Valdai Discussion Club Report

The Return of History:

Cold War Lessons
for Current International Crises

Igor Istomin,
Nikita Neklyudov,
Andrei Sushentsov

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#valdaiclub July 2022
The views and opinions expressed in this report
are those of the authors and do not represent the views
of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated
otherwise.

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The Valdai Discussion Club and the authors of this report are grateful to participants
in several discussions dedicated to the Cold War record and its influence on how
modern crises are analysed. The authors thank the following contributors for
helping to explore this topic from every angle:

Yury Dubinin
Professor, Department of International Relations and Russia’s Foreign Policy,
School of International Relations, MGIMO University

Ilya Dyachkov
Lecturer, Department of Oriental Studies, School of International Relations,
MGIMO University

Anna Kireyeva
Lecturer, Department of Oriental Studies, School of International Relations,
MGIMO University

Mikhail Lipkin
Head, Department of Universal History, School of International Relations,
MGIMO University

Fyodor Lukyanov
Research Director, Valdai Club Foundation; Editor-in-Chief,
Russia in Global Affairs

Nikolai Pavlov
Professor, Department of History and Politics of the Countries of Europe
and America, School of International Relations, MGIMO University

Vladimir Pechatnov
Professor, Department of History and Politics of the Countries of Europe
and America, School of International Relations, MGIMO University

Dmitry Streltsov
Head, Department of Oriental Studies, School of International Relations,
MGIMO University

The authors of this report are grateful for organizational and technical assistance
in the preparation of the report:

Alexey Danilenko
Master Student, MGIMO University
Elizaveta Rudenko
Intern, Institute of International Studies, Master Student MGIMO University
About the Authors

Igor Istomin
Associate Professor, Department of Applied International
Political Analysis; Leading Research Fellow, Center
for Advanced American Studies, MGIMO University

Nikita Neklyudov
Analyst, Institute of International Studies, MGIMO University

Andrei Sushentsov
Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club;
Dean of the School of International Relations,
MGIMO University
Contents
4 Forging ahead to the past?
Features of Cold War crises

7 Conceptualising the crisis:

The debate between rationalists
and sceptics

12 Raising the stakes:

Styles of leadership
and crisis solutions

17 Third-country influence
on crises
4 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

Forging ahead to the past?

Features of Cold War crises
Today, as in past epochs, the search for an international
political balance is accompanied by intense confrontation between
major powers and military blocs. Not surprisingly, mutual hostility is
emerging as the dominant mode in relations between Russia and the
West. The checks and balances of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act
are now a thing of the past. Any hope of building an inclusive European
security architecture or developing tools to restrict military activity and
provide greater transparency have been dashed, as have cooperative
approaches to resolving differences. All of this has been replaced with
furious rhetoric, a broad range of methods to weaken the enemy, and a
military build-up in the direct vicinity of the Russian border. The West’s
policy in Ukraine testifies to the revival of proxy conflicts as a means
of inflicting a strategic defeat on adversaries at low cost, with someone
else doing most of the dirty work 1.

Addressing the St Petersburg International Economic Forum

in June 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about the
“revolutionary, tectonic changes in geopolitics, the global economy,
the technological sphere, and in the entire system of international
relations.” He once again underscored the bankruptcy of the plans
to preserve the unipolar world order, adding that the “building and
shaping a new world order is no easy task” 2.

At this new stage in its development, the international system

is rapidly relapsing into the same kind of bipolar confrontation it left
behind 30 years ago. The stereotypes of “bloc thinking” are being revived;
the gap between the sides is only growing larger and the language of
containment is already dominating contacts. At the same time, there is
less proficiency in wielding the tools of crisis balancing which reflects a
partial loss of acumen.

1
Trenin D.V. Hybridity as a Central Feature of Contemporary International Conflicts // Journal of International
Analytics 13. No. 2. June 27, 2022. P. 12–22.
2
St Petersburg International Economic Forum Plenary session // President of Russia. 17.06.2022. URL: http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68669
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 5

During the Cold War, the sides were keenly aware of the cost
of a head-on clash and the risks of unintentional escalation. In the
mid-20 th century, this caution was informed by the tragic experience
of World War II. Subsequent crises made Soviet and Western elites
conscious of the fact that no outcome of an armed conflict between
the superpowers could justify the eventual losses and that any victory
would be Pyrrhic.

