from July 2014, Washington deploys
449 LGM-30G Minuteman III nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at bases in
Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming. The Navy deploys 240 UGM-133A Trident II D-5 submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) on 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).
The Air Force deploys 11 B-2A bombers that can carry up to 16 nuclear bombs and 78 B-52H Stratoforce
bombers that can each carry up to 20 AGM-86B nuclear tipped air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) each.
Following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the United States eliminated its entire
stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).
Pursuant to the restrictions of the INF, the United States does not possess ballistic or cruise missiles with
ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States decided
to retire the Navy’s nuclear-tipped Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N).
The United States devotes considerable budgetary resources to missile defense systems, including those
designed to intercept incoming missiles at the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. Most proposed
systems are hit-to-kill interceptors and many are in the early stages of research and development. The
“most mature” short-range system is the PAC-3 patriot system (MIM-104F). Use of PAC-3 systems in the
2003 Iraq war produced mixed results: while it successfully intercepted the nine “most threatening”
ballistic missiles, it failed to detect several low-flying Iraqi cruise missiles and ultralight aircraft, and
friendly fire on coalition aircraft resulted in the deaths of three soldiers. The Army has activated two
batteries, with a total of 48 interceptors, of the land-based terminal-phase Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system. The Navy operates 26 ships equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
system, which has been deployed to Europe and sold to Japan. Finally, the Air Force has deployed 30
Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California.
On 22 June 2014, the United States successfully conducted a test of its homeland Ground-based Missile
Defense System. This marked the first successful use of a “second-generation kinetic kill vehicle,”
mounted on a Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) against an intermediate-range missile target. The
effectiveness of the new Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, dubbed the “CE-2,” bolstered the popularity of the
Defense Department’s $1 billion plan to station 14 more GBI missiles in Fort Greely, Alaska by 2017.
Given the program’s cost, however, some experts and former government officials remain circumspect,
citing concerns with the technology’s ability to perform consistently, and the fact the “CE-2” has yet to
successfully intercept an ICBM―the primary objective of the anti-missile program.
The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review reversed the Bush Administration’s plans for
an antiballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe, instead adopting a four-phase, adaptive approach that will
focus new technologies on the threat from short- and medium-range missiles to U.S. and allied forces. In
March 2013 the Obama Administration canceled Phase IV, which called for SM-3 IIB ground-based
interceptors to be deployed to Europe by 2018. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that
cancellation of the fourth phase would help fund an additional 14 GMD interceptors for Alaska by 2017. In
June 2013, the House Armed Services Committee authorized funding for East Coast GMD interceptors,
while the head of the Missile Defense Agency argued there was no security need for their deployment.
Unlike China, which emphasizes the development of long-range conventionally armed ballistic
missiles, the US emphasizes precision-guided cruise missiles and stand-off air-delivered
precision-guided weapons. These now make up the conventionally armed part of the US
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 485

inventory. The US is, however, examining new ways to use its strategic missiles and new
conventional strike systems in Prompt Global Strike missions (PGS). These systems could
become conventional weapons of mass effectiveness and play a major role in deterrence,
defense, and countering the use of nuclear weapons by the DPRK or China.
A report by Amy Woolf of the US Congressional Research Service notes that, 1248
CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional
capabilities. They would provide a “niche” capability, with a small number of weapons directed against
select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S.
adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the
missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of
systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.
The Air Force and Navy have both considered deploying conventional warheads on their longrange
ballistic missiles. The Navy sought to deploy conventional warheads on a small number of Trident II
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In FY2008, Congress rejected the requested funding for this
program, but the Navy has continued to consider the possibility of deploying intermediate-range
technologies for the prompt strike mission. The Air Force and the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) are developing a hypersonic glide delivery vehicle that could deploy on a modified
Peacekeeper land-based ballistic missile—a system known as the conventional strike missile (CSM). In
FY2008, Congress created a single, combined fund to support research and development for the CPGS
mission. Congress appropriated $65.4 million for this program in FY2014 and $95.6 million in FY2015;
the Obama Administration has requested $78.8 million for FY2016.
Unclassified studies do not specifically mention the role of these missiles in deterring and
defending against China, but the target types that are suggested clearly affect Chinese forces: 1249
The United States might also be faced with circumstances during an ongoing conflict when it would need to
destroy targets that could appear quickly and remain vulnerable for short periods of time. These might
include leadership cells that could move during a conflict or mobile military systems that the adversary had
chosen to keep hidden prior to their use. These types of targets might only be vulnerable to weapons that
the United States could launch promptly and direct to their targets quickly. Analysts have noted that PGS
might provide the means to attack such targets if the United States did not have the necessary weapons
located near the conflict.
The Defense Science Board outlined several of these potential scenarios in a March 2009 report prepared
by the Task Force on Time Critical Conventional Strike from Strategic Standoff. This report “formulated
five representative scenarios” that might require a “very rapid strike response to a developing situation.”16
These scenarios included several cases:
• A near-peer competitor had used its emerging counter-space capability to destroy a U.S. satellite.
• The United States wanted to destroy a package of special nuclear materials that a terrorist organization
had shipped to a neutral country.
• A small package of weapons of mass destruction was located temporarily in a rural area of a neutral
country.
The US Navy and Air Force both have suggested programs, but the Air Force currently seems to
have the most chance of sustained funding, and its programs illustrate the capabilities of the
possible delivery systems: 1250
…[M]odified Minuteman II missiles might each be able to carry a single warhead that weighed between
500 and 1,000 pounds; a modified Peacekeeper could possibly carry between 6,000 and 8,000 pounds of
payload, which would allow for multiple warheads or reentry vehicles.51 According to some estimates,
these missiles could even destroy some targets without an explosive warhead, using the, “sheer force of
impact of a reentry vehicle moving at 14,000 feet per second…”
486 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

According to the DSB study, Peacekeeper missiles could also carry a single reentry body that had been
modified to improve accuracy by allowing for the maneuverability of the warhead, like the E2 warhead
described above.
In addition, as was noted above, the United States could use a hypersonic glide vehicle, like the CAV under
consideration in the Falcon Study, as the reentry body on a long-range ballistic missile. According to the
Falcon Study, the CAV would be an unpowered, maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle capable of
carrying approximately 1,000 pounds in munitions or other payload….This vehicle is a cone-shaped
winged body that, after launch aboard a booster derived from a ballistic missile, would fly within the
atmosphere at hypersonic speeds and maneuver to its target. …DOD has funded this program through the
defense-wide Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program since FY2008.
The US is also examining the option of deploying shorter-range systems called the Forward-
Based Global Strike (FBGS), 1251
The United States could also deploy intermediate or long-range, land-based ballistic missiles at bases
outside the continental United States. For example, they might be deployed in Guam, Diego Garcia, or
Alaska. This system could use a two-stage rocket motor, to distinguish them from current nuclear-armed
ICBMs, and could also, like the SLIRBM, carry either a guided warheads the AWH hypersonic glider. In
addition, because it would be launched from outside the continental United States, its trajectory would not
resemble that of a land-based ICBM. Hence, some analysts argue that it would solve many of the questions
about the potential for misunderstandings and misperceptions. If the missiles had a range of less than 5,500
kilometers, they would be inconsistent with the limits in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty. However, the United States has recently charged that Russia is in violation of the INF Treaty,
leading some to conclude that this agreement should no longer constrain U.S. plans for intermediate-range
systems.
At the same time, the USAF is seeking to develop new manned strategic bombers for
conventional munitions delivery as one of the procurement priorities in its FY2016 budget
request, although some outside experts feel this may be a financial place holder for funding a
future unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) or shifting future funds to make up for the cost-
escalation in the F-35.
Missile Defense and Space
The US has long focused on the development of missile defense systems, including systems
capable of intercepting missiles at the boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. Most of these
systems are still in the early stages of research and development and focus on hit-to-kill
capacities. According to NTI, 1252
The “most mature” short-range system is the PAC-3 patriot system (MIM-104F). Use of PAC-3 systems in
the 2003 Iraq war produced mixed results: while it successfully intercepted the nine “most threatening”
ballistic missiles, it failed to detect several low-flying Iraqi cruise missiles and ultralight aircraft, and
friendly fire on coalition aircraft resulted in the deaths of three soldiers. The Army has activated two
batteries, with a total of 48 interceptors, of the land-based terminal-phase Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system. The Navy operates 26 ships equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
system, which has been deployed to Europe and sold to Japan. Finally, the Air Force has deployed 30
Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air
Force Base, California.
In its FY2016 defense budget overview, the US summarized its strategy in dealing with
deterrence and nuclear forces as follows: 1253
The FY 2016 President’s Budget funds the development and deployment of robust ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capabilities to support the Administration’s priorities: protecting the U.S. homeland, deployed
forces, allies, and partners. The budget includes $9.6 billion for missile defense, including $8.1 billion for
the Missile Defense Agency.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 487

For homeland defense, the budget request maintains the commitment to increase the number of deployed
Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) to 44 by FY 2017; continue development of the Redesigned Exo-
atmospheric Kill Vehicle (REKV); and proceed with the development of the Long-Range Discrimination
Radar (LRDR). When combined with the planned GBI reliability and system engineering improvements,
these improvements will enable the homeland missile defense system to deal effectively with the maturing
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threat from North Korea and a potential ICBM threat from Iran.
The FY 2016 President’s Budget also reflects the Department’s commitment to building the regional missile
defense forces that are interoperable systems deployed by international partners.
The Department continues to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed to
protect U.S. deployed forces and allies in Europe from ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. The
budget request supports the implementation of Phase 3 of the EPAA, to include the deployment of Aegis
Ashore to Poland in the FY 2018 timeframe. The Aegis Ashore will be capable of launching Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) Blocks IA, IB, and IIA (delivery in 2018) variants.
The FY 2016 President’s Budget request:
• Provides additional funding for key capabilities to meet the maturing threat from North Korean ICBMs
and the potential threat from Iranian ICBMs, including GBI reliability and system engineering
enhancements, GBI modifications to address the root causes of recent flight test failures, and operation of
the Sea-Based X-band radar.
• Provides funding for advanced technologies to meet the future threat, including discrimination
improvements, directed energy research, and multiple kill technologies.
• Provides funding for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Extended Range concept
development; and procures 30 THAAD interceptors in FY 2016.
• Procures 80 new Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles. The MSE is a significant evolutionary
improvement over the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile, and provides greater agility and
lethality.
• Continues U.S. contributions to the Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and rockets.
Continues support for the Arrow Weapon System and the David’s Sling Weapon System.
• Continues conversion of Aegis ships to provide BMD capability and procures 40 SM-3 Block IB missiles
to be deployed on Aegis BMD ships and at the Romania Aegis Ashore site.

Space
The US has long led the world in space capabilities, although Russia remains a competitor and –
as has already been described – this is a key priority in Chinese force development that is already
affecting the balance in Asia. It is unclear how this competition and current US budget cuts will
affect this lead. The FY2016 Future Year Defense Program includes the following
developments. 1254
The FY 2016 President’s Budget request includes $7.1 billion for the DoD Space Investment Programs. For
FY 2016, the Department modified the space program portfolio based on the recently completed Space
Strategic Portfolio Review (SSPR), which recommended strategy goals and capabilities to implement an
Assured Space Strategy.
The Air Force increased investment in Space Situation Awareness and Space Control capabilities in the FY
2016 budget, based on the findings and recommendations of the SSPR. These enhancements include
funding to accelerate delivery of the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Follow-On, upgrade and
procure the full requirement of operational Counter Communication Systems, enable one-way net-centric
data to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), accelerate delivery of the JSpOC Mission System
(JMS) Increment 3, deliver enhanced information to enable rapid visualization/targeting, and other
classified efforts.
488 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

The Air Force is adjusting the Global Positioning System (GPS) III space vehicle procurement profile to
position the program for a potential competition to procure more vehicles than those currently on contract.
The budget also adjusts funding within the GPS enterprise to account for updated cost estimates on the
Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) and Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE).
The Air Force continues to explore an alternative architecture for Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
and Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR). The FY 2016 request also sustains the existing SATCOM and
OPIR systems through the transition, maintaining the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
capability with vehicles 5/6 through 2027, and the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) geosynchronous
orbit (GEO) capability with vehicles 5/6 through 2025.
The Air Force commenced development of the Weather System Follow-On (WSF) in FY 2015 to begin the
transition from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) while preparing to launch and
initialize the last DMSP space vehicle (Flight 20). The WSF will take a disaggregated system-of-systems
approach to meet specific DoD needs while leveraging near-term civilian and international partnerships.
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program has been aligned with satellite launch schedules
in FY 2016 while aggressively pursuing competition. In addition, the Air Force is taking steps to promote
the development of two commercially viable, domestically sourced space launch service providers with the
objective of eliminating reliance on a foreign-made liquid rocket engine.
The budget also includes a new account for Air Force major space procurement programs. The
Department’s appropriations are specific to a particular ___domain or function, but there has been no DoD
appropriation for space. This new appropriation is limited to major Air Force space procurement programs.
Further, a new appropriation presents an opportunity to more closely match the obligation schedules of
major space procurement programs. Since space systems are highly complex and can take a decade to
design and build, the Budget requests 5-year availability for the Space Procurement, Air Force account.
The US is also China’s only peer in ship-based space tracking: 1255
The U.S. Military Sealift Command, founded in 1958, has a Sepcal Mission Program that currently
includes 25 ships supporting military and government tasks. It operates three active instrumentation
ships… which “provide platforms for monitoring missile launches and collecting data that can be used to
improve missile efficiency and accuracy.” The Observation Island is fitted with Cobra Judy (AN/SPQ-11),
a passive electronically scanned array radar that supports space and ballistic-missile tracking as well as
other instrumentation. It is linked to two types of non-maritime radars: the ground-based Cobra Dane
(AN/FPS-108) in Shemya, Alaska; and three Cobra Ball (RC-135S) aircraft. As part of the U.S. ballistic-
missile defense system, the Military Sealift Command operations the Sea-based X-band Radar Platform
(SBX-1).
These assets represent parts of a larger U.S surveillance network that includes such allied land-based
components as the ballistic-missile detection radars at Fylingdales, U.K.; and Thule, Greenland. With its
global ground- and space-based C4ISR, the United States is far less reliant than China on this sea-based
approach. Few other countries even have space-event support ships. Russia today operates only the
Akademik Sergei Korolev, and France the Monge. No other country maintains a significant presence in this
field.

Nuclear Forces
There is no way to assess the exact probability that the US or China would make threats to use
their nuclear weapons in a Korean conflict, or ever escalate to their actual use, but the probability
they would even make explicit threats seems extremely low. Each side’s nuclear weapons have a
deterrent impact in restraining the other’s behavior without such threats, and even raising the
possibility of an actual nuclear exchange would threaten the stability of Asia, the global
economy, and the US and Chinese economies in ways in which the end result could not be
calculated. Both sides seem likely to calculate that moving beyond the tacit threat posed by the
existence of the other’s nuclear forces and would almost certainly be so destructive as to be more
costly than any strategic or military gains in a limited war could ever be worth.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 489

At the same time, neither side can predict what would happen if the ROK and DPRK became
involved in a conflict that led the DPRK to threaten the use of nuclear weapons or make
extensive use of other WMD. A successful major offensive that threatened the existence of either
the DPRK or ROK could trigger threats to use nuclear forces. The US offer of extended
deterrence links the US to the nuclear balance in the Koreas and indirectly to China, while
China’s treaty alliance with the DPRK links it to the Korean nuclear balance and the US as well.
The possible use of precision conventional-strike capability against high-value strategic and
economic targets – “weapons of mass effectiveness” could produce a process of escalation
neither side intended but both would then have to deal with. The possibility that the ROK or
Japan might eventually develop nuclear weapons could add a further level of uncertainty in the
future.
Unclassified estimates of the present structure of US, Chinese, and other outside nuclear forces
are shown in the following figures:
• Figure IX.4 compares the overall strength of US and major Northeast Asian nuclear powers.
• Figure IX.5 provides an estimate of the global holdings of nuclear weapons.
These nuclear balances include Russia, and it is important to note that most US thinking about
the nuclear balance still focuses on Russia and Europe. The forces on each side are also anything
but static. The US is pursuing ways to reduce nuclear forces. China is increasing its forces and
their capability, although there is little credible unclassified data on Chinese plans and activity.
It is also unclear that weapons numbers would be meaningful unless events forced both sides into
a major nuclear engagement. The fact the US will have much larger weapons numbers for the
foreseeable future might mean the US could theoretically “win” in terms of inflicting the most
strikes and damage, but such a victory would be as pyrrhic a “victory” as a feared Cold War-era
exchange between the US and Russia. Nevertheless, the US and China are major nuclear powers
with boosted and thermonuclear weapons. While neither is likely to use these weapons, they
have the capability and – at a minimum – their possession of nuclear weapons plays a major role
in the balance of deterrence and in shaping the risks of asymmetric escalation.
490 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.4: US and Asian Nuclear Capable Forces

China
Quantity Role/Type
Strategic Missiles (figures are estimates)
ICBM
12 DF-31 (CSS-9)
30 DF31A (CSS-9 Mod 2)
10 DF-4 (CSS-3)
20 DF-5A (CSS-4 Mod 2)
MRBM
80 DF-21/21A (CSS-5 Mod 1/2)
36 DF21C (CSS-5 Mod 3)
6 DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 4 – ASBM)
Some DF-16
IRBM
2 DF-3A (CSS-2 Mod)
SRBM
108 DF-11A/M-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)
144 DF-15/M-9 (CSS-6)
LACM
54 CJ-10 (DH-10)
Navy
1 Xia
With 12 JL-1(CSS-N-3) strategic SLBM
3 Jin
With up to 12 JL-2 (CSS-NX-4) strategic SLBM (3rd and 4th vessels under construction)

United States
Quantity Role/Type
Navy
14 Ohio SSBN 730
Each with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5 strategic SLBM

Air Force
6 SQN with 71 B-52H Stratofortress
Each with up to 20 AGM-86B nuclear ALCM and/or AGM-129A nuclear ACM

2 SQN with 19 B-2A Spirit

Each with up to 16 free-fall bombs (or 80 when fitted with Small Diameter
Bombs)
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 491

9 SQN with 450 LGM-30G Minuteman III

Each with a capacity of 1-3 MIRV Mk12/Mk12A per missile

Russia
Quantity Role/Type
Navy
3 Kalmar (Delta III)
Each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 Stingray) strategic SLBM
6 Delfin (Delta IV)
Each with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23Skiff) strategic SLBM (1 vessel in repair, 2014
expected return to service)
1 Akula (Typhoon)
Each with 20 RSM-52 Sturgeon strategic SLBM
Strategic Rocket Force Armies
3 Strategic Rocket Forces is a separate branch of the Russian Armed Forces, directly
subordinate to the General Staff. The Strategic Rocket Forces were demoted to this status
from that of a separate service of the Armed Forces by a presidential decree of March 24,
2001.Strategic Rocket Forces include three missile armies: the 27th Guards Missile Army
(HQ in Vladimir), the 31st Missile Army (Orenburg), the 33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk).
The 53rd Missile Army (Chita) was disbanded in 2002. It appears that the 31st Missile Army
(Orenburg) will be liquidated by 2016. As of 2012, the missile armies included 11 missile
divisions with operational ICBMs.*
As of March 2012, the Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to have 332 operational
missile systems of five different types. Intercontinental ballistic missiles of these systems
could carry 1092 warheads.*

Strategic Missiles
54 RS-20 (SS-18) Satan (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl)
120 RS-12M (SS-25) Sickle
40 RS-18 (SS-19) Stiletto (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl)
60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27M1), silo based
18 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27M1), road mobile
21 RS-24 (SS-27M2) Yars (estimated 3 MIRV per msl)
Long-Range Aviation Command
1 Sqn Tu-160 Blackjack
16 Tu-160 each with up to 12 Kh-55SM (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM
3 Sqn Tu-95MS Bear
32 Tu-95MS6 (Bear H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55 (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM
31 Tu-95MS16 (Bear H-16) each with up to 16 Kh-55 nuclear ALCM
Source: Based primarily on material in IISS, The Military Balance 2013. Figures do not include equipment used for training
purposes. Some equipment and personnel figures are estimates. All equipment figures represent equipment in active service.
* Based on “Strategic Nuclear Forces” section of Russian Forces Project, http://russianforces.org/missiles/.
492 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.5: Comparative Estimate of Global Holdings of Nuclear

Weapons
Country Russia US China DPRK

Information FAS 1256 CAC 1257 FAS CAC FAS CAC FAS CAC
Source

Operational: 1,740 1,740 1,950 1,950 0 n/a 0 n/a

Strategic

Operational: 0 0 200 200 ? n/a n/a n/a

Non-strategic

Non- 2,700 2,700 (+ 4,000 2,500 2,650 (+ 3,000 180 240- <10 <10
deployed/ awaiting awaiting 300
Reserve dismantlement) dismantlement

Total 8,500 8,500 7,700 7,700 240 300 <10 <10

Inventory

Growth Decrease Decrease Growing Growing

Trend

Country UK Israel Pakistan India France

Information FAS CAC FAS CAC FAS CAC FAS CAC FAS CAC
Source

Operational: 160 <160 0 n/a 0 n/a 0 n/a 290 <300

Strategic

Operational: n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 50
Non-strategic

Non- 65 65 80 80 90- 90- 80- 80- ? n/a

deployed/Reserve 110 110 100 100

Total Inventory 225 225 80 80 90- 90- 80- 80- 300 298-300
(200) 110 110 100 100

Growth Trend Decrease Growing Steady Steady Slight decrease

Note: FAS – Federation of American Scientists; CAC – Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
Source: FAS, Status of World Nuclear forces, December 18, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html; prepared by Lesley McNiesh, updated by Justin
Bresolin; “Fact Sheet: Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories in 2013,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, March
2013, http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/fact_sheet_global_nuclear_weapons_inventories_in_2012/.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 493

Chinese Nuclear Forces

China is one of the five nuclear weapons states acknowledged in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). China’s first nuclear test occurred in 1964. Since then, China has conducted 45
nuclear tests, including thermonuclear weapons and a neutron bomb. 1258 It has also become a
party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Chinese and US Views of China’s Nuclear Forces
Until at least 2010, China maintained a no-first-use policy. China’s 2008 Defense White Paper
stated that, 1259
The Second Artillery Force is a strategic force under the direct command and control of the CMC, and the
core force of China for strategic deterrence. It is mainly responsible for deterring other countries from using
nuclear weapons against China, and for conducting nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes with
conventional missiles.
The Second Artillery Force sticks to China’s policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, implements a self-
defensive nuclear strategy, strictly follows the orders of the CMC, and takes it as its fundamental mission
the protection of China from any nuclear attack. In peacetime the nuclear missile weapons of the Second
Artillery Force are not aimed at any country. But if China comes under a nuclear threat, the nuclear missile
force of the Second Artillery Force will go into a state of alert, and get ready for a nuclear counterattack to
deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China.
If China comes under a nuclear attack, the nuclear missile force of the Second Artillery Force will use
nuclear missiles to launch a resolute counterattack against the enemy either independently or together with
the nuclear forces of other services. The conventional missile force of the Second Artillery Force is charged
mainly with the task of conducting medium- and long-range precision strikes against key strategic and
operational targets of the enemy.
Similarly, China’s 2010 White Paper argued that, 1260
China has never evaded its obligations in nuclear disarmament and pursues an open, transparent and
responsible nuclear policy. It has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and
in any circumstances, and made the unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will it use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China
has never deployed nuclear weapons in foreign territory and has always exercised the utmost restraint in the
development of nuclear weapons, and has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it
ever do so. It will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level required for national security
China’s 2013 Defense White Paper did not address these issues. China is, however, in the
process of a major modernization of its nuclear-armed missile forces and is developing a
“stealth” strike aircraft – the J-20. It is also now MIRVing its nuclear systems. As a result, The
US Department of Defense report on Chinese military power for 2013 provided the following
analysis of how these developments interact with China’s no first use policy. 1261
China’s official policy on nuclear weapons continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear force structure able
to survive an attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy. The
new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are intended
to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and, to a
lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike, and
missile defense capabilities. The PLA has deployed new command, control, and communications
capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability to command and
control multiple units in the field. Through the use of improved communications links, the ICBM units now
have better access to battlefield information, uninterrupted communications connecting all command
echelons, and the unit commanders are able to issue orders to multiple subordinates at once, instead of
494 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

serially via voice commands.