After the collapse of the bipolar system, a “counter-revolution”

occurred that eroded the values of military-political restraint 3. States
are ready to demonstrate, for the sake of a dramatic public gesture,
strategic irresponsibility and frivolity 4. We have witnessed regular
provocations near Russia’s maritime and airspace borders, expulsions
of Russian diplomats, and increasingly tough rhetoric on the part of
NATO leaders, including its Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. It was
only when the stakes got too high in the early 2020s that the Western
countries regained some of their sense of danger and fear of possible
mistakes.

The purpose of this report is to update the lessons of the Cold

War for the current international situation. The history of international
relations in the latter half of the 20th century can be fairly described
as a treasure-trove of experience for current Russian and Western
foreign policy elites. It includes a number of experiments in managing
live conflicts amid severe international crises. This legacy is exactly
what politicians need as they look for mechanisms of preventing a
spontaneous escalation in situations where states are teetering on the
brink of a military clash.

The 1962 Cuba missile crisis, depicted as the apogee of the Cold
War, is what most often comes to mind, unfairly overshadowing other
Soviet-US crises. The Berlin crisis (late 1950s and early 1960s) and the
confrontation in the early 1980s, set against the background of the
3
Богатуров А. Д. Контрреволюция ценностей и международная безопасность // Международные процес-
сы. 2008. Т. 6. №. 2. С. 4–15 (Bogaturov A.D., The Counter-Revolution of Values and International Security//
International Processes, 2008, Vol. 6, No. 2. P. 4–15).
4
Международные угрозы: перехват инициативы // Евразийские стратегии (International Threats: Seizing
the Initiative). 9.01.2022. URL: http://eurasian-strategies.ru/media/insights/prognoz-mezhdunarodnye-
ugrozy-2022/.
6 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

Euromissile dispute, were no less intense5. Moreover, both crises were

unfolding in a significantly more important geographic space for both
sides which is re-emerging today as the flashpoint between Moscow
and the West.

Besides, the focus on the Soviet-American tug-of-war diverts

attention from crises that were not directly related to relations
between the superpowers. The Cold War period should not be entirely
identified with the rivalry between the USSR and the USA alone. A case
in point is the Suez crisis that put the final nail in the coffin of British
and French great-power ambitions 6. In that moment bipolarity became
the norm in the world, consolidating the privileged status of Moscow
and Washington.

Are today’s intellectual and political elites able to draw useful crisis
response models from the study of the Cold War’s flashpoints? After all, it is
clear that in the second half of the 20th century the international system
had different structural characteristics. The Cold War was characterized
by a global status quo. The post-Yalta and post-Potsdam world gave
birth to an unofficial doctrine of non-interference in the affairs of the
opposite bloc. Washington did not interfere in the Polish or Czechoslovak
crises, while the USSR, as a rule, did not prevent the United States from
retaining its control over Latin America7. Today, accusations of revisionism
are equally applicable to Moscow, Beijing and Western countries8. To some
extent, the existing rules do not suit the majority of main actors.

But the bipolar epoch has not passed without a trace. In East
Asia at any rate the Cold War in its pure form did not end with the
collapse of the USSR. The bloc confrontation is no more, but the US
hub-and-spokes system is still there, albeit with a focus on threats
5
Nuti L., Bozo F., Rey M.-P., and Rother B., eds. The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War. Washington,
D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015.
6
Pearson J. Sir Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis. London: PalgraveMacmillan UK, 2003.
7
Косолапов Н. А. Пороговый уровень и вероятность конфликта США с Россией // Международные про-
цессы 2008. Т. 6. №. 3. С. 15–25 (Kosolapov N.A., The Threshold Level and Likelihood of US-Russia Conflict //
International Processes, 2008, Vol. 6, No. 3. P. 15–25).
8
Sushentsov A.A., and Wohlforth W.C. The Tragedy of US-Russian Relations: NATO Centrality and the Revisionists’
Spiral // International Politics 57. No. 3. June 28, 2020. P. 427–50. Roy A. Russian Revisionism, Legal Discourse
and the “Rules-Based” International Order // Europe-Asia Studies 72. No. 6. July 2, 2020. P. 976–995.
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 7

posed by China. The current crisis in relations between Russia and the
Western countries has exposed the quasi-bloc nature of the European
order, which has remained intact despite the demolition of the Berlin
Wall. How can the past patterns be used under the new conditions? Will
the system of containing tensions used in the previous era be needed
today? Do foreign policy elites today find the Cold War experience
useful? This report seeks to begin a discussion of the lessons we can
draw from the history of bipolarity and what elements of the past are
to be feared and avoided.