China has consistently asserted that it adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear
forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of two stated
commitments: China will never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear-weapon state, and China will
never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free
zone. However, there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply,
including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high-altitude
bursts would constitute a first use. Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell
out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s
conventional attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. However, there
has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU
doctrine.
China will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, nuclear
force (sometimes described as “sufficient and effective”), to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging
retaliatory nuclear strike.
…China’s official policy on nuclear weapons continues to focus on maintaining a nuclear force structure
able to survive an attack and respond with sufficient strength to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy.
The new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVs and penetration aids, are
intended to ensure the viability of China’s strategic deterrent in the face of continued advances in U.S. and,
to a lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), precision strike,
and missile defense capabilities. The PLA has deployed new command, control, and communications
capabilities to its nuclear forces. These capabilities improve the Second Artillery’s ability to command and
control multiple units in the field. Through the use of improved communications links, the ICBM units now
have better access to battlefield information, uninterrupted communications connecting all command
echelons, and the unit commanders are able to issue orders to multiple subordinates at once, instead of
serially via voice commands.
China has consistently asserted that it adheres to a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating it would use nuclear
forces only in response to a nuclear strike against China. China’s NFU pledge consists of two stated
commitments: China will never use nuclear weapons first against any nuclear-weapon state, and China will
never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free
zone. However, there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s NFU policy would apply,
including whether strikes on what China considers its own territory, demonstration strikes, or high-altitude
bursts would constitute a first use.
Moreover, some PLA officers have written publicly of the need to spell out conditions under which China
might need to use nuclear weapons first; for example, if an enemy’s conventional attack threatened the
survival of China’s nuclear force or of the regime itself. However, there has been no indication that national
leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s NFU doctrine.
China will likely continue to invest considerable resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, nuclear
force (sometimes described as “sufficient and effective”), to ensure the PLA can deliver a damaging
retaliatory nuclear strike.
Estimates of Chinese nuclear forces differ by source, as has been seen in Figures IX.4 and IX.5.
An estimate by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) estimated that China has approximately 130-
195 deployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. It also appears that their XIA- and JIN-class
ballistic missile submarines are able to be deployed, while the associated JL-1 and JL-2 systems
are not yet ready. It also seems that China has an unofficial moratorium on fissile material
production. The country is estimated to have 16 +/-4 tons of HEU and 1.8 +/-.5 tons of
plutonium. China was also the first nuclear weapons state to declare a “no first use policy.” 1262
The NTI goes on to describe the Chinese nuclear stockpile in more detail: 1263
On 16 October 1964 China exploded its first nuclear device. China has since consistently asserted that its
nuclear doctrine is based on the concept of no-first-use, and Chinese military leaders have characterized the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 495

country’s nuclear weapons as a minimum deterrent against nuclear attacks. Although the exact size of
China’s nuclear stockpile has not been publicly disclosed, reports indicate that as of 2011 China has
produced a total of 200 to 300 nuclear warheads. In 2011, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen
estimated the size of China’s current nuclear stockpile to be approximately 240 warheads, with 178
deployed…
…China successfully tested its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964 — with highly enriched uranium
produced at the Lanzhou facility — and just 32 months later on 17 June 1967, China tested its first
thermonuclear device. This achievement is remarkable in that the time span between the two events is
substantially less than it was for the other nuclear weapon states. By way of comparison, 86 months passed
between the United States’ first atomic test and its first hydrogen bomb test; for the USSR, it was 75
months; for the UK, 66 months; and for France, 105 months…
…China’s nuclear tests in the late-1980s and 1990s were geared toward further modernizing its nuclear
forces. Although China officially declared in 1994 that these tests were for improving safety features on
existing warheads, they were also likely intended for the development of new, smaller warheads for
China’s next-generation solid-fueled ICBMs (e.g., DF-31 and DF-31A), and possibly to develop a multiple
warhead (MRV or MIRV) capability as well… China’s last test was on 29 July 1996, and less than two
months later on 24 September 1996 Beijing signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)….
In order to sign the treaty China overcame several of its initial concerns, including allowing an exemption
for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the use of national technical means and on-site inspections for
verification. The National People’s Congress, however, has yet to ratify the treaty.
Since the inception of its nuclear weapons program, China has relied on a mixture of foreign and
indigenous inputs to steadily develop and modernize its nuclear arsenal from its first implosion device to
the development of tactical nuclear weapons in the 1980s… As a result, The Federation of American
Scientists assesses China to have at least six different types of nuclear payload assemblies: a 15-40 kiloton
(kt) fission bomb; a 20 kt missile warhead; a 3 megaton (mt) thermonuclear missile warhead; a 3 mt
thermonuclear gravity bomb; a 4-5 mt missile warhead; and a 200-300 kt missile warhead. China is thought
to possess a total of some 150 tactical nuclear warheads on its short-range ballistic, and possibly cruise
missiles….
In its…(2011) Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments of the People’s
Republic of China, the U.S. Department of Defense noted that “China is both qualitatively and
quantitatively improving its strategic missile forces.”…The report stated that China’s nuclear capable
missile arsenal consists of a total of 55-65 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including: silo-based,
liquid-fueled DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs; solid-fueled, road-mobile DF-31 (CSS 10 Mod-1) and DF-31A (CSS-
10 Mod 2) ICBMs; limited-range CSS-3 ICBMs; and liquid-fueled CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic
missiles; DF- 21 (CSS-5) road-mobile, solid-fueled MRBMs; and JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM) for China’s single XIA-class SSBN.
China also possesses DF-15 (CSS-6) and 700-750 DF-11 (CSS-7) short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs),
though China maintains significantly fewer launchers, and 200-500 DH-10 (a cruise missile thought to be
able to support a nuclear payload). The Department of Defense assesses that all Chinese SRBMs are
deployed near Taiwan. Most recently, China has developed the long-range DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs. The
2011 report assessed that while the JIN-class submarine appeared ready, its accompanying JL-2 SLBM
system had failed several flight tests and remained in the development stage. It is currently uncertain when
the JIN/JL-2 combination will become fully operational….
There is an ongoing effort to shift from liquid-fueled missiles to solid-fueled ones which, among other
advantages, can be launched more rapidly…China has also continued to develop new missile launch sites
and underground storage facilities in remote inland regions, including the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan
highlands. As there is no evidence of long-range missiles being deployed to these new locations, the launch
sites appear to be intended primarily as forward bases for potential launches against Russia and India.
Even as it continues to develop its arsenal, however, China has also slowly moved towards increased
openness in its willingness to share a limited amount of deployment information and strategy. For example,
the 2010 China Defense White Paper details Beijing’s no-first-use policy and roughly outlines several
stages of nuclear alert. The paper states that “nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty
496 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other.” The White Paper also states China’s “unequivocal
commitment that under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.”
…China’s nuclear tests in the late-1980s and 1990s were geared toward further modernizing its nuclear
forces. Although China officially declared in 1994 that these tests were for improving safety features on
existing warheads, they were also likely intended for the development of new, smaller warheads for
China’s next-generation solid-fueled ICBMs (e.g., DF-31 and DF-31A), and possibly to develop a multiple
warhead (MRV or MIRV) capability as well.
China’s last test was on 29 July 1996, and less than two months later on 24 September 1996 Beijing signed
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In order to sign the treaty China overcame several of
its initial concerns, including allowing an exemption for Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and the use of
national technical means and on-site inspections for verification. The National People’s Congress, however,
has yet to ratify the treaty.
China’s 1996 signing of the CTBT was the latest in a series of policy shifts on nuclear nonproliferation
issues. In fact, it was during the 1980s that China’s position on nuclear proliferation first started to change.
Since the 1960s, Beijing had criticized the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as
imbalanced and discriminatory, but by the 1980s the country had also indicated that it accepted in principle
the norm of nuclear nonproliferation …
In August 1991, shortly after France acceded to the NPT, China also declared its intention to join, though it
again expressed its reservations about the treaty’s discriminatory nature…China formally acceded to the
NPT in March 1992, as a nuclear weapon state. In its statement of accession, the Chinese government
called on all nuclear weapon states to issue unconditional no-first-use pledges, to provide negative and
positive security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states, to support the development of nuclear weapon-
free zones, to withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed outside of their national territories, and to halt the
arms race in outer space. Since its accession, China has praised the NPT’s role in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also supported the decision to indefinitely extend the NPT at the 1995
Review and Extension Conference…
However, China has continued to state that it views nonproliferation not as an end in itself, but rather as a
means to the ultimate objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
Despite this, China was embroiled in nuclear proliferation scandals throughout the late 1980’s and early
1990’s, particularly with respect to its sale of ring magnets to Pakistan in 1995. China provided Pakistan
with a nuclear bomb design (used in China’s October 1966 nuclear test). These designs were later passed to
Libya by the A.Q. Khan network, and discovered by IAEA inspectors in 2004 after then President
Muammar Qadhafi renounced his nuclear weapons program and allowed inspectors to examine related
facilities.
The plans contained portions of Chinese text with explicit instructions for the manufacture of an implosion
device….In the late 1990s, the U.S. Congress formed the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military-Commercial Concerns with China (also known as the Cox Committee). According to the Cox
Committee Report, China engaged in an active espionage program and stole several nuclear bomb designs
as early as the late 1970s. Designs compromised include the United States’ then-most advanced W-88
warhead and a design for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb). However, the Cox Report has
been severely criticized by both experts and officials in the United States and China as a political document
that has several technical inaccuracies.
…There is much speculation that China’s nuclear modernization program may be geared toward
developing the capacity to move from a strategy of minimum deterrence to one of limited deterrence.
Under a “limited deterrence” doctrine, China would need to target nuclear forces in addition to cities,
which would require expanded deployments. However, such a limited deterrence capability may still be a
long way off. According to Alastair Johnston, “…is fairly safe to say that Chinese capabilities come
nowhere near the level required by the concept of limited deterrence.”…
Meanwhile, tensions between China and Taiwan have declined, and in the wake of Japan’s 2011 nuclear
crisis, China and Taiwan are taking concrete measures to cooperate on nuclear safety issues. Such cross-
strait cooperation includes establishing a formal nuclear safety agreement and an official contact
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 497

mechanism between the two sides, which will be used to facilitate information exchanges and emergency
responses in case of an accident…
While China’s decreased threat perception may not slow its nuclear modernization efforts, which are seen
simply as representing the replacement of obsolete equipment, it does have the potential to slow
acquisitions in key areas — for example, the buildup of short-range missiles. If sustained, the shift may
also make both sides more amenable to nonproliferation efforts such as ratification of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Chinese Biological and Chemical Weapons

While China is a party to many of the international agreements regulating biological weapons,
past US government reports have alleged that China maintains a small offensive weapons
program and has engaged in proliferation of related items to countries such as Iran. There have
also historically been concerns in the US about Chinese will to enforce export controls on dual
use items, but the State Department concluded in 2011 that there were no compliance issues
raised between the two.
In ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, China declared three former production
facilities. While the US has doubted that China was fully declaring its previous and current
activities in this area, the US reported most of its concerns resolved in 2011. 1264
Role of Chinese Special Forces and Tunnel Facilities
The PLA has also been building underground tunnels to protect and conceal its key assets since
the early 1950s; the underground tunnel network reportedly stretches for over 5,000 km. 1265
Experts like Phillip Karber note their value in terms of both missile deployments and the
potential ability to stockpile much larger numbers of nuclear weapons than are normally
estimated to be in China’s forces. 1266
The US DOD, however, sees these efforts as largely defensive: 1267
…China maintains a technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting all aspects
of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given China’s NFU nuclear policy,
China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear blow while ensuring leadership and strategic
assets survive.
China determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid to late 1980s. This
modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S. and NATO air
operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military capabilities during the 1991 Gulf War. A new
emphasis on “winning hi-tech battles” in the future precipitated research into advanced tunneling and
construction methods. These military campaigns convinced China it needed to build more survivable,
deeply buried facilities, resulting in the widespread UGF construction effort detected throughout China for
the last decade.

US Nuclear Forces
President Obama declared in April 2009 that the US was committed to the long-term goal of zero
nuclear weapons, and there has been a unilateral Congressional moratorium on nuclear tests
since 1992. Although the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review suggested that the US might develop
new types of nuclear weapons, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review reversed course. The new
posture is that nuclear weapons research will only involve components based on pervious
designs, not new capabilities or missions.
498 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Nuclear Forces
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been removing its deployed nuclear weapons from
Europe and Asia. In 2008, the US informed Japan it would be retiring its sea-based nuclear
warhead Tomahawk cruise missiles from the region. 1268
Figure IX.5 shows that the US had over 1,700 deployed strategic warheads as of March 2013. It
had an additional 200 active theater nuclear weapons. The FAS reported that the US had an
estimated 2,200 strategic and 300 non-strategic warheads in central storage. Some 260
nonstrategic W80-0 warheads for the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) have
been retired. Another 3,000 retired warheads were “awaiting dismantlement.” In addition, more
than 15,000 plutonium cores (pits) and some 5,000 Canned Assemblies (secondaries) from
dismantled warheads are in storage at the Pantex Plant in Texas and Y-12 plant in Tennessee. 1269
The US summarized its strategy in dealing with deterrence and nuclear forces as follows in its
FY2016 defense budget overview, 1270
Strengthening the nuclear enterprise remains the number one mission priority within the Air Force. The Air
Force continues its actions to deliver safe, secure, and effective nuclear capabilities within its Nuclear
Deterrence Operations (NDO) portfolio. The Air Force’s intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy
bombers provide two legs of the Nation’s nuclear TRIAD. Dual-capable fighters and bombers extend
deterrence and provide assurance to allies and partners. The Air Force continues its efforts to further the
skills and leadership of its NDO-Airmen and institutionalize improvements and capitalize on gains made
since the Air Force began reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise in 2008.
The FY 2016 budget funds additional investments to sustain and modernize the ICBM force. These
investments include: ICBM Fuze replacement, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) flight system
development, the addition of officer Assignment Incentive Pay and enlisted Special Duty Assignment Pay,
and various security upgrades to include replacement of the nuclear warhead Payload Transporter Van and
the addition of Remote Visual Assessment II to the missile fields.
One key question, however, is what will happen if the US is confronted with both North Korean
nuclear forces and the need to deter or respond to Chinese theater or strategic nuclear forces. The
US has several options: it can (1) rely on containment in peacetime and military restraint in
advancing into the DPRK in wartime, (2) deter Chinese threats or use of strategic theater nuclear
weapons by the threat of using its own strategic weapon, (3) it can deploy, threaten to use, or use
theater nuclear weapons, or (4) it can create conventional strike options that will be weapons of
“mass effectiveness” by precisely targeting key Chinese and DPRK facilities rather than using
nuclear warheads.
US Theater Nuclear Forces
Theater nuclear weapons present another set of complex issues because US policy has changed
and the current status of such forces in contingencies outside Europe remains somewhat
ambiguous. A 2015 report by Amy Woolf of the US Congressional Research Service notes
that, 1271
In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment most and eliminated from
their arsenals many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now has approximately 760
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with around 200 deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored
in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 1,000 and 6,000 warheads
for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration quietly redeployed and removed
some of the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. Russia, however seems to have increased its reliance on
nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its
commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 499

Recent discussions about the U.S. nuclear weapons policy have placed a renewed emphasis on the role of
U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and assurance. Extended deterrence refers to the
U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks, from Russia or other adversaries, against allies in
NATO and some allies in Asia. Assurance refers to the U.S. promise, made to those same allies, to come to
their defense and assistance if they are threatened or attacked. The weapons deployed in Europe are a
visible reminder of that commitment; the sea-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons in storage that could be
deployed in the Pacific in a crisis served a similar purpose for U.S. allies in Asia. Recent debates, however,
have focused on the question of whether a credible U.S. extended deterrent requires that the United States
maintain weapons deployed in Europe, and the ability to deploy them in the Pacific, or whether other U.S.
military capabilities, including strategic nuclear weapons and conventional forces, may be sufficient….
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration stated that the United States “will continue
to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security and to demonstrate this commitment
not only through words, but also through deeds.” The NPR indicated that a wide range of U.S. military
capabilities would support this goal, but also indicated that U.S. commitments would “retain a nuclear
dimension as long as nuclear threats to U.S. allies and partners remain.” The Administration did not,
however, specify that the nuclear dimension would be met with nonstrategic nuclear weapons; the full
range of U.S. capabilities would likely be available to support and defend U.S. allies. In addition, the
Administration announced that the United States would retire the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missiles that had helped provide assurances to U.S. allies in Asia. In essence, the Administration concluded
that the United States could reassure U.S. allies in Asia, and deter threats to their security, without
deploying sea-based cruise missiles to the region in a crisis.
Moreover, the possible use of nuclear weapons, and extended nuclear deterrence, were a part of a broader
concept that the Administration referred to as “regional security architectures.” The NPR indicated that
regional security architectures were a key part of “the U.S. strategy for strengthening regional deterrence
while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons.” As a result, these architectures would “include
effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and
integrated command and control—all underwritten by strong political commitments.” In other words,
although the United States would continue to extend deterrence to its allies and seek to assure them of the
U.S. commitment to their security, it would draw on a political commitments and a range of military
capabilities to achieve these goals.
…In the past, U.S. discussions about nonstrategic nuclear weapons have also addressed questions about the
role they might play in deterring or responding to regional contingencies that involved threats from nations
that may not be armed with their own nuclear weapons. For example, former Secretary of Defense Perry
stated that, “maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear
capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring
aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing
proliferation (emphasis added).”
…Specifically, both during the Cold War and after the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States
maintained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks with conventional, chemical, or
biological weapons. For example, in 1999, Assistant Secretary of Defense Edward Warner testified that
“the U.S. capability to deliver an overwhelming, rapid, and devastating military response with the full
range of military capabilities will remain the cornerstone of our strategy for deterring rogue nation ballistic
missile and WMD proliferation threats. The very existence of U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces,
backed by highly capable conventional forces, should certainly give pause to any rogue leader
contemplating the use of WMD against the United States…”
The George W. Bush Administration also emphasized the possible use of nuclear weapons in regional
contingencies in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The Bush Administration appeared to shift towards a
somewhat more explicit approach when acknowledging that the United States might use nuclear weapons
in response to attacks by nations armed with chemical, biological, and conventional weapons, stating that
the United States would develop and deploy those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the
capabilities of any potential adversary whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. This does not, by itself,
indicate that the United States would plan to use nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, many analysts
concluded from these and other comments by Bush Administration officials that the United States was
500 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

planning for the tactical, first use of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration never confirmed this view,
and, instead, indicated that it would not use nuclear weapons in anything other than the most grave
circumstances.
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, seemed to foreclose the option of using nuclear weapons in
some regional contingencies. Specifically, it stated, in the 2010 NPR, that, “the United States will not use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.” Specifically,
if such a nation were to attack the United States with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons, the
United States would respond with overwhelming conventional force, but it would not threaten to use
nuclear weapons if the attacking nation was in compliance with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations and
it did not have nuclear weapons of its own...At the same time, though, the NPR stated that any state that
used chemical or biological weapons “against the United States or its allies and partners would face the
prospect of a devastating conventional military response—and that any individuals responsible for the
attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.”…
…Through the late 1990s and early in George W. Bush Administration, the United States maintained
approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its active stockpile. Unclassified reports indicate that,
of this number, around 500 were air-delivered bombs deployed at bases in Europe. The remainder,
including some additional air-delivered bombs and around 320 nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles,
were held in storage areas in the United States…
After the Clinton Administration’s 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States eliminated its ability to
return nuclear weapons to U.S. surface ships (it had retained this ability after removing the weapons under
the 1991 PNI). It retained, however, its ability to restore cruise missiles to attack submarines, and it did not
recommend any changes in the number of air-delivered weapons deployed in Europe. During this time, the
United States also consolidated its weapons storage sites for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It reportedly
reduced the number of these facilities “by, over 75%” between 1988 and 1994. It eliminated two of its four
storage sites for sea-launched cruise missiles, retaining only one facility on each coast of the United States.
It also reduced the number of bases in Europe that store nuclear weapons from over 125 bases in the mid-
1980s to 10 bases, in seven countries, by 2000…
The Bush Administration did not recommend any changes for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons after
completing its Nuclear Posture Review in 2001. Reports indicate that it decided to retain the capability to
restore cruise missiles to attack submarines because of their ability to deploy, in secret, anywhere on the
globe in time of crisis. The NPR also did not recommend any changes to the deployment of nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in Europe, leaving decisions about their status to the members of the NATO alliance.
Nevertheless, according to unclassified reports, the United States did reduce the number of nuclear
weapons deployed in Europe and the number of facilities that house those weapons during the George W.
Bush Administration. Some reports indicate that the weapons were withdrawn from Greece and Ramstein
Air Base in Germany between 2001 and 2005. In addition reports indicate that the United States also
withdrew its nuclear weapons from the RAF Lakenheath air base in the United Kingdom in
2006.5…According to a recent unclassified report, the United States now deploys 160-200 bombs at six
bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Some of these weapons are stored at U.S.
bases and would be delivered by U.S. aircraft. Others are stored at bases operated by the “host nation” and
would be delivered by that nation’s aircraft if NATO decided to employ nuclear weapons.
The Obama Administration has not announced any further reductions to U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe
and has indicated that the United States would “consult with our allies regarding the future basing of
nuclear weapons in Europe.” In the months prior to the completion of NATO’s new Strategic Concept,
some politicians in some European nations did propose that the United States withdraw these weapons. For
example, Guido Westerwelle, Germany’s foreign minister, stated that he supported the withdrawal of U.S.
nuclear weapons from Germany. Some reports indicate that Belgium and the Netherlands also supported
this goal…. As was noted above, NATO did not call for the removal of these weapons in its new Strategic
Concept, but did indicate that it would be open to reducing them as a result of arms control negotiations
with Russia.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 501