Conceptualising the crisis:

The debate between rationalists
and sceptics
How important are international political crises from a historical
perspective? If we look at the key confrontations of the 1940s-1950s (the
dispute over Iran, tensions over West Berlin, or the Korean War), the Soviet
Union failed to achieve its goals in any of them9. Nevertheless, at the
end of the first decade of the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as a
formidable opponent to the United States. Its rise was due to growing
economic and military might, and this growth was in no way hindered by
an occasional foreign policy setback.

The Cold War did not end because any particular local clash ended
in any particular way, either. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the
Soviet Union was crippled by the Afghan war. Despite its contradictory and
painful nature, it diverted a relatively small portion of Soviet capacity. The
end of bipolar confrontation came because the Soviet Union lost the ability
to compete with the West, primarily, in the economic and technological
spheres after the vitality of the socialist society’s ideological foundations
had been shattered10.

9
Zubok V. M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. The New Cold War
History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
10
Zubok V. M. Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021.
8 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

The more important the crisis, the greater divergence of

interpretations of the outcomes of military-diplomatic interaction. In
particular, the Cuban missile crisis is often seen as a failure of Soviet
diplomacy, from the lack of preparations to the ill-conceived raising
of stakes that brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war, and the
painful climb-down in the end11. However, the crisis played a major role in
pushing the United States into starting a dialogue with the Soviet Union
later and prompting Washington to approach Moscow more seriously. The
ensuing détente was the outcome of this reassessment. In other words,
the Soviet Union managed to reap long-term benefits.

In terms of strategic analysis, these crisis episodes need to be

placed in a broader context. The question is, to what extent are isolated
events capable of influencing macrohistorical trends? On the other hand,
what would the dynamics of bipolar rivalry have looked like without
crises? For example, could détente have taken place sooner if the 1960
Paris summit had not failed because of the controversy over the downed
U-2 spy plane? Attempting to answer such questions leads one to the
shaky ground of counterfactuals.

If we are to understand these crises, we must consider the logic of

the participants in light of the nature of the ultimate outcomes. It is no
secret that seemingly well-conceived plans often defy expectations. The
problem is that nation states have a limited ability to calculate opponents’
reactions to their own steps, all the more so as interaction often takes
place in several rounds, and the parties learn different lessons from
previous contacts12. This discrepancy obscures the potential for conflict
management.

The lessons learned from analysing crisis situations also point to

the risk of reducing the participants to implacable foes13. This is partly
11
Horelick A.L. The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior // World Politics 16.
No. 3. April, 1964. P. 363–89; Garthoff R.L. Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story // Foreign Policy. No. 72. 1988.
P. 61–80.
12
Axelrod R. Tit-for-Tat Strategies. In Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy. Routledge.
London, 2001.
13
Herrmann R.K., Voss J.F., Schooler T.Y.E., and Ciarrochi J. Images in International Relations: An Experimental
Test of Cognitive Schemata // International Studies Quarterly 41. No. 3. 1997. P. 403–433.
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 9

due to deliberate posturing on their part. To uphold their interests, the

parties tend to exaggerate their resolve and stoop as low as to demonise
the opponent. In reality, international politics is rarely a struggle between
unconditional good and universal evil.

Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling noted that the zero-

sum game is not the correct framework for analysing international
conflicts14. Schelling was convinced that they should be considered
from the perspective of a “variable sum game”, in which one side’s gain
does not necessarily entail the other side’s loss. For example, during
the Cold War, there were disagreements between the superpowers, but
also interdependence and common goals, primarily, a shared interest
in preventing nuclear Armageddon. In some cases, the interests of
Moscow and Washington overlapped even more. The mutually beneficial
outcome of the Suez crisis for the Soviet Union and the United States
consisted in showing the “old” powers their place in the emerging
bipolar configuration. It marked the moment the former colonial
empires stepped down from the global stage. The consolidation of the
superpowers’ quasi-monopoly on nuclear weapons (Britain, France and
China obtained them, but the ambitions of other states were thoroughly
suppressed following the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty) was
a mutually beneficial result of the arms race.