Moreover, in the 2010 NPR, the Obama Administration indicated that it would take the steps necessary to
maintain the capability to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. It indicated that the U.S. Air Force
would retain the capability to deliver both nuclear and conventional weapons as it replaced aging F-16
aircraft with the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The NPR also indicated that the United States would
conduct a “full scope” life extension program for the B61 bomb, the weapon that is currently deployed in
Europe, “to ensure its functionality with the F-35.” This life extension program will consolidate four
versions of the B61 bomb, including the B61-3 and B61-4 that are currently deployed in Europe, into one
version, the B61-12. Reports indicate that this new version will reuse the nuclear components of the older
bombs, but will include enhanced safety and security features and a new “tail kit” that will increase the
accuracy of the weapon….
On the other hand, the NPR indicated that the U.S. Navy would retire its nuclear-armed, sea-launched
cruise missiles (TLAM-N). It indicated that “this system serves a redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile” because it is one of several weapons the United States could deploy forward. The NPR also
noted that, “U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs are capable of striking any potential adversary.” As a result, because
“the deterrence and assurance roles of TLAM-N can be adequately substituted by these other means,” the
United States could continue to extend deterrence and provide assurance to its allies in Asia without
maintaining the capability to redeploy TLAM-N missiles….
The US remains committed to civil nuclear programs as well. It has 104 nuclear power reactors
producing approximately 20% of US energy needs, and is considering the construction of 28
further reactors. 1272
Other US Nuclear-Related Programs
The documents submitted with the US proposed FY2014 budget describe several other current
US plans for strategic forces, deterrence, and defense. It is not clear how they will affect the
future US stockpile of nuclear weapons, but they do reflect both budget cutbacks and ongoing
improvements in other areas: 1273
The Department continues to support the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which is designed
to protect U.S. deployed forces and allies in Europe from ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.
The budget request supports the implementation of Phase 3 of the EPAA, to include the deployment of
Aegis Ashore to Poland in the FY 2018 timeframe. The Aegis Ashore will be capable of launching
Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Blocks IA, IB, and IIA (delivery in 2018) variants.
The FY 2016 President’s Budget request:
• Provides additional funding for key capabilities to meet the maturing threat from North Korean ICBMs
and the potential threat from Iranian ICBMs, including GBI reliability and system engineering
enhancements, GBI modifications to address the root causes of recent flight test failures, and operation of
the Sea-Based X-band radar.
• Provides funding for advanced technologies to meet the future threat, including discrimination
improvements, directed energy research, and multiple kill technologies.
• Provides funding for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Extended Range concept
development; and procures 30 THAAD interceptors in FY 2016.
• Procures 80 new Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles. The MSE is a significant evolutionary
improvement over the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile, and provides greater agility and
lethality.
• Continues U.S. contributions to the Iron Dome system to defeat short-range missiles and rockets.
Continues support for the Arrow Weapon System and the David’s Sling Weapon System.
• Continues conversion of Aegis ships to provide BMD capability and procures 40 SM-3 Block IB missiles
to be deployed on Aegis BMD ships and at the Romania Aegis Ashore site.
502 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Japan
Under the Japanese constitution, the country is allowed to possess the minimum necessary level
of self-defense capability. What the “minimum necessary level” is can vary depending on
available technologies, the general international situation, and other factors. However, any
capability of “war potential” is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Japanese Constitution.
Furthermore, any arms deemed to be offensive weapons designed only for the mass destruction
of another country by definition exceed the “minimum necessary level of self-defense,” and thus
are never allowed. As such, the SDF is unable to have technologies such as ICBMs, attack
aircraft carriers, or long-range strategic bombers. 1274
Maritime self-defense is charged with defending the seas surrounding Japan, ensuring sea lane
security, and international peace cooperation activities. The force consists of destroyers,
submarines, patrol aircraft, and minesweeping units. The Air Self-Defense Force works to
conduct continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in the air and seas
around Japan and is in charge of air defense. Capacities include aircraft warning and control
units, fighter units, and a Surface-to Air Guided Missile Squadron. 1275
Missile Defense
The US and Japan are cooperating in ballistic missile defense (BMD), initiating development in
2004. A timeline of Japanese missile defense progress can be seen in Figure IX.6, and a graphic
showing the Japanese system is provided in Figure IX.7. As the 2012 Japanese Defense White
Paper notes, 1276
Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis destroyers
and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by Japan Aerospace Defense
Ground Environment (JADGE). To establish this multi-tier defense structure, the MOD and SDF have been
improving the capability of existing Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems and further promoting the BMD
system development.
By the end of FY2010, the MSDF equipped its four Aegis destroyers with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3)
missiles, and the ASDF deployed a total of 164 FUs, 5 of Patriot PAC-3, achieving the deployment targets
set in the annex table of the 2004 NDPG. The MOD and SDF are to continue the development of the BMD
system, based on the latest NDPG and Mid-Term Defense Program. Immediate objective is to establish a
system consisted of six BMD-capable Aegis destroyers (two vessels added), 17 Patriot PAC-3 FUs (six Air
Defense Missile Groups, Air Missile Training Group, and 2nd Technical School) (one additional FU), four
FPS-56 radars (already deployed), and seven upgraded FPS-3 radars (already deployed) with these assets
interconnected through various types of command, control, battle management and communications
systems, such as JADGE.
Recent exercises also show that the US and Japan are succeeding in developing steadily more
integrated approaches to such capabilities. For example, the US Missile Defense Agency
reported on October 29, 2010 that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the
United States Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had successfully completed an Aegis BMD
intercept flight test, in cooperation with the US Navy, off the coast of Kauai in Hawaii. The
event marked the fourth time that a JMSDF ship has engaged a ballistic missile target, including
three successful intercepts, with the sea-based midcourse engagement capability provided by
Aegis BMD: 1277
The JFTM-4 test event verified the newest engagement capability of the Japan Aegis BMD configuration of
the recently upgraded Japanese destroyer, JS KIRISHIMA. At approximately 5:06 p.m. (HST), 12:06 p.m.
Tokyo time on Oct. 29, 2010, a separating 1,000 km class ballistic missile target was launched from the
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 503

Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii. JS KIRISHIMA crewmembers detected
and tracked the target. The Aegis Weapon System then developed a fire control solution and launched a
Standard Missile -3 (SM-3) Block IA missile. Approximately three minutes later, the SM-3 successfully
intercepted the target approximately 100 miles above the Pacific Ocean. JFTM-4 is a significant milestone
in the growing cooperation between Japan and the US in the area of missile defense. Also participating in
the test was USS LAKE ERIE and USS RUSSELL, Aegis ships which cooperated to detect, track and
conduct a simulated intercept engagement against the same target.
In September 2012, the US and Japan agreed to develop a new missile defense system, upsetting
China during a time of prolonged tension over the disputed islands in the East China Sea. Japan
and the US agreed to deploy a second advanced missile-defense radar on Japanese territory. 1278
Former US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta remarked at the time, “[It] will enhance the
alliance’s ability to defend Japan, our forward deployed forces and the US homeland from a
ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea.” 1279
The new land-based X-band radar can track ballistic missiles up to 1,000 km away, allowing US
forces to intercept the missiles. The model is smaller than a sea-based X-band radar, which can
track missiles up to 4,800 km away. The current radars are based in Aomori Prefecture, while the
new system will be deployed near Kyoto. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also said that
Japan intends to ease the domestic laws limiting the operational scope of the Japanese Self-
Defense Forces, allowing Japan to shoot down any missiles from North Korea. Japan has
reportedly spent $12 billion on its missile defense system. 1280
US and Japanese capabilities are likely to increase sharply in the near term as more advanced
tactical and long-range, wide-area theater missile defense systems like the Standard SM-2 and
SM-3 and THAAD enter service.
Japan has developed a ballistic missile defense that is a “multi-tier defense system consisting of
an upper-tier defense through the SM-3-equipped Aegis destroyers and a lower-tier defense
through the Patriot PAC-3 for base protection.” 1281 As regards the principal equipment and core
units that make up Japan’s ballistic missile defense, the 2012 Defense White paper reported, 1282
(1) Under the four-ship structure for Aegis destroyers specified in the 2004 NDPG, if the necessity for
regular maintenance, replenishment, recreation, and training is taken into account, basically two Aegis
destroyers would be able at all times to execute their missions, and thus there would be limitations on
maintaining a continuous readiness. In addition, in order to ensure the country’s defense against the threat
of ballistic missiles, including response to the future threat of ballistic missiles equipped with capabilities to
avoid interceptor missiles, Aegis destroyers would have to be equipped with an Aegis BMD system, which,
in case advanced interceptor missiles are developed in the future, could operate them.
In view of these circumstances, the 2010 NDPG, taking into account factors such as the Government’s
severe financial circumstances and the need for rapid improvement of anti-ballistic missile defense
capabilities, provides a total of six Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense capabilities,
including two Aegis destroyers equipped with Aegis BMD systems capable of operating the advanced
interceptor missiles mentioned above. In addition, the 2010 NDPG states that additional acquisition of
BMD-capable Aegis destroyers, if to be provided separately, will be allowed within the number of
destroyers after consideration of development of BMD-related technologies and fiscal conditions in the
future, among other factors.
(2) As a result of the reorganization of units described in (1) above, the air warning and control unit capable
of ballistic missile defense are to be reformed into an 11-unit warning group/squadrons from a seven-unit
warning group and a four-unit warning squadrons. While three anti-aircraft groups used to possess Patriot
PAC-3, the entire six anti-aircraft groups will be equipped with PAC-3, in order to make quick responses
across the nation possible. On this occasion, the newly introduced PAC-3 will be limited to a one-unit FU6
under the 2010 NDPG in view of the severe financial circumstances, and together with the existing 16-unit
504 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

FU (for anti-aircraft squadrons and that required for education), 17-unit FU are to be stationed uniformly
throughout the country, creating the most efficient system possible.

Space
Japan is also working to develop it space capabilities. According to the 2012 Japanese Defense
White Paper, 1283
Japan, a country which has an exclusively defense-oriented policy, is strongly required to
use outer space, which does not belong to the national territory of any country and is not constrained by
conditions such as surface topography, to strengthen information gathering functions for detecting signs of
various contingencies in advance, and warning and surveillance functions in sea and air space surrounding
Japan, and to ensure lines of communication during the international peace cooperation activities of the
SDF.
The enactment of the Basic Space Law, passed by the Diet in May 2008, has made it clearer that the
development and use of space by Japan shall be carried out under the pacifism enshrined in the Constitution
of Japan in compliance with international commitments. The law also stipulates that the Government of
Japan shall take necessary measures to promote the development and use of space that contributes to
ensuring the peace and security of the international community, as well as to the security of Japan.
In 2009, the strategic Headquarters for Space Policy Cabinet Secretariat which was established based on
the Basic Space Law formulated the Basic Plan for Space Policy, which includes the six key elements such
as the realization of a secure, pleasant, and affluent society utilizing space, as well as the enhancement of
national security utilizing space.
Furthermore, the 2010 NDPG stipulate promotion of the development and the use of outer space with a
view to strengthening information gathering and communications functions, etc.
Meanwhile, on January 2009, the Committee on Promotion of Space Development and Use established in
the Ministry of Defense formulated the “Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space”
(Basic Guidelines). The Basic Guidelines stipulates that it is extremely beneficial to take advantage of the
nature of space for defense purpose and it will be an effective means to strengthen C4ISR capability in light
of the focus of the buildup of defense capabilities on enabling accurate situational awareness, information
sharing, command and control operations, and thereby achieving systemization – maximizing of the
equipment’s performance as an ensemble.
The Ministry of Defense will promote new development and use of space for the national security in
coordination with related ministries, based on the Basic Plan for Space Policy, the 2010 NDPG, and the
Basic Guidelines. In FY2012, it will address projects such as 1) research for enhancement of C4ISR
utilizing space, 2) enhancement, maintenance, and operation of X-band SATCOM functions, and 3)
participation in the USAF Space Fundamentals Course.
Of these, with regard to the enhancement of X-band SATCOM, in light of the fact that two of the
communications satellites (Superbird-B2 and Superbird-D) used by the Ministry of Defense and Self-
Defense Forces for command and control of tactical forces are due to reach the end of their service lives in
FY2015, these satellite communications networks will be reorganized. This reorganization will facilitate
high-speed, large capacity communications that are more resistant to interference, in order to accommodate
the recent growth in communications requirements, as well as integrating communications systems, thereby
contributing to the construction of a dynamic defense force. Moreover, from the perspective of maximizing
cost-effectiveness, it has been decided to implement the project by means of the PFI (private finance
initiative)system, and 19 years’ worth of costs (approximately 122.4 billion yen) has been allocated in the
FY2012 budget, to cover expenses from the manufacture of the satellites through to the end of their service
life. In this project, after guaranteeing transparency and fairness in tenders, etc. through open tendering, the
content of the proposals will be screened impartially, from the perspective of security, with bidders being
asked to implement the appropriate management systems and conservation measures.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 505

Figure IX.6: Timeline of Japanese Missile Defense Development

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 187.

506 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

Figure IX.7: Japanese Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

Source: Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 127.

Russia
It is extremely unlikely that Russian forces would be involved in even a high level of conflict in
the Korean Peninsula, but Russia’s status as a nuclear power cannot be ignored. The IISS
estimated that Russia has 1,499 warheads that could be deployed on SLMs, ICBMs, and heavy
bombers. However, there is no accurate count of the country’s tactical nuclear weapons, so the
current total stockpile of tactical and strategic warheads is unknown. Furthermore, it is estimated
that Russia possesses 737 metric tons of weapons grade-equivalent HEU and approximately 128
metric tons of plutonium; however, it should be noted that transparency in these areas is
limited. 1284
All three arms of the Russian military are working to revamp its nuclear triad. The Russian Air
Force was planning to deploy a new strategic cruise missile in 2012, the Navy is building Borei-
class SSBN (Project 995), and the Strategic Rocket Forces are looking into a new liquid-
propelled ballistic missile while continuing to use the solid-fueled RS-24 Yars. It does not look
like much progress has been made on previous proposals to create a unified strategic command.
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1285
The Kh-101/Kh-102 (AS-2X) likely entered service with the Russian air force in 2012, carried on the
Tupolev Tu-95MS Bear H. The Kh-102 is the nuclear variant of this large cruise missile, with the Kh-101 a
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 507

conventionally armed derivative. It is not known if the missile also entered service during 2012 with the
half-dozen or so Tu-160 Blackjack bomber aircraft the air force has operational at any one time.
The Kh-101/102 programme has been under way since at least the latter half of the 1980s. Development
was hampered by the collapse in defence expenditure in the 1990s and 2000s, but funding has improved in
the last few years. After nearly 20 years in the doldrums the Russian air force now has a fifth-generation
fighter in flight-test and also harbours ambitions to introduce a new strategic bomber (PAK-DA) after
2025. Tupolev, the USSR’s main bomber design house, was selected in 2009 to develop the aircraft in
preference to a bid from Sukhoi. Though the decision may seem obvious in that Tupolev has design history
in bomber fleets, it has fared poorly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sukhoi, by comparison, has
emerged as the country’s pre -eminent combat-aircraft manufacturer. The government and industry finally
concluded a contract in May 2012 covering the purchase of five Project 955A Borei SSBNs following
prolonged negotiations over price and the schedule for the delivery of boats.

Missile Capabilities
Russia has been working to modernize its rocket forces with both silo-based and mobile ICBMs
as well as MIRVed variants. The country has had technical issues developing a new generation
of SLBMs, though tests in December 2011 of the new Bulava SLBM were reported successful.
Other modified and new missiles have also been under development. 1286
In his early 2012 remarks on Russia, DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. stated, 1287
Russia is upgrading massive underground facilities that provide command and control of its strategic
nuclear forces as well as modernizing strategic nuclear forces as another top priority. Russia will field more
road-mobile SS-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It also will
continue development of the Dolgorukiy/SS-NX-32 Bulava fleet ballistic missile submarine/submarine-
launched ballistic missile and next-generation air-launched cruise missiles.