Despite the presence of such cooperative elements, international

political crises are primarily competitions of political will. During the
Cold War, the sides had perhaps an imperfect, but nonetheless stable
idea about each other’s military capacity such as conventional and
nuclear forces. The degree to which either was prepared to use these
forces and means remained an open question in light of the cost of a
potential conflict. Therefore, crises performed an important function and
were designed to show the opponent each superpower’s commitment to
uphold its interests regardless of risks15.

14
Schelling T. C. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1960.
Gartzke E.A., Carcelli Sh., Gannon J.A., and Zhang J.J. Signaling in Foreign Policy. In Oxford Research
15

Encyclopedia of Politics, Eds. Gartzke E.A., Carcelli Sh., Gannon J.A., and Zhang J.J. Oxford University Press,
2017; Fearon J.D. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs // The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 41. No. 1. 1997. P. 68–90.
10 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

However, neither side actually sought an armed clash, and this fact
resulted in the emergence of the “last but one step” concept, tying the
amount of pressure exerted to the probability of victory16. It reflected
strategic incentives to escalate the situation to the limit, approaching
the point where it goes from a political to a military confrontation.
The privilege to take the final step across the threshold of escalation was
left to the opposite side, confronting the enemy with a choice between
painful retreat or all-out collision.

US President John F. Kennedy’s decision to impose a naval blockade

of Cuba is a case of escalating a confrontation to the brink of conflict.
Kennedy rejected options involving direct attacks on the island, which
would have made Washington the initiator of the armed phase of
the conflict. But in the case of a blockade, a potential attempt by the
Soviet Union to break through the cordon would make the Soviet Union
responsible for the military clash between the superpowers. Under these
circumstances, Moscow preferred to de-escalate and agreed to withdraw
the missiles stationed in Cuba17.

But even the most rationalistic approaches to managing conflicts

point to an element of unpredictability in brinkmanship. In order for the
opponent to take threats seriously, the risk of a collision must be greater
than zero. Moreover, a state should demonstrate “reasonable irrationality”.
It must show that it is prepared to take actions that would look
disadvantageous or even erroneous in a normal situation. For example, it
may be required to enter into a conflict over a strategically insignificant
and geographically remote area in order to prevent possible pressure in
a more important area.

In fact, the very concept of nuclear deterrence which took shape

during the Cold War relies precisely on “reasonable irrationality” in
which the parties pledge that, if needed, they will commit collective
suicide (a nuclear war between superpowers could not have ended
16
Schelling T. C. Arms and Influence. Yale University Press, 1967.
Allison G.T., Zelikow Ph. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York:
17

Longman, 1999.
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 11

in anything else). Ironically, maintaining stability requires potentially

destabilising steps to convince the enemy that you will indeed use
strategic forces if needed.

This kind of signalling, though, runs into a political and psychological

difficulty caused by discrepancies in how the same military and diplomatic
moves are assessed by different observers18. During international crises,
the sides are at the mercy of unreliable communication channels and
often interpret the other sides’ intentions based on the nature of the
actions being taken. This guesswork makes the room for speculation and
misinterpretation larger. The latter, in turn, make the situation extremely
difficult to calculate and, hence, even more dangerous.

For example, in 1979, the Soviet leadership regarded the diplomatic

manoeuvres of the Afghan leaders as an attempt to reorient their foreign
policy, and the hypothetical consolidation of the US presence in a
neighbouring country was perceived as direct threat to the national security
of the Soviet Union, giving rise to fears of the possible destabilisation of
Soviet Central Asia. These fears largely determined the decision to deploy
a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan19. In turn, Washington
erroneously interpreted Moscow’s actions as part of a larger push toward
the strategically important oil resources of the Gulf, and responded by
providing massive support to the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The behaviour of state leaders in crises is influenced not only by

strategic considerations and psychology, but also public opinion and
internal political strife, interagency squabbles, bureaucratic routine and
formal procedures20. As a result, the decision-making process becomes
more complicated and slower, and proposed solutions become less
rational. Taken together, these effects greatly complicate the attempts
to manage confrontation when balancing on the brink of conflict.

18
Jervis R. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press, 1976.
Zubok V. M. A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev. The New Cold War
19

History. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Allison G.T. Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis // American Political Science Review 63. No. 3.
20

November 1969. P. 689–718.