Missile Defense
Russia is also working to increase its missile air defense capabilities. The IISS reports that
Russia created an Aerospace Defense Command on December 1, 2011, in order to unify as one
force (the Aerospace Defense Forces) the country’s Space Forces, Air Force air-defense units,
and Air-Space Defense Strategic Command. It has been reported that air-defense units that were
previously part of the Air Force have been reorganized into 11 brigades that include both radio-
radar and anti-aircraft missile regiments. It seems that this new Command will focus on medium-
and upper-tier threats, leaving lesser threats to the geographical areas in which they appear. The
IISS gives more detail on Russia’s missile defense capabilities: 1288
Equipment includes early warning systems (in two echelons – space and ground), space-tracking systems,
Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defence System (A-135) and missile systems in the service of AA brigades. The
early warning space echelon presently consists of only three satellites, providing limited surveillance with
significant time gaps, a problem due to be solved by the introduction of new satellites. The ground echelon
consists of seven independent radio-radar centres equipped with Dnepr, Daryal, Volga and Voronezh over-
the-horizon radar stations. These systems can acquire a ballistic target at ranges from 4,000 to 6,000
kilometres. The only gap in the ground echelon’s coverage is presently in the north-east, which will be
closed when Voronezh-DM radars are put into service (possibly in Barnaul, Yeniseisk and Omsk). The A-
135 system is deployed around Moscow and has only a 150km operational radius. It consists of a warning
and monitoring system, silos of 53T6 Gazelle short-range anti-ballistic missiles and 51T6 Gorgon long-
range anti-ballistic missiles. Though the system is relatively old, no modernisation plans have been
announced. Meanwhile, the in-service date of the S-500 missile system, billed as a replacement, has slipped
further.
The State Armaments Programme 2011–2020 allocated R4tr (US$136bn) for aerospace defence, and the
plan is for around 100 SAM and Pantsyr-S1 systems, as well as more than 30 Vityaz medium-range missile
systems, to be in service by 2020. Vityaz is currently in development and, according to media reports, will
508 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

replace some S-300 systems. It is believed that the system uses the 9M96 and 9M100 missiles. Three anti-
aircraft brigades were transferred from the air force and are deployed in the central industrial region, with
12 AA regiments (32 batteries in total) mainly armed with the S-300. Two AA regiments, with two
batteries of S-400 in each, are deployed in Electrostal and Dmitrov. Two more S-400 regiments are
deployed in the Baltic Fleet AOR and in the city of Nakhodka (Primorsk Territory). A fifth regimental S-
400 unit is supposed to be delivered by the end of 2012. By 2015, the plan is for nine regimental S-400
units to be deployed.
Space
In early 2012, DIA Director Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. also commented on Russia’s use of space: 1289
Russia recognizes the strategic value of space as a military forces multiplier. Russia already has formidable
space and counterspace capabilities and is improving its navigation, communications, ballistic missile
launch detection, and intelligence-gathering satellites. It has extensive systems for space surveillance and
tracking and others with inherent counterspace applications, such as satellite-tracking laser rangefinders.
Russia is researching or expanding directed-energy and signal jamming capabilities that could target
satellites.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

While Russia ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1975, it continued
development of a large program until the fall of the USSR in 1991. Russia continues dual-use
research activities, and it remains unclear if Russia has fulfilled its Article 1 treaty obligations.
Russia also ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, and as of March 2012 has
destroyed over 60% of its stockpile (24,000 of 40,000 metric tons). The country anticipates
completing destruction by December 2014. 1290
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 509

ENDNOTES
1
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 16, 2012, 8.
2
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 22-23.
3
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, iii, 1, 6, 22.
4
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 127.
5
Tania Branigan, “North Korea’s Kim Jong-un purges his uncle in spectacularly public fashion,” The Guardian,
December 22, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/north-korea-kim-jong-un-purges-uncle;
Ioannis-Alexandros Ioannidis, “Kim Jong-un executes family of purged uncle,” Euronews, January 27, 2014.
6
Lucy Williamson, “Will North Korea change under Kim Jong-un?” BBC News, January 18, 2012.
7
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 107.
8
Rodong Sinmun, October 9, 1998, quoted in: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education,
Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, 106.
9
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 107.
10
Choe Sang-hun, “New South Korean Leader Warns North against Nuclear Pursuits,” New York Times, February
25, 2013.
11
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11,
2013.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea” and “South Korea,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/.
15
Japanese Defense Ministry, Defense of Japan 2014, Chapter 1 Section 2.
16
Kim Kwang-woo, “Analysis of the 2014 ROK Defense Budget,” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, March 17, 2014, 2.
17
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
18
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 24.
19
Based on Timeline: North Korea—Key Events since the end of the Korean War,” Guardian, November 23, 2010;
“Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times, April 4, 2013; “Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear
Program,” New York Times, November 20, 2014
20
“Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times, November 20, 2014
21
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11,
2013.
22
Ibid.
23
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 8.
24
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 22-3.
25
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, Department of Defense, May 2013, 5-7,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_DPR
K.pdf.
26
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, iii, 1. 6. 22)
27
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Armed Services
Committee, February 26, 2015, 1-3, 6, 20.
28
Lt. General Vincent R. Stewart, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment, Armed Services
Committee, US Senate, Defense Intelligence Agency, (as of February 20, 2015), 10;
510 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

http://www.dia.mil/News/SpeechesandTestimonies/ArticleView/tabid/11449/Article/570863/statement-for-the-
record-worldwide-threat-assessment.aspx.
29
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 127.
30
Ibid., 108-109.
31
Ibid., 107.
32
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 20.
33
Kim Jina, “An Analysis of Political Instability in the DPRK: Identity, Interest, and Leader-Elite Relations,”
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 1 (March 2013), 93-4.
34
Rodong Sinmun, October 9, 1998, quoted in: Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education,
Understanding North Korea, ROK Government, 2012, 106.
35
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 107.
36
Ibid., 128, 138-9.
37
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 13.
38
Nate Thayer, “Has Kim Jong Un Had Plastic Surgery? China Says, No Comment,” NKNews.org, January 24,
2013.
39
Lucy Williamson, “Will North Korea change under Kim Jong-un?” BBC News, January 18, 2012.
40
Guo Rui and Wang Xiaoke, “Quantificational Measurement of China-North Korea Relations after the End of the
Cold War: Changes, Characteristics, and Elicitation,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 1 (March 2013),
140; Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 13.
41
Stephan Haggard and Luke Herman, “Kim Jong Un Focuses Visit Schedule on Military,” NKNews.org, February
22, 2013.
42
Richard Weitz, “Regional Powers Grapple with North Korea’s New Leader Kim Jong Un,” Korean Institute for
Defense Analyses, 407.
43
Scott A. Snyder, “Why North Korea regime is scary,” CNN, March 29, 2013.
44
Fareed Zakaria, “North Korea’s high-stakes bluster,” Washington Post, March 13, 2013.
45
David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, “Intelligence on North Korea, and Its New Leader, Remains Elusive,” New
York Times, May 6, 2013.
46
International Crisis Group, North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability, Asia Report No. 230, July 25,
2012, 4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/230-north-korean-succession-and-the-risks-
of-instability.pdf.
47
David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, “Intelligence on North Korea, and Its New Leader, Remains Elusive.”
48
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 13-14.
49
International Crisis Group, “North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability,” i.
50
Evan Ramstad, “Beyond the Blast, Other Signals of Tougher (and Vain) North Korea,” Wall Street Journal,
February 12, 2013.
51
Jane Perlez, “North Korean Leader, Young and Defiant, Strains Ties With Chinese,” New York Times, April 13,
2013.
52
Ibid.
53
Robert Potter, “North Korea’s Diplomatic Push,” The Diplomat, December 13, 2014,
http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/north-koreas-diplomatic-push/; Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajora, “The China-North
Korean Relationship, Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2014,
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097; Scott Snyder, “China Subs North Korea with
Lear’s Visit to Soutyh Korea,” The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/03/china-snubs-north-
korea-with-leaders-visit-to-south-korea.
54
“Korean Peninsula’s Denuclearization Becomes Impossible,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), January 25,
2013.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
“WPK’s New Line Serves as Powerful Treasured Sword: Newspaper,” KCNA, May 7, 2013.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 511

58
“Koreans Will Surely Force Japan to Pay for Its Past Crimes,” KCNA, March 5, 2013.
59
“Aggressors Will Meet Destruction: CPRK Secretariat,” KCNA, March 8, 2013.
60
“South Korean Defense Unveils White Paper 2010,” Defence Talk, January 7, 2011.
61
CH Kim, “Latest S. Korean Defense White Paper Strengthens Wording on Dokdo, NLL,” Arirang News,
December 21, 2012. http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=142293&code=Ne2&category=2.
62
Scott Snyder, “China Snubs North Korea with leader’s visit to South Korea,” The Guardian, July 3, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/03/china-snubs-north-korea-with-leaders-visit-to-south-korea.
63
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, 25.
64
Lim, Kwan-bin, “The Outcome and Significance of the 2nd ROK-PRC Defense Strategic Dialogue,” Korea
Institute for Defense Analysis, August 24, 2012.
65
Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, “The
China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-
north-korea-relationship/p11097; Scott Snyder, “China Snubs North Korea with leader’s visit to South Korea,” The
Guardian, July 3, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/03/china-snubs-north-korea-with-leaders-visit-
to-south-korea.
66
Jae-Ho Chung, “The New South Korean Administration’s Security Challenges: Back to the Future, Again?”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013.
67
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, 25, 58.
68
Leif-Eric Easley, “Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Korea’s Security Relations with Japan
and China,” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, Asia at a Tipping Point: Korea, the Rise of China, and the
Impact of Leadership Transitions, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Korea Economic Institute, vol. 23 (2012), 154-5.
69
“Japan ready to ink military pact with S. Korea ‘at any time,’” Yonhap News, April 17, 2013.
70
IHS Jane’s: Intelligence Community news, “Japan, South Korea, and US sign tripartite intelligence-sharing pact,”
IHS Jane’s, February 4, 2015. http://www.janes.com.
71
Lally Weymouth, “South Korean President Park Geun-hye answers questions,” Washington Post, May 8, 2013.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/south-korean-president-park-geun-hye-answers-
questions/2013/05/07/d7482e5a-b761-11e2-b94c-b684dda07add_story.html.
72
Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korean President Urges Japan to Admit Past Wrongs,” New York Times, March 1, 2015.
73
Daniel Sneider, “Japan-Korea Relations: Time for US Intervention?” National Bureau for Asian Research,
January 6, 2014, 1; Ralph A. Cossa, “Japan-South Korea Relations: Time to Open Both Eyes,” Council on Foreign
Relations, July 2012, http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/japan-south-korea-relations-time-open-both-eyes/p28736.
74
Karen Parrish, “Hagel Praises 60 year old US-South Korean Alliance,” DoD News, September 30, 2013,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120879; Joint press conference, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel
and South Korean Defense Minister Ham Min Koo October 23, 2014, C-Span, “US-South Korean Military
Relations, http://www.c-span.org/video/?322291-1/news-conference-defense-secretary-hagel-south-korean-defense-
minister.
75
Kwan-bin Lim, “The Outcomes and Significance of the ROK-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting,”
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, July 5, 2012.
76
Kwan-bin Lim, “Achievements and Significance of the 44th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM),”
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, November 13, 2013.
77
Ashley Rowland, “US, South Korea agree on response plan if North Korea attacks,” Stars and Stripes, March 24,
2013.
78
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 144.
79
Victor Cha, The Impossible State (New York: Ecco, 2012), 147-8.
80
Ibid., 148.
81
Ibid.
82
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 143-4.
83
Ibid., 145-6.
84
Eun-sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Positions of Countries
Involved,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 1 (March 2013), 10.
85
Ibid.
512 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

86
Richard Weitz, “Regional Powers Grapple with North Korea’s New Leader Kim Jong Un,” Korean Institute for
Defense Analyses, 408.
87
Ibid.
88
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “North Korea: Overview,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/.
89
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Rejects Offer of Aid from South Korea,” New York Times, September 12, 2012.
90
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Country risk watch – March,” IHS Jane’s, February 14, 2013; Choe Sang-hun,
“South Korea’s New Leader Exhorts the North to Tread a ‘Path of Change,’” New York Times, March 1, 2013.
91
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 11, 2013.
92
“President-elect condemns a ‘threat to Korean Peninsula,’” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 13, 2013; James M.
Lindsay, “Hello, Park Geun-hye: President of South Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2013.
93
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 11, 2013.
94
Jae-Ho Chung, “The New South Korean Administration’s Security Challenges: Back to the Future, Again?”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013.
95
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Country risk watch – March,” IHS Jane’s, February 14, 2013.
96
“President-elect condemns a ‘threat to Korean Peninsula,’” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 13, 2013.
97
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 11, 2013.
98
Choe Sang-hun, “New South Korean Leader Warns North against Nuclear Pursuits,” New York Times, February
25, 2013.
99
“South Korean President Park Geun-hye answers questions,” Washington Post, May 7, 2013.
100
Markus Bell and Geoffrey Fattig, “How the Nuclear Test Affects Ordinary People in South Korea,”
NKNews.org, February 12, 2013.
101
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 11, 2013; Jiyoon Kim, Karl Friedhoff, and Chungku Kang, Asan Public Opinion Report, Asan Institute,
February 2013.
102
Jiyoon Kim and Karl Friedhoff, Asan Monthly Opinion Survey, Asan Institute, April 2012.
103
Jiyoon Kim and Karl Friedhoff, Asan Public Opinion Report, Asan Institute, March 2013.
104
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11,
2013.
105
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014, ix, 5, 18, 33-34,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.
106
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Overview—FY2015 Defense Budget, February 2014, 2-1
to 2-2,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/fy2015_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.p
df.
107
Department of defense, “Signing of Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and
Missile Threats Posed by North Korea,” DoD News release, NR-632-24, December 28, 2014,
http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=17090; Full text at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Trilateral-Information-Sharing-Arrangement.pdf.
108
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11,
2013.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
Ashton B. Carter, “U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia,” speech at CSIS, April 8, 2013.
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1765.
112
Jane Perlez, “U.S. and China Put Focus on Cybersecurity,” New York Times, April 22, 2013.
113
Ashton B. Carter, “U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia,” speech at CSIS, April 8, 2013.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid.
118
Ibid.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 513

119
Ibid.
120
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 6, 20.
121
Admiral M.G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2011, 13–14.
122
Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy, February 2015, 11, 24,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
123
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, CSIS,
November 2012, 3-4.
124
David Kang and Victor Cha, “Think Again: North Korea,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2013.
125
Eun-sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 6.
126
Thomas Donilon, National Security Adviser to President Obama, speech at Asia Society New York, March 11,
2013.
127
Victor Cha, The Impossible State, 408.
128
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 50.
129
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2016
Budget Request: Overview,” February 2015, 2-1,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.
pdf.
130
Ibid., 2-2 to 2-3.
131
All quotes translated by World News Connection, NTIS, US Department of Commerce.
132
Su Hao, “The United States Can Hardly Achieve Its Strategic Objectives through Stirring up the South China
Sea,” Liaowang, August 23, 2012.
133
Ren Weidong, “China Must Achieve Asia-Pacific Strategic Balance,” Renmin Ribao, January 30, 2013.
134
Ren Weidong, “China Must Be Completely Able to Withstand Pressure,” Renmin Ribao, February 28, 2013.
135
Ren Weidong, “How Can China Maintain Longer Peace and Development?” Jiefangjun Bao, January 22, 2013.
136
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 94.
137
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, Department of Defense, May 2013, 17,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf.
138
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, Department of Defense, April 2014, 16,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf.
139
Shirley Kan, “Memorandum: China’s Defense White Paper,” Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2011.
140
Ibid.; Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 31, 2011, 3,
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm.
141
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, Department of Defense, March 2011, 10,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf.
142
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, 5.
143
Ibid., 3.
144
Shirley Kan, “Memorandum: China’s Defense White Paper,” Congressional Research Service, April 5, 2011.
145
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, 10-11.
146
Ibid., 34-36.
147
Ibid., 36.
148
Christopher Johnson, discussion at “Interpreting Xi Jinping’s First Trip Abroad: Glimpses of an Emerging
Diplomatic Strategy?” CSIS, April 24, 2013.
149
Jeremy Page, “New China Leader Courts Military,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2013.
150
Chinese State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The People’s
Republic of China, April 2013, Preface.
151
Ibid., Section I.
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.
154
Ibid., Section IV.
514 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

155
Ibid.
156
James M. Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons,” New York Times, April 18, 2013.
157
Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The People’s
Republic of China, April 2013, Section III.
158
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014.
159
Ibid.
160
Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The People’s
Republic of China, April 16, 2013, Beijing; Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China Suggests That U.S., Projecting
Power, Is Stirring Asia-Pacific Tensions,” New York Times, April 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/17/
world/asia/china-suggests-us-is-stirring-tensions-in-asia.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0.
161
Information Office of the State Council, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, The People’s
Republic of China, April 16, 2013, Beijing; Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China Suggests That U.S., Projecting
Power, Is Stirring Asia-Pacific Tensions,” New York Times, April 16, 2013.
162
Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, “China Suggests That U.S., Projecting Power, Is Stirring Asia-Pacific Tensions,”
New York Times, April 16, 2013.
163
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 21-22.
164
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, 21.
165
James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,”
Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015, 19-20,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/209-congressional-testimonies-2015/1174-statement-for-the-
record-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-ic-before-the-sasc.
166
Lt. General Vincent R. Stewart, “Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Senate Armed
Services Committee, February 26, 2015, http://www.dia.mil/News/SpeechesandTestimonies/ArticleView/tabid/
11449/Article/570863/statement-for-the-record-worldwide-threat-assessment.aspx.
167
Victor Cha, The Impossible State.
168
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 7-8.
169
Eun-Sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 7-8; Jane Perlez, “Some
Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend,” New York Times, February 16, 2013.
170
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-
factbook/geos/kn.html.
171
Ibid.
172
Eun-Sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program, 7-8; Jane Perlez, “Some
Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend.”
173
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
4.
174
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “The Diminishing Returns of China’s North Korea Policy,” 38 North, August 16,
2012.
175
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 15.
176
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 7-8.
177
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 15.
178
Jane Perlez, “Some Chinese Are Souring on Being North Korea’s Best Friend,” New York Times, February 16,
2013.
179
“Pres. Lee: US troops to stay if NK event causes reunification,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 15, 2013.
180
Kwanwoo Jun, “Is China Cracking Down on North Korea Trade?,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013.
181
Guo Rui and Wang Xiaoke, “Quantificational Measurement of China-North Korea Relations after the End of the
Cold War: Changes, Characteristics, and Elicitation,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 1 (March 2013),
129-30.
182
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “The Diminishing Returns of China’s North Korea Policy,” 38 North, August 16,
2012.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 515

183
Jane Perlez, “North Korean Leader, Young and Defiant, Strains Ties With Chinese,” New York Times, April 13,
2013.
184
“North Korea Through Chinese Eyes,” Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy, April 23, 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/4/23%20north%20korea%20china/north%20korea%20through%20
chinese%20eyes_english%20transcript.pdf, 12-13.
185
“North Korea through Chinese Eyes,” Brookings Institution, April 23, 2014,
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/04/23-north-korea-china.
186
Jonathan D. Pollack, “Why Does China Coddle North Korea?” New York Times, January 12, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/opinion/why-does-china-coddle-north-korea.html?emc=eta1&_r=1.
187
Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, August
22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/13/opinion/why-does-china-coddle-north-korea.html?emc=eta1&_r=1.
188
Reuben F. Johnson, “Analysts: China ‘losing influence over North Korea,’” IHS Jane’s, February 4, 2014,
http://www.janes.com/article/33439/analysts-china-losing-influence-over-north-korea.
189
Beina Xu and Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, August
22, 2014.
190
Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission:
Hearing on China’s Relations with North Korea,” June 5, 2014, http://www.usip.org/publications/testimony-the-us-
china-economic-and-security-review-commission#_ftn23.
191
Bonnie S. Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, CSIS,
November 2012, 1-5, 18-19.
192
Ibid.
193
Ibid., 1-5.
194
Ibid.; Victor Cha, The Impossible State, 317.
195
Jae-Ho Chung, “The New South Korean Administration’s Security Challenges: Back to the Future, Again?”
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013.
196
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 2-3.
197
Ibid.
198
Chuck Jones, former DoD and NSC official in Asian/Korean affairs, interview on February 14, 2013.
199
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 2-3.
200
“Pres. Lee: US troops to stay if NK event causes reunification,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 15, 2013.
201
International Crisis Group, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea, Asia Report No. 200, January 27,
2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/200%20--%20China%20and%20Inter-
Korean%20Clashes%20in%20the%20Yellow%20Sea.pdf.
202
“China will not accept N. Korea as a ‘nuclear-armed state’: official,” Yonhap News Agency, May 3, 2013.
203
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 20-21.
204
Ibid., 28.
205
David E. Sanger, “Obama and Xi Try to Avoid a Cold War Mentality,” New York Times, June 9, 2013.
206
Jackie Calmes and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea, but Not on
Cyberespionage,” New York Times, June 8, 2013.
207
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011.
208
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 90.
209
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, William H. Cooper, Ian E. Rinehart, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for
Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 15, 2013, 7.
210
Ibid., 11-12.
211
Japanese Government, Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond [provisional
translation], December 17, 2010, 2-3.
212
Ibid., 1-2.
213
Masaki Toki, “Japan’s Defense Guidelines: New Conventional Strategy, Same Old Nuclear Dilemma,” NTI,
March 1, 2011, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/japans-defense-guidelines/.
214
Toshiya Takahashi, “A new trend in Japan’s defence white paper,” East Asia Forum, August 21, 2012.
215
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defence of Japan 2012, 115.
216
Ibid., foreword.
516 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

217
Ibid.
218
Ibid., 14-16.
219
Ibid., 16.
220
Ibid., Chapter 4, Section 2.
221
Ibid., Chapter 4.
222
Ibid.
223
Victor Cha, The Impossible State, 373.
224
Richard Weitz, “Regional Powers Grapple with North Korea’s New Leader Kim Jong Un,” Korean Institute for
Defense Analyses, 411.
225
Ibid.; Eun-Sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 8.
226
Eun-Sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 7.
227
“Diplomatic negativism,” The Korea Times, September 10, 2014,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2014/09/202_164347.html.
228
“Japan-North Korea Rapprochement: Dare to Dream or Doomed to Fail?,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 22, 2014.
229
Chinese Government, “China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2012).”
230
International Crisis Group, North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability, 16.
231
Peter Drysdale, “Prime Minister Abe and Japan’s foreign policy choice,” East Asia Forum Weekly Digest, March
11, 2013.
232
Ibid.
233
For example, see “Japan’s Shinzo Abe and China’s Xi Jinping share frosty handshake at ice breaking talks,” The
Guardian, November 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2014/nov/10/japan-shinzo-abe-china-xi-
jinping-handshake-video; Elias Groll, “Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping Shared a Really Awkward Handshake in
Beijing,” Foreign Policy, November 10, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/10/shinzo-abe-and-xi-jinping-
shared-a-really awkward-handshake-in-beijing/.
234
Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kahn, and Mark E. Manyin, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for
Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013.
235
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 23.
236
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 97-9.
237
Marcel de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000-10),” in Russian Military Politics and Russia’s
2010 Defense Doctrine, ed. Stephen J. Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2011, 39-45; Russian Government,
Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine [unofficial translation], February 5, 2010, section II.
238
Danila Galperovich, “Much Has Changed since Russia’s Last Military Doctrine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, March 3, 2010.
239
Russian Government, Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine [unofficial translation], February 5, 2010, sections II and
III.
240
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, Chapter 1 Section 2.
241
Reuters, “Russia writes off 90 percent of North Korea debt, eyes gas pipeline,” August 19, 2014; Eric Talmadge,
“Why Russia is Bolstering its Ties with North Korea,” The Guardian, June 4, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jun/04/russia-bolster-ties-north-korea.
242
Richard Weitz, “Regional Powers Grapple with North Korea’s New Leader Kim Jong Un,” Korean Institute for
Defense Analyses, 412.
243
Jane’s noted that, “Due to the DPRK’s inability to pay cash, little has come from a programme announced in
2001 for Russian assistance to upgrade the KPAs armour inventory.”
244
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 58.
245
Eun-Sook Chung, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Positions of Countries
Involved,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25:1, March 2013, 9-10.
246
Shaun Walker, “Vladimir Putin invites Kim Jong-un to Moscow,” The Guardian, December 19, 2014.
247
“The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” IISS, 2013.
248
James R. Clapper, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 10, 2011.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 517