12 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

Raising the stakes:

Styles of leadership
and crisis solutions
The key task in analysing crises in the era of bipolar confrontation
is to understand the factors determining each side’s willingness
“to raise the stakes”. Did national leaders carefully weigh the consequences
of a crisis? How well did they assess possible risks? What was the
pain threshold after which they had to pull back? Often, answers to all
these questions come much later, with the publication of memoirs and
the opening of archives. Luckily, researchers already have significant
material on Cold War crises, as distinct from some other periods.

The US record is particularly well documented and studied. Its

close consideration suggests a number of meaningful conclusions
and useful lessons. Specifically, it shows what influence differences in
national leaders’ personal styles can have on the course of developments.
US leaders relied on widely differing decision-making processes, which
was reflected in the implementation of national strategies.

Harry Truman, for example, neglected foreign policy and often

delegated decision-making to his aides21. In so doing, he frequently
shied away from mediating their disputes, preferring to maintain a
noncommittal posture and remain above the fray. The consequence was
inconsistency in US foreign policy, which became strikingly obvious, for
example, shortly before the Korean War. Speaking on behalf of the United
States, a deputy of Secretary of State Dean Acheson suspended South
Korea from the defensive perimeter, something that did not prevent them
later from joining the conflict. Washington’s view of the importance of the
Korean Peninsula changed radically in a matter of several months.

Lyndon Johnson showed a similar indifference to foreign policy. In

the mid-1960s, this was instrumental in drawing the United States into yet
21
Leffler M.P. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.
Stanford Nuclear Age Series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1992; Offner A.A. “Another Such
Victory”: President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War // Diplomatic History 23. No. 2. April,
1999. P. 127–155.
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 13

another conflict in Asia. Johnson intervened in the Vietnam War largely out
of fear that the Republicans would accuse him of insufficient resolve in the
face of the Communist threat. But he deliberately contained the scale of
US involvement as he sought to avoid both a response from the USSR and
China and public criticism at home. Johnson feared that high foreign policy
costs would interfere with his effort to pass his Great Society legislative
program, the centrepiece of his domestic agenda. However, his gradualistic
approach ended up in strategic quagmire. Johnson’s indecision led to the
United States getting bogged down in Vietnam. The US military presence
expanded and there was a loss of strategic rationale22.

On the contrary, Dwight Eisenhower, a former military officer,

set about strengthening discipline at the US foreign policy apparatus,
introducing clear-cut procedures and interagency coordination processes,
and centralising decision-making. Eisenhower personally focused on
the international agenda, regularly attending National Security Council
meetings and presiding over the key debates23. His approach led to a lot
of red tape and less flexibility in decision-making, while his penchant for
taking personal control had an ambiguous effect on the U-2 crisis (the
shooting down of a US spy plane over the USSR). It cannot be ruled out
that had he pointed the finger at subordinates, the Paris meeting would
have taken place after all. At any rate, the Soviet side took Eisenhower’s
claim that it was he who had authorized the U-2 flights as a way to raise
the stakes24.

The style of another Republican leader, Richard Nixon, demonstrates

yet another model of leadership. Unlike his Democratic predecessors
Truman and Johnson, he took a profound interest in foreign policy
matters owing to his extensive personal experience. But unlike
Eisenhower, under whom he served as vice president, Nixon pursued
personalistic approach in the decision-making process. He prioritised
informal channels and took pains to side-line bureaucrats from the
22
Gaddis J.L. The Cold War: A New History. NewYork: PenguinPress, 2005.
23
Мирошников С.Н. Проект «Солярий» администрации Д. Эйзенхауэра // Вестник Томского государ-
ственного университета. 2009. № 328. С. 72–76 (Miroshnikov S.N., The Eisenhower Administration’s Project
Solarium // Newsletter of the Tomsk State University. 2009. No. 328. P. 72–76).
Gaddis J.L. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the
24

Cold War. Rev. and Expanded ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
14 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

foreign policy process. As a result, the Department of State was often in

the dark about his policy, which was handled by National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger25. But Nixon did not entirely trust even Kissinger. The air
of secrecy and mutual suspicion poisoned the atmosphere inside the
administration and caused a lack of coordination among Nixon’s inner
circle. True, foreign policy was left largely unscathed by this dysfunction,
which came into sharpest relief with the Watergate scandal that led to
Nixon’s resignation.

While considering different leadership styles, we should keep

in mind the fact that the same presidents sometimes achieved
widely differing outcomes under similar circumstances. This reveals
the influence of political experience on an administration’s success
and suggests that caution is warranted while assessing the role of
individuals. The John F. Kennedy team’s record is instructive. Kennedy’s
Bay of Pigs fiasco, in which he failed to topple the Cuban leader Fidel
Castro, did not prevent him and the same group of advisers from
displaying political resolve and strategic foresight during the Cuban
missile crisis a year later 26.

Compared to the extensive history of efforts to conceptualise

the US record, it is much more difficult to trace the decision-making
mechanisms in the USSR and Russia. Often they have to be reconstructed
bit by bit. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Soviet leaders possessed
different styles of leadership and approached their own crises in
distinct ways.

Joseph Stalin is credited with political foresight and a talent for

modelling the international situation far into the future27. He acted
cautiously in the context of the USSR’s post-war reconstruction and
was not afraid of taking a step or two back when strongly rebuffed by
the United States. Stalin believed that sooner or later another big war
25
Kissinger H. White House Years. New York: Simon & Schuster trade paperbacks, 2011.
Allison G.T., and Zelikow. Ph. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York:
26

Longman, 1999.
Печатнов В.О. Сталин, Рузвельт, Трумэн: СССР и США в 1940-х годах: Документальные очерки. Москва:
27

ТЕРРА, 2006 (Pechatnov V.O., Stalin, Roosevelt, Truman: USSR and USA in the 1940s: Documentary Essays.
Moscow, TERRA, 2006).
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 15

would come, but he was not in a hurry to escalate, being aware that the
correlation of forces, both politically and militarily, was not in the USSR’s
favour. Despite a number of sceptical comments on the subject of the
atomic bomb, he was realistic about the US achievements in this area.
Exemplifying Stalin’s cautious approach is the Soviet pull-out from Iran
under British-US pressure, his renunciation of support for Communist
actions in Greece, and his de facto recognition that the blockade of West
Berlin was a failure.

But Stalin also committed grave foreign policy mistakes.

Specifically, the socialist bloc paid a high price for its support of Kim
Il Sung’s risky gambit to take over South Korea. The Soviet leader also
sanctioned an ill-prepared campaign of pressure on Turkey in the
matter of the Black Sea straits, which eventually forced Ankara to join
the Western bloc. The attempt to discipline the Yugoslavian leadership
led to a breach with an important ally in the Balkans. Stalin’s distrust
of the Chinese Communists in the fight against Kuomintang is, on the
contrary, an example where he misjudged opportunities. This is one of
those rare cases where the Soviet leader himself acknowledged that
he made a mistake.

Unlike his former boss, Nikita Khrushchev was more prone to

succumb to emotion in policy-making, and his international extemporising
often provoked major crises. A case in point is his capricious decision
to deploy missiles in Cuba, which sparked off the Cuban missile crisis.
While on holiday at a Black Sea resort, he was shown the coast of the
Republic of Turkey looming in the distance with a comment that a nuclear
strike could be launched at the USSR from there. After that Khrushchev
conceived Operation Anadyr28.

Despite Khrushchev’s impetuousness, he had a sincere desire

to defuse international tensions. But there were various international
problems that prevented him from doing this. He explained the logic
of his behaviour by the need “to maintain a certain level of tension”
in relations. Archive documents show that voluntarism in the USSR’s

28
Kramer M. Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Note // The
International History Review 15. No. 4. December, 1993. P. 740–751.
16 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

strategic planning resulted in the lack of detail regarding potential

responses to the West’s counter-threats29. Few people asked themselves
this question: “What if the West turns down our demands and makes
counter-moves?”

Khrushchev’s “voluntarism”, however reckless, was balanced by

his keen political insight. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain how
he managed to side-line more powerful rivals in coming to power. His
insightfulness extended to foreign policy. Even if Khrushchev’s decisions
often set off crises, he had a keen sense of the limits of pressure and
never fell under the spell of his own fierce rhetoric. Occasionally he
showed flexibility in contacts not only with the United States but
also recalcitrant members of the socialist camp, such as his attempt
to repair relations with Yugoslavia. He also made concessions during
the Polish crisis, removing Soviet functionaries from the government
in Warsaw. Nevertheless, it was in relations with allies that Khrushchev
made what was perhaps his principal foreign policy blunder, bringing
the confrontation with China to the breaking point30.