249
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s, July 2,
2014, Article 3, 12.
250
Ibid.
251
IISS, “North Korea,” The Military Balance 2014, February 3. 2014.
252
John Reed, “What do North Korea’s air defenses look like?” Foreign Policy – Situation Report, April 1, 2013.
253
John A. Grisafi, “Analysis: N. Korean tactical guided missile test,” NKNews, July 2, 2014,
http://www.nknews.org/2014/07/analysis-n-korean-tactical-guided-missile-tests/.
254
Global Security, “240 mm rocket launcher,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/m-1985-mrl.htm.
255
The US does not have a paramilitary.
256
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 110-1.
257
Ibid.
258
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012, http://www.janes.com.
259
Ibid.
260
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, 19.
261
Ibid., 12, 18.
262
Ibid., 12.
263
IISS Military Balance, 2013, 310.
264
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: North Korea,” September 24,
2014, Article 3, 9-10.
265
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
266
Ibid.
267
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: North Korea,” September 24,
2014, Article 3, 12.
268
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, 12-13.
269
IISS Military Balance, 2013, 310.
270
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, Department of Defense, March 2014, 12-13,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_DPR
K.pdf.
271
Ibid., 13.
272
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, 12-13.
273
IISS Military Balance, 2013, 310.
274
“China and Northeast Asia,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, IHS Jane’s, September 24, 2014, Article 4, 3.
275
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, 12.
276
“The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” IISS, 2013.
277
Ibid.
278
Ibid.
279
Ibid.
280
Ibid.
281
Ibid.
282
Ibid.
283
Ibid.
284
Ibid.
285
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 313.
286
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, 20.
287
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
518 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

288
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012.
289
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 312-3.
290
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 312.
291
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 312-3.
292
These forces will be discussed in more detail later in this report; IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence
Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s, October 18, 2012.
293
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
294
Ibid.
295
Ibid.
296
Victor Cha, The Impossible State, 440.
297
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 112-8, 124-5.
298
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
299
Ibid.
300
Ibid.
301
Ibid.
302
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 120-4.
303
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
304
Ibid.
305
Japanese Defense Ministry, Defense of Japan 2014, Chapter 1 Section 2, 3.
306
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
November 27, 2012, http://www.janes.com.
307
Ibid.
308
Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for
American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” Brookings, September 23, 2012.
309
Spencer Ackerman, “Pentagon Warns North Korea Could Become a Hacker Haven,” Wired.com, May 3, 2013.
310
Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for
American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” Brookings, September 23, 2012.
311
Julian Ryall, “North Korea says ‘prepare for war,’” Telegraph, March 8, 2013.
312
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
313
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
November 27, 2012.
314
Ibid.
315
Ibid.
316
Republic of Korea Armed Forces, “Innovation Makes Us Powerful,” ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2010,
12-13.
317
Ibid., 36-37.
318
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 9.
319
According to the report, were 50 Korean and 24 international experts from the US, Australia, the UK, and
Sweden.
320
International Crisis Group, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea.
321
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,”
Federation of American Scientists, June 2012, 8.
322
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
323
Ibid.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 519

324
Kim Ji Yoon and Woo Jung Yeop, “The Asan Institute Opinion Poll in the Wake of the Attack on the
Yeonpyeong Island,” Asan Institute, November 29, 2010.
325
Kim Tae-young.
326
International Crisis Group, North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability, 15.
327
International Crisis Group, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea.
328
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 9-10;
International Crisis Group, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea.
329
International Crisis Group, China and Inter-Korean Clashes in the Yellow Sea.
330
Ibid.
331
Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 25, 26.
332
Ibid., 30.
333
IISS, Military Modernization 2013, 270.
334
Due to secrecy and limited open source information, all available personnel figures are rough estimates.
335
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
336
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper.
337
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2012, 19.
338
IISS, Military Balance, 2013. Note that the word “sniper” can also mean “sharpshooter” or “marksman.”
339
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
340
Ibid.
341
Ibid.
342
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 129.
343
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
344
Ibid.
345
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s, July 2,
2014, Article 3, 12.
346
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 129-31.
347
Global Security.org, “Korea Demilitarized Zone Incidents,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/dmz.htm.
348
Ibid.
349
See IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” October 18,
2012.
350
Global Security.org, “Korea Demilitarized Zone Incidents.”
351
Ibid.
352
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s, October
18, 2012.
353
Ibid.
354
Barbara Demick, “Thousands of North Korean tunnels hide arms secrets,” Los Angeles Times, November 13,
2003.
355
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
356
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 123-5.
357
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
358
Ibid.
359
Ibid.
360
“N. Korea Has World’s Largest Artillery Force: US,” American Foreign Press, April 24, 2009.
361
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper.
362
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Yonp’yong-do Attack, November 23, 2010, Pt II,” KPA Journal 1, no. 12.
520 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

363
Ibid.
364
Barbara Demick, “Seoul’s Vulnerability Is Key to War Scenarios,” Los Angeles Times, May 27, 2003.
365
IISS. Military Balance, 2013.
366
“Spotlight on S. Korea’s Special Forces,” The Chosun Ilbo (English edition), January 24, 2011,
http://english.chosun.com; “S. Korea’s Special Forces ‘Vastly Outnumbered’ by N. Korea’s,” The Chosun Ilbo
(English edition), January 6, 2011, http://english.chosun.com; “History of Special Operations Command Korea”
United States Eighth Army website (2010), http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/.
367
Ibid.
368
Ibid.
369
Hannah Fischer, North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950–2007, Congressional Research Service, April 20,
2007.
370
US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, 42-43.
371
US State Department, “North Korea,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, April 2012, 42-43
372
“N. Korea, Iran strike mineral resources-for-oil deal,” Yonhap News Agency, April 25, 2013.
373
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, 17, 20-22.
374
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 99.
375
Ibid., 102.
376
US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, 43-45.
377
US State Department, “South Korea,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, April 2012, 42-43.
378
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,”
Federation of American Scientists, June 2012, 7, 13; Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North
Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security 32:1, 2009, 83-94; Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto,
North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service, 2.
379
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 85-95.
380
Ibid., 85-6.
381
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 10-11.
382
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
3-4.
383
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 10-11.
384
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 90-93; Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding
North Korea’s Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 2-7.
385
“N Korean leader has over $1 billion in slush funds abroad: report,” Yonhap News Agency, April 25, 2013.
386
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 90-93; Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding
North Korea’s Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 2-7.
387
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 17-18.
388
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 88-91; Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding
North Korea’s Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 8-9, 18.
389
Ibid.
390
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
6.
391
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 10.
392
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 88-91.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 521

393
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 15-16; Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto,
North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service, 11.
394
Ibid.
395
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
12-3.
396
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 89-96.
397
Paul Rexton Kan, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Romert M. Collins, Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s
Illicit International Activities, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2010, 12-14, 18.
398
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
8.
399
Ibid., 13-14.
400
Ibid., 14-15.
401
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 92.
402
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
3.
403
Ibid., 5.
404
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 95-6.
405
Ibid.
406
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 97; Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional
Research Service, 7.
407
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 97; Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 19.
408
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 100.
409
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, 21-22.
410
It should be kept in mind that these export approximations are all reported – thus, the reports might not be true.
At the same time, there could also be significant missile exports that were not reported; Markus Schiller,
Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, xiii, 38.
411
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 17; Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional
Research Service, 3.
412
NTI, “North Korea: Missile,” updated February 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/delivery-
systems/.
413
Dennis C Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 12, 2009.
414
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32:1, 2009, 93, 104-109.
415
Jeffrey Lewis, “Oryx Blog on DPRK Arms Exports,” Arms Control Wonk, June 25, 2014,
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/7370/oryx-blog-on-dprk-arms-exports.
416
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, 24.
417
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 272-3.
418
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2012, 24.
419
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 272-3.
420
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces, “Innovation Makes Us Powerful,” ROK Ministry of National Defense,
2010, 35.
421
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 272-3.
422
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 9.
423
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 312.
522 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

424
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, 9, 11.
425
Ji Myung-kil, “Washington Reacts to Cyber Attack in South Korea” Arirang News, March 21, 2013; Park Bo-
ram, “N. Korea’s state-sponsored hackers emerge as global threat,” Yonhap News Agency, March 21, 2013;
Spencer Ackerman, “Pentagon Warns North Korea Could Become a Hacker Haven,” Wired, May 2, 2013.
426
Max Fisher, “South Korea under cyber attack: Is North Korea secretly awesome at hacking?,” Washington Post,
March 20, 2013.
427
Ibid.
428
Park Bo-ram, “N. Korea’s state-sponsored hackers emerge as global threat,” Yonhap News Agency, March 21,
2013.
429
Kim Kwang-tae, “N. Korea’s hacking capabilities advance,” Yonhap News Agency, April 11, 2013.
430
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 15.
431
Park Bo-ram, “N. Korea’s state-sponsored hackers emerge as global threat,” Yonhap News Agency, March 21,
2013.
432
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens U.S. Military Bases in the Pacific,” New York Times, March 21, 2013.
433
Park Bo-ram, “N. Korea’s state-sponsored hackers emerge as global threat,” Yonhap News Agency, March 21,
2013.
434
Kim Kwang-tae, “N. Korea’s hacking capabilities advance,” Yonhap News Agency, April 11, 2013.
435
Park Bo-ram, “N. Korea’s state-sponsored hackers emerge as global threat,” Yonhap News Agency, March 21,
2013; Kim Kwang-tae, “N. Korea’s hacking capabilities advance,” Yonhap News Agency, April 11, 2013.
436
Marcus Noland, “What Goes Around Comes Around: Operation Free Korea,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, April 24, 2013.
437
Ibid.
438
Ibid.
439
HP Security Research, “Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape,” HP Security
Briefing, Episode 16, August 2014, 3, 25.
440
“N. Korea doubles number of cyber warriors over 2 years: sources,” Yonhap News Agency, July 6, 2014.
441
HP Security Research, “Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape,” HP Security
Briefing, Episode 16, August 2014, 21, 26.
442
Ibid., 21.
443
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, 14.
444
HP Security Research, “Profiling an enigma: The mystery of North Korea’s cyber threat landscape,” HP Security
Briefing, Episode 16, August 2014, 11.
445
Ibid., 20.
446
Ibid., 23.
447
Eric Tucker and Rami Abdollah, “Digital Dilemma: How Will US Respond to Sony Hack,” ABC News,
December 18, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory/korea-unprecedented-cyberattack-sony-
27678943.
448
Ellen Nakashima, “New agency to sniff out threats in cyberspace,” Washington Post, February 10, 2015.
449
The White House, “Presidential Memorandum—Establishment of the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center,” February 25, 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/presidential-memorandum-
establishment-cyber-threat-intelligence-integrat.
450
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012.
451
Ibid.
452
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 312.
453
IISS. Military Balance, 2013.
454
Ji Myung-kil, “Washington Reacts to Cyber Attack in South Korea” Arirang News, March 21, 2013.
455
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Sees South and U.S. Behind Cyberstrikes,” New York Times, March 15, 2013.
456
Chul Hwan Kim, “Strengthened Korea-US joint response to cyber threats,” Korea Defense Daily, February 19,
2014, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?command=view&page=1&boardId=O_47261&boardSeq=
O_61294&titleId=&id=mnd_eng_030100000000.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 523

457
Young-do Kim et al., “Major Issue of the National Cyber Security System in South Korea, and its Future
Direction,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 4 (December 2013), 449.
458
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 10-11.
459
Ramy Inocencio, “North Korea’s rocket launches cost $1.3 billion,” CNN, December 12, 2012.
460
Chung Eun-sook, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 4.
461
However, Schiller notes that in his research he has been unable to find the original source of these claims and
doubts their authenticity; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012,
iii, xv, 38.
462
Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, Strategic Studies Insitute, February 2008, v-vii,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub842.pdf.
463
Ibid.
464
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, Asia Report No. 168, June 18, 2009, 1,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-
korea/168_north_koreas_nuclear_and_missile_programs.ashx.
465
NTI, “North Korea Profile—Missiles (Introduction),” http://www.nti.org.
466
However, Schiller notes that in his research he has been unable to find the original source of these claims and
doubts their authenticity; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012,
iii, xv, 38.
467
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 66.
468
Ibid.
469
Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 19.
470
Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010, 45.
471
Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, 21.
472
Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2010, 45.
473
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 36.
474
See Bermudez, “Going Ballistic”; and Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program.
475
“US Warns on North Korea Missile Threat,” BBC, January 11, 2011; Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger,
“Gates Warns of North Korea Missile Threat to US,” New York Times, January 11, 2011.
476
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012.
477
“Media Busters: Is North Korean Building a Ballistic Missile Submarine,” 38 North, November 4, 2014,
http://38north.org/2014/11/editor110414/.
478
“N. Korea launches ballistic missile submarine: gov’t sources,” Yonhap News Agency, November 12, 2014,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2014/10/31/35/0301000000AEN20141031009551315F.html.
479
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 9; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the
North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 24.
480
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean
Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 24.
481
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 7; NTI, “North Korea Missile
Capabilities,” May 1, 2010; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND,
2012, 25.
482
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
483
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 30.
484
Bermudez, “Going Ballistic.”
485
“Scud B Variant,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com.
486
Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy.
487
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 9.
488
“KN-02,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com.
489
“N. Korea fires off short-range missiles: military sources,” Korea JoongAng Daily, March 16, 2013.
490
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
491
Ibid.
492
“No Dong-1,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com.
493
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 25-27.
494
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
495
Ibid.
524 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

496
Ibid.
497
Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 43.
498
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
499
Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, 47.
500
“No Dong-1,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/
id.82/missile_detail.asp.
501
Internal government memorandum made available to International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and
Missile Programs, 13.
502
Bermudez, “Going Ballistic”; Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program; and Japanese Ministry of
Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 43–35.
503
Ibid.
504
Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea’s Taepodong and Unha Missiles” (March 2009),
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/Taepodong.html; NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,”
May 1, 2010.
505
“North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/
countriesandterritories/northkorea/nuclear_program/index.html?8qa; NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May
1, 2010.
506
Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 44.
507
Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper, 18.
508
NTI, “North Korea: Missile,” updated February 2013.
509
Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Congressional Research Service,
February 24, 2009, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21473.pdf.
510
“Taepodong-2,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/
id.166/missile_detail.asp.
511
Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Congressional Research Service,
February 24, 2009.
512
David C. Wright, “An Analysis of North Korea’s Unha-2 Launch Vehicle,” Union of Concerned Scientists,
March 20, 2009, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/Wright-Analysis-of-NK-launcher-3-18-09.pdf.
513
Ibid.
514
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
515
Victor Cha, The Impossible State, 363.
516
See Bermudez, “Going Ballistic,” and Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, 43–35.
517
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
518
“North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times; NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
519
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 10.
520
NTI, “North Korea: Missile,” updated February 2013; Cheryl Pellerin, “Northcom Acknowledges North Korean
Missile Launch, Failure,” Department of Defense, April 12, 2012.
521
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 11.
522
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Watch this space – North Korea successfully launches Unha-3,” January 16, 2013.
523
“North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times.
524
Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “Breakthrough: North Korea’s Long Range Missile Launch,” NKNews.org, February 7,
2013.
525
NTI, “North Korea: Missile,” updated February 2013; Cheryl Pellerin, “Northcom Acknowledges North Korean
Missile Launch, Failure,” Department of Defense, April 12, 2012.
526
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 16.
527
Bechtol, “Breakthrough: North Korea’s Long Range Missile Launch,” NKNews.org, February 7, 2013.
528
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Watch this space – North Korea successfully launches Unha-3,” January 16, 2013.
529
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 16.
530
Evan Ramstad, “After Frist Glance, North Korea’s Missiles Not as Fearsome,” Wall Street Journal, December
13, 2012.
531
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Watch this space – North Korea successfully launches Unha-3,” January 16, 2013.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 525

532
Michael Ellerman, “Prelude to an ICBM? Putting North Korea’s Unha-3 Launch into Context,” Arms Control
Today, March 2013.
533
Ibid.
534
Ibid.
535
Ibid.
536
Ibid.
537
Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Watch this space – North Korea successfully launches Unha-3,” January 16, 2013.
538
Ibid.
539
Ibid.
540
Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 44–45.
541
Catherine Boye and Melissa Hanham, “Missiles, Maneuvers and Mysteries: Review of Recent Developments in
North Korea,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 2, 2010, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/
101102_missiles_north_korea.htm#fn9.
542
NTI, “North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
543
Boye and Hanham, “Missiles, Maneuvers and Mysteries: Review of Recent Developments in North Korea.”
544
Joseph Bermudez, “Japan reveals name of North Korea’s R-27 IRBM,” Jane’s Defense Weekly 44, issue 21 (May
2007), 4; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 33.
545
NTI, “North Korea: Missile,” updated February 2013.
546
Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy.
547
“N. Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles,” Chosun Ilbo, July 8 2006, english.chosun.com; NTI,
“North Korea Missile Capabilities,” May 1, 2010.
548
“Musudan,” Missiles of the World, Missilethreat.com, http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/
id.185/missile_detail.asp.
549
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 14.
550
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 33-34.
551
“N. Korea tested long-range missile engine before nuke blast: sources,” Yonhap News Agency, February 17,
2013.
552
Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “The Assumed KN-08 Technology: Addendum to the April 18, 2012,
Paper ‘A Dog and Pony Show,’” April 26, 2012, 8, http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2012/05/
Addendum_KN-08_Analysis_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf.
553
Jeffrey Lewis and John Schilling, “Real Fake Missiles: North Korea’s ICBM Mockups Are Getting Scary Good,”
38 North, November 4, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/11/lewis-schilling110513/.
554
“North Korea’s Sohae Facility: Preparations for Future Large Rocket Launches Progresses; New Unidentified
Buildings,” 38 North, July 29, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/07/sohae073014/#_ftn1.
555
“Media Busters: Is North Korea Building a Ballistic Missile Submarine?,” 38 North, November 4, 2014,
http://38north.org/2014/11/editor110414/.
556
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea: Test Stand for Vertical Launch of Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles Spotted,”
38 North, October 28, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/10/jbermudez102814/.
557
Richard D. Fisher Jr., “US, S. Korean sources suggest North has SLBM ambitions,” IHS Jane’s, September 22,
2014, http://www.janes.com/article/43551/us-s-korean-sources-suggest-north-has-slbm-ambitions.
558
“North Korea conducts ejection launcher tests for submarine missile,” NavalTechnology.com, November 24,
2014, http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsnorth-korea-conducts-ejection-launcher-tests-for-submarine-
missile-4448485.
559
NTI, “North Korea – Overview,” accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/.
560
Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program, 45.
561
Ibid.
562
NTI, “North Korea Profile—Missiles: Capabilities,”
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/capabilities.html#hwasong6.
563
NTI, “North Korea – Facilities: Missiles,” updated February 2013.
564
Ibid.
565
Ibid.
566
Ibid.
567
Ibid.
568
NTI, “Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” updated December 2013.
526 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

569
Ibid.
570
“North Korea’s Sohae Facility: Preparations for Future Large Rocket Launches Progresses; New Unidentified
Buildings,” 38 North, July 29, 2014.
571
“North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Major Upgrade Program Completed; Facility Operational
Again,” 38 North, October 1, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/10/sohae100114/.
572
Choe Sang-hun, “Satellite Images Show More Work at North Korean Nuclear Site,” New York Times, May 22,
2012.
573
Bermudez, “North Korea: Test Stand for Vertical Launch of Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles Spotted.”
574
John Reed, “What do North Korea’s air defenses look like?” Foreign Policy – Situation Report, April 1, 2013.
575
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 26.
576
Wade Boese, “US and South Korea Hold Ballistic Missile Talks,” Arms Control Agency, November 1999.
577
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK,” CNS Occasional Paper,
February 9, 2000.
578
“NHK 1/2,” Missiles of the World, MissileThreat.com.
579
NTI, “South Korea,” updated January 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-korea.
580
Jenny Shin, “The Concern with South Korea’s Missile Defense System,” Center for Defense Information, August
25, 2009.
581
Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK.”
582
“NHK 1/2,” Missiles of the World, MissileThreat.com.
583
Ibid.
584
“MTCR Partners,” Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info.
585
“Frequently Asked Questions,” Missile Technology Control Regime, http://www.mtcr.info.
586
Ibid.
587
“S. Korea develops long-range cruise missile: report,” Agence France-Presse, July 16, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jIekp13qY7Lz42Ywl7EQr0ufxWaA.
588
Kim Min-seok, “Seoul has longer-range cruise missile,” JoongAng Daily, September 20, 2006.
589
Jung Sung-ki, “S. Korea Deploying 1,000-Kilometer Cruise Missiles,” The Korea Times, August 17, 2009.
590
Ibid.
591
“S. Korea develops long-range cruise missile: report,” Agence France-Presse, July 16, 2010.
592
Oliver Bloom, “South Korea Develops New Long-range Cruise Missile,” CSIS, July 19, 2009,
http://csis.org/blog/south-korea-develops-new-long-range-cruise-missile.
593
Song Sang-ho, “Seoul gets long-range cruise missile: sources,” The Korea Herald, July 18, 2010.
594
Bloom, “South Korea Develops New Long-range Cruise Missile.”
595
NTI, “South Korea,” updated January 2013.
596
Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. Agrees to Let South Korea Extend Range of Ballistic Missiles,” New York Times, October
7, 2012.
597
Ibid; Lee Sang-hyun, “Evaluation and Implications of the ROK’s New Missile Guidelines,” Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses, November 30, 2012.
598
Ibid.
599
Ibid.
600
Lee Sang-hyun, “Evaluation and Implications of the ROK’s New Missile Guidelines,” Korea Institute for
Defense Analyses, November 30, 2012.
601
“North Korea warns US on missiles after South deal,” BBC News, October 9, 2012.
602
Agency France-Presse, “South Korea to Complete Missile Defense by 2012,” Defense News, February 15, 2011,
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3949088.
603
NTI, “South Korea Not Joining U.S. Antimissile Program: Defense Industry,” October 29, 2012.
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/south-korea-says-not-joining-us-antimissile-program/; Kim Eun-jung, “S, Korea beefs
up integrated air and missile defense,” Yonhap News Agency, February 13, 2013,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2013/02/13/93/0401000000AEN20130213006151315F.HTML.
604
Chang-kwoun Park, “Establishment of Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD): The Background and Ways
Forward,” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, July 3, 2012.
605
David Kang and Victor Cha, “Think Again: North Korea,” Foreign Policy, March 25, 2013.
606
Kevin Baron, “Why doesn’t Seoul have Iron Dome?” Foreign Policy – The E-Ring, April 9, 2013.
607
Kim Tong-hyung, “Satellite Fails to Enter Orbit,” Korea Times, August 25, 2009.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 527