Khrushchev was succeeded by Leonid Brezhnev, whose style was

the opposite of his predecessor’s. Under Brezhnev, the USSR steered a
more cautious course, seeking to avoid major flare-ups. The foreign policy
process was more institutionalised, with diplomats, representatives of
CPSU Central Committee departments, military officers and even expert
institutions invited to take part in decision making and implementation.
It is well documented that international issues, primarily those related
to détente, were discussed in detail at Politburo meetings 31. Information
sharing was set up between related agencies. The new foreign policy
planning process is clearly traceable in the archive documents. In

Quenoy P. Du. The Role of Foreign Affairs in the Fall of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964. The International
29

History Review 25. No. 2. June, 2003. P. 334–356.

Torkunov A.V., Wohlforth W.C., Martynov B.F., eds. History of International Relations and Russian Foreign
30

Policy in the 20th Century. Volume 1. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020.
31
Липкин М.А. Советский Союз и интеграционные процессы в Европе: середина 1940-х – конец 1960-х
годов. М.: Русский фонд содействия образованию и науке, 2016 (Lipkin M.A., The Soviet Union and the
Integration Processes in Europe: the mid-1940s – late 1960s. Moscow, Russian Fund in Support of Education
and Science, 2016).
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 17

1969, following an escalation of the USSR-PRC border conflict, a

comprehensive document revising the USSR’s foreign policy with all
countries was approved.

But even this system was no guarantee against mistakes and

miscalculations. On December 8, 1979, for example, the “smaller
Politburo” composed of KGB Chairman Yury Andropov, Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko, chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov and Defence Minister
Dmitry Ustinov held a meeting in Moscow to discuss whether or not
to send troops to Afghanistan. After much hesitation, the participants
decided to send a limited Soviet contingent to the neighbouring
country, a decision which later proved one of the USSR’s greatest
foreign policy failures 32.

Third-country influence
on crises
A m atter that still needs more consideration is the role of
third countries in aggravating Cold War crises. Countries allied to
the superpowers as well as non-aligned states were not voiceless
understudies. Not infrequently, they instigated crises or influenced
their patrons in some other fashion. While the reality of bipolarity
predominated, that did not rule out cases of the tail wagging
the dog.

“The crisis will inevitably break out within 24 or 72 hours. And if…
the imperialists conquer Cuba after all, the danger of this aggressive
policy is so great that following this event the Soviet Union must not
allow the emergence of circumstances, under which the imperialists’
first nuclear attack will become possible”, Fidel Castro wrote to Nikita

32
Сажин В. 39 лет вводу советских войск в Афганистан. Как это было. Международная жизнь. (Sazhin
V. 39 years of Soviet troops entering Afghanistan. How it was. International life) 25.12. 2018. URL: https://
interaffairs.ru/news/show/21332?ysclid=l5lboczw2d712871150.
18 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

Khrushchev in 196233. In fact, he was egging the Soviet leader on to order a

pre-emptive strike on the US. The quote shows one of the most important
tricks third countries used to steer developments in crises between major
powers. As is clear, this influence could be highly destabilising.

Meanwhile, superpowers often exerted a calming influence

on their clients, among others. A case in point is the 1968 crisis in
which the North Korean military seized a US reconnaissance ship, the
USS Pueblo. Despite its broader confrontation with the United States,
the Soviet Union mediated between Washington and Pyongyang, trying
to convince them to avoid escalation.

The role of small states in the structure of great-power interaction

changed radically during the latter half of the 20th century. At an early
stage in the Cold War, the key players were still the leaders of the
two blocs. For example, the USA and the USSR were the powers that
determined the fate of Germany during the series of Berlin crises, with
local political elites playing a limited role.

But as the Cold War progressed, the role of third countries

expanded. Under Brezhnev, for example, the Soviet Union actually began
looping in Warsaw Treaty Organisation allies on some of its foreign policy
decisions. Positions held by the allies exerted considerable influence on
Moscow34. Leaders of the “people’s democracies” were vying for the right
to discuss the USSR’s most important foreign policy actions. Shortly
before the beginning of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, Brezhnev had
to take into account the position of the leaders of the GDR, Poland and
Hungary, who, amid the din of contradictory voices and views in Moscow,
were favouring a tough line.

Soviet foreign policy planning became increasingly focused on

how to preserve the USSR’s high status in the eyes of its allies. For

Quoted after Макарычев М. Фидель Кастро. Жизнь замечательных людей. М.: Молодая гвардия,
33

2017 (Makarychev M., Fidel Castro. Biography Series. Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya Publishers, 2017).
34
Липкин М.А. Советский Союз и интеграционные процессы в Европе: середина 1940-х – конец 1960-х го-
дов. М.: Русский фонд содействия образованию и науке, 2016 (Lipkin M.A., The Soviet Union and Integration
Processes in Europe: mid-1940s – the late 1960s, Moscow, Russian Foundation for Science and Education, 2016).
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 19

example, Moscow thought better of joining the Asian Development

Bank for fear of damaging its image in the eyes of Beijing and opening
itself up to criticism that the USSR was straying from its anti-imperialist
course 35. Occasionally the USSR itself was a drag on small countries’
development. The triumph of détente and the emergence of the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) triggered
the start of integration talks between CMEA and the Commission of
the European Communities. But the failure to establish economic ties
between these two key organizations was due to the impossibility of
a direct relationship between the Communities and the CMEA member
states, that is, a relationship free from Soviet control. Moscow would
not accept that.

The no less important role of junior allies was on display in their

attempts to reform Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
Poland, for example, suggested that the main guidelines and principles
underlying the organisation be specified. In particular, the allies wanted
to delimit the jurisdiction of CMEA as a whole and the exclusive purview
of national agencies in each country (e. g. the right to determine import
and export volumes corresponding to their domestic needs). At first sight,
this looked like national egoism and a wish to undermine CMEA. But
a detailed study of archives indicates that it was rather a proposal to
optimise its performance by delimiting functions in a way that would free
CMEA from getting bogged down in secondary matters.

The significance of third countries is clearly traceable in the

dynamics of the alliances. It is commonly believed that a great power’s
allies are always satellites deprived of sovereignty. But the Korean
War and the Cuban Missile Crisis show the hegemon being led by the
nose toward conflict. Besides, relations between North and South
Korea show that the Cold War influenced not only interaction between
the great powers but also rivalry among the other members of the
competing camps. The Koreans, both in the north and south, held
subordinate positions in the Soviet and Western blocs, but occasionally
acted independently.

35
Ibid.
20 Valdai Discussion Club Report July 2022

***
Despite the vast difference existing between the international
system now and during the era of bipolarity, the lessons of 20th century
crises are still applicable for today’s politicians. Both Russia’s National
Security Strategy 202136 and the US Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance 2021 speak about a return of “power rivalries” and “interstate
confrontation” against the background of growing internationalisation
of regional conflicts and the great powers paying increased attention
thereto37.

Upon consideration, the Ukraine conflict in its current phase is

much more reminiscent of the Cold War crises than the interventions
that occurred during the decades after the collapse of bipolarity. On
the one hand, we see combat operations conducted by the forces of
the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics as well as Russia, on the
other – operations by the armed forces of Ukraine that are getting
support (military, technical, reconnaissance, information, political and
economic) from NATO and the EU. This is why the Cold War record looms
larger than ever before, as we enter a system of relations based on
mutual hostility.

First, history shows that it is necessary to competently calculate the

risks and rule out emotional decisions or comments which could provoke
the opponent into taking equally ill-considered steps.

Second, the raising of stakes should be accompanied with open

lines of communication with the opponent, sending signals about
further intentions, and being aware of overlapping interests, in spite
of the rivalry.

36
Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 02.07.2021 г. № 400 «О Стратегии национальной безопас-
ности Российской Федерации» // Президент России. 02.07.2021 (Executive Order by the President of the
Russian Federation of July 2, 2021, No. 400 On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation //
President of Russia. 02.07.2021). URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046.
Renewing America’s Advantages. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance. The White House. URL: https://
37

www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf .
 The Return of History: Cold War Lessons for Current International Crises 21

Third, the tactics of artificially creating uncertainty remain are

still in play. But foreign policy unpredictability should be based on an
awareness of the acceptable limits of escalation.

Fourth, it is necessary to take into consideration the contradictory

influence of third countries on great power struggles, including their
destabilising impact on relations between bigger players.

Thus, given the return to strategic confrontation, the events of

the 20th century serve as a valuable guide of sorts and a source of crisis
management tools. This guide contains a lot of illustrative examples
showing what practices and mechanisms proved their worth and which
did not.

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it was. International life) 25.12. 2018. URL: https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/
21332?ysclid=l5lboczw2d712871150.
 valdaitweets
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