608
“South Korea Seen Changing Missile Range Guidelines,” Global Security Newswire, March 14, 2011.
609
“South Korea Launches Space Rocket: Pyongyang Silent,” NKNEWS.org, January 30, 2013.
610
Ibid.
611
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 15.
612
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 132.
613 James R Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014, 6.
614
UN Security Council, “Report S/2010/571,” May 12, 2010), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
615
US Department of Defense, “2000 Report to Congress Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” September
12, 2000, http://www.defense.gov/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html.
616
NTI, “North Korea: Chemical,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/chemical/. Also see “미국의 북한
생화학무기 압박 전략” [U.S. Strategy of Pressure on North Korean Biological, Chemical Weapons], Shindonga, Donga
Ilbo Magazine, November 2004, shindonga.donga.com; IISS, North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment,
2011, 161; and Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper.
617
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 65.
618
An NTI summary history indicates that, “In the aftermath of the Korean War and in light of the perceived nuclear
threat from the United States, North Korea sought a less costly alternative to nuclear weapons… An indigenous
chemical industry and chemical weapons production in North Korea have their roots in the ‘Three Year Economic
Plan’ that spanned the years from 1954 to 1956, the period immediately following the Korean War, and the first
‘Five Year Plan’ from 1957 to 1961. However, significant progress was not made until the first ‘Seven Year Plan’
(1961-67). At that time, Kim Il Sung issued a “Declaration for Chemicalization” whose aim was further
development of an independent chemical industry capable of supporting various sectors of its economy, as well as
supporting chemical weapons production… It was during this time that the DPRK established the basic organization
of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau…
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the DPRK received assistance from both the Soviet Union and China in
developing its nascent chemical industry. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that
the DPRK had only a defensive capability in CW… Estimates vary as to when North Korea is believed to have
acquired the capability for independent CW production.
Some sources suspect it was not until the early 1980s, and others speculate it was as early as the 1970s. By the late
1980s, the DPRK was capable of producing substantial amounts of CW agents and deployed a large number of
chemical weapons munitions. In January 1987, the South Korean MND reported that the DPRK possessed up to 250
metric tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and some nerve agents, and by 2010, the MND’s
estimate had climbed to 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents, including nerve agents…”
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/chemical/.
619
Angola, Egypt, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria are the other countries that have no signed the treaty; Burma
and Israel have signed but not yet ratified it.
620
Globalsecurity.org, “Chemical Weapons Program,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/cw.htm.
621
US Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2006.”
622
NTI, “North Korea: Chemical,” updated February 2013.
623
Globalsecurity.org, “Chemical Weapons Program,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/cw.htm.
624
John Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, IISS, 2004, 49.
625
NTI, “North Korea: Chemical,” updated February 2013.
626
Ibid.
627
It is unclear if this amount includes only CW agents or agents and munitions
628
NTI, “North Korea: Chemical,” updated February 2013.
629
“N. Korea could make 12,000 tons of chemical weapons: expert,” Associated Foreign Press, October 13, 2010.
630
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report No. 167,
June 18, 2009, 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-
korea/167_north_koreas_chemical_and_biological_weapons_programs.pdf.
631
Globalsecurity.org, “Chemical Weapons Program,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/cw.htm.
632
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, 7.
633
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 56.
528 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

634
NTI, “North Korea: Chemical,” updated February 2013; NTI, “North Korea – Facilities: Chemical,” updated
March 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/facilities/.
635
Ibid.
636
Ibid.
637
Ibid.
638
Ibid.
639
Ibid.
640
Globalsecurity.org, “Chemical Weapons Program,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/cw.htm.
641
Ibid.
642
NTI and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “North Korea Biological Chronology,” August
2012.
643
Ibid.
644
NTI, “North Korea – Biological,” updated February 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-
korea/biological/.
645
Ibid.
646
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January
to 31 December 2010,” March 2011, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-acq2010.pdf.
647
Globalsecurity.org, “Biological Weapons Program,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/bw.htm.
648
NTI, “North Korea: Biological,” updated February 2013.
649
NIT, “North Korea – Facilities: Biological,” updated February 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-
korea/facilities/.
650
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 60.
651
UN Security Council, “Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009),”
S/2010/571, November 5, 2010, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
652
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service,
February 12, 2013, 17.
653
“U.S. Talk about ‘Threat’ from DPRK Censured by Minju Joson,” KCNA, March 2, 2013.
654
Chuck Jones Chuck Jones, former DoD and NSC official in Asian/Korean affairs, interview on February 14,
2013.
655
Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat, RAND, 2012, 65.
656
Simon Martin, “N. Korea vows to bolster nuclear deterrent,” Agence France Presse, June 27, 2010; see also
KCNA, June 28, 2010.
657
James R. Clapper, director of national intelligence, “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 10,
2011.
658
“GFTUK Spokesman Supports New Strategic Line,” KCNA, April 4, 2013.
659
Rick Gladstone and Gerry Mullany, “Study Suggests North Korea Is Doubling Area Devoted to Uranium
Enrichment,” International New York Times, August 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/world/asia/north-
korea-uranium-enrichment.html; David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Recent Doubling of Floor Space at North
Korean Gas Centrifuge Plant: Is North Korea doubling its enrichment capacity at Yongbyon?,” ISIS, August 7,
2013, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/recent-doubling-of-floor-space-at-north-korean-gas-centrifuge-
plant/10.
660
Jethro Mullen and Stella Kim, “North Korea steps up activity at its nuclear site, South says,” CNN, April 22,
2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/21/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-activity/; BBC, “More ‘activity’ at North
Korea nuclear test site,” April 22, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27107273; “Timeline on North
Korea’s Nuclear Program,” New York Times, November 19, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html?_r=0.
661
David E. Sanger, “U.S. Commander Sees Key Nuclear Step by North Korea,” International New York Times,
October 24, 1014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/world/asia/us-commander-sees-key-nuclear-step-by-north-
korea.html.
662
Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, and Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Finds Nuclear Strides by North Korea,”
International New York Times, April 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-may-
have-nuclear-missile-capability-us-agency-says.html.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 529

663
Choe Sang-Hun, “North Korea Threatens to Conduct Nuclear Test,” International New York Times, November
20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/asia/north-korea-threatens-to-conduct-nuclear-test.html.
664
James Clapper, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” US House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, February 10, 2011.
665
See http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/imagery/category/korean-peninsula/ and other material in the Korea section,
of the ISIS web page. Additional material can be found in the Global Security, Federation of American Scientists,
and NTI web pages.
666
E-mail from Mike Green, February 7, 2011.
667
NTI, “North Korea: Overview,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/.
668
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons.
669
NTI, “North Korea Profile: Capabilities,”
670
Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 34.
671
This compares with an estimated 80,000 people that worked on the early US ICMB programs in the 1950s –
along with significant industrial participation; Markus Schiller, Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile
Threat, RAND, 2012, 37.
672
Julian Ryall, “North Korea could have fuel for 48 nuclear weapons by 2015,” The Telegraph, August 20, 2012.
673
Editorial Board, “North Korea’s Nuclear Expansion,” New York Times, February 27, 2015; Joel S. Wit and Sun
Young Ahn, North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy, US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies, February 2015.
674
Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security
32, no. 1 (2009), 103.
675
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service, January
20, 2011, 20.
676
“DPRK Foreign Ministry Declares Strong Counter-Measures against UNSC’ Resolution,” KCNA June 13, 2009.
677
“DPRK Permanent Representative Sends Letter to President of UNSC,” KCNA, September 4, 2009.
678
Dennis Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” US Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
679
Siegfried Hecker, “What I Found in North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, December 9, 2010.
680
Chico Harlan, “UN Report Suggests N. Korea Has Secret Nuclear Sites,” Washington Post, February 1, 2011.
681
David Albright and Paul Brannan, Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program, ISIS, October 8,
2010, 24–25.
682
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 9.
683
Ibid.; and “N. Korea can make nuke-tipped missiles able to hit S. Korea: expert,” Yonhap News Agency, April
24, 2013.
684
January 7, 2009, interview, in International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 11.
685
See Thom Shanker, Eric Schmitt, and David E. Sanger, “Pentagon Finds Nuclear Strides by North Korea,” New
York Times, April 11, 2013; David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, “Intelligence on North Korea, and Its New
Leader, Remains Elusive,” New York Times, April 11, 2013.
686
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
687
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 27.
688
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
689
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
690
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 27.
691
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
692
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
693
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
694
Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons Program.”
695
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
696
“Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 20 January 1992,”
NTI, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/joint-declaration-south-and-north-korea-denuclearization-korean-
peninsula/.
697
“Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” International Atomic Energy Agency.
530 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

698
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
699
UN Security Council, S/RES/825, May 11, 1993, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
700
“Chronology of US–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association,
http://www.armscontrol.org.
701
Ibid.
702
Ibid.
703
“Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,”
Geneva, October 21, 1994, http://www.kedo.org.
704
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 27.
705
International Atomic Energy Agency, “Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,” http://www.iaea.org.
706
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile”; Federation of American Scientists, “North Korea, Nuclear Weapons
Program,” http://www.fas.org/nuke.
707
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 27.
708
“Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,” International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.
709
Ibid.
710
“IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in the DPRK,” IAEA, November 29, 2002,
http://www.iaea.org.
711
“Chronology of US–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association.
712
Carol Giacomo, “US Says N. Korean Fuel Oil Deliveries Should End,” Reuters, November 13, 2002; P.S.
Suryanarayana, “IAEA Inspectors Leave N. Korea,” The Hindu, January 1, 2003; “Statement of DPRK Government
on Its Withdrawal from NPT,” KCNA, January 10, 2003.
713
“IAEA Director General Cites DPRK ‘Nuclear Brinkmanship,’” IAEA, December 26, 2002, http://www.iaea.org.
714
NTI, “North Korea: Nuclear,” updated February 2013.
715
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,”
Federation of American Scientists, June 2012, 7.
716
William Perry, “Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for US Policy in Northeast Asia,” speech at
Brookings Institution, January 24, 2003.
717
David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has Made Fuel from Atom Bombs,” New York Times, July 15, 2003.
718
Siegfried S. Hecker, “Visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center in North Korea,” Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2004.
719
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
720
NTI, “North Korea: Nuclear.”
721
“N. Korea Moves to Bolster Nuclear Arsenal,” Korea Times, April 18, 2005.
722
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
723
Daniel Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,”
Federation of American Scientists, June 2012, 7.
724
Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, Congressional Research Service,
11.
725
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Public Affairs Office, “Statement by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on the North Korea Nuclear Test,” October 16, 2006.
726
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
727
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 9.
728
“Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of
China, February 13, 2007, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng.
729
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
730
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
731
“Chronology of US–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association.
732
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
733
“Chronology of US–North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association.
734
NTI, “North Korea Nuclear Profile.”
735
“US Won’t Take North Korea Off Terrorism List Yet,” Reuters, August 11, 2008.
736
“Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman on DPRK’s Decision to Suspend Activities to Disable Nuclear Facilities,”
KCNA, August 26, 2008.
737
“Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,” International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 531

738
“DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s “Presidential Statement,” KCNA, April 14, 2009.
739
“Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards,” International Atomic Energy Agency.
740
ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Sung-nam Lim, speech at Seoul National University on October 24, 2012.
741
“Text of N. Korean News Report Announcing Nuclear Test,” Washington Post, May 25, 2009.
742
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 6.
743
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Public Affairs Office, “Statement by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on North Korea’s Declared Nuclear Test on May 25, 2009,” June 15, 2009.
744
Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, Congressional Research
Service, May 27, 2009, 1.
745
Jonathan Medalia, North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications, Congressional
Research Service, November 24, 2010, 1.
746
“Experts Sure about the Nature of the DPRK Event,” Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, June 12,
2009, http://www.ctbto.org.
747
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010,” http://www.dni.gov.
748
Bonnie S Glaser and Brittany Billingsley, Reordering Chinese Priorities on the Korean Peninsula, 9; Daniel
Wertz and Ali Vaez, “Sanctions and Nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran: A Comparative Analysis,”
Federation of American Scientists, June 2012, 7.
749
NTI, “North Korea: Nuclear”; NTI, “Nuclear Disarmament North Korea,” updated August 29, 2013.
750
Chung Eun-sook, “Long-Stalled Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” 6; Andrew Quinn,
“Insight: Obama’s North Korean leap of faith falls short,” Reuters, March 30, 2012; Mary Beth Nikitin, North
Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2013, 27.
751
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E Rinehart, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation, 29.
752
Ibid., 2.
753
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, 14.
754
Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test,” CSIS, February 12, 2013.
755
William J. Broad, “A secretive Country Gives Experts Few Clues to Judge Its Nuclear Program,” New York
Times, February 12, 2013.
756
Cheryl K. Chumley, “Iranian scientists believed to have attended North Korean nuclear test, report says,”
Washington Times, February 15, 2013.
757
“Moscow Against North Korea Trade Sanctions,” RIA Novosti, February 19, 2013.
758
Rick Gladstone and David E. Singer, “New Sanctions on North Korea Pass in Unified U.N. Vote,” New York
Times, March 7, 2013; Choe Sang-hun and Rick Gladstone, “After Sanctions Vote, 2 Koreas Ratchet Up Attack
Threats,” New York Times, March 8, 2013.
759
Louis Carbonneau, “U.N. set to crack down on North Korea financing, illicit cargo,” Reuters, March 6, 2013.
760
“Top US commander: Iran Sanctions Not Working Yet But Diplomatic Pressures Could Still Succeed,”
Associated Press, March 5, 2013.
761
Rick Gladstone and David E. Singer, “New Sanctions on North Korea Pass in Unified U.N. Vote”; Choe Sang-
hun and Rick Gladstone, “After Sanctions Vote, 2 Koreas Ratchet Up Attack Threats”; Michelle Florcruz, “China
Agrees to Sanctions on North Korea, Shifts Focus To South Korea?,” International Business Times, March 5, 2013;
Jia Qingguo, “Shifting emphasis: Beijing’s reactions to North Korea nuclear test,” East Asia Forum, March 3, 2013.
762
Artyom Lukin, “Russia shows little concern of North Korean nukes (for now),” East Asia Forum, March 3, 2013.
763
Ibid.
764
Hwang Sung-hee, “U.S. Official Asks Seoul to Join in on Further N. Korea Sanctions,” Arirang News, March 20,
2013.
765
Kevin Baron, Foreign Policy – Situation Report, March 25, 2013.
766
Deng Yuwen, “China should abandon North Korea,” Financial Times, February 27, 2013.
767
Ibid.
768
Jeremy Page, “Editor Penalty Shows China’s Conflict on North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2013.
769
Jane Perlez, “China Says it Won’t Forsake North Korea, Despite Support for U.N. Sanctions,” New York Times,
March 9, 2013.
770
“China reacts to North Korea; blames US,” ABCTV Foreign News, March 30, 2013.
532 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

771
“North Korea’s aggression could strengthen US-China alliance,” Fox News, April 5, 2013.
772
Kwanwoo Jun, “Is China Cracking Down on North Korea Trade?,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013.
773
Jeremy Page, “Editor Penalty Shows China’s Conflict on North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2013.
774
Kwanwoo Jun, “Is China Cracking Down on North Korea Trade?,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013.
775
Lee Chi-dong, “US official: N. Korea food situation ‘fairly difficult,’ door still open for aid,” Yonhap News
Agency, April 22, 2013.
776
Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China Cuts Ties With Key North Korean Bank,” New York Times,
May 7, 2013.
777
Kwanwoo Jun, “Is China Cracking Down on North Korea Trade?,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2013.
778
Christopher A. Ford, “Challenges of North Korean Nuclear Negotiation,” DPRK-US Dialogue, Aspen Policy
Program, 2011.
779
Ministry for Unification and Institute for Unification Education, Understanding North Korea, ROK Government,
2012, 132.
780
Dennis Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” US Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
781
Chipman, North Korea’s Weapons Programmes, 45.
782
“Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010,” http://www.dni.gov.
783
Dan Lamothe, “US general: North Korea likely can build miniaturized nuclear weapons,” Washington Post,
October 24, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/10/24/u-s-general-north-korea-likely
can-build-miniaturized-nuclear-weapons/.
784
Victor Cha and Ellen Kim, “North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test,” CSIS, February 12, 2013.
785
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, 3, 14.
786
“U.N. monitoring body detects radioactive races from N.K.’s Feb. nuclear test,” Yonhap News Agency, April 23,
2013.
787
Ham Hyeong-pil, “Changes in North Korea’s Strategic Line and Efforts for Strengthened Nuclear Capabilities,”
ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, April 22, 2013.
788
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, 15, 20.
789
“S. Korean Authorities Accused of Fabricating UN ‘Resolution’ with Foreign Forces,” KCNA¸ January 25, 2013.
790
Sung-won Shim, “North Korea Warns U.S. Forces of ‘Destruction’ Ahead of Drills,” New York Times, February
23, 2013.
791
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens to Attack U.S. With ‘Lighter and Smaller Nukes,’” New York Times,
March 5, 2013.
792
Freya Peterson, “North Korea cuts hotline with South, threatens nuclear strike as war games begin,” Global Post,
March 11, 2013.
793
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Cuts Off the Remaining Military Hot Lines with South Korea,” New York Times,
March 27, 2013.
794
“North Korea ‘Threatens Preemptive Nuclear Attack,’” NKNews.org, March 7, 2013; Choe Sang-hun, “South
Korea Disputes North’s Dismissal of Armistice,” New York Times, March 12, 2013.
795
Alastair Gale, “Kim Jong Eun Delivers Verbal Barrage,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2013.
796
Sam Kim, “NKorea says it’s in state of war with SKorea,” Associated Press, March 30, 2013.
797
“Pyongyang Cuts Hotline as U.S.-South Korean Military Drills Begin,” NKNews.org, March 10, 2013.
798
Choe Sang-hun and Rick Gladstone, “After Sanctions Vote, 2 Koreas Ratchet Up Attack Threats.”
799
Alastair Gale, “North Korea (Again) Claims It Will Nullify Armistice,” Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2013.
800
Kevin Liffey, “North Korean army says it has ‘ratified’ Nuclear s trike against U.S.,” Reuters, April 3, 2013.
801
Rick Gladstone, “Threats Sow Concerns Over Korean Armistice,” New York Times, March 9, 2013.
802
“The Korean Peninsula: Flirting with Conflict,” International Crisis Group, March 13, 2013.
803
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Cuts Off the Remaining Military Hot Lines with South Korea.”
804
For example, the ROK says that the DPRK has violated the armistice by digging infiltration tunnels, deploying
machine guns inside the DMZ, and triggering gunfire exchanges along the border; the DPRK has accused the ROK
and US of conducting war maneuvers targeting the North, employing combat personnel and heavy weapons inside
the DMZ, and firing at DPRK fishing boats near the NLL. Foster Klug, Hyung-Jin Kim, and Sam Kim, “A look at
what NKorea vow to scrap armistice means,” Yahoo! News, March 6, 2013; Rick Gladstone, “Threats Sow Concerns
Over Korean Armistice,” New York Times, March 9, 2013; “Pyongyang Cuts Hotline As U..-South Korean Military
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 533

Drills Begin,” NKNews.org, March 10, 2013; Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea Disputes North’s Dismissal of
Armistice,” New York Times, March 12, 2013.
805
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Threatens to Attack U.S. With ‘Lighter and Smaller Nukes’”; Julian Ryall, “North
Korea says ‘prepare for war,’” Telegraph, March 8, 2013; Foster Klug, Hyung-Jin Kim, and Sam Kim, “A look at
what NKorea vow to scrap armistice means”; Choe Sang-hun, “No Trading Nuclear Arms for Aid, North Korea
Says,” New York Times, March 16, 2013.
806
NTI, “North Korea Will Never be Recognized as a Nuclear State, Kerry Says,” April 3, 2013.
807
David Chance and Phil Stewart, “North Korea readies rockets after U.S. show of force,” Reuters, March 29,
2013.
808
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy,” New York Times, March 31,
2013.
809
Ham Hyeong-pil, “Changes in North Korea’s Strategic Line and Efforts for Strengthened Nuclear Capabilities.”
810
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, 20-1.
811
“North Korea ‘to restart Yongbyon nuclear reactor,” BBC News, April 2, 2013; Choe Sang-hun and Mark
Landler, “North Korea Threatens to Restart Nuclear Reactor,” New York Times, April 2, 2013; Alastair Gale,
“Pyongyang to Restart Nuclear Plant,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2013; NTI, “North Korea Will Never be
Recognized as a Nuclear State, Kerry Says.”
812
“North Korea Is Said to Move Missiles,” Reuters, April 21, 2013; David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun,
“Intelligence on North Korea, and Its New Leader, Remains Elusive,” New York Times, May 6, 2013.
813
Christine Kim, “North Korea suspends last project with South, Putin cites Chernobyl,” Yahoo! News, April 8,
2013.
814
Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Bolster Missile Defense to Deter Attack by North Korea,” New York Times, March 15,
2013.
815
NTI, “North Korea Will Never be Recognized as a Nuclear State, Kerry Says.”
816
“South Korea pledges strong response against North,” BBC, April 2, 2013.
817
“South Korea raises alert with North to ‘vital threat,’” BBC, April 10, 2013.
818
Thom Shanker, “U.S. to Bolster Missile Defense to Deter Attack by North Korea,” New York Times, March 15,
2013; Thom Shanker, David E. Sanger, and Martin Fackler, “U.S. Is Bolstering Missile Defense to Deter North
Korea,” New York Times, March 15, 2013.
819
“Pentagon Delays Missile Test to Avoid Misperception by N. Korea,” ABCTV Foreign News, April 6, 2013.
820
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Moves Missile to Coast, but Little Threat Is Seen,” New York Times, April 4,
2013.
821
Choe Sang-hun, “Tensions with North Korea Unsettle South’s Economy,” New York Times, April 5, 2013.
822
Max Fisher, “Can the U.S. widen the gap between China and North Korea?,” Washington Post, April 15, 2013.
823
Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea tells China not to meddle in decision over missile system,” New York Times,
March 17, 2015.
824
David Albright, Future Directions in the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020, ISIS,
February 26, 2015, 11-18.
825
Ibid., 19.
826
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Blocks Workers from South at the Border,” New York Times, April 3, 2013.
827
Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea to Pull Remaining Workers from the North,” New York Times, April 26, 2013.
828
Kim Hee-jin, Lee Young-jong, “North at odds over Kaesong: Source,” Korea JoongAng Daily, April 5, 2013.
829
David Chance and Phil Stewart, “North Korea readies rockets after U.S. show of force,” Reuters, March 29,
2013; Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea to Pull Remaining Workers from the North.”
830
“DPRK Warns Future of Kaesong Industrial Zone Depends on S. Korea’s Attitude,” KCNA, March 30, 2013.
831
“S. Korean businessmen urged gov’t to declare Kaesong special disaster zone,” Yonhap News Agency, April 23,
2013.
832
Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Offers Aid to Business in Shuttered North Korean Complex,” New York Times,
April 24, 2013; “South Korea to provide $270 million in loans to firms shut out of factory park in North Korea,”
Associated Press, May 2, 2013.
833
Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea to Pull Remaining Workers from the North.”
834
Sarah Kim and Choi Hyung-kyu, “China, U.S. at odds over South’s Kaesong stance,” JoongAng Daily, April 30,
2013.
534 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

835
Jung Won-yeob and Sarah Kim, “Kim Jong-un in a tight spot after Kaesong move,” Yonhap News Agency, April
30, 2013.
836
Ibid.
837
Kim Eun-jung, “Powder sent to defense minister turns out to be flour,” Yonhap News Agency, April 23, 2013.
838
Kim Jiyoon and Karl Friedhoff, The Asan Public Opinion Report, Asan Institute, March 2013.
839
Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Dials Back on Korean Show of Force,” Wall Street Journal, April 3,
2013; David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Designs a Korea Response Proportional to the Provocation,” New
York Times, April 7, 2013.
840
“North Korea lists terms for talks with US and S Korea,” BBC News, April 18, 2013.
841
“DPRK NDC Policy Department Issues Statement,” KCNA, April 18, 2013.
842
“North Korea lists terms for talks with US and S Korea,” BBC News, April 18, 2013.
843
Choe Sang-hun, “On Anniversary, North Korea’s Bluster Begins Again,” New York Times, April 25, 2013.
844
“China says new North Korea nuclear test possible,” Associated Press, April 22, 2013.
845
Michael Madden, “The Passing of the Nuclear Torch: The Next Generation of WMD Scientists,” 38 North,
September 22, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/09/mmadden091914/.
846
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs, 12.
847
NTI, “North Korea – Facilities: Nuclear,” updated March 2013.
848
Ibid.
849
World Nuclear Association, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” updated May 2015, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/Emerging-Nuclear-Energy-Countries/.
850
Based on NTI, “North Korea – Facilities,” updated March 2013.
851
38 North (operated by Johns Hopkins) made the analysis; “Satellite imagery indicates N. Korea close to operating
light-water reactor,” Yonhap News Agency, May 2, 2013.
852
Hecker, “What I Found in North Korea.”
853
Hecker, “What I Found in North Korea.”
854
Siegfried Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” Center for International
Security and Cooperation (20 November 2010), 6.
855
Chico Harlan, “UN Report Suggests N. Korea Has Secret Nuclear Sites.”
856
Mary Beth Nikitin, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, Congressional Research Service (20
January 2011), 20.
857
Julian Ryall, “North Korea says ‘prepare for war,’” Telegraph, March 8, 2013.
858
Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea pushes Back on North’s Threats,” New York Times, March 6, 2013.
859
Choe Sang-hun and Rick Gladstone, “After Sanctions Vote, 2 Koreas Ratchet Up Attack Threats.”
860
In-soo Nam and Kwanwoo Jun, “Seoul Lashes Back at North,” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2013.
861
Choe Sang-hun, “North Korea Calls Hawaii and U.S. Mainland Targets,” New York Times, March 26, 2013.
862
Ibid.
863
“China sounds positive note on 3-way talks with S. Korea, US,” Yonhap News Agency, April 25, 2013.
864
“Japan to order interception of North Korean missiles,” ABCTV Foreign News, April 6, 2013.
865
Sheila A Smith, “Japan Prepares for Pyongyang’s Worst,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 8, 2013.
866
Alexander Martin, “Tensions Bolster Tokyo Military Bid,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2013.
867
Ibid.; Martin Fackler, “Japan Shifting Further Away From Pacifism,” New York Times, April 1, 2013.
868
Christine Kim, “North Korea suspends last project with South, Putin cites Chernobyl,” Yahoo! News, April 8,
2013.
869
David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Designs a Korea Response Proportional to the Provocation.”
870
Jane Perlez, “U.S. General Sees Hope for Chinese Help on Korea,” New York Times, April 24, 2013.
871
“China says new North Korea nuclear test possible,” Associated Press, April 22, 2013.
872
“Top diplomats of S. Korea, China to set up hotline amid N. Korea tensions,” Yonhap News Agency, April 24,
2013.
873
International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, 3-4.
874
Ibid.
875
Ibid.
876
NTI, “South Korea Profile,” http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/SKorea/index.html.
877
Chris Schneidmiller, “South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal,” Global Security Newswire, October
17, 2008.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 535

878
Ibid.
879
NTI, “North Korea – Chemical,” accessed April 5, 2013. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-
korea/chemical/.
880
“South Korea Biological and Toxin Weapons,” GlobalSecurity.org,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/bw.htm.
881
Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White Paper, 26., 2010 Defense White Paper.
882
World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html.
883
Ford, “Challenges of North Korean Nuclear Negotiation.”
884
Globalsecurity.org, “South Korea Special Weapons,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/index.html.
885
Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments,” WMD Insights, November 9, 2004,
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/041109.htm.
886
Ford, “Challenges of North Korean Nuclear Negotiation.”
887
Globalsecurity.org, “South Korea Special Weapons.”
888
Ibid.
889
Confidential documents and interviews; Mark Hibbs, “KAERI Report Documents Production of 200 Kilograms
UF4, DU Imports,” Nucleonics Week 45, no. 44 (October 28, 2004), 15–16.
890
Barbara Demick, “South Korea experimented with highly enriched uranium / Incident could complicate arms
talks with North,” San Francisco Chronicle, September 3, 2004. http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/South-
Korea-experimented-with-highly enriched-2728185.php.
891
Paul Kerr, “IAEA: Seoul’s Nuclear Sins Past,” Arms Control Today (December 2004).
892
Dafna Linzer, “S. Korea Nuclear Project Detailed,” Washington Post, September 12, 2004.
893
Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments.”
894
Mark Hibbs, “77% U-235 Was Peak Enrichment Reported to IAEA by South Korea,” NuclearFuel 29, no. 30
(September 2004): 7–8.
895
“South Korea’s KAERI Quantum Optics Lab Used Dye Lasers to Separate U-235,” Nucleonics Week 45, no. 37
(September 2004): 1.
896
Pinkston, “South Korea’s Nuclear Experiments.”
897
Daniel A. Pinkston, “South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Included Unveiling of New
Cruise Missile,” WMD Insights (October 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/other/wmdi061004_pinkston.htm.
898
Choe Sang-Hum, “South Korea Launches Satellite,” New York Times, August 25, 2009.
899
NTI, “South Korea,” updated January 2013; “Tensions Remain High as South Korea Performs Military Drills,”
NKNews.org, February 14, 2013; Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?” Foreign Policy, March 15, 2013.
900
In-Soo nam, “North’s Test Re-ignites Debate in South on Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, February 15,
2013; “Pres. Lee: US troops to stay if NK event causes reunification,” The Dong-A Ilbo, February 15, 2013.
901
Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-hun, “As North Korea Blusters, South Flirts with Talk of Nuclear Arms,” New
York Times, March 10, 2013.
902
Ibid.
903
Mark Hibbs, “Chung Mong-joon, the 123, and the State-Level Approach,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, April 14, 2013.
904
Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?”
905
World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in South Korea,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html.
906
Miles A Pomper, “Concerns Raised as South Korea Joins GNEP,” Arms Control Today (January/February 2008).
907
Ibid.
908
Ser Myo-ja, “Gates, Par discuss future nuclear energy options,” Korean JoongAng Daily, April 23, 2013.
909
“Nuclear Power in South Korea,” World Nuclear Association, updated February 2013, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/South-Korea/.
910
Ser Myo-ja, “Gates, Par discuss future nuclear energy options.”
911
Based on NTI, “South Korea: Facilities,” updated January 2013, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/south-
korea/facilities/.
912
Ibid.
913
Victor Cha, U.S and South Korea Agree to an Extension of the 123 Civil Nuclear Agreement, CSIS, April 24,
2013, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-south-korea-agree-extension-123-civil-nuclear-agreement.
914
Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?”
915
Ibid.
536 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

916
Ser Myo-ja, “Gates, Par discuss future nuclear energy options.”
917
Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?”
918
Gary Samore, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?” CSIS, April 22, 2013.
919
Sharon Squassoni, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?” CSIS, April 22, 2013.
920
Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea and U.S. Fail to Reach Deal on Nuclear Energy,” New York Times, April 24, 2013.
921
Gary Samore, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?”
922
Sharon Squassoni, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?”
923
Christopher Hill, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?” CSIS, April 22, 2013.
924
Gary Samore, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?”
925
Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?”
926
Gary Samore, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?”
927
Ibid.
928
Ibid.
929
Mark Hibbs, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?”
930
Christopher Hill, discussion at “What is at Stake in the US-ROK 123 Agreement?”
931
Choe Sang-hun, “South Korea and U.S. Fail to Reach Deal on Nuclear Energy.”
932
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea” and “South Korea.” GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms.
933
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 2013, 9-11.
934
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: North Korea,” September 24,
2014, Article 3 page 2.
935
IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, “Jane’s World Armies: North Korea,” IHS Jane’s,
October 18, 2012. http://www.janes.com.
936
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 8-9.
937
“Jane’s World Armies: Korea, North,” IHS Jane’s, updated October 18, 2012.
938
Jonathan Pollack, “The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas,” in Strategic Asia 2005–
2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington, DC:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).
939
International Crisis Group, North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability, 15.
940
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271.
941
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” November 27, 2012. http://www.janes.com.
942
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 16; Rhee Sang-Woo, “From Defense to
Deterrence: The Core of Defense Reform Plan 307,” CSIS, September 7, 2011.
943
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 23.
944
Rhee Sang-Woo, “From Defense to Deterrence: The Core of Defense Reform Plan 307,” CSIS, September 7,
2011.
945
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 24.
946
Kyu-dok Hong, “The ROK Announces its Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030,” Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, October 4, 2012; Rhee Sang-Woo, “From Defense to Deterrence: The Core of Defense Reform Plan 307,”
CSIS, September 7, 2011.
947
The minister is Kim Kwan-Jim; Kyu-dok Hong, “The ROK Announces its Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-
2030,” Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, October 4, 2012.
948
Kyu-dok Hong, “The ROK Announces its Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030,” Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, October 4, 2012; Michael Raska, “Transforming South Korea’s defence capabilities,” East Asia Forum,
May 28, 2012.
949
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271.
950
Kyu-dok Hong, “The ROK Announces its Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030,” Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, October 4, 2012.
951
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271.
952
Jonathan Pollack, “The Strategic Futures and Military Capabilities of the Two Koreas,” in Strategic Asia 2005–
2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington, DC:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005).
953
Bruce Bennett, “A Brief Analysis of the Republic of Korea’s Defense Reform Plan,” RAND, 2006,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2006/RAND_OP165.pdf.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 537

954
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 24.
955
Boeing, “F-15K – Republic of Korea,” Defense Space and Security, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-
space/military/f15/f-15k/index; “F-15K SlamEage, South Korea,” Airforce-technology.com, http://www.airforce-
technology.com/projects/f-15k-slam-eagle/.
956
Defense Industry Daily staff, “KF-X Fighter: Korea’s Future Homegrown Jet,” Defense Industry Daily,
September 28, 2014, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/kf-x-paper-pushing-or-peer-fighter-program-010647/.
957
Bradley Perrett, “The Contender: South Korea’s KF-X could become a key alternative to the F-35,” Aviation
Week & Space Technology, April 29, 2013.
958
Bradley Perrett, “Achievable or Not? South Korean defense agencies clash over KF-X Prospects,” Aviation Week
& Space Technology, April 29, 2013.
959
“Korea push to build military fortresses,” Associated Press, December 7, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/07/south-korea-build-military-fortresses.
960
“Pyongyang threat spurs defense re-think,” Oxford Analytica, January 24, 2011.
http://www.oxan.com/SubscriptionServices/DailyBrief/Samples/SouthKoreaMilitaryPosture.aspx; “South Korea’s
Defense Reform Initiative 2020 under intense review,” Asia Defense (blog), May 29, 2010,
http://theasiandefence.blogspot.com/2010/05/south-koreas-defense-reform-initiative.html.
961
“South Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase,” Reuters, January 29, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/idINIndia-54508620110130.
962
Amos Harel, “South Korea Eyes Upgrading Israel defense Deals in Light of Tensions with North,” Haaretz,
January 12, 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/south-korea-eyes-upgrading-israel-defense-deals-in-
light-of-tensions-with-north-1.336491.
963
“Elbit Systems to Supply the Republic of Korea Airborne EW Suites and MWS Valued at Approximately $29
Million,” Elbit Systems, January 11, 2011, http://ir.elbitsystems.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=61849&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1514783&highlight=.
964
“Military Overhauls Command,” JoongAng Daily, December 30, 2010,
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2930299.
965
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” November 27, 2012.
966
Jon Grevatt, “South Korea’s Hyundai on track to deliver K2 with indigenous engines and transmissions,” IHS
Jane’s, November 19, 2014, http://www.janes.com/article/45948/south-korea-s-hyundai-on-track-to-deliver-k2-with-
indigenous-engines-and-transmissions.
967
Ibid.
968
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – China and Northeast Asia: South Korea,” September 24,
2014, article 2, 5.
969
“South Korea to purchase 5 Chun Moo K-MLRS multi-calibers MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System,” Army
Recognition, October 5, 2014,
http://www.armyrecognition.com/october_2014_global_defense_security_news_uk/south_korea_to_purchase_58_c
hun_moo_k-mlrs_multi-calibers_mlrs_multiple_launch_rocket_system_0510144.html.
970
Jung Sung-ki, “With Samsung Sale, Hanwha is S. Korea’s New ‘Defense Giant,’” Defense News, November 30,
2014, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141130/DEFREG03/311300019/With-Samsung-Sale-Hanwha-S-
Korea-s-New-Defense-Giant-.
971
“The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” IISS, 2013.
972
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
973
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
974
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
975
“South Korea to buy F-35’s for the future,” ABCTV Foreign News, April 3, 2013.
976
“South Korea to sign deal this month to buy 40 F-35 jets for $7 billion,” Reuters, September 24, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/24/us-southkorea-airforce-orders-idUSKCN0HJ0P620140924; “Republic
Of Korea Approves Procurement Of Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II,” Lockheed Martin, September 24, 2014,
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/2014/september/0924-aero-south-korea-f-35.html.
977
Kim Eun-jung, “Boeing wins $1.6 bln contract for S. Korean attack helicopter fleet,” Yonhap News Agency,
April 17, 2013.
978
“U.S. Congress approves sale of Global Hawks to S. Korea,” Yonhap News Agency, May 2, 2013.
979
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
538 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

980
Paek Jaeok, “The ROK’s 2012 Defense Budget,” Korea Defense Issue & Analysis, Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, May 11, 2012.
981
Increase/decrease is for the 2007-2011 period, while the amount and share are for the 2006-2011 period.
982
With “other” included, the total of shares would equal 100%.
983
Equipment maintenance, equipment/materials procurement, fuel/ammunition, transportation/disaster
management, ammunition management.
984
Defense cost sharing, dispatch of troops out of the country, and military attaches’ activities.
985
The high increase in the amount of defense-related administrative support is due to the reflection of
compensation concerning military plane-caused noise in residential areas (120 billion won).
986
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea” and “South Korea.”
987
Ibid.
988
Ibid.
989
IISS, Military Balance 2014, 204.
990
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea.”
991
Ibid.
992
Ibid.
993
“The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” IISS, 2013.
994
Jon Grevatt, “Analysts reveal ‘real’ North Korea 2009 defense budget,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 19,
2011.
995
Ibid.
996
“N. Korea military spending third of income,” The China Post, January 19, 2011.
997
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2014, Chapter 1 Section 2.
998
Peter W. Singer, “Separating Sequestration Facts from Fiction: Sequestration and What It Would Do for
American Military Power, Asia, and the Flashpoint of Korea,” Brookings, September 23, 2012.
999
Tak Sung Han, “North Korea’s Defense Industry: An Assessment and Its Growth Prospect,” ROK Angle, Korea
Institute for Defense Analyses, March 28, 2013.
1000
Ibid.
1001
Ibid.
1002
Ibid.
1003
Ibid.
1004
CIA, World Factbook, “North Korea” and “South Korea.”
1005
CIA, World Factbook, “South Korea.”
1006
SIPRI, “Military Expenditure Database,” accessed October 28, 2014. http://milexdata.sipri.org/; IISS, The
Military Balance 2013.
1007
Japanese Defense Ministry, Japanese National Defense 2014, Chapter 1 Section 2.
1008
Kim Kwang-woo, “Analysis of ROK Defense budget for 2012,” Rok Angle, Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, January 16, 2012.
1009
Ibid.
1010
Ibid., 2-4.
1011
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 271-2.
1012
Ohm Tae-am, “Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012,” Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis 24, no. 1 (March 2012), 26.
1013
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, 13.
1014
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2012, Department of Defense, May 2012, 3,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf.
1015
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 19.
1016
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 22.
1017
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014.
1018
Ibid., 10, 47-48.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 539

1019
Andrew S. Erikson, “Building an Active, Layered Defense: Chinese Naval and Air Force Advancement,”
National Bureau of Asian Research, September 10, 2012.
1020
Andrew S. Erikson, “China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Missions,” National Bureau of
Asian Research, September 27, 2012.
1021
Ibid.
1022
Andrew S. Erikson, “Building an Active, Layered Defense: Chinese Naval and Air Force Advancement.”
1023
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, 8-11.
1024
“China ‘reveals army structure’ in defence white paper,” BBC News, April 16, 2013; Chinese State Council
Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 16, 2013, Section I-II.
1025
“China ‘reveals army structure’ in defence white paper,” BBC News, April 16, 2013; Chinese State Council
Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 16, 2013, Section II.
1026
Chinese State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 16,
2013, Section III.
1027
Ibid., Section V.
1028
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 252-3.
1029
Ibid.
1030
Ibid.
1031
Ibid.
1032
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 10, 32.
1033
Ibid., 10, 32-33.
1034
Ibid., 12.
1035
Fu Peng “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces: II. Building and Development of China’s
Armed Forces,” English.news.cn, April 16, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-
04/16/c_132312681_2.htm.
1036
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 9-10, 41.
1037
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, 9.
1038
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 253-5.
1039
IISS, Military Balance 2014, 207.
1040
Fu Peng “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.”
1041
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2012, 8.
1042
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 7-9, 31-32, 36-40.
1043
Andrew Erikson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, “China Sets Sail,” American Interest, May 2010, 27, 34,
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/05/01/china-sets-sail/.
1044
Andrew S. Erikson, “China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Missions.”
1045
Ibid.
1046
China participates in UN peacekeeping operations around the world, creating a core group of personnel with
operation experience in various regions. As of January 31, 2011, China had almost 1900 troops involved in UN
peacekeeping operations.
1047
Gabe Collins and Andrew S Erikson, “Implications of China’s Military Evacuation of Citizens from Libya,”
China Brief 11, no.4 (March 10, 2011).
1048
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 3.
1049
Fu Peng “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.”
1050
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 9-10, 69-70.
1051
AP, “Second Chinese stealth fighter makes test flight,” The Guardian, November 1, 2012.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/01/second-chinese-stealth-fighter-test; Andrew Erickson and Gabe
Collins, “Double Vision: Making Sense of China’s Second ‘Stealth’ Fighter Prototype,” Wall Street Journal,
540 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

September 18, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/09/18/double-vision-making-sense-of-chinas-second-

stealth-fighter-prototype/.
1052
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 9.
1053
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 254.
1054
Michael Raska and Alanna Krolikowski, “China’s defense aviation industry: Toward stealth innovation?” East
Asia Forum, March 11, 2013.
1055
Ibid.
1056
Andrew S. Erikson, “China’s Navy and Air Force: Advancing Capabilities and Missions.”
1057
Ibid.
1058
Ibid.
1059
Ibid.
1060
AP, “Second Chinese stealth fighter makes test flight”; Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Double Vision.”
1061
James R. Clapper, “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 10, 2011.
1061
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 35.
1062
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 109.
1063
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 179, 180 (Part 3 Chapter 1 Section 2).
1064
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 109.
1065
Ibid., 111-112.
1066
Ibid.
1067
Ibid., 118-119.
1068
Ibid.
1069
Ibid.
1070
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 204.
1071
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 117-119.
1072
Ibid.
1073
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2014, 206.
1074
Ibid., 210-211.
1075
Ibid., 211, 214.
1076
Ibid., 228.
1077
Ibid., 228-230.
1078
Ibid., 309-310.
1079
Ibid., 302-313.
1080
Ibid., 218, 221-222.
1081
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 36.
1082
IISS, Military Balance 2014, 180.
1083
Russian Government, Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine [unofficial translation], February 5, 2010.
1084
Richard Weitz, “Global Insights: Russia’s New Military Doctrine Reaffirms Old Values,” World Politics
Review, February 9, 2010.
1085
Russian Government, Russia’s 2010 Military Doctrine [unofficial translation], February 5, 2010, section IV.
1086
James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 24.
1087
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 21-22.
1088
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 199.
1089
IISS, Military Balance 2014, 162-163.
1090
Adam Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending: Less Mysterious in the
Aggregate,” China Quarterly, March 2013, 20.
1091
Edward Wong and Chris Buckley, “China’s Military Budget Increasing 10% for 2015, Official Says,” New York
Times, March 4, 2015.
1092
CIA, World Factbook, “China,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html.
1093
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, 29-30.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 541

1094
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, 41.
1095
Jeremy Page, “New China Leader Courts Military,” Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2013; Christopher Bodeen,
“China to maintain defense spending, fight waste,” Yahoo! News, March 4, 2013.
1096
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 18.
1097
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2012, 6.
1098
Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s 2013 Military Budget to Rise 10.7% to US $114.3 Billion – What it Means, and
Why it Matters,” March 4, 2013, http://www.andrewerickson.com/2013/03/chinas-2013-military-budget-what-it-
means-and-why-it-matters/.
1099
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, 44-45.
1100
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 255-6.
1101
Adam Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending,” 4-5.
1102
Ibid.
1103
Ibid., 7-8, 10.
1104
Adam Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending.”
1105
Ibid.
1106
Ibid.
1107
Ibid.
1108
Ibid.
1109
Ibid., 12.
1110
Ibid., 15-17.
1111
Ibid., 18-19.
1112
Adam Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending.”
1113
Ibid., 7-8, 10.
1114
Adam Liff and Andrew S. Erikson, “Demystifying China’s Defence Spending.”
1115
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, 12, 51-52; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, 49-50.
1116
Ibid.
1117
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 47.
1118
CIA, World Factbook, “Japan,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html.
1119
Isabel Reynolds, “Japan Defense Budget to Increase for First Time in 11 Years,” Bloomberg, January 30, 2013.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/japan-s-defense-spending-to-increase-for-first-time-in-11-years.html.
1120
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 269.
1121
CIA, World Factbook, “Russia,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
1122
Ibid.
1123
“World Military Spending Dips in 2012, First Since 1998,” Reuters, April 14, 2013.
1124
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 205-206.
1125
IISS, Military Balance 2014, 163-164.
1126
Ibid.
1127
Ibid., 207-208.
1128
“Russia Mistral: France halts delivery indefinitely,” BBC, November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-30190069.
1129
Ibid.
1130
Yun Yeong-mi and Park Ki-cheol, “An Analysis of Strategic Effects of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Relocation
of the USFK: Implementation and Prospects,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 25, no. 1 (March 2013), 20;
Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Shows Isolationist Streak in Americans,” New York Times, April 30, 2013.
1131
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010.
1132
Japanese Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2012, 25.
1133
DoD, “Joint Statement of the 2012 United States – Republic of Korea Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting,”
June 14, 2012.
542 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

1134
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 24-25.
1135
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” November 27, 2012.
1136
International Crisis Group, North Korean Succession and the Risks of Instability, 15-16.
1137
Lim Kwan-bin, “Achievements and Significance of the 44th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative meeting (SCM),”
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, November 13, 2012.
1138
Lim Kwan-bin, “Achievements and Significance of the Third KIDD,” ROK Angle, Korea Institute for Defense
Analyses, March 14, 2013.
1139
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” November 27, 2012.
1140
Kim Eun-jung, “Seoul vows to keep deadline for wartime control transfer,” Yonhap News Agency, April 22,
2013; Kim Eun-jung, “U.S. 8th Army commander says OPCON transfer preparation ‘on track,’” Yonhap News
Agency, May 3, 2013.
1141
Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Park of South Korea in a Joint Press
Conference,” The White House, May 7, 2013.
1142
Ibid.
1143
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama,” Council on Foreign Relations,
March 11, 2013.
1144
Jacob Poushter, “South Koreans Remain Strongly Pro-American,” Pew Research Center, May 6, 2013,
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/06/south-koreans-remain-strongly pro-american/.
1145
Scott A. Snyder, “Prospects for the U.S.-Korea Alliance under Park and Obama.”
1146
Max Fisher, “Poll shows Americans are obsessed with North Korea, overstate its threat,” Washington Post, April
11, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/max-fisher/2012/10/10/9d0a891e-12e7-11e2-a16b-
2c110031514a_page.html.
1147
Frank Newport, “Americans Say U.S. Should Aid South Korea if Attached,” Gallup Politics, April 4, 2013,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/161630/americans-say-aid-south-korea-attacked.aspx; Jeffrey Jones, “In U.S., 83% Say
North Korea Nukes Are a Critical Threat,” Gallup Politics, February 18, 2013,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/160541/say-north-korean-nukes-critical-threat.aspx.
1148
Max Fisher, “Poll shows Americans are obsessed with North Korea, overstate its threat.”
1149
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea.”
1150
Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle,” www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm; Global
Security, “US Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command Combined Ground Component Command (GCC),”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/usfk.htm; IIP Digital, “Briefing by Defense Secretary Gates and
ROK Minister Lee,” October 17, 2008,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2008/10/20081020121847
eaifas0.7119104.html#axzz3bpXl5HtC.
1151
Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle”; Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 14.
1152
Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2010 Defense White Paper, 55.
1153
This includes only those resources that the US has in the ROK, not those that could be transferred there in the
case of a conflict.
1154
Walter L. Sharp, speech to East Asia Institute, MacArthur Asia Security Initiative 2010 Annual Meeting, July
26, 2010.
1155
US Forces Korea, The New Korea: Strategic Digest, October 2010, 26-27.
1156
Ohm Tae-am, “Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012,” 27.
1157
IHS Jane’s, “Jane’s World Armies: South Korea,” November 27, 2012.
1158
“Tensions Rise as Both Koreas Hold Military Exercises,” NKNews.org, February 26, 2013.
1159
Kevin Baron, “What is Foal Eagle?,” Foreign Policy – E-Ring, April 3, 2013.
1160
Ibid.
1161
Ibid.
1162
Ibid.
1163
“Tensions Rise as Both Koreas Hold Military Exercises,” NKNews.org.
1164
“Talks over operational plan with U.S. stalled,” Korea JoongAng Daily, February 20, 2013.
1165
Ohm Tae-am, “Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012,” 26.
1166
J.J. Sutherland, “U.S. Weighs Options in Possible N. Korea Conflict,” NPR, July 27, 2010,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/385351.html.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 543

1167
“OPLAN 5029 risks ceding South Korean sovereignty to the U.S.,” The Hankyoreh, November 2, 2009,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/385351.html.
1168
“Talks over operational plan with U.S. stalled,” Korea JoongAng Daily.
1169
Robert Koehler, “China to intervene in N. Korea in emergency, Hani defense,” Marmot’s Hole (blog), May 26,
2011, http://www.rjkoehler.com/2011/05/26/china-to-intervene-in-n-korea-in-emergency-hani-defense-21/.
1170
Ohm Tae-am, “Security Challenges and Policy Dilemmas of South Korea in 2012,” 28.
1171
“The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” IISS, 2013.
1172
Ibid.
1173
Ibid.
1174
Jim Garamone, “Hagel, Onodera Discuss U.S.-Japanese Security Concerns,” American Forces Press Service,
April 29, 2013.
1175
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 84.
1176
IISS, Military Balance, 2013, 84.
1177
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, William H. Cooper, Ian E. Rinehart, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for
Congress, 7.
1178
US Department of Defense, Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa April 2013,
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Okinawa%20Consolidation%20Plan.pdf .
1179
Kevin Baron, “U.S., Japan to announce new plan for Okinawa,” Foreign Policy – The E-Ring, April 4, 2013.
1180
Anna Fifield, “In blow for Tokyo and Washington, Okinawa elects governor who opposes military base,”
Washington Post, November 16, 2014.
1181
USPACOM Strategy, http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/2013-uspacom-strategy.shtml.
1182
“Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy Commander U.S. Pacific Command, before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 24,
2010, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Willard%2003-26-10.pdf.
1183
Department of Defense, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century, January 5, 2012, 23.
1184
Donna Miles, “Locklear: Pacom’s Priorities Reflect New Strategic Guidance,” American Forces Press Service,
May 18, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116397.
1185
Ibid.
1186
“USPACOM Facts: Headquarters, US Pacific Command,” USPACOM, http://www.pacom.mil/about-
uspacom/facts.shtml.
1187
Department of Defense, Nuclear Policy Review, April 2010, 29, 31–32.
1188
IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 21
1189
IISS, The Military Balance 2013, 1, 5, 6, 31.
1190
IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 29.
1191
Ibid., 27.
1192
OSD Comptroller, Overview – FY2016 Defense Budget Request, Department of Defense, February 2015,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.
pdf.
1193
Ibid.
1194
Ibid.
1195
Ibid.
1196
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, Fiscal Year 2014, Department of
Defense, April 2013.
1197
“North Korea fires missiles as US-S Korea drills begin,” BBC News, March 2, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31654721
1198
IHS Jane’s, “Japan, South Korea, and US sign tripartite intelligence-sharing pact,” February 4, 2015.
1199
Han Da-eun, “S. Korea and U.S. Need to bolster Defense Capabilities: Sharp,” Arirang News, March 22, 2013.
1200
OSD Comptroller, Overview – FY2016 Defense Budget Request, February 2015, 5-1, 5-2.
1201
Ibid., 5-4.
1202
Ibid., 8-17, 8-18.
1203
CIA, World Factbook, “United States,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html.
1204
IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 33.
1205
OSD Comptroller, Overview – FY2016 Defense Budget Request, 2-3.
544 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

1206
IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 30.
1207
OSD Comptroller, Overview – FY2016 Defense Budget Request, A-1, 3-9.
1208
IISS, The Military Balance 2015, 32.
1209
Ibid.
1210
OSD Comptroller, Overview – FY2016 Defense Budget Request, 2-1.
1211
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 31, 2011, 35-37.
1212
Fu Peng, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces.”
1213
Bonnie S. Glaser, e-mail of February 8, 2010.
1214
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, 28-29; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, 30-31.
1215
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 6-8, 31, 36.
1216
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2012, 7, 25.
1217
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 40.
1218
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, 42.
1219
Andrew S. Erickson, “China Channels Billy Mitchell: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Alters Region’s Military
Geography,” China Brief 13, no. 5 (March 4, 2013).
1220
Ibid.
1221
Ibid.
1222
A. Vinod Kumar, “Impressions on China’s Second Missile Interceptor Test,” Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses [India], February 22, 2013.
1223
Robert Johnson, “China’s New MIRV Ballistic Missile is A Big Deal,” Business Insider, December 11, 2012,
http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-df-3a-mirv-multiple-us-targets-one-missle-2012-12.
1224
NTI, “China,” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/.
1225
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, 2-3, 34-35.
1226
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, 28-29.
1227
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 253.
1228
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, 35-36.
1229
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 34.
1230
Agence France-Presse, “China did not notify US before anti-missile test: Pentagon,” Google, January 12, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gIyJwTWQjzwLtHke9NhVHNS7qiHQ.
1231
“China carries out land-based mid-course missile interception test,” Xinhua, January 28, 2013.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/28/c_124285293.htm; Kumar, “Impressions on China’s Second
Missile Interceptor Test.”
1232
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 26.
1233
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 32.
1234
Keith Bradsher, “China’s Focus on Aerospace Raises Security Questions,” New York Times, January 21, 2013.
1235
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 10-11.
1236
Leonard David, “Shenlong Space Plane: China’s answer to U.S. X-37B Drone?,” Huffington Post, November
10, 2012.
1237
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 19-20.
1238
Ibid., 25.
1239
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2014, 11.
 The Changing Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia | 545

1240
“China’s anti-satellite weapon a “trump card” against US,” The Economic Times, January 6, 2013.
1241
Andrew Erikson and Amy Chang, “China’s Navigation in Space,” Proceedings, US Naval Institute, April 2012.
1242
Ibid.
1243
Ibid.
1244
Ibid.
1245
Ibid.
1246
Ibid.
1247
NTI, “United States.”
1248
Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,
Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2015, ii.
1249
Ibid., 5-6.
1250
Ibid., 15.
1251
Ibid., 39.
1252
NTI, “United States.”
1253
OSD Comptroller, “FY2016 Budget Overview,” 5-4.
1254
Ibid., 5-3 to 5-4.
1255
Andrew Erikson and Amy Chang, “China’s Navigation in Space.”
1256
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation notes and sources. Nuclear weapons programs are generally
shrouded in secrecy and all of the totals listed above should be considered estimates. The numbers in the chart above
are based on the most recent available estimates from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook series
by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. The specific sources include 2013 data on “Non-P5 Nuclear-Armed
States” and “US Nuclear Forces,” 2012 data on “Indian Nuclear Forces,” and 2011 data on “British Nuclear Forces.”
According to State Department figures from the latest New START data exchange, as of September 1,
2012, the United States had 1,722 deployed strategic warheads and Russia had 1,499 deployed strategic warheads.
This is a respective drop of 15 and increase of 9 warheads since the data exchange six months previously. U.S. totals
are lower than the estimates in the chart primarily because New START counts bombers as having one warhead
each, even though up to 20 warheads can be assigned to each bomber. In Russia’s case, the number of warheads
assigned to delivery systems in the chart also includes warheads assigned to submarines in overhaul, which are also
not counted as deployed by the treaty. Under New START, both the United States and Russia must reduce their
stockpiles of deployed strategic warheads to less than 1,550 warheads by 2018. According to the December 2012
State Department report, operations to reduce U.S. missile launchers will begin in 2015.
The US government disclosed in April 2010 that as of September 30, 2009, the total US stockpile had
5,113 warheads. On March 1, 2013, Drs. Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris revised that total to an estimated
4,650 warheads. This number excludes approximately 3,000 warheads awaiting dismantlement, whereas the totals in
the chart above include weapons awaiting dismantlement.
1257
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation notes and sources. US (2013), Russia (2012), UK (2011), France
(2011-2012), China (2013), India (2013), Pakistan (2013), Israel (2013), DPRK (2013). Nuclear weapons programs
are generally shrouded in secrecy and all of the totals listed above should be considered estimates. The numbers in
the chart above are based on the most recent available estimates from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear
Notebook series by Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. The specific sources include 2013 data on “Non-P5
Nuclear-Armed States” and “US Nuclear Forces,” 2012 data on “Indian Nuclear Forces,” and 2011 data on “British
Nuclear Forces.”
According to State Department figures from the latest New START data exchange, as of September 1,
2012 the United States had 1,722 deployed strategic warheads and Russia had 1,499 deployed strategic warheads.
This is a respective drop of 15 and increase of 9 warheads since the data exchange six months previously. U.S. totals
are lower than the estimates in the chart primarily because New START counts bombers as having one warhead
each, even though up to 20 warheads can be assigned to each bomber. In Russia’s case, the number of warheads
assigned to delivery systems in the chart also includes warheads assigned to submarines in overhaul, which are also
not counted as deployed by the treaty. Under New START, both the United States and Russia must reduce their
stockpiles of deployed strategic warheads to less than 1,550 warheads by 2018. According to the December 2012
State Department report, operations to reduce U.S. missile launchers will begin in 2015.
The US government disclosed in April 2010 that as of September 30, 2009, the total US stockpile had
5,113 warheads. On March 1, 2013, Drs. Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris revised that total to an estimated
546 | Anthony H. Cordesman and Aaron Lin

4,650 warheads. This number excludes approximately 3,000 warheads awaiting dismantlement, whereas the totals in
the chart above include weapons awaiting dismantlement.
1258
NTI, “China.”
1259
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2008,
http://www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577_9.htm.
1260
Chinese State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 31, 2011, 35.
1261
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2013, 29-30.
1262
NTI, “China.”
1263
Ibid.
1264
Ibid.
1265
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China 2011, 36.
1266
Ibid.
1267
Ibid., 31.
1268
NTI, “United States.”
1269
FAS, “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” December 18, 2012,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html.
1270
OSD Comptroller, “FY2016 Budget Overview,” 8-17.
1271
Amy F. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015, ii, 15-19.
1272
NTI, “United States.”
1273
OSD Comptroller, DOD Budget Request, Fiscal Year 2016, Department of Defense, February 2015, 5-4.
1274
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 109.
1275
Ibid., 123-6.
1276
Ibid., 187-8.
1277
Missile Defense Agency, “Joint Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Flight Test Successful,” Department of Defense,
October 29, 2010, http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0016.html.
1278
Thom Shanker and Ian Johnson, “U.S. Accord with Japan over Missile Defense Draws Criticism in China,” New
York Times, September 17, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/world/asia/u-s-and-japan-agree-on-missile-
defense-system.html?pagewanted=all.
1279
“US and Japan agree on new missile defense system,” BBC, September 17, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19620355.
1280
“U.S., Japan to Join Forces Against N. Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, February 25, 2013,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/25/2013022500870.html; Chester Dawson, “Japan Shows Off
Its Missile-Defense System,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323316804578165023312727616.html; Yuka Hayashi, “Abe Tells
Obama Japan Will Boost Its Defense,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324503204578320640390164434.html?mod=googlenews_ws.
1281
Japanese Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012, 126-7.
1282
Ibid., 126-7.
1283
Ibid., 158.
1284
NTI, “Russia”; IISS, Military Balance 2013, 204.
1285
Ibid.
1286
NTI, “Russia.”
1287
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 22.
1288
IISS, Military Balance 2013, 204-5.
1289
Ronald L. Burgess Jr., “Annual Threat Assessment,” February 16, 2012, 22.
1290
NTI, “Russia.”
 About the Authors

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He has traveled
frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, US commands, and US embassies on the
wars in those countries, and he was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group that assisted General
Stanley McChrystal in developing a new strategy for Afghanistan in 2009. He frequently acts as a
consultant to the State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked
with US officials on counterterrorism and security in a number of Middle East countries. He has worked
extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf.
Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He also served in other
government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition,
was director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Energy Department and was national
security assistant to Senator John McCain. His numerous foreign assignments have included posts in the
United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He is the author
of a wide range of studies on energy policy, national and international security, and the Middle East, and
his most recent publications include Afghanistan at Transition: The Lessons of the Longest War
(CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), Chinese Strategy and Military Power in 2014: Chinese, Japanese,
Korean, Taiwanese and US Perspectives (CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), The Indian Ocean Region:
A Strategic Net Assessment (CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), and The Gulf Military Balance
(CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).
Aaron Lin is a researcher with the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and a graduate student at the Elliott
School of International Affairs at George Washington University. His studies have taken him to China
and Singapore. Before coming to CSIS, he was an intern in the Special Projects Division of the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.

Scott Modell is a nonresident senior associate with the Burke Chair in Strategy and a senior adviser to
U.S. Special Operations Command on counter-threat finance issues related to Middle Eastern terrorist
groups and state sponsors of terrorism.
Michael Peacock is a researcher with the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and a graduate of the Bush
School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, where he studied the geopolitics of
the Middle East. Prior to joining CSIS, he interned for a member of the U.S. House of Representatives,
conducting research on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Steven Colley is a researcher with the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He holds a B.S. from the U.S.
Naval Academy and is currently enrolled in the M.P.P. program at the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University. He has served as a staff officer and company commander with the U.S. Marine Corps
and as a congressional fellow in the office of Representative Ron Barber (D-AZ).
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Aaron Lin

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with Scott Modell, Michael Peacock, and Steven Colley

Cover photo: U.S. Navy photo by LT Jared Apollo Burgamy/Released.

A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy