Beyond Schools

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 Islamic History and
Civilization
Studies and Texts

Editorial Board

Hinrich Biesterfeldt
Sebastian Günther

Honorary Editor

Wadad Kadi

volume 154

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 Beyond Schools
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr’s (d. 840/1436)
Epistemology of Ambiguity

By

Damaris Wilmers

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov
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Contents

Acknowledgements ix

Introduction 1

1 The Lives and Intellectual Environment of Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn

al-Murtaḍā 15
1 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Wazīr’s (d. 840/1436) Biography 15
1.1 Sources on Ibn al-Wazīr’s Life 15
1.2 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Family and Upbringing 17
1.3 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Education and Intellectual Development 20
1.3.1 Theology, Legal Theory and Other Classics of Zaydi
Learning 21
1.3.2 Sunni Hadith Studies 30
1.3.3 Studies in Mecca 33
1.3.4 Productive Conflict 35
1.3.5 Scholarship in Solitude 38
1.3.6 Teaching and Students 41
2 Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1436) as a Scholar 44
2.1 Teachers, Education and Students 46
2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Works 49
2.3 Intellectual Controversy between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn
al-Murtaḍā 55
3 Conclusion 58

2 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Works 60

1 Al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla 61
2 Al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim 63
3 Al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 72
4 Āyāt al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya 74
5 Al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ fī ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ 76
6 Al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr 80
7 Al-Istiẓhār bi-l-dalīl al-samʿī fī ʿadam wuqūʿ al-ṭalāq al-bidʿī 84
8 Īthār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-khalq 87
9 Kitāb al-Qawāʿid 98
10 Kitāb fī l-tafsīr 103
11 Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq wa-l-raqāʾiq fī mamādiḥ rabb al-khalāʾiq 104
12 Manẓūma shiʿriyya fī uṣūl al-fiqh 109

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13 Masāʾil arbaʿa tataʿallaq bi-l-muqallad wa-l-mustaftī 112

14 Masʾalat ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya fī ḥamd Allāh ʿalā
l-īmān 116
15 Masāʾil mustakhrajāt 120
16 Masāʾil shāfiyāt 120
17 Masāʾil sharīfa 122
18 Mukhtaṣar mufīd fī ʿulūm al-ḥadīth 123
19 Muthīr al-aḥzān fī wadāʿ shahr Ramaḍān 124
20 Nuṣrat al-aʿyān 125
21 Qubūl al-bushrā bi-l-taysīr lil-yusrā 126
22 Al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 129
23 Al-Taʾdīb al-malakūtī 135
24 Taḥrīr al-kalām fī masʾalat al-ruʾya 136
25 Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa 138
26 Tanqīḥ al-anẓār fī maʿrifat ʿulūm al-āthār 140
27 Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān ʿalā asālīb al-Yūnān 142
28 Additional Works Ascribed to Ibn al-Wazīr 148

3 Central Concepts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Epistemological Thought 151

1 Definitions of Knowledge 151
1.1 Necessary (ḍarūrī) and Acquired (muktasab) Knowledge 152
1.2 A Shift in Distinction: from Necessary and Acquired to Necessary
and Conjectural Knowledge (ʿilm ẓannī) 155
2 Definitions of the Means to Possess Knowledge 161
2.1 A Shift in the Definition: from Naẓar as Philosophical Speculation
to Naẓar as Pious Contemplation 161
2.2 Shifting the Emphasis: Original Human Disposition (fiṭra) and
Intellect (ʿaql) 167
3 The Proof of God’s Existence (ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ) 174
3.1 Proving God’s Existence by Inference (istidlāl) 175
3.2 Proving God’s Existence from Necessity (ḍarūra) 178
4 The Argument from the Absence of Evidence (dalālat nafy
al-dalāla) 185
4.1 Absence of Evidence as an Argument for Certainty 188
4.2 Absence of Evidence as an Argument for Ambiguity 189
5 Conclusion 195

4 Central Concepts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Theological Thought 198

1 God’s Wisdom (ḥikma) as the Key to Harmonization 200
1.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Wisdom 202

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contents vii

1.1.1 Mitigated Rational Discernment and God’s

Wisdom 206
1.1.2 God Is Perfect Through His Wisdom 213
1.1.3 The Hiddenness of Wise Purposes 216
1.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Wisdom 220
1.3 Conclusion 223
2 Harmonized Doctrine: God’s Names (asmāʾ) and Attributes
(ṣifāt) 224
2.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Names and
Attributes 224
2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Names and Attributes 227
2.3 Conclusion 229
3 Harmonized Doctrine: God’s Will (irāda) 229
3.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Will 229
3.1.1 Will and Love 231
3.1.2 Will and Motive 234
3.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Will 237
3.3 Conclusion 240
4 Harmonized Doctrine: Human Actions (afʿāl al-ʿibād) and Free Will
(ikhtiyār) 241
4.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding Human Actions and Free
Will 242
4.1.1 Action and Capacity 243
4.1.2 Action and Motive 247
4.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Human Actions 253
4.3 Conclusion 256
5 Conclusion 257

5 The Structure of Legal Authority in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Thought 260

1 The Theory of Infallibilism and the Probability of Ijtihād 260
1.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Infallibilism and al-Ashbah 263
1.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Infallibilism and al-Ashbah 267
2 The Possibility of Ijtihād and the Existence of Mujtahids 271
2.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Position on the Existence of Ijtihād 273
2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of the Existence of Ijtihād 276
3 Taqlīd and Concepts of Following 279
3.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Taqlīd and Following 279
3.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Taqlīd and Following 287
4 The Requirements (shurūṭ) for Ijtihād 290
4.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concepts of the Requirements
for Ijtihād 291

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5 Divisibility (tajazzuʾ) of Ijtihād and the Discerning Student (al-ṭālib

al-mumayyiz) 312
5.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Position on the Divisibility of Ijtihād 314
5.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Position on the Divisibility of Ijtihād 317
6 Extrapolation of Principles (takhrīj) 322
6.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Takhrīj 324
6.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Takhrīj 329
7 The Muqallid’s Commitment to a Legal School (iltizām) 335
7.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Iltizām 336
7.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Iltizām 339
8 Conclusion 345

6 Conclusion 350

Bibliography 367
Index of Pre-modern Authors 384
Index of Geographical Names 387
Index of Pre-modern Books 388
Index of Quran Citations 391
Index of Arabic Terms 392

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Acknowledgements

I would need many pages to name every single one of those to whom I am grate-
ful for their contribution to this book in idea, content and form. The few that I
do mention stand for the many. To begin with, I would like to express my sin-
cere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Jens Scheiner, without whom my project would not
have come to a conclusion. His commitment to see the person of the researcher
thrive along with her work is extraordinary and bears witness to his dedica-
tion to the ideal of a good teacher and mentor. I am deeply grateful for the
many hours that he devoted to my work with precision and love for detail and
structure as well as for the constructive discussions and feedback. My deepest
thanks also to Prof. Dr. Sebastian Günther for taking me on at such a late stage
of my dissertation, for giving me the opportunity to take part in the work of
the Courant-Forschungszentrum “Bildung und Religion” during a crucial period
of my project, and for actively supporting the publication of my book.
Without Prof. Dr. Sabine Schmidtke, my mentor during the first and major
part of my project, my dissertation would not have had a beginning. The broad-
ness and depth of her work as well as her eagerness to share her vast resources
provided me with a roadmap for the country of Zaydī intellectual history
through which I had previously wandered in dazzled fascination. Just as I never
left the office of Dr. Hassan Farhang Ansari without a clearer understanding
of the path I was following, whether or not it was worth pursuing or where
else to turn. Further, I want to thank my colleagues from the Research Unit
Intellectual History of the Islamicate World of the Freie Universität Berlin for
their inspiration, especially Dr. Eva-Maria Lika for her eager encouragement
and exchange about many aspects of the life and work of a doctoral student,
for hosting me whenever I was in Berlin, and for reading and commenting on
my favorite chapter in the whole thesis. In the same vein, I want to thank the
participants of the Area-3: Offenbarung, Ratio und Identität meetings of the
Courant-Forschungszentrum “Bildung und Religion” at the Georg-August Uni-
versität Göttingen for contributing to the final version of my thesis with their
excellent questions, remarks and interest in spite of my absence when the fruit
of their own labor was discussed. Many thanks to the Evangelische Studienwerk
e.V. Villigst for their financial and moral support, for eagerly providing me with
the opportunity to go on numerous productive research trips.
I am very grateful to Dr. Leigh Chipman for commenting on a major part
of my thesis, for directly and indirectly improving my language and for her
encouraging remarks. Many thanks also to Prof. Dr. Thomas Eich for critically
reading a chapter and for other helpful advice. Words are not enough to thank

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x acknowledgements

my dear friend and brother Tayyib ʿAydān of the Markaz al-Turāth wa-l-buḥūth
al-yamanī, who opened the gates for me not only to the library of the Markaz
but also to the living world of letters of Zaydī Yemen and introduced me to
all those who like Muḥammad ʿIzzān and ʿAbd al-Karīn Jadbān—knowingly or
unknowingly—led me to think that the study of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought is rele-
vant beyond an interest in intellectual history. If nothing had come of my thesis,
all the effort would have been worth it for the friendship that I gained. I want
to thank the al-Wazīr family of the Markaz al-turāth wa-l-buḥūth al-Yamanī,
especially Zayd al-Wazīr and his son Nabīl for their encouragement and for
providing me with hitherto unpublished editions of important manuscripts. I
also want to thank the employees at the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt in Ṣanaʿaʾ as well
as the Ministry of Culture for providing me with digitizations of numerous
manuscripts in a time when reconstruction in the buildings, catalogization of
the collections and political unrest in the country made the access to these
manuscripts very inconvenient. My thanks also to all those who made the many
hours of waiting for permissions and the actual digitizations much more inter-
esting. Like all who study Yemen’s intellectual history, I am also indebted to
the Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī al-thaqāfiyya for their diligent efforts to
make the riches of Yemen’s cultural heritage accessible by their continuous
manuscript digitization campaign.
From the early days of my studies, I want to thank my Arabic teacher ʿAbd
al-Ghafūr Ṣabūnī for awakening in me the passion for his beautiful language,
Müfit for working his way through ancient texts with a number of ignorant
novices just out of shared passion, Dan-Paul Josza and all who participated in
his seminar for introducing me to Muʿtazilī thought and Samet Serani for our
endless discussions. I am deeply grateful to my parents, Helma and Adolf Pot-
tek, who always encouraged and supported me in my studies, and to my entire
family and friends who amazed me with their incessant interest and encour-
agement through words, thoughts and prayers in spite of my frequent physical
or mental absence. This applies most of all to my marvelous husband, friend
and brother of my soul Burkhard, whose confidence in me and the meaning-
fulness of my work was so tangible that I could hold on to it whenever I lost sight
of its purpose. Beyond that his eagerness to discuss my findings, read chapters
and be my constant IT consultant was an equally tangible help.

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Introduction

One of the most vehement challenges to the identity of the Yemeni Zaydiyya
has been posed by what Cook has termed “Sunnisation of Zaydism.”1 Although
Cook formed this term with regard to the duty to command right and forbid
wrong in Zaydi theology and law, it was subsequently used to refer to Zaydi
accommodation to Sunni thought in general. This process of “Sunnisation” is
associated with a trend toward traditionism within Zaydi Yemen and gained
momentum in the politics of the 12th/18th century Zaydi imamate, culminat-
ing in the reform project of the traditionist scholar (muḥaddith) Muḥammad
b. ʿAlī l-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834).2 One figure who is commonly associated with
the early Sunnisation of Zaydism as well as Yemeni traditionism is Muḥam-
mad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Wazīr (d. 840/1436).3 The present study investigates Ibn
al-Wazīr’s thought vis-à-vis the ideas of his Zaydi contemporaries, in order to
determine the causes of the rupture with the prevalent Zaydi tradition and
enhance understanding of the Sunnisation process at its alleged outset.
The essential trait of the Sunnisation process is the increasing significance of
the Sunni canonical hadith compilations, as opposed to Zaydi texts, as author-
itative sources in matters of theology and law. This is why Sunnisation is inex-
tricably linked with traditionism, which is opposed to the idea of legal schools.
Haykel, a leading scholar on traditionism within the Yemeni Zaydiyya from the
12th/18th century onwards, identifies epistemological questions at the heart of
the traditionist reform. According to him, the trend toward traditionism was
motivated by the greater certainty of God’s will which traditionist scholars
could attain from the Sunni hadith compilations in contrast to the works and
views of Zaydi imams and scholars of theology and law.4 Although Ibn al-Wazīr
doubtlessly championed the authoritativeness of the Sunni hadith compila-

1 Cook, Commanding Right 247.

2 Other Yemenī scholars associated with this development are al-Ḥasan al-Jalāl (d. 1084/1683),
Ṣāliḥ b. al-Mahdī al-Maqbalī (d. 1108/1696), Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl b. al-Amīr (d. 1182/1769) and
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834); cf. Haykel, Revival and Reform; Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ
ahl al-ḥadīth, Haider, Shiʿī Islām 103, 113, and footnote 3 below.
3 Haykel, Revival and Reform 10–11; Haykel, Dissolving the Madhāhib 338; Haykel and Zysow,
What Makes a Madhhab? 343; Madelung, Introduction. Part VI: Theology 457; King, Zaydī
Revival 408; Schwarb, Muʿtazilism 381, footnote 51; Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 157, foot-
note 7, 158, footnote 8; vom Bruck, Regimes of Piety 193. The process of “Sunnisation of
Zaydism” has continued to this day and has received renewed attention in studies about the
developments in post-revolutionary Yemen, i.e. after 1962.
4 Haykel, Revival and Reform 10.

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2 introduction

tions and the certainty of their soundness, I argue that his epistemological pro-
gram went far beyond the role he played in the Sunnisation of Zaydism. It was
hallmarked by a high ambiguity tolerance in multiple fields of Islamic theology
and law, restricting the core Islamic beliefs on which certainty was required
to the least common denominator between conflicting schools. Thereby the
commonality of knowledge became the distinctive factor in matters of certain
and core doctrine, whereas the individual religious experience and practice
prevailed in matters of secondary doctrine and law, effectively championing
ambiguity as a God-given characteristic in a kind of Islamic universalism. In
other words, while Ibn al-Wazīr’s version of traditionism brought him greater
certainty in some questions, it also deemphasized the requirement of certainty
in others. He doubted the modes of knowing the answers to these questions
and was therefore content with ambiguity. A central feature of his thought may
thus be called an “epistemology of ambiguity,” comprising both theology and
legal theory.5
The increasing attention given to the Yemeni Zaydiyya in recent decades has
centered on its gradual adoption of Muʿtazili doctrine between the 3rd/9th and
4th/10th centuries, as well as its reception of the Bahshami-Muʿtazili school
during the 6th/12th and 7th/13th centuries.6 Although Zaydi law has received
some minor attention in a field dominated by the study of theological sys-
tems, its analysis has been similarly restricted to its early history. Hence, as
Schwarb writes, “subsequent periods remain largely unexplored”7 in both the-
ology and legal theory.8 The few studies that treat the intersection of Zaydi law
and theology refer to a time from the 12th/18th century onwards.9 Research on

5 Although the Arabic term for ambiguity (tashābuh) is significant in both Ibn al-Wazīr’s theo-
logical and legal thought, my use of the term comprises tashābuh as well as other terms that
broadly imply what the term ‘ambiguity’ signifies in the English language, namely something
that can be understood in two or more different ways.
6 The essential studies on the history of the Zaydiyya are Madelung, Der Imam al-Qāsim; Stroth-
mann, Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen; van Arendonk, Les Debuts de L’Imamat Zaidite au Yemen.
Members of the research unit “Intellectual History of the Islamicate World” have contributed
decisively to the current state of research on the Yemeni Zaydiyya. For an overview see, for
example, Ansari and Schmidtke, The Literary-Religious Tradition; Schmidtke, History of Zaydī
Studies, which provides a list of the important contributions to Zaydi studies from Yemeni
scholars (193–194); Thiele, Theologie in der jemenitischen Zaydiyya 6–7.
7 Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 157.
8 Among the few studies that treat Zaydi legal theory are Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and
Zaydī Reception and a to date unpublished article by Schwarb, Zaydī-Muʿtazilī Traditions of
Uṣūl al-Fiqh. 4th/10th–10th/16th Centuries, to which I unfortunately did not get access.
9 Cf. Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab?; Ghanem, The Development of the Hādawī
Doctrine.

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introduction 3

the “Sunnisation” process has concentrated on the thought and program of al-
Shawkānī along with their ramifications in Yemeni society to this day. However,
in most publications, politico-theological questions such as the imamate have
received a share of attention disproportionate to other theological matters.10
Therefore, the present study focuses mainly on theology and legal theory at a
point in history which, according to Schwarb, is remarkable for its “multiple
rival intellectual traditions and contemporaneous scholarly trends.”11
As Zysow in his groundbreaking thesis has convincingly argued, Muslims
look on Islamic law from a primarily epistemological perspective. “Certainty
and probability were the fundamental categories with which they approached
every question of law.”12 Similarly, it has been argued that differences between
theological systems are insuperable as long as their epistemological precepts
remain incongruous.13 Starting from these premises, I argue that the nexus of
theology and legal authority can be described by epistemology and that it is
ultimately Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology which sets him at odds with some of
his Zaydi contemporaries.
In this context, a word on the use of terms is due. Islamic epistemology has
been studied with regard to the use of the terms ʿilm, maʿrifa and yaqīn, all
three denoting knowledge. Whereas ʿilm came to be the focus of discussions
among speculative and traditionalist theologians and jurists, yaqīn received
special attention in the context of Sufism, more strictly referring to certainty.14
Maʿrifa apparently connoted particular aspects of either term.15 But although,
as we shall see, Ibn al-Wazīr has a clear tendency to Sufism, and although his

10 Recent research on the identity of the Yemeni Zaydiyya and its “Sunnisation” approaches
the question mostly from the socio-political angle; cf. Dorlian, Les reformulations iden-
titaires; King, Zaydī Revival; vom Bruck, Regimes of Piety; Bonnefoy, Les identités reli-
gieuses. Schwarb’s investigation of 20th century Zaydi Quran commentary is an exception;
cf. Schwarb, Muʿtazilism esp. 380. The neglect of theology in the research on the process
of Sunnisation is largely due to the fact that traditionists like al-Shawkānī tended to reject
the discussion of theological matters. One result was the elimination of theological studies
from teaching curricula; see for example Haykel, Revival and Reform 11; Subḥī, al-Zaydiyya
444–447; Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 184.
11 Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 157.
12 Zysow, Economy of Certainty 1.
13 Ghaneabassiri, Epistemological Foundation 95.
14 For the Sufi use of the term yaqīn in contradistinction to the use of ʿilm among “legal-
traditionalist theologians,” see for example Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 168; for
the prominence of ʿilm in the thought of speculative theologians like ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-
Hamadhānī, see Peters, God’s Created Speech 47–56.
15 For ʿilm and maʿrifa see Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 113; for yaqīn and maʿrifa among
a Sufis, see ibid., 156; for ʿilm and maʿrifa in the Muʿtazili thought of ʿAbd al-Jabbār, see for
example Peters, God’s Created Speech 56.

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4 introduction

biography and quest for certainty features similarities to those of scholars like
al-Ghazālī who are famous for their occupation with the different degrees of
yaqīn,16 his discussion and classification of knowledge focused primarily on
the term ʿilm. This focus may be seen as an indicator as to the group of schol-
ars among which Ibn al-Wazīr must be classed, or at least the group to which
the bulk of his work was addressed. Although he uses the term yaqīn to denote
certainty, he does not explicitly distinguish it from what he considers ʿilm, and
maʿrifa for that matter, in the strict sense.

Broader Intellectual Milieu

The influence of speculative theology in the form of Muʿtazili teachings on the

Yemeni Zaydiyya is already manifest in the theology of its founder and first
imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911). Likewise, the Zaydi
community at the Caspian Sea adopted Muʿtazili theology to a large extent.
However, the reception followed different Muʿtazili schools: while the Bas-
ran school (later called Bahshamiyya after Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933))
dominated at the Caspian Sea, the Yemeni Zaydiyya predominantly followed
the teachings of the Baghdad school. This changed in a period of intellectual
exchange when the two imamates acknowledged each other’s legitimacy in
the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries and a massive transfer of manuscripts was
initiated.17 In the 6th/12th century, the Yemeni imam al-Mutawakkil ʿalā llāh
Aḥmad b. Sulaymān (d. 566/1170) promoted unity with the Caspian Zaydiyya
and the establishment of Basran Muʿtazili theology in the Yemeni Zaydiyya.18
This unity was as relevant on the level of Zaydi law as it was on the theological
level. Imam al-Mutawakkil argued for the recognition of the legal interpreta-
tions of Caspian imams based on the theory of infallibilism.19 Kull mujtahid
muṣīb means that all legal interpretations must be accepted equally as long as

16 See for example Bakar’s chapter on “The Place of Doubt in Islamic Epistemology: al-
Ghazālī’s Philosophical Experience” in his History and Philosophy 39–60.
17 The Caspian and the Yemeni Zaydiyya were politically united for the first time under the
Caspian imam Abū Ṭālib al-akhīr (d. 520/1126) in 511/1117; cf. Schwarb, In the Age of Aver-
roes 265.
18 For a more detailed account of the transition from Baghdadi to Basran teaching, i.e.
Bahshami theology and the role of Imam al-Mutawakkil, see Schwarb, In the Age of Aver-
roes 266–276.
19 In the Caspian Zaydiyya, the theory of infallibilism was accepted in the 4th/10th century;
cf. Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 336.

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they resulted from the process of ijtihād. The theory of infallibilism has been
considered a central characteristic of the Zaydiyya ever since.20
Parallel to the reception of Bahshami theology, aspects of the Baghdadi doc-
trine continued to exist within the teachings of the Yemeni Muṭarrifiyya, a
pietist and conservative movement that referred back to the theology of al-
Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq and rejected the unity with the Caspian Zaydiyya. Although
the Muṭarrifiyya was fought and largely brought to extinction under the reign
of Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), responses to their
doctrines continued to have an impact on Zaydi theology.21
Besides the Muʿtazili schools of Baghdad and Basra, another Muʿtazili school
influenced the theological landscape in Yemen from the 6th/12th century on-
wards, namely the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044).22 What lit-
tle is known about the rivalry between Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s and the Bas-
ran/Bahshami school in the Yemeni Zaydiyya includes Imam al-Muʾayyad bi-
llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s (d. 749/1346) endorsement of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s
doctrines.23
However, not all Zaydis advocated the fusion of Zaydi and Muʿtazili theol-
ogy. In the 7th/13th century, a group of scholars around Sayyid Ḥumaydān b.
Yaḥyā (d. early 7th/13th century) attempted to demonstrate the discrepancy
between the teachings of the Zaydiyya’s founding figures and the Muʿtazila,

20 Cf. Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim 210; Madelung, Zaydiyya; vom Bruck, Regimes of Piety
186, esp. footnote 2.
21 Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes 275; Ansari and Schmidtke, Literary-Religious Tradition
(II) 102. On the Muṭarrifiyya, see also Gochenour, The Penetration of Zaydī Islam 186–201;
Madelung, Muṭarrifiyya.
22 According to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his heresiographical digest Kitāb Iʿtiqādāt firaq al-
muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn (The Beliefs of the Sects of Muslims and Polytheists) and subse-
quent research, the only two surviving Muʿtazili schools up to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s time
and beyond are those going back to Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.
The only known exception is the above-mentioned Muṭarrifiyya; cf. Schwarb, In the Age
of Averroes 257.
23 Cook, Commanding Right 246–247, 218, footnote 115; Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim 221–
222; Ansari, Maḥmūd al-Malāḥimī. The first known proof of the presence of Abū l-
Ḥusayn’s doctrine in the Yemeni Zaydiyya took the form of a refutation. The foremost
proponent of Bahshami doctrine in the Yemeni Zaydiyya of the time, al-Ḥasan b. Muḥam-
mad al-Raṣṣāṣ (d. 584/1159) refuted central aspects of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s doctrine as
rendered in a major theological work of his follower, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad
al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141); cf. Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes 273–274. A refutation of Abū
l-Husayn al-Baṣrī’s theology by the Jewish theologian Yūsuf al-Baṣīr (d. between 428/1037
and 430/1039) may have been introduced into the Yemeni debates about the same time;
cf. Ansari et al., Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s Rebuttal 37.

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as well as to expose many Muʿtazili positions as essentially heretical.24 Nev-

ertheless, Muʿtazili theology continued to thrive in the Yemeni Zaydiyya after
its decline in the Caspian Zaydiyya from the 6th/12th century onwards, and its
broad extinction in most regions of the Islamic world after the 7th/13th cen-
tury.25
Beyond the Zaydi realm, Sunnism had been present in Yemen for a few cen-
turies and the Sunni ___domain increasingly intersected with traditionally Zaydi
territories. From the beginning of the 7th/13th to the mid-9th/15th century,
Shafiʿi and to a lesser extent Hanafi scholarship flourished under the Rasulid
dynasty in Yemen’s west and parts of the highlands.26 Sanaa itself had only
shifted from Rasulid to Zaydi hegemony in the mid-8th/14th century, albeit with
several Rasulid attempts to retake it. Theologically, the Rasulids increasingly
chose Ashʿari teachings over traditionalism.27 Furthermore, the Rasulids of the
late 8th/14th and early 9th/15th centuries enhanced the flourishing of various
Sufi orders, some leaning towards the theology of al-Ashʿarī, others towards the
teachings of Ibn al-ʿArabī from al-Andalus.28
Beyond the Yemeni territory, the Hejaz strongly influenced Yemeni schol-
arship and had been an intermediate point in the transmission of knowledge
from the Caspian to the Yemeni Zaydiyya for centuries.29 Many Zaydis trav-
elled to Mecca on pilgrimage as well as for studies. The sharifs of Mecca, who
had been predominantly Zaydis since the 4th/10th century, turned increasingly
towards Sunnism from the late 8th/14th century onwards. They completely
abandoned Zaydism at the beginning of the 9th/15th century.30

24 Ibid., 218–219.
25 The remnants of the Caspian Zaydiyya are known to have fully converted to Imāmī Shīʿism
in 933/1526. Although the Caspian Zaydiyya apparently continued to exist beyond the
6th/12th century, their activities between the late 6th/12th and the 10th/16th century are
largely obscure; cf. ibid., 218; Schmidtke, History of Zaydī Studies 197.
26 The first ruler of the Rasulid dynasty, Nūr al-Dīn ʿUmar b. ʿAlī b. Rasūl (r. 626/1229–
646/1249), had originally functioned as a governor for the Ayyubids but later claimed the
title of a sultan and was recognized by the Abbasid caliph al-Mustanṣir (d. 639/1241) in
Baghdad. The Rasulids extended their rule in western Yemen and parts of the Yemeni
highlands between 626/1229 and 858/1454. The Shafiʿi Ayyubids had ruled Yemen’s south-
ern parts and some of its western regions since the middle of the 6th/12th century; cf.
Madelung, Islam im Jemen 173.
27 Smith, Politische Geschichte 144; Madelung, Rasulids; Madelung, Islam im Jemen 174–175;
Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes 273.
28 An example of a prominent Yemeni mystic who was also an Ashʿari theologian and great
historian is ʿAfīf al-Dīn al-Yāfiʿī (d. 768/1367); cf. ibid., 147; Madelung, Zaydiyya; van Ess,
Der Eine und das Andere 970–975.
29 Cf. Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes 270–271, footnote 94; Zayd, Tayyārāt 159.
30 Mortel, Zaydī Shīʿism 455, 468.

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In sum, the broader intellectual milieu of the Yemeni Zaydis increasingly

called for involvement with different theological as well as legal schools. As
Grünschloss illustrates in his deliberations on interreligious hermeneutics,
involving oneself with the religious (or confessional, as I take it) “other” chal-
lenges the perception of the self just as much as that of the other.31 In con-
sequence, the Zaydiyya needed to (re-)define their theological and legal iden-
tity as well as their relationship to other Islamic schools of thought and law.
Notably, this definition had to be achieved through a branch of Islam that
preserved the teachings of two Muʿtazili theological schools, namely the Bas-
ran school or Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, when the
Muʿtazila had become extinct almost everywhere else in the Muslim world.
However, the inner-Zaydi reaction to increasing theological and legal diver-
sity did not start at the time of Ibn al-Wazīr. Some Zaydi scholars are known
to have studied non-Zaydi hadith and fiqh literature from the 6th/12th century
onwards,32 and Zaydi theologians had already grappled with the challenge of
Ashʿari theology in the 7th/13th century,33 although mainly to consolidate their
Zaydi positions.34 Nevertheless, it was this occupation with Sunni literature,
according to Ansari and Schmidtke, that initiated the process of the “Sunnisa-
tion of Zaydism.”35 However, from the late 8th/14th and early 9th/15th century
onwards, the need to meet the challenges of an increasingly multilayered intel-
lectual and textual landscape became especially urgent, all the more so since
the theory of infallibilism, as a central characteristic of the Zaydiyya, was the-
oretically not restricted to Zaydi mujtahids.
These challenges could be met by pursuing different approaches. Ibn al-
Wazīr found a unique approach to these challenges, if not unique in view of
the whole history of the entire Muslim world, then at least unique for his
time and his immediate surrounding. In order to appreciate this uniqueness,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s approach should be studied for its own sake and then com-
pared to different approaches to the same challenges, as exemplified by that

31 Grünschloss, Der eigene und der fremde Glaube 31.

32 For a list of pre-9th/15th-century Zaydi scholars who studied with Sunni teachers, see
Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 158, footnote 8.
33 Cf. ibid., 160.
34 Cf. Haykel, Revival and Reform 9; Schwarb, Muʿtazilism 381; Ansari and Schmidtke, The
Literary-Religious Tradition (II) 105–106; Ansari and Schmidtke, Between Aleppo and
Saʿda 161.
35 In their recent publication, Ansari and Schmidtke locate the beginning of what they call
the “Sunnification” in the mid-7th/13th century, manifest in a teaching license issued to
the influential Yemeni Zaydi scholar ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAnsī (d. 667/1269) in 644/1246; ibid.,
108.

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of Ibn al-Wazīr’s contemporary and eminent Zaydi scholar Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b.

al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1436).

Research on Ibn al-Wazīr

Although a number of scholars of Yemeni intellectual history have acknowl-

edged Ibn al-Wazīr’s brilliance as well as his significance, few have attempted
to investigate his thought beyond brief references. Ibn al-Wazīr’s significance
has commonly been equated with his role in the Sunnisation of the Zaydiyya
mainly because of his unprecedented vindication of Sunni textual sources.36
Although his contribution to Zaydi accommodation of Sunnism cannot be
denied, reducing him to the range of his sources ignores how his conclusions
from these sources answered pressing questions of his intellectual context.
This lack of inquiry into Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought is especially true of European
research. An exception is Hoover’s recent article on Ibn al-Wazīr’s position on
the duration of hell-fire, “Withholding Judgement on Islamic Universalism.”
Hoover shows that Ibn al-Wazīr, instead of opting for either of the doctri-
nal positions he discusses, chooses the path of cognitive uncertainty and, in
Hoovers words, “withholds judgment.”37 Among Arabic-speaking researchers,
Ḥajar’s monograph from 1984 is of particular interest, as it investigates Ibn al-
Wazīr’s success in harmonizing contending theological schools.38 From about
the same time (1985), al-Ḥarbī’s doctoral thesis investigates Ibn al-Wazīr’s use
of his sources with the major goal of determining Ibn al-Wazīr’s school affilia-
tion.39 However, both works investigate only very few of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works,
partly because only few of them had been edited or published by the early
1980s. After the publishing of Ibn al-Wazīr’s most famous work al-ʿAwāṣim wa-
l-qawāṣim, it became the source of a number of biographies on Ibn al-Wazīr.
Similarly, various editions of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works are introduced with a brief
biography. The section Haykel devotes to Ibn al-Wazīr in his article on the
hadith scholars of the Yemeni Zaydiyya takes up essential aspects of Ibn al-

36 See for example Madelung, Zaydī Attitudes 143; Haykel, Revival and Reform 10, 41, 91, 108;
Haykel, Reforming Islam 338; Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 343; Brown,
Canonization 214, 314; Schwarb, Muʿtazilism 831; Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām Studies
157–158.
37 Hoover, Withholding Judgement 208.
38 Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu al-kalāmī (Ibn al-Wazīr and His Theological Program).
39 The thesis was published in 2009 as al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu l-ʿitiqādiyya (Ibn
al-Wazīr and his Doctrinal Positions).

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Wazīr’s life and thought.40 However, Haykel’s goal of ranging Ibn al-Wazīr with
later traditionist scholars and his profound erudition in al-Shawkānī’s thought
and later Salafism lead to an emphasis on a few points that reflect al-Shawkānī’s
priorities in what Haykel and Zysow elsewhere call the popularization of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s program.41
What many studies on Ibn al-Wazīr have in common is the attempt to dis-
cern whether or not he is a Zaydi scholar in either a theological or a legal
sense or both, or to associate Ibn al-Wazīr’s individual positions with one of
the existent schools of thought. This was already done by Ibn al-Wazīr’s con-
temporaries, followed by generations of Zaydi scholars as well as recent Muslim
and Western scholarship in general. Al-Ḥarbī’s thesis is a good example of this
attempt. Whereas some, like ʿIzzān or al-Akwaʿ, claim that Ibn al-Wazīr embod-
ies central features of the Zaydiyya,42 others, like Haykel, conclude that Ibn
al-Wazīr has left the school altogether and fallen in with another, namely the
traditionist school that received the attribute of being Sunni.43 Some, how-
ever, like al-Ṣubḥī, have recognized Ibn al-Wazīr’s unique position outside of
the school system,44 a view I agree with entirely; to my mind, that unique posi-
tion featured a syncretistic version of a universalist Islam.45 Whether or not he
thereby fell in with or even founded the school of Yemenī traditionists is a sub-
ject for further comparative research. The present study offers a starting point
for such comparison with later Yemeni traditionists. However, an understand-
ing of Ibn al-Wazīr’s approach within his immediate context must come first.

40 Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ ahl al-ḥadīth 2–5.

41 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 343. One example of the emphases that I
cannot affirm from the comprehensive reading of Ibn al-Wazīr’s work is the rejection of
Sufism, which Haykel calls a common characteristic of all the “traditionist scholars” he
discusses. Furthermore, Haykel points out Ibn al-Wazīr’s criticism of the Muʿtazila and
Ashʿariyya, and fails to identify what I attempt to reveal below as the goal behind the criti-
cism, namely the emphasis on an essential harmony; cf. Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ ahl al-ḥadīth (Ahl
al-Hadith Scholars) 1, 4.
42 ʿIzzan, al-Tasāmuḥ al-madhhabī. However, al-Akwaʿ maintains that the Zaydi doctrine of
ijtihād, coming into its own in Ibn al-Wazīr, at the same time led Ibn al-Wazīr to Sunnism.
Furthermore, al-Akwaʿ holds that Ibn al-Wazīr pretended to be more Zaydi than he really
was out of fear; cf. al-Akwāʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 80.
43 Haykel, Revival and Reform 10–11; Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ ahl al-ḥadīth 1, 4.
44 Al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 500.
45 I use the term “syncretistic” and “syncretism” as defined by Grünschloss in his portrayal
of Berner’s syncretism model. Accordingly, syncretism describes “all processes where the
boundaries and therefore the state of competition with other systems are eliminated:
formerly heterogenous elements are then defined as elements of a new, comprehensive
system;” cf. Grünschloss, Der eigene und der fremde Glaube 48. Ibn al-Wazīr legitimizes his
syncretism by relating the new system to a purported original state of Islam.

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Why Compare Ibn al-Wazīr to Ibn al-Murtaḍā?

Ibn al-Murtaḍā was a contemporary of Ibn al-Wazīr and is comparable to Ibn

al-Wazīr in both theology and legal theory for the following reasons: First of
all, Ibn al-Murtaḍā was a prolific theologian with immense output and influ-
ence even at the time of Ibn al-Wazīr. Neither Muslim nor non-Muslim research
doubts the connection between Ibn al-Murtaḍā and Muʿtazili teaching. Al-
Ṣubḥī is only one of the many scholars who mention Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a major
representative of the Zaydi-Muʿtazili current within the Zaydiyya.46 For Cook,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā personifies what he calls the Zaydi-Muʿtazili symbiosis.47 Van
Ess points out Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s lack of originality as well as his vast erudition,
and mentions that early European researchers on the Muʿtazila profited greatly
from Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s conservatism.48 On the topics of legal theory and the
structure of legal authority Ibn al-Murtaḍā is an equally interesting character
in the comparison of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought with his scholarly environment.
Not only did Ibn al-Murtaḍa write a major compendium on Zaydi law that has
been a reference for Zaydi believers ever since,49 he also authored systematic
treatises on Zaydi legal theory in which he had much to say on questions of legal
interpretation, adherence and affiliation. Most importantly, Ibn al-Murtaḍā did
not receive major criticism for his ideas nor was his loyalty to the Zaydiyya ques-
tioned in any of the above-mentioned disciplines. Therefore, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
can be taken as representative of the dominant intellectual current within the
Yemeni Zaydiyya of the 8th/14th–9th/15th centuries. Lastly, the greater part of
works by and on Ibn al-Murtaḍā has remained uninvestigated and unedited.
With regard to theology, for example, the reasoning behind Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
positions has received little attention. The main interest in Ibn al-Murtaḍā can
be accounted for by his representation of earlier Muʿtazila in his heresiograph-
ical works as well as his rendering of their theological positions in the form of
assertions in his shorter theological treatises, as van Ess explains.50 Concerning
legal theory, almost everything that Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote remains uninvesti-
gated. An exception to this is Haykel and Zysow’s article “What Makes a Madh-
hab a Madhhab?” in which they draw conclusions on the state of the Zaydiyya
as a legal school from the 11th/17th century onwards, partly based on the recep-

46 Al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 341–393.

47 Cook, Commanding Right 242.
48 Cf. van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere 989; and below.
49 Cf. Haykel, Reforming Islam 338.
50 Van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere 986–995.

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tion of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s legal encyclopedia.51 Schwarb, in his investigation of

a seminal theological commentary on a part of one of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s works,
along with its position in 9th/15th–12th/18th century Zaydi curricula, again con-
firms Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s leaning on Bahshami tradition. Schwarb also refers to
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s grappling with Ashʿari theology, indicating the urgency for
Zaydis of the 9th/15th century to face the challenges of Sunnism.52 No study
known to me has explored what Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s positions were in matters of
theology and legal theory with regard to his epistemology, let alone discussed
its implications for the division of Islamic unity into multiple schools of law
and thought.
A few modern researchers do offer helpful discussions of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
life, work and thought. Al-Kamālī in his monograph as well as al-Ṣubḥī in
his entry on Ibn al-Murtaḍā restrict themselves to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s theologi-
cal thought. Yet al-Kamālī laments the lack of research especially on Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s theological doctrine.53 Al-Mākhidhī, in his introduction to Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s Minhāj al-wuṣul on legal theory, touches upon Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s the-
ological as well as legal thought.54 However, none of them draws conclusions
on an overarching epistemological approach or its implication for the broader
problem of theological and legal division in the Muslim community, let alone
relates it with Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought on this matter.
Although my main focus is on Ibn al-Wazīr, investigating Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
life, work and approach in regard to the questions Ibn al-Wazīr wrestles with
will accomplish three things: Firstly, it will put Ibn al-Wazīr’s views into per-
spective. Secondly, it will fill out the scanty picture we have of the intellectual
situation of the 8th/14th–9th/15th century Yemeni Zaydiyya in general, and the
rivalry between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the
two Muʿtazili schools—along with the respective impact they may have had
on the “Sunnisation of the Zaydiyya”—in particular. Thirdly, and as an impor-
tant result of the former, we will see how two ways of relating to the confes-
sional other, and responding to questions of theological and legal diversity—
questions which the Islamic community has had to face in other regions and
times and which it has to face still today—correlate with two distinct concepts
of knowledge.

51 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab?

52 Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām; see also, Cook, Commanding Right 242.
53 Al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 16; al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 340–393.
54 Al-Mākhidhī (ed., intr.), Minhāj al-wuṣūl 7–204.

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Outline

In chapter 1, I give an account of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life and intellectual develop-

ment. The goal of this chapter is to outline the various influences on Ibn al-
Wazīr’s thinking as well as to illustrate the intellectual milieu he lived in. To this
end, a briefer biography of Ibn al-Murtaḍā will also be presented. I will show
that both Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā were exposed to the same theolog-
ical and legal diversity from within and outside of the Zaydiyya. The sources I
use in this chapter are mainly biographical dictionaries (ṭabaqāt), biographies
and historical accounts of the Yemeni Zaydiyya, whereas the subsequent chap-
ters are chiefly based on Ibn al-Wazīr’s and, to a lesser degree, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
works.
Chapter 2 presents an introduction to Ibn al-Wazīr’s works in form and con-
tent. The survey and summary of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works is the foundation on
which the subsequent analysis of the central concepts of his thought is built.
Beyond that, it is intended as a starting point for further research on the aspects
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought that I do not cover here.
Chapters 3 to 5 are concerned with elaborating the findings from the biblio-
graphical chapter. First, I discuss Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology in chapter 3. I will
show how a number of recurring concepts are logical constituents of this com-
prehensive although rather unsystematically presented theory of knowledge. I
will also tackle Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of knowledge in the context of the dom-
inant Zaydi-Muʿtazili current of his time. Besides the concept of knowledge
itself, I will discuss and contrast Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s under-
standing of the means commonly associated with the occurrence of knowl-
edge, namely naẓar, ʿaql and fiṭra. This is followed by two examples showing
the difference between the concepts of knowledge. The first example, the proof
of God’s existence, illustrates the doctrinal implications of epistemological
concepts. The second example, the “argument from the absence of evidence,”
is a basic logical principle that manifests the different approaches to certainty.
It could be argued that epistemology and theology do not represent two dif-
ferent disciplines of Muslim scholarship and should therefore not be treated
in two different chapters. While it is true that the theory of knowledge forms
no separate discipline in Muslim scholarship and many theological summae
begin with an exposition of knowledge, the same applies to many works on
legal theory.55 The concept of knowledge may be seen as a link between the-
ology and legal theory, and is therefore central in both disciplines discussed

55 This is true, for example, for some of most influential works on legal theory apart from
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s (d. 436/1044) al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh (The Reliable in Legal The-

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here. More importantly, Ibn al-Wazīr frequently discusses epistemological fac-

tors when grappling with theological as well as legal questions. Thus the first
chapter in the main part of this study is dedicated to a separate discussion of
epistemology.
In chapter 4, I reconstruct how Ibn al-Wazīr harmonizes the theological
tenets of the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya, how he arrives at the supposed core
of each of the theological tenets argued about and what this core contains. This
core can be considered tantamount to Ibn al-Wazīr’s own understanding of the
central tenets of Islamic faith.
In chapter 5, I analyze the main points of contention between Ibn al-Wazīr
and his contemporaries with regard to legal theory, mainly by comparing Ibn al-
Wazīr’s positions with those expressed in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s writings. These main
points of contention fall within the realm of ijtihād and taqlīd, the central con-
stituents of the structure of legal authority. Therefore, I will demonstrate how
Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of knowledge can be deployed for his view on the sys-
tem of legal schools and contrasted with the ramifications of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
concept of knowledge in the system of legal schools.
In the summarizing chapter, I conclude that legal pluralism and the theo-
logical harmonization of schools of thought are two consequences sought by
Ibn al-Wazīr through his epistemology. Ibn al-Wazīr restricts the realm of cer-
tainty to a minimum. Beyond this minimum, much is left to the discretion
of the individual. This applies to the quest for theological as well as that for
legal knowledge. It was an attempt which ran contrary to the prevalent trend
of solidifying theological and legal affiliation as well as arguing over secondary
matters of doctrine. Two relevant results of this latter trend were the epistemo-
theological exclusion of several schools of thought as well as the rejection of
a large part of the source material, namely the Sunni hadith compilations.
Both of these trends can be seen as reactions to the increasingly multilayered
intellectual and textual landscape in the Yemen of the 8th/14th and 9th/15th
centuries. While Ibn al-Wazīr’s approach promoted acceptance of the theology
and law of Sunni Islam and therefore advanced the “Sunnisation of Zaydism,”

ory), namely ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī’s (d. 415/1025) Kitāb al-ʿUmad (The Book of Main
Issues), Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī’s (d. 478/1051) al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh (The Evi-
dence On Legal Theory), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) al-Mustaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl
(The Clarified from the Science of Principles), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1209) al-Maḥṣūl
fī ʿilm al-uṣūl al-fiqh (What Can Be Obtained in the Science of the Principles of Jurisprudence).
Although ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Kitāb al-ʿUmad is not extant, Abū l-Ḥusayn in his al-Muʿtamad
criticizes al-ʿUmad for the very fact that the definition of knowledge played such an impor-
tant part in it; cf. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad i, 3.12.

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it also anticipated an individualization of religious interpretation in a univer-

salistic manner, irrespective of theological and legal schools, be they Zaydi or
Sunni. This was effected by Ibn al-Wazīr’s high ambiguity tolerance, his “epis-
temology of ambiguity.”

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 chapter 1

The Lives and Intellectual Environment of Ibn

al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā

The main interest of this biographical chapter will be to understand Ibn al-
Wazīr in his intellectual environment. Yemeni historiography of the 8th/14th
and 9th/15th centuries in the Zaydi region mainly consists of biographies (siyar
or tarājim) and biographical dictionaries (ṭabaqāt), focussing on the protago-
nists rather then the events of history. Understanding Ibn al-Wazīr in his intel-
lectual environment, therefore, means reading the events of his life in relation
to the events of the lives of his contemporaries. The focus will be on Ibn al-
Wazīr’s as well as Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s education, intellectual development and
scholarly output. What did they study and with whom? How did they react to
the different elements of their education? What influenced the direction that
their development took? How did their environment react to their ideas and
output? Besides filling in the scanty picture we have of the intellectual envi-
ronment in 8th/14th and 9th/15th century Zaydiyya, initial conclusions can be
drawn regarding Ibn al-Wazīr’s motivation for his syncretistic approach to the
different schools of thought and his role in the “Sunnisation” process.

1 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Wazīr’s (d. 840/1436) Biography

1.1 Sources on Ibn al-Wazīr’s Life

The main sources on Ibn al-Wazīr’s life originate from his immediate fam-
ily. Next to the biography (tarjama) written by the grandson of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
brother, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr (897/1492),1 a chapter
in the family history Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr (The History of the al-Wazīr Family)

1 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī not only wrote the Tarjama of Ibn al-Wazīr, but also pro-
vided the sequel of al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Wazīr’s family history Thabat Banī l-Wazīr (The List
of the al-Wazīr Family). Al-Ḥadī b. Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad alias al-Hādī al-Ṣaghīr (d. 923/1517)
wrote a follow-up to Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh’s sequel, which in turn became the basis of
Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr’s (d. 985/1577) Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr. On Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Wazīr,
see al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 993–995; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 331–332. On
al-Ḥādī al-Ṣaghīr, see for example Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 459–461; al-Shawkānī, al-
Badr al-ṭāliʿ Suppl. 223–224.

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by Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Wazīr (d. 985/1577)2 is dedicated to Ibn al-Wazīr.

The two extensive biographical collections, Ibrāhīm b. al-Qāsim al-Shahārī’s
(d. 1152/1739) Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya al-kubrā (The Great Classes of the Zaydiyya)3
and Aḥmad b. Ṣāliḥ b. Abī l-Rijāl’s (d. 1092/1681) Maṭlaʿ al-budūr wa-majmaʿ
al-buḥūr fī tarājim rijāl al-Zaydiyya (Where Full Moons Rise and Oceans Meet:
Biographies of Zaydi Personalities),4 both draw their data on Ibn al-Wazīr chiefly
from Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh’s Tarjama. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl’s emphatic preference
for the family narrative may be one of the reasons his description of Ibn al-
Wazīr’s skill and rank depicts such an extremely outstanding scholar.5
From among the non-Zaydi authors, the richest accounts are found in the
writings of two historiographers who were active in the Hejaz, namely Shams
al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī’s (d. 902/1497) al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ li-ahl al-qarn al-tāsiʿ (The Light
that Shines on the People of the Ninth Century) and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-
Fāsī’s (d. 832/1429) al-ʿIqd al-thamīn fī taʾrīkh al-balad al-amīn (The Precious
Necklace: On the History of the Safeguarded Town).6 Al-Sakhāwī mentions ʿUmar
b. Muḥammad b. Fahd (d. 885/1480) as a source who in turn wrote a supple-
ment to al-Fāsī’s work.7 Al-Fāsī seems to have drawn his information from his
thorough acquaintance with events in Mecca, where Ibn al-Wazīr received an
important part of his education (as will be discussed later).
Among the later biographical accounts, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī l-Shawkānī’s
(d. 1250/1834) al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ bi-maḥāsin man baʿd al-qarn al-sābiʿ (The Full
Moon Rising: The Merits of Those Who Came after the Seventh Century) is of par-
ticular interest. Biographical collections of the 14th/20th century like Ismāʾīl
b. ʿAlī al-Akwaʿ’s (d. 1429/2008) Hijar ʿilm wa-maʿāqilihu fī l-Yaman (Abodes of
Emigration for Knowledge and Its Strongholds in Yemen), ʿAbd al-Salām b. ʿAbbās

2 I am using an unpublished partial edition of Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, which the editor, Zayd al-
Wazīr, kindly made available to me prior to the completion and publishing of the whole work.
Unfortunately, this edition has not yet been provided with page numbers. I am therefore using
my own consecutive numbering, starting with the entry on al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr as
page 1. On Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Wazīr, see Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 329–345; al-
Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 153–158.
3 Ibid., ii, 896–903.
4 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 138–160.
5 Ibid., iv, 142.
6 Al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ; al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn. Additionally, Ibn Abī l-Rijāl refers to
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s (d. 852/1449) al-Durar al-kāmina fī aʿyān al-miʾa al-thāmina (The Hid-
den Pearls: Important Personalities of the First Eight Hundred Years) as a source for Ibn al-
Wazīr’s life, which I could not verify. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl must have confused al-Durar al-kāmina
with Ibn Fahd’s al-Durr al-kāmin (see below); cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 142.
7 Ibn Fahd, al-Durr al-kamīn bi-dhayl al-ʿIqd al-thamīn (The Hidden Pearls: Supplement of The
Precious Necklace).

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the lives of ibn al-wazīr and ibn al-murtaḍā 17

al-Wajīh’s (b. 1376/1975) Aʿlām al-muʾallifīn al-Zaydiyya (Outstanding Authors of

the Zaydiyya) and ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad al-Ḥibshī’s (b. 1368/1949) Maṣādir al-
fikr al-Islāmī fī l-Yaman (The Sources of Islamic Thought in Yemen) mostly rely on
the above-mentioned earlier sources as well. Al-Wajīh’s and al-Ḥibshī’s works
are of special value, because they combine biographical data with their biblio-
graphical research. Most editions of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works contain a biographical
sketch in the introduction. These are useful where they represent a study in
their own right, as in the case of al-Akwaʿ’s (d. 1429/2008) introduction to Ibn
al-Wazīr’s magnum opus,8 or where the authors illustrate their data with ele-
ments such as letters or poems not easily available elsewhere, as in the case of
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Yaḥyā al-Iryānī’s (d. 1419/1998) introduction to Ibn al-Wazīr’s
first known work on theology.
In summary, the Yemeni sources seem to draw mostly on the two family
accounts as well as on letters and poems scattered throughout the extensive
manuscript collections in Yemeni libraries. In some instances, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
own remarks provided information for historiographers and later researchers.9

1.2 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Family and Upbringing

Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Wazīr was born into the ancient and today still well
known al-Wazīr10 family as the youngest of three sons, followed by one daugh-
ter. His family descends from the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muham-
mad, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, as attested by his genealogy.11 Ibn al-Wazīr was born in
Rajab 775/January 137412 in a center of Zaydi learning (hijra) called Ẓahrawayn,

8 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāsim i. Al-Akwāʿ’s introduction was published separately in Beirut

in 1997. However, I used the version introducing al-ʿAwāṣim.
9 For a remark from Ibn al-Wazīr on his own spiritual development, see for example Ibn
al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 201–202. Al-Akwāʿ made use of Ibn al-Wazīr’s autobiographical com-
ments in his introduction to al-ʿAwāṣim.
10 Ibn al-Wazīr’s ancestor Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-ʿAfīf was given a leading admin-
istrative position (al-wazīr, or elsewhere al-amīr) after having given up his claim to the
imamate to the advantage of his rival, the great scholar al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b.
Ḥamza (d. 614/1217). Henceforth, the family was called al-Wazīr; cf. al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm,
Thabat Banī l-Wazīr 5–10; al-Jirāfī, al-Muqtaṭaf 129. To trace the fame of the family one
need only survey the indices of the Grand Mosque in Ṣanaʿāʾ or, for the role played by
members of the family throughout the events of the last century, see von Bruck, Islam,
Memory and Morality.
11 For the genealogy, see al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 437; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 896; al-
Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 81; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 138; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ
al-lāmiʿ vi, 272.
12 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 126b; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 138; al-
Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 368; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 133; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām v, 300–301; ʿAfīf, al-

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located approximately 100km northwest of Sanaa.13 In line with the family’s

history and standing, Ibn al-Wazīr was “raised to be a scholar”14 with his father
Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī (d. 782/1380)15 and elder brother al-Hādī (d. 822/1419)16 as his
principle teachers in his youth. His father was a scholar in many disciplines,
especially known for his poetry and his piety.17 Al-Hādī, the eldest of the broth-
ers (b. 758/1357–1358),18 became a second father to Ibn al-Wazīr and his brother
Ṣalāḥ (d. after 840/1436)19 after the death of their father Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī in
786/1384.20
Al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm, having studied with a number of influential Zaydi schol-
ars in Saʿda and Sanaa, was known for his mastery of “circulating books of
kalām” besides other classical fields of Zaydi learning such as legal theory, lin-

Mawsūʿa al-yamaniyya iv, 3157; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 81. Only al-Sakhāwī, most
probably relying on Ibn Fahd, would have 765/1363–1364 as the year of birth; cf. al-
Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ vi, 272. Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh does not mention a date of birth
at all.
13 The history of the so-called hijra is something uniquely Yemeni. Making use of the
well-known concept of emigration (hijra) from the abode of injustice (dār al-ẓulm),
the concept of a hijra as a protected abode for scholars was developed in the 5th/11th
century when members of the Zaydi sect of the Muṭarrifiyya sought refuge among the
tribes from their Zaydi contemporaries as well as the Ismāʿīli Sulayḥids of lower Yemen.
The Yemeni tribes would protect the scholars in their fortresses in exchange for spir-
itual guidance, education and mediation. Later on, the concept was used beyond the
Muṭarrifiyya; cf. Gochenour, The Penetration of Zaydī Islam 148–243; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-
ʿilm; Madelung, Yemenite Hijra; Madelung, Muṭarrifiyya; Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes
267.
14 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 897.
15 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 47, 54. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl and al-Shahārī date it in the
year 782/1380; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 151–155; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya
i, 78–79. In the predecessor of Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, Thabat Banī l-Wazīr, Hādī b. Ibrāhīm
b. al-Wazīr does not mention the date of either birth or death; cf. al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm b.
al-Wazīr, Thabat Banī l-Wazīr 100–101. An edited, not yet published version of the Thabat
was given to me by Nabīl al-Wazīr, another very helpful member of the Wazīr family and
of the Markaz al-Turāth wa-l-buhūth al-yamanī.
16 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1181; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 132.
17 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 44; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 1347.
18 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 11; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 461.
19 Ibn Abī al-Rijāl notes that Ṣalāḥ b. Ibrāhīm died after 810/1407 but does not mention a
source for that date. However, in Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, a story is told of a meeting between
Ṣalāḥ and Imam al-Mahdī Ṣalāh al-Dīn b. ʿAlī b. Abī l-Qāsim (d. 849/1445). When they met,
Ṣalāh b. Ibrāhīm was an old man and Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAlī was already imam. But since Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAlī
only became imam in 840/1436, Ṣalāḥ b. Ibrāhīm must have died after 840/1436; cf. Aḥmad
b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 21.
20 Ibid., 19.

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guistics, law and hadith.21 He himself was a prolific scholar of Zaydi-Muʿtazili

theology, a fervent defender of the ahl al-bayt in general22 and early Zaydī
imams like the founder of the Yemeni Zaydiyya in particular.23 Yet, he also
received teaching licenses from Sunni scholars like Nafis al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī in
Taʿizz24 and Ibn Ẓahīra in Mecca25 and was associated with such scholars as
Imam al-Nāṣir Salāḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad (d. 793/1391) who was known for pro-
moting the dissemination of the Sunni hadith compilations.26 This exposure
to Sunni texts and thought was not unusual for his time. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl men-
tions al-Hādī’s written and personal correspondence with scholars beyond the
boundaries of region, school of law and theology, including for example with
the Shafiʿi poet and jurist Ismāʿīl Abū Bakr al-Muqrī (d. 837/1433–1434).27 Al-

21 On al-Hādī, see Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 2–17; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 1069–1073;
Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 462–470; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya iii, 1181–1185;
al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 316–317.
22 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr notes that even those older than al-Hādī referred to him with regard to
the genealogies of the ahl al-bayt; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 4.
23 Among his works are commentaries like the one on al-Raṣṣāṣ’ Khulāṣa, entitled Durrat al-
ghawāṣ naẓm Khulāṣat al-Raṣṣāṣ (The Diver’s Pearls: Al-Raṣṣāṣ Khulāṣa in Verse), which is
concerned with arguments for God’s unicity and justice dominant in speculative theol-
ogy. The titles of two other theological works, namely Kifāyat al-qāniʿ fī maʿrifat al-ṣāniʿ
(The Satisfying Amount of Knowledge of the Creator) and al-Suyūf al-murhafāt ʿalā man
alḥada fī l-ṣiffāt (The Sharpened Swords to Him Who Deviates Concerning the Attributes
[of God]) indicate a similar focus. Hidāyat al-rāghibīn ilā madhhab ahl al-bayt al-ṭāhirīn
(Right Guidance for Him Who Desires the Madhhab of the Pure Ahl al-Bayt) and Nihāyat
al-tanwīh fī izhāq al-tamwīh (The Utmost Praise for the Destruction of Distortion) are the-
ological defenses of the privileged position occupied by the ahl al-bayt in Zaydi thought.
Similarly, Riyāḍ al-absār fī dhikr al-aʾimma l-aqmār wa-l-ʿulamāʾ al-abrār wa-shiʿatihim al-
akhyār (Meadows of Vision: An Account of the Moonlike Imams, Pious Scholars and Their
Excellent Followers) as well as a refutation of the Shiʿi-critical book on the history of the
Maliki Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī (543/1148) called al-Tafṣīl fī l-tafḍīl (The Elaboration of Favor-
ing [the Ahl al-Bayt]) both defend the position of the Prophet Muḥammad’s progeny. Cf.
al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 132–133; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 463 al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-
Zaydiyya ii, 1183–1184; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 1070–1072.
24 Al-Shahārī falsely associates the Hanafi Nafīs al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī with the Shafiʿi school of law;
cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1183. See in contrast Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr
iv, 464; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 132.
25 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 462–463.
26 Al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm authored two biographical defenses of Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn with
the titles Kāshifat al-ghumma ʿan ḥusn sīrat imām al-aʾimma (The Remover of Worries from
the Excellence of the Biography of the Imam of Imams) and Karīmat al-ʿanāṣir fī sīrat al-
Imām al-Nāṣir (The Most Precious Element: The Biography of Imam al-Nasir); cf. al-Ḥibshī,
Maṣādir 492; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 463–464; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām, 1072. More on
Imam al-Nāsir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn below.
27 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 463–465. For al-Muqrīʿ, see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 220. Al-

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Hādī was known beyond Yemen even as far as Egypt, so that the Egyptian his-
torian and scholar of hadith, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449) and a member
of the ruling houses (amīr) of Mecca28 are said to have commended his charac-
ter and learning.29 However, in contrast to his brother Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Hādī b.
Ibrāhīm did not challenge prevailing Zaydi notions in theology or legal theory.
On the contrary, a whole tribe in the Hejaz apparently left the Shafiʿi school in
favor of adherence to the ahl al-bayt on al-Hādī’s account.30
Nonetheless, the intimate relationship between the eldest, al-Hādī b. Ibrā-
hīm, and the youngest brother, Ibn al-Wazīr, and their deep mutual influence
is not least obvious in their continuous exchange of poems and letters. Ibn al-
Wazīr is known to have taken his brother’s advice and often calls al-Hādī his
father and his master (sayyidī). The other members of the family, the mid-
dle brother Ṣalāḥ,31 their sister Fāṭima (d. after 840/1436) and their mother
Ḥawriyya bt. Ḥamd b. Ṣalāḥ b. al-Hādī b. Imām Ibrāhīm b. Tāj al-Dīn (n.d.) are
well known for their learning and piety as well.32

1.3 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Education and Intellectual Development

Ḥajar, in his analysis of Ibn al-Wazīr’s theological thought, divides Ibn al-
Wazīr’s life into three stages characterized as follows: a.) Growing up and stud-
ies; b.) Teaching, writing and debate; c.) Asceticism and isolation. Whereas he
can limit the first stage roughly to the first 25 years of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life, Ḥajar

Shawkānī commends the latter not so much for the content of his scientific observations
as for the unusual poetic manner of conveying them; cf. al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i,
142–143.
28 The amīr’s name is al-Ḥasan b. ʿIjlān b. Rumaytha (d. 827/1424), as documented in a poem
by the gatekeeper of the Kaʿba Abū Shayba; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 465;
Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 8.
29 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 465; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1185.
30 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 8; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr ii, 121.
31 For his brother Ṣalāḥ see ibid., 18. Zayd al-Wazīr mentions in a footnote that there are
glosses in another hand in the copy of Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr which determine 810/1407 as
the date of death. But according to Zayd al-Wazīr, Ṣalāḥ’s date of death must have been
after 840/1436, because of a report of Ṣalāḥ’s meeting with Imam al-Mahdī Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAlī,
whose call to allegiance (daʿwā) occurred in that year. Ibn Ḥajar and another comment in
the margins suggest a date after 822/1419, because al-Hādī would have included him in his
Thabat had he died before him.
32 His mother is mentioned in the section about his eldest brother al-Hādī. His sister has her
own entry in Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr but not in Maṭlaʿ al-budūr. Yet, the dates of birth and
death of both seem to be unknown; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 10 (for his
mother), 45–47 (for his sister); al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 26; Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu
52–57; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 35.

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admits that the boundary between the second and third stages is rather vague.
However, Ibn al-Wazīr’s own accounts and the intellectual content of his work
suggest a much higher degree of overlap. The only marked crossover from one
stage to another can be detected in the shift from the perceived incertitude of
speculative theology to the peace of mind that goes along with the prophetic
traditions. This crossing over must have taken place at an early stage of his edu-
cation, since his first known works already clearly show him as a strong propo-
nent of the prophetic traditions, wary of the methods of speculative theology.33
According to Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr spent the last twenty years of his life preoccu-
pied with the path of an ascetic, no longer given to intellectual exchange. But
the survey of his works in the next chapter shows that arguably his most bril-
liant work on theology, Īthār al-ḥaqq, was written in the last twenty years of his
life. I suggest looking at Ibn al-Wazīr’s life as a whole, with a unique turn early
on that determined the fruits of his life’s labours.

1.3.1 Theology, Legal Theory and Other Classics of Zaydi Learning

The disciplines of Ibn al-Wazīr’s education covered a multitude of sciences.
Besides the memorization of the Quran, his early years were dominated by the
study of works in two important disciplines generally called “the two princi-
ples” (uṣūlān) in Zaydi literature, namely theology (uṣūl al-dīn or kalām) and
legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh). Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr is said to have memorized
works in substantive law ( fiqh) and stylistics and the theory of imagery (ʿilm
al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān) in part or in toto.34 From his home in hijrat Ẓahrawayn
he moved to Saʿda, the traditional heartland of Zaydi learning, sometime after
his brother al-Hādī moved there in 780/1378.35 In Saʿda, Ibn al-Wazīr studied
uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh with Qadi ʿAbdallāh b. al-Ḥasan al-Diwārī (d. 800/1379)36
and Arab language and linguistics (ʿarabiyya), lexicography (lugha), litera-
ture (adab) and exegesis (tafsīr) with Qadi Muḥammad b. Ḥamza b. Muẓaffar

33 Cf. summary of al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ below, ch. 2 sec. 5.

34 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 14–15. In my translation of ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān as “stylis-
tics and the theory of imagery,” I follow Heinrichs in his EI article about one of the most
influential Arab rhetoricians, Yūsuf b. Abī Bakr al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229). ʿIlm al-maʿānī wa-
l-bayān is a sub-discipline of rhetoric. The difficulty of the translation and definition of the
term has already been discussed by Bonebakker; cf. Heinrichs, al-Sakkākī; Bonebakker and
Reinert, al-Maʿānī wa-l-bayān.
35 Cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 591.
36 Qadi al-Diwārī was probably Ibn al-Wazīr’s most prominent teacher; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir
132; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 891, i, 89; Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 42;
Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 133b.

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(796/1393–1394)37 as well as with his older brother al-Hādī.38 Al-Diwārī was

probably one of Ibn al-Wazīr’s early and most important teachers in kalām, uṣūl
al-fiqh and fiqh, as the qadi spent most of his life teaching and writing on these
subjects in the al-Hādī mosque in Saʿda.39
No teaching licenses (ijāzāt) are known to have existed at that time. Accord-
ing to Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn in Ghāyat al-amānī, Saʿda in those days was gov-
erned by a group of influential Zaydi scholars around the al-Diwārī family.40
Yet al-Diwārī’s influence reached far beyond that, as illustrated in the events
concerning Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAlī b. Ṣalāh al-Dīn’s (d. 840/1436) call to
allegiance (daʿwa) in 793/1390–1391. ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn only received the oath
from the scholars of Sanaa after a delegation of scholars from Saʿda headed
by al-Diwārī spoke out for him.41 It stands to reason, therefore, that while in

37 Al-Shahārī, Zabāra and al-Wajīh mention 796/1393–1394 as the year of death, whereas al-
Ḥibshī gives 836/1432–1433 and Ibn Abī Rijāl 808/1405–1406. Qadi Muḥammad b. Ḥamza
b. Muẓaffar was known for his expertise in exegesis. According to the sources, Ibn al-Wazīr
was his most prominent student; cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 895–897; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-
budūr iii, 290–292; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman i, 286; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii,
965; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 26f.
38 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 133b.
39 Prominent among al-Diwārī’s works is a four-volume work on Zaydi fiqh, commenting
on al-Amīr ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn’s (d. 7th/13th century) major work on Zaydi fiqh, Kitāb al-
Lumaʿ fī fiqh ahl al-bayt (The Book of Shimmers on the Jurisprudence of the Ahl al-Bayt);
cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 590; al-Ḥibshī; Maṣādir 214; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ
al-budūr iii, 227. On al-Amīr al-Husayn, see for example al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 675–677. Further-
more, al-Diwārī authored two commentaries on major works of Zaydi-Muʿtazili theology,
namely on Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Raṣṣāṣ’ (d. 621/1224) al-Khulāṣa l-nāfiʿa
(The Useful Summa). For Raṣṣāṣ’s Khulāṣa, see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 118; for al-Diwārī’s two
commentaries, see ibid., 131. In legal theory, al-Diwārī wrote a commentary on Aḥmad
b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ’s (d. 656/1285) Jawharat al-usūl (The Gem of Princi-
ple) called Sharḥ Jawharat al-uṣūl (A Commentary on the Gem of Principles); cf. al-Ḥibshī,
Maṣādir 180. Al-Shawkānī mentions that the Zaydi scholars ceased to write commentaries
on al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Jawhara, because they could not produce anything superior to the work of
al-Diwārī; cf. al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 382. Indeed, al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Jawhara is one of the
works most commented on in this field. To this day, it remains a foundational work in
Zaydi uṣūl al-fiqh, as does al-Diwārī’s commentary on it; cf. al-Maḥatwarī, Uṣūl al-fiqh 19.
The great number of commentaries testifies to the Jawhara’s importance; cf. al-Ḥibshī,
Maṣādir 178. Ibn al-Wazir refers to al-Diwārī only a few times. He never mentions that al-
Diwārī had been his teacher. Yet whenever he refers to al-Diwārī, he refers to the latter’s
commentary on al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Khulāṣa, making a direct influence by al-Diwārī appear even
more likely. It is hard to imagine that he would have been taught al-Diwārī’s commentaries
by anyone but the author in such a local and temporal proximity.
40 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 555–556.
41 Ibid., 538–539; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 571; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman 314; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-
Mahdī 74. Similarly al-Diwārī was crucial for his remaining in power on several other

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Saʿda, Ibn al-Wazīr would have studied with al-Diwārī and his associates, of
whom Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm was a particularly close one.42
Al-Diwārī and Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī were also powerful supporters of
Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, who is known for his profound erudition and the
dissemination of the prophetic Sunna and the Sunni hadith collections.43 It is
unlikely that Ibn al-Wazīr would have been left untouched by this, as evident in
his own support of Imam al-Nāṣir and his son and successor ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.
Fortunately, more data exists concerning the next stage of Ibn al-Wazīr’s edu-
cation. The focus of his studies in later years can be concluded from the titles
given in teaching licenses (ijāzāt) and biographical sources. The sources tell us
that his focus on theology and legal theory was still prevalent during the next
stage of his studies in Sanaa. When exactly he left Saʿda is unclear. But he must
have done so before 793/1390–1391, since that is the year of death of his teacher
ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. Abī l-Khayr, who lived and taught in Sanaa.44 Ibn al-Wazīr
seems to have moved to Sanaa of his own accord or at least without his elder
brother al-Hādī, who remained in Saʿda until 802/1399.45 An account of a night
vision Ibn al-Wazīr had on a mountain close to Sanaa when he was around 15
years of age further indicates that he lived in Sanaa from the early 790s/late
1380s onwards.46
The historical accounts suggest that the intellectual environment in Sanaa
was not as purely Zaydi as it had been in Saʿda. It is likely that Ibn al-Wazīr
began to question prevalent Zaydi teachings in this more diverse environment,
and that his teacher Ibn Abī l-Khayr played an important role in this develop-
ment. According to Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh, it was Ibn Abī l-Khayr who encour-
aged a focus on hadith studies for the simple reason that Ibn al-Wazīr had

occasions; cf. Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 538–550; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ
i, 381–382.
42 Al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm is mentioned as Diwārī’s master student; cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-
Zaydiyya i, 591; Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 3. Al-Hādī b. Ibrahim wrote about
Qadi al-Diwārī’s life and works, lauded him in his poems and was a close associate of the
whole al-Diwārī family. Al-Hādī married the daughter of the qadi, al-Mahdiyya bint ʿAbdal-
lāh al-Diwārī. ʿAbdallāh al-Diwārī’s son Aḥmad travelled to Mecca with al-Hādī after they
had left Saʿda in 802/1399; cf. Ibid., 10; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 77.
43 According to Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Imam al-Nāṣir was among the leading traditionists of his
time, so that scholars would come from countries like Egypt in order to hear hadith from
him; cf. Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 537.
44 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 761–765; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 274; al-
Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 180.
45 Ibid., 555–556.
46 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 395; Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-khāliq 210.

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already excelled in the other sciences and exhausted what they held for him.47
According to al-Shawkānī, Ibn Abī l-Khayr, being a scholar of the uṣūlān, taught
Ibn al-Wazīr a number of classics of contemporary Zaydi-Muʿtazili learning;
namely, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s (d. 415/1025)48 Sharḥ al-usūl al-khamsa (Commentary
on the Five Principles), Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ’s (d. 621/1224) al-Khulāṣa
l-nāfiʿa bi-l-adilla l-qāṭiʿa fī fawāʾid al-tābiʿa (The Useful Summa: Certain Proofs
and the Resulting Benefits)49 and Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ’s
(d. 656/1285) Jawharat al-usūl wa-tadhkirat al-fuḥūl (The Gem of Principles and
the Reminder of Masters).50 Ibn Abī l-Khayr’s own work comprised commen-
taries on the latter writings.51
However, beyond Zaydi-Muʿtazili doctrine, Ibn Abī l-Khayr was the one with
whom Ibn al-Wazīr studied the writings of a detractor of the Muʿtazili influ-
ence on Zaydi doctrine, Ḥumaydān b. Yaḥyā al-Qāsimī (d. after 653/1255).52
Ibn Abī l-Khayr also introduced Ibn al-Wazīr to the works of a Kufan scholar
of Zaydi fiqh, history (taʾrīkh) and hadith, namely Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-
Murādī (d. 290/903),53 to whom Ibn al-Wazīr refers approvingly in his major
work al-ʿAwāṣim as well as in his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid (Book of Principles). In Ibn al-
Wazīr’s view, al-Murādī’s ʿUlūm Āl Muḥammad (The Sciences of Muhammad’s

47 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 29; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 145.
48 ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī was one of the most important teachers of the Basran
branch of the Muʿtazila. He is often accorded the title qāḍī l-quḍāt, as he was appointed
chief judge in Buyid Rayy. In the above-mentioned Sharh al-uṣūl al-khamsa, one of his
principle works in speculative theology, he comments on the five Muʿtazili principles;
cf. Peters, God’s Created Speech 13–14. For more on ʿAbd al-Jabbar, see also Stern, ʿAbd al-
Djabbār b. Aḥmad.
49 For the ___location of copies of these works, see for example al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 118.
50 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 81.
51 In the field of the uṣūlān, Ibn Abī l-Khayr’s major works are commentaries on works of
Zaydi-Muʿtazili scholars such as Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Khulāṣa and Aḥmad b.
Muḥammad al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Jawhara; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 130, 180.
52 Al-Akwaʿ classes Ḥumaydān among the scholars of the 7th/14th century; cf. al-Akwaʿ, Hijar
al-ʿilm 1343–1344. See also al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i 413–416; al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya
397–434. Ibn al-Wazīr refers to him on several occasions when discussing Muʿtazili views;
see for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 34, 88.
53 Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Murādī was the head of one of the four Zaydi schools in the Kufa
of the 3rd/10th and 4th/11th centuries. Besides being a “gewaltiger Sammler des Rechts der
Prophetenfamilie,” he rejected Muʿtazili theology, compiled Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā’s (d. 247/861)
Amālī and was used as a source for Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī’s (d. 445/1053) al-Jāmiʿ al-
kāfī. For more on al-Murādī, see Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim 80; Sezgin, Taʾrīkh al-turāth
iii, 333–335, al-Sabḥāni, Buḥūth vii, 391–392. In Ibn al-Wazīr’s biography, Muḥammad b.
ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr mentions al-Murādī’s al-Jumla wa-l-ulfa (Totality and Harmony), or al-
Ulfa wa-l-jumla as it is elsewhere called, as one of the books Ibn al-Wazīr read with Ibn
Abī l-Khayr; cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 134a.

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Family) represents the first book of Zaydi hadith and features transmissions
from al-Bukhārī’s famous hadith collection.54
A commentary on the Maliki Abū ʿAmr b. ʿUmar b. al-Ḥājib’s (d. 646/1248–
1249) Mukhtaṣar Muntahā l-suʾl wa-l-amal (Digest of The Utmost of Demand and
Wish) called Mishkāt anwār al-ʿuqūl (The Lamp for the Lights of the Intellect) is
among Ibn Abī l-Khayr’s writings in jurisprudence and among the things Ibn al-
Wazīr would have learned from him. For Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Mukhtaṣar al-muntahā
this is documented by Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī in his biography of
Ibn al-Wazīr,55 though no actual ijāza is preserved. Although Ibn al-Ḥājib was a
Maliki scholar, many a Zaydi’s writing on legal methodology was patterned on
Ibn al-Ḥājib’s work in the field. Ibn al-Wazīr refers to him frequently.56 Other
writings that are essential to Zaydi uṣūl al-fiqh studied by Ibn al-Wazīr were
Imam Abī Ṭālib Yaḥyā al-Hārūnī’s (d. 424/1033) al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh (The Suf-
ficient [Amount] in Uṣūl al-Fiqh) and Imam al-Manṣūr ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s
(d. 614/1217) Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār fī uṣūl al-fiqh (The Prime Choice in Uṣūl al-Fiqh).
According to Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Ibn al-Wazīr studied the essential
work on Zaydi fiqh, al-Jāmiʿ al-kāfī (The Sufficient Collection) of Imam Muḥam-
mad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī al-Ḥasanī (d. 445/1053–1054) with his teacher Ibn Abī l-
Khayr. Moreover, several writings by his grandfather Yaḥyā b. Manṣūr b. al-ʿAfīf
b. al-Mufaḍḍal (d. 788/1386)57 were transmitted to him by the same teacher.58
Mysticism (taṣawwuf ) is another field that Ibn al-Wazīr became acquainted
with through Ibn Abī l-Khayr. Ibn Abī l-Khayr authored a number of works on
mysticism59 and was affiliated with a Sufi tradition that passed on the symbolic
cloak (khirqa). According to Madelung, Ibn Abī l-Khayr founded the first Zaydi
Sufi order.60 An anecdote narrated by Ibn al-Wazīr illustrates his teacher’s atti-

54 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim viii, 278.

55 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 133b.
56 In the case of the prolific Zaydi scholar Ibn al-Murtaḍā, the editor of one of his most impor-
tant writings on uṣul al-fiqh, Aḥmad ʿAlī Muṭahhar al-Mākhidhī, goes so far as to say that
Ibn al-Murtaḍā practices “taqlīd of this exalted scholar [Ibn al-Ḥājib] where the method
of writing is concerned”; al-Mākhidhī (ed., intr.), Minhāj al-wuṣūl, 157.
57 Yaḥyā b. al-Manṣūr b. Muḥammad al-ʿAfīf was especially known for his scholarship in
kalām; cf. al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm, Thabat Banī l-Wazīr 33; Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-
Wazīr fs. 184–189; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 513–515.
58 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 133b.
59 According to Yaḥyā b. al-Mahdī, student of al-Kaynaʿī (see below), Ibn Abī l-Khayr au-
thored around 40 works; cf. Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 328.
60 Madelung, Introduction. Part VI: Theology 457. Ibn Abī l-Khayr was the most important
teacher of the ascetic shaykh and co-founder of a Sufi order Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad al-Kaynaʿī
(d. 793/1390–1391) to whom he passed on the symbolic cloak of Sufī affiliation (khirqa),
after he had passed it on to another Sufi in 790/1388. Ibn Abī l-Khayr himself received

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tude towards the persuasive power of kalām-arguments and his typically Sufi
way of responding: Once Ibn al-Wazīr confronted his teacher with the chal-
lenges concerning the existence of God that some philosophers brought forth.
These caused Ibn Abī l-Khayr to doubt all evidence that was propounded in
ʿilm al-kalām. Ibn al-Wazīr reports that Ibn Abī l-Khayr’s supplication to God
was answered by a divine inspiration (ilhām) in the form of a nightly vision.
The proofs advanced in this vision were based on miracles to be perceived in
nature.61 Both Ibn Abī l-Khayr’s attitude towards kalām-arguments and his way
of responding resonate with Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning, as we shall discuss in sub-
sequent chapters.
In short, it is very probable that Ibn al-Wazīr’s stance of being critically dis-
posed towards speculative theology and favorably receptive to traditionalism
and Sufism was formed at an early stage of his life. And it is equally likely that
Ibn Abī l-Khayr played a major role in this regard. Hence, already in his teens
and his twenties, Ibn al-Wazīr would have been familiar not only with an exten-
sive amount of what the different disciplines of Zaydi teaching held, but also
with the range and limits of Zaydi contribution to the study of traditions and
reports (ʿilm al-ḥadīth). Where kalām is concerned, it can be ascertained that
he had been introduced to criticism of the prevalent Muʿtazili teaching from
within the Zaydiyya in the writings of Ḥumaydān b. Yaḥyā al-Qāsimī and pos-
sibly Ibn Abī l-Khayr himself, who had strong reservations, at least, concerning
a proof of God that relied on logical presuppositions alone.
But this did not stop Ibn al-Wazīr’s study of classical Zaydi literature. The
content of the ijāza he received from al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad b. al-Imām al-Muṭahhar
(d. 802/1399–1400)62 around the year 800/1397–1398 supports this claim. Unfor-
tunately, the ijāza does not state a date or place. However, Muḥammad b.
ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr suggests that it must have been issued two or more years

the khirqa from his teacher Yūsuf al-Kurānī (d. 769/1367). Al-Kurānī traces his author-
ity in the teaching of remembrance (dhikr) back to ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and the Prophet
Muḥammad through the line (tarīqa) of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. For the complete line, see al-
Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 763. Most sources attest to Ibn Abī l-Ḳhayr’s Sufism; cf.
al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 328; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 692–694; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 275;
al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 761–765. On al-Kaynaʿī, cf. Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 120; Ibn al-
Qas̄im, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 64–65; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 45; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 4;
Madelung also discusses al-Kaynaʿī’s relationship to Ibn Abī l-Khayr; cf. Madelung, Zaydī
Attitudes 131.
61 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 105; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 281.
62 On al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad, see al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ suppl., 219; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 1057; Ibn
Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 442; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1167; Zabāra, Aʾimmat
al-Yaman i, 291; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 562.

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before al-Nāṣir’s death 802/1399–1400 in Sanaa’s al-Ajdham Mosque where al-

Nāṣir taught.63 That Ibn al-Wazīr was residing and studying there at the time
is confirmed in Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya al-kubrā and Maṭlaʿ al-budūr.64 Al-Nāṣir
b. Aḥmad attests to having transmitted the entire content of the Khizāna al-
Mahdiyya, the library of the Zaydi imam al-Mahdī Muḥammad b. al-Muṭah-
har.65 Examples of the theological works Ibn al-Wazīr studied with him are
generic for Zaydi learning of that time, mirroring the proximity between Zaydi
scholarship and Muʿtazili doctrine: ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa,
Ibn Mattawayh’s (d. 5th/11th c.) Tadhkira fī aḥkām jawāhir wa-aʿrāḍ (The Re-
minder: On the Characteristics of Substances and Accidents),66 Aḥmad b. Ḥasan
al-Raṣṣāṣ’s (d. 621/1224) Khulāṣa and its commentary al-Ghiyāṣa sharḥ al-Khu-
lāṣa (Pearl Diving: A Commentary on The Summa) by Muḥammad b. Aḥmad
Ḥanash (d. 719/1319).67 It must be noted that all these authors represent the
Bahshami school of Muʿtazili teaching. Even though the latter two scholars, al-
Raṣṣāṣ and Ḥanash, belong to the Yemeni Zaydiyya, they are known for their
Bahshami-Muʿtazili leanings as well.
Al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad’s ijāza also provides us with a list of what Ibn al-Wazīr
studied in the fields of fiqh and hadith: Majmūʿ (Collection), the collection of
writings on questions of substantive law by the eponym of the Zaydiyya, the
imam Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740); the extensive fiqh work Amālī (Expectations) by
Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā b. al-Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 247/861–862); Imam Aḥmad b. Sulay-
mān b. Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar’s (d. 566/1170) collection of three thou-
sand traditions concerning legal issues, Uṣūl al-ahkām fī l-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām
(The Principles of Rulings on the Allowed and the Prohibited);68 Imam al-Mahdī
Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar b. Yaḥyā’s (d. 728/1380–1381) treatise on abrogation,
ʿUqūd al-ʿuqyān fī l-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh min al-Qurʾān (Necklaces of Pure Gold:

63 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 141a. Zayd al-Wazīr confirms this estimation in a foot-
note in Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 39.
64 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1167; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 442.
65 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1167; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 195.
66 Abū Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Mattawayh was a principle student of ʿ Abd al-
Jabbār. The exact date of birth or death is not known. Schmidtke suggests the end of the
5th/11th century; cf. Schmidtke (ed., intr.), An Anonymous Commentary. Schwarz suggests
414–415/1024 as the year of death; cf. Schwarz, Maimonides’ Mutakallimun? 159. See also
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila 119; Madelung, Ibn Mattawayh.
67 Al-Shahārī mentions two separate works on the Khulāṣa, as does al-Ḥibshī; cf. al-Shahārī,
Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1098–1103; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 126. Ḥanash’s Ghiyāṣa was published
at an unknown date by the Muʿassasat Imām Zayd.
68 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 617. On Imam Aḥmad b. Sulaymān, see Ansari and Schmidtke,
Literary-religious tradition 168, 202, 204; Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and Zaydī Re-
ception 95, footnote 17.

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The Abrogation and the Abrogated in the Quran),69 and his al-Sirāj al-wahhāj
fī ḥaṣr masāʾil al-Minhāj (The Blazing Lamp: A Compilation of the Questions in
The Path), which may be a commentary on his al-Minhāj al-jalī fī sharḥ majmūʿ
Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī (The Clear Path: A Commentary on Imam Zayd b. ʿAlī’s Collec-
tion), which, in turn, is a commentary on the above-mentioned fiqh collection
of the eponym of the Zaydiyya.70 Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr got a license for a
certain Sharḥ Nukat al-ʿibādāt wa-jumal al-ziyādāt (A Commentary on the Issues
of Worhip and the Generals of Additional Subjects), a commentary on a widely
used fiqh treatise of Qadi Jaʿfar b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 573/1177–1178) by,
apparently, an anonymous writer.71
Besides being a scholar of theology and fiqh, al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad was known
as a mystic who lived as a hermit and devoted all of his time to teaching. Many
sources mention only Ibn al-Wazīr, of his many students, by name. This indi-
cates that Ibn al-Wazīr was al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad’s most important student and
that al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad had at least some lasting influence on him.72
The titles in this ijāza and those listed previously for Ibn Abī l-Khayr show
two things: Firstly, up to this point Ibn al-Wazīr’s education focussed on Zaydi
writings that were widely studied among the students of Zaydi kalām, uṣūl al-
fiqh and fiqh. Though the study of prophetic reports had not formed a major
part of his education, it had not been altogether absent either. Yet this is only
the case for Zaydi compilations. There is no indication that he had been intro-

69 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 643.

70 Zabāra mentions the commentary in Aʾimmat al-Yaman 211. See also al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir
642.
71 Al-Ḥibshī mentions a commentary of Qadi Jaʿfar’s work by an anonymous commentator,
of which several copies are known to exist; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 197. The existence of sev-
eral copies from the 8th/14th and early 9th/15th centuries indicates that it was a widely
used text at the time of Ibn al-Wazīr. This of course is only the case if the writing men-
tioned by al-Ḥibshī is the one al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad lists in his ijāza to Ibn al-Wazīr. Al-Nāṣir
b. Aḥmad does not give the name of the commentator either. Qadi Jaʿfar’s Nukat wa-l-
jumal, as al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad calls it, is a treatise on the rulings of Zayd b. ʿAlī’s legal school;
cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 140b. Qadi Jaʿfar was appointed by the above-
mentioned Imam al-Mutawakkil ʿalā llāh Aḥmad b. Sulaymān and lived during the time
of ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza. He was very active in combating the Mutarrafiyya and in spread-
ing the teachings of the Bahshami variety of the Muʿtazila. His most prominent student
was al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ; cf. Thiele, Propagating Muʿtazilism 541; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 110. On
Qadi Jaʿfar, see Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 617–624; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya
i, 273–278; Ibn Fanad, Maʾāthir al-abrār ii, 769–774; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 278–282; Madelung,
Djafar b. Abī Yaḥyā; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 955–959.
72 Al-Nāṣir b. Aḥmad was taught by the above-mentioned Zaydi Sufis Ibn Abī l-Khayr and
Ibrāhīm al-Kaynaʿī. Cf. reference on al-Ṇāṣir above (footnote 62) and 30n78 below.

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duced to the Sunni hadith collections. However, it is likely that he was familiar
with them to a certain extent, since scholars such as Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-
Dīn, of whom Ibn al-Wazīr was a supporter, were known for propagating the
Sunni hadith compilations. Their absence from Ibn al-Wazīr’s ijāzas until this
point indicates that they had not become an essential part of Zaydi education
and were therefore not considered worth mentioning.
What is strikingly absent from records of the teaching Ibn al-Wazīr had
received up to this point are writings from the school of thought competing
with the Bahshami teaching, namely the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. As in
the case of the Sunni hadith compilation, this does not mean that he did not
receive such teaching, but rather that it was not considered important enough
to be quoted in any of the lists found in the ṭabaqāt or tarājim—even though
by this time, not only had Abū al-Ḥusayn’s writings become part of the Zaydi
curriculum in the field of uṣūl al-fiqh73 but, beyond uṣūl al-fiqh, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s
theological views had already penetrated Zaydi Yemen in the early 7th/13th
century. As the research of Ansari, Madelung and Schmidtke has shown, man-
ifestations of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s Muʿtazili thought were part of the teaching tradi-
tion in the Yemeni Zaydiyya of the early 7th/13th century, introduced mainly
through the writings of Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī
(d. 536/1141). The conflict between the two Muʿtazili schools remained active
in the 8th/14th century and beyond.74 However, none of this is documented
in the accounts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s education, indicating that the Bahshamiyya
found wider acceptance than Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school in Ibn al-Wazīr’s lifetime.
The sources state that Ibn al-Waz̄ir excelled in the scholarship of the above-
mentioned disciplines. Already during his years as a student he functioned as
a reference for his peers in the uṣūlān. This is reported about Muḥammad b.
Dawūd al-Nahmī (n.d.), who met Ibn al-Wazīr while both were pupils of Ibn
Abī l-Khayr.75 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh states that al-Nahmī accompanied Ibn
al-Wazīr constantly, referred to him and gave credit to his fellow student’s views
in kalām, highlighting that Ibn al-Wazīr persuasively undermined a number

73 The earliest extant copy of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh in
Yemen dates from the year 550/1155–1156; cf. Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and Zaydī
Reception 100.
74 For the influence of Abū l-Husayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī on the Yemeni Zaydiyya, see
for example Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and Zaydī Reception 100; Madelung and
Schmidtke (eds., intr.), Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla; Ansari, Maḥmūd al-
Malāḥimī al-Muʿtazilī 48–58; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb
al-Fāʾiq; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn; Ansari and Thiele, A Unique Manuscript
73–74.
75 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 134a; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 970.

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of views held by the speculative theologians. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh records

that Ibn al-Wazīr challenged a view here attributed to the eponym of the
Bahshamiyya, Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī (d. 321/933),76 according to which anyone
claiming to know God save by their own way of logical argument is an unbe-
liever.77 This indicates that Ibn al-Wazīr vocalized his criticism, already at an
early stage of his career, of at least some of Bahshami doctrines that were preva-
lent among the Zaydis of his day. This very view is evidence of the initial point
of much of Ibn al-Wazīr’s criticism towards speculative theologians in general,
and the Bahshami Muʿtazila in particular.
Furthermore, it must be noted that Ibn al-Wazīr’s early years featured a
considerable influence of Sufi scholars, or those leaning towards mysticism.
Besides his two above-mentioned teachers Ibn Abī l-Khayr and al-Nāṣir b.
Aḥmad, Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Qadi al-Diwārī are known for having
encouraged Sufism in Zaydi lands.78 This confirms my assumption that Ibn al-
Wazīr’s tendency towards mysticism and life in seclusion was not merely a later
reaction to scholarly conflict as Ḥajar suggests. Rather, his studies in his early
and later youth in Sanaa already featured a strong influence of a Zaydi version
of Sufism.

1.3.2 Sunni Hadith Studies

Many acknowledged that Ibn al-Wazīr reached a stage of learning in general
and ijtihād in particular that equalled the eponyms of Sunni schools of law.79
According to Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, a major factor in Ibn al-Wazīr’s outstanding rank
was his profound erudition in the texts of revelation, and particularly in the
prophetic traditions. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl quotes an outstanding scholar of the time,
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Azraqī (d. around 850/1446), to this effect:

No one in our time has reached the [level of] ijtihād that the Sayyid ʿIzz
al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm [Ibn al-Wazīr] has attained. We have done
well in everything, but what he has attained we cannot, because of his

76 Abū Hāshim ʿAbd al-Salām was the son of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī. Though none of his works
survived and little is known about his life, his views are transmitted by his students; cf.
Gardet, al-Jubbāʾī.
77 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 134a.
78 Madelung states that Imam al-Nāṣir b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was a close associate of Ibrāhīm al-
Kaynaʿī. According to al-Kaynaʿī, no one was better informed about the practices and
disciplines of the ascetics than the imam. Furthermore, al-Kaynaʿī was apparently invited
to Ṣāʿda by Qadi al-Diwārī in order to spread his blessings and his teachings; cf. Madelung,
Zaydī Attitudes 133.
79 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 143–145.

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knowledge of the traditions, the transmitters and his deep penetration

into the texts of revelation.80

It was in the early years of the 9th/15th century that Ibn al-Wazīr’s education
focused mainly on the study of prophetic traditions and the Sunni hadith col-
lections. Ibn al-Wazīr himself states that after having studied the uṣūlān, a
major principle of these very sciences was decisive in intensifying his occupa-
tion with hadith. This principle said that those who emulate others in doctrinal
questions are unbelievers (man qallada fī l-iʿtiqād kafara).81 By his own account,
this principle was not only his reason for an in depth study of those non-Zaydi
positions which the Zaydiyya deemed misguided, but also convinced him that
a wide knowledge of the prophetic traditions was a collective duty ( farḍ kifāya)
in order to base one’s own opinions on the sources rather than on the opinions
of others.82
Curiously, it may have been ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Abī l-Qāsim (d. 837/1433–
1434),83 Ibn al-Wazīr’s most famous opponent, who enhanced Ibn al-Wazīr’s
desire to study the Sunni hadith collections. Ibn Abī l-Qāsim lived in Sanaa,
where he taught, wrote and issued legal opinions.84 The sources state that Ibn
al-Wazīr received another ijāza for Ibn Ḥājib’s Muntahā among other works in
theology and exegesis from Ibn Abī l-Qāsim.85 If it is accurate that Ibn Abī l-
Qāsim taught his students from the six Sunni hadith collections, as al-Ḥibshī
indicates, we can assume that some of Ibn al-Wazīr’s views on hadith devel-
oped under Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s before the year 808/1406, when their difference of
opinion culminated in Ibn al-Wazīr’s legendary scholarly output, al-ʿAwāṣim.86
However, a great part of al-ʿAwāsim is dedicated to refuting Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s
claim of the unreliability of the Sunni hadith collections. Furthermore, Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim’s staunch Zaydism is attested in the biographical sources. In Ibn Abī l-
Rijāl’s words, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim “prohibited al-Sayyid Muḥammad [Ibn al-Wazīr]

80 Ibid., iv, 145. For al-Azraqī, see ibid., i, 410.

81 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 202.
82 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 6.
83 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 310–318.
84 Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s most famous work is his exegetical Tajrīd al-Kashshāf al-muzīd fīhi min
al-nuqaṭ al-liṭāf (Disentangling The Revealer Extended by a Few Subtle Points). He also
authored books in Arabic grammar, such as for example a commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s
Kāfiyya (The Sufficient); cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 27; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 311;
al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 717; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 780.
85 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 311; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 485.
86 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 27.

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from engaging any other [than the books of the Āl Muḥammad].”87 It is there-
fore more likely that Ibn al-Wazīr’s interest developed in opposition to Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim’s vehement partisanship for the sources and teachings of the Zaydiyya,
rather than through Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s encouragement.
Whether or not Ibn al-Wazīr’s zeal for prophetic traditions intensified
through the teaching of Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, it evidently caused his brother al-
Hādī to send him to the Hanafi jurist Nafīs al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī (d. 825/1422)88 in
Taʿizz. In a letter of recommendation, al-Hādī indicates that Ibn al-Wazīr’s pas-
sion for and emphasis on the study of the prophetic tradition had evoked the
disapproval of fellow Zaydi scholars.89
At this stage, Ibn al-Wazīr had already written at least al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ fī
ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ (The Certain Proof: Establishing [the Existence of ] the Creator),
arguing for the knowledge of God on the basis of the signs in the revelational
sources.90 According to al-Ḥarbī, by this time Ibn al-Wazīr had also already
authored his al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr (The Unsheathed Sword) in defense of the
imamate of al-Manṣūr. In the latter work, Ibn al-Wazīr challenges prevalent
interpretations of the two major requirements of a Zaydi imam, partially based
on his interpretation of knowledge, as I will show below. However, al-Ḥarbī’s
date (805/1402–1403) is rendered unlikely by data given in the content itself.
On the first folio of the manuscript, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions a letter that had
been send to Imam al-Manṣūr ʿAlī in the year 826/1423.91 Since the place where
the letter’s author should have been named is blank in all copies I viewed, the
occasion of the treatise cannot be verified unambiguously. In any case, the dat-
ing of the treatise before or after Ibn al-Wazīr’s studies with the Hanafi jurist
does not disprove the apparent assumption that, by this time, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
criticism of prevalent Muʿtazili notions in the Yemeni Zaydiyya was already
well established in the field of kalām. This can be concluded from al-Burhān

87 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 311. Cf. ibid., iii, 310; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii,
779, 780.
88 Nafīs al-Dīn authored several works in the arbāʿīn genre. Furthermore, he authored a work
on Sufism, called Irshād al-sālikīn fī-l-tasawwuf (Guidance for the Followers of the Sufi Path).
Nafīs al-Dīn studied hadīth and fiqh in Mecca, and later studied and taught in the famous
Ṣulayḥī school in Zabīd before moving to Taʿizz permanently; cf. al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-
lāmiʿ iii, 259; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 265; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 56, 330.
89 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 25–26.
90 Ibn al-Wazīr himself mentions the 4th or 5th of Rajab 801 (13th or 14th of March 1399) as
the time of completion; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ MS 1) f. 114b.
91 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr MS 1) f. 182b; MS 2) f. 103a. Another indication that
al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr was authored later are cross-references to al-ʿAwāṣim on fs. 105b and
107a.

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al-qāṭiʿ taken together with the above-mentioned comment of Ibn al-Wazīr’s

fellow student, Muḥammad al-Nahmī, who supported Ibn al-Wazīr in his crit-
icism of prevailing theological notions and al-Hādī’s letter to the Taʿizzī jurist
and traditionist Nafīs al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī. It was thus not rooted in his subsequent
intensified immersion in the study of hadith of other schools.
The educational focus is evident in an ijāza that Ibn al-Wazīr received from
his Taʿizzī teacher. It is dated Tuesday, 8th Dhū l-Qaʿda 806 (May 18, 1404) in the
house of Nafīs al-Dīn in Taʿizz. Besides an extensive appraisal of Ibn al-Wazīr,
Nafīs al-Dīn mentions Ibn al-Wazīr’s explicit wish to study the prophetic tradi-
tions. Corresponding to Ibn al-Wazīr’s wish and Nafīs al-Dīn’s expertise, special
focus was laid on the major Sunni hadith collections as well as on comparative
works like the Jamʿ bayn al-Ṣaḥīḥayn (Comparison Between the Ṣaḥīḥayn) by a
student of the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī (d. 456/1064), namely Muḥammad
b. Abī Naṣr Futūḥ al-Ḥumaydī al-Andalusī (d. 488/1095).92 Next in line were
works on narrator biographies (ʿilm al-rijāl) including Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
al-Mizzī’s (d. 742/1342) Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl (The Refinement of the
Complete: On the Names of Narrators) and its abridgment Tadhhīb tahdhīb al-
kamāl (Gilding The Refinement of the Complete) by Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b.
ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), as well as historiographical works of ʿAlī b.
Muḥammad b. al-Athīr (d. 630/1233).93 Furthermore, Nafīs al-Dīn reports that
he gave another, less extensive ijāza to Ibn al-Wazīr and his brother al-Hādī on
Jumādā l-ākhira 19th 806/January 3, 1404.94 Nafīs al-Dīn informs us that, besides
his brother al-Hādī, Ibn al-Wazīr had a certain Hanbali Ṣāliḥ b. Qāsim b. Sulay-
mān al-Maʿmarī as a travelling and studying companion.

1.3.3 Studies in Mecca

Ibn al-Wazīr intensified his Sunni hadith studies on his three subsequent jour-
neys to Mecca. Apparently, the first time was shortly after his sojourn in Taʿizz in
807/1404.95 In Mecca, Ibn al-Wazīr studied with a number of famous Meccan
scholars, among them the Maliki judge and historian Muḥammad b. Aḥmad

92 Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr, Tarjama f. 142b. On al-Ḥumaydī, see Miranda, al-
Ḥumaydī; Goldziher, Die Zahiriten 172. According to Fierro, Abū Naṣr Futtūḥ al-Ḥumaydī
played a major role in the invention of the genre; cf. Fierro, Local and Global Ḥadīth Lit-
erature 68, 73.
93 Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama fs. 141a–b; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 899–
900.
94 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya iii, 900.
95 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 141a; Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 40, foot-
note 235; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 899; al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 31.

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al-Fāsī (d. 832/1429)96 and the Shafiʿi chief judge Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh
b. Ẓahīra (d. 817/1414).97 According to the author of his biography, Ibn al-
Wazīr apparently received teaching licenses in the disciplines of fiqh, hadīth,
tafsīr, lugha, al-maʿāni wa-l-bayān, uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām in Muḥarram 807/July
1404.98 A famous anecdote illustrates how firm Ibn al-Wazīr’s views on the
madhhab must have been already at that time. When the famous judge Ibn
Ẓahīra asked Ibn al-Wazīr whether he would consider becoming a follower of
the Shafiʿi madhhab, Ibn al-Wazīr is said to have replied indignantly that if emu-
lation (taqlīd) was permitted to him he would emulate his forefathers Imam
al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq (d. 298/911) and Imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 264/860).99
This episode shows that Ibn al-Wazīr’s immersion in the disciplines of Sunni
learning in general and hadith in particular was not motivated by a desire to
challenge the Zaydiyya in its entirety, nor to leave the school of his forefathers
altogether in order to become a Sunni.
The list of Ibn al-Wazīr’s non-Zaydi teachers in Mecca encompass three
Shafiʿi, two Maliki and one Hanafi jurist, as well as one jurist of uncertain affil-
iation, all of whom were mainly occupied with the transmission of prophetic
traditions.100 It is not entirely clear with whom Ibn al-Wazīr extended his stud-
ies in non-Zaydi theology. Most sources, like Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr
and those that use him as a major source, mention the extension of his theo-

96 Cf. al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ vii, 18–20; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām v, 331; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr
al-ṭāliʿ ii, 114.
97 Cf. al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn ii, 53–59; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ viii, 92–96; al-Shawkānī,
al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 196.
98 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 141a.
99 According to Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Ibn Ẓahīra was not the only one to pose such a question
and receive such an answer; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 31. Similarly, Ibn
Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 142; al-Shahārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 901; al-Shawkānī,
al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 90.
100 Besides Ibn Ẓahīra, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. al-Raḍī Ibrāhīm al-Ṭabarī (d. 809/1406) and
ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Salāma al-Sulamī al-Makkī (d. 828/1425) were both Shafiʿī.
On al-Ṭabarī, see al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn i, 282–285; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ vi, 287–
288. On al-Sulamī al-Makkī, see al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn vi, 139–142; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ
al-lāmiʿ v, 183. Besides al-Fāsī, there was the Maliki ʿAlī b. Masʿūd b. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Ansārī
al-Khazūmī (d. 813/1410); cf. al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn vi, 267–268; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-
lāmiʿ vi, 38–39. Jār Allāh b. Ṣāliḥ b. Aḥmad b. Abī Maʿālī al-Shaybānī (d. 815/1413) was
a Hanafi jurist; cf. al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn iii, 407; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ iii, 52.
Muḥammad b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Quṭb al-Qasṭalānī (d. 811/1408) was a Mec-
can traditionist of unknown affiliation; cf. al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn ii, 8–9. For lists of the
teaching licenses Ibn al-Wazīr received from Meccan teachers, see for example Muḥam-
mad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 141a; Abī l-Qāsim, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 899; al-Shawkāni,
al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 82.

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logical studies in general.101 The little that is intelligible from a teaching license
issued by Ibn Ẓahīra indicates that he was at least one source for the study of
non-Zaydi and non-Muʿtazili doctrine. And indeed, Ibn Ẓahīra is the only one
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Meccan teachers who is known for his scholarship in theology
alongside other disciplines.102 Be that as it may, Ibn al-Wazīr would have been
deeply familiar with the ideas and sources of many different schools of thought
and law by this time.

1.3.4 Productive Conflict

Coming back from his first pilgrimage around the beginning of 808/1405, Ibn
al-Wazīr wrote a long poem in which he praised the Quran, prophetic Sunna
and the Prophet Muḥammad. In the poem, Ibn al-Wazīr describes his spiritual
and scientific quest for certainty, which was only satisfied after having returned
to the sources of revelation. This poem apparently provoked Ibn al-Wazīr’s for-
mer teacher Ibn Abī l-Qāsim to write the famous, now lost letter which in turn
caused Ibn al-Wazīr to write his magnum opus al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim late in
808/1406.103
The content of the controversy between Ibn al-Wazīr and his teacher Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim is known in great detail. This dispute clearly went to the core of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s beliefs. Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s family background and his progeny were
staunchly Zaydi-Hādawī. He, his brothers and his sons were known as fervent
defenders of the Zaydi branch of Muʿtazili theology as well as the Prophet’s pos-
terity.104 The major source for details of the controversy is Ibn al-Wazīr’s mag-
num opus al-ʿAwāṣim as well as its abridgment, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim. But beyond
Ibn al-Wazīr’s own account and despite the absence of Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s let-
ters, most sources leave little doubt that Ibn Abī l-Qāsim accused Ibn al-Wazīr
of having completely left not only the path of al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq, the eponym
of the Yemeni Zaydiyya, but also the path of the ahl al-bayt. A major cause for
this accusation was Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim to ijtiḥād, which will be investigated
in detail in subsequent chapters.105 Although the facts indicate that the chal-

101 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 141a.

102 Ibn Ẓahīra was a judge, faqīh, mujtahid and grammarian in addition to his occupation in
the learning and teaching of sciences of transmission. See also footnotes 99 and 100 above.
103 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 14, 16; cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 37. The first 14 lines
of the poem are preserved in Ibn al-Wazīr’s biography; cf. Muhammad b. ʿAbdallāh’s biog-
raphy, Tarjama fs. 139b–140a.
104 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 310; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 778–780; al-
Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 485; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 27.
105 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 33; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 148.

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lenge directly initiating the controversy came from Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, it is likely
that Ibn al-Wazīr, for his part, was challenged by Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s vehement
partisanship for the Zaydiyya. Commands like the one mentioned by Ibn Abī l-
Rijāl, namely that Ibn al-Wazīr may not use any books other than those of the
ahl al-bayt, must have been deeply disturbing for one who had become familiar
with the intellectual, theological and legal diversity of Islam, and who took the
prohibition against emulation in matters of doctrine as well as the correctness
of all mujtahids seriously.106
Although the controversial poem is generally summarized as a love poem for
the Prophet Muḥammad, it was probably Ibn al-Wazīr’s attitude towards the
common practice of taqlīd that offended Ibn Abī l-Qāsim. A few lines will suf-
fice to anticipate the conflict between Ibn al-Wazīr and all those who restricted
the Zaydiyya to the persons, doctrine and rulings of the ahl al-bayt:

Look to the fairness of the ahl al-bayt,

they were not extreme or fanatic in any resolution.
They disagreed with their fathers and sought to discover,
what is correct, seeking the most rightly guided.
I took them as models. Then every idiot
from the troop of riffraff denied me my model (qudwa).
(…)
All are brothers, and religion is one,
in the legal rulings, every mujtahid is correct, as is him who is guided
in these rulings; and in the uṣūl [al-dīn], my doctrine is that
upon which no Muslim (muwaḥḥid) disagrees.107

Although Ibn al-Wazīr expresses his criticism of taqlīd rather cautiously in this
poem, he insists on his right to investigate in matters of law independently
of legal affiliation, based on the principle of permissible legal disagreement
already practiced by the early authorities. Furthermore, the poem bespeaks
Ibn al-Wazīr’s agenda in the harmonization of contending theological schools,
namely restricting himself to agreed upon general Islamic tenets. This implies
two things: Firstly, the bulk of criticism that Ibn al-Wazīr received was aimed
at his challenge to the prevalent notion of legal authority at a doctrinal level.
He insisted on practicing his own ijtihād and claimed to apply the doctrine
of the ahl al-bayt in so doing. This apparently infuriated his contemporaries

106 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 201–202; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 311.
107 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 34–35.

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more than his early criticism of speculative theology had done. And secondly,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s method of harmonization developed in the midst of conflict on
doctrinal grounds, and was probably the cause of, as well as the reaction to,
criticism of his contemporaries.
Despite al-Ḥādī’s defense of his brother’s views, which supposedly had been
dreadfully misunderstood, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim and others with him saw the prin-
ciples of the Zaydiyya threatened. Letters were exchanged, meetings held and
books were written: al-ʿAwāsim in 808/1406 and its abridgment al-Rawḍ al-
bāsim in 817/1414, indicating that the conflict lasted for a number of years. Even-
tually Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn Abī l-Qāsim made peace with each other, years later.
Convincing evidence for this reconciliation, attested by a number of sources, is
seen in Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s sending his son Ṣalāḥ (d. 849/1445)108 to study under
Ibn al-Wazīr. However, most sources do not mention when the rapprochement
took place. A note written by Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Wazīr and recorded
in a collection of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings mentions “eight hundred thirty and
something” (i.e. in the late 1420s or early 1430s) as the year of reconciliation.109
Yet again, the periods where peace reigned and those where conflict pre-
vailed do not seem to have been so easily distinguishable. We can gather this
from a poem in which Ibn al-Wazīr scolded his teacher for the fickleness of atti-
tude towards himself.

You knew my value, then you denied it.

By God! What has led you away from your first state?110
Every day you have an opinion of me,
you went too far in your words about the evil of what seems.
Yesterday praise, and today the evil of insult,
I wish I knew how I will appear tomorrow.111

The poem clearly speaks of a continuous vacillation in their relationship. Be-

yond Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s charge, most sources report the extensive intellectual

108 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 573–582; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʾ iii, 323; al-
Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ suppl., 107; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman i, 321–322; al-Ziriklī, al-
Aʿlām iii, 207; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn v, 21–22; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 675; al-Wajīh,
Aʿlām 505; al-Ḥusaynī, Muʾallafāt al-Zaydiyya iii, 96.
109 Majmūʿ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, f. 511. Again, Ibn al-Wazīr’s biography written by the same
author does not mention the date.
110 The phrase used here is “fa-mā ʿadā bi-llāh mimmā badā,” referring to a famous saying
by ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib to ʿAbdallāh b. Abbās, asking him what made him turn away from the
obedience he had showed at first.
111 Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Allāh, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 34; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 149–150.

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attacks that Ibn al-Wazīr had to face.112 A number of poems attest to al-Hādī b.
Ibrāhīm’s attempts to calm down his brother as well as his critics, and to Ibn
al-Wazīr’s docile replies to his beloved advocate. However, al-Hādī’s attempts
to clear up some of what he considered misunderstandings seem not to have
been entirely convincing.113
The bibliographical sources provide little data on Ibn al-Wazīr from this time
onwards. As most of his writings do not mention a date, these do not easily
provide the reader with a guideline to the events and developments of Ibn al-
Wazīr’s life. We know that he wrote a book on the science of hadith, called
Tanqīh al-anzār fī ʿulūm al-athār (Rectifying the Perceptions in the Science of
Traditions) in 813/1411, and the abridgment of Awāṣim, his al-Rawḍ al-bāsim fī
l-dhabb an sunnat Abī l-Qāsim (The Smiling Meadows: A Rebuffal of the Sunna
of Abū l-Qāsim) in 817/1414. Ibn al-Wazīr travelled to Mecca at least once after
the controversies had ensued. But there is no indication that he wanted to
leave his Zaydi environment permanently. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr mentions that
Ibn al-Wazīr set out on pilgrimage three times.114 Little is known of the two later
pilgrimages. One was never concluded because a conflict between the sharifs
and the people of a village 400km south of Mecca forced him to return. Al-Hādī
wrote a poem to his brother Ibn al-Wazīr in 818/1416, in which he consoles him
for not having been able to complete his pilgrimage. Zayd al-Wazīr, editor of
Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, thinks it was his second Hajj,115 while al-Arnaʾūt, editor of
al-Awāṣim, considers it number three.116 Nothing else is known about this last
pilgrimage, other than that a number of miracles (karāmāt) occurred in Mecca
and on the way there, just as they are reported to have occurred throughout Ibn
al-Wazīr’s life and especially during the times that he spent in solitude.117

1.3.5 Scholarship in Solitude

Most sources contain a section or a comment on Ibn al-Wazīr’s life in solitude
or seclusion (ʿuzla). Works such as Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla fī ākhir al-

112 See for example the excerpts of other attacks and defenses in verse preserved in ibid., iv,
140–141.
113 Al-Hādī’s poem summarizing his defense is called Jawāb al-nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq al-yaqīn al-
shāfī li-ṣudūr al-muttaqīn (The Answer of Him Who Says the Truth Healing the Hearts of the
Pious); cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 132; ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿAmrān (ed.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 12,
footnote 2. Ibn al-Wazīr’s comments on the attacks on him are numerous. See for example
Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 13.
114 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 40.
115 The conflict took place in Ḥalī b. Yaʿqūb; cf. ibid.
116 Al-Arnaʾūt (ed.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 52.
117 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 35–41.

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zamān (The Command of Solitude at the End of Times) leave no doubt that Ibn
al-Wazīr’s regret at having been involved in doctrinal (and political) strife led
him to turn away from public life.118 Most sources mention that he spent peri-
ods of time in solitude in mosques in Sanaa and the surrounding region, as well
as in mountains and wadis in the Ibb region. Yet none of them tell us when
that would have been.119 Ḥajar suggests that the last twenty years of Ibn al-
Wazīr’s life were dominated by his reclusiveness. Haykel likewise restricts Ibn
al-Wazīr’s retreat into solitude to the latter part of his life.120 Although Ḥajar
understandably gives Ibn al-Wazīr’s remarks in Tarjīḥ as a main reason for his
assumption, I suggest that these very same remarks indicate a less distinct divi-
sion between the different phases of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life.121 It is true that Ibn
al-Wazīr states that he spent a number of years (sinīn ʿadīda) in seclusion from
people and their continuous strife, preferring to commit the rest of his life to
preparing to face his Creator. And the dates given for most of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
visions and dreams in his Dīwān (Collection of Poems) indicate that he had most
of them within the last decade of his life. Yet there is no convincing reason why
“sanīn adīda” should necessarily mean 20 years, nor that he should have chosen
the lifestyle of an ascetic or a mystic only at an advanced age. Indeed, a mys-
tic attitude towards God and a tendency to withdraw from society is already
apparent in poems Ibn al-Wazīr wrote and visions that he had during his youth.
Two events are narrated for the time that he spent studying in Sanaa: First, the
poem recorded in his Dīwān from the time when he “had just reached adult-
hood” and realized that he had no friend in the city: He went out to Nuqum
which holds a Mosque he is said to have frequented during his times of soli-
tude.122 The second is a night vision that he had “in his youth,” recorded by

118 See for example aspects four and eight in Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla 307. For similar
thoughts, see Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīh 61, 67.
119 Ibn al-Wazīr seems to have frequented the Wahb Mosque in Sanaa’s south, the Nuqum
Mosque between Sanaa and Nuqum, the al-Rawna Mosque 13 km northeast of Sanaa and
the al-Akhdhar Mosque, now called Khaḍīr, close to al-Shaʿūb Gate in the east of Sanaa. A
school on Jabal Saḥammur close to Yarīm in the Ibb governorate was apparently named al-
Wazīr School in memory of Ibn al-Wazīr’s sojourn there; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī
l-Wazīr 35 (main text and footnote 227); Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 150; al-Shawkānī,
al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 92; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ vi, 272; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 1371.
120 Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ ahl al-ḥadīth 4.
121 Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 44–45.
122 See Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 395; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 56l; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ
al-khāliq 221. According to Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, the Mosque of Nuqum was one of the places
where Ibn al-Wazīr experienced miraculous events (karāmāt ṣūfiyya). The occurrence of
other miracles during his pilgrimages and in Mecca is recorded in the family history; cf.
Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 35–37.

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his relative in his biography.123 At the age of eighteen, Ibn al-Wazīr wrote a
poem to his brother al-Hādī in which he warns him against political involve-
ment and insists on the preferability of asceticism. Al-Hādī lauds his brother’s
words as well as his deeds, indicating that Ibn al-Wazīr already practiced the
life of an ascetic.124 Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr received the sign of Sufi affili-
ation (khirqa) according to al-Shahārī. Apparently, it was the Shaykh ʿUmar b.
Muḥammad al-ʿIrābī (d. 827/1424) who passed on the khirqa to Ibn al-Wazīr.125
Since al-ʿIrābī moved to Mecca in 811/1408–1409 and, more importantly, Ibn
al-Wazīr mentions al-ʿIrābī in al-ʿAwāṣim, written in 808/1406, as “our shaykh
(shaykhunā),”126 it is likely that Ibn al-Wazīr received the khirqa and was famil-
iar with ascetic practices already in the first half of his life.
Besides, the very request that caused Ibn al-Wazīr to mention the years spent
in seclusion also caused him to write a book of considerable theological insight,
namely Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān ʿalā asālīb al-Yunān (The Preponderance of the
Methods of the Quran Over the Methods of the Greeks). And we know that his last
great theological work, Īthār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-khalq (Preferring the Truth to Man),
was written in 837/1433–1434. Both writings are rife with theological subtlety
and discuss intricate questions of speculative theology, something that Ibn al-
Wazīr was loath to do while living in seclusion.127 By his own account, lethargy
(khumūl), sadness (ḥuzn) and hopelessness ( yaʾs) often threatened to over-
come him while living in solitude.128 He found relief in a deeper “commitment
of all his affairs to God” (tafwīḍ, tawakkul) bountifully expressed in the collec-
tion of his poems.129 Yet it seems that the desire to benefit students and seekers,
awakened by the request that provoked the writing of Tarjīḥ, initiated another
phase of productivity.130 I would therefore suggest that the last phase of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s life was not entirely dominated by his reclusiveness, but rather that
he alternated between solitude and scholarly activity throughout his life. Fur-
thermore, the periods spent in isolation during his later adulthood resulted in a
richer understanding of the different responsibilities of a scholar and teacher,

123 Muḥammad al-Wazīr, Tarjama f. 137a.

124 Cf. vom Bruck, Regimes of Piety 206–207; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman iii, 484.
125 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 902. On al-ʿIrābī, see al-Fāṣī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn vi, 360;
al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ vi, 131–132.
126 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim viii, 297.
127 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 61, 63.
128 Ibid., 62–63; see also Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 401; Ibn al-Wazīr., Dīwān laq. 69l, in
which he laments his solitude.
129 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 63.
130 Cf. ibid.

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and what a Muslim believer needs to know and do. Such a nuanced understand-
ing finds expression, for example, in his defense of a life in seclusion, namely
Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla, or in his exposition of the general tenets that
supposedly unite all Muslim schools and individuals. This understanding was
already implied in the early poem quoted above as well as in al-ʿAwāṣim, and
was masterfully elaborated in his late Īthār al-ḥaqq.

1.3.6 Teaching and Students

It is uncertain when Ibn al-Wazīr began teaching. Zaydi Yemen knew of no offi-
cial madrasas until the 10th/16th century.131 And even then, Zaydi scholars were
not paid, rendering it difficult to trace the circumstances of employment. The
only sources on Ibn al-Wazīr’s students are ijāzas and biographical accounts,
of which the former are especially hard to find. If al-Akwaʿ’s account is accu-
rate and Ibn al-Wazīr did indeed teach Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, he must
have started teaching at quite a young age.132 Imam al-Nāṣir died in 793/1391,
when Ibn al-Wazīr had not even reached the age of twenty. It is more likely
that al-Akwaʿ is correct in naming the late imam’s son, al-Manṣūr ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ
al-Dīn, among Ibn al-Wazīr’s students since Ibn al-Wazīr supported al-Manṣūr
and seemed to have had considerable knowledge regarding al-Manṣūr’s educa-
tion. This is apparent in Ibn al-Wazīr’s written defense of Imam al-Manṣūr.133
It is documented, however, that Ibn al-Wazīr’s fellow students listened to his
opinions from an early age on. Prologues and comments in a number of his
writings reveal that he was sought after as a teacher even after he received crit-
icism from a number of his contemporaries, although in many cases his critics
were actually urging him to justify his supposedly deviant arguments. As men-

131 The first Zaydi imam to build madrasas in the hijras of Kawkabān, Sanaa, Thulāʾ and
Dhamar was Imam al-Mutawakkil Sharaf al-Dīn (r. 912/1506–965/1558); cf. Madelung,
Islam im Jemen 175.
132 None of the sources apart from al-Akwaʿ claim that he was a student of Ibn al-Wazīr; cf. al-
Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 102. On Imam al-Ṇāṣir, see Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī
523–538; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1023–1026; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 972; al-Ziriklī, al-
Aʿlām vi, 287; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 655–657; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman 261.
133 Besides Ibn al-Wazīr’s reference to his no longer extant biography of Imam al-Manṣūr,
his al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr boasts the imam’s erudition in the main sources Quran and
Sunna. This impression is confirmed by the accounts of Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, where it was
his statesmanship and his strong support of a number of scholars that helped to defeat
his enemies and extend the area under his control. Though similar and more extensive
achievements can be ascribed to Imam al-Nāṣir’s father, the former lacked his father’s
learning; cf. Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 538–573; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʾ v,
232, 324; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 487; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman i, 280–312; al-Ziriklī,
al-Aʿlām v, 8.

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tioned above, even the son of the belligerent teacher Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, Ṣalāḥ,
was sent to study with Ibn al-Wazīr by his own father.134
The sources are not in accord concerning most of the names and biographi-
cal data of a number of Ibn al-Wazīr’s students. However, a name all sources
associate with Ibn al-Wazīr is the Shafiʿi al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-Shaẓabī
(d. 834–835/1430–1431). Al-Shaẓabī studied under Ibn al-Wazīr in Sanaa and
later taught a number of disciplines in Taʿizz.135 Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr
probably taught his brother’s grandson and author of a major source on the life
of Ibn al-Wazīr, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī (d. 897/1492).136 Other stu-
dents mentioned in connection to Ibn al-Wazīr are either his own son ʿAbdallāh
b. Muḥammad (d. 840/1436) or his nephew ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī (d. 840/1436), or
both of them.137 Even more obscure are the names of Qadi ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥam-
mad al-Nahwī (n.d.)138 and ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥamzī (n.d.).139

134 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 34. On Ṣalāḥ b. ʿAlī, who functioned as an imam
briefly but then took to scholarship, see Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 573–582; al-
Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʾ iii, 323; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ suppl., 107; Zabāra, Aʾimmat
al-Yaman i, 321–322; al-Ziriklī, al-Aʿlām iii, 207; Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam al-muʾ allifīn v, 21–22; al-
Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 675; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 505; al-Ḥusaynī, Muʾallafāt al-Zaydiyya iii, 96.
135 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 26; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr ii, 101; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-
Zaydiyya i, 341; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 346; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ iii, 125.
136 Born in 810, this nephew of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm is known for his skill as a writer and
penman in verse and prose with handwriting like “chains of gold,” besides being a distin-
guished scholar; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 331–332; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ
viii, 120; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ suppl., 202; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 429–450.
137 Although Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr and al-Akwaʿ name Ibn al-Wazīr’s son among his students, the
other biographical sources state that it was in fact the son of his brother al-Hādī, likewise
called ʿAbdallāh, who was taught by Ibn al-Wazīr. However, Ibn Abī l-Rijāl and al-Shahārī
mention no ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm (Ibn al-Wazīr) at all, whereas Aḥmad b.
al-Wazīr has no entry on a son of al-Hādī called ʿAbdallāh. There are other overlaps in the
biographical data on the two cousins, as for example their year of death (840/1436) and
their focus on Zaydi fiqh. Therefore it may well be that the two cousins were confused
in person or in details; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 42–45; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl,
Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 153; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 649; al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 1377;
al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 384.
138 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr states nothing but his name; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr
42.
139 What is said about the above-mentioned ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Naḥwī seems also to
be the case for ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥamzī. Al-Shawkānī has an entry that appears
to be a blend of both ʿAbdallāhs, namely ʿAbdallāh b. al-imām al-Muṭahhar b. Muḥammad
b. Sulaymān al-Ḥamzī. However, he does not mention that an ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad
studied with Ibn al-Wazīr. Yet Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr al-Wazīr says that he was one of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s particularly close followers; cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 42; al-
Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 399.

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the lives of ibn al-wazīr and ibn al-murtaḍā 43

figure 1 Annex of Farwa b. Musayk al-Murādī Mosque, Sanaa

photograph by the author

Although disseminating knowledge was an important part of Ibn al-Wazīr’s

life, continuous teacher-student relationships apparently did not play a cen-
tral role in his scholarly activities. When the plague that had devastated lower
Yemen for some months hit the northern towns and killed tens of thousands
in 840/1436, Ibn al-Wazīr died, leaving one son and an intellectual legacy that
was not immediately palpable in any circle of students or followers.140 He was
buried in the annex of the al-Ruʾya Mosque, now known as Farwa b. Musayk al-
Murādī Mosque, located in the south of Yemen’s capital (figure 1 above).141 His
relationship to the Shāfīʿī al-Shaẓabī next to his Zaydi pupils further attests to
Ibn al-Wazīr’s negligent attitude towards madhhab boundaries. Although Ibn
al-Wazīr is often referred to as an independent mujtahid who founded his own
school,142 this school was apparently not characterized by immediate trans-

140 According to Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Ibn al-Wazīr died on the same day as Imam al-
Manṣūr; cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 143a. For an account of the plague years,
see Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 572–574.
141 Cf. al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 1371.
142 See for example Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 28.

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missions of opinions in the sense of a legal or a theological school. This phe-

nomenon is in line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s life task of counteracting divisions into
rivaling schools of legal and theological thought.

2 Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1436) as a Scholar

A scholar is hardly understood unless seen against the background of his con-
temporaries. As anticipated in the introduction, Ibn al-Murtaḍā represents not
only a mainstream current in Zaydi theology and law,143 but also the group of
speculative theologians whose star has long been on the wane in other regions
of the Islamic World, namely the Bahshami Muʿtazila.
Little is known of the first years of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s life. The major source for
data on Ibn al-Murtaḍā is Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ wa-rawḍat al-ʿulamāʾ (The Treasure
of Sages and the Garden of Scholars), his biography written by his son al-Ḥasan
b. Aḥmad (d. 840/1438).144 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s birth took place in Alhān Ans, part
of the district of Dhamar in the south of Sanaa. As to the date of his birth
the sources mention a number of dates between 764/1363 and the less likely
775/1373.145 Born into the same extended family that Ibn al-Wazīr belonged to,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā grew up as a scholar. After the death of his parents he was
taught by his uncle Imam al-Mahdī ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (d. 773/1371–1372),146

143 On Ibn al-Murtaḍā, see Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī ii, 538; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr
al-ṭāliʿ i, 122; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman i, 312; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 661–674; al-Shahārī,
Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 226–233; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 206–213; Blackburn et al., Al-Mahdī li-Dīn
Allāh Aḥmad 2.
144 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 493.
145 Ibn Murtaḍā’s son al-Ḥasan reports 764/1363 as the year of birth, yet he acknowledges that
it might well have been a few years earlier or later; cf. l-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ
148. Al-Ḥibshī agrees with him, as do al-Ṣubḥī and Zabāra; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 583; al-
Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 340; Zabāra, Aʾimmat al-Yaman 312. Al-Shawkānī marks 775/1373 as Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s year of birth, as does al-Ziriklī; cf. al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 8; Ziriklī,
al-Aʿlām vi, 269. A third position, again held by Zabāra, contradicts itself. He says that Ibn
al-Murtaḍā was 24 when he received the bayʿa, which was in 793/1390–1391 The concluded
year of birth (769/1367–1368) contradicts what Zabāra records as the age at his death in
840/1436, namely 76 years. This age would mean that he was born in 674. It is confirmed
by all sources that Ibn al-Murtaḍā received the bayʿa in 793 when he would have been 29
and therefore in compliance with one of the conditions of the imamate. More arguments
are provided by al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 69–70.
146 The date of birth given by al-Shawkānī (775/1873–1874) calls the influence of Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s uncle, Imam al-Mahdī ʿAlī, into question. However, besides the data rendered
by Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s son, several factors speak for the likelihood of an earlier date and of
a relationship between uncle and nephew. For one thing, Ibn al-Murtaḍā expressed his

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his brother al-Hādī b. Yaḥyā (d. 785/1383–1384)147 and his sister Dahmāʾ bt.
Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā (d. 837/1433–1434) in his hometown of Dhamar.148 Dahmāʾ
probably also taught him in Thulāʾ, where she spent a considerable amount of
time.149
Basic information relevant to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s later life and scholarship
can be summarized as follows: After Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s death in
793/1390–1391, Ibn al-Murtaḍā received the oath of allegiance (bayʿa) in Sanaa
from a number the city’s scholars. This bayʿa was the reaction to the news of
plans made by a group of Saʿda’s most prominent scholars around Qadi al-
Diwārī to appoint the son of the late imam, ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.150 The sources
leave no doubt that not all scholars agreed with the choice, a main reason being
ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s young age and inability to meet all the intellectual require-
ments for the imamate.151 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, for his part, proved the scholar, yet
not the warrior and statesman an imam was required to be.152 Consequently,
the military conflict that arose between the armed groups of the two candidates
in Sanaa’s south (Bayt Baws) was terminated after thirteen days by a truce and
a subsequent arbitration tribunal of leading scholars. The arbitration in favor
of ʿAlī b. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was not complied with, which resulted in more fighting
and ended with Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s arrest.153
From the time of his imprisonment, the instances of his political involve-
ment decreased, whereas his scholarly productivity increased. Ibn al-Wazīr’s
brother, al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm, played a crucial role in ensuring proper treat-
ment of Ibn al-Murtaḍā and his release seven years later.154 Apparently, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā received ink and paper and authored a number of books while
in prison. After a second uprising in Saʿda, he relinquished the reign to his
ally Imam al-Hādī al-Muʾayyad (d. 836/1432–1433) and settled in Thulāʾ where
he remained until 816/1413–1414. At the time, Thulāʾ was a famous center of

appreciation for his uncle and mentions him among the Zaydi imams who were mujtahids;
cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 231. Furthermore, Ibn al-Murtaḍā took on his uncle’s for-
mer title “al-Mahdī li-Dīn Allāh” when he himself became imam, as al-Mākhidhī points
out; cf. al-Mākhidhī (ed., intr.), Minhāj al-wuṣūl 29.
147 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 321.
148 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 108.
149 For more on Dahmāʾ b. Yaḥyā, see al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 58; al-Ḥibshī,
Maṣādir 221.
150 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 539.
151 Cf. ibid., 538.
152 For the details of the dispute between the contending scholars, see especially al-Ḥasan b.
Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 111–113.
153 Ibid., 546.
154 Ibid., 553.

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learning and home of the prolific Qadi Yūsuf b. Aḥmad ʿUthmān (d. 832/1429).
According to Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Qadi Yūsuf had supported Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
daʿwa in 793/1390–1391 and had received Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā after his release in
801/1398. That Qadi Yūsuf’s love for the ahl al-bayt was given as the reason for
supporting Ibn al-Murtaḍā indicates that Ibn al-Murtaḍā was readily identified
with Zaydi scholarship and that his imprisonment by the imam did not call
that into question.155 In 816/1414, Ibn al-Murtaḍā moved to Jabal Miswar were
he remained until 836/1432–1433, with an intermediate sojourn in the moun-
tainous Ḥarāz. When the plague reached the Yemeni highlands in 840/1436,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā lived in Ẓafīr, a fortress in the region of Ḥajja he had taken over
from his former ally Imam al-Hādī al-Muʾayyad after the latter’s death. Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, like his former opponents Ibn al-Wazīr and Imam al-Manṣūr, died of
the plague in that year.156

2.1 Teachers, Education and Students

Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s uncle, brother and sister were scholars of kalām, uṣūl al-fiqh
and other disciplines typical for a scholarly Zaydi family.157 His father had
guided Ibn al-Murtaḍā into the sciences of the Arabic language, of which Ibn al-
Murtaḍā was considered an extraordinary scholar throughout his whole life.158
He began studying kalām with his brother and later continued with Qadi Abū
Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad al-Madhhajī (d. early 9th/15th century).159
Al-Madhhajī gave him teaching licenses in the field of kalām for al-Raṣṣāṣ’s
Khulāṣa, Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa (A Commentary on the Five Principles) by the

155 Besides the title of qadi, Yūsuf b. Aḥmad more accurately carries the epithet al-faqīh (the
jurist). Considered one of the important mudhākirūn, he probably played an active role
in consolidating the corpus of Zaydi substantial law. This is illustrated, for example, by
the high number of ijāzas (at least five or six) he received for Imam Yaḥyā b. Hamzā’s
(d. 749/1346) important compendium of Zaydi substantial law, al-Intiṣār ʿalā ʿulamāʾ al-
amṣār (The Triumph Over the Scholars of the Region). Al-Faqīh Yūsuf’s subsequent abridg-
ment of al-Intiṣār, namely al-Istibṣār al-muntazaʿ min al-Intiṣār (The Insight Gained from
The Triumph) is likewise influential. He also wrote a commentary on al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh
Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Hārūnī’s (d. 411/1020) Ziyādāt and one on al-Amīr ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn’s
(d. around 670/1270) Lumaʿ; cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya iii, 1275–1279; Ibn Abī l-
Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 521–523; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 350; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir
219.
156 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 573.
157 Al-Mākhidhī (ed., intr.), Minhāj al-wuṣūl, 33.
158 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 108; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 122.
159 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1109–1110; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 403. Both
biographers point out especially that al-Madhhajī taught Ibn al-Murtaḍā al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Khu-
lāṣa.

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Zaydi-Muʿtazili Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Qazwinī al-Manakdīm (d. 425/1034), al-

Ghurar wa-l-ḥujūl fī qāwaʿid sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa (Blazes and Anklets: Prin-
ciples of A Commentary on the Five Principles) by al-Qāsim b. Aḥmad al-Muḥallī
(d. 8th/14th c.),160 Ibn Mattawayh’s (d. after 415/1025) Tadhkira and al-Muḥīṭ bī-
l-taklīf (The Encompassing [Treatment] of That which God Makes Incumbent) of
ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1025).161 In uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Madhhajī taught
him Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Jawhara as well as Abū al-Ḥusayn l-
Baṣrī’s al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh and Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Muntahā l-suʾl.162
Like Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn al-Murtaḍā was a student of the above-mentioned
Ibn Abī l-Khayr (d. 793/1391) under whom he intensified his understanding of
Ibn Mattawayh’s Tadhkira.163 Al-Mākhidhī states in his introduction to Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s Minhāj al-wuṣūl that Ibn al-Murtaḍā studied al-Muḥīṭ, al-Muʿtamad
and Muntahā l-suʾl a second time with Ibn Abī l-Khayr.164 Another teacher of
considerable interest is Imam al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (d. 793/1391). As already
mentioned, Imam al-Nāṣir was well known for teaching and propagating the
use of the Sunni hadith compilations.165 Moreover, Ibn al-Murtaḍā learned
al-Kashshāf from Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Najrī al-Nassākh (n.d.).166 With al-
Ḥusayn b. Alī l-ʿAdwī (n.d.) he studied Ibn Hishām’s prophetic biography as
well as writings on Arabic linguistics.167 Another teacher Ibn al-Murtaḍa had
in common with Ibn al-Wazīr was the Nafīs al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī (d. 825/1422) from
Taʿizz. Ibn al-Murtaḍā studied the hadith compilations of al-Bukhārī and Mus-
lim, as well as a number of other writings with him.168
As to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s students, a few famous individuals are mentioned in
Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya, with a reference to a much greater number of less signif-
icant names: Firstly, there is Imam al-Muṭahhar b. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān
(d. 879/1474), to whom Ibn al-Murtaḍā passed on his theological and jurispru-
dential writings.169 Another pupil of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-faqīh Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad

160 On al-Ghurar wa-l-ḥujūl, see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 131.

161 ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Muḥīṭ is also among his principle works on speculative theology and has
had a strong influence in Bahshami-Muʿtazili thought; cf. Peters, God’s Created Speech 10.
162 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 227.
163 Al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 73; al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 58.
164 Al-Mākhidhī (ed., intr.), Minhāj al-wuṣūl 34.
165 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 537.
166 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 458–459, al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 206.
167 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 109.
168 Al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 73; al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 58; for the wording
of an ijāza issued in 795 in Taʿizz, see ibid., 148.
169 Imam al-Muṭahhar was a teacher of the author of Maʾāthir al-abrār, i.e. Ibn Fanad; cf. al-
Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 1130–1134.

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b. Mughram (d. 865/1460–1461), was also taught by the above-mentioned Imam

al-Muṭahhar. Both teachers are said to have given Ibn Mughram ijāzas for
important works of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, like al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār and its Muqad-
dima (Introduction).170 ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Najrī (d. around 840/1436) wrote
another commentary on his teacher’s Kitāb al-Azhār, namely Sharḥ al-Najrī.
He followed Ibn al-Murtaḍā in the furūʿ and gave teaching licenses for Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s works and his own commentary to his own students.171 ʿAlī al-Najrī’s
younger brother, ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Najrī (d. 877/1472–1473), though
probably no immediate student of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, was yet associated with
some of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s most influential students alongside his brother ʿAlī al-
Najrī.172 ʿAbdallāh al-Najrī wrote a commentary on a part of Ibn al-Murtaḍa’s
introduction (Muqaddima) to his al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār which was to become
“the backbone of Zaydi kalām studies.”173 Another student worth mentioning
is Zayd b. Yaḥyā al-Dhamārī (d. unknown).174 Al-Dhamārī was the link between
Ibn al-Murtaḍā and Ibn Miftāḥ, writer of the most important commentary on
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Azhār, or rather on Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s own commen-
tary on Kitāb al-Azhār, called Taʿlīq Ibn Miftāḥ (Ibn Miftāḥ’s Commentary) or
Sharḥ al-Azhār al-muntazaʿ al-mukhtār min al-Ghayth al-midrār al-mutafattiḥ
li-kamāʾim al-Azhār (Commenting on The Blossoms: A Chosen Extract from The
Abundant Rain Opening Up the Perianths of The Blossoms).175 A final student
mentioned by name is Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad b. Muẓaffar (d. 875/1470–1471).176

170 Cf. ibid., iii, 1206–1207.

171 Ibid., ii, 789–790. According to Schwarb, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Najrī died in 844/1441; cf.
Schwarb, Guide to Zaydī Kalām 161, footnote 16.
172 Cf. ibid., 161. The biographical sources are silent concerning ʿAbdallāh al-Najrī’s Yemeni
teachers besides his brother ʿAlī and his father Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Najrī (d. 852/
1448). Yet ʿAbdallāh al-Najrī is known to have been in close contact with Imam al-Muṭah-
har b. Muḥammad and Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad b. Muẓaffar. On ʿAbdallāh al-Najrī, see for example
Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 129–133; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ i, 436–438; al-
Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 29, 137, 226, 385, 425, 586.
173 Ibid., 155. ʿAbdallāh al-Najrī’s Kitāb Mirqāt al-anẓār al-muntazaʿ min Ghāyāt al-afkār al-
kāshif li-maʿānī al-muqaddimat al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār (The Book of the Ascent of Opinions
Chosen From The End of Thoughts Revealing the Meaning of the Introduction to The Over-
flowing Sea) was written in 853/1449–1450. The Kitāb Mirqāt al-anzār constituted the cen-
tral part of Zaydi kalām-studies from the mid-9th/15th until the end of the first century of
Qāsimī rule (early 12th/18th century).
174 Al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 458. The data on the content of al-Dhamārī’s studies
with Ibn al-Murtaḍā is restricted to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s own works, as it is in the case of Ibn
Mughram.
175 Cf. ibid., i, 229.
176 Ibid., iii, 1205–1206.

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A survey of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s main teachers and the content of his educa-
tion shows that his educational upbringing was in many ways congruent with
Ibn al-Wazīr’s. Not only were they students of the same teachers, they more-
over studied many of the same books in Zaydi kalām with Bahshami-Muʿtazili
influence. These similarities hold true for Zaydi uṣūl al-fiqh as well as in respect
to Sunni hadith compilations. Since a large number of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s teach-
ers died before his claim to the imamate (793/1390–1391), no potential shift in
educational focus in later years can be concluded from the input he received.
Zaydi-Muʿtazili kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh was as much a part of his early educa-
tion as were the studies in Sunni hadith. Whether or not Ibn al-Murtaḍā and
Ibn al-Wazīr studied together cannot be established due to the lack of temporal
specification of the teaching periods with the respective scholar.
Where students are concerned, a greater number is documented for Ibn al-
Murtaḍā. The teacher-student relationships as well as the content of teaching
indicate that Ibn al-Murtaḍā was part of an ongoing teaching tradition, and
that his Muqaddima to his al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār in Zaydi theology (beside other
disciplines) as well as his Kitāb al-Azhār in Zaydi fiqh formed a vital part of this
tradition.

2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Works

The list of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s literary output is extensive. Al-Ḥibshī lists sixty
titles,177 among which Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s works in theology, legal theory, positive
law and heresiography are most famous.
In the field of theology, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Qalāʾid fī taṣḥīḥ al-ʿaqāʾid
(The Book of Necklaces: Affirming the Doctrines)178 is well known, wherein he
renders the doctrinal positions of different schools of thought and later com-
pares them, pointing out the differences in the understanding of the five fun-
damental doctrines between the Zaydi and the Muʿtazili teaching. This writing
is considered one of the most important sources for the study of Zaydi doc-
trine because of its brevity.179 Al-Kamālī compares its importance for Zaydi

177 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 661–675. An in-depth analysis of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s works may reveal
false ascriptions or numerous titles of the same work. Yet, as my main focus is not on Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, it will suffice to mention the magnitude of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s productivity and
some of his most important works.
178 For Kitāb al-Qalāʾid, see Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 52–89. Al-Qalāʾid contains six sepa-
rate books.
179 The number of copies of commentaries of al-Qalāʾid and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s own commen-
tary, i.e. al-Durar al-farāʾid, indicate its importance. For a list of the copies and commen-
taries, see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 592.

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theology with the importance of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Azhār for Zaydi
fiqh.180 Beyond the Zaydiyya, the Kitāb al-Qalāʾid already functioned as a source
for research on the Muʿtazila in the early 20th century, as van Ess tells us.181
Ibn al-Murtaḍā himself expounds on al-Qalāʾid in its commentary al-Durar
al-farāʾiḍ fī sharḥ kitāb al-Qalāʾid (Rare Pearls: Commenting on The Book of Neck-
laces).182 In Riyāḍat al-afhām fī latīf al-kalām (Excercise for the Intellects: Sub-
tleties of Kalām)183 and its commentary Dāmigh al-awhām fī sharḥ Riyāḍat al-
afhām (Triumph over Errors: A Commentary on Exercise for the Intellects), Ibn
al-Murtaḍā discusses his theological methodology and epistemology as well as
some aspects of natural theology.184 Riyāḍat al-afhām was used as a source for
the study of Muʿtazili theology along with Kitāb al-Qalāʾid.185
In legal theory, Ibn al-Murtaḍā authored Fāʾiqat al-uṣūl fī ḍabṭ maʿānī Jawha-
rat al-uṣūl (The Superior in [the Science] of Principles: Capturing the Meaning of
The Gem of Principles), a commentary on al-Raṣṣāṣ’s famous Jawhara.186 His
Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl fī ʿilm al-uṣūl (The Standard for Intellects in the Science of Princi-
ples) is divided into an introduction and 11 chapters, comprising the common
questions of legal theory.187 Its commentary Minhāj al-wuṣūl ilā sharḥ Miʿyār
al-ʿuqūl (The Path to Arriving at the Commentary of The Standard for Intellects)
is widely read still today.188

180 Cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 116.

181 Van Ess refers to Max Horten’s Die Philosophische Systeme der spekulativen Theologie im
Islam from 1910, using the Kitāb al-Qalāʾid to examine Shahrastānī’s presentation of the
Muʿtazila. Van Ess, in his citation of the title of Horten’s work, has turned “Systeme” into
“Probleme”; cf. van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere 989.
182 Al-Durar al-farāʾid is the second of nine parts of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s commentary on his
Muqaddima to al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār called Ghāyāt al-afkār (The End of Thoughts). For the
discussion of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s positions in al-Durar al-farāʾid, I use Dāwūd b. Aḥmad al-
Ḥayyī commentary called Sharḥ al-Qalāʾid al-muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fī sharḥ
Kitāb al-Qalāʾid (A Commentary on The Necklaces Drawn from Rare Pearls: Commenting on
The Book of Necklaces). Al-Ḥayyī’s representation of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s reasoning coincides
with Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s positions in other works. For al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid,
see Ahlwardt, Verzeichnisse x, 310. On al-Ḥayyī, cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 151; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām
420.
183 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 669.
184 Several copies of Dāmigh al-awhām are apparently located in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt; cf. al-
Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 667–668. For Riyāḍat al-afhām, see Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 99–158.
185 Horten’s monograph consists of a rearranged translation of the two works; cf. van Ess, Der
Eine und das Andere 989.
186 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 671.
187 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 159–204; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 673.
188 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 674; The last edition of the work is al-Mākhidhī’s from 1992.

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In positive law, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s most annotated writing189 remains to date

a major source of Zaydi fiqh in Yemen: his Kitāb al-Azhār fī fiqh al-aʾimma al-
athār (The Book of Blossoms: The Jurisprudence of the Pure Imams).190 In Kitāb
al-Azhār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā compiled and rectified the legal rulings handed down
from the eponym of the Yemeni Zaydiyya, al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq, and thereby con-
solidated the latter’s madhhab.191 The similarly famous al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār
al-jāmiʿ li-madhāhib ʿulamāʾ al-amṣār (The Overflowing Sea Compiling the Opin-
ions of the Scholars of the Regions) extends to the fiqh of scholars of other
schools of law. However al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār is introduced with a section on
the speculative theologians as well as their classes (maqālāt) as the first of six
separate books in which legal theory and theology figure prominently. These six
introductory books are called Muqaddimat al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār or Dībāja.192
Prominent among Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s heresiographical works on Muslim sects
is al-Munya wa-l-amal fī sharḥ al-milal wa-l-niḥal (Desire and Hope: A Commen-
tary on Denominations and Creeds),193 a commentary on his al-Milal wa-l-niḥal
(Denominations and Creeds) that discusses confessional groups within and out-
side the borders of Islam.194 Kitāb al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, in turn, is the first part of
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Muqaddima to al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār.195 According to Arnold,
van Ess and Stern, the part of al-Munya wa-l-amal (and al-Milal wa-l-niḥal)
that is concerned with the Muʿtazili classes is hardly more than a rework-
ing of al-Ḥakim al-Jishumī’s (d. 464/1101) Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-masāʾil,196 which in

189 Al-Kamālī counts at least 24 commentaries and glosses; cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī
122.
190 Kitāb al-Azhār has been edited and printed a few times since 1913, with the fourth and to
date last edition by al-Faḍl b. Abī l-Saʿd ʿUsayfirī and ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ b. Yaḥyā Wāsiʿī from
1993. Its commentaries and glosses are numerous; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Masādir 662–664.
191 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʿ 123–124. For the reception of Kitāb al-Azhār, see al-
Ḥibshī, Muʾallafat ḥukkām 94.
192 Al-Baḥr al-zakhkhar was edited and printed a number of times, with the first edition in
1949 in Cairo and the last one by Muḥammad Tāmir and Muḥammad Bahrān in 2001.
193 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 16–31.
194 Cf. Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 590, 594. The last chapter of al-Munya wa-l-amal concerning the
generations of Muʿtazili scholars was printed by Harrasowitz in 1902 as Bāb dhikr al-
Mutazila min kitāb al-Munya wa-l-amal fī sharḥ kitab al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, Thomas Arnold
(ed.).
195 Cf. Arnold (ed., intr.), Bāb dhikr al-Muʿtazila 1.
196 Al-Muḥassin b. Muḥammad b. Karāma al-Barūqānī alias al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (elsewhere
al-Jushamī) (d. 484/1101) was an influential student of ʿAbd al-Jabbār in the second gen-
eration, as well as a Hanafi convert to Zaydism from Bayhaq. His conversion is probably
a major reason why his works were widely received among the Yemeni Zaydiyya. On al-
Jishumī, his heresiographical works and his reception among the Yemeni Zaydiyya, cf. van

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turn had ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila as its main source. Apparently,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā focused mainly on the early Muʿtazili sects with little atten-
tion to either the developments since al-Jishumī’s death, or to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
contemporary environment.197 Hence, heresiography is another discipline in
which Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Muʿtazilism is evident.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Murtaḍā dedicated a considerable number of writings
to the sciences of the Arabic language and a few to mysticism (ʿilm al-tarīqa).
According to al-Ḥibshī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s commentary on his Sufi-styled book
on ethics in al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, called Thamarāt al-akmām (The Fruits of the
Perianth, alluding to the sleeves of the Sufi cloak) became popular among
Yemeni Sufis.198 On the other hand, his al-Qamar al-nawwār fī-l-radd ʿalā al-
murakhkhisīn fī l-malāhī wa-l-mizmār (The Shining Moon: A Refutation of Those
Who Concede Entertainment and Flute Play) was written in refutation of Sufi
practices. Other disciplines of his proficiency in which he contributed to Zaydi
scholarship were the prophetic Sunna, the science of inheritance (ʿilm al-
mawārīth or ʿilm al-faraʾiḍ), history (taʾrīkh) and logic (manṭiq).199
Not much can be extracted from the primary sources as to when Ibn al-
Murtaḍā wrote which book. The major source for dating his works is again
Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ. Al-Kamālī, in his analysis of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought, relied
mostly on Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ for the biographical and bibliographical data.200
As the sources indicate, Ibn al-Murtaḍā was prominent from his early days
on for his scholarship in the sciences of Arabic. His first book, al-Kawkab al-
ẓāhir fī sharḥ Muqaddimat Ibn Ṭāhir (The Clear Star: A Commentary on Ibn
Ṭāhir’s Introduction), was dedicated to linguistics. According to his son, Ibn al-
Murtaḍā wrote it before he was twenty, hence between 783/1381 and 784/1383.201
According to al-Kamālī, the Kitāb al-Qalāʾid on the positions of the theologi-
cal schools was the next book Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote, although Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
son mentions that he wrote another theological work, along with its commen-
tary, before Kitāb Qalāʾid.202 Al-Kamālī assumes, on the basis of the report in
Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ, that Ibn al-Murtaḍā turned to the study of kalām after having

Ess, Der Eine und das Andere 761–770; Madelung, Der Imam al-Qāsim 188; Madelung, al-
Ḥākim al-Djushamī; Schwarb, In the Age of Averroes 252.
197 Cf. Arnold (ed., intr.), Bāb dhikr al-Muʿtazila 66; van Ess, Der Eine und das Andere 988–995;
Stern, ʿAbd al-Djabbār b. Aḥmad. On al-Jishumī’s heresiographical works, cf. van Ess, Der
Eine und das Andere 761–770.
198 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, al-Ṣūfiyya wa-l-fuqahāʾ 65–66; Madelung, Zaydī Attitudes 135.
199 Cf. al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʿ 147–148.
200 Cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 113–116.
201 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 108.
202 Ibid., 146.

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mastered the various disciplines of Arabic linguistics. He summarized the the-

ological works he studied and compiled their meaning “in two and a half note-
books.”203 The first recorded titles of works Ibn al-Murtaḍā studied in kalām
are al-Raṣṣāṣ’s (d. 621/1224) Khulāṣa, Ḥanash’s (d. 719/1319) al-Ghiyāṣa and al-
Manakdim’s (d. 425/1034) Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa, representing a Bahshami-
Muʿtazili current in the Zaydiyya. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Qalāʾid is indeed
rather short, possibly the length of two and a half notebooks. Without claim-
ing to be an in-depth analysis, a resemblance to a commentary of al-Uṣūl
al-khamsa suggests itself upon the reading of Kitāb al-Qalāʾid. And in those
instances where Ibn al-Murtaḍā mentions his own choice, it is often in line with
what he ascribed to ʿAbd al-Jabbār or the Bahshami variety of the Muʿtazila.204
Therefore, it is likely that Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s account of the theological schools
with respect to the five principles (al-uṣūl al-khamsa), along with his own opin-
ion, were already established at an early stage of his career. Likewise his views
on legal theory: According to his son, his first writing on legal theory was the
versified summary of Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Raṣṣāṣ’s Jawhara, called Fāʾiqat
al-uṣūl.205 It is uncertain at what point he authored Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl. According
to Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ, all this happened before Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s political career
even started, hence before 793/1390–1391.206
It is quite certain that a large part of the six years of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s cap-
tivity (794/1392–801/1389) were spent in scholarly activity. At least three of his
writings resulted from this period, most prominently Kitāb al-Azhār and its
commentary Sharḥ al-Azhār.207 During his years in Thulāʾ (801/1399–816/1413),
Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote at least his great fiqh work al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār.208 Dur-
ing his sojourn in Jabal Miswar (816/1413–836/1432–1433) he authored Ghāyāt
al-afkār, a commentary on the introduction of al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, completed
al-Durar al-farāʾiḍ, commenting on his earlier Kitāb al-Qalāʾid, and began to
write Dāmigh al-awhām.209 In an intermezzo of what must have been a few
years between 816/1413 and 836/1432–1433, Ibn al-Murtaḍā lived in Ḥarāz where
he authored a large part of his writings. He completed Dāmigh al-awhām and
wrote Minhāj al-wuṣūl. Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad additionally mentions that Ibn

203 Ibid., 109.

204 For Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Qalāʾid, see Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 52–98; cf. al-Ḳamālī,
al-Imām al-Mahdī 114.
205 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 109.
206 Ibid., 109.
207 Ibid., 123.
208 Ibid., 130.
209 Ibid., 131; cf. al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 230–231.

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al-Murtaḍā wrote the following works while in Ḥarāz: Tāj ʿulūm al-adab wa-
qānūn kalām al-ʿarab (The Crown of the Sciences of Poetry and the Rules of Ara-
bic Speech) and Iklīl al-tāj wa-jawharat al-wahhāj (The Crown’s Corona and the
Glittering Gem) in the field of Arabic linguistics, al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm fī ʿilm
al-ḥadd wa-l-burhān al-qawīm (The Trustworthy Scales in the Science of Defini-
tion and the Sound Proof ) in logic, and al-Qāmūs al-fāʾiḍ fī ʿilm al-farāʾiḍ (The
Plentiful Lexicon in the Science of Inheritance) in inheritance.210 Upon his return
to Jabal Miswar at an unknown date before 836/1432–1433, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
authored the above-mentioned al-Qamar al-nawwār against leniency towards
mystical practices.211 None of the sources give specific information about Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s literary productivity after he took over the fortress Ẓafīr in Hajja
in 836/1432–1433.212
When comparing to the account of the chronology of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works,
the following must be noted: When Ibn al-Wazīr wrote his first known criti-
cism of contemporary speculative theology in general and the proof of God’s
existence in particular, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ, in 801/1399, Ibn al-Murtaḍā would
already have authored his great work on Hādawī-Zaydi fiqh,213 Kitāb al-Azhar.
It is also likely that his central work on speculative theology Kitāb al-Qalāʾid had
already appeared. Although it is not clear how well known Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s al-
Baḥr al-zakhkhār, Riyāḍat al-afhām and al-Durar al-farāʾid would have been at
the time when Ibn al-Wazīr wrote al-ʿAwāṣim, it is quite likely that he knew of
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s positions. After all, he visited and questioned Ibn al-Murtaḍā
during the latter’s sojourn in Thulāʾ. Concerning the consolidation of the Zaydi
madhhab, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Kitāb al-Azhar would have been indicative enough
of his views.
If Tarjīḥ was authored at a later stage of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life, as the second part
of the work indicates, Ibn al-Wazīr would have been familiar with all of Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s theological positions at the time of writing. Ibn al-Murtaḍā was well
known as a scholar of theology and law by then. Therefore, from a historical
point of view, it is very likely that Ibn al-Wazīr reacted at least partly to Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s doctrinal influence described in Tarjīḥ, as well as to his influence on
the structure of legal authority manifest in the trend to consolidation of the
Zaydi madhhab.

210 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 132.

211 Ibid., 133; cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 115.
212 Al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad, Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 132.
213 Those within the Zaydiyya who claim to follow the legal doctrine of the founder of the
first Zaydi state in Yemen, al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq, are called Hādawiyya.

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2.3 Intellectual Controversy between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā

In the rivalry between Ibn al-Murtaḍā and al-Manṣūr ʿAlī b. Muḥammad around
the succession of Imam al-Nāṣir in the year 793/1390–1391, Ibn al-Wazīr was
clearly opposed to Ibn al-Murtaḍā. According to Haykel, Ibn al-Wazīr’s support
for al-Manṣūr ʿAlī was motivated by political and family matters.214 One such
reason may have been that Ibn al-Wazīr endorsed the endeavor of al-Manṣūr’s
father, Imam al-Nāṣir, to disseminate the Sunni hadith compilations. The dis-
cussion of Ibn al-Wazīr’s defense of Ibn al-Murtaḍa’s rival (see chapter 2 section
6 below), although probably of a much later date (after 826/1423), will shed
light on the initial reasons. What we do know is that the nature of the con-
troversy between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā was obviously doctrinal at
a later stage. Remarks in Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings point to Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a
representative of a current within the Zaydiyya which Ibn al-Wazīr attempted
to challenge.215 A keen exchange of polemical poems between the two schol-
ars provides evidence that their controversy went to the core of both scholars’
beliefs. After Ibn al-Wazīr declared that the “principles of my religion are God’s
book, not the accidents” (uṣūl dīnī kitāb Allāh lā l-ʿarāḍ),216 Ibn al-Murtaḍā
replied by accusing Ibn al-Wazīr of opposing the principles of religion alto-
gether:

O you who contradicts the principles of religion,

and said: I have no purpose of knowing them,
that is the saying of one whose foot has slipped
from the path of truth, or whose heart is diseased.217

Since Ibn al-Wazīr mentions this poetical dispute in his al-ʿAwāṣim, it must have
taken place before 808/1406, the year when al-ʿAwāṣim was completed.218 It is
also clear that their controversy had doctrinal grounds when they met after Ibn
al-Murtaḍā pretended to the imamate a second time. After his imprisonment,
when Ibn al-Murtaḍā found refuge in Thulāʾ with Qadi Yūsuf, Ibn al-Wazīr vis-
ited him for some time and probed into Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s view of the imamate

214 Cf. Haykel, ʿUlamāʾ ahl al-ḥadīth 5.

215 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 8–9.
216 Ibid., 68; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422. For an explanation of the verses, see ch. 2 sec.
27. and ch. 3 sec. 3.1. below.
217 The poem is quoted in al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 43. For what is either a similar poem
or perhaps another part of the above poem and its theological context, see ch. 3 sec. 3.1.
below.
218 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422, 441.

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in 25 queries.219 Apparently, Ibnal-Wazīr was neither convinced of nor satisfied

with Ibn al-Murtaḍā replies.220 In a similar incident with Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s ally
of the second uprising, Imam al-Hādī al-Muʾayyad, Ibn al-Wazīr left his oppo-
nent after having investigated his arguments during a prolonged visit and joint
journeys, with the following lines:

If I desired, I could make the eyes cry by censuring,

and ignite fire in the hearts by subtle issues.
Yet, a desirer of God I have become,
the concern with trifles has been divorced from me.221

Evidently, Ibn al-Wazīr was satisfied, because he had acquainted himself with
Imam al-Hādī l-Muʾayyad’s positions and did not disagree on the core beliefs.
There is no mention of any controversy between them afterwards.
Both incidents must have taken place sometime between 802/1399, when
Ibn al-Murtaḍā came back to Thulāʾ after his second uprising, and 816/1413
when he went to Jabal Miswar. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr writes that the theological
controversy between Ibn al-Murtaḍā and Ibn al-Wazīr broadened and inten-
sified after the latter’s views had become more outspoken in the course of his
controversy with his teacher Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, and after Ibn al-Wazīr had discov-
ered that Ibn al-Murtaḍā was, or was becoming, a Zaydi with a strong Muʿtazili
leaning.222 That means it would have had to be after Ibn al-Wazīr had written al-
ʿAwāṣim in 808/1406. However, I suggest that both scholars were well aware of
each other’s theological positions before that time, based on the assumption
that Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s views regarding theology and legal theory were already
well established and partially expressed prior to his pretension to the ima-
mate in 793/1390–1391. Furthermore, biographical and bibliographical sources
tell us of the continuous exchange of letters between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn
al-Murtaḍā throughout many years.223 If al-Akwaʿ is correct in assuming that
Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote his al-Qamar al-nawwār against leniency towards Sufi

219 Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 31.

220 For Ibn al-Wazīr’s response to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s unsatisfactory argumentation, see al-Akwaʿ
(intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 49.
221 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 31; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 147.
According to the editor of Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, the second part of the quoted verse is found
only in the margins of one copy of the family chronicles. However, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdal-
lāh has recorded the entire poem; cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama fs. 138b–139a.
222 Cf. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 33–34.
223 Ibid., 34.

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practices to refute Ibn al-Wazīr’s Qubūl al-bushrā,224 their controversy would

still have been relevant between 816/1413 and 836/1432–1433 and it would have
involved issues of legal theory.225
In Ibn al-Wazīr’s fruitful controversy with his former teacher Ibn Abī l-
Qāsim, on the other hand, the case was apparently different. Aḥmad b. al-Wazīr
and Ibn Abī l-Rijāl tell us that Ibn al-Wazīr had Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a major
comrade-in-arms in the struggle for the validity of ijtihād after the establish-
ment of the legal schools. Ibn Abī l-Qāsim apparently rejected its validity, refer-
ring even to non-Zaydi scholars who had argued against the practice of ijtihād
after the time of “Muḥammad b. Idrīs [al-Shāfiʿī].”226 Both sources present Ibn
al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā as working hand in hand on the question of ijti-
hād. Yet even if both spoke out for the possibility and significance of ijtihād,
the grounds on which they did so reveal the epistemological differences which
were also at the root of their doctrinal controversy, as we shall see in subse-
quent chapters.
The controversy between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā ended through
the mediation of one ascetic who was a friend to both, namely Muḥammad
b. ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Kinānī (d. unknown).227 This reconciliation probably took
place late in their lives. In the glosses of one MS of the Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr,
the year 839/1435 is suggested. The remark is probably not on the original, as
it appears in none of the manuscripts that Ibn Abī l-Rijāl used.228 However, an
entry recorded in a collection of writings by or related to Ibn al-Wazīr mentions
the same year.229 Beyond these indications, it is likely that their conflict would
have lasted until a very late stage since Ibn al-Wazīr challenged ideas that would
have been in line with what Ibn al-Murtaḍā held throughout all of his writings.

224 Cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 50.

225 As I shall discuss below, Qubūl al-bushrā treats leniency as a legal maxim in general, and
in Zaydi law in particular. Legal maxims are located at the intersection of legal theory and
law.
226 Ibid., 33; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 148–149.
227 Apparently, al-Kinānī appealed to their common sense, placidity, kinship and lineage; cf.
ibid., 34. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl suggests that al-Kinānī died before the beginning of the 9th/15th
century. This is of course unlikely, given his mediative role at the end of the two scholars’
lives; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iii, 345–346; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya ii, 901.
228 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, who took different MSS of Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr as his sources, does not men-
tion the date.
229 Cf. Majmūʿ Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, 511. The remark was apparently recorded by the grand-
son of al-Ḥadī al-Wazīr, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh. However, the biography of Ibn al-Wazīr
that Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh authored and that I used as a source does not contain these
informations.

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3 Conclusion

An account of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life, education and personal controversies within

his context reveals the picture of a man whose life, thought and work devel-
oped in the intellectual environment of Yemen and the Hejaz, where different
schools of thought and law had a bearing on the political and social climate.
While Ibn al-Wazīr participated in political decisions and contributed to the
related doctrinal controversies to a certain degree, he actively sought to under-
stand the argumentation of opponents, and retreated where the issues at stake
were marginal. He endeavored to acknowledge the various theological and
legal influences that were already present in his immediate Zaydi environment,
and the more so in the broader context of Yemen and the Hejaz. However, this
endeavor involved criticism of the state of scholarship in the Yemeni Zaydiyya
of his day, which was wary of acknowledging the diversity. But his criticism
apparently did not involve the origins of the Zaydiyya, nor was it expressed
comprehensively until his views met with the broad indignation of his Zaydi
contemporaries.
Ibn al-Wazīr often chose retreat from social activity and turned to ascetic
and mystical forms of worship. He chose this path early on in his life and pur-
sued it until his death, albeit to varying degrees of social activity, alternating
scholarly productivity with phases of retreat.
One might expect that the content of Ibn al-Wazīr’s studies were a decisive
factor for the prominent position he took in the criticism of prevalent Muʿtazili
manifestation of Zaydi thought in kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. Yet if compared to the
contents of the studies of his contemporary, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, who was influ-
ential in his time and took decisively Muʿtazili views, it becomes evident that
the content of Ibn al-Wazīr’s education was by no means extraordinary. Ibn al-
Murtaḍā not only studied the same works to a large extent, but also received
licenses for these same works from the same teachers. It is very likely that both
scholars studied other works in common as well. The choice of what was men-
tioned is probably based on what was considered most important in the eyes
of historiographers. This choice itself reflects the dominant teaching in the
Zaydiyya of the time. It is, for example, noteworthy that none of the sources
mentions theological works by the Muʿtazili school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,
although the dissemination of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s thought in Zaydi Yemen
is documented prior to the 8th/14th century. In contrast, the Muʿtazili school
of the Bahshamiyya is strongly represented in the recorded education of Ibn
al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā.
Be that as it may, Ibn al-Wazīr was influenced by the study with non-Zaydi
teachers in general, and of prophetic traditions in particular, in a way Ibn al-

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Murtaḍā was not. The intensive extension of his knowledge in prophetic tra-
ditions seems not only to have quietened his soul, as he himself says,230 but
also to have furnished him with the sources he needed to cultivate and express
the views that he had already developed earlier in his education and that had
moved him to deepen his studies of the prophetic traditions in the first place.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s case lies differently. Although he studied Sunni hadith and
was familiar with theology and legal theory of other schools of thought and law,
his scholarly and spiritual activity did not seem to have diverged from the con-
temporary mainstream. Even if Ibn al-Wazīr built upon ideas that were already
present among the Zaydiyya of his day, many contemporaries strongly reacted
to his conclusions. In contrast to that, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s pretension to the ima-
mate was not rejected for doctrinal reasons. On the contrary, many lauded and
preferred him because he represented the Zaydi ideal of a scholar imam, mem-
ber of the ahl al-bayt and well-versed in the important disciplines of Zaydi
learning. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s legal and theological works became a beacon of
Zaydi learning in his time and much beyond. His teacher-student relation-
ships, although not differing much from Ibn al-Wazīr’s experience where input
is concerned, are an argument for the claim that Ibn al-Murtaḍā stood in an
established teaching tradition that referred back to authorities like the eponym
of the Yemeni Zaydiyya al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq. Ibn al-Murtaḍā even enhanced this
tradition by his own contributions.
In sum, Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā were exposed to the same intel-
lectual, theological and legal diversity. Even though a degree of inclusivist
approach to non-Zaydi texts and concepts cannot be denied in the life and work
of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, this does not go beyond what is almost inevitable, accord-
ing to Grünschloss, whenever one scholar has to grapple with the belief system
of the religious (or confessional) other.231 The factors for the diverging reac-
tions to the intellectual, theological and legal diversity are not perfectly clear.
Possibly, Ibn al-Wazīr spent more time in the intellectually more heterogenous
Sanaa, whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā had little personal contact with other schools
of thought and law in the Zaydi hijras he occupied. Moreover, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
apparently never travelled to Mecca to learn from any of the non-Zaydi scholars
of the Hejaz. However, no external element in Ibn al-Wazīr’s development ren-
ders him more prone to initiate or endorse a “Sunnisation” of the Zaydiyya than
his contemporaries, since Sunni texts and teachers as well as alternatives to the
Bahshami-Muʿtazili theology were already present in the Zaydi heartland.

230 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 201–203.

231 Grünschloss, Der eigene und der fremde Glaube 313.

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 chapter 2

Ibn al-Wazīr’s Works

This section provides a survey of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works and serves as the basis for
analysis of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought in the subsequent chapters. Although a num-
ber of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings have been discussed by mostly Muslim scholars,
many others have been neglected beyond a mere mention. To my knowledge,
an overview of his complete works has not been published yet. Therefore, this
survey will also provide a basis for further research on Ibn al-Wazīr, for example
in the important areas of Sufism and hadith studies, which I have only touched
upon.
The description of each work commences with a brief explanation of exter-
nal features, such as the date and number of copies along with their locations.
Extant and accessed copies of each manuscript, as well as printed editions, if
available, will be listed. After a short description of the structure, i.e. chapters
and section topics, of each book, its subject will be discussed at slightly greater
length.1 In the frequent case of no apparent internal structure, I have attempted
to order the writing into semantic fields without changing too much of the orig-
inal. Where access to a given work was impossible, the description and analysis
may be limited to the data given in catalogues and bibliographical sources.
The descriptions are arranged in alphabetical order. Bibliographical ac-
counts like al-Ḥibshī’s Maṣādir opted for an arrangement according to genre.
However, many books, like al-ʿAwāṣim, incorporate more than one discipline,
intertwining them in the line of argument for different topics. Others, like al-
Āyāt al-mubīnāt, which is a list of Quranic verses with infrequent comments,
may formally belong into the category of ʿulūm al-Qurʾān, as al-Ḥibshī sug-
gested,2 but the choice of verses as well as the content of the comments ren-
der the writing a highly theological one. Another option would have been to
arrange Ibn al-Wazīr’s works chronologically. Yet only very few writings are pro-
vided with a date of completion. Furthermore, the thick pattern of references
and cross-references makes it extremely difficult to track a development, espe-
cially since they frequently refer to works which we know were completed at
a later date. Therefore a chronological ordering could only be extremely ten-

1 The length of the descriptions is not proportional to the length of the original work. Rather, I
attempted to summarize the contents as well as possible while yet preserving the main propo-
sitions and train of thought.
2 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 28.

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ibn al-wazīr’s works 61

tative. With regard to both genre and chronology, Ibn al-Wazīr’s works elude
classification. Beyond merely being a problem of research, this phenomenon
is symptomatic of Ibn al-Wazīr’s integrative thought and method. It is among
Ibn al-Wazīr’s original features that he fuses genres, and that he claims to have
reached conceptions of the religious sciences that are consistent and timeless.

1 Al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla

Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla fī ākhir al-zamān (The Command of Solitude at

the End of Times) is extant in several copies in the library of Sanaa’s Grand
Mosque as well as in a number of private libraries.3 One version in the Grand
Mosque as well as copies found in the Ambrosiana in Milan and the British
Museum list varying titles: Anīs al-akyās fī l-iʿtizāl ʿan al-nās (The Intimately
Known of the Fine Points on Isolation from People) or ʿIddat al-akyās fī l-iʿtizal
ʿan al-nās (A Number of Fine Points on Isolation from People).4 It is commonly
listed under the titles belonging to mysticism (taṣawwuf ). Al-Shawkānī does
not mention a title for this “writing in praise of celibacy (ʿuzba) and solitude
(ʿuzla).”5
No date of completion is indicated, neither in any of the consulted versions
nor in the biblio- and biographical sources.6 Yet a comment in the second chap-
ter in the context of ijtihād clearly refers to Kitāb al-Qawāʿ id, indicating that it
was written sometime after the Book of Principles.7 It is very likely that Ibn al-
Wazīr wrote al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla at a later stage of his life. Although none of the
biographical sources tells us when exactly he went into isolation, the content
of al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla provides some indication. Some of the advantages of seclu-
sion from people refer to the temptations of fame as well as to the nuisance of
being sought for help and inquiry. Both suggest that Ibn al-Wazīr was already
advanced in age when he wrote the work, unless he referred to other, senior
scholars without mentioning it.

3 MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, colls. 21 and 118, 698; cf. Ruqayḥī iii, 1301–1303, which gives the
year 1281/1864–1865 for the second copy. The third copy is from 957/1550. Al-Ḥibshī and al-
Wajīh also mention copies in the private libraries of Zabāra as well as Muḥammad al-Kibsī;
cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332; al-Wajīh, al-Aʿ lām 826.
4 Cf. Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332.
5 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.
6 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, like most other sources, simply mentions the title; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ
al-budūr iv, 151.
7 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla 307.

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Of the two copies of the MS used here, one is relatively old, dating from
1035/1626, whereas the other copy was apparently completed in 1350/1932. The
older one has a number of collation remarks and comments from later cen-
turies (1223/1809) indicating that it was well read. Both copies were part of
collections that mainly contained writings of Ibn al-Wazīr and thematically
related authors.8 Al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla was edited by Ibrāhīm Bājis ʿAbd al-Majīd
and printed at the Dār Ibn al-Qayyim in al-Dammām, Saudi Arabia, in 1412/1991.

Content
The treatise is divided into a prologue, an introduction with a long section dis-
cussing scriptural evidence, and three main chapters ( fuṣūl). The benedictions
in the short prologue give prominence to the clarifying nature of the Prophet
Muḥammad’s legal endeavor. According to him, this clarification consisted in
explaining what benefits (maṣāliḥ) and causes of evil (mafāsid) particularly
pertain to all times and all legally responsible individuals (mukallafūn). Further,
the Prophet clarified the means to gain the benefits and to ward off harms. Ibn
al-Wazīr’s wording indicates the probable nature of finding those means. He
emphasizes the necessity of prefering that which is more likely to lead to the
desired end—the preponderant (al-rājiḥ).9
In the introduction, Ibn al-Wazīr informs the reader about the purpose of
his brief treatise: factors which render the retreat into solitude (ʿuzla) prefer-
able in certain times. He points out that these factors are in agreement with
Quran and Sunna. Ibn al-Wazīr generally points to the one reason for choosing
solitude: bringing one’s heart into unity with God and His will.10 He then lists
a number of conditions for such a retreat, which can be summarized as the
absence of any duties that an individual would violate if he went into solitude.
The next four pages are devoted to four Quranic narrations relating how
Quranic figures spent a time in solitude (ʿuzla), followed by a number of pro-
phetic reports about the same topic.11 The main chapter follows these prophetic
reports. Ibn al-Wazīr supports these narrations and reports with a series of

8 Both copies originate from the private library of Muḥammad al-Kibsī. Only the older one
has pagination, although infrequent. I will henceforth quote from the older copy. Writ-
ings of other authors contained in the collection include for example Ṣāliḥ b. al-Mahdī
al-Maqbalī’s (d. 1108/1696) al-ʿAlam al-shāmikh fī tafḍīl al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-abāʾ wa-l-mashāyikh
(The Lofty Banner: Preferring the Truth over the Fathers and Chiefs). For al-ʿAlam al-shāmikh,
see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 153.
9 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Amr bi-l-ʾuzla 293.
10 Ibid., 293.
11 Ibid., 294–298.

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Quranic verses, from which a number of lessons ( fawāʾid naẓariyya) can be

drawn. Ibn al-Wazīr arranges these in the form of seventeen aspects.12
The second chapter is devoted to distinguishing isolation as a means (wasī-
la), rather than an end (maqṣad) in itself.13 Accordingly, the value of the period
of isolation is determined by the way it is employed to arrive at its end: wor-
shipping God.
The third chapter deals with the duty of jihād.14 Q 9:36 and 41 are two
Quranic verses portraying the duty of jihād as a general command for every-
one and in every circumstance. The particular verse that Ibn al-Wazīr employs
to qualify the general duty is Q 9:91, in which the weak, the sick and the
poor are excluded from the obligation of jihād. The vital point of the chap-
ter comes down to the fact that a preference of those who fight for God’s cause
as opposed to those who remain behind is only valid where those remaining
behind have no excuse (ʿudhr) in the sense of weakness, sickness or lack of
means.15 Whereas jihād is a duty of the able, it is (only) a merit ( faḍīla) in the
eyes of the incapable.
The so-called principles which dominate Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning are very
general ones and are also applicable in the fields of theology and, especially, of
legal theory. Where tension between demands, duties and principles exists, an
individual must do what appears the most probable to him (rājiḥ). The ends
determine the means. Whatever is likely to lead to harm, needs to be shunned,
even though it may be good in itself. Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr directly refers
to the texts of revelation and, without discussing opinions of other scholars,
enhances the focus on spiritual and epistemological subjectivity.

2 Al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim

Al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim fī l-dhabb ʿan sunnat Abī l-Qāsim (Defenders and

Breaking [Arguments]: The Rebuffal of the Sunna of Abū l-Qāsim) is Ibn al-
Wazīr’s most famous work.16 He completed it in 808/1406. Yet many references

12 Ibid., 299–309.
13 Ibid., 309.
14 Ibid., 310.
15 Q 4:95 for example speaks of “those with an incapacity” (ūlī l-ḍarar) as excused; cf. Ibn al-
Wazīr, al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla 311. Citations from the Quran verses follow M.A.S. Abdel Haleem’s
translation.
16 See for example al-Akwā (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i; and al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu, who
identifies Ibn al-Wazīr almost entirely with his ʿAwāṣim. For Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, “he who studies
it does not need to study anything else,” because of the comprehensiveness with which it

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to later works of his own as well as to other authors indicate that he continu-
ously revised it. For example, Ibn al-Wazīr’s last work, Īthār al-ḥaqq, which was
completed in 837/1433–1434, is quoted in vol. 8, 383 of al-ʿAwāṣim.17 The origi-
nal consists of four volumes and is preserved in numerous complete as well as
partial MSS in several libraries inside and outside of Yemen. The oldest extant
copy is probably from 1083/1672–1673 and located in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt.18
Al-ʿAwāṣim was edited by Shuʿayb Arnaʾūt and printed in 9 volumes for the first
time in 1405/1985 and several times afterwards.
Al-ʿAwāṣim triggered the bulk of the criticism Ibn al-Wazīr received dur-
ing his lifetime. This magnum opus incorporates and discusses the positions
of various schools of thought and interweaves a large number of disciplines.
Al-Ḥibshī, and after him Rizq Ḥajar, call it an “encyclopedia of kalām.”19 Al-
Shawkānī counts it among the outstanding writings of Yemeni scholarship,
“containing useful lessons in various sciences that cannot be found else-
where.”20 Describing al-ʿAwāṣim as a “refutation of the Zaydiyya,” as al-Shaw-
kānī does, is nevertheless a far too restricted and biased view of the work, as
we shall see.21

Content
The work is written in the polemical ilzām-style widespread in Muslim kalām:
Ibn al-Wazīr’s express aim is to refute his opponent based on his opponent’s
challenges.22

apparently treats a large range of topics; cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 150. Biogra-
phies written on Ibn al-Wazīr’s life and work frequently refer to him as ṣāḥib al-ʿAwāṣim
wa-l-qawāṣim, especially outside of Yemen as in the case of Ṣadīq Ḥasan Khān; cf. Ṣadīq
Ḥasan Khān, al-Tāj al-mukallal 332–339; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 97.
17 Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr quotes Ibn Ḥajar’s Talkhīṣ al-ḥabīr (ix, 278), Fatḥ al-bārī (viii,
341) as well as Sharḥ al-nukhba (ix, 127, 260), which were completed after 808/1406, 813/1411
and 818/1416 respectively. The details of references to later writings by other authors were
gathered from the editor’s introduction to al-Rawḍ al-bāsim; cf. al-ʿAmran (ed., intr.), al-
Rawḍ al-bāsim 58–59.
18 Copies are documented for the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt and Maktabat al-Awqāf in Ṣanaʿāʾ, as well
as several private libraries. More copies can be found in the Maktabat Shaykh al-ʿAbīkan
in Riyāḍ and the Maktabat Markaz al-baḥth al-ʿilmī in the University of Umm al-Qura; cf.
Ruqayḥī, 688–690; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 96; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134; al-Wajīh,
Aʿ lām 829.
19 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134; Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 17.
20 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.
21 Ibid., ii, 82.
22 On ilzām, see Peters, God’s Created Speech 74.

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The first volume of the original MS corresponds to volumes 1 to 3 (to

page 299) of the edited version. It commences with an appeal to turn to the
prophetic Sunna as the main source of evidence in all religious questions.
The virtues of the Prophet, the ahl al-bayt and the Prophet’s companions are
emphasized. The appraisal of the virtues of the Muslim community requires
that those disagreeing in doctrinal issues apart from the five pillars may not be
called unbelievers. Indeed, to charge a person with unbelief (takfīr) and strife
between Muslims is prohibited, and the first part of this volume is a strong
appeal to avoid strife along with methods for compliance with this appeal. This
section sets the stage for most of Ibn al-Wazīr’s further endeavor and indeed
his entire agenda. Ibn al-Wazīr explains his concept of knowledge as a means
of preserving unity. He refers to the Muslim community at the time of the
Prophet, when faith was based on the knowledge that necessarily follows from
the perception of his miracles and preternatural phenomena, as well as being
informed about his attributes along with circumstantial evidence (qarīna) in
his surroundings.23 Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes a view which regards that kind of
knowledge which is apparent to all human beings as the basis of faith, suppos-
edly free of doubt and confusion and manifest in the general tenets of Islam
( jumal).24 This view is what he calls the “middle between the two groups” (al-
wasaṭ bayn al-farīqayn), which most likely refers to the extreme Muʿtazila and
Ashʿariyya.25
In the next section, the question is whether the duty of independent legal
interpretation (ijtihād) is still valid, or its performance is no longer within the
abilities of believers. Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the arguments of both sides. On
the one hand, there are those who negate the question and consider ijtihād
beyond the abilities of believers after the establishment of the schools of law.
This group is called muʿassirūn, i.e. “those who render ijtihād exceedingly dif-
ficult.” On the other hand, there are those who consider the duty valid and
“render ijtihād easily attainable,” called muyassirūn. Ibn al-Wazīr clearly ranges

23 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 206–207.

24 Ibid., i, 211. Jumal—the things as a whole, broadly defined, understood integrally—is not
to be confused with the concept of the general (ʿāmm, pl. ʿumūm) in legal methodology,
which has the particular (khāṣṣ, pl. khuṣūṣ) as its counterpart. Jumal in this context per-
tains to knowledge and is not well defined; it refers to the external meanings of passages,
the whole of a text, or a broad tenet.
25 This middle ground was actually held by another group of Muʿtazilis, namely Abū l-Qāsim
al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī and his followers. Al-Balkhī is an authority to whom Ibn al-Wazīr refers
more than once in his attempt to champion Muʿtazili views that he could agree with. On
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, see the doctoral thesis of Omari as well as its reworked version,
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī’s doctrine 39–57.

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himself with the latter. His arguments treat the requirements of a mujtahid, as
well as the implications of taqlīd.26
The second prominent controversial question in Volume I is whether reports
of those who interpret the sources differently—or erroneously, according to
the Zaydiyya—i.e. ahl al-taʾwīl, should be accepted and incorporated into the
working material of a religious scholar. Again, Ibn al-Wazīr explains the dis-
tinction between those who reject transmission from the ahl al-taʾwīl on the
one hand, and those for whom the scientific contributions of the ahl al-taʾwīl
are valid on the other hand. Ibn al-Wazīr especially questions the claim of
certainty for rejection, before he goes on to discuss the affirming party.27 A
consensus—among which influential Zaydi and Muʿtazili scholars of the ear-
lier generation are particularly mentioned28—apparently accepts information
from those whose wrong interpretation of the sources leads them to grave sin
( fussāq taʾwīl). Extensive evidence from reason and revelation is given.
The matter is different concerning those whose wrong interpretations lead
to more than grave sin, namely to unbelief (kuffār taʾwīl). Although the same
arguments apply as in the case of fussāq taʾwīl, only five Zaydi authorities insist
on consensus in the matter. Ibn al-Wazīr affirms the acceptance, yet leaves the
matter in the realm of the merely probable where different positions coexist
(maḥall naẓar wa-ijtihād).29
A specific accusation towards Ibn al-Wazīr discussed at the end of Volume I
reveals how Ibn al-Wazīr’s position in these questions of legal theory specifi-
cally challenged Zaydi doctrine: For the Zaydiyya, the Prophet’s progeny the-
oretically occupied a privileged role in all matters of religious knowledge. Ibn
al-Wazīr often seemed to prefer statements of those considered fussāq taʾwīl
by the Zaydiyya to positions of the ahl al-bayt.30 Was this a methodical prefer-
ence, revealing his rejection of the Zaydiyya as a whole? Ibn al-Wazīr strongly
denied this. Rather, his occasional preference for the information of scholars
other than ahl al-bayt manifests the principle that “the specialists of each disci-
pline should be preferred in their field” (taqdīm ahl kull fann fī fannihim).31 This
preference of specialists is manifest in Ibn al-Wazīr’s strong reliance on the six
main Sunni hadith compilations, especially those of al-Bukhārī and Muslim,

26 Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 167a.

27 Cf. ibid., f. 167b.
28 Ibn al-Wazīr lists twelve Zaydi and Muʿtazili scholars in support; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-
ʿAwāṣim ii, 317–330.
29 Cf. ibid., ii, 402.
30 See for example ibid., iii, 21.
31 Ibid., ii, 429.

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whose value he upholds in spite of the concession that not all of the traditions
mentioned in their compilations are sound.32
In a last extensive section, Ibn al-Wazīr defends the traditionists (ahl al-
ḥadīth or muḥaddithūn) against a number of accusations. Some of these refer
to beliefs such as the assumption that the traditionists consider Muḥammad’s
companions infallible (ʿiṣma). Others justify the acceptance of particular trans-
mitters, who would not be accepted by the Zaydiyya for doctrinal reasons. Many
of these justifications are closely related to the position vis-à-vis the ahl al-
taʾwīl.33 Ibn al-Wazīr points out that although many members of the Zaydiyya
and Muʿtazila reject the six Sunni hadith compilations, they still rely upon them
heavily, either directly or by adopting them indirectly from others.34
The second volume of the original MS corresponds to vol. 3, 300 to vol. 5,
263 of al-Arnaʾūt’s edition. Throughout the work, Ibn al-Wazīr defends cen-
tral theological beliefs of the traditionists against accusations that would ren-
der them beyond the limits of sound and certain doctrine. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal,
for example, supposedly did not defend anthropomorphism (al-tashbīh wa-l-
tajsīm).35 Ibn al-Wazīr supports his theological reasoning with transmissions
from a group of the ahl al-bayt who hold to the agreed-upon matters of gen-
eral knowledge (ahl al-jumal).36 Ibn al-Wazīr follows this with the reasoning
of these so-called ahl al-jumal in the vital theological matters of God’s unicity,
prophethood, and the rest of the central doctrines37 in contradisctinction to
prominent Bahshami-Muʿtazili arguments.38
Ibn al-Wazīr further explains and defends the reasons for desisting from
speculative theology by the example of Mālik b. Anas as well as other jurists
and traditionists who rejected kalām.39 One reason pertains to the question
of whether or not kalām leads to the highest certainty about the existence of
God.40 Another reason refers to the validity of kalām as a necessary means to
refute the philosophers and innovators.41

32 Ibid., iii, 65, 89.

33 Ibn al-Wazīr discusses 14 of 27 wrong assumptions in reference to the traditions; Ibn al-
Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 142; cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 168a.
34 Ibid., iii, 299.
35 Cf. ibid., iii, 300.
36 Ibid., iii, 409.
37 Here again Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the poem which caused him much opposition; cf. ibid.,
iii, 422.
38 Ibid., iii, 441.
39 Ibid., iii, 453.
40 Ibid., iv, 33.
41 See for example ibid., iv, 58, 87.

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After the defense of this first group of traditionists, Ibn al-Wazīr continues to
discuss another group. Unlike the first group, this second group combines rea-
soning based on revelation with the rational sciences. Ibn Taymiyya would be
an example for this group.42 In this context, the ahl al-taʾ wīl are discussed again,
along with the arguments of different schools for or against takfīr of them. Ibn
al-Wazīr discusses the question of whether the consensus of the ahl al-bayt can
be used as the standard for judging ahl al-taʾwīl, referring to Zaydī authorities
such as the imams al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza and al-Muʾayyad bi-
llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza to support his point.43
The next controversial doctrine discussed in volume two is the createdness
of the Quran.44 Although Ibn al-Wazīr defends the uncreatedness of the Quran
(ʿijāz), he alludes only to his own position. More importantly, he argues against
takfīr in the controversies on this question, and supports his argument with
quotations from early Zaydi and Muʿtazili authorities. Insistence on the jumal
is repeatedly determined to be the way to avoid charges of unbelief. The forefa-
thers or early generations (salaf ) are an often-cited example for the support of
such jumal. But the early Zaydi theologian al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī is also
claimed for the defense of this view.45
A considerable part of the volume is dedicated to the question of whether
or not God can be seen in the Hereafter (masʾalat al-ruʾya). In this case, it is
the eponym of the Shafiʿi school that becomes the means by which the oppo-
nents of the speculative theologians are defended against the charge of anthro-
pomorphism.46 In two chapters, Ibn al-Wazīr ranges himself with those who
affirm the possibility of seeing God in the Hereafter, without speculating on
how (bi-lā kayf ).47 Again, he expends most of his efforts on defending the views
of those who differ from the predominant Zaydi-Muʿtazili view, rather than elu-
cidating his own.48
In the next section, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses a number of other doctrinal issues
in which a misunderstanding of the Sunni and traditionists’ approach appar-
ently prevails. Ibn al-Wazīr touches upon compulsion ( jabr) and goes into the

42 Ibid., iv, 119.

43 Ibid., iv, 196–197.
44 Ibid., iv, 342.
45 Ibid., iv, 396. Another example of a member of ahl al-bayt who insists on the restriction
to the jumal is Ibn al-Wazīr’s relative, Imam Yaḥyā b. Manṣūr b. al-ʿAfīf b. Mufaḍḍal (d.
around 680/1281–1282) in his Jumal al-islām wa-uṣūl dīn Muḥammad; cf. ibid., iii, 411; Ibn
al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 30.
46 Ibid., v, 5.
47 Cf. ibid., v, 74.
48 Ibid., v, 72, 74, 107, 208–238.

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difference between hoping for God’s mercy (rajāʾ) and deferment of judgement
(irjāʾ), associated with school of the Murjiʾa.49 Faith is also discussed in this
context: Is the utterance of the creed a necessary condition of faith or only
an independent duty, subsequent to internal conviction as fasting or praying
are?50 Other questions include the necessity of thankfulness towards God; the
question of whether reason knows of the duty to be thankful and whether it
is able to discern good and evil independently (al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ bi-l-ʿaql);
and the consensus of the Islamic community that no deficient attribute can be
ascribed to the Divine.51 However these questions are answered, the opponents
are not charged with deliberate unbelief (kufr taṣrīḥ).
In the third and longest volume of al-ʿAwāṣim—corresponding to vol. 5,
264—vol. 8, 11 of the edition—Ibn al-Wazīr resumes his vindication of Sunni
doctrine from the accusation of denying the human being any part in their
actions and conduct.52 In this volume, Ibn al-Wazīr’s predominant method is
to show that the doctrines of the Ashʿariyya and the Muʿtazila do not differ in
essence. In other words, they do not disagree on the matters known by neces-
sity, the jumal.53
The first central matter treated in this volume is the human being’s free
choice (ikhtiyār).54 Ibn al-Wazīr employs Muʿtazili, Shiʿi and Sunni texts in
order to uncover the error of the prevailing opinion about the Ashʿariyya
and the resulting takfīr expressed by his opponent. The root of the question
of ikhtiyār is determined by the various doctrines on the divine will (irāda,
mashīʾa)55 and the closely related issue of the divine decree (al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-
qadar).56 Although Ibn al-Wazīr insists that the divine decree is among those
matters of kalām which human reason should not attempt to penetrate, he
broadly discusses the different positions on the issue along with the respective
proofs and backgrounds. Ibn al-Wazīr’s major emphasis is on demonstrating
that the Ashʿari insistence on the divine decree is not equal to championing
the idea of absolute voluntarism. The understanding Ibn al-Wazīr develops in

49 Ibid., v, 255.
50 Ibid., v, 245.
51 Ibid., v, 258–259.
52 Ibid., v, 264.
53 Al-Akwaʿ says that if anyone wanted to know the two groups in full, he should read this
volume, adding that one would have to be an extremely knowledgable scholar, since he
himself did not succeed in giving order or structure to its contents; cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-
ʿAwāṣim i, 94.
54 Ibid., v, 271.
55 Ibid., v, 272.
56 Gardet, al-Ḳaḍāʾ wa l-Ḳadar.

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his discussion of related evidence and opinions would supposedly be agreeable

to the Ashʿariyya as well as the Muʿtazila.
Subsequently, Ibn al-Wazīr argues that there is a broad consensus in the
Muslim community to the effect that human beings’ reward and punishment
(al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd) for their actions correspond to divine measures of justice.
Of course, the Ashʿari idea of acquisition (kasb) must be discussed in this con-
text. The various positions of Muʿtazili and Ashʿari groups in respect to kasb are
put forth to show that the attitudes toward the idea differed in both schools.
Apparently, the Muʿtazila did not entirely reject the idea as a whole.57
Another controversy which arises from the doctrine of the divine will is
the question of whether or not God charges his creatures with doing what is
impossible (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq). With few exceptions, Ibn al-Wazīr endeavors
to discharge the Ashʿari doctrine of an allegation concluded from the Ashʿari
view of divine voluntarism according to which God needs no motive (dāʿī) for
actions. The points of contention between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya are
especially drawn out in volume three of al-ʿAwāṣim, so that Ibn al-Wazīr’s biog-
rapher writes: “Whoever desires to know the two schools entirely and belongs
to those who are studious, knowledgeable and equitable should occupy himself
with it.”58
In volume four (vol. 8, 11—vol. 9, 404 in the edition) Ibn al-Wazīr again
endeavors to dissociate the views held by the traditionists from a number of
doctrines that amount to unbelief: anthropomorphism (tajsīm), the theory of
coerced human actions ( jabr) and the deferment of judgement (irjāʾ).59 These
doctrinal issues were used to explain why transmissions by the traditionists
were rejected, at least by later Zaydiyya and Muʿtazila, exemplified in the chal-
lenges of Ibn al-Wazīr’s teacher Ibn Abī l-Qāsim throughout the entire work.
Yet another doctrine of particular interest in the Zaydi rejection of the trans-
missions of Sunni traditionists is extensively treated in the fourth volume of al-
ʿAwāṣim: the theory of the imamate.60 Ibn al-Wazīr illustrates with arguments,
traditions and quotations of opinions that many traditionists are supposedly
either close the Zaydiyya or the Muʿtazila on different aspects of the imamate.
Those who apparently allow the imamate of an unjust ruler do so only out of
necessity and only so long as the injustice does not exceed a particular level.61
The level of injustice that determines whether or not a ruler should be endured

57 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 56.

58 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 130b.
59 Cf. ibid., f. 131a. Ibn al-Wazīr takes up the same topic again at the end of volume three.
60 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim, viii, 11.
61 Ibid., viii, 163.

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according to the traditionists is closely connected to the performance of the

five pillars of Islam.62 Where the traditionists differ from the Zaydis, namely
concerning genealogy, they do not differ from the Muʿtazila: neither restrict the
imamate to the members of ahl al-bayt. In the same vein, Ibn al-Wazīr treats the
matter of social intercourse with questionable rulers, which was yet another
point of criticism towards the traditionists.63
Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the different kinds of interpretation
(taʾwīl).64 The context is once again the accusation that the traditionists hold
views that anthropomorphize God. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, this false ascrip-
tion is due to a misunderstanding of interpretation. A major distinction be-
tween the permitted kind of interpretation and the kind advised against per-
tains to the relation between the ambiguous (mutashābih) and the metaphor-
ical (majāz). Ibn al-Wazīr discusses this relationship along with its epistemo-
logical implications for diverging doctrinal conclusions, to the effect that many
interpretations may co-exist.65
In the last part of the fourth volume, Ibn al-Wazīr provides the reader with
his exposition of a collection of traditions that are decisive for further doctrinal
issues at the center of the controversy between the speculative theologians and
the traditionists.66 Significantly, Ibn al-Wazīr repeatedly states that he does not
claim certainty (qatʿ) for his expositions, but rather allows for other interpre-
tations.
The doctrinal issues subsequent to anthropomorphic statements about God
are those of promise, threat and hope in God’s goodness (waʿd, waʿīd and
rajāʾ).67 The last concept, i.e. rajāʾ, is much emphasized time and again. The cer-
tainty of God’s ultimate goodness functions as a counterbalance to the many
doctrinal matters that must be relinquished to the realm of conjecture.
Notably, Ibn al-Wazīr concludes al-ʿAwāṣim with a topic that is already sa-
lient in the introduction of the book. Although al-Ḥibshī’s characterization
of al-ʿAwāṣim as an “encyclopedia of kalām” registering multiple positions of
numerous Islamic groups appears accurate,68 there is one main theme that
renders significance to the discussion of different topics: The larger part of
doctrinal matters cannot be known for certain. Natural differences between

62 Ibid., viii, 168.

63 Ibid., viii, 203.
64 Ibid., viii, 262.
65 Ibid., viii, 264–325. See also al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 362–363.
66 Ibid., viii, 336.
67 Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 131b.
68 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 134.

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created beings bear on the differences in understanding. An example of this

are the different emphases placed on either the fear of God or the hope for
His mercy. In one particular tradition, a quarrel between the angels is reported:
Shall God have mercy on the murderer of one hundred men or shall he pun-
ish him? Neither of the two groups of angels occupying opposite positions was
rebuked.69 Ibn al-Wazīr relates this to opposing views among human beings.
Consequently, charges of unbelief, rejection of transmissions and division of
the Muslim community cannot be justified by reference to the discussed doc-
trines. A satisfaction with a general understanding of the broad tenets (al-iktifāʾ
bi-l-jumal) keeps the community together. But, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, al-
iktifāʾ bi-l-jumal is hard to maintain using any source other than the texts of the
Quran and prophetic Sunna and necessary knowledge that is general. Method-
ologically, direct reference to these sources is especially endangered by the
practice of taqlīd, not only in legal matters, but also in theological questions
where individuals affiliate with scholars and schools who represent different
doctrinal systems.

3 Al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt

The short title of Ibn al-Wazīr’s treatise The Clear Verses gets a different twist
when linked to the longer title: al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt li-qawlihi taʿalā {yuḍill man
yashāʾ wa-yahdī man yashāʾ} (The Verses That Elucidate the Divine Saying “He
Leads Astray Whom He Wills and Guides Whom He Wills”).70 The verse in ques-
tion is part of Q 16:93.71 Al-Ḥibshī calls the treatise al-Āyāt al-bayyināt with a
similar meaning. Al-Ḥarbī considers al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt clearer, yet has found
the other title in the catalogues as well.72 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl’s information on the
work confirms the first title.73 Al-Ḥibshī mentions two separate works with the
same title, but under different categories and in different locations.74 He failed
to either realize or to point out their identity. No indication as to the time of
writing of the original can be found.

69 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ix, 376.

70 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt, MS Sanaa, Maktabat Muḥammad al-Kibsī, coll. 89, 291.
71 The same phrase recurs in Q 14:4.
72 Al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu, 88 (footnote 2).
73 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 153.
74 One MS with the title Āyāt al-bayyināt is mentioned in the category of Quranic sciences
(ʿulūm al-Qurʾān); cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 28; another one is in the category of theology (ʿilm
al-kalām); cf. ibid., 134. Al-Wajīh lists only one MS titled al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt, which is to be
found in a collection of al-Kibsī’s library; cf. al-Wajīh, al-Aʿ lām 826.

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Content
ʿAlī l-ʿAmrān, editor of the latest version of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, ranks al-Āyāt
al-mubīnāt among those “epistles and responses to the innovators among the
Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya that can neither be counted, nor can that which
they comprise be responded to.”75 As the longer title indicates, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt is a list of Quranic verses that attest to Ibn al-Wazīr’s under-
standing of Q 16:93.76 The verse was of central importance in the disagreement
between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya concerning predestination and free
will. Although it is placed well in the category of theology, it contains none
of the disputation style prevalent in many other theological writings by Ibn
al-Wazīr. Briefly stating his position on the question of right guidance and lead-
ing astray, he immediately starts to list numerous Quranic verses to confirm his
view. He begins with the second Sura and systematically works his way through
the Quran from beginning to end. Ibn al-Wazīr finds support for his under-
standing of Q 16:93 in a number of verses from 43 other Suras. Explanations
of the verses are rare and, if existent, very brief, hardly ever more than one line.
It appears that Ibn al-Wazīr meant this piece of writing to be a source for a
related discussion he conducted elsewhere.
The first statement of the work sets the stage for the subsequent under-
standing of the verse. Ibn al-Wazīr leaves no doubt that he is among those
who defend both God’s justice and human free will. Right guidance and lead-
ing astray must refer to a point in time after the human being has chosen his
path. Reminiscent of one typical Muʿtazili explanation of the verse in question,
Ibn al-Wazīr insists that the concept of misguidance signifies a punishment
which occurs after sinning.77 After this initial statement, Ibn al-Wazīr starts list-
ing the Quranic verses. Similarly to the first statement, Ibn al-Wazīr interprets
the “seal” which God “set on the heart of the unbelievers” according to Q 2:7 to
signify punishment.78 A little later, the verse about guidance and misguidance
in Q 14:4 is commented upon briefly and clearly to the same effect, namely that
the leading astray occurs “after it is deserved” (baʿd al-istiḥqāq).79 Ibn al-Wazīr
points out that Q 14:4 concludes with the divine name ‘the All-Wise’ (al-ḥakīm).

75 Al-ʿAmrān (ed., intr.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 35.

76 The manuscript used for the present study was copied in Shaʿbān 1035/May 1626. Ibn
al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 291, colophon. It is part of a collection from the library of
Muḥammad al-Kibsī (p. 284 to p. 292).
77 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 284.
78 Ibid., 284.
79 Ibid., 285.

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God’s wisdom in the “leading astray” or the “right guidance” is that He does
this for a particular purpose. Ibn al-Wazīr does not go into what this purpose
signifies in detail.
Another example is taken from Q 39:57–59: An individual facing perdition
laments his fate and asserts that he would have been among the righteous had
he been guided by God. In response, there is an appeal to the signs which God
did indeed send for guidance, but which were unheeded. For Ibn al-Wazīr, this
response is clear evidence against undeserved leading astray of the unbelievers.
Had God wanted to mislead or prevent guidance, so Ibn al-Wazīr’s argument
goes, He would have done so from the beginning.80
Besides a confirmation of the above-mentioned argument that there can be
no initial “leading astray” before it is deserved, another aspect is of interest
here. Ibn al-Wazīr insists that guidance is for all (qad hadā l-jamīʿ).81 An exam-
ple from Q 41:17 that talks about the tribe of Thamūd82 explains Ibn al-Wazīr’s
stance: all mankind had the choice of following the guidance and were (or are)
either rewarded or punished according to their choice. If, then, the verse that
“He guides whom He wills” refers to a time before the choice, all would have
been given guidance.
The last verse that apparently yields an argument for guidance is Q 100:11.
God will be informed about (khabīr) the supposedly sinful secrets of the hearts
on the Day of Judgement. Logically, this has consequences for the question of
responsibility.83
In conclusion, this brief work is of great interest for the study of Ibn al-
Wazīr’s thought. It is a clear and brief expression of Ibn al-Wazīr’s own position
and method concerning a central issue in dispute between the two dominant
theological schools, the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya. Ibn al-Wazīr’s method,
the direct reference to Quranic verses, bears on the whole work’s character as
an expression of his own view.

4 Āyāt al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya

Ibn al-Wazīr’s Collection of Quranic Verses Pertaining to Religious Law received

much attention in spite of its brevity. It is listed in numerous biographical

80 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 289.

81 For the corresponding concept of luṭf, see Leaman, Luṭf.
82 Thamūd is the name of an ancient Arab tribe, which disappeared before the rise of Islam
and is presented as a godless people; cf. Shahid, Thamūd.
83 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 291.

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and bibliographical sources. Another version of the title reads Ḥaṣr āyāt al-
aḥkām. One or two copies of the MS are apparently to be found in the Dār
al-Makhṭūṭāt.84 According to al-Wajīh, the original is located in the Maktabat
al-Awqāf.85 The copy used for the present study dates from the year 1034/1625.
It originates from a collection of the private library of al-Kibsī’s, which is prob-
ably the same that al-Wajīh mentions. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Qāsim
(d. 1067/1657)86 used the work as a major source for his commentary on the
legally significant verses of the Quran (āyāt al-aḥkām). His book is called
Muntahā l-marām fī sharḥ āyāt al-ahkām (The Utmost Desire: Explaining the
Legal Verses) and was edited and printed by the Dār al-yamaniyya in Sanaʿāʾ
in 1986.

Content
Āyāt al-aḥkām is not a rich source of information on the thought of Ibn al-
Wazīr. It is hardly more than a list of Quranic verses. In contrast to the other
collections of Quranic verses concerning particular topics, Ibn al-Wazīr does
not comment on a single one of the listed verses. His list commences with Surat
al-Baqara (Q 2). Surat al-Kawthar (Q 108) provides the last legally applicable
verse. There are, however, interesting insights into Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology
that can be indirectly gathered from the writing.
It is noteworthy, for example, that those verses which Ibn al-Wazīr lists as
verses of rules (āyāt al-aḥkām) amount to only 236. Different ways of count-
ing exist. Yet there is agreement among later jurists that there are 500 Quranic
verses from which legal rules can be derived.87 Ibn al-Wazīr lowers the num-
ber of required verses without weakening the importance of the Quran as a
major source. This is emphasized especially in his Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾ ān. In
Āyāt al-aḥkām, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the Tarjīḥ with the aim of warding off the
potential challenge that he would not take the Quran as a source of knowledge
seriously enough.88 On the contrary, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, the whole of the

84 The information provided as to ___location varies; cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu, 94;
al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 27–28; al-Wajīh, al-Aʿ lām, 828. Al-Akwaʿ mentions Āyāt al-aḥkam with-
out locating it; cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 74.
85 Cf. al-Wajīh, al-Aʿ lām 828.
86 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ suppl., 197.
87 Cf. Pakatchi and Harris, Āyāt al-aḥkām.
88 Ibn al-Wazīr does not mention his Tarjīḥ explicitly by title. Rather, he refers to a “separate
book” which he “committed to the strengthening of the principle of taking the Qurʾān as
the greatest foundation as well as the means of distinction in ambiguous issues”; cf. Ibn
al-Wazīr, Āyāt al-aḥkām 267.

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Quranic text needs to be known, as a foundation for the deduction of legal rules
from particular verses.89 But why then does he not require the same amount of
verses others do? A concept ever present with Ibn Wazīr permeates the intro-
ductory sentences of Āyāt al-aḥkām. One must distinguish, he writes, between
two kinds of verse: One the one hand, there are verses in which the connec-
tion between indicator and that indicated (madlūl) is so obvious that everyone
agrees about it. On the other hand, there are verses upon which the scholars
disagree as to whether they point to a particular matter of legal interest at all.90
These need only be known by scholars who base their arguments on them. It is
not certain whether they are of legal significance. Therefore, they are dispens-
able for the legal discourse of which all active legal interpreters must be aware.
Unfortunately, Ibn al-Wazīr does not explain how he distinguishes between the
two kinds of inference in the first and second sets of Quranic verses. Further,
Ibn al-Wazīr writes that it is impossible to limit all the material of which one
supposes or allows legal rules to be inferred.91 In other words, where matters
are binding, as the āyāt al-aḥkām in this case, one should restrict oneself to a
minimum. This minimum is defined by the agreement that exists among the
scholars.

5 Al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ fī ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ

The full title is usually given as al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ fī ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ wa-jamīʿ mā
jāʾat bihi l-sharāʿi (The Conclusive Proof of [the Existence of ] the Creator and All
That is Put Forth by the Revealed Law). Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 1099/1698) quotes
the title of a book that might be identical with al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ as Kitāb al-
Burhān fī uṣūl al-adyān (The Book of Proof: On the Principles of Religions).92 Ibn
Abī l-Rijāl has Kitāb al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ fī maʿrifat al-ṣāniʿ (The Book of Conclu-
sive Proof: On the Knowledge of the Creator).93 According to the bibliographical
sources as well as the catalogues, the oldest copy of the MS exists in the Dār al-
Makhṭūṭāt and was copied in the year 957/1550.94 Neither the digitized copy
received from the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt in Sanaa, nor the one from the Muʾassasat

89 Ibn al-Wazīr, Āyāt al-aḥkām 267.

90 Ibn al-Wazīr, Āyāt al-aḥkām 267.
91 Ibid., 267.
92 Cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 74.
93 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151.
94 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 135.

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al-Imām Zayd were headed originally.95 After the colophon of the preceding
work, the scribes state that “now follows al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ.” The catalogue of
the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt mentions that the title is a reconstruction. However, it
must have already been established by the time of al-Shawkānī, since he men-
tioned the above title in full.96 It is possible that the title was not known to
Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn and hence he rendered it slightly differently. Ibn al-Wazīr,
however, makes mention of al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ along with references to its con-
tents a few times in al-ʿAwāṣim.97 Al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ was edited and printed in
1349/1930–1931 in Cairo.
This is one of the rare cases in which a writing of Ibn al-Wazīr can be dated
with a degree of certainty. The author mentions the day on which he completed
his work as the fourth or fifth of Rajab 801, corresponding to the 13th or 14th of
March 1399.98 This completion date, being prior to the writing of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
magnum opus, is further confirmed by his detailed reference to the content of
al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ along with its title in more than one instance in al-ʿAwāṣim.

Content
Like most of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings, the content of al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ is not
divided into clearly defined chapters headed by titles and subtitles. The sug-
gested arrangement of the content is based firstly on the accentuations given
to the respective topics by the copier (or author) of the MS by means of the
size and color of the letters.99 Secondly, the content is arranged into units of
meaning according to the connection the treated topics have in the discourse
in general, and in Ibn al-Wazīr’s works in particular. Ibn al-Wazīr remarks in al-
ʿAwāṣim as well as in al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ itself that the treatise is a reproduction
and extension of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 606/1209) Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-
dīn (The Book of Forty: On the Principles of Religion).100 However, Ibn al-Wazīr

95 MS 1) Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3133, (1185/1745); MS 2) Sanaa, Muʾassasat al-Imām

Zayd, CD coll. 1407, (1350/1931), originating from the private library of Muḥammad al-Kibsī.
96 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.
97 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 207; iii, 436.
98 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ, MS 1) f. 114b; likewise in other versions of the MS. See also
Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151, and other biographical sources.
99 Size and color in one MS, and only size in another. I do not feel bound by the order and hier-
archy of significance given to the various topics in the index of the edited version. Indeed,
the arrangement under headings in that edition seems arbitrary and is apparently deter-
mined by the length of discussion of each item in Burhān al-qāṭiʿ as well as by personal
interest. Both arrangements, mine and that of the edition, remain arbitrary to the same
extent, as neither strictly follows the order of items and sub-items suggested by the size
and colors of the letters in the MSS.
100 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 207; Ibn al-Wazīr, Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 18, 30.

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only reproduces a few of the forty issues treated by al-Rāzī and imbues them
with his own meaning.101
After a short prologue, Ibn al-Wazīr involves the reader in an ongoing argu-
ment, which can be divided into eight subsections. The prologue sets the stage
for the subsequent argumentation. Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes that a matter (be it
a report, a claim, etc.) uncertain in itself necessarily becomes conclusive when
corroborated by multitudinous pieces of evidence, even if these are likewise
not conclusive in themselves. This corroboration generally happens by means
of transmission, witness or sensual perception and is of the same value as unin-
terrupted transmission (tawātur).102
In the first subsection Ibn al-Wazīr illustrates this kind of corroboration on
the example of the prophets. Contextual evidence (qarīna, pl. qarāʾin) in the
form of the prophets’ circumstances testifies to the truthfulness of their mes-
sage. The truthfulness is not established by tawātur transmission. Some of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s examples for the evidence of the circumstances of different prophets
are their unusual uprightness (ʿadāla), their abandoning of the path of their
forefathers, their poverty, and the realization of their purposes (ḥuṣūl aghrāḍi-
him).103
In the second subsection, Ibn al-Wazīr explains the nature of prophetic mir-
acles (muʿjizāt). They are divided into those perceived by the senses (ḥissiyya)
and those determined to be miracles by reason (ʿaqliyya). The miracles con-
cluded by perception are divided into three types: those outside the being
(khārij ʿan dhātihi) of Muḥammad, those within him ( fī dhātihi), and thirdly,
the miraculous nature of his attributes.104 The latter seems to be the most
important for Ibn al-Wazīr, as he expands on it most and later uses it as a basis
for another argument.105
In the third subsection, Ibn al-Wazīr summarizes the rational arguments
for miracles as qarāʾin that are apparent in the circumstances of Muḥam-
mad (aḥwāl). Muḥammad’s truthfulness thereby attains the rank of necessary
knowledge (ḍarūrī) in accordance with the reasoning of a number of promi-
nent scholars.106

101 Cf. al-Rāzī, al-Arbaʿīn.

102 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 7.
103 Ibn al-Wazīr lists a number of other arguments for the truthfulness of Muḥammad’s
prophethood, resulting from the consideration of his circumstances (aḥwālihi); cf. ibid.,
8–17.
104 Ibid., 19.
105 Cf. ibid., 22–33.
106 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Imam al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-Hārūnī, Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, Ibn al-

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In the fourth subsection, the same concept is illustrated in the case of a

solitary report (aḥad).107 A solitary report that is corroborated by contextual
evidence (qarāʾin) leads to necessary knowledge. Ibn al-Wazīr identifies the
individual conjectural report with a single conjectural and contextual unit of
evidence (qarīna).
The fifth subsection is devoted specifically to miracles as a vital part of the
verification of prophethood.108 This is illustrated by the discussion of four ratio-
nal arguments as well as four instances from revelation. Reason, according to
Ibn al-Wazīr, would permit the authentication of prophethood without mir-
acles, if the purpose (qaṣd) of prophecy was solely action in compliance with
the prophecy. Action can be based on conjecture. Revelation, however, requires
that the claimant’s truthfulness be known in order for the purpose of prophecy
to be accomplished. Therefore reason’s conjecture needs corroboration by mir-
acles. The authentication of prophecy without miracles would otherwise be
invalid.
The sixth subsection discusses what reason and revelation say concerning
the degree of certainty arrived at by qarāʾin.109 After quoting Quranic verses
and prophetic traditions, Ibn al-Wazīr basically repeats the line of argument
mentioned above, namely that the corroborative effect of an accumulation of
contextual evidence amounts to necessary knowledge, without determining
the amount or number.
The subsection that follows is shaped by (hypothetical) questions as a pre-
lude to explanations of Ibn al-Wazīr’s views. Firstly, Ibn al-Wazīr explains the
difference between conjecture and knowledge. Conjecture leaves room for
doubt, whereas knowledge is signified by the absence of doubt. This distinc-
tion pertains to ordinary things (ʿādiyyāt). In other words, the distinction is
obvious to all. There is either necessary knowledge or conjecture. This is the
defining distinction whenever conjecture and knowledge occur.110 An ensuing
longer passage is devoted to the ways to know God. Most of these are effected
by considering creation, the miracles and the circumstances of the prophets.
This knowledge is informed by a tawātur of meaning.111

Ḥājib and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Nazzām, Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī,
while many others deny it; cf. ibid., 36.
107 Ibid., 36.
108 Ibid., 38–43.
109 Ibid., 43–49.
110 Ibid., 49.
111 Ibid., 49–51.

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This is followed by a long eighth subsection arguing for the collective truth-
fulness of the prophets. In the eight arguments discussed in the section, Ibn
al-Wazīr puts major emphasis on the corroborative conclusiveness of contex-
tual evidence.112 Furthermore, the arguments point at how the prophets arrived
at and handed down knowledge of God and creation by means other than the
speculative investigation suggested in the “four claims” (al-daʿāwā l-arbaʿa) of
the theologians.113
The last passage resembles a conclusion of the eight subsections and con-
tains an affirmation of philosophical speculation (naẓar) in the context of the-
ological knowledge. However, naẓar with regard to the knowledge of God is
redefined and applied to two areas: firstly, the wisdom and order that is appar-
ent in created things and beings; secondly, the narratives of the prophets and
their circumstances (aḥwāl).114 Ibn al-Wazīr concludes with his notorious state-
ment that probing too much into the nature of unclear matters leads to the
denial of necessary matters on the basis of probabilities.

6 Al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr

Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr fī l-dhabb ʿan al-imām al-Manṣūr (The

Unsheathed Sword: Defense of Imam al-Manṣūr) is, according to its subtitle,
the completion (takmīl) of Qadi Jaʿfar b. ʿAbd al-Salām’s (d. 753/1177–1178)
Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij wa-faḍīḥat al-Khawārij (Clear Paths and the Disgrace of
the Khawārij).115 This additional title is probably the reason why al-Ḥibshī

112 Ibid., 52–57.

113 Ibid., 57–64.
114 Ibid., 66–76.
115 On Qadi Jaʿfar, see Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr i, 617–624; al-Shahārī, Ṭabaqāt al-
Zaydiyya i, 273–278; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 110–112; Madelung, Jaʿfar b. Abī Yaḥyā, Shams al-
Dīn Abū ‘l-Faḍl; Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim 204, 212–216; Thiele, Propagating Muʿtazil-
ism 541; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 278–282. The title under which Qadi Jaʿfar’s work is known in
the bibliographical sources varies slightly without change of meaning: Ibāna l-manāhij fī
nasīḥat al-Khawārij; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 111; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 280. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr erro-
neously thought Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij to be a no longer extant writing of Ibn al-Wazīr’s; cf.
Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr (intr.), Author’s biography, in al-ʿAwāṣim i, 103. Al-Ḥibshī lists two similar
titles for Qadi Jaʿfar in the category of kalām, namely Īḍāḥ al-minhaj fī fawāʾid al-miʿrāj and
Ibānat al-manāhij fī naṣīḥat al-Khawārij; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 110. I consulted neither of
these MSS, yet from another version of the title of Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr,
namely al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr fī-l-radd ʿalā l-Khawārij, I gather that al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr
was a response to Qadi Jaʿfar’s Ibānat al-manāhij. Ibn al-Wazīr mentions the title of the

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thought the “completion of Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij” to be a separate work called

al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr fī l-radd ʿalā l-Khawārij (The Unsheathed Sword: A Refu-
tation of the Khawārij) and located it in the field of theology, whereas he inac-
curately considered al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr to be a work on history.116 Al-Ḥarbī
claims to know that al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr was written in 805/1402–1403. This
is questionable, not only because of the lack of evidence—he does not refer
to his source for this information—but two other details also render this date
unlikely: Firstly, both copies consulted for the present study contain a reference
to al-ʿAwāṣim, which was written in 808/1406, on the last pages just before the
colophon. In spite of the difficulty of using references from and to al-ʿAwāṣim
as a source for chronology, there is another detail indicating that al-Ḥusām
al-mashhūr was written long after al-ʿAwāṣim. In the prologue of al-Ḥusām al-
mashhūr, Ibn al-Wazīr explains his motivation for writing his treatise: In the
year 826/1423, a treatise reached the said imam, the main concern of which was
the requirements for the imamate. Unfortunately, both copies have a lacuna
where the name of the author of the letter should have appeared.117 However,
we can conclude that Ibn al-Wazīr could not have written his treatise in sup-
port of the imam in the year 805/1402–1403, but that it originates from after
826/1423 instead. Al-Ḥarbī’s source is most likely to have been Ghāyat al-amānī
which mentions a similar writing of Ibn al-Wazīr for that year. The date was
probably assumed because it followed close on the year of the expulsion of
the two imams, al-Hādī and al-Mahdī Ibn al-Murtaḍā, from Saʿda by Imam
al-Manṣūr 802/1399.118 The year 805/1402–1403 itself is marked in Ghāyat al-
amānī by another extension of al-Manṣūr’s imamate. Both events caused a new

book which he completed (takmīl) as being Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij wa fāḍiḥat al-Khawārij;

cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr MS 1), f. 103a.
116 Cf. Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 143 (al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr fī l-radd ʿalā l-Khawārij), 493 (al-Ḥusām
al-mashhūr fī-l-dhabb ʿan dawlat al-Manṣūr). Al-Ḥibshī gives no details as to the ___location
of the former work and dates the copying of the latter MS to the year 1158/1745, which
corresponds to one of the MSS with the addition “completion of Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij” in
the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt in Sanaa. Cf. MS 1) Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3313, fs. 182a–191a, quote
f. 182a. The foliation seems to have changed repeatedly because the Fihris gives varying
numbers. There is also pagination in red which seems to be an even later addition. The
second copy consulted for this study is another MS (MS 2) from Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll.
3158, fs. 102a–113b. It must have been copied before 1343/1924–1925, since that is the date
mentioned in the collation mark. The following quotes will refer to the earlier copy (MS 1)
unless I explicitly refer to MS 2.
117 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr f. 182b. This indicates that they were copied from the
same source.
118 Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn, Ghāyat al-amānī 554–557.

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series of challenges to the legitimacy of al-Manṣūr’s imamate. Ibn al-Wazīr’s

brother al-Hādī apparently authored writings in al-Manṣūr’s defense in that
year.119 However, what al-Ḥarbī mentions is unlikely to be the present writing
because of a remark in the glosses of MS (2) that Ibn al-Wazīr’s refutation of the
Kharijites is identical with his “defense of Imam al-Manṣūr.”120 Yet, Ibn al-Wazīr
refers to a biography of Imam al-Manṣūr in al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr.121 Since it is
not mentioned in any of the catalogues, its identity with the historical defense
cannot be verified.

Content
The content is best divided into two major parts. For Ibn al-Wazīr, the second
and greater part is the conclusion of the first part. Folios 182b–185b are dedi-
cated to the different kinds of ijtihād in general, and Imam al-Manṣūr’s status
as a mujtahid in particular. This is followed by part two, which occupies fs. 185b–
191a and discusses what is required of an imam.
Part one is structured by a number of assumptions along with Ibn al-Wazīr’s
responses, which partly merge into three sub-chapters. It starts with the affir-
mation that knowledge (ʿilm) is required as a condition of the imamate. The
question is whether or not Imam al-Manṣūr possesses the knowledge required
of an imam. Ibn al-Wazīr begins by singling out “the true [kind of] knowledge”
(al-ʿilm al-ḥaqq) as opposed to the kind of knowledge that should be derivative
of the former. The former kind of knowledge is linked to the reflection of the
certain textual sources, the Quran and Sunna, as well as of the conditions of the
early generations without taqlīd.122 The other kind of knowledge is that which
is occupied first and foremost with derivative questions of substantive law. But
speculative theology would also have to fall under this category. A significant
distinction he makes is that between certain and uncertain knowledge: the first
is that necessary knowledge of which important elements are the texts of rev-
elation and the basic doctrines. The second is broader and could be used to
signify a range of things like understanding, skill, information or scientific dis-
cipline. Furthermore, the existence of a considerably high degree of probability
still allows one to speak of knowledge, and not just any kind of knowledge, but
knowledge sufficient to make legal decisions and, indeed, to practice ijtihād.
This definition of knowledge allows Ibn al-Wazīr to divide the degrees of ijtihād

119 Ibid., 559–560.

120 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr MS 2) f. 113b.
121 Ibn al-Wazīr refers the reader to his biography of al-Manṣūr for a more detailed list of
writings that the imam studied; cf. ibid., f. 185a.
122 Ibid., f. 183b.

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and employ its lowest form. The lowest form of ijtihād is a hidden (khafī) and
therefore conjectural matter which cannot be judged objectively other than
from the material it uses as a source.123
Subsequently, the two criteria for the validity of al-Manṣūr’s ijtihād are estab-
lished. Firstly, his consultation of the major sources: since ijtihād and taqlīd
belong to the realm of conjecture, it must be concluded that al-Manṣūr’s infer-
ences from the sources might very well be a form of ijtihād. Secondly, the source
material he knows and consults: as Ibn al-Wazīr shows in a tentative list of
sources imparted to Imam al-Manṣūr and authorized by ijāzāt, al-Manṣūr has
mastered the Quran and prophetic Sunna to a considerable degree. The qual-
ity of his sources, therefore, determines the validity of his ijtihād. After dis-
cussing the definitions of knowledge advanced by a number of Zaydi, Imāmī
and Muʿtazili scholars,124 Ibn al-Wazīr proceeds to his conclusion, which is the
prelude to the discussion of whether the imam must be a mujtahid. Firstly,
no one can deny that al-Manṣūr is a mujtahid in the most basic meaning of
the word. Secondly, even if al-Manṣūr’s claim to the imamate were not valid if
based on the absolute ijtihād, the other functions that he would be permitted
to conduct according to the opinion of some would allow him to perform the
role of an imam. Thirdly, the requirement of ijtihād for the imamate is uncer-
tain.
Providing evidence for this last conclusion is the concern of the second part
of the treatise. After an extensive discussion of the opinions of several scholars
from ahl al-bayt in support of Ibn al-Wazīr’s view, he goes on to argue from the
Quran, supporting this by a number of traditions and opinions in one chap-
ter.125 This is followed by a chapter elucidating the meaning of tyrant ( jāʾir):
The primary sources are very clear about the moral status of an imam. He
may not be unjust. By contrast, the sources are silent concerning the kind of

123 Ibid.
124 The scholars quoted as sources in his argument are an interesting choice: Next to Ibn Ḥājib
(d. 646/1248) and his Mukhtaṣar al-muntahā (Abridgement of the Utmost Limit), al-ʿAllāma
al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) as well as al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-Hārūnī figure greatly. The Imāmī
al-Ḥillī scholar is quoted from his commentary on Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Mukhtaṣar al-muntahā.
One of the many feats of al-Ḥillī was the establishment of ijtihād as a major instrument
of Imāmī jurisprudence. Al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-Hārūnī’s Ziyādāt (Additions) and al-Ifāda
(The Benefit) are both works mentioned repeatedly throughout Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings. See
for example ibid., f. 183a.
125 Ibn al-Wazīr repeatedly refers back to an instance from the succession struggle after
Muḥammad’s death where propositions emphasized both candidates’ (i.e. Saʿd b. ʿUbāda
by the anṣār and Abū Bakr by the muhājirūn) justice and leadship abilities rather than
their outstanding knowledge. See for example ibid., fs. 186b–187b.

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knowledge expected of an imam.126 A final chapter discusses the origins of the

discourse on the imamate and its requirements, drawn from two sources: texts
of revelation and reason.127
The core argument in part two of al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr goes as follows:
There is disagreement among the scholars within the Zaydiyya, as well as
between the Zaydiyya and other schools, as to whether or not ijtihād is a
requirement for the imamate. Furthermore, the primary sources are not explic-
it about it. This necessitates that the topic be detached from the realm of core
doctrine. The purported consensus on the topic is only a tacit one, falling short
of the certainty necessary to make a general rule. In contradistinction to the
requirement of ijtihād for an imam, the Quran focuses on the necessity that an
imam be a just and strong leader rather than an unjust ruler.
Drawing the line back to part I, the knowledge that is required of an imam—
knowledge of the textual sources—is part of the taklīf of all Muslims. Accord-
ingly, the role of the imam is open to all Muslims as far as the requirement
of knowledge is concerned, because all Muslims have knowledge. Analogously,
every mukallaf is able to practice some form of ijtihād, be he muqallid or not.128
In line with this is Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of rebellion (khurūj) against
an unjust ruler. Those proposing it as well as those rejecting it are equally
supported in their decision as long as they base their views on conjectural con-
clusions arrived at by investigation of the indicators.129 To Ibn al-Wazīr it is no
doctrinal issue where certain judgments are required.

7 Al-Istiẓhār bi-l-dalīl al-samʿī fī ʿadam wuqūʿ al-ṭalāq al-bidʿī

This response to a legal inquiry is also called Bayān al-madhhab al-manṣūr fī

ḥukm al-ṭalāq al-maḥẓūr (The Explanation of the Supported Opinion: The Case
of the Prohibited Divorce).130 The first title, The Exposition of the Scriptural Evi-
dence for the Ineffectiveness of the Irregular Divorce, is given as the first part
of the name in the consulted manuscripts. It is uncertain from what year the
writing dates. Only al-Wajīh mentions the writing as part of a collection in the

126 Ibid., f. 189b.

127 Ibid., f. 190a.
128 For the relation between the “correct taqlīd” (al-taqlīd al-saḥīḥ) and the “lowest levels of
ijtihād” (adnā marātib al-ijtihād), see ibid., f. 191b.
129 Cf. ibid., f. 190a.
130 Al-Wajīh erroneously writes maqṣūr (restricted) instead of manṣūr (supported); cf. al-
Wajīh, al-Aʿlām 829. All accessed MSS render the latter name. A “restricted opinion” would
lack meaning in any case.

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private library of Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Kibsī. One of the copies used

for the study at hand is from that same library. It is uncertain, however, whether
it is the same collection that al-Wajīh speaks of since the number of pages he
counts (36) does not correspond to the number counted in the said copy (24,
with 35 lines per page). The copies used for the present study are from the years
1032/1622 and 1350/1932 respectively.131

Content
Al-Istiẓhār was written as a response to an inquiry addressed to Ibn al-Wazīr.
The inquirer apparently asked which of the two prevalent opinions concern-
ing the irregular divorce (ṭalāq al-bidʿa) was the correct or rather the apparent
(ẓāhir) one.132 Ṭalāq al-bidʿa is the counterpart of ṭalāq al-sunna, the “regu-
lar divorce.”133 Ṭalāq al-sunna describes the repudiation expressed by a man
towards his wife between her menses, i.e. during the time of purity (ṭahāra),
under the condition that the couple had no sexual intercourse. Another condi-
tion of the regular divorce is that the husband utters the statement of repudia-
tion three times, with intervals each as long as one cycle of menstruation and
purity.134 The question of ṭalāq al-bidʿa is whether or not the unilateral decla-
ration of the husband is effective (waqaʿa) while the women is menstruating or
between the menses if they have not abstained from sexual intercourse? Fur-
thermore, is a divorce definite, if the husband utters the triple statement of
repudiation all at once? Apparently both procedures concerning the validity of
irregular divorce were in practice in the time of Ibn al-Wazīr.
Two aspects of Ibn al-Wazīr’s response are worth mentioning here: Firstly,
by his own account Ibn al-Wazīr wrote his response while he lived as a hermit
in the Yemeni wilds. What arguments and quotes he mentions in his discussion
must therefore have been provided from memory.135 Secondly, Ibn al-Wazīr for-
mulates his response as a basis for the legal activity of a student of the religious
disciplines who has achieved the ability to weigh evidence, determine prepon-
derance (tarjīḥ) and reach his own decision (al-nāẓir al-mumayyiz). Expressly,
Ibn al-Wazīr does not intend to write a legal opinion ( fatwā), which a supposed
legal inquirer would be called to apply by taqlīd.136

131 Both copies were made available to me in digitized form by a Yemeni friend, whom I would
like to thank for his support. The quotes will refer to the earlier copy (that of al-Kibsī’s col-
lection), mainly because it provides pagination.
132 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Istiẓhār 107.
133 Cf. Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial 36.
134 Cf. ibid., 37.
135 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Istiẓhār 107.
136 Ibid., 107.

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The structure of the writing is as follows: after presenting the two oppos-
ing sides of the question, Ibn al-Wazīr proceeds to list the arguments (ḥujaj)
of those rejecting the effectuality of an irregular repudiation. Later, these are
followed by the arguments of their opponents. The reason he provides for start-
ing with this group is that their position is grounded on the apparent (ẓāhir)
meaning of the texts. It is apparently defended by the majority of the Imāmiyya,
the Nāṣiriyya137 of the Caspian Zaydiyya, as well as most of the Ẓāhiriyya.138 The
first three of sixteen arguments in favor of this position are grounded in reason.
Firstly, this kind of repudiation is prohibited for its own sake. The prohibition of
actions which are prohibited in and of themselves is unrestricted (muṭlaq).139
This determines the general rule. In other words, potential examples where ṭa-
lāq al-bidʿa was effective describe exceptions. Secondly, divorce is a legal issue.
The revealed law is not silent about it, wherefore rational understanding does
not occupy center stage in the interpretation and application of the ensuing
legal rule. The primary source text and its apparent meaning determine the out-
come of the legal ruling to a much higher degree.140 Thirdly, the presumption of
continuity (istiṣḥāb) applies in the question of the irregular divorce. The validi-
ty of the latter is doubtful, whereas the soundness of the state of being married
is certain. This certain matter continues to apply until evidence is provided that
is stronger than what is rendered by mere possible, exceptional rulings.141
The remaining thirteen arguments consist of traditions of the Prophet Mu-
ḥammad and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib transmitted by Sunni, Imami and Zaydi authori-
ties. The apparent meaning in all of them amounts to the fact that an irregularly
divorced woman is returned to her husband.142 Whereas the first three rational
arguments above determine why the apparent meaning of the text is decisive
in the question of the irregular divorce, the remaining arguments provide this
apparent meaning of the text itself.

137 The school of the Nāṣiriyya goes back to the prolific Imam al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Uṭrush al-
Nāṣir lil-ḥaqq who was active in Gīlān and Daylamān. The rivaling Zaydi school at the
Caspian Sea, the Qāsimiyya, goes back to Imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm. Al-Nāṣir’s doctrinal
views did not differ much from al-Qāsim’s, although he was critical of Muʿtazili teachings.
In positive law, al-Nāṣir was close to the Kufan Zaydi tradition as well as to the Imāmiyya.
The irregular divorce is taken as a sign of this closeness. Like the Imāmiyya, the irrevoca-
ble triple repudiation of the wife is not considered lawful by al-Nāṣir and his followers; cf.
Madelung, Zaydiyya.
138 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Istiẓhār 107, 118; cf. Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial 37.
139 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Istiẓhār 107–110.
140 Ibid., 110–111.
141 Ibid., 111.
142 See for example ibid., 111, 113, 116, 117, 118.

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The opposing side argues that a number of reasons demand that one turn
away from the apparent meaning. Ibn al-Wazīr can recall eleven arguments
from memory. Of these eleven arguments, the first sets the stage for the other
ten: The Quranic verse prohibiting reunion of a couple after the third repudia-
tion, i.e. Q 2:230, is taken to apply to irregular as well as regular divorce. The
second argument discusses the meaning of return (murājaʿa) used in many
traditions to describe the sending back of the wife to her husband.143 The
remaining nine arguments consist of traditions which go back to the Prophet
Muḥammad or ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.144 Most of these traditions are rendered in al-
Amīr al-Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn’s (d. 662/1264) standard work on Zaydi hadith,
Shifāʾ al-uwām (Quenching the Thirst).145 Rather than challenging the content,
Ibn al-Wazīr queries the soundness and strength of these traditions formally.
The presentation of the two sides of the question is followed by four lessons
( fawāʾid) that can be drawn from it. Ibn al-Wazīr frequently challenges the
soundness of traditions that are used for arguments that conflict with his own
opinion. Furthermore, he refers to the opinions of scholars of different Zaydi
(Ṇāṣiriyya, Hādawiyya) and non-Zaydi affiliations (Imāmiyya, Ẓāhiriyya).146
Ibn al-Wazīr concludes with a quote of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, which is used to
argue against the instant effectiveness of a thrice uttered repudiation: “Verily
the people have begun to hasten in the matter in which they are required to
observe respite.”147
In conclusion, it can be said that Ibn al-Wazīr provided the different opin-
ions along with their evidence. His own preference was in favor of the apparent
meaning of the texts of revelation.

8 Īthār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-khalq

Īthār al-ḥaqq is one of Ibn al-Wazīr’s greatest works. Few who write about
Ibn al-Wazīr fail to comment on it.148 Some versions have an extended title,

143 Ibid., 118.

144 Ibid., 123–126.
145 For al-Amīr al-Ḥusayn and his Shifāʾ al-uwām, see al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 50; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām
390.
146 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Istiẓhār 127–130. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s accounts of Zaydi positions do not
always agree with Ibn al-Wazīr’s, as for example concerning the recompense (ʿiwaḍ) paid
to the husband by the wife; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār vii, 260–261.
147 Ibid., 130. See also Sahīh Muslim, The Book of Divorce, hadith 3491.
148 Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, for example, gives prominence to the discovery that Ibn al-Wazīr indeed

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Īthār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-khalq fī radd al-khilāfāt ilā l-madhhab al-ḥaqq min uṣūl al-
tawḥīd (Preferring the Truth to Man: Bringing Deviations Back to the Path of Truth
Concerning the Principles of God’s Unicity).149 Written in 837/1433–1434, Īthār al-
ḥaqq was probably Ibn al-Wazīr’s last work.150 The references to Īthār al-ḥaqq
in al-ʿAwāṣim151 is, as mentioned repeatedly, more likely to be an indication of
a continuing adjustment of al-ʿAwāṣim than of an early dating of Īthār al-ḥaqq.
Numerous references to Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān confirm that Īthār was written
much later than 808/1406.152 A number of copies of the MS are extent in the
libraries belonging to the Grand Mosque in Sanaa as well as private libraries.
The number of MSS as well as the span of years of completion—ranging from
846/1443 to 1212/1797–1798—show the work’s popularity.153 In 1318/1900–1901,
Īthār al-ḥaqq was edited and printed in Cairo for the first time, with several later
editions to follow. It was most recently printed at the Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya,
Beirut, in 1987. The copy consulted for the present study (see figure 2 below) is
from the year 846/1443, only 9 years after the original was authored.154

Content
Īthār al-ḥaqq is Ibn al-Wazīr’s most comprehensive work on theological mat-
ters. Similar to most of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings, structure and content are not
very neatly arranged. Al-Shawkānī calls the style “queer” (gharīb al-uslūb),
although he appreciates the content.155 The tone is less polemic than in his
other writings on theology and legal methodology. This probably reflects not
only Ibn al-Wazīr’s advanced age at the time of writing—he was around 62 by
then—but also the work’s express purpose, namely to bring together quarreling
groups within the Islamic community156 and to “prefer the truth before man,”

wrote introductions to many Suras, as Ibn al-Wazīr claims to have done; cf. Ibn Abī al-Rijāl,
Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 152–153.
149 Al-Ḥibshī lists the longer title, as does the first edition. The MS from the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt
used for the present study gives only the shorter version.
150 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 133b; al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 73. However, the
Dīwān contains poems that were written in 838/1435 and 839/1435–1436 and are thus
younger than Īthār al-ḥaqq.
151 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim viii, 142, (to Īthār, 425), 383 (to Īthār, 382).
152 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq i, 53, 91, 97, 100, 109, 156, 179.
153 Cf. Fihris al-Makhṭūṭāt al-yamaniyya, 259–260; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134–135; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām
826; Ahlwahrdt, Verzeichnisse ii, 579–580.
154 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, no. 579. It encompasses 361 pages
including the title page.
155 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.
156 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 9.

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figure 2 Īthār al-ḥaqq ʿalā l-khalq fs. 74b–75a (Sanaa, Dār al-makhṭūṭāt)

i.e. ignore his school background, as the title indicates.157 The content is divided
into an introduction, prolegomena consisting of five chapters, a main text, and
a brief epilogue. The original work consists of two volumes, with volume two
starting apparently arbitrarily in the middle of the main text, after the discus-
sion of the divine names and attributes.
In the lengthy introduction of the book, Ibn al-Wazīr explains the impor-
tant elements of his undertaking. First, he distinguishes between two kinds of
knowledge: the useful and the harmful. Examples from revelation, the tradi-
tions and authorities in kalām testify to his claim.158 He discusses the means
of obtaining knowledge, i.e. the original human disposition ( fiṭra) and philo-
sophical speculation (naẓar), and conducts a redefinition of naẓar.159

157 Ibid., 33.

158 Ibid., 10.
159 Cf. ibid., 15.

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The first part of the introduction is permeated by two topics in a rather

unsystematic manner. First are the seven major tenets that can be known by
the uncorrupted fiṭra. If human nature has shifted away from its original state
of completeness and is corrupted, it can be cured. This cure is what Ibn al-Wazīr
intends to provide in his present work.160 The seven tenets concern: 1. Things
known by necessity (al-ʿulūm al-ḍarūriyya); 2. God’s existence (thubūt al-rabb);
3. God’s unicity; 4. God’s completeness in His beautiful names (kamāluhu bi-
asmāʾihi l-ḥusnā); 5. The existence of the prophecies as a whole (thubūt al-
nubūwāt); 6. Belief in all the prophets without distinction; 7. Renunciation of
innovations by addition or omission.161 The other topic permeating the discus-
sion is the preoccupation of some groups of theologians with the subtleties of
the premises of doctrinal issues. In this context, the fiṭra is again contrasted
with naẓar as regards the epistemological implications of both concepts.162
The second part of the introduction is an appeal to laymen and inquirers
after knowledge.163 In light of the reprehensibility of ignorance ( jahl) taught by
the Zaydi sect,164 Ibn al-Wazīr defines the reprehensible kind of ignorance.165
He explains why, in consequence, ʿilm al-kalām cannot be the means of find-
ing a way out of that ignorance. This is what caused Ibn al-Wazīr to look for
another way that leads to certainty ( yaqīn),166 one not involving the emula-
tion of a kalām school (taqlīd).167 Confidence in the ability of the fiṭra as well
as fairness in the study of the scholars’ arguments irrespective of school affil-
iation are two of the five important characteristics of those who want to gain
knowledge.168
The next brief passage of the introduction contains a more detailed distinc-
tion between the knowledge required for religion and that knowledge which
is not required.169 Of the needful kinds of knowledge some require study, like

160 Ibid., 15, 26.

161 Ibid., 21.
162 Ibid., 17–18.
163 Ibid., 18.
164 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-Hārūnī in his al-Ziyādāt; cf. ibid., 18.
165 Ibn al-Wazīr’s definition of the reprehensible kind of ignorance is the exact negative of
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī’s definition of knowledge (ʿilm); cf. Omari, The Theology of Abū
al-Qāsim al-Balkhī 162.
166 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 20.
167 Ibid., 22–23.
168 Ibid., 27–28.
169 For those sciences which are not needed, yet not reprehensible, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to
Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī alias Ibn al-Afkānī’s (d. 749/1348) list of 40 sciences in his
Irshād al-qāṣid ilā asnā l-maqāṣid (Guidance for the One Headed for the Most Sublime Goal).
Ibn al-Wazīr mentions a number of such permitted, yet nonessential sciences, like astrol-

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the sciences of the traditions or exegesis. Whereas disagreement is natural in

some, like substantive law or linguistics, disagreement is reprehensible in oth-
ers, like the seven tenets in listed above. Accordingly, as repeatedly stated, these
tenets along with their premises ought to be acknowledged rather than inves-
tigated.170
The chapters of the prolegomena are vaguely in line with the seven tenets,
with chapter one treating the first tenet (i.e. knowledge), chapters two and
three addressing the second tenet (i.e. God’s existence), chapter four covering
tenets three to six (i.e. God’s unicity, prophecy and the prophets) and chapter
five addressing tenet seven (i.e. innovations).
In the first chapter, Ibn al-Wazīr establishes that knowledge does exist (ith-
bāt al-ʿulūm). Two groups of people deny the existence of knowledge: some
philosophers and Sufi monists (Ittiḥādiyya).171 Ibn al-Wazīr attempts to demon-
strate how even they employ some kinds of knowledge as a basis for action.172
In this context, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the virtues of beneficial knowledge and
those who have it.173
The second chapter establishes the ways to the knowledge of God (al-ṭuruq
ilā llāh). Whereas chapter two establishes this in general (ʿalā sabīl al-ijmāl),
chapter three goes into detail.174 Ibn al-Wazīr introduces three ways (dalālāt)
that lead to the necessary knowledge of God.175
In chapter four, Ibn al-Wazīr presents God’s unicity (tawḥīd) as necessary
knowledge.176 Those who affirm the existence of knowledge (ʿulūm) and divin-
ity (rubūbiyya), discussed in previous chapters, disagree as to how the argu-
ment for tawḥīd can be established. Clearest among those is the proof of the
prophecies (ithbāt al-nubuwwāt), and especially the uniqueness of Muḥam-

ogy, natural sciences, natural magic, chemistry, engineering, medicine and also the knowl-
edge of the subtleties of theology (ʿilm al-laṭīf ); cf. ibid., 34–35. For the the development
of the term ʿilm from an indivisible abstract to ʿilm as the sum of all things known, divisi-
ble into separate ʿulūm, as for example the scientific disciplines, see Rosenthal, Knowledge
Triumphant 41–45.
170 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 36.
171 Ibn al-Wazīr mentions the extent of the monist “error” in order for his reader not to think
that truth can only be that which is not denied by anyone. He denies that monists, going
back to Muḥyī l-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), are entitled to the name
“Sufism”; cf. ibid., 37–39.
172 Ibid., 39; cf. Gutas, Certainty, Doubt, Error 284.
173 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 44.
174 Ibid., 45.
175 Ibid., 45–54.
176 Ibid., 64.

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mad’s prophecy.177 The characteristics of prophethood and its distinction from

magic play a major role among the topics of this chapter.178
Chapter five leads to the main part of the writing. It is called “chapter
on prudence towards the innovations of Muslims” and introduces179 Ibn al-
Wazīr’s concept of innovations as “obscure matters of detail” (masāʾil mubhama
tafṣīliyya) in the latter part of the chapter.180 Said innovations are either addi-
tions to (ziyāda) or omission from (naqṣ) the Islamic core beliefs. Both kinds
of innovation can have roots in reason as well as revelation. Indeed, mastery of
both is one of two ways to avoid innovations.181 The other way is to live as one
who abstains from all partisanship (tamadhhub), emulation, school affiliation
or fanaticism and relies solely on Quran and Sunna, “as if he had lived before
the time of the advent of schools.”182
Of the two kinds of innovations, Ibn al-Wazīr first addresses cases where an
innovation was added to the Islamic core beliefs (ziyādāt). Ibn al-Wazīr repeats
that rational reasons for innovations of that kind are mostly rooted in the inten-
sive occupation with matters that the human mind cannot understand. Such
innovators err in their distinction between the self-evident and the ambiguous
issues (al-muḥkam wa-l-mutashābih) in revelation, as well as the known (ʿilm)
and the conjectural (ẓann).183 The confusion between the conjectural and the
known goes back to the criteria of knowledge which Ibn al-Wazīr lists and dis-
cusses.184
Innovations based on omission (naqṣ) predominantly originate in the refus-
al to take the texts (nuṣūṣ) at their face value (ẓawāhiruhā) and often follow
from the emulation of certain theologians or school doctrine.185 Ibn al-Wazīr
illustrates this issue based on the divine names, some of which are interpreted
metaphorically by different schools in order to circumnavigate, for example,
the reprehensible identification (mumāthala) of divine attributes with human
ones.186 The insufficiency of believing in metaphorical meanings also becomes

177 Cf. ibid., 76–83. See also the summary of Tarjīḥ below, ch. 2 sec. 27.
178 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh’s writings, most probably the imam’s Kitāb Ith-
bāt al-nubuwwa (The Book on Proofing Prophecy), which, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, was
shaped after al-Jāḥiẓ’s book on prophecies; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 66.
179 Ibid., 84–157.
180 Ibid., 157–415.
181 Ibid., 122.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid., 101–103.
184 Ibid., 117–120.
185 Ibid., 123.
186 Ibid., 89, 114–129.

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evident in the reprehensibility of such an abstraction where prophethood or

angels are concerned.187
Besides addition and omission, a third phenomenon is considered to be
the root of innovations: the exercise of too much freedom in the employment
of expressions in the exegesis (tafsīr) of the Quran and Sunna (taṣarruf ).188
Although taṣarruf is the result of the two former phenomena ziyāda and naqṣ,
a separate discussion seems justified as taṣarruf in exegesis frequently leads to
invalid takfīr.189
The last part of the general presentation of the obscure matters (mubham) is
a schematic exposition. Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between the personal exe-
gesis which goes back to narration (riwāya) by the companions and followers,
on the one hand,190 and seven kinds of scientific exegesis (dirāya), on the other
hand.191 Emphasis is put on explaining the controversial nature of some kinds
of scientific exegesis and the epistemological implications.192
The rather extensive prolegomena are followed by an exposition of a num-
ber of controversial matters of detail (al-masāʾil al-tafsīliyya al-mukhtalafa fīhā)
which were discussed in a general manner in the prolegomena. Concerning
these, Ibn al-Wazīr seeks to establish the sound core.193 The first concerns the
divine names, the second God’s wisdom, will and love as well as human actions.
God’s names figure first, because they are the only way by which God’s essential
self (dhāt) can be known, albeit in a general way.194
After establishing the central tenets and how they can be preserved from
innovations in the first volume, the second volume of Īthār al-ḥaqq is an expo-
sition of Ibn al-Wazīr’s views on “divine wisdom, will, love, human actions and
all that is related to it.”195 The related areas concern unbelief and grave sin (al-
kufr wa-l-fisq), as well as the promise and the threat (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd).196 Ibn

187 Ibid., 129–130.

188 Ibid., 133.
189 Ibid., 136–145. Frequently mentioned examples of kalām scholars who acknowledge hu-
man limitations in their doctrine are the Bagdhādī Muʿtazili Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, the
Shiʿi Muʿtazili Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd and the Zaydi Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Murādī. The latter,
for example, is quoted as reporting the prohibition on uttering takfīr in the foundations
of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) for that very reason; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 138.
190 Ibid., 146–148.
191 Ibid., 149.
192 Ibid., 149–156.
193 Ibid., 157.
194 Ibid., 177–180.
195 Ibid., 181.
196 Ibid.

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al-Wazīr commences with what he considers the foundation of all the follow-
ing concepts, i.e. divine wisdom (ḥikma), and defines what he means by it.197 In
what follows, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the implications for divine justice (ʿadl).
The question is whether or not good and evil are objective entities and may
thus be discerned by human reason (al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī). Ibn al-Wazīr
relates his concept of divine wisdom to the way God makes good on his promise
and his threat in a just, yet not always comprehensible way.198
In nine studies, Ibn al-Wazīr goes on to define and expound the divine will
(irāda, mashīʾa).199
The theological problem is rooted in a supposed scriptural discrepancy
between God’s hatred of sin and the affirmation of His power to have every-
thing that he intends executed. After affirming common ground between the
schools, Ibn al-Wazīr’s line of argument focuses on the idea that God’s will is
directed towards two different kinds of intentions (murād) manifest in con-
nection with the command.200
The question of the origin of human actions (afʿāl al-ʿabd) is intricately inter-
woven with the question of divine will and consequently with divine wisdom.
Again, Ibn al-Wazīr essentially claims a concurrence between Muʿtazili and
Ashʿari positions. He himself is the representative of the middle ground, based
on doctrine of the salaf.201 After mentioning and discussing 14 different posi-
tions towards human actions—eight of the Muʿtazila, four of the Ashʿariyya
and ahl al-sunna and two of the Jabriyya202—Ibn al-Wazīr establishes the limits
of what can be known with certainty. He excludes from this the idea of com-
pulsion ( jabr)203 and discusses agency in the context of motives (dawāʿī),204
human choice205 and his particular understanding of God’s anticipation of and
reaction to this choice (taqdīr).206
In contrast to what was generally held by the Muʿtazila and Zaydiyya, Ibn
al-Wazīr argues that none of the ahl al-sunna and the Ashʿaris supported the
view that human actions are coerced.207 The same must be said about the obli-

197 Ibid., 181–183.

198 Ibid., 200–228.
199 Ibid., 228.
200 Ibid., 250–251.
201 Cf. ibid., 290.
202 Ibid., 282–285.
203 Ibid., 287–324.
204 Ibid., 287.
205 Ibid., 314–315.
206 Ibid., 312–313, 323–324; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 5–165.
207 Al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–936) is the only acknowledged exception. Ibn al-Wazīr admits this

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gation to do the impossible (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq). Ibn al-Wazīr employs numer-

ous Quranic verses and traditions and shows how the concept is contrary to
the doctrine of divine wisdom.208 The arguments ascribed to a number of
Ashʿaris209 can be exposed as void. Both elements of the term are discussed:
the obligation (taklīf )210 as well as the impossible (mā lā yuṭāq).211 In conclu-
sion, Ibn al-Wazīr insists that only that kind of “obligation to do the impossible”
is inconceivable which necessitates severe punishment in case of omission
(tark).212 Ibn al-Wazīr’s distinction between a term and its possible meanings
allows him to harmonize the doctrine of different theological schools, in this
case that of al-Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the one hand, and an unde-
fined group of Muʿtazilis and Zaydiyya and ahl al-bayt on the other.213
In this context, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the question of whether the children
of unbelievers can be punished for the sins of their fathers. Negating this, Ibn
al-Wazīr mentions a number of possible explanations for Quranic passages and
traditions that imply the possibility of such punishment.214 However, the more
prevalent and stronger arguments refer back to divine wisdom.215 Although the
Muʿtazila explicitly reject the doctrine of substitutionary punishment, based
on their doctrine of divine justice,216 Ibn al-Wazīr bases his views mainly on
the consensus of the salaf, which supposedly agreed on God’s wisdom on the
whole ( fī l-jumla).217
The question of whether unaided human reason can discern good and evil
(al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī) is also closely linked to divine wisdom. Indeed,
those who deny this ability also argue against divine wisdom. The majority of
the Ashʿari school is famous for this, although Ibn al-Wazīr notoriously ascribes
the negation to only a few “extremists” (ghulāt) among the Ashʿariyya. As is
often the case, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī is the instrument of Ibn al-Wazīr’s har-
monization between a moderate Ashʿari position and the genuinely Muʿtazili

in his quotation of Ibn al-Ḥājib, according to which al-Ashʿarī allowed that God obliges
the believer to do the impossible; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq., 324.
208 Ibid., 325, 339.
209 The scholar discussed here is first and foremost al-Ghazālī; cf. ibid., 325.
210 Ibid., 332–337. The discussion of al-Ghazālī’s positions refers to Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (Revival
of the Religious Sciences) and more explicitly to his Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (The Median in Belief ).
211 Ibid., 328–331.
212 Ibid., 333.
213 Cf. ibid., 325. See also Gimaret, Taklīf.
214 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 340, 342.
215 Ibid., 342.
216 Cf. Gimaret, Muʿtazila.
217 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 339.

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tenet of al-taḥsīn al-ʿaqlī. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, agreement exists that the
human reason is able to recognize the moral value of a number of qualities and
attributes. In his discussion, Ibn al-Wazīr focuses on the ability of the human
fiṭra to discern good and evil, the role of revelation in completing that knowl-
edge218 and the part that God’s wisdom plays in cases of seeming contradic-
tions.219
Following the discussion of al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ, Ibn al-Wazīr resumes the
discussion of promise and threat (al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd), emphasizing God’s for-
giveness (ʿafw), his mercy, and the good purposes.220 It is the insistence on
God’s nature as expressed in the beautiful names, the good opinion of Him
(ḥusn al-ẓann), that allows the believer to hope for God’s forgiveness. Ibn al-
Wazīr again refers to God’s wisdom.221
Promise and threat is another occasion for Ibn al-Wazīr to defend an inter-
mediary position between two extremes. These extremes are here represented
in the Waʿīdiyya, i.e. the people of the threat (waʿīd), and the Murjiʾa, those
who defend the deferment of judgment (irjāʾ).222 In a sub-chapter, Ibn al-Wazīr
argues against a recurring assumption which equates irjāʾ with rajāʾ (hope in
God’s mercy) and erroneously ranges the ahl al-sunna as a whole with the
Murjiʾa.223 Although Ibn al-Wazīr does not approve of the Murjiʾī doctrine, he
still considers the Murjiʾa merely as innovators who are within the group of
believers.224
The concept of walāya and barāʾa, literally the duty of association and disso-
ciation, is a term discussed in this context. The underlying question is whether
or not a Muslim can, or even must, declare a fellow Muslim an unbeliever
under particular circumstances. Beyond the theological implications of takfīr,
the acceptance of religious information was open to debate. In line with that
concern, Īthār al-ḥaqq is another instance where Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the

218 Ibid., 343.

219 Ibid., 344.
220 Ibid., 358–361; likewise ibid., 185, 224, 346.
221 Ibid., 366–367; likewise ibid., 227.
222 For the Murjiʾa, see Madelung, Murjiʾa. The Waʿīdiyya refers predominantly to the Muʿta-
zila because of their requirement that God strictly deliver on His threats (and promises);
cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī xiv, 337.
223 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 365–370.
224 A quote of Shaykh Mukhtār al-Muʿtazilī’s al-Mujtabā (The Chosen Among Many) shows
that not all early Muʿtazila excluded the Murjiʾa from the creed; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-
ḥaqq 366. See also Ibn al-Wazīr’s reference to al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī’s Sharḥ ʿuyūn al-Masāʾil
(The Explanation of the Question’s Essences), where the latter apparently argued in favor
of rajāʾ; ibid., 366–367.

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distinction between an explicit unbeliever (kāfir ṣarīḥ) and one whose beliefs
are wrong because of an error in interpretation of the main sources (i.e. kuf-
fār taʾwīl, mutaʾawwilūn (those who interpret) or ahl al-taʾ wīl), and positions,
both with regard to association and dissociation. Ibn al-Wazīr affirms that the
explicit unbelievers doubtlessly deserve the full range of the results of unbe-
lief. The reason for this is the explicit textual command that they do. However,
mutaʾawwilūn remain within the group of Muslims.225
Besides Ibn al-Wazīr’s position, three other views incorporate the ques-
tion of kufr taʾwīl into the scope of permissible disagreement.226 However, to
him, the apparent meaning (ẓāhir) of the broadly authenticated transmission
(mutawātir) as a whole represents the only matter on which disagreement
leads to takfīr.227 There is no takfīr based on derived knowledge. What some
term matters of certainty (qawātiʿ) not pertaining to necessary knowledge are
no exception.228 Exclusion based on an error in interpretation would not only
lead to broad takfīr, but also stand in conflict with other important principles
like taklīf mā lā yuṭāq or the principle that God intends religion to be easy.229
This also finds expression in the last subchapter on grave sin ( fisq). In
most cases, grave sins must explicitly be declared to be such in the tawātur-
transmission. However, some schools include actions in the list of grave sins
that are derived from the explicit command.230 According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the
grounds for acceptance of the mutaʾawwilūn is the clear distinction between
the necessary (ḍarūrī) and the conjectural (ẓannī). The person in question
erred in what he took to be conjectural. Other schools of thought, like the
Muʿtazila and some Shiʿi groups, insist on a third separate category: knowl-
edge which is certain (qaṭʿ), yet not necessary.231 If one who commits a grave
sin because of his wrong interpretation of certain yet not necessary matters
(qawāṭiʿ) is equated with a grave sinner in the necessary matters, this results in
his condemnation.232 Ibn al-Wazīr, in turn, puts those who erred in the correct
understanding of grave sins on a par with mujtahids in the conjectural matters
of law. He mentions the corresponding cases where mujtahids come to con-

225 Ibid., 371–374.

226 Cf. ibid., 376. Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the salaf, early ahl al-bayt, as well as Muʿtazila. His
source is the often cited al-Jumla wa-l-ulfa of the early Zaydi authority Muḥammad b. al-
Manṣūr al-Murādī (d. 290/903).
227 Ibid., 377.
228 Ibid., 386.
229 Ibid., 393–400.
230 Cf. ibid., 408.
231 Ibid., 409.
232 Cf. ibid., 376–378, 407–409; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 84–86, 328–329.

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flicting conclusions in matters of ḥadd-punishment. The ḥudūd are explicitly

defined as a whole in the Quran. As such they are a matter of certainty. But there
is disagreement as to their application. According to the position defended by
Ibn al-Wazīr, the pardon in all such cases applies as long as the striving was the
result of a mistaken but honest attempt to do right.233
Ibn al-Wazīr’s brief epilogue of his Īthār al-ḥaqq clearly reflects the harmo-
nizing approach dominant in the whole work. He finishes with a laudation of
ahl al-bayt and the companions alike. Both groups are particularly singled out
in the tawātur transmission as well as in consensus.234 Beyond that, all schol-
ars and laymen should be valued and honored “equally” to the aforementioned
group. This reflects Ibn al-Wazīr’s general approach and especially his idea of
the source of true knowledge: no group is singled out by special access to knowl-
edge. Although ahl al-bayt and companions enjoy a special status, each believer
should respect every fellow believer irrespective of position. Ultimately, every
Muslim must himself ascertain that his own positions are in line with the divine
book and the prophetic Sunna. And every believer is responsible for the knowl-
edge that he has by necessity.235

9 Kitāb al-Qawāʿid

The Book of Principles is referred to under various titles. The Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt
in Sanaa owns one MS that is titled Kitāb al-Qawāʿid.236 Al-Ḥarbī lists the copy
under the name al-Qawāʿid fī uṣūl al-fiqh (The Principles of Uṣūl al-Fiqh), while
al-Wajīh mentions Kitāb [al-]Qawāʿid min qadīm (The Book of Long Standing
Principles) as well as al-Qawāʿid fī l-ijtihād (The Principles of Ijtihād).237 Al-
Ḥibshī knows only of the latter title.238 In fact, al-Qawāʿid fī l-ijtihād is the
additional title given in the colophon of one of the two abridgments of Kitāb al-
Qawāʿid, likewise to be found in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt.239 The copy that found
its way to the Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī is called Qawāʿid min qadīm,
although their catalogue has Qawāʿid man qad tamma jamaʿa [sic]. This slightly
obscure title is probably due to a repetition of the word “jamaʿa” (here: com-

233 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 414.

234 Ibid., 416–417.
235 Ibid., 417.
236 MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3158.
237 Al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 99; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām, 829.
238 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 181.
239 MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, colls. 1772, 3088.

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figure 3 Kitāb al-Qawāʿid (Qawāʿid min qadīm) 32 (Sanaa, Muʾassasat al-

Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī al-thaqafiyya)

piled by) in the first and second line of the title (see figure 3 above). Addition-
ally, the script of the title shows hardly any diacritical marks. This last MS seems
to be the oldest extant copy (1204/1799).240
The high number of copies in libraries inside and outside Yemen bespeaks
the interest in its subject, namely the structure of legal authority. Ibn al-Wazīr
is most likely to have written the original before Qubūl al-bushrā, as the latter

240 This is the copy I will quote henceforth. It is paginated. A comparison with the copy from
Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3158 showed that the content is identical apart from minor discrep-
ancies. The colophon of the latter gives no indication of the date of completion.

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has a reference to it. The context of this reference is the discussion of the trans-
fer of adherence from one madhhab to another (tanaqqul). In Qubūl al-bushrā,
the reference mentions that “a separate book” (kitāb mufrad) was written on
the the topic. No title is mentioned, which would also explain the variety of
titles supposedly given to the treatise at a later stage. It most likely refers to
Kitāb al-Qawāʿid since, to my knowledge, Ibn al-Wazīr’s discussion of this topic
is much more extensive in his Book of Principles than it is in Masāʾil arbaʿa or
anywhere else.

Content
Kitāb al-Qawāʿid is divided into a prologue followed by prolegomena and the
five principles to which the title refers. In the prologue, Ibn al-Wazīr com-
mences by lamenting intellectual corruption, and the spread of the practice
of emulation (taqlīd) as a token of that corruption. Ibn al-Wazīr calls for a
search for truth and certainty. Both can be arrived at in one of only two ways:
firstly, by individual investigation; secondly, by maintaining a good opinion
(ḥusn al-ẓann) of others engaged in the quest for understanding, irrespective of
affiliation. From the outset, Ibn al-Wazīr clarifies what he considers to be the
only source capable of rendering the “tranquility of the soul” (sukūn al-nafs)
the seeker of knowledge aims at, namely the prophetic Sunna. In the remain-
ing part of the prologue, Ibn al-Wazīr outlines his own history in the writing of
the book. Wrongly accused of having abandoned the early imams and ahl al-
bayt, he set out not to vindicate himself in the eyes of his accusers, but rather
to clarify the principles and causes that provide the background of his teach-
ing. His express purpose is to show that his views realize rather than violate the
madhhab of the early imams and preserve the eager student from falling prey
to intellectual degradation.241
In the prolegomena, Ibn al-Wazīr warns the pursuer of knowledge against
five impediments to the understanding of clear proofs and obvious arguments.
The first impediment describes someone who prejudges a book he is about to
read, concluding from the name of the author that the latter is incapable of con-
veying any truthful or useful knowledge. The second impediment deals with an
investigator who considers his own reason too weak to discern the sound and
the false, even though his conscience and mind give him clear indications as
to a particular conclusion. The third impediment discusses one who discards
an entire book on the basis of having found a number of weak points in it.
The fourth impediment is effective if a student or scholar rejects or accepts

241 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid 64.

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a statement, ruling or evidence, because of the evaluation of the one who con-
veyed the statement to him. Fifth and last is the case of an investigator who is
predetermined to consider something correct or false prior to a thorough inves-
tigation. In the context of these five impediments to thorough understanding,
Ibn al-Wazīr embarks on the discussion of his five principles.
Principle I is concerned with the true meaning of following another (al-
mutābaʿa lil-ghayr).242 Ibn al-Wazīr makes a distinction between three kinds of
following (ittibāʿ) the Prophet Muḥammad, ahl al-bayt or early imams in legal
matters: following in a way of a formal outward imitation (al-ittibāʿ fī l-ṣūra),
following with regard to the meaning of doctrines (al-ittibāʿ fī l-maʿnā) or fol-
lowing in form and in meaning ( fī l-ṣūra wa-l-maʿnā). Whereas the first kind of
following is invalid, the second kind is praiseworthy, while the third is likewise
praiseworthy although not always possible. The first and objectionable kind of
following is manifest in the practice of emulating the dead (taqlīd al-mayyit, pl.
amwāt). Consequently, the greater part of the treatise deals with establishing
the impermissibility of emulating dead scholars. Ibn al-Wazīr claims for him-
self the true and permissible kind of following: that which takes someone as an
example in the widest sense.
The discussion is divided into four parts. The first and second explicitly deal
with the prohibition of emulation of the dead. First, its impermissibility is
argued for.243 Then, the conditions of its restricted permissibility (according
to some scholars) is discussed.244 Part three reiterates the impermissibility of
merely outward compliance (al-ittibāʿ fī l-sūra).245 And part four anticipates
principle II: the restraint put on a student able to discern legal qualifications to
practice taqlīd.246 This first principle takes predominance over the other four
not only in terms of the space it occupies, but with regard to the variety of top-
ics it contains. Furthermore, the ramifications of the “wrong kind of following”
are discussed.
Principle II treats the restraint put on a student capable of discerning legal
qualifications, i.e. the prohibition to practice taqlīd (taqlīd al-ṭālib al-mumayyiz
lā yajūz) and the related concept of divisibility of ijtihād (tajazzuʿ al-ijtihād).247
The separate discussion of the “discerning student” as well as a prolonged proof
for the divisibility of ijtihād given under principle I render principle II rather

242 Ibid., 66.

243 Ibid., 67.
244 Ibid., 74.
245 Ibid., 80.
246 Ibid., 81.
247 Ibid., 131.

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short. It is not even a page long and simply contains some autobiographical
explanations of how Ibn al-Wazīr was forced to discover that ijtihād must be
divisible.248
This brief report is immediately followed by principle III: the performance of
a sunna or pious deed (qurba) is preferable to precaution (iḥtiyāt, al-aḥwat).249
Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the duty to act according to anything considered
sunna, i.e. that which is rewarded if performed, but not punished if omitted.250
This emphasis is especially formulated in opposition to the tendency to act
according to precaution. Along these lines Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the reward
associated with sunna, as opposed to focusing on the avoidance of punish-
ment associated with precaution. On the following pages, Ibn al-Wazīr dis-
cusses what he considers the recommendable kinds of precaution as well as
what moderation in precaution would amount to.251
Principle IV provides a full discussion of the requirements (shurūṭ) for ijti-
hād.252 His notion on the ease of ijtihād apparently contrasts with another
prevalent notion, namely that ijtihād can no longer be performed.253 The re-
quirements discussed—but not yet agreed to—are knowledge of theology (ʿilm
al-kalām), Quran, prophetic traditions, Arabic linguistics and legal methodol-
ogy, as well as of stylistics and imagery (ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān).
The fifth and last principle taken up in Kitāb al-Qawāʿid treats the prophetic
traditions or, more precisely, the soundness of the Sunni Ṣaḥīḥ compilations.254
However, in Ibn al-Wazīr’s introduction to the last principle as well as in the
issues he chose for discussion in the two sub-chapters of principle V, it becomes
apparent that the defense of the Ṣaḥīḥan is the result of a number of epistemo-
logical conclusions rather than a statement in favor of a particular madhhab.
Accordingly, the first subchapter discusses the practical legal implications of
accepting religious information of kuffār and fussāq taʾwīl. The second sub-
chapter extends the evidence advanced in the first and discusses the implicit
acceptance of kuffār and fussāq taʾwīl. Some Zaydis reject transmissions of
such mutaʾawwilūn, yet accept reports of unknown origin (majhūl) or inter-
rupted transmission (mursal) from transmitters who accept kuffār and fussāq
taʾwīl.255 What is more, they themselves do not engage in the science neces-

248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
250 Cf. Krawietz, Hierarchie der Rechtsquellen 115–116.
251 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid 132.
252 Ibid., 134.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., 141.
255 Ibid., 142. However, others accept majhūl traditions as well as ahl al-taʾwīl, as for example

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sary for authenticating and ranking transmissions, in contrast to those whose

transmissions they reject, namely the traditionists.256 The last principle is an
attempt by Ibn al-Wazīr to show his contemporaries that their evaluation of the
traditionists is based on wrong assumptions. Furthermore, they neglect early
Zaydi scholars who would still provide grounds for valid hadith criticism. After
all, these early Zaydi scholars themselves were majorly involved in it—an issue
in which Ibn al-Wazīr practices the endorsed kind of following.257

10 Kitāb fī l-tafsīr

The Book on Exegesis is one of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings of which nothing but the
title seems to be extant.258 Al-Wajīh suggests that Kitāb al-tafsīr may be identi-
cal to a certain Kitāb fī tafsīr ʿulūm al-Qurʾān (Book on the Sciences of the Quran).
Otherwise, the title might refer to a Kitāb al-tafsīr min al-kalām al-nabawī (Book
on the Exegesis of the Words of the Prophet) which is mentioned by Ibn Abī
l-Rijāl as well as by al-Wajīh and al-Ḥibshī, but is apparently equally lost.259
Only al-Ḥarbī claims to have found it,260 but its supposed ___location in the Dār
al-Makhṭūṭāt could not be verified. Al-Ḥibshī and al-Wajīh both mention two
books on exegesis, referring them both back to Ibn Abī l-Rijāl. But Ibn Abī l-
Rijāl only lists one book on exegesis, the Exegesis of Words of the Prophet.261
It is very likely, therefore, that the two are identical. Ibn al-Wazīr himself only
refers to his “prophetical exegesis” (tafsīr nabawī) in Īthār al-ḥaqq.262 It is not
certain whether he meant a separate writing, as Ibn Abī l-Rijāl suggests. Ibn al-
Wazīr may have also referred to his exegesis of the Prophet’s words on several
occasions in Īthār la-ḥaqq and elsewhere.

al-faqīh ʿAbdallāh al-ʿAnsī (d. 667/1269), from whose al-Durar al-manẓūma Ibn al-Wazīr
frequently quotes in this context.
256 Ibid., 146–147.
257 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to al-ʿAwāṣim for a more extensive discussion of the same point; cf.
ibid., 148.
258 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 28; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 829.
259 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151.
260 Al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu, 92.
261 Cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 74; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 28; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 827.
262 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 154.

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11 Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq wa-l-raqāʾiq fī mamādiḥ rabb al-khalāʾiq

From a literary point of view, the collection of Ibn al-Wazīr’s poems (Dīwān)
falls into the category of fine literature, especially poetry (adab). However, top-
ics of theology, personal piety and asceticism dominate the content of almost
all poems contained in Ibn al-Wazīr’s collection. The title Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq
wa-l-raqāʾiq fī mamādiḥ rabb al-khalāʾiq (Collection of Truths and Subtleties: The
Praiseworthy Characteristics of the Lord of Created Beings) referred to in many
sources is most likely a later addition. Some sources list it simply as Dīwān
al-Murtaḍā (Poem Collection of the One [God] Approves of ) or Dīwān shiʿrihi (Col-
lection of His [Ibn al-Wazīr’s] Poems).263 This indicates that Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq
is only the first part of the entire collection of poems.264 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl explic-
itly says that Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq is part of Ibn al-Wazīr’s “extensive collection of
poems.”265 No reference to the longer title can be found in any of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
writings. He himself refers to his Collection of Poems and Qasīdas (Dīwān wa-
qasāʾid) at the beginning of the writing. However, the longer title sounds like
a summary of the prologue. It is uncertain when the collection was compiled.
The prologue indicates that Ibn al-Wazīr himself had compiling in mind.266 An
indicator of the time of writing is found elsewhere: a number of poems are
introduced by a verse or two, informing the reader that the poem originated in
a night vision and was expanded later. The dates of those visions are recorded.
The latest vision in Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq dates from Muḥarram 834/September
1430.267 The extended version records a last poem for the year 839/1435–1436,
which was shortly before his death.268
At least two copies are found in the library of the Grand Mosque in Sanaa269
as well as in several private libraries.270 The two copies used for the present
study are from Shawwāl 1035/June 1626 (MS 1) and Dhū l-Qaʿda 1247/April 1832
(MS 2) respectively. Both originate from private libraries.271 While both copies

263 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 424.

264 Al-Akwaʿ lists both titles separately; cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.) al-ʿAwāṣim i, 76. See also al-Akwaʿ,
Hijar al-ʿilm 1375; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 828.
265 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 154.
266 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 373; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 7r.
267 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 388; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 39l.
268 Ibid., laq. 87r.
269 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 282: Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 424; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr
wa-ārāʾ uhu 98.
270 Cf. al-Akwaʿ, Hijar al-ʿilm 1375.
271 Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq was digitized by the Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd (CD 279); the digitization
of the Dīwān is likely to originate from the same source.

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mention the title Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq on the first page and are concluded with a
colophon, the younger copy (MS 2) is more extensive than the compilation of
MS 1 and has Dīwān Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr written on the cover. MS 1
extends over 31 pages with an average of 30 lines, whereas MS 2 counts 229 pages
averaging 12 lines.272 Be that as it may, the additional poems speak in favor of
the above-mentioned remark that Ibn al-Wazīr’s Dīwān is more extensive than
Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq. For the sake of clarity, the younger copy (MS 2) will be called
Dīwān henceforth.273 The Dīwān is extensively commented on by Muḥammad
b. Ismāʿīl al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī in his Fatḥ al-khāliq fī sharḥ Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq wa-
l-raqāʾiq fī mamādiḥ rabb al-khalāʾiq (The Victory of the Maker: A Commentary
on A Collection of Truths and Subtleties: The Praiseworthy Characteristics of the
Lord of Created Beings).274

Content
The Yemeni theologian often mentioned along with Ibn al-Wazīr and his appeal
to the prophetic traditions, i.e. Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, considers Majmaʿ al-
ḥaqāʾiq too extensive to respond to appropriately.275 The broadness he speaks of
allows for a bias in favor of some of the issues addressed. Such bias is discernible
in some of the brief comments on the subject matter of the Dīwān. Al-Ḥarbī,
for example, turns the poetry collection into a poetic call to the Sunna and
the refutation of the innovators (mubtadiʿūn).276 Although al-Ḥarbī thereby
describes aspects of the collection accurately, other biographers seem to grasp
its broadness more properly. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, for example, mentions divine issues
(ilāhiyyāt), intimate dialogues with God, fear and hope, trust in God and admo-
nitions in prose as major themes of the work.277 The Dīwān is probably most
fittingly described by Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī, who calls it the “extract of his [Ibn

272 Next to the number of lines, the apparently great difference in extent is put into perspec-
tive by the fact that each verse in MS 1 incorporates two verses of MS 2.
273 A printed digest is supposed to exist, edited by Ismāʿīl Jirāfī and ʿAlī b. al-Muʾayyad and
printed in Cairo 1961 with the title Madāʾiḥ ilāhiyya (Panegyrical Poems on the Divine). Yet,
apart from an entry in the catalogue of the library of the Centre français d’ archéologie
et de sciences sociales de Sanaa (CEFAS), no attestation to the book could be found. In
the CEFAS catalogue, Ibn al-Wazīr’s younger relative, Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. al-Wazīr,
is erroneously mentioned as the author.
274 Fatḥ al-khāliq was completed in Ṣafar 1108/September 1696; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fath al-khāliq
322.
275 Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-khāliq 4.
276 al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 93.
277 Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 154; and similarly al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 424, and al-
Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii 91.

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al-Wazīr’s] two writings al-ʿAwāṣim and Īthār.”278 However, an introduction to

the prologue and a tentative classification of the poems appear feasible.
After a prologue in praise of God and His Prophet, Ibn al-Wazīr goes on to
explain his motivation for compiling his poetry. Along with quotations from
Quran and Sunna he emphasizes the significant role of praising God in order
to approach him (min al-muqarribāt). Realizing this significance caused Ibn
al-Wazīr to write down the panegyrical poems granted (wahaba) to him. He
especially points out those praises that manifest a perfect trust in God’s plan
(tawakkul ʿalā llāh) and expectancy of God’s benevolence (rajāʾ), expressing an
undefined but determined good opinion of God (ḥusn al-ẓann). He contrasts
this with “some of his Muʿtazili contemporaries and neighbors who exagger-
ate in the disparagement of the strength of these two principles [i.e. tawakkul
and ḥusn al-ẓann] of Islam and the path of the important scholars as well as
the early generation of the Prophet’s family,”279 although they belong to the
fundamentals of Islam as well as the different schools (madhāhib) including
the Prophet’s family (ʿitra). His poems are based on the multiple testimonies to
tawakkul and ḥusn al-ẓann found in Quran and Sunna. Therefore, he can speak
of proofs (barāhīn) contained in his poems, which, he hopes, will last beyond
his death and benefit not only his own standing before God, but also the under-
standing of his fellow Muslims.280
The number of poems counted as far as Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq (MS 1) extends
is approximately 85. The Dīwān contains another 42 poems.281 The poems can
be roughly classified into four groups. While many have no heading other than
“[Ibn al-Wazīr] May God be pleased with him, said,” the ones that do have a
heading are not arranged according to content. Sometimes a poem without a
title concludes with a thought which is then taken up by the following title and
further elaborated in subsequent verses. Sometimes no immediate connection
is noticeable. Some headings are repeated much later in the collection with a
slight variation.
A chronological order is also not obvious. A number of poems refer to visions
Ibn al-Wazīr had, all but one of which are dated. The first was written just after
Ibn al-Wazīr had entered adulthood. Yet, the first vision listed in the Majmaʿ al-
ḥaqāʾiq as well as the Dīwān is from the year 827/1423–1424;282 a later one from

278 Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-khāliq 4.

279 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 374; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 8l.
280 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 373; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 8l.
281 The number is only tentative, because MS 1 and MS 2 do not always admit the same set of
verses to be a separate poem.
282 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 385; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 33r.

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834/1430–1431,283 and at the end, there is a poem recording the date Jumādā
l-ākhira 832/March 1429.284 The more extensive version, i.e the Dīwān, ends
with a vision from Ramaḍān 838/April 1435,285 listing the latest one chronolog-
ically (from 839/1435–1436) as the second but last.286 Yet, generally speaking,
the extended collection of the Dīwān does quote the later dates at a later point.
Chronology therefore seems to have played some role.
As to the four groups, the most important group of poems treats those top-
ics announced in the introduction: Fourteen poems alone are explicitly dedi-
cated to the issue of trusting perfectly in God’s plan (tawakkul) and entrusting
one’s affairs to him (tafwīḍ),287 fourteen to hoping for His goodness and mercy
(rajāʾ).288 Similarly, numerous poems contain appeals to Ibn al-Wazīr’s fellow
Muslims to think well of God and people (ḥusn al-ẓann), to thank God (shukr),
to implore Him (taḍarruʿ, ṭalab, suʾāl) or to dwell on God’s pleasure (riḍā), his
forgiveness (ʿafw) and wisdom (ḥikma). Ibn al-Wazīr often emphasizes the har-
monizing effect of a focus on these divine characteristics in cases where the
doctrines of different schools are in disagreement.289
Most of the poems are formulated as lessons for the reader and are testi-
monies of Ibn al-Wazīr’s position. The very first poem is of this kind. The title
and its extent is likely a major reason why researchers like al-Ḥarbī subsumed
the entire poem collection under the category of calls to the prophetic Sunna
and a refutation of innovators.290 In these verses, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to five pre-
dominant theological innovations for which he finds no basis in Quran and
Sunna, and contrasts them with God’s superior wisdom and the proper human
response. The subsequent pages are dedicated to a discussion of these inno-
vations. The principles that Ibn al-Wazīr does find established in the textual
sources are God’s benevolent characteristics which are obvious in concepts like
“the good is the first,” “the purpose of the evil is merely the good” and “mercy
precedes wrath.”291
II. While some poems are phrased in an exhortative manner, addressing the
reader, others are directly addressed to God in the second person. Of the poems

283 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 388; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 39l.
284 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 392; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 48l.
285 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 119l.
286 Ibid., laq. 87r.
287 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 373, 378, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 397, 399,
401, 403; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 8l, 17r, 25r, 26l, 30r, 32r, 36r, 37l, 39r, 42l, 62r, 66r, 70r, 75r.
288 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 378, 383, 386, 389, 396, 399; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān 18r, 27l,
34r, 34l, 43l, 59r, 66r, 100r.
289 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 377; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 14l.
290 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 374, Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 9r.
291 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 386; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 34r.

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that can be termed dialogues between Ibn al-Wazīr and God, many have no
explicit title. The scholar addresses God in praise of His virtues, in benedic-
tions for mercy and wisdom, or for help in need.292 Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the
limitations of human beings’ knowledge and understanding of their affairs and
appeals to God for forgiveness and favor in highly emotional terms.293 The man
who trusts God’s plans perfectly (tawakkul) and thinks well of Him beyond his
own understanding (ḥusn al-ẓann) is aware of his own limitations and seeks
to encounter God in his need. On the other hand, if man claims an ability to
make sense of the ambiguous, his strife to explain prompts him to think God
incapable of undeserved kindness or purposeless in his actions.294
III. Another set of poems is framed by autobiographical information as to
date, ___location and cause of composing. Usually, Ibn al-Wazīr saw (raʾaytu) the
first few lines of the poems in a night vision, dream or mystical experience,
and added to them later. Poems of this kind broach similar subjects as his
other poems, namely the passionate love of God and the abandoning of the self
to him.295 In other instances, however, it was a particular thought or insight
caused by an experience that triggered the writing.296 Besides the poem that
he had apparently written “just after reaching adulthood,”297 the dates of other
temporally identified poems range between 827/1414 and 839/1436, hence in
the latter part of Ibn al-Wazīr’s life.
IV. The last group, consisting of approximately ten poems, are responses to
other scholars. In most cases, Ibn al-Wazīr first quotes the verses he wants to
respond to, followed by his own verses. Two poems are dedicated to the refu-
tation of the Abbasid poet Abū Nuwās (d. 814–815/1412–1413),298 one to the
poet Ibn Ṭabāṭabā l-ʿAlawī (d. 322/934)299 and one to Ibn al-Wazīr’s teacher
Ibn Ẓahīra (d. 817/1414).300 Beyond these refutations in Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq, the
Dīwān adds responses to poems of Abū Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/965),301

292 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 394, Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 53r.
293 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 388.
294 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 400; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 14r–l; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ
al-khāliq 76–77.
295 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 385, 388, 392, 394; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs., 32r, 33r, 39l,
48l, 53l, 76l, 80l, 89l, 121l.
296 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 395; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 56l; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-
khāliq 221.
297 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 395; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 56l.
298 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 385; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 31l–32r.
299 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 394; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 54l.
300 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 401; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 71r.
301 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 88l.

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the mystic Muḥyī l-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-ʿArabī (d. 638/1240),302 the Muʿtazili
Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd al-Zamakhsharī (d. 583/1144)303 and the physician and
philosopher Abū ʿAlī l-Ḥusayn b. Sīnā (d. 428/1037).304 Less specific, yet signif-
icant for the understanding of the context of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought, are the
responses to unspecified verses of “some strangers,”305 “some Sufis,”306 “some
Muʿtazilis”307 or simply questions directed towards him.308 In these poems, Ibn
al-Wazīr contrasts his theological positions with those of his contemporaries
or of scholars widely read in his day. In one instance, Ibn al-Wazīr debates the
mutual but largely false accusations between the theological schools. This is
then followed by a poem expressing Ibn al-Wazīr’s affirmation of all schools.309
The last 33 pages of the Dīwān contain refutations of some kind. Ibn al-
Amīr does not really consider them as belonging to the “praises of the Divine”
(mamādiḥ ilāhiyya).310 Although written in verse, scholarly argumentation and
the justification of Ibn al-Wazīr’s position is much more apparent than in the
preceding poems. The Dīwān concludes with a poem originating in a vision,
in which Ibn al-Wazīr consolidates his desire and intention for continuous
defense (dhabb) of the Prophet.311

12 Manẓūma shiʿriyya fī uṣūl al-fiqh

Ibn al-Wazīr’s Treatise in Verse on Legal Theory is only mentioned in one of the
biographical and bibliographical sources, namely al-Wajīh’s Aʿlām.312 Yet it con-

302 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 103r.

303 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 118r. Al-Zamakhsharī was a Muʿtazili who apparently refused to
takes sides in the tension between the Bahshamiyya and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school.
His poetry originated with al-Mutanabbī. On al-Zamakhsharī, see Madelung, al-Zamakh-
sharī; Schmidtke (ed., transl.), A Muʿtazilite Creed of az-Zamakhshari.
304 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 119l.
305 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 376; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 14r; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-
khāliq 72.
306 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 377; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 15l–16r.
307 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 400; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 67l.
308 An example is Ibn al-Wazīr’s response to students who wanted to study logic with him; cf.
ibid., laq. 92r.
309 Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 400; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 67l; cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-
khāliq 243–244. For related topics, see also Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 374–376; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān
laqs. 9r–14l.
310 Cf. Ibn al-Amīr, Fatḥ al-khāliq 315.
311 Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 121l–122r.
312 Al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 829.

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tains valuable information on the thought of Ibn al-Wazīr as it is probably his

most concise and systematic writing on all the classical questions of Islamic
legal theory. However, the authorship is not entirely certain, as the Manẓūma
appears in only one relatively recent collection.313 It is not mentioned else-
where and has no explicit internal reference, other than a remark in the mar-
gins according to which it was written by “the great scholar and pride of the
Banū l-Wazīr, Muḥammad.”314 Yet the collection also contains a few writings
which are clearly not authored by Ibn al-Wazīr. Furthermore, the Manẓūma did
not make its way into Ibn al-Wazīr’s Dīwān although the Dīwān is where Ibn a-
Wazīr’s most important poems are collected. However, the content bespeaks
the authenticity of Ibn al-Wazīr’s authorship. The copy of the Manẓūma was
completed in 1350/1931.315 It covers 8 pages with an average of 27 lines per page.

Content
The Manẓūma is divided into a prologue, an introduction, four preliminary
poems and 27 chapters ( fuṣūl). All is versified, including the initial praise of
God and the Prophet. The chapters of the Manẓūma are arranged similar to
the order in Zaydi316 and other works on legal theory.317 Indeed, in the intro-

313 MS Sanaa, Maktabat Muḥammad al-Kibsī, coll. 49; cf. al-Wajīh, Maṣādir turāth i, 219.
314 Ibn al-Wazīr, Manẓūma laq. 111r. There is another Muḥammad of the Āl al-Wazīr that could
have been meant, namely the writer of the first version of the family biography al-Faḍāʾil fī
taʾrīkh al-sāda l-aʿlām Āl al-Wazīr (The Virtues: On the History of the Outstanding Masters of
the House of al-Wazīr), Muḥammad b. al-ʿAfīf al-Wazīr. Al-Faḍāʾil was extended by several
of Muḥammad’s descendants. The last version, compiled by a grandson of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
brother al-Hādī, Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr, became famous under the title Taʾrīkh Banī
al-Wazīr; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 487. It is unlikely, however, that the remark in the mar-
gins of the Manẓūma should have meant the earlier Muḥammad. He was not particularly
known for his productivity in legal theory.
315 Ibn al-Wazīr, Manẓūma shiʿriyya laq. 114l.
316 See for example al-Manṣūr bi-llāh’s (d. 614/1217) Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār and Ṣārim al-Dīn b.
al-Wazīr’s (d. 914/1508) Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya. Of the MS of al-Manṣūr bi-llāh’s Ṣafwat al-
ikhtiyār, numerous copies exist, cf. Schwarb, Handbook, MS no. 362. According to Ansari
and Schmidtke, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār was the “first deliberate attempt by an imam to formu-
late a specifically Zaydī legal methodology.” Cf. Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and Zaydī
Reception 103. The earlier works of the Zaydi imam al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq Abū Ṭālib al-Hārūnī
(d. 424/1033) al-Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh and Jawāmiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Comprehensive
Proofs in Uṣūl al-Fiqh) reflect the view of the Muʿtazili Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Baṣrī on legal the-
ory; cf. ibid., 94. See also Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 430–433 (index of topics).
317 The reception of the al-Muʿtamad of the Muʿtazili Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) is
only one testimony to the fact that legal methodology generally defies the boundaries of
legal as well as theological schools. For the reception of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s al-Muʿtamad see
Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and Zaydī Reception 90–109.

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ductory verses, Ibn al-Wazīr refers his reader to Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī
(d. 478/1085), of whose legal doctrine the Manẓūma is little more than a refor-
mulation.318 The following four preliminary poems provide definitions (taʿrīf )
of the basic operative elements of uṣūl al-fiqh (i.e. the root (aṣl) and the branch
( farʿ)), as well as the epistemological values attainable by the various opera-
tions (i.e. knowledge (ʿilm) and ignorance ( jahl), conjecture (ẓann) and doubt
(shakk)), and finally of the discipline of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) in general.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s concern with epistemology is noteworthy. The fact that the
preliminary poem of the Manẓūma is devoted to the different kinds of knowl-
edge (aqsām al-ʿulūm)319 is in line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s general concern with
knowledge, and with the common practice among scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh to
preface their works with an epistemological introduction.320
The next chapters present a list of the hermeneutical principles with which
legal theory is occupied.321 The order, accurately repeated in subsequent chap-
ters, again follows the order rendered in classical treatises of uṣūl al-fiqh: 1.
speech (kalām); 2. the literal and the metaphorical along with their respec-
tive subdivision, namely; 3. literal figures of speech (aqsām al-ḥaqīqa); and 4.
metaphorical figures of speech (aqsām al-majāz); 5. the command (amr); 6.
that which should be considered part of speech and what should not; 7. the
prohibition (nahy); 8. the relationship between the general (ʿāmm) and the
particular (khāṣṣ); 9. the particular (khāṣṣ) on its own; 10. connected partic-
ularization (takhṣīṣ bi-l-muttaṣil); 11. unconnected particularization (takhṣīṣ bi-
l-munfaṣil); 12. the ambiguous (mujmal) and the clarified (mubayyan); 13. clari-
fication (bayān); 14. the text (naṣṣ); 15. the apparent (ẓāhir) and the interpreted
(muʾawwal); 16. the deeds of the Prophet; 17. abrogation (naskh); 18. consensus
(ijmāʿ); 19. the reports (akhbār); 20. analogy (qiyās); 21. impermissibility and
permissibility (ḥaẓar wa-ibāḥa); 22. presumption of continuity (istiṣḥāb); 23.
the order of evidence (tartīb al-adilla); 24. requirements of the legal interpreter
and the inquirer (muftī wa-mustaftī); 25. taqlīd and 26. ijtihād.
Some of these chapters are worth pointing out as they speak in favor of
the likelihood of Ibn al-Wazīr’s authorship. The indications that this poetical
treatise is at least in line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking commence already in

318 Ibn al-Wazīr, Manẓūma laq. 111r.

319 Ibn al-Wazīr, Manẓūma laq. 111l.
320 Cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 195, 213. An exception to this was Abū l-Ḥusayn al-
Baṣrī, who considered epistemology to belong to the subtleties of kalām; cf. Abū l-Ḥusayn
al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad i, 3. Ibn al-Wazīr did not seem to have agreed with him in this,
whereas other kalām topics that should have no part in uṣūl al-fiqh according to Abū l-
Ḥusayn were not touched upon in the Manẓūma.
321 Ibn al-Wazīr, Manẓūma, laq. 111l.

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the prologue in praise of God and his Prophet. Among the divine attributes
that are singled out for praise is God’s mercy. God is to be praised because
He is the provider of wisdom, reason and favor.322 Furthermore, there is a list
of the requirements of a mujtahid that does not mention speculative theol-
ogy as a requirement.323 Furthermore, the author of the Manẓūma insists on
knowing the proofs that lead to the different opinions. Likewise redolent of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s thinking, as we shall see later, are the last two lines of the verses on
the requirements: the necessity of ijtihād for everyone who is capable of it.
The Manẓūma represents the only systematic illustration of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
legal methodology available to us. Although uṣūl al-fiqh figures majorly in many
other writings, discussions of many, but not all elements of legal theory are scat-
tered throughout these writings.

13 Masāʾil arbaʿa tataʿallaq bi-l-muqallad wa-l-mustaftī

This short treatise called Four Questions Related to the One Who is Emulated and
the Legal Inquirer is not mentioned in any of the bibliographical sources. The
time of authorship is hard to determine. It was probably a relatively early writ-
ing. Some of Ibn al-Wazīr’s positions in legal methodology, which later became
rather distinct beacons of his argumentation, are hardly pronounced yet. The
MS consulted for the present study issues from the year 1032/1622. It extends
over eight pages with an average of 34 lines.324

Content
After a short prologue, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses four questions that concern the
relationship between an emulator asking for a legal opinion (mustaftī muqallid)
and the legal interpreter (mujtahid, muqallad), i.e. his imam. The four questions
were posed to him by some of his students. The interest in the questions issued
from their prominence in the books on legal theory circulating in Ibn al-Wazīr’s
lifetime.325 Significantly, Ibn al-Wazīr points out that an active subject of law
does not need profound knowledge of either the essential rules of philosophi-

322 Ibid., laq 111r.

323 Ibid., laq 114l.
324 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil arbaʿa 131–138; MS Sanaa, Maktabat Muḥammad al-Kibsī, coll. 89; cf.
al-Wajīh, Maṣādir al-turāth 232.
325 In their What Makes a Madhhab?, Haykel and Zysow confirm the centrality of the four
questions in the discourse around the identity of the Zaydi madhhab far beyond Ibn al-
Wazīr’s lifetime.

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cal speculation (naẓar) or the principles of verifying traditions. In other words,

the information sought is attainable by all. It belongs to those issues where the
Creator and Lawmaker (i.e. God) encourages, desires and indeed expects gen-
eral understanding.326
Discussing question I, namely whether a non-mujtahid has to adhere ( yal-
tazim) to one particular imam,327 Ibn al-Wazīr presents six positions along with
their respective proponents. There are those who declare adherence binding
and others who do not. The first two positions represent the two opposing
extremes: incumbency of iltizām on the one hand,328 and the claim that iltizām
is an unacceptable innovation on the other.329 The subsequent positions are
nuances of the permission to transfer from one school or imam to another.330
Ibn al-Wazīr explains that the reason for the differences goes back to the differ-
ent stances toward four questions concerning a particular principle (aṣl) of uṣūl
al-fiqh, namely the legal quality of taqlīd in its most basic form: Is the original
quality of taqlīd permissibility, or does the permissibility apply only to some
forms after particularization? Is the proof on which the permissibility claim
relies a general or a particular proof? Is the emulator permitted to act without
knowledge or conjecture, and is he allowed to act against his conjecture? Or is
the emulator equal to the mujtahid in his obligation to act according to his own
conjecture?331
The ensuing discussion touches upon a number of issues implied in the dif-
ferent positions towards the question of adherence. First, Ibn al-Wazīr debates
the four arguments (ḥujaj) of some who declare that neither adherence to one
imam or school nor the investigation of evidence is binding. Their sole indica-
tor is the leniency of the respective rulings. This position stands for the com-
plete acceptance of unquestioning taqlīd. It applies to both sets of principle
questions concerning the legal quality of taqlīd as well as the significance of
conjecture.332

326 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil arbaʿ a 131.

327 Ibid., 131.
328 Examples of proponents of this view are Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza,
Imam al-Manṣūr’s teacher al-Ḥasan al-Rassas and al-Raṣṣāṣ’s grandson, Aḥmad b. Muḥam-
mad al-Ṛaṣṣāṣ, as well as Ibn al-Wazīr’s teacher and transmitter of the said disagreement,
ʿAlī b. Abī al-Khayr. Ibn Abī l-Khayr claims that this view was held by the majority of jurists;
cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil arbaʿ a 131.
329 Examples are the Baghdadi Muʿtazili Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī, Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, Ibn ʿAbd
al-Barr and a number of Zaydis, as for example Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza; cf. ibid., 131.
330 Ibid., 131.
331 Ibid., 132.
332 Ibid., 132–135.

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Another topic touched upon is that of precaution (iḥtiyāt), which Ibn al-
Wazīr discusses in two studies (bahthān). A distinction must be made between
acts of worship (ʿibādāt), where the intention must entirely conform to divine
intention behind the action, and mundane matters. In mundane matters, the
cautious, hence more severe, ruling can be chosen. A second distinction con-
cerns individual rights (ḥuqūq al-makhlūqīn) and demands of public well-being
(ḥuqūq Allāh). If statements and evidence in the case of public well-being are
contradictory and conjecture does not tend towards one of them, the muqallid
can chose the ruling of anyone who acknowledges that there is neither a duty
to perform nor to omit. Where the individual rights are concerned, the layman
must refer to a judge in the case of a lawsuit or can chose the ruling of a scholar,
who releases him from his legal obligations. In brief, the basis of every action
and every choice for a particular ruling should be based on the muqallid’s con-
jecture as a result of an investigation. In ambiguous matters, where evidence is
equally indecisive on either side (haythu yaḥṣul shakk mustawī l-ṭarafayn), cau-
tion is desirable. However, the most appropriate application of caution consists
in the omission of taqlīd. For Ibn al-Wazīr, choosing the most cautious ruling
is not identical to choosing the prohibition over permission or the more severe
ruling over the lighter one.333
Question II asks whether or not it is permissible to follow more than one
imam in a single case.334 Ibn al-Wazīr basically refers to the response to ques-
tion I. Those, who consider strict adherence (iltizām) binding, prohibit that
more than one imam be followed, and vice versa.
Question III refers to the issue of the ahl al-bayt’s collective prerogative to
being emulated. Is transfer of following (tanaqqul) permitted only among the
positions of ahl al-bayt?335 In this passage, Ibn al-Wazīr establishes that the
prevalence of ahl al-bayt holds true in a number of issues. Prominent among
them are the pronouncement of tafsīq and takfīr and other matters where
certainty is required (ijmāʿ qaṭʿī, masāʾil qaṭʿiyya). Similarly, preeminence is
conceded to their consensus in suppositional matters.336 This preeminence is
based on the praise they received among the Prophet and his companions and
followers.337 Even though Ibn al-Wazīr grants them this extraordinary status,
he does not restrict ijtihād, taqlīd or adherence to them. Being a descendant of
the Prophet’s daughter Fāṭima has not been made a requirement for ijtihād, nor

333 Ibid., 136.

334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
336 Ibid., 137.
337 Ibid.

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does descent from the Prophet outweigh evidence.338 Investigation of the evi-
dence with the aim of arriving at an informed starting point for weighing the
given positions against each other (rujḥān) remains the postulate of all matters
of probability, hence all matters of ijtihād. The highest probability (al-ẓann al-
aqwā) is the ultimate goal.339 The dominant role in matters requiring certainty
that Ibn al-Wazīr concedes to ahl al-bayt seems to speak for an early origin.
This observation may be qualified by the fact that Masāʾil arbaʿa is not at all
specific, up until the time that the consensus of ahl al-bayt may be considered
valid. If the consensus of ahl al-bayt is only valid up until the spread of Islam,
the argument of ijmāʿ ahl al-bayt can only be of very limited applicability.
Question IV treats the divergence between the texts of an imam and the rul-
ings of his school’s muṣaḥḥiḥūn.340 What if a layman adheres to the madhhab
of an imam and finds that some later authorities of the imam’s school (muṣaḥ-
ḥiḥūn) bring forth rulings that diverge from the explicit textual sources of the
imam in question?341 Ibn al-Wazīr answers the question with the repeated ref-
erence to and insistence on the “most probable according to individual conjec-
ture” (ittibāʿ al-ẓann al-aqwā) as a heuristic method. The weightier argument
must be found and followed, and the possibility of weighing the evidence in
the case of supposed evenness must be sought (ṭalab al-rujḥān). Ibn al-Wazīr
enumerates mechanisms for arriving at the most probable: a) investigating the
indicators of the case in question (al-naẓar bi-l-adilla); b) weighing the indica-
tors of the different parties (tarjiḥ dalīlihim), i.e. the imam and the muṣaḥḥiḥūn
of his school, with the possible inclusion of c) contextual evidence (bi-l-qarīna).
Ibn al-Wazīr insists: “With these scales, weigh everything that you receive in
these issues!”342

338 Ibn al-Wazīr’s choice of examples indicates the background of his addressees in law and
theology: Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 148/767), a non-Arab, was a known and referred to mufti during
the time of the Zaydi eponym Zayd b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740); likewise the Muʿtazili theologian
ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1025), who did not refer to his contemporaries and
representatives of the Zaydi legal school, the Hārūnī brothers Imam al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh
Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 411/1020) or Imam al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq Abū Ṭālib (d. 424/1033).
Hence, with these examples, Ibn al-Wazīr points out that important landmarks in their
intellectual past did not confer prerogatives of leadership in matters of ijtihād to mem-
bers of the Prophet’s progeny; cf. ibid., 137.
339 Ibid., 138.
340 Muṣaḥḥiḥūn are scholars of a particular legal school that extract the principles underly-
ing their imam’s (or more than one imam’s) legal positions. Subsequently, the muṣaḥḥiḥūn
bring the diverging legal opinions into harmony with these principles. They are also called
muḥaṣṣilūn; cf. Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 9, and below.
341 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil arbaʿ a, 138.
342 Ibid., 138.

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If the above-mentioned procedures are followed, the origin of the ruling that
is embraced is of no consequence. The ruling can originate from the imam
himself, the muṣaḥḥiḥūn of his school or some other origin. The implications
for adherence are obvious: even an emulator that holds to strict adherence
(iltizām) must abandon the school of his imam in a particular ruling, if he
arrives at the conviction that that particular ruling is most likely to be weak.
In his insistence that everyone must follow what seems most probable to him
after investigation, Ibn al-Wazīr goes as far as affirming the unlikely case that
a muqallid emulates his deceased imam even if this imam prohibited taqlīd
al-mayyit, if the muqallid himself came to the conclusion that it is permissi-
ble.343
Ibn al-Wazīr concludes with an appraisal of the salaf. In the discussion of
these four questions, the significance that Ibn al-Wazīr grants the informed
conjecture of the legal subject and his participation in the legal activity be-
comes evident.

14 Masʾalat ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya fī ḥamd Allāh ʿalā

l-īmān

Alternative titles for The Issue of the Disagreement Between the Muʿtazila and the
Ashaʿriyya Concerning the Praise of God for Faith are Risāla fī taqrīr raḥmat Allāh
taʿālā ʿalā l-īmān (Epistle Establishing Faith as God’s Mercy),344 Baḥth fī ḥamd
Allāh ʿalā l-īmān wa-ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya (A Study on the Praise
of God for Faith and the Disagreement the Muʿtazila and the Ashaʿriyya),345 and
al-Ikhtilāf fī ḥadd Allāh ʿalā l-īmān (The Disagreement on the Limitation [sic] of
God for Faith).346 Al-Wajīh suggests the identity of al-Ikhtilāf with a Risāla fī
taqrīr ḥamd Allāh, although he mentions them as two distinct works. Possibly,
there is confusion as to the titles because the original had none, or had various
titles. The uncertainty of the title rather than the diversity of works is further
supported by the suggestion that the word ḥadd in al-Ikhtilāf is a reading mis-
take. No date of completion of the original is explicitly given. However, on the
last page, Ibn al-Wazīr refers the reader to his al-ʿAwāṣim for further detail, indi-
cating that Masʾalat ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya may have been written

343 Ibid.
344 Al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 828; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 93.
345 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 135; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 154.
346 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 826.

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after 808/1406. Of the two copies used for this study, one was completed in
1035/1626.347 The other copy from the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt does not mention a
date of completion.348

Content
As the title says, Masʾalat ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya is devoted to the
question of the origin of faith and, more generally, the origin of human actions.
The writing is divided into a long introduction and two following sections. In
the introduction, Ibn al-Wazīr explains his motivation for writing the treatise
and establishes two doctrines concerning the question of the createdness of
human actions, which he then elaborates in the two following sections.
Ibn al-Wazīr was asked to explain the differences between the doctrine of
faith in Muʿtazili and Ashʿariyyi teaching. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the abyss
that is supposed to exist between the two groups is due to contentiousness
inhibiting an accurate understanding of their respective positions. Ibn al-Wazīr
repeatedly refers to the Prophet Muḥammad’s admonition not to quarrel.349
Investigation would show that ultimately, there is no essential difference in the
understanding of faith, but rather a difference in expression ( fī l-iʿbārāt, lafzī).
Ibn al-Wazīr establishes two tenets on which supposedly both schools and
the Muslim community at large agree (ijmāʿān): I. God deserves praise for the
occurrence of faith in human beings. II. Human beings have free choice (ikhti-
yār) in their actions. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the differences came about in
the course of polarization. The general tenet that God is to be thanked for all
graces (niʿam) is apparently not doubted. The choice that the human being has
in acting according to divine command and prohibition is likewise affirmed by
all, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, until “the saying appeared that human actions are
created.”350 The Jabriyya took this in an extreme way and denied human beings
any agency in their actions, faith included. The Ashʿariyya likewise employed
the expression that “actions are created” extensively. In reaction, the Muʿtazila
identified everyone phrasing this statement with one who denied that human
beings have free choice (ikhtiyār). By calling such people unbelievers, they
neglected to refer back to the intention of those who expressed the phrase as a
tenet. Exaggeration on the Ashʿari side has led some Muʿtazilis to go far beyond

347 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf, MS Sanaa, Maktabat Muḥammad al-Kibsī, coll. 89, 363–
371. I was given access to a digitized version of the MS by a Yemeni friend, whom I want to
thank for this help. The references below refer to this copy.
348 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf, MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 2990.
349 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf 363.
350 Ibid., 363.

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the limits of their own school, ending up with the opposite, namely that “God
must be thankful towards human beings for their faith.”351
After describing the general problem, Ibn al-Wazīr briefly shows how both
sides—the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya—actually do advocate the same posi-
tion: The Muʿtazila acknowledge that God deserves praise and thanksgiving for
all things. An example of this advocacy is found in the preamble of an impor-
tant Muʿtazili writing of “the teacher and source of the Muʿtazili and Zaydi
doctrine for the theologians in our time and country,”352 i.e. Aḥmad b. Ḥasan
al-Raṣṣāṣ’s (d. 621/1224) Khulāṣa. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the due al-Raṣṣāṣ
paid God for His being the director (qawwām) of all things and guide to Islam
(hadānā lil-Islām) was not questioned by any Muʿtazili theologian after him.
Correspondingly, the Ashʿariyya affirm that there is an element of free choice
in faith for which human beings are responsible and deserve reward or punish-
ment accordingly.
In the two subsequent sections, Ibn al-Wazīr elaborates these supposedly
agreed-upon tenets. Elucidating the first tenet (I), Ibn al-Wazīr puts forward
four arguments from reason and three from the Quran (Q 49:17, Q 5:3 and
Q 4:94). In all of these arguments, the emphasis is put on God’s favor in creating
what helps people to have faith (i.e. ability, reason, motives, prophets, revela-
tion, etc.). These things are seen as derivations from the root of favor and hence
to be ascribed to God. In contradistinction, sin and disobedience are described
as deviations from the root and not ascribed to God accordingly.353
In elucidating the second tenet (II), Ibn al-Wazīr makes an effort to absolve
those accused of negating this tenet, i.e. the Jabriyya and the Ashʿariyya, from
the allegations advanced by the Muʿtazilis. The Zaydi Muʿtazili Aḥmad b. Abī
Hāshim known as al-Manakdim (d. 425/1034) is used as an example of one
who mitigates the disagreement between the Muʿtazili and the Ashʿari doc-
trine of human actions.354 Ibn al-Wazīr goes on to buttress his assumption with
the writings of an Ashʿari authority, namely Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209)
in his Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl (The Goal of Intellects Concerning the
Knowledge of the Principles). Ibn al-Wazīr draws a not-unlikely relationship to
the thought of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1045) on two issues.355 Firstly,

351 Ibid., 363–364.

352 Ibid., 364.
353 Ibid., 364–366.
354 The quote is taken from the beginning of chapter two of al-Manakdim’s commentary on
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s al-Uṣūl al-khamsa on justice.
355 For the reception of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, see for example
Madelung (ed., intr.), Kitāb al-Fāʾiq, 4–5; Madelung, Late Muʿtazila; Madelung, Abū l-

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he attempts to square al-Rāzī’s understanding of compulsion ( jabr) with that

of Abū l-Ḥusayn.356
Secondly, Ibn al-Wazīr attempts to harmonize the views of al-Rāzī and other
Ashʿaris with that of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s concerning the effectiveness of human
capacity (qudra muʾaththira).357 Again, the assumed disagreement is said to
pertain only to the mode of expression. At times drawing on Muʿtazili rea-
soning, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī and other Ashʿaris even go further than Bahshami
Muʿtazilis in that they, like Abū l-Ḥusayn, insist that the connection between
the human being and his freely chosen action is one of necessity (ḍarūrā)
rather than merely being known by inference (istidlālī). Necessity has a higher
epistemic value than inference. In consequence, Ibn al-Wazīr expresses his
great astonishment that supposed opponents of the Muʿtazila should be ac-
cused of negating free choice, although they support and go beyond what he
calls “extreme Muʿtazilism.”358
In the subsequent pages, more examples are provided from the writings
of Ashʿaris that allegedly parallel Abū l-Ḥusayn’s views,359 such as Abū Bakr
Muḥammad al-Baqillānī (d. 402/1013) and Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī
(d. 478/1085). Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the important agreement that good-
ness (ḥusn) and evil (qabḥ) are attributes of actions rather than their essence
and that human beings are responsible for their actions in the sense that their
power has an effect on these attributes.360
In conclusion, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf must be considered a masterpiece of syn-
thesis. Furthermore, what suggests itself on reading this short theological trea-
tise is that according to Ibn al-Wazīr, the scholars most conducive to harmo-
nization of Ashʿari and Muʿtazili thinking are Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.

Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Proof for the Existence of God; Ansari and Schmidtke, Muʿtazilī and
Zaydī Reception. See also the relationship of their respective positions on human action
in Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 140.
356 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf 367.
357 Ibid., 367–368.
358 Ibn al-Wazīr mentions Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1248–1249) along with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī;
ibid., 368. For the difference between Abū l-Ḥusayn and the Bahshamiyya, see al-Ḥayyī,
al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 82b and below.
359 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf 370.
360 Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī is mentioned as an example; cf. ibid., 371. See also Ibn al-
Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 53–65, 265–268.

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15 Masāʾil mustakhrajāt

The full title is given as Masāʾil mustakhrajāt min qawlihi taʿālā {ʿĀlim al-ghayb
wa-l-shahāda} (Questions Extracted from the Word of the Sublime {He is the
Knower of the Unseen and the Seen}). Al-Ḥibshī places this treatise in the cat-
egory of the sciences of the Quran.361 Unfortunately, I could not get access to
the treatise. However, it is likely that it was mainly concerned with the theolog-
ical implications of the relevant Quranic verse, namely Q 13:9, which reads {He
knows what is not seen as well as what is seen; He is the Great, the Most High}.
If it is indeed a theological exposition of the verse, it might be similar or even
identical to Masāʾil sharīfa min qawlihi taʿālā {ʿĀlim al-ghayb wa-lā yuẓhir ʿalā
ghaybihi aḥadan}, discussed below. There are several reasons for this assump-
tion: Titles were often a later ascription, the topics are similar, and Ibn al-Wazīr
would have mentioned more than one Quranic verse in each work. It is pos-
sible that only the one verse chosen for the title varied. A copy is to be found
in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, MS no. 53. No date of authorship nor of completion is
mentioned.

16 Masāʾil shāfiyāt

The full title of this short work, Masāʾil shāfiyāt wa-bi-l-maṭālib wāfiyyāt fī-mā
yataʿallaq bi-āyāt karīma Qurʾāniyya tadull ʿalā llāh al-mabʿūd wa-ṣidq anbiyāʾihi
l-muballighīn ʿanhu, succinctly describes its contents: Issues that Cure and Fully
Meet the Requests Related to the Noble Verses of the Quran that Point to the Wor-
shipful God as well as the Truthfulness of His Prophets Who Give Account of Him. A
few copies are known to exist in the libraries of the Grand Mosque in Sanaa.362
The writing is most probably identical with two manuscripts mentioned else-
where: 1. al-Āyāt al-dālla ʿalā llāh wa-ʿalā ṣidq anbiyāʾihi, of which al-Wajīh
found a copy in the library of the Ministry of Religious Endowments dating
from 957/1550–1551,363 and 2. Baḥth ʿan mā dhakaruhu llāh taʿālā fī l-Qurʾān al-
karīm min al-āyāt al-dālla ʿalayhi ʿizz wa-jall wa-ṣidq anbiyāʾihi min al-khawāriq,

361 Al-Ḥibsī, Maṣādir, 28.

362 Cf. al-Wajīh, al-Aʿ lām 829; cf. ʿAlī al-ʿAmrān (ed., intr.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 35. Al-Ḥarbī men-
tions the same number of folios from the collection. Neither apparently consulted the
work, although al-Ḥarbī quotes the first line after the basmala. It is also possible that both
considered al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt to be a part of the Masāʾil shāfiyāt; cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr
wa-ārāʾ uhu 100.
363 Al-Wajīh, al-Aʿlām 826.

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mentioned by al-Ḥarbī.364 Al-Wajīh’s identification of Masāʾil shāfiyāt with a

Mukhtasar fī ʿilm al-ḥadīth (Synopsis of the Sciene of Hadith) in a collection of al-
Kibsī is erroneous. In contrast to al-Wajīh’s assumption, Masāʾil shāfiyāt should
not be classified as a writing in the science of hadith, but rather as a brief doc-
trinal treatise. It is unknown when Ibn al-Wazīr finished the writing.
The copy used here is a digitized version from the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt. No date
of completion is mentioned in the colophon. Yet the copy is likely to origi-
nate from around 1158/1745, judging from other works comprised in the same
codex.365

Content
As the full title mentions, the work provides Quranic verses in evidence of God
and His prophets. In the two lines after the basmala, Ibn al-Wazīr asserts the
sufficiency of the Quranic evidence.366 Subsequently, he systematically works
his way through the first nineteen Suras of the Quran, at times quoting a pas-
sage or a phrase from the relevant Sura. At other times, he simply mentions
the story and draws a brief conclusion in support of his main thesis: Things
transcending the natural are employed to prove God’s existence as well as the
truthfulness of those He sent to convey His word to human beings. For this the
Quran gives ample evidence. In the second Sura of the Quran, Ibrāhīm asks
God to give him more evidence after he witnesses the revival of the dead, so
that his heart may be at rest (iṭmiʾnān). God asks why Ibrāhīm does not have
faith. Ibn al-Wazīr concludes from this that faith is a confirmation (taṣdīq)
in the realm of conviction (iʿtiqādāt), not in the realm of deeds. God subse-
quently gives further signs that lead to more certainty. These signs are clearly
within the realm of rational activity.367 Thus, the signs and miracles in creation
which are mentioned in the Quran should be the source and subject of rational
endeavor. Reason plays a large part in religious knowledge. More specifically,

364 Al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 90. He refers to Maṭlaʿ al-budūr which mentions Ḥaṣr al-
āyāt al-dālla ʿalayhi taʿālā wa-ʿalā ṣidq anbiyāʾihi wa-awliyāʾihi min al-khawāriq (Collection
of Verses that Point to God the Exalted and to the Truthfulness of His Prophets and Friends by
Way of Things that Surpass the Ordinary). Ibn Abī al-Rijāl does not mention the alternative
title Masāʾ il shāfiyāt; cf. Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 153.
365 MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3133. The editor of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim mentions fs. 92–114.
Yet the text amounts only to 9 pages (fs. 92a–96a; or pages 183–191 according to the newer
pagination which I will henceforth quote). In the said collection, Masāʾ il shāfiyāt is fol-
lowed by a copy of al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt which is not mentioned as part of that collection,
neither in the catalogue nor in any of the bibliographical sources.
366 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil shāfiyāt 184.
367 Ibid., 185.

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Ibn al-Wazīr speaks of the “conditions or circumstances of creation” (aḥwāl)

which need to be pondered. An indication of what Ibn al-Wazīr terms aḥwal-
proof elsewhere is found in the discussion of Q 11:6. The verse speaks of all
the beasts of the earth. None of them was created without God being the one
who gives them substance and sustenance. The circumstances of these crea-
tures (aḥwāl al-khalq) should be pondered, leading to the knowledge of the
truthfulness of God and his message.368 Besides the miracles within the realm
of nature, there is the miracle of the Quran itself which indicates the exis-
tence of God and the truthfulness of His messenger. This is also treated in the
Quran.369
Another noteworthy aspect of Masāʾil shāfiyāt reveals Ibn al-Wazīr’s involve-
ment with Sufism. Addressing Sufis in a passage in Masāʾil shāfiyāt, he explains
as follows: In Q 2:144, the direction of prayer, the qibla, is determined as being
toward Mecca. This determination comes about as a response to Muḥammad’s
turning his face towards heaven. God wants to give Muḥammad and his follow-
ers another direction which supposedly pleases them more. In this verse, Ibn
al-Wazīr finds support for his teaching of human freedom in relation to God’s
wisdom and decree.370 For one thing, human beings seem to have the choice
between several actions within the decrees of God. To explain this, Ibn al-Wazīr
uses the term taqdīr which must be understood as some kind of presupposi-
tion or prescience. Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr’s comment on Q 2:144 illustrates
his view of God’s divine wisdom and motive behind every act and decree. This
apparently is not impaired or questioned by the believer’s favoring one over the
other. Lastly, Ibn al-Wazīr states that the command which is more pleasant to
the believer is also more beneficial for him.
In sum, the main features of this work are the importance Ibn al-Wazīr places
on miracles to prove the veracity of prophethood, and that he argues for his
positions in his preferred manner of rendering proof: directly from scripture.

17 Masāʾil sharīfa

According to al-Ḥibshī, a copy of Masāʾil sharīfa mustakhraja min qawlihi taʿālā

{ʿĀlim al-ghayb wa-lā yuẓhir ʿalā ghaybihi aḥadan} (Noble Questions Extracted
from the Word of the Sublime {He is the One Who Knows What is Hidden and He

368 Ibid., 190.

369 See for example ibid., 190, 191.
370 Ibn al-Wazīr, Masāʾil shāfiyāt 185.

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Does not Disclose it.})371 can be found in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt. He ranks Masāʾil
sharīfa in the category of theology as well as science of the Quran.372 Unfortu-
nately, I did not get access to the MS. However, the title and al-Ḥibshī’s account
indicate that Masāʾil sharīfa is an exposition of Q 72: 26–27a.373

18 Mukhtaṣar mufīd fī ʿulūm al-ḥadīth

The Beneficial Compendium on the Sciences of Hadith was written as an “im-

provement” (taslīḥ) of the Shafiʿi Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s (d. 852/1449) Nukhbat
al-fikr (The Top of Thinking). Accordingly, it was also called Taslīḥ Nukhbat al-
fikr.374 Al-Ḥibshī simply gives a description as the title: Risāla taʿaqqaba fīhā
ʿalā risālat al-ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī fī ʿilm al-athār (Epistle Following Ibn
Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s Treatise on the Science of Traditions).375 Al-Ḥarbī, who men-
tions the latter title as well as Mukhtaṣar fī ʿulūm al-ḥadīth, did not realize that
the content is identical.376 Besides the libraries of the Grand Mosque, copies
of the manuscript are extant in the Königliche Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin377 as
well as the private library of Muḥammad al-Kibsī.378
The introduction of the Mukhtaṣar informs the reader of an approximate
time of writing. Ibn al-Wazīr states that he wrote his Mukhtaṣar after he had
read Ibn Ḥajar’s Nukhbat al-fikr. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn Ḥajar wrote his
masterpiece on hadith during his journey to Mecca in the year 817/1414–1415.379
Hence Ibn al-Wazīr’s Mukhtaṣar must have been written after that year. The MS
used for the study at hand originates from the collection of writings of Ibn al-
Wazīr found in the library of Muḥammad al-Kibsī. The copy was completed in
1034/1625.

371 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl adds part of the following verse, “except unto a messenger of His choosing;”
cf. Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr, vol. 4, 154.
372 al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 28 (Quranic sciences), 135 (theology).
373 Q 72:26–27a reads {He is the One who knows what is hidden. He does not disclose it except
to a messenger of His choosing}.
374 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 153; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 827.
375 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 57. Likewise al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 94.
376 This is apparently due to the fact that both titles are mentioned in the catalogue of the
Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt; cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 99.
377 Ahlwardt, Verzeichnisse, no. 1117, Glaser 234, fs. 120–124.
378 This is the same writing that al-Wajīh took to be identical with Masāʾil shāfiyāt; see above.
379 Ibn al-Wazīr, Mukhtaṣar 187.

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Content
In his Mukhtaṣar, Ibn al-Wazīr strongly affirms the Shafiʿi traditionist. The
points that need amendment are apparently minor and due to limitations that
are common to all human beings.380
The main text of the treatise begins by listing and explaining the different
categories of traditions along with their conditions and epistemic value, start-
ing with the uninterrupted tradition (mutawātir) and its counterpart, the soli-
tary tradition (aḥad).381 Among the different categories of hadith treated in the
following passage, the controversies around the acceptance of traditions that
either have gaps in the line of transmission (mursal) or feature transmitters
whose doctrinal orientation is unknown or not impeccable according to the
teaching of one’s own school (majḥūl), receive special attention.382 These con-
troversies represent an important dividing line between the Zaydi and Sunni
sciences of hadith as well as a hindrance to mutual acceptance of traditions.383
It is in this context that Ibn al-Wazīr provides Ibn Ḥajar’s nomenclature with
additions. He adduces Zaydi and Muʿtazili authorities to stress his point in
favor of the principles set down by Ibn Ḥajar, as for example in the controversy
around the acceptance of majhūl traditions. In this case, Ibn al-Wazīr refers
to Imam ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, and al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ
among others.384
The subsequent passage is dedicated to the different kinds of licenses for
transmission (ijāza).385 Ibn al-Wazīr concludes his brief Mukhtaṣar with a list
of the different categories by which transmitters are either disqualified ( jarḥ)
or qualified (taʿdīl) as trustworthy sources.386

19 Muthīr al-aḥzān fī wadāʿ shahr Ramaḍān

The Stimulant of Sadness Concerning Bidding the Month of Ramadan Fare-well is

a short collection of poems. Only few sources mention it. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl refers to

380 Ibid., 187.

381 Ibid., 187.
382 Ibid., 188.
383 For a comparison between hadith science in the Zaydiyya and among the Sunni tradition-
ists, see al-ʿIzzī, ʿUlūm al-ḥadīt; for the question of the acceptance of majhūl traditions,
see Ibn al-Wazīr, Mukhtaṣar, 109–110.
384 Ibid., 189.
385 Ibid., 190.
386 Ibid., 191.

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the collection in the glosses of his Maṭlaʿ al-budūr.387 One copy is found in the
Maktabat al-Awqāf dated to the year 807/1404.388 There is said to be another
copy in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt.389 The MS used for the study at hand is part of
a collection from the private library of al-Kibsī. 1359/1940 is mentioned as the
year of completion of the copy.390

Content
With 5 to 15 lines each, the 16 poems in this collection are relatively short. All
are shaped in the form of dialogues between Ibn al-Wazīr and his soul, his heart
or an undefined addressee. As regards content, the main theme is repeated
throughout: the benefits of staying awake in contemplation during the nights
of the month of Ramaḍān. The addressee, be it soul, heart or human counter-
part, is encouraged to endure, and is promised the help that is due to those
who love God. At the outset of the collection, Ibn al-Wazīr refers his soul to the
prophetic practice transmitted in a tradition that is mentioned in all six Sunni
hadith collections. According to this tradition, a person who stays awake dur-
ing the nights of Ramaḍān in contemplation is forgiven all previous sins.391 Ibn
al-Wazīr repeatedly encourages his addressee not to fear the strains involved in
vigils, with reference to the mitigating effect of love.392 The “Night of Power”
(laylat al-qadr) is especially singled out because of the multiple effectiveness
that is ascribed to prayer during that night. As the “Night of Power” usually
occurs within the last five nights of the third portion of Ramaḍān, the reason
that this poetic emphasis on personal piety and mystic experiences is named
“bidding Ramaḍān farewell” is not far to seek.393

20 Nuṣrat al-aʿyān

The complete title of the writing is Nuṣrat al-aʿyān ʿalā shirr al-ʿumyān fī l-radd
ʿalā Abī l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (Assistance for the Eyes Against the Evil of Blindness: A

387 Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151, footnote 1.
388 Ruqayhī, Fihrist 1385–1386.
389 Al-Ḥibshī does not specify which library, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt or Maktabat al-Awqāf; cf. al-
Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 829.
390 Ibn al-Wazīr, Muthīr al-ahzān laq. 126l.
391 Ibid., laq. 108r; Ibn al-Wazīr explicitly refers to the tradition in Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ix,
136.
392 Ibn al-Wazīr, Muthīr al-ahzan laq. 108r.
393 Ibid., laq. 109r.

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Refutation of Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī).394 Unfortunately, the writing is apparently

lost.395 However, some information can be gathered from the biographical and
bibliographical sources: In Nuṣrat al-aʿyān, Ibn al-Wazīr rebuts the blind Syrian
poet Abū l-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (d. 449/1058). According to al-Ḥibshī, Ibn al-Wazīr
refers to al-Maʿarrī’s verses on taqlīd of the legal schools.396 But that is ques-
tionable since al-Maʿarrī was also a critic of taqlīd and the system of legal
schools.397 The first few verses reproduced by Ibn Abī l-Rijāl indicate that Ibn
al-Wazīr’s main concern was with al-Maʿarrī’s stance on prophecy, which was at
least questionable from an orthodox point of view. According to Muḥammad b.
ʿAbdallāh, Ibn al-Wazīr’s biographer, Ibn al-Wazīr compares al-Maʿarrī’s physi-
cal blindness with the spiritual one which supposedly led to the disparagement
of the prophets.398 Whoever does that, Ibn al-Wazīr writes, thereby devaluates
the imams of Islam, “destroying the furūʿ by destroying the foundations.”399
From these lines alone it is imaginable that Ibn al-Wazīr would have criticized
al-Maʿarrī’s degradation of the prophets. As regards al-Maʿarrī’s stance towards
taqlīd, Ibn al-Wazīr might have criticized the way rather than the fact that al-
Maʿarrī spoke out against it.

21 Qubūl al-bushrā bi-l-taysīr lil-yusrā

An alternative name for The Acceptance of the Good News Concerning the “Mak-
ing Easy of the Path to Ease” is Qubūl al-bushrā fī taysīr al-yusrā, with basi-
cally the same meaning.400 The title refers to Q 92:7 which reads {We shall
smooth his way unto ease}. In addition to several copies of the MS in the Dār al-
Makhṭūṭāt, a number of copies can be found in private libraries.401 The copies
of the MS consulted here were copied in 1158/1745 and in 1151/1738.402 A number
of reference works state that Qubūl al-bushrā was edited and printed in Egypt

394 Naṣr al- aʿyān is an alternative title to Nuṣrat al-aʿyān; cf. Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr
iv, 150.
395 Cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 75; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 100; al-Ḥibshī,
Maṣādir 424; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 129.
396 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 424.
397 On al-Maʿarrī, see Smoor, al-Maʿarrī.
398 Cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama fs. 133a–133b.
399 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 150. Nuṣrat al-aʿyān seems to have been extant at the
time of Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, since he quotes from it.
400 Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151.
401 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 222; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 829; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 98.
402 MS 1) Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3133; MS 2) Sanaa, Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd, CD 3.

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in the year 1349/1931–1932. The fact that there are references to Qubūl al-bushrā
in al-ʿAwāṣim403 allows for the possibility that it was written before 808/1406,
the year al-ʿAwāṣim was completed. In addition, Qubūl al-bushrā contains a ref-
erence to Kitāb al-Qawāʿid.404

Content
Some sources classify Qubūl al-bushrā within the discipline of substantive law
( fiqh). Others consider it a work on asceticism and mystics.405 Yet a thorough
analysis of its content allows for a classification within the realm of legal theory
as well. Although the examples from substantive law take much more space,
the vital points under discussion belong within the realm of legal theory or
the overlapping genre of legal maxims (qawāʿid).406 Another indication in sup-
port of this is al-Akwaʿ’s supposition that Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote his al-Qamar
al-nuwwār fī l-radd ʿalā l-murakhkhiṣīn fī-l-malāhī wa-l-mizmār in response to
Qubūl al-bushrā, criticizing Ibn al-Wazīr’s legal methodology and the resulting
leniency towards Sufi practices.407
The writing consists of an introduction followed by a number of substan-
tially different sections illustrating the main argument. In the introduction,
Ibn al-Wazīr sets the stage: God in His wisdom and mercy intended the law
brought by his messenger to bring ease to faithful human beings. Yet some of
these human beings render law much more difficult than it was intended to be.
Apparently, this applies to some of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Zaydi contemporaries, who
claimed that Imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq’s rulings were especially strict and cau-
tious (aḥwaṭ).408
The first section contains a list of Imam al-Hādī ilā al-ḥaqq’s legal opinions in
several areas of substantive law. In all of these, al-Hādī apparently ruled much
more leniently than many other scholars of the Zaydiyya and other schools.409
These examples illustrate that “the sound concession of a scholar can be more
excellent than precaution.”410
In later chapters, Ibn al-Wazīr continues to illustrate the point by referring
to lenient rulings of Hādawī-Zaydi scholars, but also more broadly from the

403 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 199, 298.

404 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid 316.
405 Fihris al-Makhṭūṭāt al-raqamiyya, no. 3.
406 For legal maxims in the Zaydiyya, see al-Siyāghī, Uṣūl al-madhhab al-Zaydī 27–28.
407 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 50.
408 Ibn al-Wazīr, Qubūl al-bushrā 256.
409 The examples extend from p. 254 to p. 270 in the quoted copy.
410 Ibid., 263.

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Zaydiyya in general. Indeed, more than a quarter of the treatise is taken up by

individual rulings.
The section of examples is followed by a defense of the principle that “mak-
ing legal concessions (rukhṣa) is generally preferable.”411 After a general expla-
nation, Ibn al-Wazīr lists five circumstances that render concessions desirable
(mustaḥabb). This is followed by a discussion of Quranic verses advanced by
the proponents of said principle,412 and a section that is devoted to discussing
146 prophetic traditions in support.413
There is, of course, an opposing view. The arguments and evidence from
Quran, Sunna and reason for the view that “shunning concessions is more
excellent” are brought forth and refuted subsequently.414 A major principle of
the opposing view equates precaution (iḥtiyāṭ, al-aḥwaṭ) in legal matters with
the stricter ruling in cases of doubt, for example where matters are ambiguous.
In order to refute his opponent’s claims, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the understand-
ing and implications of the problem of ambiguous matters (mutashābihāt,
mushtabihāt): 1. Ambiguous matters are reprehensible (makrūh) not prohib-
ited (muḥarram).415 2. “Ambiguous” is an additional, not an essential qualifica-
tion of legal issues (aḥkām).416 3. “Ambiguous” is employed as a classification
of matters actually belonging to another class of doubt.417
Discussing the arguments of his opponents, Ibn al-Wazīr demonstrates how
the ruling of each different ambiguous question depends on the nature of the
ambiguity. It is determined by an investigation of the indicators leading to
a conclusion of preponderant probability. But this is precisely what is fore-
stalled by elevating the equation of precaution, strictness and truth to a general
principle. Ibn al-Wazīr laments that this causes most muqallids to neglect the
investigation of the indicators, to oppose the clear texts and sound proofs, and
“to establish customs that ignore the known and unknown evidence.”418 In the
last pages and much in the manner of the introduction, Ibn al-Wazīr concludes
with a summary of the vital points. He follows this up with a final set of exam-
ples from Zaydi authorities and those accepted by the Zaydiyya, all pointing
to the same fact: the easiness of the divine law is known from this law as well
as from what is known about God by necessity. Hence, ease and rendering the

411 Ibid., 270.

412 Ibid., 272.
413 Ibid., 290.
414 Ibid., 305–335.
415 Ibid., 322.
416 Ibid., 330.
417 Ibid., 331.
418 Ibid., 270.

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easier ruling should be the preponderant notion. A thorough understanding of

preponderance is vital, so that a distinction within the category of the ambigu-
ous matters is possible. A last remark refers the reader to Ibn Taymiyya’s Taysīr
al-ʿibādāt ʿalā ahl al-ḍarūrāt for further details.419

22 Al-Rawḍ al-bāsim

The full title of this lengthy work indicates that it is an abridgment of his mag-
num opus bearing partly the same title: al-Rawḍ al-bāsim fī l-dhabb ʿan sunnat
Abī l-Qāsim (The Smiling Meadows: A Rebuffal of the Sunna of Abū l-Qāsim).420
It is safe to say that the abridgment was written in 817/1414, nine years after the
principal work. Apparently, the date is indicated in one copy in the author’s
own handwriting as Shaʿbān 3rd 817/October 17th 1414.421 A further indicator
that Ibn al-Wazīr must have written the abridgment before or during 817/1414
is found on page 213 of the work itself. Ibn al-Wazīr uses a eulogy to his teacher
Ibn Ẓahīra that is only used as long as the person in question is alive: “May God
grant those who benefit from him the enjoyment of his continuing life.”422 Ibn
Ẓahīra died during Ramaḍān 817/November 1414.423 The cross-references, on
the other hand, do not help to place al-Rawḍ al-bāsim in a chronological order.
Most of these cross-references are found in al-ʿAwāṣim, which must have been
written before its own abridgment.
Besides authors of biographical collections and commentators, Ibn al-Wazīr
himself refers to the fact that al-Rawḍ al-bāsim is the abridgment of al-ʿAwā-
ṣim.424 Interestingly, there are other biographers who do not mention al-Rawḍ
al-bāsim at all. These include Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr, author of the family
history Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr, as well as Ibn Abī l-Rijāl.425 Discrepancies between
the two works, for example in the rendering of prophetic reports, could be
explained by the suggestion that Ibn al-Wazīr wrote the abridgment during a

419 Ibid., 334–341.

420 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 828.
421 The editor of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim refers to the MS that was used as a source for previous edi-
tions; cf. al-ʿAmrān (ed., intr.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 58. See also al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i,
74.
422 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 213.
423 Al-Fāsī, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn ii, 53–59; al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ viii, 92–96.
424 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 225; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 15, 19; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir
134; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 82, 91.
425 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr only mentions al-Rawḍ al-bāsim in a passing remark
and not in the list with other major writings; cf. Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh, Tarjama f. 144b.

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period he spent in isolation. In several instances, he indicates that the books

he quotes from were not present with him at the time of writing.426
There are a number of extant copies. The oldest one is from the year 956/
1550.427 Another copy dates from 1178/1766 and is found in the Dār al-Makhṭū-
ṭāt. Yet another from the same library (dating from 1336/1918) is apparently a
copy of the former. This is what the editor of the 1419/1999 edition of al-Rawḍ
al-bāsim, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿAmrān, states. He used both copies as sources
for this edition.428 The digitizations I received from the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt are
taken from a copy of the Ramaḍān 1137/May 1725 edition.429 In addition to sev-
eral copies in private libraries, the Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya in Cairo apparently
possesses a copy from 1319/1901–1902.430 The book was edited and printed for
the first time in 1385/1964 by the Maṭbaʿat al-Salafiyya in Cairo. Besides the MS
copies, I made use of ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-ʿAmrān’s edition from 1998. The
number of copies, frequency of references and literary reactions to the work
reflect its significance.

Content
Although al-ʿAwāṣim is the accumulation of Ibn al-Wazīr’s scholarly produc-
tivity and al-Rawḍ al-bāsim only the abridgment, it is the latter that found
response in two refutations. The first known refutation bears the title al-ʿAḍb al-
ṣārim fī l-radd ʿalā ṣāḥib al-Rawḍ (The Sharp Sword: A Refutation of the Writer of
The Meadows). Al-Ḥibshī mentions that it was written by Ibn al-Wazīr’s grand-
son, without specifying which one.431 Al-Wajīh says the author is unknown, as
does al-Ḥarbī.432 Another well-known rebuttal of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim bears the
title al-ʿIlm al-wāṣim fī l-radd ʿalā hafawāt al-Rawḍ al-bāsim (Blaming Knowl-
edge: Refutation of the Errors of The Smiling Meadows). It was written by Aḥmad
b. Ḥasan b. Yaḥyā l-Qāsimī (d. 1375/1956) and edited and printed in 1429/2008

426 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 15, 276, 278.

427 Cf. Ruqayḥī, Fihrist ii, 638; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 828; al-ʿAmrān (ed., intr.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 97.
428 Cf. Ibid., 92–96.
429 The Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt possesses another copy, of which the date cannot clearly be identi-
fied; cf. Fihris al-makhṭūṭāt al-yamaniyya 321–322.
430 Cf. Al-Hibshī, Maṣādir 134; al-Wajīh Aʿlām, 828. Several copies from private libraries in
Yemen were digitized by the Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd; cf. Fihris al-makhṭūṭāt al-raqmiyya,
MS 724, CD 72; MS 1976, CD 195.
431 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134.
432 Al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 828. Al-Ḥarbī mentions 1214/1799–1800 as the year of writing. If, however,
al-Ḥibshī is correct in suspecting a grandson of Ibn al-Wazīr’s to be the writer, al-Ḥarbī’s
date is likely to refer to the time of copying rather than of authoring; cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-
Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 59.

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in Sanaa.433 Considering the fact that al-ʿAwāṣim was written first, one may
ask why al-Rawḍ al-bāsim became the focus of criticism rather than the more
extensive and apparently more famous al-ʿAwāṣim. One possible reason is the
fact that al-Rawḍ al-bāsim features considerable improvement in structure and
setup. Whereas al-ʿAwāṣim discussed the arguments, evidence, and examples in
the order in which they were advanced in the letter from Ibn al-Wazīr’s teacher
and opponent ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Abī l-Qāsim, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim renders
them in coherent clusters without following the order provided by the oppo-
nent. The editor al-ʿAmrān points out, for example, that Ibn al-Wazīr takes up
the defense of the doctrine of the eponyms of the four Sunni schools of law
coherently in one section of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim.434 In al-ʿAwāṣim, in contrast,
the link between the defenses of the eponyms of the four Sunni schools is not
immediately apparent, as they are spread throughout the entire work.435 More-
over, al-ʿAwāṣim contains more examples and additional lessons ( fawāʾid) not
immediately related to Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s challenges. In the abridgment, Ibn
al-Wazīr furthermore omitted points of challenge he did not consider worth
responding to because of their supposed internal contradictions.436 Al-Rawḍ
al-bāsim is simply easier to read and comprehend. According to the author, this
was his intention in writing the abridgment so that potential readers would
not be dissuaded from studying the book by its lengthiness.437 A further and
probably decisive reason for refuting al-Rawḍ al-bāsim instead of al-ʿAwāṣim
is the fact that Ibn al-Wazīr expresses his own views much more markedly
in the later writing. The main goal of al-ʿAwāṣim was to “commit the oppo-
nent to the consequences of the doctrines of his own school” in the manner
of ilzām.438 He wanted to disprove Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s accusations and rectify
prevalent notions on the existing schools of thought. Although Ibn al-Wazīr
employs the method of ilzām in al-Rawḍ al-bāsim as well,439 it seems to be writ-
ten as a more emphatic statement of his own views.440

433 Al-Muʾayyidī, al-ʿIlm al- wāṣim 2008.

434 Al-ʿAmrān (ed., intr.), al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, 67; cf. Ibn al-Wazir, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim i, 295–326,
308.
435 See, for example, the defense of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal against the accusation of anthropomor-
phism, Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 300, 331, or of al-Shafiʿi’s understanding of the “vision
of God” in ibid., v, 5.
436 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 230.
437 Cf. ibid., 19.
438 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 225.
439 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 27.
440 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 225.

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The text of Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Rawḍ al-bāsim commences with an appraisal of

the prophetic Sunna, and its role in Ibn al-Wazīr’s own life and scholarly devel-
opment. An excerpt from a long poem in honor of the traditions and the tradi-
tionists emphasizes his point. He explains how this passion for the prophetic
traditions caused opposition, manifest in the letter from his former teacher
Ibn Abī l-Qāsim. After briefly describing the contents of the letter, Ibn al-Wazīr
explains his reasons for and methods in writing al-Rawḍ al-bāsim and its longer
precursor, al-ʿAwāṣim.441 After this introduction, he sets out to respond to the
claims of his opponent. More clearly than in al-ʿAwāṣim, it becomes evident
that the challenges of Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent and the group of scholars he
apparently stood for all converged in one question: Are the traditions collected
in the six Sunni hadith compilations, and especially the two collections of
al-Bukhārī and Muslim (Ṣaḥīḥān), trustworthy enough to be relied upon in
doctrinal as well as in legal matters? Whereas Ibn al-Wazīr’s critic negates the
question, Ibn al-Wazīr answers in the positive.
The validity of the Ṣaḥīḥān traditions along with the other four collections
is substantiated by means of the following questions of doctrine and legal
methodology. First, Ibn al-Wazīr shows that it is possible to make conclusive
statements on the uprightness of transmitters in general.442 In contrast, Ibn
Abī l-Qāsim is depicted as denying the trustworthiness of the transmitters of
hadith and subsequently the use of the prophetic traditions (as preserved by
the traditionists) as a whole. But Ibn al-Wazīr argues that the hadith collections
are necessary for the performance of the duty of ijtihād,443 as well as all other
sciences, indeed of religious knowledge as a whole. From the challenges of his
opponent Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, Ibn al-Wazīr infers the following claim: the disap-
pearance of knowledge has made taqlīd a necessity. Of course, this can only be
rejected, as it would reduce the entire system of Islamic science to absurdity.444
A more specific refutation of Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s claims follow: As part of this
discussion, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim challenges the acceptance of prophetic traditions
which have not been transmitted by an immediate eyewitness (mursal) as well
as such that were transmitted by an unknown person at one stage of transmis-
sion (majhūl).445 Ibn al-Wazīr in turn argues for the acceptance of both mursal
and majhūl traditions in reference to Muʿtazili and Zaydi sources. In response
to his opponent’s general challenge of the rectitude (ʿadāla) of a number of

441 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 14–15.

442 Ibid., 19.
443 Ibid., 20.
444 Ibid., 60.
445 Ibid., 31–52.

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transmitters, Ibn al-Wazīr insists that minor sins do not nullify uprightness.446
Thus, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, the traditions rendered in the Sunni hadith
compilations cannot be rejected on the basis of these claims. On the contrary,
the state of traditions and their transmitters can be discerned easily.447
In the following, the same principle is in effect: Ibn al-Wazīr acquits those
who prove the trustworthiness of the transmitters in question (muʿaddilūn)
from the charges of holding doctrines such as compulsion ( jabr), anthropo-
morphism and deferral of judgment (irjāʾ).448
After the discussion of transmitter status, the next section is dedicated to
the traditions of the Sunni hadith compilations themselves. According to Ibn
al-Wazīr, most of them are sound (ṣaḥīḥ). The rank of only a few is question-
able. However, the doubts regarding their soundness do not reach the degree of
probability necessary to reject them.449 Ibn al-Wazīr continuously challenges
his opponent in respect of the degree of knowledge or certainty that can or
must be reached.
This may be recognized in the following section about taqlīd and ijtihād:450
From the moment a student is able to weigh instances of textual evidence
against each other (tarjīḥ) and discern the most probable or preponderant (al-
rājiḥ), he has the duty to decide and act on the basis of his discernment. Ijtihād
in one or a number of questions is possible for a student of one or more disci-
plines.451
After a general discussion of the above points, Ibn al-Wazīr sets about to
examine them in more detail. A large section is dedicated to the defense of
individual transmitters, among them the eponyms of the four Sunni schools
of law.452 Beyond doctrinal differences, one criticism against the traditionists
expressed in the second letter from Ibn Abī l-Qāsim was their reluctance or
resistance to engaging in speculative theology. Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent equated
this reluctance with being simple-minded (balah).453 But what characteris-
tic is it, asks Ibn al-Wazīr, that restricts knowledge among the Muʿtazila? Ibn
al-Wazīr discusses the indications of stupidity and intelligence. For him, ʿilm
al-kalām is no sign of intelligence or quality of knowledge. He disputes a histor-

446 Ibid., 52.

447 Ibid., 78.
448 Ibid., 85, 94, 110. Most of the muʿaddilūn are companions who are all trustworthy according
to Ibn al-Wazīr.
449 Ibid., 159.
450 Ibid., 207–229.
451 Ibid., 216.
452 Ibid., 229–307.
453 Ibid., 326.

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ical event in which kalām had been considered to be the decisive characteristic
of intelligence and subsequently of excellence ( faḍl), with the result that the
status of a particular imam, i.e. al-Mahdī l-Ḥusayn b. al-Qāsim b. ʿAlī al-ʿIyānī
(d. 404/1013),454 was elevated above that of the Prophet Muḥammad. Accord-
ing to Ibn al-Wazīr, the elevation of kalām above everything (any other kind of
knowledge or science) is the reason al-ʿIyānī “departed from the Zaydi school
and even the Islamic schools altogether.”455 The traditionists, however, can
be proved to be thoroughly skilled in the knowledge of the prophetic Sunna.
Professionalism in their own discipline is the benchmark of intelligence and
excellence, rather than derived knowledge as defined by the principles of the
logicians. A recurring argument insists that the experts of each of the Islamic
sciences need to be honored and praised for laying the groundwork others can
benefit from in their specific discipline.456
In what follows, Ibn al-Wazīr defends the traditionists against a number of
other doctrinal impeachments: they do not allow the obligation of the impos-
sible (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq);457 they do not hold that the innocent children of
unbelievers are to be punished for their parents’ sins,458 nor do they condone
the imamate of an unjust ruler.459 Ibn al-Wazīr intends to prove that the tra-
ditionists do not rank among those whose unbelief is clearly expressed (kufr
ṣarīḥ) and whose transmission would have to be rejected in consequence.460 As
stated and discussed repeatedly, the opponent is mistaken when he surmises
the doctrines of compulsion ( jabr) and deferral of judgement (irjāʾ) in the tra-
ditions of the Sunni hadith compilations.461
After having defended the traditionists from accusations of holding doc-
trines erroneous to the degree of clear unbelief, Ibn al-Wazīr endeavours to
prove that the transmissions of those whose interpretation have lead to errors
(mutaʾawwilūn) may still be employed as sources for religious knowledge and
argumentation. First, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses the arguments of proponents and
opponents of the acceptance of such traditions. He demonstrates that most
Zaydis accept the traditions and reports of mutaʾawwilūn, especially if their

454 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 610–613.

455 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim ii, 328. Others, like the anti-Muʿtazili scholar Ḥumaydān b.
Yaḥyā (d. after 653/1255), judged al-ʿIyānī similarily; cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 611.
456 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 340.
457 Ibid., 367.
458 Ibid., 368.
459 Ibid., 379–413.
460 Ibid., 354.
461 Ibid., 415–446.

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interpretation results in sin ( fisq) and not in unbelief (kufr).462 Similarly to

the Zaydiyya, the traditionists apparently broadly accept the reports of those
whom they consider fussāq taʾwīl and kuffār taʾwīl, under the condition that
the latter do condemn lying.463
In closing, Ibn al-Wazīr examines three groups mentioned explicitly by Ibn
Abī l-Qāsim as examples of the untrustworthiness of the Sunni hadith collec-
tions: the Mujbira, the Murjiʾa and three of the companions (Muʿāwiya b. Abī
Sufyān, al-Mughīra b. ʿUthmān and ʿAmr b. al-ʿAṣ). He argues that the Ashʿariyya
are falsely accused of holding a predeterminist doctrine like the Mujbira. This
accusation is supposedly only the result of strife between the Ashʿariyya and
the Muʿtazila. In the course of this strife, the Muʿtazila likewise have been
ascribed beliefs which they do not really hold. Consequently, Ibn al-Wazīr him-
self insists on the use of those traditions that can be affirmed by two (or more)
contending groups directly or indirectly.464 Restricting the requirements for
the acceptable to a minimum makes it possible to find points of agreement. In
the case of Muʿāwiya, for example, there is only one agreed-upon way: a group
of companions who attest the soundness of his transmission, especially in legal
issues (siḥḥat al-riwāya). This group of companions is accepted by the Shīʿites
and the Sunnis alike.465 Other examples of traditions by the three companions
in question follow. Apparently, there should be agreement on the soundness of
these latter traditions.466
The last few pages contain advice in prose and in verse: Ibn al-Wazīr wants
to urge his fellow believers not to be discouraged from reliance on Quran and
Sunna. The work ends as it begins, with a warning against deep immersion in
kalām which supposedly results in strife and innovations.467

23 Al-Taʾdīb al-malakūtī

The Heavenly Discipline is mentioned by all consulted biographical and bibli-

ographical sources. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be extant, at least not
in toto.468 This writing on “marvels and wonders” (al-ʿajāʾib wa-l-gharāʾib) was

462 Ibid., 481.

463 Ibid., 483.
464 Ibid., 523.
465 Ibid.
466 Ibid., 524–590.
467 Ibid., 594.
468 Al-Akwaʿ states that a few pages probably belonging to al-Taʾdīb al-malakūtī have been
found; cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 73.

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apparently not very long,469 yet its loss is regrettable in respect to any further
study of the influence Sufism had on Zaydi thought during the time of Ibn al-
Wazīr and his teacher Ibn Abī l-Khayr.

24 Taḥrīr al-kalām fī masʾalat al-ruʾya

The full title is sometimes given as Taḥrīr al-kalām fī masʾalat al-ruʾya wa-
tajwīdihi wa-dhikr mā dāra bayna l-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya (Record of Speech
Regarding the Vision Along with its Amelioration and a Reference to the Discus-
sion Between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya),470 which is a quotation from the
prologue. There are several copies of the work in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt471 as
well as in the private library of al-Kibsī. The two copies accessed for the present
study were completed in the years 1034/1625 and 1158/1745 respectively.472 The
work itself could not be dated yet. It is very likely, however, that it was writ-
ten before the year 822/1420, the year Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī died. Ibn
al-Wazīr wrote Taḥrīr al-kalām at his brother’s request. When informing the
reader of this detail, Ibn al-Wazīr does not add any benediction to his brother’s
name that would have indicated his having died.

Content
As stated in the prologue, Ibn al-Wazīr wrote this brief treatise in compli-
ance with a request advanced by his brother al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm, asking him
to clarify the positions taken in respect to the issue of seeing God (ruʾya).
The controversy applied especially to the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya. Al-
Hādī had written a refutation of the Ashʿari theologian Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-
Karīm al-Shahrastānī’s (d. 548/1153–1154) theological work, Nihāyat al-aqdām
fī ʿilm al-kalām (The End of Steps in the Science of Theology).473 Ibn al-Wazīr
informs the reader that he will comply with his brother’s request by presenting

469 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 90; Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-
budūr iv, 151; al-Ṣubḥī, Kuttāb al-Zaydiyya 207; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 827; Muḥammad b. ʿAbdal-
lāh, Tarjama f. 133a.
470 Cf. Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿal-budūr iv, 153–154.
471 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 135; al-Wajīh, al-Aʿlām 827; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 91. I
found a copy of Taḥrīr al-kalām in Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, MS coll. 3133 not mentioned else-
where; cf. Fihris al-makhṭūṭāt al-yamaniyya 272.
472 MS 1) copied in Ramaḍān 1034/June 1625 is part of an MSS collection from the library of
Muḥammad al-Kibsī, coll. 89. MS 2) copied in 1185/1757 originates from Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt.
In what follows, source information will refer to the earlier copy, which is paginated.
473 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿal-budūr iv, 153.

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what information is generally available on the topic, extending it with addi-

tional insights and omitting marginal or exceptional views.474 Firstly, he repro-
duces al-Shahrastānī’s Ashʿari arguments from Nihāyat al-aqdām concerning
the vision of God based on the prophet Moses’ request to see God in Q 7:143.
Secondly, al-Hādī’s views are rendered as representative of the Muʿtazila. After
presenting both schools’ positions, Ibn al-Wazīr clarifies them and sometimes
adds a comment about his own view.
The argument and accordingly the response consists of four parts: Firstly, al-
Shahrastanī argued that Moses knew of the possibility of seeing God and there-
fore asked to see Him. In response to the first argument, al-Hādī claimed that
Moses did not ask for himself but for his people, who did not believe him.475
Moses knew that seeing God is impossible (mustaḥīl) even before he asked. He
knew it by rational evidence, since being visible would have required a phys-
ical body. However, a physical body cannot be ascribed to God. Furthermore,
Moses knew it before he asked because in this rational question, no revelation
is necessary. Testifying to his Muʿtazilism, al-Hādī stated that revelation came
as a confirmation of the rational investigation.
According to the following argument from the Ashʿari side, God’s answer
shows that His refusal refers merely to the incapability of the one requesting
the vision, rather than the utter impossibility of the matter. The Muʿtazili coun-
terargument runs that God’s answer gives evidence for the impossibility of the
matter not with regard to the inquirer (i.e. Moses), but with regard to the object
of inquiry: God told Moses to look at the mountains, and said he would see
Him when the mountains were still. Then God sent down his glory, and the
mountains collapsed. Accordingly, they could not be called “still mountains”
anymore. The impossibility of calling them so indicates the impossibility of
seeing God, as the seeing was linked to the still mountains.476
Thirdly, it is argued that if Moses had asked to see God’s face or form rather
than asking to see God in a general manner, the answer would have been
different. The corresponding Muʿtazili argument claims that Moses knew the
answer to the question, but his people did not. Hence, Moses asked God so that
they would be convinced of the truthfulness of his message. God’s answer was
not more precise (“I have no form, face etc.”) in order to force the people to
employ their rational faculties to discover the reason for the prohibition. There
is no necessary connection (mulāzama) between the rejection of seeing (nafy

474 Ibn al-Wazīr, Taḥrīr al-kalām 341.

475 Ibid., 342.
476 Ibid.

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al-ruʾya) on the one hand, and the possibility of seeing on the other. Yet, the ref-
erence of negation (nafy) to impossibility is prevalent and customary (ʿurfī).477
The fourth argument claims that it is inappropriate for a prophet to ask for
anything impossible. If he did ask, the object must have been possible. The
counterargument runs that the intention of the inquiry after this known impos-
sibility renders it acceptable even for a prophet. The intention was to free his
people from disbelief. Hence, Moses could have asked for what he knew was
impossible.478
In Taḥrīr al-kalām, Ibn al-Wazīr mainly reproduces the arguments of the two
theological schools dominant in his time and context. His comments are little
more than qualifications of the reasonings expressed before. In one case, Ibn
al-Wazīr makes a remark on the question of whether the impossibility lies on
the part of the inquirer or of the object of inquiry. Ibn al-Wazīr merely states
that God may interrelate the possible, of which He knows that it will not occur,
with the impossible in itself. The condition is that the impossible bears resem-
blances to the possible that will not occur.479 Later, Ibn al-Wazīr responds to
the question of how a negation is to be understood. He points out that the
customary use (ʿurfī) of the negation is only as valid as the other two possible
uses—linguistic (lughawī) and legal (sharʿī)—are.480 Yet, Ibn al-Wazīr’s reluc-
tant way of commenting reiterates the emphasis on the investigation of proofs
and arguments of different schools irrespective of affiliation. Together with the
mitigation of contrasting positions, it allowed potential inquirers to trace each
side’s arguments and come to a conclusion that allowed for agreement with
both. However, Ibn al-Wazīr’s reluctance in expressing his own views may also
have been influenced by his high respect for his brother.

25 Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa

Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa (The Particularization of the Verses on Friday) is not men-
tioned in many biographical or bibliographical sources.481 In spite of the little
attention this short treatise received in the secondary literature, the relatively
large number of copies indicate a considerable interest in the matter. Sev-
eral public and private libraries possess manuscripts of the writing.482 Takhṣīṣ

477 Ibid., 344.

478 Ibid.
479 Ibid., 342.
480 Ibid., 343.
481 al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾ uhu 91; Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 154.
482 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿlām, 827; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 91.

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āyāt al-jumʿa is possibly identical or at least very similar in content to Iqāmat

al-jumʿa min dūna imām (The Performance of Friday [Prayers] Without Imam)
and Suʾāl fī imāmat al-jāmiʿ wa-iʿtirāḍat baʿḍ al-nās ʿalayhi (A Question Concern-
ing Friday Prayers and the Objections of Some People) mentioned by al-Wajīh,483
Risāla fī iqāmat al-jumʿa bi-ghayr imam (Treatise on the Performance of Friday
[Prayers] Without Imam) listed by al-Ḥibshī,484 and Risāla fī ʿadam ishtirāṭ al-
imām al-aʿẓam fī ṣalāt al-jumʿa (Treatise Concerning [the Fact] that [the Pres-
ence] of the Main Imam is No Condition for Friday Prayers) briefly referred to by
al-Akwaʿ without further detail.485 Their identity is likely since titles were often
later additions. The copy consulted for the present study is part of the collec-
tion of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works in Muḥammad al-Kibsī’s library and was completed
in 1035/1626.486 Unfortunately, no date of completion is known for the original
writing.

Content
Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa refers to Q 62:9, wherein believers are exhorted to leave
everything behind once they hear the call to the communal Friday prayer. Ibn
al-Wazīr’s writing originates in a response to an inquiry advanced to him by sev-
eral students of fiqh.487 The question was whether or not the said Quranic verse
was to be particularized by a prophetic tradition starting with the words “Know
that God has prescribed to you the Friday.” Throughout the whole writing, Ibn
al-Wazīr shows that the general implication of the Quranic verse cannot be
particularized by this specific tradition.488 The issue evolved around a cen-
tral point of controversy in doctrine and law between the Zaydiyya and Sunni
schools, i.e the Zaydi obligation to strive against an unjust imam (khurūj ʿalā
l-imām al-jāʾir) along with its legal implications. Contrary to a prominent opin-
ion among Ibn al-Wazīr’s contemporaries,489 he defended the view that the
duty of prayer applies irrespective of an imam. Consequently, praying behind
an unjust imam or, by implication, a non-Zaydi imam, would be permissible in
Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding.

483 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 826, 828.

484 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 222.
485 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 76.
486 MS Sanaa, Maktabat Mụhammad al-Kibsī, coll. 89; cf. al-Wajīh, Maṣādir al-turāth 233.
487 Ibn al-Wazīr, Takhṣīṣ 352.
488 Cf. ibid., 352.
489 As usual, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Zaydi authorities such as the imams al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-
Hārūnī, al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza and al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza in
support of his argument; cf. ibid., 359.

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At the outset of the writing, Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the central role the
texts (nuṣūṣ) have in the acquisition of knowledge as well as in legal argumenta-
tion. Along with it, he provides a hierarchy of sources in which the salaf figure
prominently.490 In contradistinction to the later generations (khalaf ), the salaf
apparently referred to the texts of revelation. They thereby provide evidence
for subsequent generations to reconstruct their line of argument and to arrive
at the conclusion they themselves consider preponderant. Relying on scholars
of later generations, however, results in less replicable ways of argumentation.
This leaves laymen or students unaware of the evidence and possible lines of
reasoning. Determination of preponderance among the indicators (tarjīḥ) is
thereby obstructed. But tarjīḥ is the decisive mechanism in the acquisition of
legal understanding as well as a major religious duty.491
The significance of Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa lies in the fact that it is a call to the
revival of ijtihād, rather than in the fact that in it, Ibn al-Wazīr does not agree
with many of his contemporaries. Weighing evidence (tarjīḥ) is equated to the
study and comprehension of law (tafaqquh).

26 Tanqīḥ al-anẓār fī maʿrifat ʿulūm al-āthār

Ibn al-Wazīr’s treatise on the science of hadith, Rectifying the Perceptions in the
Science of Traditions, is one of the few writings of Ibn al-Wazīr that al-Shawkānī
mentions by name.492 Next to the copies in libraries of the Grand Mosque,493
al-Wajīh lists a number of copies in various private libraries.494 Tanqīḥ al-anẓār
has been edited and printed in 1999. Unfortunately, the editors Muḥammad
Ṣubḥī b. Ḥasan Ḥallaq and Amīr Ḥusayn do not indicate the origin of the MS
they used for the edition. However, it seems to be older (1008/1601) than the
copies at the Grand Mosque (1158/1745). Besides the large number of extant
copies and the broad scope of dates—from 870/1456495 to 1350/1932496—the
extensive reception of the book is further documented in its most important

490 Ibid., 351.

491 Ibid., 351.
492 Al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.
493 MS Sanaa, Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt, coll. 3313, fs. 137b–181a. See also al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 57.
494 Cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 827.
495 The very early date is found on the copy in the Staatsbibliothek Berlin. The date given
here, however, is the collation date since the other one was not legible. It is likely to have
been sometime in the same year or a little earlier.
496 This late date refers to the abridgment of the Mukhtaṣar found in a collection of different
MSS of the Muʾassasat al-Imām Zayd.

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commentary, namely Tawḍīḥ al-afkār li-maʿānī Tanqīḥ al-anẓār (Clarifying the

Thoughts on the Concepts of Rectifying the Perceptions) by Ibn al-Amīr al-Sanʿānī
(d. 1182/1768), which was edited and published in 1997. Tanqīḥ al-anẓār is one of
those rare writings that can be dated with a high degree of certainty. According
to Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, it was completed in 813/1411.497 There are numerous refer-
ences to al-ʿAwāṣim. Tanqīḥ al-anẓār is one of Ibn al-Wazīr’s most systematic
writings due to its focus on the terminology of the science of hadith.

Content
The relatively brief prologue contains an appraisal of the prophetic traditions.
Then, Ibn al-Wazīr goes on by dedicating his compendium to students of ʿilm
al-ḥadīth who need to master the following information and technical termi-
nology.
The book is divided into three parts in which the three different categories of
traditions are discussed: sound (ṣaḥīḥ), good (ḥasan) and weak (ḍaʿīf ). Subse-
quently, a fourth part treats several questions of a more polemic nature. Part I
is concerned with the most basic categorizations of traditions, followed by
the discussion of sound traditions (ṣaḥīḥ) and the conditions for soundness.
This chapter deals with the vindication of the Sunni hadith compilations. The
basis for this vindication is found in the epistemological value they represent,
which is manifest in their soundness. The debate revolves around the question
which collections of traditions contain the soundest traditions. Furthermore,
Ibn al-Wazīr deals with the criteria for traditions not found in the Ṣaḥīḥān of
al-Bukhārī and Muslim. Here he considers the possibility of judging on the
soundness of hadiths in general (taṣḥīḥ). A brief discussion is added concern-
ing the transmission of traditions from books (wijāda).
Part II is dedicated to the group of traditions considered good (ḥasan) along
with the conditions of goodness advanced by the compilers of the Sunni hadith
collections. Subsequently, Ibn al-Wazīr treats the usefulness of aṭrāf works498
as well as ambiguities in the classification of traditions as sound and good.
Part III deals with the different sub-categories of the weak tradition (ḍaʿīf ).
Of special interest is the afterthought which Ibn al-Wazīr deemed necessary
to emphasize at the end of part III: a scholar or student of hadith should not
consider a tradition weak too readily and without detailed information. This
is especially true if the qualification as weak is merely rendered by one’s own

497 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151. See also al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 93.
498 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Tanqīḥ al-anẓār 92. For the genre of aṭrāf, see Brown, Canonization 105.

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teacher or imam. Even if it is considered weak, the classification should be

based on the line of transmitters (isnād) rather than the content (matn).499
Part IV is not designated as such by Ibn al-Wazīr. Moreover, whereas parts I–
III dealt with the three different categories of traditions, part IV is separate from
the other parts. Here, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses a number of controversies around
the transmitters.500 What are the criteria for accepting a transmission and how
certain can one be as to the qualification of a transmitter? And what weight
is ascribed to professional skill in proportion to rectitude (ʿadāla) and doctri-
nal soundness?501 In this last part, the relation to the acceptance of the Sunni
hadith compilations and the transmissions of the totality of the companions is
evident—one of the most controversial issues between the Zaydiyya and the
Sunni legal schools.
A significant feature of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Tanqīḥ al-anẓār is that he mentions the
opinions of his Zaydi predecessors on the principles of ʿilm al-ḥadīth along with
those of traditionists of other schools. Furthermore, he discusses the technical
terms of ʿilm al-ḥadīth and distinguishes them from their use in uṣūl al-fiqh,
wherever they overlap. Consequently, the importance of this work and the sig-
nificance Ibn al-Wazīr concedes to the study of hadith must be seen in light
of the theory of ijtihād. An informed use of the prophetic Sunna as well as an
awareness of the whole range of different opinions on a given topic is a major
requirement for the performance of ijtihād independent of school affiliation.

27 Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān ʿalā asālīb al-Yūnān

The Preponderance of the Methods of the Quran Over the Methods of the Greeks
is another of Ibn al-Wazīr’s relatively widely known writings. In al-ʿAwāṣim, he
himself refers to it as Tarjīḥ dalāʾil al-Qurʾān ʿalā dalāʾil al-Yūnān,502 as well as
by the more common name Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān.503 The explicit references
in al-ʿAwāṣim to Tarjīḥ are numerous. Additionally, Ibn al-Wazīr has quoted a
number of poems, also found in Tarjīḥ. Tarjīḥ, in turn, contains a few refer-
ences to al-ʿAwāṣim. These references, however, appear like additions at the end
of passages that point the reader to al-ʿAwāṣim for further details.504 But the

499 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tanqīḥ al-anẓār 158.

500 Ibid., 187.
501 Ibid., 205.
502 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 214.
503 Ibid., iii, 420, 436; iv, 10, 50, 61; v, 59, 60, 86, 90, 34; viii, 263, 328.
504 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 44, 53.

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most compelling indicator for the time of writing comes from the text of Tarjīḥ
itself. On page 54, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to an inquiry he received from a young
student. Besides the development of his own intellectual journey, Ibn al-Wazīr
refers to himself as an old man with considerable experience.505 Accordingly,
the Tarjīḥ must have been written long after al-ʿAwāṣim. The biographical and
bibliographical sources that mention the work do not refer to a time of writ-
ing.506
There are copies of the MS in Sanaa’s Grand Mosque as well as in a num-
ber of private libraries.507 Tarjīḥ was first printed in Egypt in 1349/1930508 and
then again in Beirut in 1984.509 The MS consulted for this study mentions the
date Rajab 1204/March 1790 as the date of copying.510 Different versions seem
to exist, judging from the fact that the copies listed in the catalogue of the Dār
al-Makhṭūṭāt, the Maktabat al-Awqāf as well as the one mentioned by Ibn Abī l-
Rijāl give varying information for the explicit, varying from one another as well
as from the MS and the printed copy used for this study.511 At least one abridg-
ment of the Tarjīḥ was written. Al-Ḥibshī mentions a Mukhtaṣar Tarjīḥ asālīb
al-Qurʾān by al-Nāṣir b. ʿAbd al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Mahallā (d. 1037/1627).512

Content
Al-Shawkānī considers Tarjīḥ to be a highly useful book with an innovative
style.513 This innovative style might be the reason why it is rather difficult to
discern a structure in the writing. The original text of Tarjīḥ itself is divided into
two parts which are structured by five unequal chapters ( faṣl), not all of them
numbered. Between the second chapter of the first part and the first chapter

505 Ibid., 54, 67.

506 See for example Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 151; al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.;
as well as the footnote below.
507 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir, 134; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 827; Fihris al-Makhṭūṭāt al-yamaniyya 276.
508 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān ʿalā asālīb al-Yūnān, Egypt: Maṭ-
baʿat al-Maʿāhid 1349/1930. It is based on a manuscript from Shawwal 1129/September 1717.
509 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān ʿalā asālīb al-Yūnān, Beirut: Dār
al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya 1984.
510 This MS is part of a digitized collection obtained by Princeton University as part of
the Yemeni Manuscript Digitization Initiative, see http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/
zk51vh52r (28 February 2015). The MS is found in the inventory of the Muʾassasat al-Imām
Zayd b. ʿAlī al-thaqāfiyya, CD 314.
511 Ibn Abī al-Rijāl mentions a poem in the conclusion; cf. Ibn Abī al-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv,
151. The catalogue of the Maktabat al-Awqāf quotes a reference to al-ʿAwāṣim; cf. Ruqayhī,
Fihrist ii, 569.
512 Al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 134, 144.
513 Cf. al-Shawkānī, al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ ii, 91.

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of the second part, an extensive parenthesis gives the impression of an intro-

duction to the context of the whole book. The parenthesis takes the form of
a request that was addressed to Ibn al-Wazīr after he had written the first two
chapters. After explaining the circumstances of his reply, he responds to the
inquiry in the following three chapters of the second part.
Chapters one and two of the first part were initially intended as a short trea-
tise in itself (mukhtaṣar) in open response to a contemporary trend that was
manifest in one or more real or imaginary opponents (khaṣm) who apparently
attempted to weaken unmediated reliance on the Quranic text in favor of the
Greek sciences. It is probable that Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Ibn al-Murtaḍā. In
the glosses of two copies of al-ʿAwāṣim, “al-Mahdī Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā or Aḥmad
b. Yaḥyā [Ibn al-Murtaḍā], author of al-Azhār,” is mentioned in the context
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s provocative verses (quoted below). Furthermore, “Aḥmad b.
Yaḥyā [Ibn al-Murtaḍā]” is mentioned in the glosses where Ibn al-Wazīr refers
to a contemporary who contradicted his own insistence on the sufficiency of
the Quran to prove God’s unicity.514 Ibn al-Wazīr portrays the argument of his
opponents as follows: Although the unambiguous matters in the Quran appear
obvious, the true meaning is hidden and a certain procedure needs to be fol-
lowed for it to be understood.515 Those who respond to the outward meaning
of the Quranic text (ẓāhir) with acceptance and faith are disdained. Attain-
ment of knowledge of the ambiguous matters (mutashābihāt) of the Quran is
claimed instead. To Ibn al-Wazīr, denying others’ ability to understand the out-
ward meaning while claiming an understanding of the ambiguous meaning for
oneself contradicts reason as well as revelation.
Chapter one is dedicated to invalidating the claim that the Quran falls short
of rendering the proofs for God’s divinity (rubūbiyya) and unicity (tawḥīd) as
well as the truthfulness of the prophecies.516 Ibn al-Wazīr’s argumentation is
based on the discussion of a number of Quranic verses, followed by rational
arguments, prophetic traditions and consensus. Among the authorities in favor
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s argument, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib figures most prominently. The dis-
cussion of a number of quotes from the Nahj al-balāgha is followed by various
opinions. It focuses on the positions of several scholars from various theologi-
cal and legal schools. Some of the Zaydiyya and early Shiʿa are worth mention-
ing as they reappear throughout: Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Murādī (d. 290/903)
in his al-Jumla wa-l-ulfa, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī al-Ḥasanī (d. 445/1053)
in his al-Jāmiʿ al-kāfī, al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī (d. 484/1101) in his Sharḥ al-ʿUyūn,

514 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422.

515 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 8–9.
516 Ibid., 9.

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Shaykh Mukhtār b. Maḥmūd al-Ẓāhidī al-Muʿtazilī (d. 658/1260) in his Kitāb al-
Mujtabā, and Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza (d. 749/1348) in al-Tamhīd. Ibn al-Wazīr
also mentions other scholars of the Imami Shiʿa, the Ashʿariyya and some tra-
ditionists.517
In chapter two, Ibn al-Wazīr introduces the concept of the general tenets
( jumal), according to which an integral understanding of certain truths is suf-
ficient (kifāyat al-jumal). He attempts to show, in numerous examples and
quotations, that the whole of ahl al-bayt spoke out against the immersion in
the subtleties of theology, preferring the concept of kifāyat al-jumal instead.518
Next to a general reference to the time of the salaf, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, the
early Imāmiyya and Zaydiyya,519 Caspian imams like the Hārūnī brothers al-
Muʾayyad bi-llāh Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 411/1020)520 and Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-
Ḥusayn (d. 424/1033)521 figure most prominently in Ibn al-Wazīr’s detailed ref-
erences. Their reasoning, as presented by Ibn al-Wazīr, generally tends towards
an aversion to probing into that which does not necessarily need to be known.
Deferment of conclusive judgement in cases of uncertainty in inessential mat-
ters of theology is portrayed as recommended or even incumbent.522 Examples
of the Hārūnī brothers, famous for their productivity in all essential fields of
Zaydi scholarship, are supposed to show that the Zaydiyya was not always iden-
tified with speculative theology. Ibn al-Wazīr claims that in spite of the high
productivity of the Hārūnī brothers, they did not advance much into specula-
tive theology. The main part of theology produced in their vicinity was said to
originate from foreign disciples and to be based on ʿAbd al-Jabbār in terms of its
content. Correspondingly, other theological writings of Zaydi scholars do not
refer to the early Zaydis themselves but rather to Muʿtazili scholars.523
The rest of the chapter is devoted to the classical kalām argument that philo-
sophical speculation (naẓar) is vital to finding answers to the challenges of

517 Ibid., 18.

518 Ibid., 24.
519 Cf. ibid., 27–28. Among others, Ibn al-Wazīr names ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn (d. between 92/710
and 95/714), the eponym of the Zaydiyya Zayd b. ʿAlī (122/740), Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (148/765),
Aḥmad b. ʿIsā (d. 247/861) and even al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 264/860), grandfather of the
eponym of the Zaydiyya. According to Madelung in his al-Imām al-Qāsim, the latter made
a decisive step towards integrating Muʿtazili concepts into Zaydi doctrine.
520 al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 100–103.
521 Ibid., 1121–1123.
522 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 26, 28.
523 Ibid., 32. This interpretation of Zaydi history diverges considerably from what modern
research reveals. Madelung, for example, describes the relationship between “den späten
Muʿtaziliten und einigen der kaspischen Zaiditenimamen im 4. (10.) und 5. (11.) Jh.” as
“besonders eng;” cf. Madelung, Islam im Jemen 175.

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heretics.524 Ibn al-Wazīr refutes this in two points, discussing the means of
attaining knowledge and the first proofs against heretics.525
The second part starts again with the basmala and the ḥamdala. It was the
result of a question that was directly presented to Ibn al-Wazīr by an inquirer.
The apparently young inquirer (mustarshid or walad) wanted to know Ibn al-
Wazīr’s reason for abandoning the methods of speculative theology. This aban-
donment was manifest in a poem written by Ibn al-Wazīr. In a long passage, Ibn
al-Wazīr explains his adverse reactions to the inquiries and methods of specu-
lative theology as well as his emotional journey in search of satisfying sources
in the quest for certainty.526 Before venturing to answer the inquirer, he recol-
lects himself, seeks forgiveness for his hostile conduct and praises the inquirer
for honest searching and good manners.527
The response contains a direct appeal to the inquirer as well as a substantial
section in which Ibn al-Wazīr explains the theological implications of the first
verse of the poem that triggered the inquirer’s irritation. In the appeal, Ibn al-
Wazīr emphasizes experience and the search for peace as a major guideline in
the quest for knowledge.528 The section is divided into one passage in which
Ibn al-Wazīr explains the meaning of his verses, followed by three chapters in
which he discusses the doctrines implied in that meaning. The relevant verses
read: “The principles of my religion are God’s book, not the accidents (aʿrāḍ), in
other principles I have no interest.”529 Ibn al-Wazīr’s intention in theses verses
can be summarized as pointing to what he consideres the principles of reli-
gion: the inimitability of the Quran (iʿjāz) and the perfection of creation (iḥkām
khalq al-makhlūqāt). The “accidents” in the first line refer to the proof of God’s
existence based on the real existence of accidents (dalīl al-akwān), as shall be
discussed below.530
The three chapters of the second part address three major topics: proof
of God’s existence, the ambiguous matters in the Quran and the distinction
between metaphorical and literal meanings. The first chapter is divided into
two points of discussion. In point one, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses how the proof
of God’s existence is independent of the proof of the modes of spatial pres-
ence of accidents (ṭarīq al-akwān, dalīl al-akwān).531 Leaning heavily on Shaykh

524 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ, 44.

525 Ibid., 44–49.
526 Ibid., 61.
527 Ibid., 63.
528 Ibid., 64–67.
529 Ibid., 68; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422.
530 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ, 68–77.
531 Ibid., 78.

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Mukhtār, Ibn al-Wazīr instead sees the aḥwāl-proof as especially effective in the
human perception of their own conditions, details and varieties (dalīl al-anfus).
Similarly, perceiving the processes, movements and mechanisms in the organic
and inorganic world around (dalīl al-āfāq), should lead to the same realiza-
tion.532 The arguments of other scholars from the Muʿtazili camp in support
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s position are discussed as well, as for instance the proof from
compositeness (dalālat al-tarkīb) as rendered by ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Abī l-Ḥadīd
(d. 656/1258).533
In point two, Ibn al-Wazīr responds to the inquirer’s question as to why Ibn
al-Wazīr turned away from the akwān-proof. He does not explain all his reasons,
other than that they were many, showed themselves increasingly throughout a
long period of investigation, and were amplified by the disagreements and con-
tradictions between the theologians’ arguments.534 On his own account, Ibn
al-Wazīr lacks comprehensive understanding of all the arguments and refers
the inquirer to Shaykh Mukhtār’s Kitāb al-Mujtabā, where the latter discusses
the arguments of the Muʿtazili schools of the Bahshamiyya and Baghdadiyya
concerning the proof of God’s existence.535
Chapter two is again addressed to the opponent to whom Ibn al-Wazīr ini-
tially responded. Indicating his return to the Quranic text for argumentation,
he refutes two claims made by the opponent: Firstly, that he knows as much
of God’s essence and attributes as God himself knows.536 Secondly, that he can
understand and interpret the ambiguous matters (taʾwīl al-mutashābihāt) in
the Quran.537 Ibn al-Wazīr responds to both claims with a discussion of the
ambiguous matters.538 Here as elsewhere, the Quranic verse on which this
debate is based is Q 3:7 and concerns the debate of whether or not those firmly
grounded in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm) are able to understand the mean-
ing of the ambiguous verses in the Quran. Along with many Zaydi and other
scholars, who, according to Ibn al-Wazīr,539 do not think that al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm
are included in the knowledge of the ambiguities, Ibn al-Wazīr postulates that
knowledge of the ambiguous matters and verses can only be of a general nature
(ʿalā l-jumla). The knowledge that the human being is commanded to have

532 Ibid., 109–110.

533 Cf. ibid., 86.
534 Ibid., 116.
535 Cf. ibid., 117.
536 Ibid., 129.
537 Ibid., 140.
538 Ibn al-Wazīr adopts this thought from the commentators (shurrāḥ) of Nahj al-Balagha; cf.
ibid., 129.
539 Cf. ibid., 141.

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would thus refer to the clear or unambiguous matters (muḥkamāt) in which

God explicitly addresses the human beings subject to divine law.540 Hence, Ibn
al-Wazīr perceives part of the problem in the confusion of the muḥkamāt and
the mutashābihāt.541
Chapter three, the brief final chapter of the second part, is concerned with
another misconception related to the confusion between the muḥkamāt and
the mutashābihāt. Ibn al-Wazīr concludes his Tarjīḥ by demonstrating why the
interpretation (taʾwīl) of metaphors belongs to the unambiguous rather than
the ambiguous parts of the Quran. Thus, the ambiguous matters cannot justifi-
ably be brought into the realm of the certainly understandable by calling them
metaphors. Their meaning would then have to be understood by all who are
gifted with an original human disposition ( fiṭra).542

28 Additional Works Ascribed to Ibn al-Wazīr

There are a few other pieces which may have to be ranked in Ibn al-Wazīr’s the-
ological work although their identity and/or ___location cannot be verified. For
example, al-Tuḥfa l-ṣafiyya fī sharḥ al-abyāt al-ṣūfiyya (The Lucid Gem: A Com-
mentary on the Mystic Verses) is ascribed to either Ibn al-Wazīr or his brother
al-Hādī. What can be said with near certainty is that it is a commentary on
the latter’s al-Abyāt al-ṣūfiyya.543 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl as well as al-Wajīh mention
alternative names for al-Tuḥfa l-ṣafiyya, namely al-Nasamāt al-najdiyya fī l-
niʿamāt al-wajdiyya (Breezes from the Nejd: Blessings of Ardor)544 and Sharīʿat
al-Furāt fī sharḥ al-Abyāt (The Drinking Place of the Euphrates: Commentary on
The Verses).545 It is not known when Ibn al-Wazīr authored the writing, if he
did at all. Copies of the manuscript are found in the Dār al-Makhṭūṭāt and the
Maktabat al-Awqaf, as well as in private libraries.546 Unfortunately, I did not
get access to the writing for verification of the authorship or investigation of
the content. Furthermore, al-Ḥarbī mentions a certain Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā ṣāḥib

540 Ibid., 159–163.

541 Ibid., 167–168.
542 Ibid., 189–192.
543 Al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 73; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332.
544 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr 153.
545 Al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 827.
546 According to al-Wajīh, the version in the Maktabat al-Awqāf carries the alternative title
Sharīʿat al-Furāṭ. The oldest copy seems to be the one found in a collection in the Dār al-
Makhṭūṭāt dating from 957/1550; cf. al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām, 827. See also al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 332,
who mentions a copy from 1179/1765–1766, and al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 91.

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ibn al-wazīr’s works 149

al-Nihāya wa-l-Maḥṣūl (Refutation of the Author of The End and The Harvest)
referring to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. According to al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr himself
refers to the work in Īthār al-ḥaqq and al-ʿAwāṣim.547 However, no reference
to the refutation could be found in either of the two books. Al-Ḥarbī might
have taken Ibn al-Wazīr’s affirmative reference to Ibn al-Ḥājib’s refutation of
al-Rāzī’s negation of al-taḥsīn al-ʿaqlī in vol. vii of al-ʿAwāṣim as a reference to
a book of his own.548 Another book, which only al-Ḥarbī knows of, is a certain
Kitāb al-Mubtadiʾ (Book on the Beginning).549 Neither the supposed reference
in al-ʿAwāṣim nor any other information on the book could be verified.
Ibn al-Wazīr himself refers to a qaṣīda listed only by al-Ḥarbī as well: al-Ijāda
fī l-irāda (The Excellent Accomplishment: On the Will) is a poem of 1200 lines
and of much theological interest.550 Fifty-four lines of the poem are quoted
in Īthār al-ḥaqq.551 Moreover, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions a brief treatise in which
he collects and comments on the thoughts of Ibn Taymiyya and his pupil Ibn
Qayyim al-Jawziyya. The default title of the writing is Bayān al-ḥikma fī l-ʿadhāb
al-akhrawī (The Elucidation of the Wisdom Behind Punishment in the Hereafter).
Ibn al-Wazīr’s summary of the writing supposedly emphasizes the wise pur-
poses that are intended behind the apparent evil of punishment.552 Al-Ḥarbī
suggests that the work is identical to Ijāda fī l-irāda.553 However, this iden-
tification is unlikely. Firstly, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions both explicitly and sepa-
rately.554 Secondly, the Ijāda is a qaṣīda, whereas Bayān al-ḥikma is a collection
of statements for example from Ibn al-Qayyim’s Ḥādī l-arwāḥ ilā bilād al-afrāḥ
(Spurring Souls on to the Realm of Joy) which is not written in verse. Yet, in all
probability, the Ijāda is close to Bayān al-ḥikma where content is concerned.
The contexts in which Ibn al-Wazīr mentions the Ijāda treat questions such as
why God created the damned (ashqiyāʾ)555 closely related to the question of
punishment in the Hereafter.
A number of writings in response to legal questions are ascribed to Ibn
al-Wazīr, namely Risāla jalīla fī thalāth masāʾil: al-fiṭra, himā l-arāk, nikāḥ al-
yatīmiyya (Splendid Epistle on Three Questions: Original Disposition, Protection

547 Cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 99.

548 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 52.
549 Cf. Al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 99.
550 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 325, 342; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 204.
551 Ibid., 202–204.
552 Ibid., 96.
553 al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 100.
554 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 202–204. See also Hoover, Withholding Judgement 218–220.
555 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 204.

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of Arak Trees and the Marriage of an Orphan Girl),556 Risāla fī zakāt al-fiṭr (Epis-
tle on the Almsgiving at the End of Ramadan),557 and Jawāb Muḥammad b.
Ibrāhīm ʿalā fuqahāʾ abyāt Ḥusayn fī taqdīr al-dirham wa-l-awqiya (Muḥammad
b. Ibrāhīm’s Response to the Jurists of Husayn’s Verses on the Evaluation of the
Dirham and the Awqiyya).558 Apparently, Ibn al-Wazīr wrote a Mukhtaṣar fī ʿilm
al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān (Brief Exposition on the Sciences of Stylistics and Imagery)
on the science of stylistics and imagery. However, according to the bibliograph-
ical literature, nothing but the title is extant.559
Numerous qaṣīdas of Ibn al-Wazīr are quoted in different sources. Much of
the exchange that happened for example between Ibn al-Wazīr and his brother
al-Hādī was written in verse. Furthermore, there is a separate refutation of the
famous ʿAbbāsid poet and slanderer of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, Marwān b. Sulaymān
b. Abī Ḥafsa (182/798).560 Many of these poems are found in Ibn al-Wazīr’s
Dīwān or scattered throughout the collections of different writings in many
Yemeni libraries. No itemization of all of them is attempted here due to their
vast number. A number of other pieces ascribed to Ibn al-Wazīr in different bib-
liographical sources shall not be discussed because of the blatant errors of the
ascription.561
Following on this survey of his works, an examination of the major concepts
in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought is due.

556 Cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 94; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 221; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 828.
557 Cf. al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 94; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 828.
558 Cf. al-Ḥibshī, Maṣādir 221; al-Wajīh, Aʿ lām 827.
559 Cf. al-Akwaʿ (intr.), al-ʿAwāṣim i, 76; al-Ḥarbī, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-ārāʾuhu 99; al-Ḥibshī, Maṣā-
dir 384.
560 Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 154. On Ibn Abī Ḥafsa, see Bencheikh, Marwān al-Akbar
b. Abī Ḥafṣa and Marwān al-Aṣghar b. Abī ‘l-Janūb.
561 An example of this would be a Irshād al-nuqqād ilā tafsīr al-jihād and other known pieces
by Ibn al-Amīr al-Ṣanʿānī. Al-Wajīh probably ascribed it to Ibn al-Wazīr because it is found
in al-Kibsī’s collection of writings of Ibn al-Wazīr which al-Wajīh often referred to; cf. al-
Wajīh, Aʿ lām 826.

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 chapter 3

Central Concepts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Epistemological

Thought

1 Definitions of Knowledge

The definitions of knowledge (ʿilm) vary considerably among the theologians.1

Ibn al-Wazīr introduces none of his books with a definition of knowledge. He
was most often occupied with discussing the use and limits of knowledge rather
than with defining it. Ibn al-Wazīr, like the Ashʿari scholar Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
(d. 606/1209), required that the “knowledge of knowledge” must be necessary
or intuitive.2 In his Burhān al-qāṭiʿ—admittedly an extended reproduction of
al-Rāzī’s Arbaʿīn—Ibn al-Wazīr mentions that the distinction between knowl-
edge and conjecture is self-evident and “common knowledge” (al-ʿilm al-ʿādī).3
However, when explaining how to distinguish true knowledge from invalid con-
victions in Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions three necessary characteristics
of knowledge, supposedly uniting the positions of “the scholars:” certain res-
olution ( jazm), correspondence to outward realities (al-muṭābaqa fī l-khārij)
and persistence in spite of raised doubt (al-thabāt ʿinda l-tashkīk).4 Although
the definitions of knowledge vary considerably, these three conditions gener-
ally recur in the definitions of other scholars, albeit with different expressions.5

1 For an excellent overview of definitions of knowledge as well as the attitudes towards defining
knowledge among various Islamic groups, see Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 46–69.
2 Ibid., 46. Others who were apprehensive of defining knowledge tended to come from Sufi or
traditionalist circles. Rosenthal cites Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148) in his commentary on
the Jāmiʿ of al-Tirmidhī as an example of traditionists who rejected a definition of knowledge
because of its supposed clarity. Such definitions were too reminiscent of the need of specu-
lative theologians to complicate the obvious in order to lead people astray; cf. Ibid., 50–51.
This argument is one frequently referred to by Ibn al-Wazīr, although he rarely accuses the
speculative theologians of deliberately leading people astray.
3 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 49.
4 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 120.
5 The exact terminology is, of course, a very important matter in definitions, as every term
implies a different understanding. But since Ibn al-Wazīr does not stick rigidly to one term or
definition, and since the three elements mentioned by him are generally the points of discus-
sion, one may well say that his definition agrees with those of other scholars. For example, Ibn
al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141) mentions the first two elements as Abū Hāshim’s definition, calling
them “the tranquility of the soul” (sukūn al-nafs) that “the believed thing is according to what

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What Ibn al-Wazīr termed jazm in the above definition is equivalent to what
was also termed the “tranquility of the soul” (sukūn al-nafs), as both describe a
state of resolve that an individual “finds within himself.”6 Bahshami-Muʿtazilis
like ʿAbd al-Jabbār and with him Ibn al-Murtaḍā considered the “tranquility of
the soul” the one essential characteristic of knowledge because they considered
it the only criterion that distinguishes knowledge from emulation (taqlīd).7
According to them, the object that one is convinced of on the authority of
another may correspond to truth, but does not result in the tranquility of the
soul. Ibn al-Wazīr was likewise aggrieved by the taqlīd of theological schools.
Yet the distinctions he makes between the concept of knowledge and modes
of knowing reveal that he sought to restrict the scope of what could be called
items of certain knowledge by counterbalancing the subjective criterion of the
“tranquility of the soul” with what he considered a more objective standard.

1.1 Necessary (ḍarūrī) and Acquired (muktasab) Knowledge

Among speculative theologians, knowledge is usually divided into two kinds:
self-evident or necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī) and acquired or inferred knowl-
edge (muktasab, istidlālī).8 The broad definitions of both terms are challenged

it is firmly believed to be” (anna muʿtaqadahu ʿalā mā iʿtaqadahu ʿalayhi); cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī,
Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 13. Rosenthal shows that this and similar definitions were usually ascribed
to the Muʿtazila; cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 63–64. For general elements of the
concept of knowledge among theologians, see Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 173–174.
6 Cf. Peter, God’s Created Speech 48. See also Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 120, for his use of jazm.
7 According to Peter, ʿAbd al-Jabbār did include in his definition of knowledge the coincidence
between that about which the soul is in a state of tranquility, on the one hand, and the reality
of that very thing, on the other hand. Yet the major emphasis was apparently on the tranquil-
ity of the soul; cf. Peter, God’s Created Speech 43–45, 47–50. According to Ibn al-Malāhimī, ʿAbd
al-Jabbār did not include the correspondence to truth in his definition; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī,
Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 12. Different versions of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definition seem to have existed.
However, in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought, the emphasis on the tranquility of the soul is percep-
tible in that he says that tranquility of the soul is the only thing that distinguishes knowledge
(ʿilm) from the other kinds of conviction (iʿtiqād), which include taqlīd according to some def-
initions. Furthermore, the knowing person knows that he knows by finding his soul in a state
of tranquility; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 127, 130. See also Omari, The Theology of
al-Balkhī 163. The other kind of conviction that was debated in this context is supposition
(ẓann). A supposition, according to most Muʿtazila and especially those who belonged to the
Bahshamiyya, was not characterized by the tranquility of the soul; cf. Reinhart, Before Reve-
lation 155.
8 See for example Wensinck, The Muslim Creed 252; Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 20; Peter,
God’s Created Speech 53. An exception to this distinction is represented by the early Muʿtazili
al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868–869) along with the “People of Cognitions” (ahl al-maʿārif ) associated
with him; see below 165, 183.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s epistemological thought 153

only seldom. Necessary knowledge is knowledge that is not produced by hu-

man beings. Rather, it occurs in them independent of their choice. Necessary
knowledge cannot coexist with doubt. It is God’s production and not the result
of philosophical speculation or inquiry.9 Acquired knowledge, on the other
hand, is arrived at by human efforts of speculation and inference according
to the rules of reasoning.10 The premises of the speculation must be based on
prior knowledge. Yet a central feature of this kind of knowledge, according to
Muʿtazili teaching, is that the result of the speculation and inference itself is
not known beforehand. It must be preceded by the absence of knowledge, by
doubt with regard to the matter in question.11
Although the lists of sources of necessary knowledge differ, there are a few
common elements.12 An essential element of necessary knowledge is formed
by a priori or intuitive knowledge (badīhī). To this a priori knowledge belong
self-consciousness or logical judgements such as the knowledge that a thing
cannot be simultaneously true and false, or eternal and created. A second ele-
ment of necessary knowledge occurs through the senses (ḥissī). Perception
thus plays an important role in necessary knowledge. A third element is formed
by experience. This element is not always seen as separate from sense percep-
tion. A last but not unimportant element of necessary knowledge is supplied
by tawātur information. This refers mainly to divine revelation but also to other
issues of non-empirical knowledge, especially of past events. In these cases, the
truth of an item of information is determined by the methodological criteria of
corroboration by different trustworthy sources.13
A major disagreement exists between the Ashʿariyya and the Muʿtazila con-
cerning moral judgments as part of necessary knowledge. The question of the
independent rational discernment of something as good or evil (al-taḥsīn wa-
l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī) is tantamount to the question of whether moral judgment is

9 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 128–129; Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 21; Frank,
God’s Created Speech 405. An exception to this view was held by Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-
Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), for example. Al-Juwaynī thought that speculation can result in
necessary knowledge; cf. al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil 111.
10 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 131.
11 For a Muʿtazili definition of acquired knowledge, see Peters, God’s Created Speech 55, 57–
61; concerning the element of uncertainty prior to acquired knowledge, cf. ibid., 60. See
also Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 136; Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 359.
12 See for example Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 22–22; Peter, God’s Created Speech 53–
55; Wensinck, Muslim Creed, 252–254.
13 An often-used example of the latter kind of tawātur knowledge is the existence of the
city of Mecca. Although we have never been there, many witnesses have testified to its
existence. Therefore its existence is not in doubt; cf. Weiss, Knowledge of the Past 88.

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a natural ability or not.14 Another central difference concerns the knowledge

of God. A significant part of the Muʿtazila deems the knowledge of God’s exis-
tence acquired knowledge. The necessity to acquire knowledge of God is the
main reasoning behind the duty of philosophical speculation (naẓar). Ibn al-
Murtaḍā represents the Bahshami branch of the Muʿtazila well when he writes:

The knowledge of God is a duty (…). He is not known by necessity nor

by emulation; hence the requirement of naẓar. Its incumbency is estab-
lished because it takes the place of averting harm. The significance of
what we say lies in that it is the first duty: No mukallaf is free of that duty
at the beginning of being obliged to [practice] it, in contrast to the rest of
the duties.15

Accordingly, there is little doubt that Ibn al-Murtaḍā, like the majority of
Muʿtazili theologians as well as those of other schools, takes the distinction
between necessary and acquired knowledge as a major basis for argumenta-
tion.16
Ibn al-Wazīr agrees with most of the mentioned elements of necessary
knowledge. There is a priori or intuitive knowledge, which includes moral judg-
ments on good and evil, as for example the evilness of lying, as well as logical
judgments like the impossibility of the same thing being both eternal and cre-
ated. Sense perception is a vital part of the whole of necessary knowledge. But
this is hardly challenged by anyone. Starting with his first (known) book on the-
ology, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ, it becomes evident that tawātur forms a crucial con-
stituent of Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of necessary knowledge beyond the tawātur
of revelation. Ibn al-Wazīr argues for the knowledge of the prophets’ trust-
worthiness (and of course ultimately for that of their message) based on the
necessity which occurs by way of corroboration: different pieces of evidence
from sense perception and intellect that would be inconclusive by themselves
together effect necessary knowledge.17 In what follows, Ibn al-Wazīr does the
same with regard to the solitary report (aḥad): A solitary report, inconclusive
by itself, is elevated to necessary knowledge by contextual evidence (qarīna).18

14 The disagreement of course reflects a central difference between Muʿtazili and Ashʿari
ontology. If the ability to make moral judgments is acquired, it depends on knowledge
of God’s revealed will. If it is immediately God-given, it is an intrinsic part of the human
being, independent of revelation.
15 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 138.
16 Ibid., 128.
17 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 8–17, 38–43.
18 Cf. ibid., 36, 43–49. Including the solitary report in the possible sources of true knowledge

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The necessary knowledge occurs because the intellect realizes by necessity that
the circumstances corroborate the solitary information. Consequently, all cen-
tral tenets of Islam in their broad and general form can be considered necessary
knowledge. The interesting issue here is that something that is neither naẓar
nor a priori knowledge yet leads to necessary knowledge, and this necessary
knowledge is attainable by all. Therefore, it may be termed al-ʿilm al-ḍarūrī
al-ʿādī (common necessary knowledge) according to Ibn al-Wazīr. The strong
emphasis Ibn al-Wazīr puts on necessary knowledge is evident. But what about
acquired knowledge?

1.2 A Shift in Distinction: from Necessary and Acquired to Necessary and

Conjectural Knowledge (ʿilm ẓannī)
The division between necessary and acquired knowledge is a central question
in Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemological argumentation. He rejects the distinction and
argues that acquired (or inferred) knowledge cannot be considered knowledge
in the true sense:

Knowledge as a technical term: differentiation within it is not sound. And

there is disagreement concerning its division into necessary and inferred
(istidlālī) [knowledge]. The sound [opinion] is that it cannot be distin-
guished where it is established by necessity. And when this necessity
ceases it can no longer be described as knowledge in the technical sense.19

According to Ibn al- al-Wazīr, knowledge without necessity may be called

knowledge, as preponderant probability is often commonly called “knowledge.”
But it cannot be that kind of knowledge which constitutes what is commonly
agreed upon by the necessity of its givenness. The acquired knowledge of the
speculative theologians always includes an element of doubt, which needs to
be overcome so that reflection can result in proper knowledge.20 For Ibn al-
Wazīr, this kind of knowledge cannot be part of the body of knowledge to
which all believers must have access. Additionally, such so-called knowledge
cannot be the basis of evaluating a Muslim’s faith. Only the acknowledge-
ment or rejection of necessary knowledge may determine who is a Muslim and

appears to be a feature common to those who reject the distinction between necessary
and acquired knowledge. This is true, for example, for the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1063)
who excludes the solitary report that urges one to follow God from the realm of doubt and
uncertainty; cf. Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 24–25.
19 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 211.
20 Cf. Peters, God’s Created Speech 60.

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who is not. This refers to Ibn al-Wazīr’s continuous attempt to reduce mutual
charges of unbelief.
The necessary characteristic of knowledge, “correspondence to outward
realities” (al-muṭābaqa fī l-khārij), emphasizes this. Ibn al-Wazīr explains what
this term means when he argues that the inner conviction of the certainty of a
matter (sukūn al-nafs) is not enough, because “the heart of futile ones is at rest
in its futility,”21 and

Conjectures (…) may be absolutely certain in the souls of those who have
them, but they do not correspond to outward realities or the beliefs of the
common Muslims (iʿtiqādāt ʿawāmm al-muslimīn).22

Hence, the subjective standard of inner conviction must be reinforced by an

objective standard, if one is to claim true knowledge. Whatever conviction does
not fulfill the requirements of necessary knowledge remains conjecture, even
if its bearer perceives certainty in himself or tranquility in his soul.23 Ibn al-
Wazīr himself employs descriptions such as sukūn al-nafs in legal questions,
where absolute certainty is not required.24
In the strict sense of the word, the term ‘knowledge’ applies only to nec-
essary knowledge as far as Ibn al-Wazīr is concerned, i.e. knowledge that is
bestowed by God and can neither be produced nor doubted and rebutted by
human beings. Necessary knowledge denotes what is at times called yaqīn (cer-
titude) and ʿilm qaṭʿī (certain knowledge) by Ibn al-Wazīr. However, there is
another, less restricted sense in which the term “knowledge” can be employed
and times attributed with conjecture, i.e. ʿilm ẓannī (conjectural knowledge).
The significance of this other use of the term in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking becomes
evident in his al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr. The writing represents a defense of Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s rival for the imamate, Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAlī. The legitimacy

21 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 114.

22 Ibid., 120.
23 The problem of tranquility residing in the soul without any actual correspondence to
the truth of the known thing was largely included in the defenses of different concepts
of knowledge. Ibn al-Murtaḍā defended the decisiveness of the condition by saying that
in such a case, there is no occurrence of tranquility in the soul resulting from the truth,
but rather an act of appeasing it (taskīn). In such a case, tranquility in the soul does not
result from truth. He does not explain, however, how one is to tell the difference; cf. Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 130. For al-Jāḥiẓ, this problem was a major leverage point in
his argument against acquired knowledge; cf. al-Jāhiẓ, al-Masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt fī l-maʿrifa
39–41.
24 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 85b.

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of al-Manṣūr’s imamate was challenged by means of the argument that the

imam does not possess sufficient knowledge. Ibn al-Wazīr effectively argues
that the implication of this challenge is that the knowledge that is required
of the imam should be acquired knowledge. He strives to show that this chal-
lenge is invalid by arguing that Imam al-Manṣūr possesses knowledge based on
two arguments: 1. The imam is well versed in the texts of revelation; 2. The pre-
ponderant supposition (al-ẓann al-rājiḥ) is called knowledge. This tells us the
following two things.
The first argument implies that thorough familiarity with the tawātur texts
is tantamount to (necessary) knowledge. At the beginning of the discussion of
what “spending all efforts to formulate an independent judgment on a legal or
theological question” (ijtihād fī l-ʿilm) means, Ibn al-Wazīr writes:

A group of men ignorant of the real meaning of true knowledge which

the righteous forefathers possessed saw that our Lord, the Commander of
the Faithful, al-Manṣūr bi-llāh, peace be upon him, is wholly engaged with
contemplating what is beneficial (maṣāliḥ) and is dedicated to studying
the noble Quran, the prophetic reports and the traditions of the com-
panions like the righteous forefathers were, [yet he] does not plunge into
the innovations that occurred in recent times after the extinction of the
best of all times. What I mean is the plunging into the predestined events
before they occur, which God’s prophet hated.25

According to Ibn al-Wazīr, Imam al-Manṣūr has the knowledge required of an

imam, unlike those who require of him another kind of knowledge:

And when methods differed and creatures feuded, those who were not
occupied with the sciences of the forefathers deemed those who were
[occupied with them] void of knowledge. Just as those who were occu-
pied with the sciences of the forefathers knew those ignorant of them
[the sciences] to be blind to true knowledge. Thus, the ignorant ones
combined the vilest ignorance with claims to the highest ranks of knowl-
edge. How greatly strange that they consider knowledge what [really] is
ignorance, and that they defame our Lord, the Commander of the Faith-
ful, peace be upon him, for not being occupied with what they consider
knowledge.26

25 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr f. 103a.

26 Ibid., f. 103b.

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Considering that the tawātur report is one—for Ibn al-Wazīr, the major—
source of necessary knowledge, it makes perfect sense to ascribe knowledge
to Imam al-Manṣūr on that basis. This is especially so in the light of Ibn Ibn
al-Wazīr’s view that the most obvious way of understanding the texts—that
which occurs first in the mind and is indeed “common necessary knowledge”—
is the most important method of employing them.27 In another passage of
al-Ḥusạm al-mashhūr, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the ascetics who are known for
having been given knowledge because they know what is most worthy of being
known: the five pillars of Islam and tawātur reports.28 Here Ibn al-Wazīr clearly
argues on the basis of necessary knowledge. Imam al-Manṣūr has knowledge in
the strict sense, because he knows what represents the most important part of
necessary knowledge: the pillars of Islam, known by all, as well as tawātur trans-
mission. Inferred or acquired knowledge, associated with speculative theology
and other sciences that developed in later generations, cannot be made incum-
bent nor a prerequisite for the imam (or anyone else) as long as knowledge is
to be understood in its strict sense.
The second argument is of another kind. It reveals the heart of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
epistemology. Although Imam al-Manṣūr may merely possess conjectural judg-
ment on a number of questions, these are as good as knowledge as long as the
indicators leading to those judgments are stronger than those leading to con-
trary judgments.

Secondly, conjecture is called knowledge as the Exalted says {When you

know them to be believers, do not send them back} [Q 60:10]. (…) Con-
jecture is called knowledge in language. This has been well put by the
commentator of Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ in a useful instruction, namely that the
Quran finds fault with conjecture sometimes, and praises it at other
times. The response to this is that it [conjecture] is an expression shared
between doubt of equal (mustawā) or overruled (marjūḥ) likelihood on
the one side. This is the dispraised kind when it relates to something
where knowledge is incumbent. On the other side, there is the prepon-
derant (rājiḥ) conjecture that emerges from evidence necessitating it
(al-mūjiba lahū). This is the praised kind [of conjecture] which is called
knowledge.29

27 Ibid., fs. 104a–105a.

28 Ibid., f. 104b.
29 Ibid., f. 104b.

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Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between two meanings of the term conjecture

(ẓann). On the one hand, there is conjecture that is not based on indicators. It is
merely a claim or unfounded assumption, equivalent to the opposite of knowl-
edge, i.e. ignorance ( jahl).30 On the other hand, sometimes conjecture may be
based on indicators that render the object of the supposition “almost certain”
(ghālib al-ẓann). This “almost certain” supposition is encouraged in the texts
of revelation, and indeed often called knowledge, according to Ibn al-Wazīr.
Consequently, Ibn al-Wazīr can assert that, whether the knowledge required of
an imam by al-Manṣūr’s detractors refers to necessary or to conjectural knowl-
edge, Imam al-Manṣūr has what it takes.
At first sight, this equation seems to contradict Ibn al-Wazīr’s insistence
on necessary knowledge. But if reconsidered more closely, it becomes clear
that the broadening of the term ‘knowledge’ is in perfect harmony with the
other elements of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought. In al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ, Ibn al-Wazīr tells
the reader that the ever-present distinction between knowledge and conjec-
ture is that knowledge is necessary whereas conjecture is not.31 All necessary
knowledge occurs in all people, scholars as well as laymen. It is given by God
and leaves no room for doubt. All else is conjecture. Although Ibn al-Wazīr
equates the speculative theologians’ acquired knowledge with preponderant
conjecture, and although he equates this preponderant conjecture at times
with knowledge, the two differ tremendously from one another. This difference
is rooted in the function that ambiguity has in each. In the case of acquired
knowledge, ambiguity is a means to an end. In the case of knowledge as over-
whelming probability, ambiguity is the end. It is the end that corresponds to
the human limitation of knowing and of producing knowledge, which “every
one finds in himself.”32
Furthermore, this difference is manifest in the function that each of the two
concepts can have in the broader context of theology and legal theory. Specula-
tive theologians use acquired knowledge as a foundation of religious doctrines,
much like necessary knowledge. The decisiveness of its content at a given time,

30 There are two different kinds of jahl. The one corresponding to reprehensible ẓann is sig-
nified by an unfounded conviction that a thing is what it is not. The other kind of jahl
describes the mere absence of knowledge, which is not meant by the prohibition; cf. Ibn
al-Wazīr, Tarjīh 26; Ibn al-Wazīr, Ịthār al-ḥaqq 18. Ibn al-Wazīr is neither the first nor the
only one to make this distinction; cf. Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 174. Ibn al-Wazīr
refers to the Caspian imam al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh in this distinction, according to whom only
the first kind of jahl is meant by the rule that prohibits jahl. See also ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s def-
inition in Peter, God’s Created Speech 43.
31 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 49.
32 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 210.

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the tranquility of the soul that is present at the time of conclusion, qualifies it
as knowledge of the truth of its object. For the speculative theologians, the ini-
tial doubt is no longer effective. But for Ibn al-Wazīr, knowledge of the truth of
a thing cannot occur unless it was always beyond doubt.33 He does not distin-
guish between temporal and absolute absence of doubt. All true knowledge is
necessary knowledge. Necessary knowledge exists only in “the general tenets”
( jumal)—those things that are necessarily known by all (al-ʿilm al-ḍarūrī al-
ʿādī).34 The theologians’ acquired knowledge is claimed for the details of mat-
ters. Indeed, one reason why acquired knowledge can be termed knowledge at
all is that it is a particularization of the necessary knowledge that is general.35
But Ibn al-Wazīr argues that what they claim to be knowledge is really only a
preponderant probability, a conjecture that is likely to be true. In contrast to the
claim theologians make for their acquired knowledge, preponderant probabil-
ity can never be made the foundation of doctrine. Doctrine cannot rest on the
subjective criteria of the tranquility of the soul of the individual, arrived at by
inference. Ibn al-Wazīr argues that the term ʿilm for conjectural matters is used
in the Quran for things that the human being is encouraged or obliged to refer
to.36 He should “know” them rather in the sense that he should be occupied
or acquainted with them. But he does not have, or cannot arrive at, a certain
knowledge of them. This inquiry has practical rather than theoretical purposes.
Like in the realm of legal methodology, preponderant probability may inform
action, not theory or certain knowledge. Representing the realm of theory, it
is the jumal that are known for certain because of necessary knowledge, and
because the subjective inner state of individual “certainty” is reinforced by the
commonality of the knowledge. But the concrete matters that require detailed
response are vast. It seems that there is in actual fact little of which the human
being can have true knowledge in the strict sense of the word. Thus, concern-
ing their epistemic value, Ibn al-Wazīr equates all matters other than the most
basic Islamic doctrines with the legal matters of substantive law. They are only
probable, theoretically always allowing the possibility of another position or of
someone else’s deeper insight. But since no more certainty than this high prob-
ability can be arrived at, it must be taken as the basis for judgments and actions
and theological statements. To emphasize it once again: the epistemic value of
all these does not go beyond overwhelming probability at best.

33 See also Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 97–98.

34 Ibid., i, 211.
35 See for example Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 131; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 369,
389.
36 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 40.

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Abrahamov shows how necessary knowledge mainly has been used as a basis
of proof in Islamic theology. He argues that those issues where it has been used
as evidence on its own merit were the “basic issues of Islamic theology.”37 I
suggest that these “basic issues of Islamic theology” are identical to what Ibn
al-Wazīr calls “the general tenets” ( jumal). Abrahamov focusses on those the-
ologians who did distinguish between necessary and acquired knowledge. But
I suggest that the same is true for those who did not make that distinction:
necessary knowledge is used as evidence itself in the basic and general issues
of Islamic theology. In contrast to those who do distinguish, Ibn al-Wazīr does
not see that philosophical speculation can lead to anything but overwhelming
probability in the non-basic issues of Islamic theology.38

2 Definitions of the Means to Possess Knowledge

2.1 A Shift in the Definition: from Naẓar as Philosophical Speculation to

Naẓar as Pious Contemplation
Ibn al-Wazīr’s third criterion for knowledge, i.e. persistence (of the conviction)
in spite of raised doubt (al-thabāt ʿinda l-tashkīk), is aimed against the notion
of naẓar as a first duty. The definition of naẓar established by the theologians
requires prior doubt regarding, or ignorance of, the object of later knowledge.39
Ibn al-Murtaḍā writes that naẓar must produce something that was not there
before.40 Furthermore, the certainty of the result of naẓar is determined by the
way it is practiced. Naẓar implies that the connection between an indication
(dalīl) and that which it indicates (madlūl) is followed in a particular way that

37 Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 24.

38 There is of course another question, but one which I will not answer in much detail, as
to whether there are any objective standards for the border between the necessary and
the probable. Ibn al-Wazīr does refer to common necessary knowledge in a number of
quite concrete matters. He does consider the corroboration of a solitary report and con-
textual evidence as informing necessary knowledge equal to tawātur. The transition from
assumption to necessity in tawātur is no new subject. Al-Ghazālī and others state that the
exact point of transition cannot be determined; cf. Weiss, Knowledge of the Past 88–90.
Weiss speaks of an “adequate” number of witnesses. The point at which conjecture turns
to knowledge depends on the experience of the individual. Ibn al-Wazīr formulates some-
thing similar with reference to the mutawātir traditions. It is not far-fetched to assume that
he determined the point where probability turns into necessary knowledge, for example
in the case of contextual evidence, with similar vagueness. For more on the criteria of
tawātur, see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre 412–413.
39 See, for example, Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 376.
40 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 137.

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generates knowledge (tawallud). The second condition that Ibn al-Murtaḍā

mentions for a conviction to be called knowledge is that it was “generated by
correct speculation,” implying the existence of incorrect speculation.41 Ibn al-
Malāḥimī writes that for naẓar to generate knowledge it must be based on
correct premises, as well as consist in the correct ordering of these premises.42
As Peter shows for ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s thought, the connections drawn between
the indication and the indicated are not always necessary. Doubt may enter
here as well.43 According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, one distinction between necessary
and acquired knowledge is that the former “cannot be expelled from the soul
by doubt or sophism” whereas the latter can.44 Ibn al-Wazīr rejects this notion
of naẓar:

If the suspicion (waswasa) occurs at the foundations of the evidence then

doubt [shakk] will bring knowledge to an end. This necessitates renewed
speculation. This is the opinion of Abū Hāshim and his followers who do
not require that speculation arrive at the necessary premises. Rather, they
are content with the tranquility of the soul concerning the foundations of
the evidence, [because they] are only concerned with [the issue of] suspi-
cion on that level. If they hold that to be true, it represents a great decline.
It follows that the foundations of the evidence, which are an expression of
the premises, cannot possibly be known with absolute certitude without
doubt. Consequently, there is doubt in the result. (…) If the consensus of
Muslims has concluded that the one to whom suspicion occurs in spite
of spending the greatest effort in naẓar is not charged with unbelief, it
follows that it is not assumed that decisive indicators (al-adilla al-qāṭiʿa)
lead to the kind of certitude that necessitates the tranquility of the soul.
Or this is not possible because it [the certitude] is oftentimes absent in
spite of the abundance of claims to it. Hence, naẓar is possible but what
it generates is diverse.45

For Ibn al-Wazīr, the existence of doubt at any stage of the process of knowl-
edge means that this doubt is inherent in the relationship between the subject

41 Ibid., 131.
42 Ibn al-Malāḥimī explains how different conclusions can result from inquiry into the same
questions, if, for example, the ordering of the premises (tartīb al-muqaddimāt) was not
done correctly; cf. Ibn al-Malāhimī, al-Muʿtamad 53–54.
43 Cf. Peter, God’s Created Speech 65–68.
44 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 129.
45 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 49–50.

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and its object of naẓar. Doubt or forgetfulness may return at any time, requiring
renewed naẓar.46 And, more gravely according to Ibn al-Wazīr, this doubt exists
at levels as fundamental as the foundations of the evidence (arkān al-dalīl),
resulting in the doubting of the most essential things, like God’s existence.
But these are the foundations of all secondary doctrines for which certainty is
claimed. Consequently, not only the definition of knowledge in the strict sense
would be invalidated, but also the grounds on which the faith of a Muslim is
evaluated. In short, the definition of naẓar is another reason why Ibn al-Wazīr
thinks that knowledge based on inference cannot be termed knowledge in the
strict sense of the word. The threefold description of knowledge above ( jazm
or sukūn al-nafs, al-muṭābaqa fī l-khārij and al-thabāt ʿinda l-tashkīk) therefore
always refers to necessary knowledge. A summarizing comment on a passage
about necessary knowledge and its circumstances in al-ʿAwāṣim illustrates how
Ibn al-Wazīr views the connection between acquired knowledge and naẓar:

In sum, they [the speculative theologians] have made the admission of

doubts and sophisms now and later the measurement by which they dis-
tinguish their kind of knowledge from ignorance ( jahl), from the con-
viction that results from emulation (taqlid) and from matters of the nec-
essary knowledge which does not need to be sought by speculation or
teaching. If you have considered all this you will have found that all that
can be described by these characteristics is far from that knowledge which
can be distinguished from other things by certain resolution ( jazm) and
decisiveness (qaṭʿ). This is so, because whatever may be discovered to be
invalid now, has never been certain knowledge. There is no difference
whatsoever between it and preponderant conjecture.47

Besides illustrating Ibn al-Wazīr’s rejection of acquired knowledge as knowl-

edge, the passage refers to another aspect of Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology: the
distinction between knowledge and conjecture. Ibn al-Wazīr is obviously not
averse to inquiry into the sources nor to the inference of information. However,
he rejects the idea that naẓar in the realm of acquired knowledge as defined
by the theologians leads to anything other than probable knowledge. And this

46 The position of the speculative theologians here challenged by Ibn al-Wazīr corresponds
to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 132. Acquired knowledge, in contrast to necessary
knowledge, may be disproved or become absent (intifāʾ) if doubt, suspicion, inattentive-
ness or forgetfulness enters at the level of the premises of the inquiry that lead to the
knowledge; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 393.
47 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 209.

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kind of knowledge is on a par with other results of intellectual endeavor and

does not qualify as a standard for truth or faith.
In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking, naẓar figures as the first duty of every believer,
and it is clear that naẓar generates certain yet acquired knowledge. Its sig-
nificance is illustrated by the amount of knowledge that is required of every
believer. In al-Durar al-farāʾid, Ibn al-Murtaḍā determines what needs to be
known by every mukallaf :

The later scholars of our school (aṣḥābunā min al-mutaʾakhkhirīn) have

restricted it [the required amount] to thirty issues, ten concerning divine
unicity, ten concerning divine justice and ten concerning promise and
threat. Those concerning divine unicity are divided into affirmation and
negation (…).48

Another slightly mitigated list that insists on the necessity of detailed knowl-
edge is followed by Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s conclusion and the indication that the
required knowledge in each area will be specified in the respective chapters:

Know that the requisite amount in every question where knowledge is

required is the knowledge of what is true in it and the evidence that it
is indeed true. This evidence amounts to the ordering of the premises
(tartīb al-muqaddimāt) in the way that leads to knowledge. [Acquiring]
this amount [of knowledge] is an individual duty.49

It is obvious that knowledge generated by naẓar amounts to a considerable part

of the knowledge required of every common mukallaf. After all, the essential
doctrines like God’s unicity and justice, and the promise and the threat, have
to be known in detail and by way of rational inference.
Ibn al-Wazīr is not the first to reject the distinction between necessary and
acquired knowledge. Nor was he the only thinker to include preponderant
probability in a broader concept of knowledge. In al-ʿAwāṣim, he discusses
three (and elsewhere two) groups of theologians who supposedly held views
similar to his own on the present topic.50 This is in line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s con-
stant attempt to show that neither all Zaydis nor all Muʿtazilis took naẓar to be
the first duty. Not all were set on the idea that human beings are able to produce
certain knowledge themselves.

48 Quoted from al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 4b.

49 Ibid., f. 5a.
50 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 30–44.

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The common feature of these groups consists in the severing of the causative
relation between naẓar and knowledge. Al-Jāḥiẓ, and the so-called People of
Cognitions (ahl al-maʿārif ) associated with him, insisted that all true knowl-
edge is necessary.51 According to them, the role of naẓar consists in the con-
templation of the things known by necessity. For the acquisition of knowledge,
naẓar is merely a relative condition (sharṭ iʿtibārī).52 It means that naẓar may
coincide with knowledge, yet does not generate it. This resounds with Ibn al-
Wazīr’s description of commendable naẓar. He often quotes al-Jāḥiẓ’s al-ʿIbar
wa-l-iʿtibār with reference to proving God’s existence and unicity through con-
templation (naẓar) of the order of the natural necessary phenomena in the uni-
verse. Like the contemplation of miracles and perceptible things, contempla-
tion of the necessary things of religion like death also belongs to this category.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s Dīwān is full of examples of this kind of reflection.53 Al-Muʾayyad
bi-llāh al-Hārūnī in his Siyāsat al-murīdīn is quoted as having urged the con-
templation of death for the very reason that it is known to exist by necessity.54
This kind of naẓar has as its goal to come nearer to God.
In his definition of the commendable kind of naẓar, Ibn al-Wazīr often refers
to the no longer extant Kitāb al-Mujtabā by the Muʿtazili Shaykh Mukhtār.
Apparently, the latter defined naẓar as “divesting the intellect of distractions”
(tajrīd al-ʿaql ʿan al-ghaflāt)55 or “divesting the heart” (al-qalb).56 This expres-
sion implies that the function of naẓar is to remind the human being of
that which he knows already by necessity, rather than to generate (tawallud)
knowledge following a particular order of premises (tartīb al-muqaddimāt) as
described by the theologians.
Ibn al-Wazīr further quotes Shaykh Mukhtār, who referred to his own teacher
Rukn al-Dīn al-Malāḥimī as one who did not require the acquisition of knowl-
edge from every common Muslim.57 Due to the lack of direct access to Shaykh
Mukhtār’s views, it is impossible to say whether or not this interpretation of
Ibn al-Malāḥimī originates with Shaykh Mukhtār. It may also emanate from
Ibn al-Wazīr’s habitual attempt to harmonize and argue against contemporary
Muʿtazili views with support from earlier Muʿtazila. However, the reading of

51 See also Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 24.

52 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 423.
53 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 382, 386, 396; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 25a,
34a, 59a.
54 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 35.
55 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 49.
56 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 15.
57 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 71. Shaykh Mukhtār’s quote of Ibn al-Malāḥimī as rendered by
Ibn al-Wazīr can be found in al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 6.

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Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s Kitab al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn shows a picture that differs
from the way Ibn al-Wazīr presents him. Ibn al-Malāḥimī spends considerable
effort on arguing that naẓar according to a certain order of premises (tartīb al-
muqaddimāt) leads to acquired knowledge, that this kind of naẓar is a duty,
and that it is the first duty of every believer once the state of responsibility is
reached (taklīf ).58
In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr ranges Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s student Shaykh Mukhtār
with al-Jāḥiẓ and the ahl al-maʿārif in that he considers naẓar merely a rel-
ative condition (sharṭ iʿtibārī) of knowledge.59 But unlike those with whom
Ibn al-Wazīr contends, Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not call those unable to reach
knowledge in all the details of doctrine by naẓar unbelievers.60 A general com-
prehension, reminiscent of Ibn al-Wazīr’s jumal, suffices them as knowledge.
But while Ibn al-Malāḥimī requires that this general knowledge be acquired,
Ibn al-Wazīr considers it necessary.61 Still, Ibn al-Wazīr might have found Ibn
al-Malāḥimī’s views on the issue less severe than those of contemporary oppo-
nents. In comparison, Ibn al-Murtaḍā concludes every section on one of the
essential attributes of the Divine in al-Durar al-farāʾid with the details of what
knowledge is required of the ordinary believer (mukallaf ). These details would
doubtless be counted among the subtleties of kalām, as for example that God
is able (qadīr) in his essence, not by an ability.62
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the difference between philosophical speculation
of the theologians and his pious contemplation—the two different definitions
of naẓar—consists in the nature of the knowledge that results from it. Naẓar
in the sense of philosophical speculation, on the one hand, consists in an infer-
ential activity on the basis of necessary knowledge leading to other kinds of
knowledge.63 These kinds of knowledge are based on the choice and the activ-
ity of the human being. Naẓar in the sense of pious contemplation, on the other
hand, does not generate knowledge. It leads to approximation to God. It may

58 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 79–82; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 7–9. About
naẓar and tartīb al-muqaddimāt according to reason, see ibid., 363.
59 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 95–97.
60 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 63.
61 For Ibn al-Malāhimī, like the majority of Muʿtazila, acquisition of knowledge beyond the
necessary is a vital duty. Conjecture in questions like God’s unicity, justice etc., although
allowed in cases of incapability, could never fulfill taklīf ; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-
Muʿtamad 60–64.
62 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 22b.
63 Ibn al-Murtaḍā and some Zaydis, however, hold that there are kinds of acquired knowl-
edge which do not have their root in necessary knowledge; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat
al-afhām 133.

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correlate with knowledge but it does not have knowledge as its goal. If knowl-
edge occurs, it is necessary, is given by God, and depends on neither the choice
nor the activity of the human being. But if no knowledge occurs, the purpose
of naẓar is not frustrated.64
The process described by al-Jāḥiẓ as reflection on nature, for example, may
also be termed naẓar. But it is far from being a means by which a truth is delib-
erately proved by a conscious process of ordering correct premises. Rather, it
coincides with the necessary knowledge of the meaning of the world (dalīl al-
āfāq), the miracles, or the observed self (dalīl al-anfus). It is tantamount to the
knowledge occurring by way of the senses or intuition in the natural human
disposition ( fiṭra).65

2.2 Shifting the Emphasis: Original Human Disposition (fiṭra) and

Intellect (ʿaql)
All concepts of fiṭra as the original human disposition go back to a Quranic
verse as well as a prophetic report. Q 30:30 speaks of a particular constitution
“with which God created man,” and unto which Muhammad is to set his pur-
pose.66 According to tradition, the prophet Muhammad said that “every infant
is born according to fiṭra, then his parents make him a Jew or a Christian or a
Zoroastrian, just as an animal is born intact.”67 The concept of fiṭra was mainly
discussed in the context of the legal status of children and unbelievers, as well
as their destiny in the Hereafter.68 Both contexts imply an idea of pre-natal orig-
inality as well as uprightness in the sense of monotheistic religion. This resulted
in the notion that the original nature of every human being is identical with
Islam.69 Although the term does not figure majorly in Muʿtazili literature, the
notion of identifying Islam with the original human nature supported a num-
ber of Muʿtazili doctrines that caused indignation among their Ashʿari counter-
parts. The notion underscores the Muʿtazili emphasis on human responsibility
for evil, but undermines the Ashʿari stress on the sovereignty of divine will and

64 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 39.

65 On the dalīl al-āfāq and the dalīl al-anfus, see Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 109–110; cf. this study,
147 above.
66 Q 30:30 reads {So [Prophet] as a man of pure faith, stand firm and true in your devotion to
the religion. This is the natural disposition God instilled in mankind—there is no altering
God’s creation—and this is the right religion, though most people do not realize it}.
67 For the fiṭra tradition, see for example al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ xxiii, hadith 441.
68 van Ess, Zwischen Hadith und Theologie 110–114; Gobillot, La Fiṭra.
69 On the identification of fiṭra with Islam, see for example Adang, Islam as the Inborn Reli-
gion 391–410; Holtzman, Human Choice 163–188.

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guidance.70 Furthermore, it stands to reason that, if every human being is born

a Muslim, divine revelation is little more than a confirmation of what the orig-
inal disposition of the human being already knows. This idea is reminiscent of
the Muʿtazili concept of the relationship between reason and revelation.71
Griffel shows that the epistemological dimension of fiṭra was hardly dis-
cussed by early Muslim scholars up until the time of al-Ghazālī.72 In Ibn al-
Wazīr’s thought, it is in the context of knowledge that the concept of fiṭra
is most often referred to. How then does he answer the question that would
be asked in a discussion of the epistemological dimension of fiṭra? I borrow
from Griffel and ask: “What knowledge does the original disposition of humans
include?”73 And does Ibn al-Wazīr take the originally created fiṭra to be identi-
cal to the Islamic religion? And what does that mean for Ibn al-Wazīr’s view on
the relationship between human knowledge and revelation?
To answer these questions one must look at the function Ibn al-Wazīr as-
signed to fiṭra, and of course what fiṭra really is in his thought. Ibn al-Wazīr
does not give a clear definition of his concept of fiṭra anywhere in his writ-
ings. He first mentioned fiṭra in his Tarjīḥ when championing the ahl al-jumal
whose thirst for certain knowledge was satisfied with the general tenets (al-
iktifāʾ bi-l-jumal). Another occasion for a discussion of fiṭra was the distinction
between the ambiguous and the clear matters in the Quranic text.74 Moreover,
the concept is extensively employed in the passage on the distinction between
necessary and acquired knowledge in the fourth volume of al-ʿAwāṣim. Beyond
that, the concept of fiṭra is the single most important methodological argu-
ment in Īthār al-ḥaqq.
In Tarjīḥ, Ibn al-Wazīr defends fiṭra as the source of knowledge in two func-
tions. Firstly, the original human disposition created by God in man is sufficient
to understand the meaning of the Quranic text. Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent appar-
ently claimed that the revealed texts contain a high number of ambiguities,
requiring prior knowledge and skill for their interpretation before knowledge
of the essential truths can be extracted from them.75 Secondly, according to Ibn
al-Wazīr, the original human disposition knows the major tenets that unite all
Muslims in a general manner. These jumal include extra-Quranic knowledge,
namely necessary knowledge.76 Although it appears that the second function is

70 Macdonald, Fiṭra.
71 Cf. Peters, God’s Created Speech 95–102, 404.
72 Griffel, Original Human Disposition 5.
73 Ibid., 5.
74 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 44, 189–192.
75 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 8–9.
76 Ibid., 189–192.

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broader and therefore more essential than the first one, we must keep in mind
that Ibn al-Wazīr’s main concern in Tarjīḥ is man’s ability to understand divine
revelation. It is only natural, therefore, that he should have focused more on
the Quranic text.
The answer to our first question (What knowledge does the original dispo-
sition of human beings include?) appears obvious at first. In both functions
of fiṭra described in Tarjīh—understanding the meaning of the texts of revela-
tion and knowing the major Islamic doctrines—but especially in the first one,
the human fiṭra is sufficient to know the meaning of texts and principles. But
at second glance, it does not really answer the question. This is because Ibn
al-Wazīr does not discuss knowledge that is included in the fiṭra in the sense
that it is possessed by it in its original state. The fiṭra does not already possess
the content of revelation. Rather, the fiṭra is a faculty which understands and
knows the meaning of the information provided in the Quran. In that sense, the
answer to the second question concerning the identity of fiṭra and Islam would
have to be answered in the negative. Fiṭra appears to be a kind of disposition
towards understanding God’s revelation, rather than a body of information that
already contains the knowledge confirmed by the content of the Quran.
The second function—the knowledge of the jumal—promises to be more
conducive to understanding what knowledge is included in the original dispo-
sition. In Īthār al-haqq, the reader is presented with seven major issues (ashyāʾ)
that constitute general necessary knowledge or the broad general tenets known
by all ( jumal). The first issue is all necessary knowledge, the second through the
sixth are the major Islamic tenets and the last is an awareness of divergence
from the five Islamic tenets (ʿadam al-ziyāda wa-l-naqṣ). Fiṭra is a term often
used in al-ʿAwāṣim as well. In most instances, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to “human
intellects in their original state” ( fiṭar al-ʿuqūl)77 according to which God cre-
ated human beings. When distinguishing between the blameworthy and the
praised kind of conjecture, Ibn al-Wazīr writes:

Wherever it [conjecture] is dispraised, what is intended is the doubt rely-

ing upon which human intellects in their original state know to be blame-
worthy. Wherever it is praised, what is intended is the preponderant, act-
ing according to which human intellects in their original state know to be
good.78

77 Ibn al-Wazīr’s use of the plural indicates that this disposition is a common feature of all
human beings’ intellects.
78 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iv, 53.

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True to type, Ibn al-Wazīr reduces almost every doctrine and theological
problem to a minimum. Then he claims essential agreement on this minimum
in the sense of a lowest common denominator. This represents the correspond-
ing “tenet” in its most general form, i.e. jumal. Somewhere within the discus-
sion of each of these doctrines, he refers to fiṭar al-ʿuqūl to show that these
jumal are naturally and necessarily agreed upon. They are agreed upon because
they are received and necessarily understood by every human being that is
liable to taklīf. Indeed, whoever does not understand them cannot be liable
to taklīf, in contradistinction to the subtle and detailed matters of knowledge
which which require prolonged study, yet do not result in necessary knowl-
edge.

Experience shows that the principle proofs (awāʾil al-adilla) are stronger
than the cryptic studies for which the theologians claim dependency
on them [the principle proofs]. That is why Shaykh Maḥmūd [Ibn al-
Malāḥimī], Shaykh Mukhtār and others among the Muʿtazili scholars
have affirmed that every compos mentis quickly grasps them. And who-
ever does not understand them, is no mukallaf whatsoever, as will soon
be shown in the third aspect. Be that as it may, both groups have con-
cluded that they [the principle proofs] are strong, sound and conceivable
for human intellects in their original state.79

In short, it is the essential tenets in their general form that are immediately
realized by the original disposition upon the grasp of the most principle proofs.
Hence, necessary knowledge is tantamount to jumal: both are known by fiṭra.
Interestingly, Ibn al-Wazīr’s definition of fiṭra corresponds in many ways to
the common Muʿtazili definition of ʿaql. Indeed, an overlap of the concepts of
ʿaql and fiṭra is not uncommon.80 Ibn al-Murtaḍā in Riyāḍat al-afhām defines
ʿaql as follows:

We say: if it [ʿaql] was something other than the ten [knowledge items]
it would be correct [to say] that it exist and not exist and the opposite
[all at once]. The ten are knowledge of the self and its states,81 [knowl-

79 Ibid., 78.
80 Hoover shows how Ibn Taymiyya uses the two almost interchangeably; cf. Hoover, Ibn
Taymiyyah’s Theodicy 39–44.
81 “Knowledge of the self and its states” means that one knows that one exists, that one is
willing or needy etc.

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edge] by sense perception, by intuition,82 [knowledge of] rational prin-

ciples,83 by experience like [knowing] that stone breaks glass, [knowl-
edge] of the connection between the action and its actor, of important
recent events,84 of the speaker’s obvious intentions, [knowledge] of the
detestableness of the detestable and the existence of duty; Abū ʿAlī [al-
Jubbāʾī includes knowledge] by tawātur report; Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbāʾī
says] that this is not part of the cognitions of ʿaql until after taklīf by rev-
elation,85 because ʿaql is complete without it through the rational knowl-
edge of the duty and the detestable.86

ʿAql, according to this definition, includes all kinds of information that is indis-
putable. This is very similar to Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of fiṭra, which includes
all kinds of things known by necessity. Yet, a difference exists between the two
concepts, which bears on the answer to the question of whether or not fiṭra
(and ʿaql accordingly) is identical to Islam. The answer becomes evident at the
outset of both scholars’ lists of what is known by fiṭra or ʿaql. Ibn al-Wazīr, crit-
icizing speculative theologians for the attempt to attain detailed and certain
knowledge of divine things, writes:

I considered all the disagreement that happens between the denom-

inations of the unbelievers and Muslims. With all their diversity and
branches, as a whole they all go back to seven things, which can easily
be understood by the fiṭra (mudrakuha bi-l-fiṭra qarīb), God’s natural dis-
position according to which He has created people.87

82 Examples of intuitive knowledge are that the whole is more than a part or that five is half
of ten.
83 Rational principles refer to the knowledge that a thing must be either negated or affirmed,
or that a thing cannot be existent and non-existent.
84 Such knowledge would entail the event of an earthquake or the death of the king of a
country.
85 Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933), eponym of the Bahshamiyya, apparently distinguished between
the mutawātir of religious transmission, which becomes necessary only after revelation,
and tawātur of events that were not witnessed personally, as for example that al-Quds is
located in Palestine. He considers the latter a matter of inquiry and inference; cf. ʿĀrif,
al-Ṣila 93.
86 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 132–133. The origin of this list of ten elements or things
known by necessity that constitute ʿaql is not entirely clear. It does not originate with
ʿAbd al-Jabbār, for whom ʿaql consisted of three major elements. It is possible that Ibn al-
Murtaḍā borrowed it from al-Raṣṣāṣ. See the list by Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ḥābis al-Suḥūlī al-Saʿdī
(d. 1061/1650–1651) in his al-Īḍāḥ sharḥ al-Miṣbāḥ; ʿĀrif, al-Ṣila 93–94.
87 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 21; emphasis in italics mine.

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To Ibn al-Wazīr, the original human disposition is a nature that God gave to
human beings so that they would be able and predisposed to know those things
of which the knowledge is necessary. But these items of necessary knowledge
are not present in the fiṭra.
In contrast, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, when discussing the different definitions of ʿaql,
writes:

The intellect is the things known by necessity. The philosophers say:

Rather, it is a simple substance. Some say it is a complex substance, and
others that it is a particular nature. But we say: If it were something other
than the ten [kinds of knowledge] (…).88

Both concepts ( fiṭra and ʿaql) are identified with things known by neces-
sity. But whereas Ibn al-Wazīr describes fiṭra as a disposition by which things
known by necessity are naturally perceived as such, the Muʿtazili ʿaql goes
beyond the disposition or capacity and identifies ʿaql with this kind of knowl-
edge itself.
The Muʿtazili concept of ʿaql is distinct from Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of fiṭra
regarding another aspect. Beyond the inherent possession of indisputable facts,
ʿaql is the initial point from which another kind of knowledge springs. Accord-
ing to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, knowledge constituting ʿaql includes the knowledge of
human beings’ state of contingency. In reaction to a so-called warner (khāṭir),
the ʿaql fears that there may be a Creator who requires something of the human
being. The duty to know more about the possible Creator and respond appro-
priately thus arises immediately in the ʿaql of the human being. This duty to
know more signifies the duty of philosophical speculation (naẓar), because
naẓar generates true knowledge, and it is knowledge of the Creator and His
demands that is required here.89 Consequently, knowledge of the duty of naẓar
is part of ʿaql, and naẓar itself is the means to perform this duty.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s notions of the initial points of philosophical speculation
are common in Muʿtazili kalām.90 Reinhart shows how ʿaql, for Basran Muʿta-
zilis like ʿAbd al-Jabbār, is both a “collection of particular knowledges” and a

88 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afham 132, emphasis in italics mine. Tritton describes an iden-
tical argumentation as typically Muʿtazili, cf. Tritton, Some Muʿtazilī Ideas 617.
89 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 137.
90 Ibn al-Murtaḍā connects the duty of naẓar also with the duty of averting harm, which is
known by necessity. Possible harm is represented by the fear of the existence of a Creator
who demands something of human beings; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afham 138–139.
For more on the duty of naẓar as part of the necessary knowledge contained in human
reason, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 382–383; Reinhart, Before Revelation 155–156.

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“kind of perceptiveness” to things known by necessity and by philosophical

speculation, but not in a comprehensive or final way. Rather, ʿaql is described
as a set of things known by all, and by virtue of which those who possess it
become responsible for taklīf 91 and gain the capacity (quwwa) to perform what
taklīf entails, namely to inquire rationally.92 Consequently, ʿaql indeed con-
tains all those things that constitute necessary knowledge very similar to the
“necessary common knowledge” continually referred to by Ibn al-Wazīr and
identified with the original human disposition.93 But it also includes the means
of expanding the known things by acquired knowledge.94 If this were not so
and there was only necessary knowledge, says Ibn al-Murtaḍā, taklīf would be
meaningless.95
Thus another difference between Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of fiṭra and the
Muʿtazili concept of ʿaql becomes manifest. This difference again refers to the
distinction between necessary and acquired knowledge. Whereas Ibn al-Wazīr
restricts fiṭrā knowledge to knowledge known by necessity, Basran Muʿtazilis
include necessary as well as acquired knowledge. Some of what ʿaql includes or
comes to include is brought into the realm of the kinds of certain knowledge
of ʿaql through naẓar.96 The knowledge of ʿaql entails the duty of speculation
which again leads to a set of secondary cognitions, namely the uṣūl al-adilla:
kinds of knowledge or doctrines that follow from ʿaql and are thereby as much
part of taklīf as the necessary knowledge inherent in ʿaql itself.97 In contrast,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of fiṭra: It comes to realize only that knowledge which
occurs without human initiative or influence and cannot add to what it knows.
As we read in the above quote, taklīf is justified only on the grounds that every
compos mentis quickly grasps the principle proofs that constitute the central
Islamic tenets in their general form. Hence the validity of taklīf rests on neces-
sary knowledge.

91 Reinhart, Before Revelation 151–157, quotes 152.

92 Ibid., 139.
93 Reinhart compares the Muʿtazili notion of ʿaql with the ‘common sense’ of every day
language as well as the Stoic understanding of ‘common notions;’ cf. Reinhart, Before Rev-
elation 152. On ʿaql as a set of kinds of knowledge, see also Peters, God’s Created Speech 82;
Ghaneabassiri, Epistemological Foundation 82–83.
94 See also ʿĀrif, who ascribes the origin of this definition of ʿaql as a capacity to Abū Hud-
hayl, as indeed does Reinhart. Later Muʿtazilis like ʿAbd al-Jabbār rejected the idea that
ʿaql is a substance; cf. ʿĀrif, al-Ṣila 91–92; Peter, God’s Created Speech 82–84.
95 Ibn al-Murtaḍa renders this as the majority opinion; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afham
128.
96 Reinhart, Before Revelation 155–156.
97 See for example ʿĀrif, al-Ṣila 95.

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To sum up: for Ibn al-Murtaḍā, representing the Bahshami position, ʿaql is
identical to true knowledge, is “the sum of essential knowledge” as Tritton puts
it.98 Furthermore, naẓar along with what it generates is also part of and con-
ceived by ʿaql. We must conclude then that according to this position ʿaql is also
identical to Islam. Revelation would then be little more than a confirmation of
what is already present in the human ʿaql.99 In contrast, for Ibn al-Wazīr, fiṭra is
only the predisposition to realize necessary knowledge and to perceive the cen-
tral Islamic tenets. It is not identical to Islam. Necessary knowledge as well as
the central Islamic tenets are both general knowledge. The fiṭra is predisposed
to this general knowledge, and revelation does not exist merely to confirm what
fiṭra is predisposed to or includes. Rather, it gives details of what fiṭra is predis-
posed to in general.

3 The Proof of God’s Existence (ithbāt al-ṣāniʿ)

The proof of God’s existence is a classical instance where the difference be-
tween views on necessary and acquired knowledge, as well as the different
definitions of naẓar, become manifest.
It is also the topic of Ibn al-Wazīr’s first known objections to prevalent
Muʿtazili methods, namely in al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ. And it was the foundations
of the proof of God’s existence that caused Ibn al-Wazir to write his Tarjīḥ.
Arguments for God’s existence based on inference leading to acquired
knowledge prevailed in scholastic Muʿtazili doctrine. Of course, it is based
in one way or another on the knowledge human beings find in themselves
by necessity: they cannot help but know that they are created. But only in a
sequence of steps does inference lead to the knowledge of a creator. However,
coexistence of self-evident and inferred proofs for God’s existence is docu-
mented in the works of early Muslim theologians.100 In Ibn al-Wazīr’s time and
environment, the so-called akwān-proof was apparently the dominant argu-
ment for the existence of God. We can gather this from the reaction to the
above-quoted verses of Ibn al-Wazīr in which he rejected the discussion of

98 Cf. Tritton, Some Muʿtazilī Ideas 617.

99 This is of course no new insight. The elevation of ʿaql and supposed degradation of revela-
tion has been a major point of argument for opponents of the Muʿtazila all along. However,
the two pieces of secondary literature that analyze Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought most com-
prehensively, namely al-Ṣubḥī in al-Zaydiyya and al-Kamālī in al-Imām al-Mahdī, do not
mention his definition of reason.
100 See for example Abrahamov, al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the Proof ; Abrahamov, al-Qāsim b.
Ibrāhīm’s Argument from Design 266–267; van Ess, Early Islamic Theologians 46–81.

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accidents (aʿrāḍ) as a basis for proving God’s existence. However, a major con-
stituent of the akwān-proof is the real existence of aʿrāḍ, whose contingent
nature supposedly indicates the contingent nature of substances, which in
turn points to a creator.101 Ibn al-Wazīr’s versified indifference towards such
accidents apparently caused considerable indignation among his students and
peers.102 The inquirer in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Tarjīḥ claims that elite among con-
temporary scholars rely on the proof.103 Furthermore, the prominence of the
akwān-proof is manifest in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s writings. Although, Ibn al-Wazīr
does not explicitly refer to Ibn al-Murtaḍā by name, it is likely that he had Ibn
al-Murtaḍā in mind when he juxtaposed the proof based on the contingency of
accidents as entitative beings (dalīl al-akwān) with the “proof by way of states”
(dalīl al-aḥwāl).104

3.1 Proving God’s Existence by Inference (istidlāl)

Al-Iryānī argues convincingly that Ibn al-Murtaḍā wrote the following verses
in reply to Ibn al-Wazīr’s controversial verses on the “principles of my religion”
(uṣūl dīnī):

O you, who objects to the principles of religion,

saying that you have no intention to know them.
If you knew them you would not say in objection
‘the principles of my religion are the book of God, not the accidents’.
This is the position of one whose foot has slipped
from the path of truth, or whose heart is diseased.
What is the way to know our Creator?
You said ‘by the Book,’ but this position is refuted.
For we do not believe it, unless the wisdom of him
who establishes it gives a proof that arouses the intellect.105

101 For the poem see Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 68; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422 as well as 55 and
147 above.
102 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 422–423, 441; Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 68; Ibn al-
Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 103l.
103 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 77.
104 There are a number of terms for the two proofs. Madelung translates ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s ver-
sion of the dalīl al-akwān, namely the ṭarīqat al-maʿānī, as the “proof by entitative beings;”
cf. Madelung, Proof for the Existence of God 276. A variety of titles could also be given to
different forms of rendering Abū l-Ḥusayn’s dalīl al-aḥwāl. But in both cases the different
terms signify the same concepts.
105 Cf. al-Iryānī (intr.), al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 7.

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Discussing aʿrāḍ is a major component of the akwān-proof, as is the premise

that knowledge of God is acquired. Al-Ṣubḥī says of Ibn al-Murtaḍā that he did
not explicitly pronounce his opinion on the matter of knowledge of God.106
This may be true for the passage in Riyāḍat al-afhām, where the question of
whether knowledge of God is necessary or acquired is posed explicitly. How-
ever, Ibn al-Murtaḍā clearly expresses his opinion on the question of naẓar as
the first duty a little later on in the same work.

Naẓar is the first duty of the mukallaf. It is said that it is no duty. [But]
we say: The knowledge of God is incumbent because it is a grace (luṭf ).
(…) It [the knowledge] can only be accomplished by means of it [naẓar]
because He [God] is not known by necessity nor by taqlīd. Hence, naẓar
is obligatory and its duty affirmed, because it fulfills the function of avert-
ing harm. When we say ‘first duty’ we mean that no mukallaf is free of it
at the beginning of his taklīf in contradistinction to the other duties.107

In this reasoning, the assumption that the knowledge of God is acquired is the
main argument. In his Kitāb al-Qalāʾid, Ibn al-Murtaḍā clearly uses inference
to arrive at the knowledge of the existence of the Creator. Starting from the
premise of the necessary knowledge that the world is created, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
proceeds to argue from the different modes of spatial existence of accidents,108
which is precisely what the dalīl al-akwān is concerned with. A little later, the
fact that a human action must have been performed by someone is used as
a basis for arguing that created beings must have been created by someone.
This is different from Ibn al-Wazīr’s proof of God’s existence by the observation
of creation, because a sequence of deliberate reasoning based on an analogy
between the seen and the unseen (qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿalā l-shāhid) is involved in
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s development of the argument.109 He considers both elements
of the argument as clearly inferential (istidlālī), leading to acquired knowl-
edge.110 Necessary knowledge is the basis of the proof rather than the proof
in itself.

106 Al-Ṣubḥī nevertheless lists Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s theory of the knowledge of God as the second
example that marks Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a Muʿtazili in many doctrinal matters; cf. al-Ṣubḥī,
al-Zaydiyya 358.
107 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 138.
108 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 53.
109 See also al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 7b, 22a.
110 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 52–53; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
f. 10a.

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The argumentation attributed to Ibn al-Murtaḍā by his commentator al-

Ḥayyī leaves no doubt that Ibn al-Murtaḍā demonstrates God’s existence based
on the akwān-proof and a sequence of inferences according to a particular well-
established order:

The principles of evidence (qawāʿid al-dalīl) are first of all, that it needs
to be established that accidents (aʿrāḍ) are additional to the body. Then
their [the accidents’] contingency (ḥudūthuhā) is proved. Further, [it is
proved] that the body does not precede them [the accidents]; then [it is
proved] that the existence of that which does not precede the contingent
must be contingent like it. And after all this is established by apodictic
proof, we know that the body is contingent. Then it is established that
whatever is contingent requires the existence of a creator (muḥdith). (…)
If we then know that the bodies have a creator, [we have] what was desired
from this proof. Yet, know that talking about the first principle must come
first, which is the establishment of the accidents.111

Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s views on this question ranges him clearly within the Bahsha-
miyya112 who argued with the duty of philosophical speculation according to a
certain order of evidence to arrive at the certainty about God’s existence, the
dalīl al-akwān as well as the analogy between the seen and the unseen world.
This reasoning is ascribed to the Zaydiyya as a whole.113
This way of reasoning for the existence of God is the major point where ʿAbd
al-Jabbār’s student Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī initially deviated from his teacher
and coined the proof for the existence of God termed dalīl al-aḥwāl, “the proof
by way of states.”114 Abū l-Ḥusayn’s teaching on the matter is preserved in
Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s Kitab al-Muʿtamad and Kitāb al-Fāʾiq. According to Ibn al-
Malāḥimī, Abū l-Ḥusayn rejects the analogy between the seen and the unseen
world upon which his Bahshami predecessors based their inference of the exis-
tence of a creator. Furthermore, Abū l-Ḥusayn challenges the real existence of
the contingent accidents (aʿrāḍ) upon which the proof of the contingency of
the substances was based. His argument is termed dalīl al-aḥwāl because he

111 Ibid., f. 6a.

112 According to al-Ḥayyī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā affirms that his contemporary Zaydis and indeed
he himself endorse the proof of the createdness of the world that rests on the real exis-
tence (maʿānī) of the accidents of bodies; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
f. 6b.
113 Ibid., f. 5a–6b.
114 Cf. Madelung, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Proof 273–280; Ansari et al., Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s Rebuttal
28–29.

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defines these accidents as states (aḥwāl) or characteristics (aḥkām) of the sub-

stances, rather than separate entities (maʿānī).115

3.2 Proving God’s Existence from Necessity (ḍarūra)

The major difference between Abū l-Ḥusayn’s thought and that of his Bahshami
colleagues that is of most interest for the present question concerns the kind
of knowledge arrived at. Whereas the knowledge of the existence of the cre-
ator is acquired by way of analogical inference in the Bahshami argument, Abū
l-Ḥusayn holds that it occurs by necessity.116 This is why it was so conducive
to Ibn al-Wazīr’s argumentation. True to type, Ibn al-Wazīr confirms the dalīl
al-aḥwāl according to Abū l-Ḥusayn in a rather broad way.117 He endorses it
in general, yet his own examples illustrate that he was not concerned with
the question of whether accidents are entities (maʿānī) or states (aḥwāl) of
substances per se, but rather with the states (aḥwāl) in which all elements of
creation find themselves or are perceived to be. His emphasis is on the claim
that naẓar in the theologians’ sense is not needed. In a general way, it is self-
evident that all elements of creation are brought into being and are arranged in
a perfectly fitting way, necessarily speaking of a creator as well as of the wisdom
of same.

If you consider these different wonders that are perceived by the senses—
heaven and earth and all the living things that are dispersed in them—you
know that they were created from the appearance of createdness in them,
acknowledging their own incapability of producing a thing.118

In reply to the question whether or not he rejects naẓar completely, Ibn al-
Wazīr negates this and writes at the end of al-Burḥān al-qāṭiʿ:

115 For juxtapositions of the akwān-proof and the ahwāl-proof in Muʿtazili literature, see for
example Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 101–109, 157–158.
116 The late Muʿtazili Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī (or ʿAjālī) summarizes the difference between the
Bahshami position and that of Abū l-Ḥusayn and others most concisely; cf. Taqī l-Dīn al-
ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 155. On Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, see footnote 126 below.
117 Ibn al-Wazīr does not reject the analogy between the seen and the unseen as a whole.
According to him, the meanings of things in the unseen can only be understood through
meanings in the seen. But unlike the analogy between the seen and the unseen employed
by the Bahshamiyya for the proof of God’s existence on a merely rational base, Ibn al-
Wazīr applies the comparison to the interpretation of what God says about Himself in
revelation; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 89.
118 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 86; cf. ibid., 81, 91–94.

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There are two issues: [Naẓar] upon the creatures [that are] of miracu-
lous making and brilliant wisdom in the towering heavens and hills and
valleys of the earth, the masterfully made animals with their tools and
instruments, like the instruments for seeing, smelling (…). When you con-
template these things, you know by necessity just after contemplation
that they have a knowing, wise, able creator. (…) The second issue where
naẓar leads to knowledge are the stories of the prophets and their circum-
stances (aḥwāluhum).119

Later in his Tarjīḥ, Ibn al-Wazīr gives the concept of this proof its common
name:

This is called the method of the states (tarīqat al-aḥwāl). It is the most
familiar and most beneficial for most common people, women and the
uneducated from among the Bedouins and slaves, because it causes them
to arrive at the knowledge of God directly.120

The miracles of the prophets, and indeed the existence of the Quran, are con-
sidered in much the same way: the wondrous character of prophetic miracles
and the Quran and the necessary knowledge of every compos mentis that he
is incapable of producing anything similar are proof of the miracle’s divine
nature.121

This knowledge [of the miraculous nature of the Quran] occurs by way
of knowing our own incapability of [producing] it, not by way of know-
ing the real essence of the speech (kalām). If we knew the true essence
of the speech and we were not incapable of [producing] something like
the Quran, it [the Quran] would not be miraculous. And if we were inca-
pable of it and did not know it, it would be miraculous. Consequently, the
issue is the incapability (ʿajz) rather than the knowledge of the essence
of that of which one is incapable (al-maʿjūz ʿanhu). We know by neces-
sity of our incapability of [producing] some characteristics of sounds and
their states. So we know of our incapability to produce a sound like thun-
der. And we know that our knowledge of our incapability of it does not

119 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 67.

120 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 109.
121 Ibid., 75, 81, 92–93. The acknowledgement of the reality of miracles was another point
that caused Bahshami scholars to criticize Abū l-Ḥusayn; cf. Madelung (ed., intr.), Kitāb
al-Muʿtamad, 11.

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depend on our knowledge of the essence of the sound and its techni-
cal definition after we know the sound in a general manner (ʿalā sabīl
al-jumla). Likewise, we know the attributes of God the Exalted after we
know His essence in a general manner. People at the time of the prophet
knew of the inimitability. Yet, they did not penetrate into it. This is a mat-
ter that is not grasped by the original human disposition. (…) You, may
God support you, know and I know that before we learned of what the
theologians say about the speech and the akwān, we did not know these
things by our fiṭra. The ordering that leads to the knowledge of evidence
and definitions did not occur to us. Whoever denies that does not deserve
to be heeded.122

In short, Ibn al-Wazīr’s proof of God’s existence incorporates the dalīl al-aḥwāl
as well as the argument from the design of the world or the teleological argu-
ment. The argument from design predicates the necessary knowledge of a wise
creator due to the wonderful and perfect composition (tarkīb) of the world.123 A
decisive characteristic of all the indicators and proofs for the knowledge of God
endorsed by Ibn al-Wazīr is that they are grasped by every human being’s origi-
nal disposition immediately. This puts them in sharp contrast to arguments like
the akwān-proof, which asserts that knowledge must be acquired by means of
complicated inferences.
Equally true to type, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to earlier Muʿtazili as well as Zaydi
authorities as having argued for the existence of God from the design of cre-
ation and the contemplation of same. According to Madelung as well as Abra-
hamov, the Zaydi imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/860) used the
argument from design along with proofs more reminiscent of Muʿtazili reason-
ing.124 In his Tarjīḥ, Ibn al-Wazīr at one point provides a short summary of the

122 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 92–93.

123 For the argument from design, see Abrahamov, al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm on the Proof ; Abra-
hamov, al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm’s Argument from Design 259–284.
124 Al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm’s Kitāb al-Dalīl al-kabīr focuses more on the argument from design,
whereas the following Kitāb al-Dalīl al-saghīr introduces arguments that involve philo-
sophical speculation; cf. Abrahamov, al-Qasim b. Ibrahim on the Proof 8. Abrahamov and
Madelung disagree concerning the influence of Muʿtazili doctrine on al-Qāsim’s argument
from design. According to Abrahamov, the argument from design was used by Muʿtazilis
contemporary to al-Qāsim and passed on to the Zaydiyya. Madelung doubts the connec-
tion between al-Qāsim’s argument from design and the Muʿtazila, apart from al-Jāḥiẓ. The
connection between the argument from design and al-Jāḥiẓ is apparently neither new nor
far-fetched. The difference between al-Jāḥiẓ’s argument and that of al-Qāsim, and Ibn al-
Wazīr for that matter, is that the former seems to be inspired by Christian authors while

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Bahshami reasoning from Ibn Mattawayh’s Tadhkira fī aḥkām jawāhir wa-aʿrāḍ.

However, he attempts to illustrate that this position belongs to the irregulari-
ties (shudhūdh) even among the kalām theologians by mentioning a number
of scholars who argued for God’s existence by proofs other than the dalīl al-
akwān.125 Most frequently, he refers to Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) in his
commentary on the Nahj al-balāgha, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1045), Rukn
al-Dīn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), Shaykh Mukhtār al-Muʿtazilī (d. 658/1260),
Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī (d. late 6th/12th or early 7th/13th c.)126 and the Zaydi imam
al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza (d. 749/1346).
The claim that the Bahshami argument is, by and large, merely an irregular-
ity would be hard to sustain. Yet the fact that all of the above-mentioned schol-
ars are associated with the Muʿtazili school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī127 implies
that Ibn al-Wazīr’s attempt, at least in relation to this question, can be seen
as evidence that the struggle between the Ḥusayniyya and the Bahshamiyya

the latter two draw the argument directly from the Quran; cf. Abrahamov, al-Qāsim b.
Ibrahim on the Proof 2–4; Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim 106 and above.
125 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 79.
126 Little is known of Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī or al-ʿAjālī, elsewhere endowed with the nisba al-
Najrānī, other than that he was a Sunni representative of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn who
studied with Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Ibn al-Wazīr quotes extensively from his Kitāb al-Kāmil fī l-
istiqṣāʾ fīmā balaghanā min kalām al-qudamāʾ on the very topic of the advantages of the
dalīl al-aḥwāl as against the dalīl al-akwān. Although deficient according to Madelung, an
edition of the extant parts of Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī’s al-Kāmil was prepared by Muḥammad
al-Shāhid, Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf 1999; cf. Madelung (ed., intr.), Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 6–7;
Madelung, Elsayed Elshahed: Das Problem der transzendenten sinnlichen Wahrnehmung
(review) 129. The editor of al-Kāmil, al-Shahid, identifies al-ʿUjālī with Shaykh Mukhtār
based on the alleged identity of al-Kāmil and al-Mujtabā which Ibn al-Wazīr often refers to.
He challenges Madelung’s placement of the two scholars, arguing mainly that Madelung
wrongly identifies Shaykh Mukhtār with the author of a book called al-Mujtabā on legal
methodology (not kalām) extant in a library in Cairo; cf. al-Shāhid (ed.), al-Kāmil 13–20;
Ansari argues for Madelung’s distinction from the content of an extant copy of al-Kāmil.
To my mind, Madelung’s and Ansari’s conclusion is much more likely than al-Shāhid’s. It
is supported by the fact that Ibn al-Wazīr quotes both scholars on various separate occa-
sions, in the same context and even in the same sentence; cf. for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-
ʿAwāṣim v, 60; Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīh 99–101. For the connection between Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī
and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, see also Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 214; Schwarb, In
the Age of Averroes 261. Schmidtke is preparing an article on Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī’s reception
of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī; cf. Schmidtke, The Sunni transmission of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s
theological thought, (forthcoming).
127 According to Madelung, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd “stood close to the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-
Baṣrī;” Madelung, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Abū l-Ḥadīd. Shaykh Mukhtār and Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī
both refer to Ibn al-Malāḥimī and Abū l-Ḥusayn as their teachers (shuyūkh). This term
does not imply an immediate teacher-pupil relationship. See also Madelung (ed., intr.),
Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 6–7. For Yaḥya b. Ḥamza, see also footnotes 128, 155 and 171 below.

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within the Yemeni Zaydiyya was still ongoing in the 9th/15th century.128 And
indeed, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s proof of the existence of God has a characteristic of
central import in Ibn al-Wazīr’s entire thought, namely that God is known by
necessity. In no other instance does Ibn al-Wazīr express his support of Abū l-
Ḥusayn’s thought as emphatically as in this question, calling the line of arguing
with the dalīl al-aḥwāl “the Sunna of the prophets, the predecessors and righ-
teous forefathers.”129 But Ibn al-Wazīr, unlike Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī according
to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, does not allow naẓar in its prevalent speculative function
a role in the acquisition of certain knowledge at any point of the religious
endeavor. On this point, only Shaykh Mukhtār of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school seems
to agree with Ibn al-Wazīr. Although Ibn al-Malāḥimī affirms that knowledge
of the existence of a creator is necessary, he spends considerable effort to prove
that philosophical speculation does lead to certain knowledge, and is the first
duty of every believer once he reaches adulthood. He insists repeatedly that
the ordering of the premises according to reason (tartīb al-muqaddimāt) is the
essential characteristic of proper naẓar.130 Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s argument is sim-
ilar to the views expressed by Ibn al-Murtaḍā in Riyāḍat al-afhām.131 This was
the very feature of the speculative version of naẓar that Ibn al-Wazīr rejected
so vehemently.
The main difference between Ibn al-Wazīr’s employment of the proof and
that of Ibn al-Malāḥimī is grounded in the initial point of naẓar. For Ibn al-
Malāḥimī, the initial point for the performance of naẓar is not the general
proof of the existence of a creator, as it is in Bahshami’s, and indeed in Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s, thought. Rather, it is the particular knowledge of the Creator him-
self (bi-l-taʿyīn), namely that the Creator is one of unicity and wisdom along
with His other attributes (ṣifāt).132 According to him, a human being knows by
necessity of the existence of a creator. But naẓar is needed to acquire a detailed
knowledge of who the Creator is. For Ibn al-Wazīr, the knowledge of the essence
and the attributes of God, like His wisdom, His power or His knowledge, is part

128 For this struggle, see for example Ansari, Maḥmūd al-Malāḥimī al-Muʿtazilī fī l-Yaman. The
competition between the two schools is documented until the 8th/14th century. Accord-
ing to Ansari in this blog entry, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s thought became more accepted among
the Yemeni Zaydiyya through the efforts of Imam al-Muʿayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza
(d. 747/1346). See also Madelung (ed., intr.), Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 8.
129 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 85.
130 Cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitab al-Muʿtamad 27, where he clearly presents this as Abū l-Ḥu-
sayn’s definition of naẓar.
131 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 139–140.
132 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 175–181, 252–253; Thiele, Jewish and Muslim Recep-
tion 111.

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of the necessary knowledge occurring along with the knowledge of God’s exis-
tence, albeit in a general manner (mujmalan). It is impossible to arrive at a
detailed knowledge of God’s essence and attributes133 and no further specula-
tion is needed.134 We conclude that Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of knowing God was
informed by the proof of God’s existence employed by Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school—
but only to a certain degree.
As a consequence, the relationship between the proof of God’s existence
and the insistence on necessary knowledge in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought becomes
more evident if we consider early Muʿtazilis who also argued for the existence
of the Creator from the design of the world.135 Al-Jāḥiẓ and his ahl al-maʿārif
are a prominent example.136 They negated the distinction between necessary
and acquired knowledge, insisting, like Ibn al-Wazīr, that all true knowledge
must occur by necessity.137 According to them, philosophical speculation does
not lead to certain knowledge because the mental activity of human beings is
influenced by a variety of matters, among them the ego. People therefore arrive
at a variety of conclusions. The results are a matter of chance rather than cer-
tain knowledge. In short, there are limits to the human ability to think. True
knowledge must always be a gift from God and cannot be a result of an active
performance of human reason.138
It is questionable whether Ibn al-Wazīr would have agreed with callingthe
result of mental activity mere chance. The line of argument just described,
however, corresponds to the connection Ibn al-Wazīr first draws in Tarjīḥ be-
tween necessary knowledge, the original human disposition, and the proof of
God’s existence along with His wisdom: The knowledge of God’s existence must
be absolutely certain. It must be necessary knowledge inviolable by an initial
absence of knowledge, doubt or possible error in the process of proving it. This
necessary knowledge is attainable by all, because all possess the fiṭra bestowed
by God. The necessary knowledge that a Creator exists is effected by a tawātur
of meaning from the observation of the design of creation, and later on, from

133 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 178.

134 See also Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 49–50.
135 Van Ess, Early Theologians 64–81.
136 Ibn al-Wazīr often refers to them in this context. On al-Jāḥiẓ’s argument from design see
also Abrahamov, al-Qasim b. Ibrahim, 2–3; Gibb, Argument from Design 150–162; van Ess,
Early Theologians 69–71. An example of al-Jāḥiẓ’s way of arguing for the existence of the
Creator God is based on pondering the wise way in which man was made, cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, al-
ʿIbar wa-l-iʿtibār 78–79.
137 Cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt fī l-maʿrifa 33–47.
138 For a survey of early Muʿtazili scholars who objected to the proof of God’s existence based
on philosophical speculation, see Joseph van Ess, Early Theologians 64–81.

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the miracles and circumstances of the prophets as well as revelation. For Ibn
al-Wazīr, the original human disposition is a crucial source of, as well as an
instrument in, true, certain and general knowledge in the sense of a recipient.
The knowledge is necessary and therefore bestowed by God. Human reason or
intellect, even if identified with fiṭra, is no reliable deliberate producer of cer-
tain knowledge by its performance of naẓar in the sense of the theologians.
In conclusion, the difference to Muʿtazili doctrine represented by Ibn al-
Murtaḍā consists in the restrictions placed on deliberate and independent
human access to certain knowledge. Necessary knowledge is bestowed by God,
be it by intuition, from sense perception or from the pondering of surround-
ing phenomena and reports, strengthened by contextual evidence. The same is
true for revelation. That is why Ibn al-Wazīr could refute the speculative theolo-
gians’ argument that they need to engage in speculation in order to refute unbe-
lievers and heretics. The latter would not attain more proof from argumenta-
tion and debate than was already available to them in creation. This poses the
question as to whether Ibn al-Wazīr thought, like al-Jāḥiẓ and others, that those
in whom no necessary knowledge of the creator occurred would be exempt
from taklīf.139 The answer is no. But this answer is not based on reason. It
was the distinction between necessary and acquired knowledge that provided
a rational explanation for punishment of ignorance or denial of Islamic doc-
trine.140 For Ibn al-Wazīr, the punishment of unbelievers is rather one of those
cases where revelation supplied the details of what the intellect only knew in
a general manner.141 It illustrates Ibn al-Wazīr’s recurring insistence that only
revelation can determine the particularities of what is naturally known only
in a general form—precisely what naẓar is supposed to achieve, according to

139 The Muʿtazili court theologian of Caliph al-Maʾmūn, Thumāma b. al-Ashras (d. 213/828),
for example, is thought to have stated that only those who are compelled to the knowledge
of God, His messenger and the Quran can be obliged with taklīf. Thumāma is counted
among the ahl al-maʿārif for whom only necessary knowledge is true knowledge; cf. van
Ess, Early Theologians 72. The quote that leads to the conclusion about al-Jāḥiẓ’s under-
standing of the limitations of human beings’ mental abilities is taken from an epistle that
cannot be ascribed to al-Jāḥiẓ with certainty. However, the reading of al-ʿIbār wa-l-iʿtibār
or al-Jāḥiẓ’s letters suggests that this idea was at least shared by him. For example, in the
thirteenth epistle of his letters, he argues that if two people practiced proper naẓar, yet
one is right and the other one wrong, both will be equally convinced that they are cor-
rect. Furthermore, people who come to supposedly certain conclusions later change their
minds. Even more clearly, al-Jāḥiẓ writes that reason may be overpowered by nature and
become weak in its reasoning; cf. al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ, 39–43. The treatise ascribed to
al-Jāḥiẓ is called Kitab al-Dalīl wa-l-iʿtibār; cf. van Ess, Early Theologians 65.
140 Cf. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre 16–17.
141 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 44.

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speculative theologians. For Ibn al-Wazīr, only revelation determines, for exam-
ple, to whom the term ‘unbeliever’ applies in particular. Only what is explicitly
mentioned as unbelief in revelation can be excluded or condemned. Knowl-
edge of God’s existence is necessary yet general. All Muslims agree on it and
have access to it. It is not, and indeed cannot be, proved by the practice of infer-
ence according to a particular ordering of premises, which would render only
those few who perform it properly within the realm of what is true.
The connection between necessary knowledge occurring in the original dis-
position of all human beings as the only true knowledge, on the one hand, and
proving God’s existence from the design of the world and human beings’ self
and surroundings, on the other hand, is obvious. What is important is the fact
that, once again, Ibn al-Wazīr restricts the matter that can be known with cer-
tainty to a minimum and removed it to a place beyond direct human influence.
All true knowledge is directly bestowed by God. Similar to Ibn Taymiyya and
Ibn Qayyim, Ibn al-Wazīr allows for the possibility that other kinds of knowl-
edge may be granted by God, too. Yet, such “special knowledge” is not merited
by an act of speculation nor is there any certain way of attaining it.142 Thus,
Ibn al-Wazīr extended what can be known with certainty to the whole Muslim
community and took away the grounds for mutual condemnation or charge of
unbelief.

4 The Argument from the Absence of Evidence (dalālat nafy

al-dalāla)

The so-called “argument from the absence of evidence” has been formulated
and applied by Muslim theologians in several versions.143 In Ibn al-Wazīr’s writ-
ings, it permeates several debates in theology as well as legal methodology.
The attitude taken towards it illustrates epistemological differences as to the

142 On Ibn Taymiyya’s and Ibn Qayyim’s concept of special knowledge granted by God, see
Schallenbergh, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s Manipulation 102. Some Ashʿaris, like ʿAbd al-
Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) and al-Baqillānī (d. 403/1013), likewise assert that sec-
ondary or speculative knowledge may be transferred to necessary knowledge through an
act of God without merit; cf. Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 22.
143 Phrases that were used to describe the same principle are “al-istidlāl bi-l-ʿadam,” “mā lam
yaqum al-dalīl ʿalā thubūtihi yajib nafyuhu” and “mā lā ṭarīq ilayhi fa-wājib nafyuhu.” See
for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 29; Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 322, Abū l-Ḥusayn
al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla 13. See also Thiele, Jewish and Muslim Reception 111–113. For an
overview of the different corollaries of the argument along with the respective counter-
arguments, see Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 192–200.

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degree of certainty a human being can expect or can be obliged to attain at a

fundamental level. Furthermore, the argument is of interest for Ibn al-Wazīr’s
broader intellectual context. Like in the example of the definition of naẓar or
the proof of the existence of God, the attitude taken towards this argument
illustrates the influence of two different Muʿtazili schools in the Zaydiyya of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s time. Lastly, the argument from the absence of evidence has received
hitherto little attention in spite of its significance for research on epistemol-
ogy.144
Essentially, the argument purports that whenever the existence of an entity
or state of affairs is not evidenced either by necessity or comprehensive naẓar,
the entity or state of affairs must be negated, lest necessary as well as acquired
knowledge be invalidated. Elaborately, it is argued that firstly, necessary knowl-
edge would be invalidated because not negating what human beings have no
way (ṭarīq) of perceiving would lead to the possibility of imperceptible exis-
tences that human beings have no way of knowing. Human beings could no
longer trust their senses. Secondly, acquired knowledge would be invalidated
because not negating what human beings have no way (ṭarīq) of procuring evi-
dence for would lead to the possibility of undiscernible errors in the premises
(muqaddimāt) of evidence. Human beings could no longer trust their naẓar.145
As a consequence of negating what cannot be proven, certainty exists about
the non-existence of the entity or state of affairs. In contrast, those negating
this principle basically hold that the non-existence of decisive evidence for a
particular entity or state of affairs must result in a statement about its possible
existence (tajwīz). Apodictic judgement is deferred (tawaqquf ).146 Whereas the
first conclusion signifies an epistemic value of certainty, the second signifies
probability.
Considering the importance that probability and ambiguity have in Ibn al-
Wazīr’s thought, it would be reasonable to expect Ibn al-Wazīr to be an oppo-
nent of this argument. While Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponents did not explicitly reason
with the argument from the absence of evidence in all of the following ques-
tions, the epistemological implications of the argument are of such a funda-
mental nature that the attitude taken towards it can be perceived throughout
an individual’s thought. Accordingly, Shihadeh’s conclusion from his discus-

144 Exceptions to this lack of attention are Shihadeh’s article “Argument from Ignorance” and
van Ess’s monograph on al-Ijī’s epistemology, where it is referred to as “argumentum e
silentio;” cf. Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance; van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 376–380.
145 Cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimi, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 282–285; Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 324–325.
146 Cf. ibid, 323.

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sion of the Muʿtazili defenses of the argument can be confirmed, namely that
“school members were motivated in their espousal of the argument from igno-
rance by a complex combination of commitments of theirs—ontological, epis-
temological, soteriological, theodicean and dialectical (…). Chief among these
is arguably the notion that humans are under obligation to arrive at perfect
knowledge of God (…).”147 This confirmation is based on the claim that the
counterposition is of a similarly essential character in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought.
Shihadeh shows how the attitude towards what he calls “argument from
ignorance” shifted in the Ashʿariyya. Al-Juwaynī and after him—and more
comprehensively—Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī refuted different corollaries of the ar-
gument, not only as propounded by the Bahshami school of the Muʿtazila or
Ibn al-Malāḥimī,148 but also those versions of the argument brought forth by
their own predecessors from among the Ashʿariyya.149
As far as the Muʿtazila are concerned, Shihadeh assumes Ibn al-Malāḥimī to
be the last to defend the argument comprehensively, although Ibn al-Malāḥimī
challenges the Bahshami way of reasoning for the argument. It is difficult to
determine whether Ibn al-Malāḥimī expressed his own positions or those of his
predecessor.150 What remains of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla shows that
he endorsed the argument. Yet, he substantiated it only in the passing, as it was
not his major concern in the extant fragments. Significantly, he explicitly dis-
tinguishes between non-existence of proof (lā ṭarīq ilayhi) and failing to find
proof ( faqd al-dalāla).151 Shihadeh shows how Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, from whom
both Ibn al-Wazīr and Shaykh Mukhtār quote extensively, already deviated
from the support of the argument so thoroughly treated by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.
Although Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī did not mention Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his refuta-
tion and referred to the Bahshamiyya exclusively, he discussed and rebutted
the very argument Ibn al-Malāḥimī demonstrated so elaborately and endorsed
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s counter-argument instead.152

147 Ibid., 191.

148 Cf. ibid., 183–191.
149 This refers especially to al-Baqillānī; cf. Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 192.
150 In the defenses of Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s predecessors, the argument is employed to defend
the epistemological foundations of their own school. However, a thorough defense of the
argument would have to show that its rejection results in the abolition of the very grounds
of necessary as well as acquired knowledge for all of Islam and indeed mankind; cf. ibid.,
185; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 278–287.
151 Cf. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla 13–15.
152 Ibid., 214–217; cf. Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 322–334. See also Madelung’s review of
Elshahed’s Das Problem der transzendenten sinnlichen Wahrnehmung 129.

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In al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr’s quote from Shaykh Mukhtār’s al-Mujtabā is

among the first the former refers to in support of his own position.153 Another
rebuttal of the argument originates from the Zaydi imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza,
whom Ibn al-Wazīr cites along with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his presentation
and ensuing refutation of the argument.154 In Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s Kitāb al-
Tamhīd a whole section is devoted to the exposition of five “corrupt methods
used by kalām theologians” (masālik al-mutakallimīn al-fāsida), resembling the
“four weak methods and two wrong principles” ascribed to the kalām theolo-
gians by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.155 The argument from the absence of evidence
per se (mā lā dalīl ʿalayhi wajaba nafyuhu) and one of its corollaries figure
prominently among them. According to Shihadeh, no serious defense of the
argument could be brought forward after Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s refutation.156
Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s statements confirm the great influence of al-Rāzī’s rea-
soning on this particular point beyond the Ashʿariyya. Yet, one century after
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, at the time and in the context of Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza,
there still seems to have been the need to refute the argument in a place where
Muʿtazilism, and especially its Bahshami variety, was still influential when it
had ceased to be so elsewhere.

4.1 Absence of Evidence as an Argument for Certainty

In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s shorter theological writings Kitāb al-Qalāʾid and Riyāḍat
al-afhām, he does not defend the argument from the absence of evidence
explicitly. However, we learn that the argument was present and applicable in
his thought from his own commentary on Kitāb al-Qalāʾid, namely al-Durar
al-farāʾid. For example, the following proof of the limitlessness of divine pow-
erfulness (qādiriyya) is ascribed to him:

The powerfulness of the Exalted is all-transcending, there is no way of

proving (ithbāt) [the existence of] its restriction (ḥāṣir) to a certain kind

153 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 30.

154 Ibid., v, 30. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, a certain al-Buḥturī (d. unknown) ascribes the rejec-
tion of the argument from ignorance to Imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 264/860), grandfa-
ther of the founder of the Yemeni imamate al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq (d. 298/911).
155 Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, Kitāb al-Tamhīd i, 32–41. Interestingly, Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza does not identify
what is called the “argument from impediments” (dalīl al-mawāniʿ) with the argument
from the absence of evidence. Whereas he rejects the latter in its most general form as
one of five invalid methods of reasoning, the former figures among the accepted argu-
ments against the visibility of God; cf. ibid., 286–293. For al-Rāzī’s refutation of the four
methods and two principles, see Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 207.
156 Ibid., 217.

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or number, in contradistinction to our power. The evidence that will fol-

low, God willing, leads us to the limitation of what it [our power] is capa-
ble of. If then the transcendence of the Powerfulness of the Eternal One
is proved as well as the non-existence of a way to prove a restriction, the
restriction must be negated.157

The line of reasoning features typical points of the argument, like the reference
to the invalidation of knowledge if one allowed the existence of the unprovable.
Where the visibility of God is concerned, Ibn al-Murtaḍā argues against it
with the “argument from impediments” (dalīl al-mawāniʿ), clearly based on
what Shihadeh calls “the classical-kalām argument from ignorance.”158 A sum-
mary of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s argument runs as follows:

There is no evidence for God’s visibility at a given point (God is not seen).
There are eight impediments that could hinder the perception of God at
any time. None of these impediments applies at that given point in time.
Hence the possibility of seeing God must be negated for that moment.
There is no difference between that and other moments. Hence, the pos-
sibility of seeing God must be negated for all times.159

Ibn al-Murtaḍā clearly argues from a position that expects that certain knowl-
edge of the existence of a fact or entity must be attainable by either perception
or rational evidence. However, as we know from the discussion of naẓar, the
validity of evidence depends on a particular order of premises and inferences.
If this knowledge is not thus attainable, a different certain knowledge of some-
thing else is concluded, namely of non-existence. Ibn al-Murtaḍā is therefore
clearly in line with the teaching of the Bahshami school that expects to arrive
at a certain result susceptible of proof.

4.2 Absence of Evidence as an Argument for Ambiguity

Beyond the different versions of the argument, its significance is manifest in
the large number of questions in which it is employed. We came across Ibn
al-Wazīr’s challenges towards different corollaries of the argument in several
instances: Firstly, the Muʿtazila apparently invoked the principle on many occa-
sions. Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī provides a list of issues where the Bahshami Muʿtazila

157 Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 22b.

158 Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 179. For Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s argument from impedi-
ments, cf. ibid., 189.
159 Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 39b–43a.

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apparently argues based on the absence of evidence.160 Abū l-Ḥusayn and Ibn
al-Malāḥimī remarked that they themselves also use the argument in many
places.161 And we know that Ibn al-Wazīr responded to many issues that were
prevalent in Zaydi doctrine as a result of the influence of the Muʿtazila.
Secondly, the suggestion is based on Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning itself. In Tar-
jīḥ, the argument from the absence of evidence is mentioned only briefly, yet
at the fundamental level of the definition of knowledge. Ibn al-Wazīr chal-
lenges whether a conclusion be called knowledge if it is based on the absence
of evidence (ʿadam wujūd dalīl ʿalā dhālika illā ʿadam al-wijdān) as it is always
possible that evidence be found later.162 The argument receives the longest and
most explicit attention in the fifth volume of al-ʿAwāṣim, where Ibn al-Wazīr
responds to his opponent’s charge that the supporters of the bi-lā kayf notion
teach anthropomorphism (tajsīm).163 The refutation of the claim that human
beings will be able to see God without asking for the details of this visibility
(bi-lā kayf ) is a typical instance of the deployment of the argument from the
absence of evidence, as the argument is often deployed in connection with
God’s unicity and His attributes.164 In this particular case, the opponent’s argu-
ment claims that, because there is no valid way of proving a difference between
bodies (ajsām), the difference must be negated. If God were visible and hence
found in a place, He would have to have a body like human beings. A corol-
lary of the argument that constitutes the second pillar of the reasoning says
that likeness in one aspect necessitates likeness in all resulting aspects.165 In
this case, that would mean that likeness of the divine and the human in their
substantial nature ( jismiyya) necessitates likeness in all bodily characteristics,
allegedly amounting to reprehensible anthropomorphism.166
In his defense of the bi-lā kayf position concerning the “vision of God” in al-
ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr explicitly and extensively disputes the argument, draw-
ing largely on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s as well as Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s refuta-

160 Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 322–323.

161 Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 176, 184; referring the reader to Abū l-Ḥusayn, Tasaf-
fuḥ al-adilla 13.
162 Ibn al-Wazīr, Tarjīḥ 98.
163 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 27–66.
164 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 22b, 39b–42a; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-
Muʿtamad 278–296; Ibn al-Wazīr mentions the Muʿtazila in general and Ibn Mattawayh’s
Tadhkira in particular; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 29–39. See also Shihadeh, Argument
from Ignorance; Thiele, Jewish and Muslim Reception 111–113.
165 Cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 36–37.
166 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 28–29.

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tions.167 Ibn al-Wazīr describes his opponent as holding that “whatever cannot
be affirmed must be negated” (mā lā dalīl ʿalayhi yajib nafyuhu). He seeks to
invalidate their line of argument and, like the two aforementioned scholars,
only considers the positive existence of evidence as proof for a statement on
the existence or non-existence of an entity or state of affairs:

It is agreed upon that the substances are at variance with each other in
their essence. And it is agreed upon that their likeness (tamāthul) is not
known by necessary knowledge. Whoever wants to argue that it is, needs
sound apodictic evidence. But they [those who claim the likeness] did
not bring forward anything like that. Shaykh Ibn Mattawayh responded
with the famous doctrine that is invalid according to the critics. It [the
doctrine] says that ‘whatever cannot be affirmed by evidence must be
negated.’ This is refuted by [the statement] that there is no evidence that
the Eternal (qadīm) [existed] in eternity ( fī l-azal), in spite of the neces-
sity that He was there at that time. Accordingly, they would have to negate
that He was there at that time, and [it is refuted] because it is not more
likely than [saying] that whatever cannot be negated must be affirmed.168

Admittedly, it would be a grave misrepresentation of Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponents

if he left it with the mere allegation that they negate anything for which they
happen not to have evidence. However, in what follows, Ibn al-Wazīr, heavily
quoting from Yaḥyā b. Hamza and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī, reacts to the reason-
ing that not applying the argument from the absence of evidence leads to an
invalidation of necessary as well as acquired knowledge. According to the two
scholars’ line of argument, necessary knowledge is not invalidated, because the
connection of dependence between the presence of imperceptible things on
the one hand and the argument from the absence of evidence on the other
is denied.169 Likewise, acquired knowledge is not invalidated as long as only
positive premises based on necessary knowledge are accepted, as is the case
according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī and Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza.170

167 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 30. This confirms Shihadeh’s claim of the great influence of
al-Rāzī’s Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl beyond Ashʿarism; cf. Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 206.
168 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 29–30. The challenge to the argument from the absence of evi-
dence which Ibn al-Wazīr deploys here has been responded to by Ibn al-Malāḥimī; cf.
Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 188.
169 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 34; cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 33–34.
170 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 34–35; cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 34.

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What is at issue here again are the means of possessing knowledge and
the interdependence of human knowledge and truth. Whereas the opponents
argue that valid evidence would have to be found by human reason if it existed,
Ibn al-Wazīr is weary of restricting valid evidence to the products of established
ways of rational inferences.

They say that there is no proof for it [an entity], and whatever cannot
be proved by an evidence has to be negated. Concerning the explanation
for the absence of evidence, they argue for it by rendering the proofs of
those who argue for the existence of the entity (al-shayʾ) and then explain
their invalidity and weakness. They base the cogency [of evidence] on
the restriction [ḥaṣr] on certain types of proofs, and then merely explain
their nonexistence by the fact that they have not found them. (…) I say:
They have no evidence that all proofs must be accounted for by the
method of restriction and investigation apart from not finding [what is
not accounted for].171

To him, it is conceivable that evidence as yet unavailable be found at a later

time or by someone else. Accordingly, no certain statement can be made as
long as no positive evidence exists for the presence or absence of an entity or
state of affairs. Ibn al-Wazīr clearly takes the position that absence of evidence
leads to conjectural statements or deferment of judgement:

The non-existence of that which necessitates certain affirmation does

not necessitate certain negation because a third category is possible.
This is that no certain resolution is taken at all, rather the judgement is
deferred.172

It is evident that Ibn al-Wazīr once again opts for ambiguity in the form of a
statement of probability rather than claiming certainty based on logical infer-
ences.

171 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 31. Ibn al-Wazīr probably refers to a corollary of the argument
from the absence of evidence used to establish the ratio legis (ʿilla) of the original case
in an analogy called investigation and disjunction (al-sabr wa-l-taqsīm): A restricted yet
supposedly comprehensive number of possible solutions (inḥiṣār) is discussed; then each
of them is refuted until only one remains to be affirmed; cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i,
35; cf. Shihadeh, Argument from Ignorance 192–193.
172 Ibid., v, 37.

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Where the divine names are concerned, Ibn al-Wazīr argues that both the
Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya negate particular names of God in their literal
sense. Instead, they find interpretations (taʾwīl) for the very reason that they
cannot find or agree with evidence that affirms the literal meaning of those
names.173 An example of this would be the above-mentioned rejection of God’s
purposeful wisdom by the Ashʿariyya, who interpret the divine name of al-
ḥakīm as the masterful maker (al-muḥkim li-maṣnūʿātihi) instead. They do not
acknowledge the existence of evidence for the literal meaning of al-ḥakīm as
the “wisely purposeful” (lahū fī dhālika l-iḥkām ḥikma).

We have to have faith in them [God’s names] and firmly believe that they
have a meaning that is appropriate to the glory of God, along with our
strong conviction that there is none like God, and that He is beyond being
subject to anthropomorphism in His entire word. (…) The rational rea-
soning [behind the opposing view] is that the interpreter is certain that
his interpretation of what God intended is true, to the exclusion of any
other interpretation. This is erroneous because there is no evidence that
no other interpretation might possibly conform to what God intended.
At the most, it [the other interpretation] might be a search that does not
find. However, not finding the object of the search does not mean that the
object itself does not exist. How many scholars provide an interpretation
and are then succeeded by others who offer a better interpretation with-
out claiming that their interpretation is equal to what God intended for
certain.174

In addition, in this context there is the all-pervading concept of divine wis-

dom to consider. A premise of the argument from the absence of evidence
implies that a thing must be proved and known for what it is in itself (maʿlūm
fī nafsihi).175 When talking about the wise purposes of the Divine, Ibn al-Wazīr
categorically refers to human beings’ limitations on knowing a thing for what
it really is, namely the content of the wise purpose itself. Although human
beings have general necessary knowledge of the goodness of God as well as
the moral value of types of actions (al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī), the goodness
of His particular actions and their purposes cannot always be demonstrated.
Indeed, human knowledge considers some actions that may be ascribed to God

173 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq i, 123. See also ch. 4 on Ibn al-Wazīr’s theological positions
below.
174 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim viii, 324–325.
175 Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 323.

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as reprehensible, as for example intending His servant to do something repre-

hensible. A distinction is made between the evil in itself (li-nafsihi) and that
which only appears evil (li-ghayrihi). The first kind of evil is known by neces-
sary knowledge to be evil without possibility of there being anything good in it.
In contradistinction, that which only appears evil really contains an ultimate
good. But this good is beyond human knowledge or evidence. Conjecture as to
the contained good is possible, but ultimately no certain evidence is attainable
or perceivable. In the section on divine wisdom in chapter 4, it will become
evident that the entire reasoning is built on the existence of a purpose that
cannot be made evident in detail by human perception or inference, and the
entire reasoning hinges on the very hiddenness of that purpose. This reasoning
is diametrically opposed to an argument that takes the lack of certain evidence
as grounds for necessitating negation.
As in many other cases, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Shaykh Mukhtār in support
of his concept of a divine wisdom that is built on the purposeful limitedness
of human knowledge. Ibn al-Wazīr quotes from Shaykh Mukhtār’s Kitāb al-
Mujtabā concerning God’s wisdom in intending what appears to be evil. He
first outlines the counterargument that reasons with either of two possibilities:
If God’s intention is born out of wisdom, it would either have to agree with rea-
son or go counter to reason. In the second case it would be no wisdom at all and
would have to be rejected. In case of agreement with reason, the compos men-
tis would have to comprehend it. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, Shaykh Mukhtār
replies:

We do not consent [to saying] that if it [the wise purpose] agrees with
reason we would have to comprehend it. How many things agree with
reason yet the compos mentis cannot comprehend them until they are
instructed.176

In contrast to this, we find yet another support for the initial thesis that Ibn al-
Wazīr’s thought largely relies on: the limitation of necessary knowledge and the
broad space that is left to conjecture in the correlation between the argument
from the absence of evidence and Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of divine wisdom.
What cannot be known does not need to be known. Instead of negating the
unknown, judgment should be deferred and possible further evidence awaited,
as occurred in the form of revelation and transmission (khabar), for example.177

176 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 301.

177 Ibid., v, 33.

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Negation is of course just another way of knowing, namely knowing about non-
existence. In contrast, postponing apodictic judgment is tantamount to not
knowing, hence to the acknowledgement of ambiguity.

5 Conclusion

The argument from the absence of evidence again shows that one underly-
ing principle of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking is satisfaction with ambiguity. In many
questions, the available positive evidence does not suffice to come to a neces-
sary judgment. The example of the lack of evidence for the existence of God in
eternity shows how absurd it seemed to Ibn al-Wazīr to base certain judgments
on the absence of evidence. Similarly, and in harmony with Ibn al-Wazīr’s per-
petual reference to what the common people know as a standard, he refers to
all the divine things that the common people cannot prove by evidence. Must
we conclude the non-existence of these things accordingly?178
Although Ibn al-Wazīr blatantly disregards his opponents’ line of argument
with this polemic simplification—no Muʿtazili considered a mere ignorance of
proofs tantamount to something that could not be proven—his point accords
with his own insistence on the negation of the obligation of philosophical spec-
ulation, the original human disposition as the means to attain true knowledge,
and the knowledge of God’s existence as necessary. The common epistemo-
logical feature of Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning in all of these topics is the insis-
tence that true knowledge is that which is “common necessary knowledge,”
and that all else is conjectural knowledge. Whereas the first is bestowed by God
and amounts to substantial intuitional, sensual, experiential, revelational and
tawātur evidence, the second may be constructed by conscious rational deduc-
tions and inferences, but does not amount to apodictic knowledge. As far as Ibn
al-Wazīr is concerned, no rational argument and ordering of premises amounts
to evidence that is absolutely certain. There is always an element of ambiguity
in all knowledge that is not necessary.
In contradistinction to Ibn al-Wazīr’s position, if naẓar is considered to be
the first duty as well as the means of proving God’s existence and arriving
at certain knowledge, there would of course be no lack of evidence among
the common people for the existence of the divine things. This latter train of
thought clearly represents Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking. In his al-Durar al-farāʾid,
for example, he requires detailed acquired knowledge of the divine attributes of

178 Ibid., v, 32.

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every believer, arrived at by naẓar. Accordingly, he does not need to fear that the
lack of evidence results in a negation of the attributes. He clearly supports and
employs the argument from the absence of evidence in several instances. Sim-
ilarly, he supports the division of apodictic knowledge into the necessary and
the acquired, the knowledge of God as acquired by naẓar and the human intel-
lect (ʿaql) as the means to actively generate apodictic knowledge. The degree of
certainty that can and must be attained in all of these questions is considerably
high.
With regard to the historical level, it appears likely that Shaykh Mukhtār, Taqī
l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī and Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza179 represent a development within the
school of Abū l-Ḥusayn that moves even further away from Bahshami Muʿtazil-
ism than Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī or at least Ibn al-Malāḥimi did. What is evident
in the case of the argument from the absence of evidence was already suggested
in the case of the proof of God’s existence, where Shaykh Mukhtār apparently
even went so far as to not require naẓar in the sense of philosophical spec-
ulation at all. Ibn al-Wazīr again felt much more drawn towards this current
within the Muʿtazila than towards the Bahshami variety that was supported by
many of his Zaydi contemporaries. Ibn al-Wazīr could frequently invoke these
later followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school in order to support his claim
that there had been Muʿtazilis who did not support the trends of his own time.
When refuting the argument from the absence of evidence, Ibn al-Wazīr, like
Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī before him, did not mention that Ibn al-Malāḥimī and, at
least to a degree, Abū l-Ḥusayn also deployed it.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā could very well have been the person referred to in Ibn al-
Wazīr’s Tarjīḥ, especially in light of what we know about Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s teach-
ing on the proof of God’s existence, on naẓar and the detailed knowledge he
required of every believer. On these and related issues, the influential Zaydi
scholar represented the Bahshami view that Ibn al-Wazīr contended with in
particular.
Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, whom Ibn al-Wazīr argues against in al-ʿAwāṣim, did not
explain his initial claim that provoked the extensive refutation of the argument
from the absence of evidence. However, the fact that Ibn al-Wazīr anticipated
the argument together with Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s endorsement of it renders it very

179 This is not to say that Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza agreed with Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī and Shaykh Mukhtār
in everything, nor Ibn al-Wazīr with Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamẓa, for example, sup-
ports naẓar as the first duty and the only way to know God’s attributes; cf. Yaḥya b. Ḥamza,
Kitāb al-Tamhīd i, 48–58. However, while the influence of Abū l-Ḥusayn on Yaḥya b. Ḥamza
has been mentioned, he deviates from Abū l-Ḥusayn in the present case and is more in line
with Taqī l-Dīn al-ʿUjālī, Shaykh Mukhtār and indeed Ibn al-Wazīr.

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likely that the Bahshami line of argument was still prevalent among Ibn al-
Wazīr’s Zaydi contemporaries. This supports our thesis that Ibn al-Wazīr’s epis-
temology of ambiguity distinguished him from his contemporary Zaydis, the
hallmark of whose epistemology was the attainment of certain knowledge in
more than one field or discipline. This may appear to contrast with the initial
suggestion that Ibn al-Wazīr’s theory of knowledge was his means of harmo-
nization. However, although Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding did contrast with
that of his contemporaries, the broadness of his epistemology of ambiguity
allowed him to incorporate a wide range of conflicting doctrines into the pos-
sible, including those doctrines that resulted from his opponents’ theory of
knowledge.

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 chapter 4

Central Concepts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Theological

Thought

One characteristic that runs through most of Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings is the
attempt to demonstrate that the doctrines of contending theological schools—
predominantly the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya—were essentially consistent.
The difference between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya is most pointed
in regard to divine unicity and justice.1 The most predominant and recurrent
aspects of God’s unicity and justice in Ibn al-Wazīr’s theological writings are
God’s names and attributes (asmāʾ and ṣifāt) as well as His will (irāda) and the
question of human actions (afʿāl al-ʿibād). Arguably, Ibn al-Wazīr was partic-
ularly occupied with these questions for the very reason that harmonization
was needed most here. At the outset of Ibn al-Wazīr’s harmonization of the
“controversial detailed matters” (al-masāʾil al-tafṣīliyya al-mukhtalafa fīhā) fol-
lowing the general prolegomena in Īthār al-ḥaqq, most of the topics treated are
subsumed under one of these three aspects.2
The question is how exactly Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology of ambiguity func-
tions to arrive at a general form of the central Islamic tenets ( jumal) on
which all Muslims supposedly agree, on the one hand, and tolerate ambigu-
ity in matters on which they disagree on the other. How does Ibn al-Wazīr
apply his concepts of al-ʿilm al-ḍarūrī l-ʿadī, fiṭra and naẓar to apparently con-
flicting teachings of different schools? What constitutes the central Islamic

1 The issue of divine justice has been a topic of major interest in research on Muslim theology.
A few examples are Heemskerk, Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology; Vasalou, Moral Agents
and Their Deserts; Frank, Several Fundamental Assumptions 5–18; Hourani, Divine Justice and
Human Reason 73–83. As divine justice (ʿadl) was arguably one of the first pillars of Muʿtazili
theology, the attempt to justify some of God’s actions figures prominently in the majority
of books on Muʿtazili doctrine. Although Ashʿari theology does not have as great a need to
defend God’s actions, the issue received broad attention among Ashʿaris as well. Since it has
been a major point of controversy between contending theological schools, scholars who
formulated views in contradistinction to the theological schools, like Ibn Taymiyya or Ibn
Qayyim, were much occupied with the question as well. For a discussion of the latter two’s
concept of God’s justice, see mainly the research of Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy; Hoover,
Islamic Universalism 181–209; Hoover, Justice of God 53–75; Hoover, God’s Wise Purposes 113–
134.
2 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 157, 181.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 199

tenets in their general form? And how do these epistemological concepts struc-
ture Ibn al-Wazīr’s own views?
Before we get to the how of Ibn al-Wazīr’s harmonization, a word on method-
ology is due. In research, the feasibility of the attempt to harmonize has been
discussed. Al-Ṣubḥī praises Ibn al-Wazīr’s endeavor which speaks to him of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s outstanding skill and scholarship. Yet he questions the final result
of Ibn al-Wazīr’s attempt.3 The question of whether harmonization of differ-
ing theological school doctrines is feasible depends on one’s understanding of
speculative theology (ʿilm al-kalām). We can look at this from two different per-
spectives. First, we could start from the premises of ʿilm al-kalām as an “art of
contradiction-making,” as Frank suggests (but then rejects).4 From the perspec-
tive of an “elaborate polemics of apology”5 where the content of an argument is
determined in contradistinction to the opponent’s intended concept, it would
be hard to deny that the difference between the Ashʿariyya and the Muʿtazila
goes beyond mere form and expression. However, Ḥajar is persuaded by Ibn
al-Wazīr’s argumentation and attempts to show that the two schools do not
disagree profoundly.6 If we look at Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim from different premises,
namely those that object to the necessity and usefulness of the apologetic ele-
ment of kalām as a means of grasping fundamental truths, Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim
of essential agreement no longer seems so far-fetched. Al-Ṣubḥī writes that Ibn
al-Wazīr’s uniqueness as a theologian consisted in his ability to “elevate its [ʿilm
al-kalām’s] subject matter from its disputative character unto the character of
religious knowledge.”7 Arguably, Ibn al-Wazīr would disagree with Frank who
insists that the raison d’être of kalām “is a knowing (scientia, ʿilm) based on a
genuine quest for the true, impl[ying] a love of wisdom.”8 He would likely agree
with van Ess, who claims that “nicht selten geht es weniger um die Wahrheit als
um Rechthaben, im günstigsten Fall um Überzeugen.”9 Therefore, Ibn al-Wazīr
tries to dissociate the content of the theological doctrines from their respective
polemic and apologetic elements.10

3 Al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 493.

4 Frank, The Kalām 295–309.
5 Ibid., 295.
6 Ḥajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 361. His conclusion is that much of modern scholarship
would have to be rewritten, based on the uncovering of the essential agreement between
the two groups. Although I do agree that some essential agreement can be proved, this
only applies as long as the terminology employed in kalām debates is not taken in its strict
sense.
7 Al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 499.
8 Frank, The Kalām 295.
9 Van Ess, Erkenntnislehre 20.
10 In this, Ibn al-Wazīr is much closer to the philosophers, described by Weiss as relegating

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1 God’s Wisdom (ḥikma) as the Key to Harmonization

In the classical discussions of kalām, the concept of divine wisdom did not fig-
ure prominently on its own.11 Its main significance lay in its implications for the
doctrines on divine justice and omnipotence so central in Muʿtazili and Ashʿari
theology. For Ibn al-Wazir, it occupied a key position in his theological thought:

They could not find an escape from one of the three calamities in the
[religious] sciences except through allegorical interpretation,
of the wise purpose of the Lord of creation, or His capacity to be gra-
cious, or the consignment of evildoers to eternity [in the Fire].
Better than this is withholding judgement in [the matter] because we all
are definite about the goodness of the judgment of the best Judge.
That suffices, seeing that the safety of the judicious in the face of fear [of
error] is better than the correctness that is [only] possible.12

This excerpt from Ibn al-Wazīr’s largely lost poem al-Ijādā fī l-irāda preserved in
Īthār al-ḥaqq indicates that engaging in the discussion of the classical questions
of kalām did not constitute a major interest for Ibn al-Wazīr. His own positions
on those classical questions are not given prominence and often remain vague.
In the introduction to his elaboration of divine wisdom in Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-
Wazīr refers to the results of speculation about the classical questions of kalām:

This ponderous matter [divine wisdom] is devoted to him who knows of

ʿilm al-kalām and its disagreements, which sicken his heart and inhibit

an inferior position to the art of dialectics within theology, because dialectics are more
interested in defeating an adversary than in discovering truth; cf. Weiss, Search for God’s
Law 47.
11 Similar in meaning to the concept of knowledge (ʿilm) at the beginning of Islam, ḥikma
later lagged behind ʿilm. However, among the philosophers and Ṣufīs, the concept of ḥikma
retained more prominence; cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 35; Goichon, Ḥikma.
12 For the translation of this part of Ibn al-Wazīr’s Ijāda fī l-irāda, I mostly rely on Hoover’s
translation. However, I made minor changes, as for example translating “taʾawwul” as “alle-
gorical interpretation” rather than “reinterpretation,” because the conflict was between
taking a divine name at face value on the one hand, and interpreting it allegorically on
the other hand. Furthermore, I interpreted the second part of the last line “awlā min iṣāba
jāza” as “better than correctness that is [only] possible,” rather than “better than correct-
ness of the [overly] decisive,” because of the significance of the aspect of chance in it. As
Hoover explains: “It is in fact better, Ibn al-Wazīr affirms, to exercise caution than to be
rashly and compulsively decisive and per chance get something correct.” Hoover, With-
holding judgement 235, footnote 99.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 201

him from attaining the certainty [that comes] by way of belief in the gen-
eralities (al-iʿtiqād al-jumlī). [It is also for] him in whose heart fanaticism
has taken root, so that he cannot avert it without an irrefutable argument,
or for him who has gone astray through taqlīd.13

Apparently, Ibn al-Wazīr considers the concept of God’s wisdom to be the solu-
tion to many conflicts that arise due to immersion in the subtleties of kalām.
Ḥikmat Allāh14 is a major component of all topics treated throughout Īthār
al-ḥaqq. In al-ʿAwāṣim the concept is most prevalent in the discussions of vol-
umes 5–7. As a consequence, Ibn al-Wazīr does not merely refer to God’s wis-
dom in his elaboration of other theological issues. Rather, the centrality of the
concept of God’s wisdom for Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought becomes evident in that
his own views in this regard are much more pronounced than in any other the-
ological question. He does not merely juxtapose and harmonize positions of
other scholars, but explicitly offers his own interpretation.

13 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 181.

14 In this regard, a word on translation is due. Rosenthal tells us that ḥikma became a syn-
onym of ʿilm and eventually was relegated to a lower place for most Muslims, partly
because it was associated with ḥukm as ‘worldly authority’ and lost fame as a conse-
quence.; cf. Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 38. This, however, is not the case for Ibn
al-Wazīr and scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in whose thought
divine wisdom figures prominently. I translated ḥikma as “wisdom” in its broadest sense.
Scholars such as Hoover who devoted considerable effort to the ḥikma-theories of Ibn
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, referred to ḥikma as “wise purposes;” cf. Hoover,
Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy; Hoover, God’s Wise Purposes 113–134. Others, like Ormsby in
his discussion of al-Ghazālī’s concept of theodicy, described the concept of ḥikma in
terms of causality; cf. Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought. In Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought, the
term ḥikma often appears in the sense of a “wise purpose” or a “hidden good” pointing
to purposefulness or intentionality, rather than causality. Moreover, Bell translates Ibn
Taymiyya’s concept of ḥikma as “for the sake of wisdom,” which Ibn Taymiyya apparently
used in contradistinction to the Muʿtazili understanding of ḥikma as “purpose.” Bell, Love
Theory 69. This translation likewise suits Ibn al-Wazīr’s use of the term ḥikma, because it
still bears the connotation of “knowledge” (ʿilm), which is a constituent of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
definition of wisdom and which will help us to see the link to epistemology. However, Ibn
al-Wazīr makes use of Ashʿari concepts of causality as well as of Muʿtazili concepts of pur-
posefulness in order to prove an essential agreement on the concept of God’s wisdom.
Therefore, using a variety of translations for ḥikma such as “wisdom” or “for the sake of
wisdom” as well as “wise purpose” and “hidden good” seems appropriate because it allows
for a rapprochement of contending views, which again provides the background of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s own concept.

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1.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Wisdom

Regarding divine wisdom, the Ashʿari doctrine appears to be especially in need
of rectification in the eyes of Ibn al-Wazīr, whereas the Muʿtazila is already a
strong proponent of divine purpose in all of God’s acts.15 However, they also
“exaggerate,” as we shall see in the paragraph on Ibn al-Wazīr’s development
of the concept. Al-Ṣubḥī paraphrases Ibn al-Wazīr’s view when he writes that
“the Muʿtazila went too far in [their concept of] wisdom and neglected the will,
whereas the Ashʿariyya exaggerated [the importance] of will and neglected wis-
dom.”16 Since the Muʿtazila identifies wisdom with a cause, divine wisdom in
all actions means that God is dependent on causes, a thought inconceivable
to the Ashʿariyya. The supposed exaggeration of the Muʿtazila consists in the
claim that human reason is able to know the details of divine wisdom.17 Ibn al-
Wazīr’s golden mean insists on God’s divine wisdom as the end of all his actions,
of which the human being has merely a general knowledge (ʿilm jumlī). One
line in al-ʿAwāṣim well illustrates what we will elaborate in the following: “His
[the human being’s] general knowledge of His [God’s] wisdom is sufficient.”18
Before we proceed to Ibn al-Wazīr’s unique view, common ground needs to
be established, namely a doctrine of divine wisdom in a general form that can
be agreed upon by all ( jumal). According to Ibn al-Wazīr, it is in fact common
knowledge that everything that proceeds from God does so for a reason. He
reconstructs this supposedly common knowledge in the following way: The
Ashʿariyya deny that God has a goal in (gharaḍ) or motivation for (dāʿī) His
actions. They deny ḥikma because they identify it with such a compelling goal
or motivation. The troublesome thought for them is the idea that God could be
forced to do something, if anything outside His own will had a causative effect
on His decisions. Accordingly, the limitlessness of God’s volition and power
would appear to be impaired. God would be incapacitated (taʿjīz) and imper-
fect for lack of self-sufficiency.19 In consequence, Ashʿaris often interpreted the
Qurʿānic al-ḥakīm as referring to the concept of perfection in acts (iḥkām).20

15 The Ashʿariyya is not the only theological school to deny that divine actions have causes.
Similarly, the Māturīdiyya and the Ẓāhiriyya reject the idea of the purposiveness of divine
behavior. But Ibn al-Wazīr’s discussion mainly involves Muʿtazili and Ashʿari theology. I
will therefore refer only to these two positions here.
16 Al-Ṣubḥī, al-Zaydiyya 493.
17 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 182.
18 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 122.
19 For the view of Ibn Taymiyya, who struggled with the same tension between the Ashʿari
and Muʿtazili visions of God, having a different agenda but coming to a similar conclusion,
see Hoover, Ibn Tamiyya as an Avicennan Theologian 42.
20 Cf. Bell, Love Theory 69.

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However, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, it is the very centrality of God’s volition

and power in Ashʿari doctrine which speaks of purpose. Questioning the Ashʿari
interpretation of the divine name al-ḥakīm, he writes:

Expositors of the Beautiful Names who did not understand this danger
[of denying God’s action a purpose or a motive] have construed al-ḥakīm
to mean ‘the one who acts with perfection’ (al-muḥkim) (…) What nec-
essarily follows from this is that generosity and the like does not become
God more than their opposites, and also that every object of power (kull
maqdūr) may exist as well as remain in non-existence. One possible thing
preponders only through a preponderator, and there is no preponderator
other than the motive (dāʿī). This means that the ambiguous matters do
not need an allegorical interpretation. What follows from this is that those
who deny God’s wise purposes are unable to affirm the truthfulness of the
Exalted and the truthfulness of His noble apostles, peace be upon them,
with certainty.21

And in response to the Ashʿari reasoning against God’s wisdom based on His
supposed incapacitation, Ibn al-Wazīr writes:

This [Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of wisdom] refers causes, motives and wise
purposes back to God. The creation of those created beings who are
purely good was intended for itself, not for any other meaning or sec-
ondary reason. That which is evil was intended for a good that resides in
it or that necessarily follows from it or is dependent on it. Human beings’
intellect in the state of their original disposition ( fiṭar al-ʿuqūl) agree and
the law asserts that wanting evil because it is evil is reprehensible. But
[concluding] the incapacitation of the Lord is a most preposterous error
in this. Where is the connection between the negation of the capacity and
the negation of the action? God the Exalted has demonstrated this in his
Word, {Blessed is He in whose hands is sovereignty and He is able to do
all things}. He did not say that He does all things. And we did not say that
God is unable to do the futile, trick or act unjustly. But we said that He
does not do it and we praised Him for it as He Himself does in His noble
book. If He were incapable of doing it, He would not be praiseworthy for
not doing it.22

21 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 194.

22 Ibid., 222.

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In other words, the fact that God could have acted, but did choose not to
act in a futile way is the precondition of the praiseworthiness of His action.23
This means that the two possibilities of the choice were not even. Otherwise,
it would not have been a choice at all. Unevenness implies the existence of
something that made the choosing of one side preponderant (murajjiḥ). Ibn
al-Wazīr here refers to a term coined by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and indeed by
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.24 Thus, he presumes that such a murajjiḥ is much the
same as a motive, cause or a wise purpose.25
Furthermore, the fact that God made a choice—for example, to create a
particular thing in a particular way—shows that He had an intention for his
action.26 God sent the prophets because He intended that humankind should
be shown the way. Moreover, He affirmed the truthfulness of the prophets
through miracles. The Ashʿariyya generally agree with these statements, which
is reason enough for Ibn al-Wazīr to argue that the Ashʿariyya in fact believe
that God’s actions are not futile (ʿabathan).27
Interestingly, showing that God’s action are not futile was one of the Muʿta-
zila’s major concerns in their line of argument against Ashʿari doctrine.28

23 This reasoning is again very similar to Ibn Taymiyya’s position. Ibn Taymiyya admits that
God is able to do evil. The goodness of His action depends on the fact that He did not
choose to do the evil action. Had he been unable to choose to do evil He would not have
been praiseworthy; cf. Hoover, Justice of God 72.
24 In his Maṭālib, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī explains how we know by necessary knowledge that
man makes his choice between two actions based on a preponderator (murajjiḥ); cf. al-
Rāzī, al-Maṭālib ix, 29; Abrahamov, Necessary Knowledge 28. For Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s
use of the term, see Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, Kitāb al-Tamhīd i, 123. In fact, Abū l-Ḥusayn was not
the first to formulate the thought that motives are unequally strong and that one of them
must be preponderant. But ʿAbd al-Jabbār, who discussed the thought before him, did not
allow any compelling force to the preponderant motive; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theod-
icy 142; Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 247–248.
25 However, Ibn al-Wazīr repeatedly states that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī got confused and entan-
gled himself in his concept of the preponderator, ending up confirming the Muʿtazili
position; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 7, 87, 319, 326. For the equation of motive, pre-
ponderator and wise purpose, see also Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 193. Al-Ghazālī is one
of those Ashʿaris whom Ibn al-Wazīr quotes in order to show the essential agreement. He
refers to al-Ghazālī’s concept of a motive (dāʿī). Of course it is not difficult to associate
al-Ghazālī with the doctrine of God’s wise purposes; cf. ibid., 194.
26 Obviously, Ibn al-Wazīr does not agree with the view held by some Muʿtazilis that only the
evenness of two possibilities renders a choice really free.
27 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 192. The argument that leading Ashʿaris make the confirmation
of the prophets’ truthfulness dependent on miracles was already used by Ibn Taymiyya as
an argument against the Ashʿari rejection of God’s purposeful activity; cf. Hoover, Justice
of God 64–65.
28 For the Muʿtazila, an act without purpose would be foolish and absurd, which of course

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It is noteworthy that Ibn al-Wazīr refers to a concept Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī

apparently took over from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school in order to argue for
the supposed agreement between the contending theological schools. Yet Ibn
al-Wazīr evidently ignored the contrast between the two scholars’ conclusions
from the same concepts. He did not point out that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī practi-
cally restricted the use of the term murajjiḥ to human actions and apparently
ignored its implications for his concept of the divine will. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
ascribed the origin of such a preponderator to God and used it as an argument
to prove the divine role in the occurrence of human actions. However, Abū l-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī used the term to argue for man’s role as the originator (mūjid)
of his actions as well as to describe what being willing means in the case of
God, as we shall explore further below.29 Yet, for Ibn al-Wazīr, the existence of
the concept of a preponderator or motive that causes an agent, be it God or
man, to choose one action over another was sufficient to claim essential agree-
ment on a general tenet of divine wisdom and purposefulness.30
It seems that, due to his intention to find common ground, Ibn al-Wazīr
occasionally ignored distinctions between the use of terms and the connota-
tions they carry. The term gharaḍ, for example, was rejected not only by the
Ashʿariyya but also by explicit supporters of the concept of God’s wise pur-
poses like Ibn Taymiyya, because gharaḍ connotes need.31 As another example,
Ibn al-Wazīr himself uses the distinction between motive (dāʿī) and wise pur-
pose (ḥikma) to show the superiority of divine action above human action, as I

cannot be said about God’s actions; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 99; Bell, Love
Theory 67.
29 Cf. Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 256; Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, Kitāb al-Tamhīd i, 120–123; al-Kamālī,
Imām al-Mahdī 294; Schmidtke, Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik 147.
30 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 326. The potentially connecting role of the idea of a pre-
ponderator has been pointed out already by Ḥajar. However, Ḥajar focused on the link
between the murajjiḥ and independent intellectual discernment, rather than its link to
motive, which seems to have been considered of greater importance in research; cf. Ḥajar,
Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 364. Ibn Taymiyya is only one example of those who inter-
linked the concepts of preponderator, motive and wise purpose. However, in contrast to
Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn Taymiyya does not seem to have intended to reveal an essential agree-
ment between the schools; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya as an Avicennan Theologian 42.
Another argument advanced by Ibn al-Wazīr comes from the realm of legal theory. Accord-
ing to him, the widely accepted theory of uṣūl al-fiqh as set forth by the Malikite Jamal
al-Dīn b. al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1248) builds fundamentally on the validity of causes for the
divine stipulations of religious law. In fact, all who agree on analogical reasoning (qiyās) as
a main instrument of legal interpretation would thus support the idea of purposefulness
and intentionality behind divine stipulations; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 187.
31 Bell, Love Theory 67–69.

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shall discuss below.32 This seemingly casual attitude toward details appears to
be a natural result of Ibn al-Wazīr’s agenda of focusing on and being satisfied
with “the general tenets.” If mere occupation with one another’s concepts and
adoption of key terms is argument enough for establishing common ground,
Abū l-Ḥusayn and al-Rāzī are indeed good examples for the convergence of
Muʿtazili and the Ashʿariyyi doctrine.

1.1.1 Mitigated Rational Discernment and God’s Wisdom

A related concept where Ibn al-Wazīr considers the essential agreement of the
schools to be evident is that of rational discernment of good and evil indepen-
dent of revelation (al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī). Undisputedly, many Ashʿaris
expressly reject the objectivism in the notion that human reason can discern
whether an action is good (ḥasan) or evil (qabīḥ) without prior revelation.33
This refers to God’s actions and commands in particular. According to the
Ashʿari teaching, it would be meaningless to call a divine action evil on the basis
of the human intellect, because the categories of good and evil only acquire
meaning through divine command or prohibition.34 Accordingly, they do not
apply to God and His actions and are restricted to the realm of human responsi-
bility. Further, if revelation does not give a reason why a particular divine action
or command is good or evil, no reason exists. In contrast, the Muʿtazila gen-
erally hold that good and evil are objective categories intrinsic to acts in the
human as well as in the divine realm. Sound human reason is endowed with an
immediate knowledge of these intrinsic values. It is therefore not only capable
of judging human acts independently of revelation, it can also discern whether
or not a divine act agrees with the moral principles that human beings are sub-
ject to. Accordingly, God’s imposition of obligation on His creatures (taklīf ) as
well as His own actions would always have to be comprehensible to the human
intellect.35 The Muʿtazili theory of divine justice rests to a large degree on these
objectivistic assumptions, as does the greater part of the differences between
Muʿtazili and the Ashʿari theology. Ibn al-Murtaḍā goes so far as to say that
agreement in this question would result in agreement in all other questions.36

32 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 183; see also 237 below.

33 For an account of the Ashʿari attitude toward al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ, see Reinhart, Before
Revelation 62.
34 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 69b. Ibn al-Murtaḍā discusses positions
of Ashʿari scholars in contrast to his own views as well as that of different Muʿtazili schol-
ars. I therefore used Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a source for Ashʿari views in order to augment Ibn
al-Wazīr’s depiction of Ashʿari doctrine.
35 Frank, Fundamental Assumptions 16.
36 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 66a.

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Yet Ibn al-Wazīr endeavors to show that the two schools effectively—though
not explicitly—assume the same concept concerning speech. He argues as fol-
lows: In the context in question, the theological issue of al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ
al-ʿaqlī pertains to seemingly evil or unjust divine acts that are mentioned
in the scriptural sources. Many Ashʿaris hold that God’s acts are above moral
judgement by human reason. Therefore, no one can say that God acts unjustly
in these cases. Furthermore, revelation does not usually mention the reasons
for God’s actions. Accordingly, there is no need to look for some good reason
or interpretation of the cause for such actions. However, Ibn al-Wazīr argues
that Ashʿaris along with the whole of the Muslim community do assert that
God must be taken to be truthful in His speech. A common Ashʿari expla-
nation for this assertion is that lying is an attribute of imperfection. Such
attributes of imperfection could never be ascribed to God. One can be sure,
for example, that He has not send liars as messengers. Ibn al-Wazīr affirms
this:

This is a sound saying. Yet, [considering] lying to be an attribute of imper-

fection is rationally tantamount to acknowledging al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ
as well as to proving divine wisdom. If there is consensus that lying is an
attribute of imperfection and that it cannot possibly be ascribed to God
because it is an attribute of imperfection, then the same applies to the
punishment of prophets for the sins of their enemies and the rewarding of
their enemies for their good deeds on the Day of Resurrection, the Day of
Religion, of truth and justice. Rationally and by revelation it is impossible
to ascribe these things to God in the same way that lying cannot possibly
be ascribed to Him. Whoever claims that there is a difference between the
two in regard to the imperfection of the Just and the Wise is wrong. God
loves justice, so that sending truthful messengers without liars belongs to
the good actions that they [some Ashʿaris] combat and not to the truthful
speech that they require.37

The knowledge that lying is evil and that God is no liar is a classic instance of
al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ with regard to God’s words. This is not limited to Muʿtazili
reasoning.38 Yet Ibn al-Wazīr concludes from the Ashʿari doctrine that God can-

37 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 185.

38 For a discussion of the Muʿtazili view of the objectivity of the evilness of lying, see for
example Vasalou, Moral agents 15; Hourani, Islamic Rationalism 8–14. Ibn Taymiyya also
held that the moral value of a lie was necessarily known by reason. However, the moral
value of a speech or an action was not determined in the independent nature of the speech

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not be a liar based on the nature of a lie, and thus reasons that the Ashʿariyya
does hold to al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ. Their supposedly erroneous distinction
between divine speech and divine actions does not dissuade him from the
validity of his harmonization.
The result is Ibn al-Wazīr’s own view: Man knows in his fiṭra what is good
and what is evil in a general way. He knows that lying is evil and that punish-
ing sinless human beings is likewise evil. He knows that evil things cannot be
ascribed to God because He is perfect. Perfection includes goodness. All these
things are known necessarily, they do not need deliberate demonstration or
clarification. Yet, this common necessary knowledge does not extend to all the
details of divine speech and action. Where practical application of the general
knowledge of moral values is concerned, namely in taklīf and its legal implica-
tions, revelation is still needed.
Besides law, there are those instances where God’s action does not seem to
agree with the general rational evaluation of moral values. Here the very con-
cept of the ability for taḥsīn and taqbīḥ itself is helpful. God has created human
beings in such a way that they know of God’s perfection and goodness. Even
where they cannot understand a particular divine action, that knowledge is
still valid. There must be some good reason or wise purpose for God’s action
which reflects His goodness. Ibn al-Wazīr explains his synthesizing view with
the Quranic example typically employed to argue for divine wisdom:

It is conceivable that He has a wise purpose which is hidden to the crea-

tures because of the incompleteness of their knowledge of the things
that are possible (al-umūr al-muḥtamala). Like when the angels, peace be
upon them, asked about the wisdom in creating Adam and his offspring
because they assumed that they would all be evil without there being any
good in a single one of them—the downright kind of evil which contains
no good at all, neither now nor in the future, [the evil] that is abominable
to reason. What concerns that kind of evil which contains some good,
some praiseworthy purposes or that which may have some of these, [con-
cerning this] no reason can say with certainty that it is abominable. That
is why the Exalted replied to them [the angels] “I know things you do not
[know].”39 And He did not say that whatever they or the knowledgeable

or action, but by the respective suitability or unsuitability, benefit or harm, pleasure or

pain related to it in a given circumstance; cf. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Radd ʿalā l-manṭiqiyyīn 424;
Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 34–35.
39 Ibn al-Wazīr quotes from Q 2:30, which reads {[Prophet], when your Lord told the angels,
‘I am putting a successor on earth,’ they said, ‘How can You put someone there who will

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 209

people (al-ʿārifūn) consider abominable is good with regard to Himself.

If God’s actions were void of wise purposes, His mentioning of His own
knowledge and its surplus beyond their knowledge would have no mean-
ing in this case at all.40

In other words, there are divine actions that are not comprehensible to any-
one but God. This is so because of His surpassing knowledge. However, that
surpassing knowledge is only one of extent, not of moral nature. The essential
general idea of goodness or evil remains the same.41
The thought expressed here contains two important arguments as to the
contention between the schools, answering the Ashʿariyya as well as the Muʿta-
zila. Responding to the Ashʿariyya, Ibn al-Wazīr insists that the difference
between God’s and human knowledge is in extent, not in moral assessment.
The other argument responds to the Muʿtazila, or rather, to those among the
Muʿtazila who “exaggerate” in that they require detailed knowledge of God’s
actions and their justification.
These arguments are reminiscent of Ibn al-Wazīr’s principle of general
knowledge and the jumal. He refers to the angels’ general knowledge of God’s
goodness, a knowledge they should apply to those of His actions which they
do not, and in fact cannot, understand. God’s superiority is maintained by the
superior extent of His knowledge. The angels’ attempt to determine the reason
and purpose of God’s action in detail would have lead them to false assump-
tions because there was a lack of knowledge. Of course, God might have told
them His reasons. However, that would have required the angels to share in the
knowledge of the unknown (ʿilm al-ghayb), an important distinctive feature
between the superiority of divine and creaturely attributes and abilities.42
This is just another way of talking about the unclear, the ambiguous mat-
ters (al-mutashābihāt). Ibn al-Wazīr refers the detailed understanding to God’s
superior knowledge. Human beings lack the ability to understand the details.
However, the knowledge that they do have, the general knowledge, ensures
that there is a best possible interpretation of the unknown. Because God is
good, there must be some good and wise purpose behind the incomprehen-
sible action.

cause damage and bloodshed, when we celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your holiness?’
but He said, ‘I know things you do not.’}.
40 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 345.
41 Cf. ibid., 194.
42 Ibid., 345.

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This ‘good’ is that which is intended, it is what revelation calls the inter-
pretation of the ambiguous matters (taʾwīl al-mutashābihāt), and what
the wise call the objective of the objective (gharaḍ al-gharaḍ).43

Both claims, the Muʿtazili claim that the details of the ambiguous acts can be
known and the Ashʿari claim that whatever is not known or understood (e.g. for
lack of reasons) of the ambiguous acts does not exist, cause doubt about partic-
ular attributes of God. In contrast, if one accepts an epistemology of ambiguity
concerning the details, it becomes possible to uphold a literal understanding of
all of God’s attributes and maintain what Ibn al-Wazīr, in his Dīwān and other
writings, calls “a good opinion” (ḥusn al-ẓann) of God.44 For Ibn al-Wazīr, an
interpretation of the ambiguous theological matters always exists. It must be a
positive interpretation, but it can be known by God only.
In short, Ibn al-Wazīr’s harmonization can maintain the major Muʿtazili con-
cern to deny all evil in relation to God45 as well as the Ashʿari desire to keep
God’s decisions above too much human incursion. The human intellect is able
to discern good and evil, but only in a general manner. In contrast, the human
being should “omit outright rational discernment of good and evil in some sub-
tle matters where the human intellect may err due to its confusedness and
dullness.”46 If God’s knowledge does not differ from human knowledge in its
moral assessment, one must ask how exactly Ibn al-Wazīr resolves the conflict
between the following two concepts by his doctrine of wise purposes: On the
one hand, al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī, on the other hand, the existence of evil
in creation besides apparently abominable (qabīḥ) acts of God?

43 Ibid.
44 A great number of poems in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Dīwān are devoted to this topic, of which the
following is only one example:
“Concerning hope (rajaʾ) and the thinking well of God (ḥusn al-ẓann).
The good is the first thing that reaches a rank, evil the last to be considered in the
classes.
Therefore ease is promised to come after it, so that the purpose of the evil is merely
the good, it does not remain.
So all becomes good in reality, unless one’s goal ignores the assignment of this
good.
Lo! Interpret mercy as preceding wrath, (wrath is) vanquished in the good, as is writ-
ten in the books.”
Ibn al- Wazīr, Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 386; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laq. 34r. See also Ibn al-Wazīr,
Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 374; Ibn al-Wazīr, Dīwān laqs. 8l; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 366, 227.
45 According to Vasalou, all the principles ʿAbd al-Jabbār deals with in his Mughnī form part
of the same project, namely to deny all evil of God; cf. Vasalou, Moral agents 19.
46 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 366.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 211

According to Ibn al-Wazīr, God’s knowledge is superior in its extent and must
be so in order to be distinguishable from human knowledge. Human reason
knows that God’s knowledge is superior, and that His actions are perfected by
the goodness of their purpose, which is a goodness perceivable by the human
intellect. However, some of His actions appear to contradict the rational evalu-
ation of moral goodness. They seem to lack a good purpose or benefit. Why, for
example, has God created Iblīs or those human beings of whom He knows that
they will end up in hell-fire? Or why do innocent children suffer and die before
they can make a choice for or against Islam? These and other commonly asked
questions appeal to the issue of God’s justice and were therefore the object of
much discussion especially in Muʿtazili circles.47
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the explanation lies in a distinction between the
relative and the ultimate evil. The relative evil only seems to be such, because of
the limitedness of human knowledge. Man fails to see that God is good because
he does not know the hidden purpose of the apparent evil: the purpose of the
purpose (gharaḍ al-gharaḍ) referred to in the quote above, or the “hidden wis-
dom” (ḥikma khafiyya).48 Referring to al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziyya, his predecessors in this particular view, Ibn al-Wazīr explains that
God’s action has to be evaluated in view of its ultimate purpose. This purpose is
aimed at for itself, and not as a means to some other purpose. We find this con-
cept throughout Ibn al-Wazīr’s writings: the good for the good itself or the evil
for the evil itself. This describes an ultimate value in contradistinction to a rel-
ative, instrumental or consequential value. A quote from al-ʿAwāṣim illustrates
well the link of “the good in itself” to wisdom:

The good is the primary goal in the action of every wise person. That is,
that which is intended for itself. There cannot be evil in the action of the
wise person unless it is a means to something else, like cupping is the
means to health. Health is the primary goal which is intended for itself.
Cupping is the evil that is the secondary goal which is intended for some-
thing other than itself. The downright evil can have no part in the action
of the wise person. It [the evil] is never intended for itself.49

In Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr explains how human beings should know wheth-
er a particular action considered abominable is so intrinsically, or whether it is

47 A classical illustration of these and similar questions is the dilemma of the three brothers
ascribed to Abū ʿAlī l-Jubbāʾī and al-Ashʿari; cf. Gwynne, Three Brothers 132–161.
48 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 122; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 259.
49 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 287.

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only an instrument which appears evil. Why not suppose a hidden good in any
apparently evil action? Might there not be a hidden good in sending prophets
who lie?50 In response, Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between the necessary and
the suppositional discernment of evil (taqbīḥ). If a thing is known by necessity
to contain no good, like lying or violating a promise, no hidden purpose may
be sought. In such cases, the intellect can be trusted in not ascribing them to
God. Other things are only assumed to be evil, like the cupping in the example
above, or if one goes back on his word by cancelling a threat.51
However, the criteria for each category appear somewhat vague or arbitrary
in their generality, which is typical for Ibn al-Wazīr. Necessary taqbīḥ is that
which all people possessing sound reason agree to be evil. In contradistinc-
tion, taqbīḥ is merely suppositional and describes an instrumental or relative
evil when disagreement exists due to the different degrees of knowledge and
understanding that people have. For example, not all compos mentis agree that
it is evil for God not to carry out His threat of punishment. While some would
consider this to be injustice, others call it forgiveness (ʿafw). This disagreement
means that this breach (khulf ) of His word cannot be an ultimate evil.52
This principle of an ultimate as opposed to an instrumental value is also key
to Ibn al-Wazīr’s explanation of the obligation of the impossible (taklīf mā lā
yuṭāq). A common example in the question of taklīf mā lā yuṭāq and determin-
ism is the case of Abū Lahab. Having heard Muhammad’s message, Abū Lahab
was obliged to believe (al-taklīf bi-l-īmān). However, Q 111:1–5 determines that
he will be thrown into hell. Was Abū Lahab then obliged to do the impossi-
ble since it was already certain that he would not believe? Ibn al-Wazīr uses
this example to illustrate the difference between that which is impossible in
itself (al-mumtaniʿ li-dhātihi)—an ultimate impossibility—and that which is
impossible because of another—a consequential impossibility (al-mumtaniʿ
li-ghayrihi).53 The intrinsically impossible is called muḥāl. Accordingly, Abū
Lahab’s faith is not impossible in itself. Rather, the statement that his faith is
impossible is based on the knowledge that he will not believe. God’s knowledge
of the unknown, His foreknowledge, discerns that Abū Lahab will not believe.

50 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 224.

51 Revoking one’s threat leads to the good of forgiveness. Therefore, this breach of promise
only seemingly gives the lie to the initial promise; cf. ibid., 227.
52 Ibid., 224.
53 I call the instrumental the consequential in this case. Both connote a kind of secondary
nature. Yet, whereas instrumentality suggests a transitive character, consequentiality
denotes an intransitive one.

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It was Ibn al-Wazīr’s conviction that this foreknowledge did not have an
immediate causative effect on actions.54 Therefore, God did not cause the
impossibility, but rather stated that it is impossible for Abū Lahab to believe.55
The key is God’s foreknowledge. In many cases of apparent taklīf mā lā yuṭāq or
other actions and commands of God that appear abominable to human reason,
Ibn al-Wazīr must resort to the principle of “the ultimate” vs. “the consequen-
tial” or “the instrumental” to preserve God’s ultimate goodness. Often, however,
“the ultimate” is only known to God himself. And man is left with the general
knowledge that God has knowledge of the ultimate goal and that the purpose
of his taklīf, his action, command or prohibition intends that very goal. That
remains true even if the human being does not know of or perceive anything
good in the particular aspect of taklīf, action, command or prohibition.

1.1.2 God Is Perfect Through His Wisdom

In Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr defines God’s wisdom as “a particular kind of
knowledge about hidden benefits, praiseworthy reasons and preponderant
interests” (al-manāfiʿ al-khafiyya wa-l-ʿuqūl al-ḥamīda wa-l-maṣāliḥ al-rājiḥa).56
He does not explicitly address the question of whether or not the benefits are
only geared to the interests of human beings, as the Muʿtazila commonly hold.
For the Muʿtazila, the wisdom of God’s action usually has human beings’ high-
est benefit (al-aṣlaḥ) as its end. Ibn Taymiyya, on the other hand, spent much
effort in showing that God also benefits from acting wisely, namely that He
gets praised for being wise in His actions.57 From the following explanation

54 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Shaykh Mukhtār in the latter’s Kitāb al-Mujtabā to explain that the
effect of foreknowledge or knowledge on action is restricted to the motive. It does not
have the causative effect that would lead to compulsion; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 92;
iv, 42; vii, 84 etc.; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 332.
55 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ix, 52; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 330–335.
56 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 181.
57 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 75; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya as an Avicennan Theologian
42; Bell, Love Theory 69. Ibn al-Wazīr repeatedly refers to Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim
al-Jawziyya in the contexts of God’s wisdom. Of these two, Ibn Taymiyya is known for
his doctrine of “the golden mean.” Although there are apparent similarities between the
Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn Taymiyya, to my understanding Ibn Taymiyya followed a very dif-
ferent agenda in his quest to find the middle path. Ibn Taymiyya wrote a book called
al-Aqīda al-wāsiṭiyya where he explains his “golden mean” most concisely and claims it
to be the orthodox position; cf. Ibn Taymiyya, al-ʿAqīda al-wāsiṭiyya. According to Hoover,
Ibn Taymiyya’s creed became well known already in his day and has been widely read ever
since; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 119, footnote 78. A comprehensive comparison of
Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Wazīr with regard to “the middle path” is beyond the scope of this
study. However, the difference most obvious to me is that while Ibn al-Wazīr constantly

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of the link between wisdom and perfection, we can conclude that Ibn al-Wazīr
held a view similar to Ibn Taymiyya in this case: For Ibn al-Wazīr, all divine
attributes go back to the title of “the praiseworthy ruler” (al-malik al-ḥamīd).
Consequently, they are subsumed under either the title “ruler” or the attribute
“praiseworthy.” God’s being a “ruler” requires that His sovereignty, His power,
His omnipotence, His independence and His glory be perfect (kāmil). God’s
being “praiseworthy” comprises His goodness, His mercy, His benevolence, His
truthfulness, His justice and His uncovering of harm, in their perfect form
(kāmil).58 Hence, it is perfection that distinguishes God from human beings,
and the divine attributes from their namesakes among human beings. Yet, by
what is this perfection signified?
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, God’s wisdom is the foundation of all of His
names and attributes, because it is what the perfection of those names and
attributes consists of. Subsequent to the explanation of the names, he writes
that the greatest state of perfection in all of these names and attributes is sig-
nified by their praiseworthy purposefulness that is free of futility.59 Elsewhere
in Īthār al-ḥaqq, the reader is told:

There is neither doubt nor uncertainty that the foundation of perfection

in actions is that they proceed from an extensive wisdom that is directed
towards a preponderant benefit and praiseworthy result. Whenever this
is apparent in them [the actions], it is proof of the wisdom of the agent,
[of] his knowledge and the good and praiseworthy character of his choice.
Wherever they [the actions] are far from this, they resemble accidental
traces and that which results from necessitating causes (al-ʿilal al-mūjiba),
like the actions of little boys in their games or of madmen in their fan-
tasies. There is nothing more base and more deficient than the actions of
little boys and madmen because they are void of wisdom, although they
do accord with their desires and are not without purpose. (…) The funda-
mental reason why Muslims prohibit comparing God’s acts to the actions
of the rational and the wise in their perfectness and their want of mea-
suring up to them [God’s acts] is their [God’s acts] excess in perfectness,

points to the common ground between the schools, including them in the golden mean,
Ibn Taymiyya focusses more on showing who is outside it. In Love Theory, Bell shows how
Ibn Taymiyya discusses concepts of God’s will and wisdom by showing where Muʿtazilis
and Ashʿaris went wrong; cf. Bell, Love Theory 46–73. Although Ibn al-Wazīr may have come
to similar conclusions about the essence of tenets or “the golden mean,” he endeavoured
to show that the Muʿtazila and Ashʿariyya do in fact agree on those.
58 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 186.
59 Ibid., 186.

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and their excess in this [perfectness] reaches a point that the intellects of
the smart and wise cannot arrive at. Similarly, the brutish animal with its
instinct does not get to know the wisdom of the wise, the compilations
of the clever and the learning of the bright. And they cannot know the
degree to which they [the wise, smart and bright] are beyond them [the
animals]. Accordingly, the wise people do not know the whole of God’s
wisdom, the Exalted. And they are unable to know how much it exceeds
their own wisdom, as is evident in the story of Moses and al-Khiḍr.60

In the example of the boy and the madman, the lack of a wise purpose is the
reason why their actions are not praised at all, and are far from being called
perfect. God’s wise purposefulness is then a key concept to understanding Ibn
al-Wazīr’s view of Him.
As shall be discussed below, Ibn al-Wazīr insists that all divine attributes
must be equally affirmed. He criticizes the Ashʿariyya and Muʿtazila profoundly
for voiding particular divine names of significance by interpreting them meta-
phorically, or by negating them altogether for lack of evidence.61 Nevertheless,
it seems that Ibn al-Wazīr himself gives precedence to certain attributes. God’s
wisdom is a certain kind of divine knowledge: God’s knowledge of the best pos-
sible benefit as well as the action that goes along with that knowledge. Or, put
differently, the excellence of knowledge is in acting according to it.62 If all of
His attributes are made perfect by being geared to that knowledge of the bene-
fit, it is really God’s knowledge that takes center stage. The greatest praise that
a human being can render to God, therefore, is to praise and honor Him in and
for His superior and perfect knowledge.63
This explains the continuous reference to God’s knowledge and wisdom
throughout Ibn al-Wazīr writings. However, as shown above, divine knowledge
as opposed to human knowledge is signified by a superiority of quantity or
extent. There is no hint of two kinds of knowledge that are distinct as to moral
standards. God does not know of another kind of good. Accordingly, the pur-
poses He aims at on the basis of the knowledge that He has are not “wise”

60 Ibid., 183.
61 In a similar way, Ibn Taymiyya criticized the Ashʿariyya for interpreting God’s love and not
interpreting His will in their equation of will and love; cf. Bell, Love Theory 64.
62 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 287.
63 In contradistinction, Ibn Taymiyya, according to Hoover, leaves it unstated and only
implies that God is perfect and praiseworthy because of the rationality in the things that
He does; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya as an Avicennan Theologian 43. Hoover shows how
Ibn Taymiyya takes God’s perfection to rest in His continuous creativity; cf. Hoover, Ibn
Taymiyya’s Theodicy 70–102; Hoover, Perpetual Creativity 3.

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according to a different kind of good, even though their moral quality might
be beyond the human grasp.
Human beings can (or must, as we shall see) have enough general knowl-
edge of God, His goodness and His wise purposes to praise Him for them and to
admit their own lack. The superiority of God’s knowledge is not maintained by
a difference in moral nature. This principle is also effective when Ibn al-Wazīr
responds to the accusation of anthropomorphism in al-ʿAwāṣim.64 There he
argues that the affirmation of God’s visibility does not require a detailed knowl-
edge of that which is seen (God). Man knows that God can be seen in general,
but cannot understand what this entails exactly. How much more important
then to uphold this principle with the insistence that the difference is merely
one of extent, along with implications that follow for theological as well as legal
activity.

1.1.3 The Hiddenness of Wise Purposes

Ibn al-Wazīr requires every believer to know of God’s purposefulness in a gen-
eral way ( jumlatan). Consistent with his teaching of “the sufficiency of the
general tenets” (kifāyat al-jumal), Ibn al-Wazīr does not define in much detail
what exactly he takes to be God’s wise purposes. He provides suggestions of
other scholars, albeit with much more reluctance to conclude a meticulously
defined and exclusive doctrine. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Wazīr undertakes the dis-
cussion of what these wise purposes may look like for two reasons. Firstly, for
the sake of refuting those who employ several Quranic verses and Prophetic
traditions to argue for the utter inexplicability of God’s actions. Of course the
explicability must be confirmed, if only in a general sense. Secondly, and more
importantly, Ibn al-Wazīr discusses what God’s purposes might be in order to
point out the reason for their hiddenness.
As part of the elucidation of his ḥikma-theory in Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr
provides a list of wise purposes behind pain and catastrophes. The purposes
that he does explain are those supposedly already mentioned in the texts of
revelation.65 Otherwise, the explanations should be understood as possibili-
ties. After all, Ibn al-Wazīr considers the Muʿtazili assumption that the purpose
of creating unbelievers is clear ( jalī) an error.66

64 Ibn al-Wazīr discussed this charge on numerous occasions, usually in defense of different
Sunni scholars. See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim v, 5.
65 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 124.
66 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim v, 278–279.

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The beginning of the list mostly reflects the educational ends also men-
tioned by the Muʿtazila as well as other supporters of a concept of God’s wis-
dom, like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya.67 Accordingly, pain and
calamitous events in the world are geared towards disciplining the character,
teaching patience, moral admonition, engendering a desire for the Hereafter,
testing faith and the like.68 Besides educational and religious ends, there is
already an element in this list that indicates the display of God’s superior wis-
dom as an end in itself:

The human being learns of his own inability and lowliness. He unites his
heart towards God and His acceptance of his [the human being’s] peti-
tion and supplication. He then knows that God will answer his petition,
uncover the harmful and increase his certainty.69

Hence, in the sorrow of the world there is the good of becoming aware of
human limitations and God’s superiority. This element becomes more obvious
in the explanation of God’s creation of sinners, torture in the Hereafter and
taklīf in spite of the foreordainment of actions. These explanations make use
of the principle of the relative and the ultimate end—an apparent evil for the
sake of the ultimate good.
The question why God created human beings who would be sinners and
unbelievers was of central importance to the question of God’s justice. Why did
He create people who would sin although He hates and punishes sin? In Īthār
al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions seven aspects of the hidden wisdom behind
the creation of sinners, and one general principle (amr jumlī) which comprises
them all. A very similar list is found in al-ʿAwāṣim, albeit in a slightly differ-
ent order.70 Significantly, the general principle is phrased in God’s statement,
“I know what you do not know.” In the particular aspects, we see the display of
His attributes as an ultimate purpose. However, the purposes are formulated in
what seems at first a peculiar fashion, amounting to hardly more than an affir-
mation of these attributes in spite of a seeming tension. For example, “God, the
Exalted, has created sinners for His worship with regard to his command (…)

67 Hoover, God’s Wise Purposes 122–127. For the Muʿtazila, see for example Heemskerk, Suf-
fering in Muʿtazilite Theology 151–156.
68 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 211.
69 Ibid., 211.
70 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 6–7. Preceding the list, Ibn al-Wazīr remarks that the list is not
at all exhaustive.

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and for testing with regard to his justice (…).”71 Aspect five consists in the fact
“that He cannot be comprehended in full (lam yuḥāṭ bi-jamīʿihi), except that
He is Glorified and Exalted with regard to His knowledge and mercy.”72
God apparently also created sinners so that just punishment for the unbelief
in His favor (kufr niʿma) and the denial of His authority may exist. This purpose
rests on divine knowledge, choice, foreordainment and His book. In these and
other examples, Ibn al-Wazīr does not inform the reader about the content of
the wise purposes themselves.73 Yet, in one way or another they are intended to
affirm the different divine names and attributes. How, for example, could God’s
justice be understood if there was no possibility of doing wrong?
Others, like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, have used a similar kind of argument
in order to explain why God created human beings who would be sinners
and unbelievers. Yet, Ibn al-Wazīr went beyond arguing, as for example Ibn
Qayyim has done according to Hoover, that the purpose in creating evil is
geared towards the display of God’s individual attributes.74 What is more, God’s
wise purposefulness functions as the glue that makes sense of otherwise poten-
tially conflicting aspects of God’s description of Himself. This is well illustrated
in aspect seven:

Aspect seven is the wise purpose that made His punishment preponder-
ant over His pardoning and His justice over His favor in their case [the
case of the sinners]. This [wise purpose] signifies the interpretation of
the ambiguous matters (mutashābihāt). This, in turn, is the good that is
the ultimate goal in what appeared to the rationalists to be the intention
in what ambiguous matter occurred before. This [according to what the
rationalists took to be the intent] is that kind of evil in which no good
is known [to exist]. This is the seventh kind which refers to the ultimate
hiddenness of His purposes. It is connected to His will and design. It is
what is primarily intended. And it is the interpretation of the ambiguous
matters which no one knows except Him.75

71 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 261.

72 Ibid., 261.
73 Ibid., 260–262.
74 Hoover, God’s Wise Purposes 126. Ibn Qayyim also argued based on the distinction
between the relative or instrumental good on the one hand, and the ultimate good on
the other hand.
75 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 262.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 219

Ibn al-Wazīr explains punishment in the Hereafter by a similar reasoning.

Accordingly, there is some truth in the fact of punishment that comprises jus-
tice and benefit, and that is also the interpretation of the ambiguous matters.
Man’s lack of detailed knowledge of the exact purposes is a necessity.

How shall this great Lord not be distinguished by a knowledge of the sub-
tle wise purposes which we do not have. The uniqueness of His knowledge
of them [the purposes] necessitates that He alone knows the good that is
connected with them as well as its interpretation. That is what opens the
breast of the knowledgeable for faith in the ambiguous things and belief
in the unknown (ghayb).76

According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the existence of sinners, torture and taklīf serves
the end of displaying God’s attributes, most of all His wisdom, in one way
or another. Ibn al-Wazīr does not go as far as Ibn Qayyim in explicitly stat-
ing that evil is a necessary concomitant of the good in order for the good to
be displayed. He does not say explicitly that both good and evil necessarily
proceed from God’s essence.77 Yet, considering that it is God’s wisdom that per-
fects his attributes, as we have seen in the explanation of the two categories of
God’s attributes “praiseworthy” and “ruler,” and if the difference between God’s
attributes and man’s attributes is perceived by necessity, as we shall see below,
the means by which the superiority of God’s wisdom is displayed would seem
to be necessary as well.
To summarize, the reasoning for God’s wisdom points to the concept of wise
purposes as the end, rather than a means, of explaining the seemingly inexpli-
cable. The hiddenness of these wise purposes secures God’s superiority over
human beings and especially over human knowledge. Some things are hidden
so that man acknowledges the superiority of God’s knowledge and wisdom and
consequently commits all his affairs to Him trustingly. Ibn al-Wazīr’s Dīwān tes-
tifies to the centrality of human worship by means of trust in and surrender to
God’s purposes. Furthermore, the affirmation of God’s wise purposefulness is
directly connected to the harmonization of God’s attributes and names. The
limitedness of human knowledge causes human beings to see contradictions
between God’s attributes. This results in metaphorical interpretations or the

76 Ibid., 87.
77 For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya’s explanation of the purposes in creating Iblīs, see Hoover,
God’s Wise Purposes 123–127. For the translation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s list of wise purposes
in the creation of Iblīs as recorded in his Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, see ibid., 127–131.

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negation of some attributes, as well as the elevation of some attributes over oth-
ers. However, that is only the case if the necessity to know in detail is claimed,
on the one hand, or if the human ability to understand in terms of moral assess-
ment is denied altogether, on the other. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, all names
can be preserved and equally displayed against the background of the limita-
tions of human knowledge. The divine counterpart of the limitations of human
knowledge is God’s wisdom, His wise purposes. Herein rests His perfection.
Ibn al-Wazīr describes the inexplicable, the ambiguous matters, as a means of
manifesting God’s wisdom. These ambiguous matters are often related to the
existence of evil and pain. It stands to reason that Ibn al-Wazīr draws a neces-
sary connection between God’s essence and the existence of evil as a means of
achieving a greater good, namely the display of God’s attributes in toto and the
incitement to worship.
Drawing a line from Ibn al-Wazīr’s theory of God’s wise purposes back to
other issues of the theological debate, the question is: How does Ibn al-Wazīr’s
epistemology of ambiguity as displayed in his concept of God’s wise purposes
contrast with the concept of God’s wisdom held among his Zaydi contempo-
raries?

1.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Wisdom

Ibn al-Murtaḍā discusses issues pertaining to divine wisdom in the context of
the divine attribute of justice (ʿadl) in al-Durar al-farāʾid.78 According to al-
Ḥayyī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā defines a just person as “someone who does not do the
evil and does not fail to perform [his] duty, and whose actions are all good.”79
The first two criteria of justice help the reader to understand Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
concept of divine wisdom. It is evident that Ibn al-Murtaḍā represents the
Bahshami branch of the Muʿtazila, because he holds that God is capable of
evil (min maqdūrātihi).80 This distinguishes him clearly from those holding the
common Ashʿari view, according to which God’s actions are altogether beyond
moral assessment. But his view also distinguishes Ibn al-Murtaḍā from those
Muʿtazila who equally took God to be incapable of evil, as for example al-
Naẓẓām (d. 221/836) and his student al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868).81 For Ibn al-Murtaḍā,

78 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 65b.

79 Ibid., f. 65b.
80 For ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s definition of divine justice, see for example Peters, God’s Created
Speech 30–33, 224.
81 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 95. Al-Naẓẓām’s student al-Jāḥiẓ apparently shared his
teacher’s views on this topic. Al-Naẓẓām and indeed al-Jāḥiẓ are worth mentioning, as al-
Naẓẓām’s theory on God’s volition and creation was received by the Baghdadi Muʿtazila

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God’s actions are not beyond assessment. God is able to do actions that would
have to be considered evil for two reasons. Firstly, there is no kind of object
of power (maqdūr) that He is incapable of.82 Secondly, the human intellect is
capable of discerning good and evil independent of revelation (al-taḥsīn wa-l-
taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī). Thus, if God did any evil action, the compos mentis would be
able to tell, because the evil is intrinsic to the action.83 What then is the rea-
son that God’s actions are never described as evil? How can His justice remain
indefeasible? Divine wisdom is the answer to this question. The indefeasibility
of God’s justice can be maintained by stating that God has no motive (dāʿī) to
act in an evil way.

The Muʿtazila and the Zaydiyya hold that God, the Exalted, does not do
evil. And we have two proofs for this: We say that He has no motive for
doing it. Put clearly, this means that the Exalted has ample deterrents
from doing it. He has no motive to do it—neither a motive of need as
this [need] cannot be ascribed to him, nor a motive of wisdom, as there
is no benefit. And He is not forced to do it, therefore it must be that He
does not do it.84

The first kind of motive, the motive of need, cannot be ascribed to God, because
He is self-sufficient (ghanī). This is no point of contention. But the reference
to the second kind of motive, the motive of purposefulness, reveals Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s Muʿtazili thinking. God does not commit evil actions, because evil
actions would not be for the benefit of human beings. And it is a requirement
of God’s justice to act according to the utmost human benefit (al-aṣlaḥ).85 Thus,
wisdom is intricately intertwined with justice. This is emphasized by the fact
that Ibn al-Murtaḍā usually mentions the two together: “God, being just and
wise.”86
The doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ is one of the most distinctive features of Muʿtazili
thinking. Ormsby, in analyzing al-Ghazālī’s concept of “the best possible world,”
suggests that the Muʿtazili doctrine of what he calls “the optimum” (al-aṣlaḥ)
may have been a major reason for the initial rift between the Muʿtazila and the

as well as by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, albeit in a modified form; cf. Thiele, Theologie in der
jemenitischen Zaydiyya 82; McDermott, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on God’s Volition 89.
82 Ibid., f. 71b.
83 Ibid., fs. 66b; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī, 310–320.
84 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 72b–73a.
85 Al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 318.
86 For Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s refutation of the claim that the argumentation for justice and wis-
dom by motive is circular, see al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 73b.

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Ashʿariyya.87 It requires that the unaided human intellect must be able to assess
the divine acts in order to discern what is most beneficial, and thus determine
God’s duties (wājib) towards human beings.88 After all, the quote above leaves
no doubt that performing one’s duties is a vital component of justice. Thus, this
principle contradicts the Ashʿari belief that God is beyond human assessment.
Likewise, Ashʿaris generally reject the idea that God would be under any obli-
gation whatsoever.89
From Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Muʿtazili perspective, his concept of wisdom and
the intellectual ability of moral discernment could be employed to argue for
a detailed understanding of God’s duties towards human beings. Just after
explaining why God does not do anything evil (qabīḥ), Ibn al-Murtaḍā pro-
ceeds with a list of God’s duties towards human beings resulting from this
definition of divine justice and purposefulness. Both are aimed at the benefit
of the believer. For example, God is obliged to empower the legally responsi-
ble human beings (tamkīn al-mukallafīn), and He must clarify His speech to
the addressees (bayyān lil-mukhāṭabīn). This latter duty involves the creation
of necessary knowledge and the establishment of evidence from reason and
revelation. Consequently, God must clarify his intention in an unambiguous
way and in detail. In line with Muʿtazili doctrine, Ibn al-Murtaḍā requires that
“the knowledge of this issue is an individual duty (min furūḍ al-aʿyān) since the
knowledge of God’s justice is incomplete without it.”90
In short, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s concept of divine wisdom is vital for the mainte-
nance of the doctrine of divine justice. The purpose of this justice is the benefit
of the believer. And it is a concept that requires the individual to know God’s
justice in greater detail. Indeed, it guarantees that he can know and understand
God’s justice, as it signifies the path of God’s working for human benefit.

87 For a discussion of the origin of the theory of al-aṣlaḥ, see Robert Brunschvig, Muʿtazilism
et Optimum 5–23; Gwynne, Three Brothers 132–161. According to Gwynne, it was Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī who first identified the doctrine of al-aṣlaḥ as the cause of the rift between
al-Ashʿari and his teacher Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and accordingly associated the problem of
“the three brothers” with the two scholars’ controversy; cf. ibid., Brothers 132.
88 Of course there are different understandings of what this optimum entails. A major dif-
ference within the Muʿtazila was that the Baghdadi school obliged God to do what is most
beneficial for human beings in this world and in the next, whereas the Basran Muʿtazila
generally restricted the necessity of al-aṣlaḥ to the next world, hence to what human
beings need in order to fulfill their religious duties; cf. Brunschvig, Muʿtazilism et Opti-
mum 17.
89 Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought 21–22. Even though the world that God created is
the best of all possible worlds, al-Ghazālī was eager to emphasize that God was under no
obligation to do so in the way He did; cf. ibid., 258–260.
90 Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 74a; cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 318.

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1.3 Conclusion
The benefits mentioned by Ibn al-Murtaḍā can be much more easily defined
than Ibn al-Wazīr’s general and rather vague idea of wise purposes beyond
the understanding of human beings. Ibn al-Wazīr, like Ibn al-Murtaḍā, main-
tains that God’s actions must be assessed as good in a general manner. Yet, for
Ibn al-Wazīr the purposes are good by virtue of proceeding from divine wis-
dom, rather than by virtue of benefitting the believer in a manner susceptible
to detailed proof. Even more importantly, in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking this char-
acteristic of being beyond human understanding is essential as it maintains
God’s uniqueness. Defining the nature and recipient of the benefit is far less
important. The affirmation that God is good and wise is enough. According to
al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of the intellect’s ability to discern, and of God’s jus-
tice and duty to do what most benefits the human being, it is inconceivable that
the human intellect should be restrained from achieving a detailed knowledge
of God’s purposes. In Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking, however, the intellect must always
assume the best of purposes behind an apparent evil action.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thoughts on these issues render him in line with Bahshami-
Muʿtazili thinking.91 He claims that his view represents the Zaydi position.
However, Ibn al-Wazīr refers to Shaykh Mukhtār and Ibn al-Malāḥimī as exam-
ples of Muʿtazili scholars who did require of God’s justice and purposes the
same degree of assessability. Ibn al-Wazīr locates Shaykh Mukhtār’s argumen-
tation in his book on justice. Citing Shaykh Mukhtār, Ibn al-Wazīr speaks of
a hidden purpose (ḥikma khafiyya), whereas the quote from Ibn Malāḥimī’s
Kitāb al-Fāʾiq mentions “a wise purpose not known to anyone but God” behind
the creation of a human being with a nature unable to receive benevolence
(luṭf ).92 Discussing the motive of an action in al-Awāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr ascribes
this position to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī himself, as we shall discuss below.93
Unfortunately, the original line of argument cannot be verified, as Shaykh
Mukhtār’s writing is not extant. Yet Ibn al-Wazīr’s quote from Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s
Kitāb al-Fāʾiq can be confirmed. Both scholars belong to the school of Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, and both seem to allow for a hidden purpose that is not evi-
dent to the human intellect, giving the respective action the appearance of evil
(istiqbāḥ). Were that purpose to become known, however, its assessment would
certainly be positive (istiḥsān).94

91 Cf. Brunschvig, Muʿtazilism et Optimum 12.

92 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim v, 302.
93 Ibid., vi, 123.
94 Ibid., v, 302; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Fāʾiq 149–156.

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In conclusion, Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā apparently represent the

influence of different Muʿtazili schools within the Zaydiyya of the 9th/15th cen-
tury. Or it may be more accurate to suggest that Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school was more
conducive to Ibn al-Wazīr’s harmonization of conflicting school doctrines and
to his epistemology of ambiguity than was the Bahshami school represented by
Ibn al-Murtaḍā. So far, this has been made apparent regarding the concept of
divine wisdom. In the following this claim will be consolidated as to other the-
ological questions, namely God’s names and attributes (asmāʾ and ṣifāt), God’s
will (irāda), and human actions (afʿāl) in relation to Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of
wisdom.

2 Harmonized Doctrine: God’s Names (asmāʾ) and Attributes (ṣifāt)

A central topic that occupied the minds of Muʿtazili and Ashʿari scholars in
their controversy was God’s unicity. How is God different from human beings,
and how can this difference be maintained in spite of the human character
which all descriptions of divine things have? According to Wensinck, the dis-
cussion of the divine attributes representing man’s description of God was a
result of the problem of anthropomorphism.95 Ibn al-Wazīr’s focus on the ques-
tion of whether anthropomorphic descriptions in revelation should be inter-
preted allegorically (taʾwīl) would seem to confirm this.

2.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Names and

Attributes
Apparently, some revelational descriptions of the Divine were more prone to
being confused with human attributes than others. Consequently, they were
interpreted according to each group’s respective doctrine.96 Ibn al-Wazīr insists
that both the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya essentially agree that God’s names
should not be interpreted allegorically. This agreement manifests in the aver-
sion expressed by both schools towards the allegorical interpretation of a
name they themselves take at its face value. Ibn al-Wazīr does not differenti-

95 Wensinck, Muslim Creed 68.

96 As mentioned above, Ibn al-Wazīr criticized the Ashʿari interpretation of the divine name
al-ḥakīm (the All-wise) as well as the Muʿtazili interpretation of the divine name al-ḅaṣīr
(the Seeing). The Ashʿariyya, theoretically rejecting the idea of purposefulness, empha-
sized the connotation of “creating masterfully” or “ruling,” both contained in the root
ḥ-k-m. The Muʿtazila, refusing the idea that God has eyes necessary for seeing, interpreted
al-Baṣīr in terms of “perception.”

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ate between the divine attributes. On the one hand, he rebuffs the charge of
anthropomorphism (tashbīh) brought forward against the traditionists as well
as the Ashʿaris. On the other hand, Ibn al-Wazīr argues that it was only the
“extremists” of the Muʿtazila who denied God the power to act by divesting
Him of His attributes (taʿṭīl) in order to forestall anthropomorphism.97 In Ibn
al-Wazīr’s view, both groups are guilty of interpreting one or the other divine
attribute more or less arbitrarily. For him, there can be no allegorical interpre-
tation of any of the attributes, and therefore no subordination of one attribute
to another. All alike are affirmed (ithbāt).98 The negation of anthropomorphic
meanings of God’s names and attributes should never lead to the negation of
the attributes themselves. God’s transcendence consists in that His attributes
are free (tanzīh) of the insufficiencies and deficiencies which human beings’
attributes feature.

Concerning the explanation of the inability to comprehend the true

meaning of the knowledge of God, His names and sublime attributes
(…). However you understand the meaning of the similitude (mumāth-
ala) that must not be ascribed to God the Exalted, you know that nothing
is like Him (annahu lā mithlahū shayʾ). It is not desirable for you to assume
that participating in the same expression necessitates similitude. Do you
not see that the two [God and man] are so distinct from one another that
more of a contrast could not be imagined. They have many descriptions
in common, just as black and white share in being accidents, in being per-
ceptible, in being colors etc.99

And elsewhere in Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr notes:

Names of praise by which human beings are called in different manners

necessarily entail an imperfection, and [the names of praise by which]
God is called in different manners necessarily entail perfection. These
are the attributes of knowledge, power, mercy, life and the like. They are
applied to God, the Exalted, in the way of perfection. They apply [to Him]
free of the imperfection of creatures which befall them for reasons par-
ticular to them, unlike Him the Exalted.100

97 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 122; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 103.
98 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 339.
99 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 177.
100 Ibid., 165.

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Ibn al-Wazīr does not specify here how these attributes and names apply to
God other than in their perfect meaning (akmal maʿānīhā). This knowledge is
restricted to the only one to whom they apply, God (lā yuḥīṭ bi-ḥaqīqatahu illā
llāh taʿālā).101 In that sense, the bi-lā kayf of the middle course applies to all
of God’s attributes: they should be described “without qualifying God in a way
only to be applied to His creation.”102 The true meaning of things must be sur-
rendered to God’s knowledge. But the literal meaning of the names must not
be denied just because their true sense cannot be affirmed in detail.
Ibn al-Wazīr justified the use of the same descriptions for God and human
beings by referring to the difference between perfection and imperfection.103
Using anthropomorphic descriptions for God does not necessarily mean
putting Him on a level with human beings. No metaphorical explanations
should be found for God’s attributes. Rather, it is the human equivalents of
those terms that are to be understood in an allegorical way. As in the exam-
ple of a child that asks about the characteristics of marriage and is told that
marriage is as sweet as sugar, human beings get an idea of how God describes
Himself by using concepts that exist in the human world as well.104 Yet human
beings possess their attributes in an imperfect way. As discussed above, per-
fection is characterized by the wisdom of the purpose behind an action or an
attribute. Consequently, God’s perfection consists in the wise purposefulness
of all of His attributes, names and actions. Therefore, Ibn al-Wazīr can refer
not only to God’s knowledge and wisdom for the true meaning of attributes,
names and actions, but also to God’s wise purposes behind the ambiguities
that accompany the divine attributes, as they are the benchmark for the dis-
tinction between God and man. Ibn al-Wazīr can thus justify a literal reading
of the anthropomorphic descriptions in the texts without exposing himself to
the charge of anthropomorphism. The difference between the divine and the
human description is self-evident.105
Hoover, his insightful article on the duration of hell-fire has shown how Ibn
al-Wazīr’s “agnosticism”—what I call his epistemology of ambiguity—allowed
him to include different and conflicting positions on the question. Beyond

101 Ibid., 166.

102 Van Ess describes this as “the middle course between a literal acceptance of the anthro-
pological statements in the Scripture (takyīf tashbīh) on one side, and their metaphori-
cal interpretation in the Muʿtazili sense (taʾwīl = taʿṭīl) on the other.” Even Ibn Taymiyya
adopted this attitude; cf. van Ess, Tashbīh wa-Tanzīh.
103 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 277.
104 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 177–180.
105 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 208.

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being a point in argument for the present thesis, Hoover’s argument underlines
the conclusions from this sub-chapter. How it does so is best illustrated in the
concluding part of Ibn al-Wazīr’s poem al-Ijāda fī l-irāda:

Laud and do not exclude anything from laudation,

and let innovations be like the muddles of a dreamer.
Fear neither impotence nor ignorance of wise purposes,
neither the exasperation of the oppressed nor the tyranny of the
oppressor,
and [think] not that He in His beneficence is not powerful and mighty,
and not that He in His might is not merciful,
and not that He in His judgement is not just, wise and knowing
what creatures do not know.106

Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology of ambiguity not only allows him to include a num-
ber of possible explanations for the ambiguous matters like the duration of
hell-fire, it also allows him to affirm all divine names equally, without having to
deny or find an allegorical interpretation of one or more of them as a result of
a particular explanation of ambiguous matters.
Yet, with all of Ibn al-Wazīr’s desire to equally affirm God’s attributes, he
seems to have neglected one aspect. He himself has elevated one divine attri-
bute over the rest: God’s wisdom, His wise purposes, is defined as “a type of
knowledge.” Ultimately then, it is God’s superior knowledge in which the per-
fect nature of His names and attributes consists.

2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Names and Attributes

In comparison, the views expressed by Ibn al-Murtaḍā in his al-Durar al-farāʾid
bespeak the views Ibn al-Wazīr ascribes to the Basran Muʿtazila. Just as Ibn
al-Wazīr has criticized, Ibn al-Murtaḍā puts much emphasis on a particular
knowledge of God’s attributes according to a specific order of evidence. Essen-
tial attributes are ascribed to God because of their identity with His essence. For
example, God is not able by virtue of an ability (qudra), but rather by virtue of
an essential ableness (qādiriyya).107 Apart from devoting long passages to the

106 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 204. Again I used Hoover’s very apt translation; cf. Hoover,
Withholding Judgement 26.
107 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 22b. This doctrine was developed early
in the history of Muʿtazili kalām in order to maintain both God and man as autonomous
and freely choosing agents, while yet preserving a distinction between God and the human
being; cf. Thiele, Theologie in der jemenitischen Zaydiyya 83.

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demonstration of the true nature (ḥaqīqa) of each divine attribute like able-
ness or knowingness (ʿālimiyya), Ibn al-Murtaḍā insists that many descriptive
Quranic statements about God must be interpreted allegorically. In a passage
concerned with countering invalid similitude (tamāthul) between human and
divine attributes, Ibn al-Murtaḍā rejects the anthropomorphism implied in a
number of Quranic verses:

The intellect refuses to understand them [the verses] in their apparent

meaning (ʿalā ẓāhirihā). Where that [meaning] allows that He [God] has
a body, they [the verses] must be interpreted as figurative expressions.108

This contrasts with Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning. According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, it is

God’s side of the equation that has to be interpreted with the goal of defining
its meaning. Whereas Ibn al-Wazīr leaves the precise nature of the difference
between divine attributes and their human equivalents largely unknown, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā explains the difference in detail:

He is equally capable of all types of objects of creative power ( jamīʿ

ajnās al-maqdūrāt), and it is impossible to restrict it [God’s ableness] to
some object of power (maqdūr) and not another. That which limits the
object of power to a type or number is the ability (qudra). The Creator,
the Exalted, is able by His essence not by an ability. (…) It is established
that His ableness (qādiriyyatuhu) is transcendent. It is impossible to prove
that it is limited to one type but not to another, or one number but not
another in contradistinction to our ability, for it is limited to its object of
power.109

The difference between the divine and the human attribute is that God is able
by His essence, whereas the human being is able by an ability. According to Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, this doctrine is a knowledge item that every believer must know
in detail, based on the evidence and the order of evidence established by the
theologians, just as a detailed knowledge of the true meaning of every divine
attribute is required of him.110

108 Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 38b.

109 Ibid., f. 22b.
110 Ibid., fs. 3a, 5a.

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2.3 Conclusion
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s reasoning for allegorical interpretation as well as his require-
ment for detailed knowledge of the meaning contrasts sharply with Ibn al-
Wazīr’s argument. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the difference between divine and
human attributes consists in the self-evident perfection-imperfection divide.
Furthermore, it contrasts with Ibn al-Wazīr’s broad concept of the difference
as to the particular attributes. Ibn al-Wazīr leaves this difference to God’s wis-
dom and knowledge, and he leaves human beings with cognitive uncertainty
of it. Whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s claim to detailed understanding requires that
some attributes be interpreted allegorically, Ibn al-Wazīr’s broad understand-
ing as to the actual difference between the divine and the human attributes
allows him to affirm all of God’s attributes. He maintains the ambiguity as to
their precise meaning.

3 Harmonized Doctrine: God’s Will (irāda)

Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of divine will and his harmonization of conflicting ideas
again underlines the central role the concept of God’s wisdom plays in Ibn
al-Wazīr’s thinking. He challenges the widely accepted assessment that the
Muʿtazili idea of a God who wills only what is just is essentially contrary to
the Ashʿari doctrine of a God who wills all that occurs.

3.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding God’s Will

Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of the divine will is characterized by a similar
harmonization of Muʿtazili and the Ashʿari positions as in the case of divine
attributes. At the heart of these issues is the execution of the Divine volition.
The conflicting concepts are illustrated by the question of why disobedience
exists in the face of God’s omnipotence. Does God will it or not? And if He does
not, why does it occur? Does not God have the power, for example, to guide the
disobedient to obedience? Or does He lead them into disobedience? The signif-
icance this question had for Ibn al-Wazīr is especially tangible in Īthar al-ḥaqq
and al-Ijāda fī l-irāda,111 or in al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt where he treats Q 16:93.112 How-
ever, it recurs throughout his writings and in the context of different questions,
indicating its key role in Muslim thought about God.

111 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 186 (in the context of elevating one divine name above an-
other), 201–204 (in the context of the negation of divine wisdom), 352 (in the context of
the question of the duration of hell-fire); cf. Hoover, Withholding Judgement 21–27.
112 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 289.

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Ibn al-Wazīr acknowledges that the gap between the two schools of thought,
i.e. the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya, appears to be particularly great with regard
to this question. Yet, he insists that ultimately all Muslim groups agree that God
can and does guide disobedient human beings in spite of seeming contradic-
tion:

It [the fifth study] is the most precious of all and sufficient for it [the
question of agreement]: The apparent meanings of the expressions of
Muʿtazila and Ashʿariyya in this question [right guidance for sinners]
show the utmost incompatibility. But a close examination of their posi-
tions necessitates that their words agree concerning the power of God,
the Exalted, to guide whomever He wills by benevolence and making
easy (taysīr). [They also agree] that God the Exalted, does not will dis-
obedience and shameful deeds. This is truly astonishing. One can hardly
believe it unless one has conducted sincere research and profound exam-
ination.113

Ibn al-Wazīr establishes the common ground:

It [God’s will] is the command (amr) by which the action of the freely
choosing agent occurs according to different aspects of good or evil, dif-
ferent degrees of much or little, and the rest of shapes and forms like
speed and slowness, according to purpose or against it in different points
of time.114

A paraphrase of Ibn al-Wazīr’s explanation reads as follows: As the Muʿtazila

hold, God hates disobedience. By no means does He love it. This, however, does
not mean that disobedience happens in contravention of the divine will, as

113 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 251. In the preceding discussion, Ibn al-Wazīr traces the rea-
sonings of prominent scholars of both sides. For the Muʿtazili side, he traces Abū ʿAlī
al-Jubbāʾī’s position, who tried to justify the limitedness of God’s power to right guidance
by limiting divine knowledge. According to Ibn al-Wazīr’s presentation of the argument,
this “excuse of the limiting of God’s power by another error” was merely a result of the
attempt to object to the Ashʿari insistence on the limitlessness of God’s power. Hence, Ibn
al-Wazīr considers this example appropriate to show that disagreement is restricted to
the play with and the entanglement of words, expressions and concepts. Ibn al-Malāḥimī
represents the return to the essential point of agreement with the Ashʿariyya; cf. ibid.,
252–253. For the question of divine guidance, see also Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt
289.
114 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 228.

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He has the power to realize whatever He wills.115 Disobedience is within God’s

will, as the Ashʿariyya hold. Yet, that disobedience is not intended for itself. The
Ashʿari doctrine that God is to be praised for the completeness of His power and
for the fulfillment of His will can be upheld. But the Muʿtazili appeal to God’s
justice does not have to be surrendered either. God wills that the agent chooses
in what characteristic the action occurs. This choice is rewarded or punished
according to the agent’s deserts.

3.1.1 Will and Love

Beyond what seems like an affirmation of apparently conflicting statements
and their integration into one general tenet, Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of divine
wisdom appears in the shape of “the relative or instrumental” vs. “the ultimate:”
something apparently evil may be willed, yet not for its own sake. After insist-
ing that some Muʿtazila affirm God’s ability to make the sinner a recipient of
guidance, Ibn al-Wazīr quotes from the Quran and explains:

{And there are others who are waiting for God’s decree, either to punish
them or to show them mercy. God is All-Knowing and All-Wise.} [Q 9:106]
Therein is an argument for the establishment of the wise purposefulness
of God, the Exalted, concerning their guidance which the intellect knows
to be good, and [concerning] the omission of guidance in spite of the
capacity to do so. Of these [latter] things, the intellect does not know the
goodness.116

The apparent conflict between the effective execution of God’s will (irāda)
on the one hand, and His aversion (karāha) to disobedience and evil on the
other, can be resolved by reference to God’s wise purposes. In cases where His
demand or decree effectuates an apparent evil or a seeming contradiction to
other important values and concepts, it cannot be for the sake of the appar-
ent evil. There must be an ultimate goal that is entirely good. The assurance of
the good as the ultimate purpose of the apparent evil maintains the integrity
of God’s will, even if that particular good is not within human comprehension.
Thus, the execution of God’s will is assured and God’s justice is maintained by
the assurance of purposefulness.
For the above distinction between what is willed ultimately and what is
willed relatively, Ibn al-Wazīr takes refuge in a distinction between will (irāda)

115 Ibid., 228.

116 Ibid., 252.

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and love (maḥabba). This distinction was made before Ibn al-Wazīr by Ibn
Taymiyya and a number of Ashʿaris, albeit with different conclusions. It is also
discussed in Muʿtazili literature.117 Ibn al-Wazīr claims that it originates in the
apparent text of the Scripture:

Resorting to belief in the general tenet is more prudent and preferable,

namely that God hates evil actions and does not love them; and that He is
capable of all things. If he wanted He could have rightly guided all people.
Verily, He has an effective wise purpose in all that He does, and omits, and
decrees and ordains. And this is not contradictory.118

According to Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding, the Quranic text is clear that God
does not love evil. In order to maintain that God’s will is always executed, it
must be something other than love. God’s will and aversion refers to another’s
actions only in a relative way, whereas love (maḥabba) and wrath (sukhṭ) refer
to another’s actions in an ultimate way. Elsewhere, Ibn al-Wazīr explains that
this means that will in its literal meaning does not refer to another’s action at
all; although it is used metaphorically for that purpose. Love, in contrast, refers
to the act of another in a literal way.

This part is the clearer one of the two [parts] on wise purposes. I mean the
part on those creatures that receive mercy. Apparently, the above-quoted
verse [Q 6:125]119 means that He wills that the straying from the right path
occurs through Him, although it [the straying] is a hateful disobedience
according to the text of the divine saying {The evil of all these actions
is hateful to your Lord}[Q 17:38]. (…) The will is not connected with the
action of another, rather it is love called will metaphorically which is con-
nected with it [the action of another]. This whole book is built on [the
principle] that we do not exchange the apparent meaning with the text.

117 Cf. ibid., 250. For a discussion of this distinction among Ashʿari theologians prior to Ibn
Taymiyya, see Bell, Love Theory, 50–60; and on Ibn Taymiyya’s thought and refutation of
the Ashʿari concepts, see ibid., 60.
118 In the preceding passage, Ibn al-Wazīr explains Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction between God’s
existential will (al-irāda al-kawniyya) and His prescriptive will (al-irāda al-sharʿiyya).
Although much of what Ibn al-Wazīr holds resembles Ibn Taymiyya’s view on the mat-
ter, Ibn al-Wazīr cannot verify Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction because his terminology is not
confirmed either in scripture or by the righteous forefathers; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq
249, italics mine. For Ibn Taymiyya’s distinction, see Bell, Love Theory 67.
119 The quoted part of Q 6:125 reads {when He [God] wishes to lead them astray, He closes
and constricts their breast}.

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Do you not see that His misguidance, of which the clear text says that it
is His will, can only be construed to mean that God does good things that
coincide ( yaqaʿa ʿindahā) with hateful sins on their part. Like what God,
the Exalted, says about the extension of provision in many verses and
prophetic traditions: It does not mean what they have stipulated, because
it is possible that the intention (murād) of such good actions which are
means to the most excellent morals in this world and the next, is forgive-
ness (ʿafw) after offense and charity towards the offender (…), like His will
in the creation and eternal life of unbelievers in spite of His aversion of
them. There is no contradiction between the two.120

In other words, God may do something according to His will that correlates
with another’s evil act which He abhors, but for the sake of some ultimate good
He may yet do it. Accordingly, God may will the evil action of a sinner for the
good of something else, never for its own sake. God’s will, either relative or ulti-
mate, is always executed. In contradistinction, not all that God loves comes into
being, and not everything that comes into being is loved by God.121
According to Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of the general tenet of the divine
will, the God-given rational original nature ( fiṭra) of all human beings is recep-
tive to the benevolence (luṭf ) of God’s guidance. God loves obedience and His
power to guide is not limited.122 But the question remains as to why some par-
ticular human beings happen to be rightly guided in the end, whereas others
are not. The answer to this question has to be surrendered to God’s hidden wis-
dom (ḥikma) in particular cases.123 He may abhor the action of the disobedient

120 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 242. Ibn al-Wazīr discusses several Ashʿari scholars who distin-
guish between God’s will and His love, prominent among them al-Shahrastānī; cf. ibid.,
277.
121 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim v, 382.
122 Ibn al-Wazīr does admit, though, that the Muʿtazila presuppose that a change of the
human constitution (binya) be effected by God before a disobedient human being can be
receptive to God’s guiding benevolence. Other schools, on the other hand, do not require
this. But this difference does not affect the essentials as understood by Ibn al-Wazīr; cf.
Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 251–252. Ibn al-Wazīr is careful to use the word binya and not
fiṭra when talking about the Muʿtazili position. Fiṭra may imply a moral, rational as well as
a pre-existential dimension. Ibn al-Wazīr’s distinction allows that binya is the post-natal
disposition which varies between people, whereas all mankind has the same fiṭrā. On
fiṭra, see MacDonald, Fiṭra. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the fiṭra can be corrupted, but does
not change or is not created with the inability to receive divine guidance. He can there-
fore use fiṭra, when talking about his own view of the entity that is always receptive to
benevolence. This fiṭra would not be changed, like the binya, but only healed.
123 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 229, 278.

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human being, yet does not choose to guide him rightly because of some hidden
wise purpose. Note that the knowledge of the ultimate end in the quote above,
i.e. forgiveness in spite of sin, was only a possible, never a certain option.

3.1.2 Will and Motive

Another question that was much debated in the context of God’s will was
whether or not God’s will is identical to His motive (dāʿī). The concept of a
motive is closely linked to the concepts of a wise purpose as referred to above.
In the theological debates, the question was significant because a motive could
be understood as a factor that determines God’s will.124
It is especially in this context that Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the understand-
ing of divine will among theologians of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school, and it
seems that Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school once again helps to establish what Ibn al-
Wazīr takes to be an essential agreement. In one instance, Ibn al-Wazīr argues
that Abū l-Ḥusayn defines will as “the preponderant motive (al-dāʿī al-rājiḥ)
that arises from the knowledge of what results from the action.”125 Although
the majority of the Muʿtazila as well as the Ashʿariyya apparently reject this
idea, Ibn al-Wazīr sees a uniting factor in Abū l-Ḥusayn’s equation of will and
motive.126 The conflict Ibn al-Wazīr refers to is that between the Muʿtazili doc-
trine that God’s will is contingent, and the Ashʿari doctrine that it is eternal.
Arguing from Abū l-Ḥusayn’s equation of will and motive, Ibn al-Wazīr writes
that “this leads to something like the Ashʿari position concerning the eternity
of the will (qidam al-irāda).”127
The conflict takes shape, for example, in the question of how the Quranic
term “God’s misguidance” (iḍlāl) is to be understood in terms of His will to
punish. Is His will eternal, thereby excluding that anything but what He wills
occurs? Or is it contingent, coming into being in the moment the intended
thing (the punishment) is justified by the occurrence of sin? Ibn al-Wazīr res-
cues the concept of an eternal will from injustice by defining the implied prede-
termination (qadar) as “knowledge, recording, and willing the punishment that

124 I referred to this problem above, when discussing Ibn al-Wazīr’s attempt to prove the
agreement between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya by referring to the concept of the
preponderator (murajjiḥ).
125 “Al-dāʿī al-rājiḥ al-rājiʿ ilā l-ʿilm li-mulāzamat al-fiʿl li-dhālika wa-li-mulāzamat al-irāda
lahu”; Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 267.
126 The rejection of the equation of will and motive is well documented, see for example
Ibn al-Malāhimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 240; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 58; al-Ḥayyī, al-
Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 74b; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 226; McDermott,
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on God’s Volition 89.
127 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 267.

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is deserved by action.”128 Ibn al-Wazīr takes Abū l-Ḥusayn’s equation to mean

that he defines will as knowledge. After all, it is the knowledge of the results that
determines the motive and the will accordingly. And whoever holds to such a
definition cannot reject the idea of the eternity of the divine will, according to
Ibn al-Wazīr.129
It is relatively well documented that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī equated God’s
will with His motive.130 Accordingly, Ibn al-Malāḥimī could argue that evil
could not be part of God’s will because, being wise, He could have no motive
to do evil.131 Motive, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, is the knowledge of the
benefit of the action.132 His and probably Abū l-Ḥusayn’s definition of motive
resembles Ibn al-Wazīr’s definition of ḥikma. Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of ḥikma
describes “the knowledge of the most excellent of actions and the action
according to that knowledge.”133 Both concepts are determined by the knowl-
edge of the result of the action.134 In God’s case, His perfect knowledge ensures
the best of motives, and the wisest of purposes.
Ibn al-Wazīr concludes that will is knowledge according to Abū l-Ḥusayn.
Therefore being willing to punish, or talking of “leading astray” before it is
deserved, neither causes the punishment nor is it unjust.135 This understanding
fits well with Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of the wise purpose that is intended
by a seeming evil action or command on God’s part, the purpose being an abso-
lute good that only God knows of. Hence, if God does something apparently
evil, it is the wisest action in reaction to His foreknowledge of what will hap-
pen. He wills this, His own action, for a relative purpose, thereby determining

128 Ibid., 244.

129 Besides Abū l-Ḥusayn, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions the Baghdadi branch of the Muʿtazila as
examples of the same view; cf. ibid. Ibn al-Wazīr probably refers to Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām,
Abū ʿUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī, who are known to have held
corresponding views; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 240. According to Ansari,
Madelung and Schmidtke, the association of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school with Abū
l-Qāsim al-Balkhī and the Baghdadis was apparently not uncommon among Zaydi; cf.
Ansari et al., Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s Rebuttal 36.
130 This is true of those who endorse Abū l-Ḥusayn’s theological doctrine, see Taqī l-Dīn al-
ʿUjālī, al-Kāmil 284; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, al-Muʿtamad 240; Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 223,
228–232, as well as those who mostly opted for the Bahshami position; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-
Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 74b.
131 McDermott, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on God’s Volition 90.
132 Cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 241, 248.
133 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 181.
134 The motive does not necessarily need to be good, although of course it is where God is
concerned; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 247–248.
135 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 244.

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the human action which He hates for itself, yet which He knows will happen.
Accordingly, Ibn al-Wazīr can claim Muʿtazili support for his thesis that God
could have guided the disobedient differently—for example by giving them
another constitution (binya)—but did not for some good reason only known
to himself:

After mentioning that the Muʿtazila agree with ahl al-sunna, Ibn al-Malā-
ḥimī basically says: “If it is asked ‘What do you mean by the creation of
one who is disobedient according to a constitution that is not receptive
to benevolence in spite of God’s power to create them according to a con-
stitution that is receptive to benevolence, or even to infallibility?’, we say
that God has a wise purpose in a general way [ʿalā sabīl al-ijmāl], but that
we do not know its details.” So, after asserting that the obvious meanings
of [the texts of] Quran, Sunna and the traditions of the righteous forefa-
thers are ignominious, and [after] embarking on everything difficult and
base in their allegorical interpretation, the Muʿtazila returned to what the
ahl al-sunna began with. If only I knew what the difference is supposed
to be between the Muʿtazili admission of this unknown wise purpose and
the admission that God, the Exalted, wills the occurrence of the sins of
disobedient humans and omits to guide them rightly in spite of His power
to do so for some wise purpose that we do not know, rather than because
of the evil aspect for which it [the disobedience] is called evil and is hated.
Even if some Muʿtazila disagree in this, we are content to gather from this
that the ahl al-sunna occupy a position that Muʿtazila like Abū l-Ḥusayn
and his followers approve of.136

We are not interested here in Ibn al-Wazīr’s interpretation of the Muʿtazili con-
cept of binya. Rather, we are interested in the agreement with his own thinking
that Ibn al-Wazīr spots in Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s concept of binya and divine
guidance: the divine knowledge of an absolute good unknown to human beings
that is tantamount to God’s will to permit or to do something apparently evil
or unjust in spite of His power to act in a way that appears good and just.
Ibn al-Wazīr argues that the concept of God’s wisdom exists in the contend-
ing schools albeit in different forms. Accordingly, he could call it one of the
general tenets ( jumal). He achieved this basically by equating the concepts
preponderator (murajjiḥ), motive (dāʿī) and wise purposes (ḥikam) behind

136 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 19, 123. See also Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 251–252, in the con-
text of the divine will.

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actions. However, as pointed out earlier, Ibn al-Wazīr himself did distinguish
between a motive and wisdom, for example to point out the difference between
a divine action and that of a common human being or a madman. The fact
that Ibn al-Wazīr ascribes a motive to the madman and distinguishes between
motive and wise purpose is another point supporting the thesis that he favored
Abū l-Ḥusayn’s teachings.137 Where Ibn al-Wazīr equated the preponderator,
the motive and the wise purposes, he referred to God’s will and actions. In
contrast, where he distinguished between motive and wisdom, he referred to
human beings. Similarly, Abū l-Ḥusayn equates motive and will where God
is concerned, and allows that will is something additional to motive where
human beings are concerned.138
The reason for the distinction, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, would be that God
knows what is really the best outcome, something human beings do not know.
Their motive does not require rationality and awareness, they might not be
guided by wisdom, or their knowledge of what would be best and most ben-
eficial is limited. Not so for God. For that reason, human beings often do not
know what God intends in particular nor exactly what the wise purpose.139

3.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of God’s Will

Ibn al-Murtaḍā discusses God’s will as part of divine justice especially in his
Kitāb al-Qalāʾid and its commentary al-Durar al-farāʾid, and to a lesser degree
in his Riyāḍat al-afhām.140 Ibn al-Murtaḍā clearly holds that God does not will
evil and that He cannot guide the disobedient. Indeed, He would have to, if
He could.141 Rather, according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, God “wills that which is bet-
ter done than left undone”142 as opposed to the position of what he calls the
compulsionists (Mujbira), according to whom God wills everything that hap-

137 Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, made even an unconscious or unre-
flected action dependent on a motive, albeit to a minor degree. Madelung showed how
this altered the Muʿtazili theory of act and responsibility, as consciousness and rational
reflection no longer delimitated the concept of motive and knowledge; cf. Madelung, Late
Muʿtazila 251.
138 Cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 240.
139 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 267. In fact, Abū l-Ḥusayn argued in a similar way. This is one
of the few points in which Ibn al-Malāḥimī apparently disagreed with his master. Ibn
al-Malāḥimī equated will and motive in the divine as well as the human realm; cf. Ibn
al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 241. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, in his discussion of the different posi-
tions on irāda, notes the disagreement; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
f. 74b.
140 Ibn al-Murtaḍā is sure to have treated the subject elsewhere as well.
141 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 74a.
142 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitab al-Qalāʾid 58.

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pens. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, and with him most of the Muʿtazila and Zaydiyya (as he
claims), does not distinguish between God’s will and His love or approval (riḍā)
of an action. In Riyāḍat al-afhām he writes:

Love, hatred, anger, displeasure, wrath and approval are names for will
and antagonism that occur in different manners. We say, that love is
the will to benefit the beloved and antagonism his harm. There is no
other meaning apart from this. (…) Approval of an action is to will it and
[approval] of the agent is to will his aggrandizement.143

Similarly in al-Durar al-farāʾid, Ibn al-Murtaḍā clarifies that God does not will
anything He does not love or approve of.144 We can conclude from this that Ibn
al-Murtaḍā could not envision God willing anything like the disobedience of a
sinner for some good purpose without approving of the sin itself. Neither could
He will to refrain from giving sinners right guidance based on some unknown
wisdom, and thereby fail to do His duty. In both cases, God’s justice would be
violated in an inconceivable way. No unknown purpose could justify divine love
for something obviously evil.
As mentioned above, God’s justice requires that He does not will anything
evil. One of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s arguments for this, and indeed a common Muʿta-
zili one, is that God is wise. God’s wisdom provides that He acts from a motive
(dāʿī), and since He has no motive for evil actions, He does not commit such
actions. So far, this does not seem any different from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s
and Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s position. It must be asked then how Ibn al-Murtaḍā
answered the question of whether God’s will is identical to His motive. The
later Bahshami theologians, and along with them Ibn al-Murtaḍā, held that
God’s will is not identical to motive. Ibn al-Murtaḍā answers this question more
extensively for the human side. However, the Bahshami Muʿtazila often argue
based on an analogy between God and human beings (qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿalā l-
shāhid). This allows us to illustrate Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of God’s will
by quoting from a passage on human will.145 Ibn al-Murtaḍā cites four positions
on the issue of the quiddity (māhiyya) of the will, with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s

143 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 143.

144 Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 78a.
145 According to al-Ḥayyī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā himself argues thus after a long passage on the
human will in al-Durar al-farāʾid: “He [God] is willing in the true sense which means that
an attribute of willingness (murīdiyya) can be established for Him according to the def-
inition that has been established for us. And it is in His case additional to motive and
deterrent, as it is in our case.” Al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 75a.

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view of the identity of will and motive in the unseen world as the fourth one.
A little later, Ibn al-Murtaḍā writes:

The method by which it was established that they [irāda and karāha]
are additional to desire and aversion (al-shahwa wa-l-nafra) is the same
by which it is established that they [irāda and karāha] are additional to
motive and deterrent. Do you not see that the hungry person has ample
motives for eating, yet may not intend to take food because it belongs to
someone else or the like. Hence, the motive is not the will.146

Although Ibn al-Murtaḍā negates the equation of will and motive, he does
acknowledge that a knowing person has a motive or an effect that renders the
action preponderant over non-action. Yet this motive or effect is only a relative
(iʿtibārī) requisite of the action that influences the will to do the action.147
For Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the will is identical to the
preponderant motive. Therefore the knowledge of the outcome may be taken to
determine what God wills.148 This is a problem that was pointed out by Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī and resulted in charging Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī with determinism,
as McDermott, Madelung and Gimaret have shown.149 Ibn al-Murtaḍā demon-
strates Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s determinism based on the latter’s adoption of Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s concept of the preponderant motive as the determinant of
action.150 But if God’s will is equated with His motive and hence as determin-

146 Ibid., f. 74b.

147 Ibid., f. 73b.
148 This charge could be extended to the matter of human will and action for all those who
draw an analogy between the seen and the unseen world in general, or in this question
in particular. Abū l-Ḥusayn, in contrast to his follower Ibn al-Malāḥimī, does not apply
the identity of motive and will to the human realm. As Madelung has shown, it was rather
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī himself whose “argument of the preponderator involved him in insol-
uble problems while trying to defend the Muslim belief in a freely choosing creator God
against the philosophers’ view of God as the necessitating cause of the world.” Madelung,
Late Muʿtazila 256. It seems that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī solved the problem by ignoring his
own requirement of motives for God analogous to human actions. He asserted that God’s
will itself is the preponderator.
149 Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain 34; McDermott, Abū l-Ḥusayn on God’s volition 68,
footnote 1; Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 246. Madelung questions Gimaret’s concession to
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s accusation that Abū l-Ḥusayn holds to determinism, and rightly so.
Of course, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s main argument refers to the determination of human
acts, but Abū l-Ḥusayn’s concept of the preponderant motive as determining the action
holds true for divine as well as human actions.
150 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 73b; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 294–
296.

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ing His action according to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, what reasons does God have
for his will to act according to a particular motive in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s view?
Although this question is not answered explicitly by Ibn al-Murtaḍā in any of
the consulted texts, his argument for God’s justice is telling: God cannot will or
do evil, as we were told above. For Ibn al-Murtaḍā, this necessarily means that
God must fulfill a duty (siḥḥa wujūb al-wājib).151 Or, to be more precise, God is
obliged to a set of duties that follow from His justice and His acting according
to the highest benefit (al-aṣlaḥ) of human beings.
It appears that obliging God to do what is most beneficial for the human
being (al-aṣlaḥ) in order to maintain His justice does not determine God’s will
in any less significant way, even if God’s will should be something additional to
His motive. Whereas God seems obliged to act according to His preponderant
motive according to Abū l-Ḥusayn and those who follow him, God is obliged to
act according to man’s highest benefit according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā and other
Bahshami Muʿtazila.
The determining factor in Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s view seems somewhat
vague. McDermott suggests that “Abū l-Ḥusayn has God willing, it seems, for
no reason.”152 I would add, ‘[for no reason] other than the existence of a pre-
ponderant motive.’ But this vagueness goes very well with Ibn al-Wazīr’s con-
cept of the hidden purpose behind God’s actions that is often unknown to
human beings: God intends, for example, not to guide some sinners to paradise,
although He could have given them a new binya, because He knows something
that human beings do not know. This is not arbitrary, let alone evil. The reason
for this particular “willing” is merely not known. Claiming to know the wise
purpose behind this is erroneous.153

3.3 Conclusion
Ibn al-Wazīr would not have agreed with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s charge of deter-
minism toward Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī because of the latter’s concept of
motives. Ibn al-Wazīr has shown this, for example, in his juxtaposition of Abū l-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī in Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf. In his view, and
supposedly that of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, God’s will is determined by some wise
purpose—or preponderant motive—that is hidden to human understanding.
But the existence of this purpose does not forestall freedom of will on God’s
part. The exact purpose and the way it comes about is uncertain, yet certainly
wise and good. It is the role played by ambiguity in Abū l-Ḥusayn’s thought that

151 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 74a.

152 McDermott, Abū l-Ḥusayn on God’s volition 92.
153 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim v, 277.

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seems to render him favorable for Ibn al-Wazīr’s harmonization, as well as sup-
portive of his own thinking.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s concept of God’s will and His action, although proved not
to be evil by his insistence on God’s wisdom, is determined by God’s justice
and the human knowledge of what this justice entails in particular instances.
If God failed to lead some to paradise by withholding guidance or a change of
constitution, this would have to be proved as being just and for human benefit.
Since it cannot be proved to be such, God cannot will or do such a thing. The
same is true of man’s disobedient actions.
Whereas God’s will is determined by His justice in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking,
Ibn al-Wazīr—and, it seems, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī—has it determined by His
superior knowledge. In contrast to Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of a hidden purpose
behind God’s will that is unknown but sure to be wise and good, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
has human beings able to determine with certainty what God wills in general
as well as in particular instances. This, of course, renders it easy to judge the
conclusions on God’s will that other scholars or scholars of other schools draw.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s lack of certainty concerning what exactly God wills leaves room
for a number of probable conclusions. However, since certain answers as to
what exactly God wills and why cannot be given, the different answers must be
accepted as equally probable. The question remains ambiguous.

4 Harmonized Doctrine: Human Actions (afʿāl al-ʿibād) and Free

Will (ikhtiyār)

Closely related to the doctrine of God’s will is the doctrine of human actions
(afʿāl al-ʿibād) and free will (ikhtiyār). The debate is especially intense with
regard to the question of responsibility for evil human actions. Who is the agent
of these actions and therefore responsible for them? Are these actions com-
pelled or do they happen in violation of God’s will? As is the case with God’s
will, the Muʿtazila are concerned with maintaining God’s justice, whereas the
Ashʿariyya attempt to champion God’s omnipotence. Here as above, Ibn al-
Wazīr’s position on the question of human responsibility for actions is manifest
in his description of an agreement between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya.154

154 Ibn al-Wazīr’s description of the agreement excludes two extreme positions. On the
extreme side of predetermination is the what Ibn al-Wazīr calls the “Jahmiyya” or “pure
Jabriyya (al-Jabriyya al-khāliṣa)” or “the extremist Jabriyya (ghulāt al-Jabriyya al-khāliṣa).”
These groups claim that human will and power have no effect on human action what-
soever, and do not acknowledge the self-evident distinction between a voluntary action

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Accordingly, Ibn al-Wazīr defends both notions: Human actions are not com-
pelled ( jabr or iljāʿ) but happen according to human beings’ free choice. Yet
every human action occurs according to God’s will and power.

4.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Harmonization Regarding Human Actions and Free

Will
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the points of agreement between Muʿtazila and
Ashʿariyya consist in the two major notions above, albeit expressed in differ-
ent, complicated and often ostensibly contradicting terminology.155 Both God
and man play their very distinct parts in the occurrence of human actions. This
is masterfully illustrated in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf with regard to
human faith. In al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between “the obvious
side” (al-ṭaraf al-jalī) and “the hidden side” (al-ṭaraf al-khafī) of human actions.
All apparently agree that, on the obvious side, human actions are dependent on
human choice and motive. This renders it possible for man to be responsible for
his actions. He is responsible, because he wills an action to occur in a particular
way and thus performs it.156 The hidden side refers to the existence of actions in
their essential form (ḥaqīqat afʿāl al-ʿibād ʿalā jihat al-taʿyīn wa-l-tamyīz lahā ʿan
sāʾir al-ḥaqāʾiq). In this regard, they originate with God in one way or another.157
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, agreement exists between the schools that an essen-
tial part of the action is beyond human power, or that it happened with some
kind of help (iʿāna) from God. Hence, man does not perform his action com-
pletely independently (mustaqill).158 God’s part, in contrast, cannot be defined
with equal certainty.

(ḥarakat al-mukhtār) and an involuntary action (ḥarakat al-maflūj wa-l-masḥūb). The

other extreme is represented by the extreme Qadariyya. They are said to hold that God
has neither influence on nor foreknowledge of human actions, or future events for that
matter. Ibn al-Wazīr excludes both groups from the discussion, as they either no longer
exist or are rejected by the entirety of the Muslim community; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim
vii, 6, 73 (where he refers to Shaykh Mukhtār for this distinction.); Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-
ḥaqq 287.
155 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq, 285–286. Ḥajar agrees with Ibn al-Wazīr that it is virtually
impossible to clearly charge one entire group with believing in predestination; cf. Ḥajar,
Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 344. Al-Kamālī, discussing Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought, repeat-
edly states how complicated and extensive the conflict about this topic has been, espe-
cially on the question of acquisition, without “ever arriving at real results.” Al-Kamālī,
al-Imām al-Mahdī 286–287.
156 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 28.
157 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 281–283, 294, 308, quote 282.
158 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 13.

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In contrast to what Ibn al-Wazīr illustrates, Zaydis influenced by Bahshami-

Muʿtazili doctrine do in fact hold that it is possible, and indeed imperative,
to define the exact nature of the essence of human action.159 The difference
between Ibn al-Wazīr’s attempt to harmonize conflicting understandings of
human actions based on his epistemology of ambiguity on the one hand, and
the Zaydi-Muʿtazili attempt to define correct doctrine in detail by means of
unimpeachable inferences on the other, is especially prominent in two central
notions of the concept of human actions, namely capacity (qudra) and motive
(dāʿī).

4.1.1 Action and Capacity

Ibn al-Wazīr has no difficulty in upholding God’s creation of acts (khalq) as
well as real human responsibility. True to type, he again maintains the “golden
mean” also ascribed to Ibn Taymiyya.160 The Ashʿari idea of appropriation
(kasb)161 is no absurdity to him: God creates the essence of an act. This essence
does not have the attribute of good or evil. Rather, God’s agency may be taken to
signify the transfer of the act from non-existence to existence. Human beings
appropriate the act by performing it in a way that renders it praiseworthy or
reprehensible.

The essence [of the act] that is dependent on the power of the Lord can-
not be described as evil (qabḥ) as the two sides, Muʿtazila and Ashʿariyya,
agree. Rather, it [the act] is described as evil by the admission of all,
because it occurs according to different aspects and additional relative
manners (iʿtibārāt iḍāfiyya). And it [the act] does not occur according to
these by the power of the Lord, as all agree as well, because these aspects
are no real entities (ashiyāʾ ḥaqīqiyya), according to all. That which is
ascribed to God, the Exalted, of human acts is the move of the essence of
the acts that are real entities from non-existence to existence. The capac-
ity of human beings effect that the essences of the acts occur according to
different aspects. And because they occur according to these only by the
capacity of human beings, they [the acts] deserve names that could not be
ascribed to God at all, like worship, obedience and disobedience. If these

159 See also Hajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 348.

160 Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 173.
161 I tend towards the translation of kasb as “appropriation” used first by Watt, as it seems to
express the active part of “performing something” or “doing something” (iktasaba) more
strongly than either of those two terms. For Ibn al-Wazīr, the human beings’ activity in
their own actions cannot be overemphasized; cf. Watt, The Origin 237.

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aspects happened by the power of God, the Exalted, He would have to be

called worshipping, disobeying, praying, fasting and the like. And whereas
these names cannot be attributed to Him—rather, He is called Creator,
Originator and Producer—this indicates that that which is dependent on
the power of Him, the Glorified, is that from which His Beautiful Names
are derived. And that which is derived from one word differs according to
its different aspects.162

Ibn al-Wazīr incorporates concepts into this discussion that are also used in
the question of al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlī without much differentiation. In
this latter context, the “way” or “aspect” or “respect” is referred to as “wajh” or
“jiha” by some Muʿtazili scholars, or as referring to the “state” (ḥāl), manner
(ʿayn) or attribute (ṣifa) of the action by others.163 In the context of the Ashʿari
concept of acquisition, this concept of the non-essential part of actions is also
expressed by the idea of “relativity” (iʿtibār).164 Elsewhere, Ibn al-Wazīr calls
this way or aspect the “particular form” (hayʾa makhṣūṣa).165 Whichever name
is given to the morally assessable aspect of the action, the human being is its
real agent, because he has a will and a motive that corresponds to the action
in its state of moral assessability. The action that human beings perform is the
side (ṭaraf ) of it that deserves praise or punishment, although God has a part
in the creation of the action.166 Several ideas exist among the Muʿtazila that

162 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 28.

163 The goodness or evil of an action is not essential but rather refers to the condition (ḥāl) of
the action; cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 319–320. In Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr writes
that will “is that by which the action of a freely choosing agent occurs in its different
aspects (or literally: manners—wujūh) as to good and evil, its different degrees as to plenty
and scarcity etc.” He claims consensus for this definition as far as it goes; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr,
Īthār al-ḥaqq 228. For ʿAbd al-Jabbār and the aspects or aḥwāl that render something oblig-
atory etc., see also Brunschvig, Muʿtazilism et Optimum 14–15. According to Peters, the
Muʿtazili position represented by ʿAbd al-Jabbār discerns the point where an act becomes
morally assessable in “the way” it is brought into existence; cf. Peters, God’s Created Speech
415. However, according to Omari, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī held the view that an act is called
good or evil because of its attributes (ṣifātihi) and manner (ʿaynihi), but this was refuted
by the Basran Muʿtazila; cf. Omari, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī 72. For Ibn al-
Wazīr’s concept of jumal, this would make no difference. The distinctions between the
terms and even between the different understandings of the same terms as described, for
example, by Frank are effectively ignored by Ibn al-Wazīr; cf. Frank, Ḥāl.
164 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 13.
165 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 362.
166 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 282. In al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 361, Ibn al-Wazīr has an Ashʿari affirm
the apparent agreement on the general doctrine of the human action: “We say that human
beings have no effective power on the essence of their actions. The Muʿtazila consider this

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Ibn al-Wazīr interprets to the effect that there is a side to human action that
is beyond human power. Many Muʿtazila would not ascribe the creation of the
essence of action to God. They take it to have a real existence in pre-eternity
(thābita fī l-azal), without being an object of God’s power.167 However, accord-
ing to Ibn al-Wazīr, some of those Muʿtazilis who ascribe creation to human
beings take this creative act to refer to the attribute of existence of the essence
(ṣifat al-wujūd) rather than the essence itself.168 In both cases, the essence of
the act could be understood as being beyond the realm of immediate human
influence. And this is precisely what Ibn al-Wazīr attempts to show in order to
furnish proof for his harmonization efforts.
Put thus, it seems that Ibn al-Wazīr accepts the concepts of kasb and “one
object of power for two wielders of power” (maqdūr bayna qādirayn). In some
passages in al-ʿAwāṣim, he employs this terminology in his discussion of human
actions.169 This, however, should be seen as a means of harmonization rather
than as Ibn al-Wazīr’s own terminology.170 In the above-mentioned passage in

sound. We say that human beings have an effective power on the attributes of good and
evil. This also is considered sound by the Muʿtazila. The majority of the Muʿtazila have
established that actions are not good or bad in their essence. Rather, [they become such]
by occurring in a certain manner or regard. This is because the essences of humans beings’
actions are all one.”
167 This thought is part of the Muʿtazili theory of substances. It says that in non-existence
(ʿadam) all essences are alike (tamāthul); cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 282–283. Azal
(pre-eternity) must be distinguished from qidam (eternity) in that azal has no begin-
ning, whereas qidam has neither beginning and nor end. Non-existence (ʿadam) can apply
to both; cf. R. Arnaldez, Ḳidam. However, according to Bahshami-Muʿtazili teaching, the
essence of the act that exists in pre-eternity is not subject to God’s power (ghayr maqdara
li-llāh); cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim v, 270; vi, 14.
168 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 361–362. For a list of eight Muʿtazili and four Ashʿari posi-
tions on the question, see Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 10–14. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, for example,
distinguishes between the neutral act that has no other attributes but existence, and acts
with moral value that have further attributes added to the attribute of existence. An exam-
ple of the first would be an act performed while sleeping. An example of the second kind
of act would be lying. These added attributes then are the entitative ground for the char-
acteristic of an act; cf. Ghaneabassiri, Epistemological Foundations 81.
169 God’s power (qudra) effects that the neutral essence of the action comes into existence.
Man’s power (qudra) effects ( yuʾaththir) the assessable aspect of the action (wujūh al-ḥusn
wa-l-qabḥ); cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 32.
170 In other instances, Ibn al-Wazīr questions the expression of maqdūr bayna qādirayn. This,
I think, can be explained by Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim that God’s and man’s actions do not really
refer to the same aspect of the object of power (maqdūr). Indeed, man’s part in the action
cannot really be called creation; cf. ibid., vii, 24. For the corresponding Muʿtazili discussion
of the term creation (khalq), see for example al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
f. 86b.

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al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr seeks to demonstrate that not all Muʿtazilis rejected
the concept of appropriation outright,171 and some even endorsed the idea of
maqdūr bayna qādirayn.172 Again, it is Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his disciples
who function as examples of a supposed agreement.

Abū l-Ḥusayn has permitted what the inquirer has prohibited, [namely]
that the physical essence [of the action] (al-dhāt al-jismiyya) is an action
of God, the Exalted, and that its [the physical essence’s] attributes which
are generated according to different respects (ṣifātuhā l-kawniyya fī l-
jihāt), are the actions of human beings. He [Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī] has
done enough to refute him who considers this impossible. Whoever wants
to, let him study his [Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s] books and the books of his
adherents like Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī, and beyond that [the books] of
Mukhtār, author of al-Mujtabā, and of [Imam] Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza.173

Although this does not mean that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī defends the Ashʿari
concept of kasb, it does substantiate Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim that there are Muʿta-
zilis who do not consider it altogether irrational (ghayr maʿqūl).174 The same
could be said of Ibn al-Wazīr. Two pages later, Ibn al-Wazīr explicitly says that he
shares the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers on the question.175
The explicitness of this endorsement (al-mukhtār ʿindī qawl Abī l-Ḥusayn) is
rather significant, as Ibn al-Wazīr refrains from positioning himself with any
group apart from what he ascribes to the righteous forefathers in most cases.
The background for Ibn al-Wazīr’s utilization of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is the
latter’s theory of the states (aḥwāl) of essences and bodies which was described
above in the argument for God’s existence. According to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,
the accidents of substances are not real entities (dhawāt, maʿānī) with an inde-

171 The often-cited Shaykh Mukhtār is again an example of a Muʿtazili who gives the Ashʿari
position the benefit of the doubt and does not dismiss the matter of kasb as outright irra-
tional; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 56. For an account of the possible origin of the theory
along with the different definitions, see Watt, The Origin. He shows that the concept was
neither originated by al-Ashʿarī nor restricted to the Ashʿariyya, but rather was connected
with the early Muʿtazila, especially the school of Baghdad. This supports Ibn al-Wazīr’s
emphasis on the similarities between the Ashʿariyya and the Muʿtazila.
172 Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza confirms this for Abū l-Ḥusayn; cf. Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 138–141.
173 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 70; see also ibid., 56–57.
174 When claiming this, Ibn al-Wazīr often refers to Shaykh Mukhtār as a representative of
Abū l-Ḥusayn’s school, see also ibid., 56, 66.
175 By his own admission, Ibn al-Wazīr does not hold to kasb, rather “his choice” (al-mukhtār
ʿindī) is that of Abū l-Ḥusayn; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 72.

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pendent existence, but rather states (aḥwāl) or characteristics (aḥkām).176 For

the question of human agency, this theory is important as it means that human
beings can only affect the characteristics of substances, bodies or essences
(actions in this case),177 without negating the self-evident nature of human
agency.178 In fact, Ibn al-Wazīr must have meant Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī when he
spoke of Muʿtazilis who thought that man did not really produce the essence
of the action, but rather the non-entitative aspects that render an action good
or evil, obedient or disobedient. In Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr ascribes this
very position not only to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his disciples, but to Imam
Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza and “the majority of ahl al-bayt. (…) And this is what is con-
tained in the original disposition of every compos mentis whose fiṭra has not
been changed with a change of teachers.”179 In other words, it needs no philo-
sophical speculation to know that human beings’ capacity to bring about their
actions bears upon that part of the actions that deserves praise or blame, leav-
ing room for a less defined influence of God on the actions. Attempts such as
the Ashʿari kasb-theory or Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s aḥwāl-theory to define the
details of this necessary knowledge may or may not be employed, according to
Ibn al-Wazīr, but they should certainly not be condemned as they fall within
the realm of possible explanations. In fact, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s teachings
prove once again a helpful tool for Ibn al-Wazīr to argue for an essential agree-
ment in a way that was acceptable in a context where Muʿtazili doctrine was
highly esteemed.
The significance of this last statement for Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking also deter-
mines his means of harmonization concerning another central aspect of
human responsibility, namely the motive.

4.1.2 Action and Motive

Besides the question of essence and capacity, human responsibility finds
expression in the question of free choice (ikhtiyār). According to Abrahamov, a
theory of actions and freedom must include something on the role that motives
play.180 As should be clear by now, Ibn al-Wazīr affirms that human beings
have free will. Reminiscent of the Muʿtazili doctrine, man is by no means com-

176 For Abū l-Ḥusayn, existence (wujūd) was tied to essence. Nothing non-essential could
exist independently; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 6b, 26b; Madelung
and Schmidtke, Rational Theology 5; Schmidtke, The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī 181–184.
177 Madelung and Schmidtke, Rational Theology 5–7.
178 See for example Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-Tamhīd i, 120–122.
179 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 285, 295.
180 Abrahamov, A Re-Examination 215.

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pelled ( jabr) to do anything he does not also will to do or for which he has no
motive.181 Human beings choose whether to perform or omit an action in con-
crete circumstances that are related to command or prohibition. This choice
renders an action either an act of obedience or of disobedience. And this choice
determines whether or not human beings deserve praise or blame, reward or
punishment. As became evident, for example, in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Āyāt al-mubīnāt
where he interprets a verse often used to defend the doctrine of predestina-
tion, God does not “lead astray” (iḍlāl) before this is deserved in one way or
another.182 The choice is not unaided, as for example there may be a motive,
which God may influence.183 But it is man’s choice nevertheless, and therefore
his own act and his own merit.184
Generally, motives are considered to be under divine influence.185 So even if
opinions differed on the degree of divine influence on motives, Ibn al-Wazīr
was able to claim agreement between the schools in the sense that human
beings do not perform their part of the action entirely independently. God
could influence their choice in a certain direction. Yet, when and to what degree
He does so is to be left within the realm of uncertainty.186 Again the question
of guidance is used as an example: Guidance is understood by Ibn al-Wazīr as

181 ʿAbd al-Jabbār argued that man is responsible for his actions because it is his own will and
his own motive that causes him to perform these actions. Motives consist in the knowl-
edge, presumption or belief that performing a particular act is beneficial or averts harm; cf.
Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 246. However, according to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, the act is not neces-
sitated by the preponderant motive. For the difference between ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s concept
of motive and that of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī as rendered by Ibn al-Malāḥimī see especially
Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 250–257; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 270.
182 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 285.
183 For example, motivation is influenced by all kinds of knowledge, including necessary
knowledge. Necessary knowledge is created by God in man. However, man still has to
decide between items of knowledge and motives, according to ʿAbd al-Jabbār; cf. Gimaret,
Théories de l’acte humain 48–49; Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 246.
184 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, 359.
185 In the case of Bahshami theologians like ʿAbd al-Jabbār, such an example for a motivation
created by God would be the warner (khāṭir) who initiates the first duty of philosophi-
cal reflection (naẓar). For the connection between motive and warner in ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s
thought, see Ghaneabassiri, Epistemological Foundation 83–84. Furthermore, it is God
who creates the necessary knowledge, as I discussed above. “God could be seen to be
directly responsible, thus, for the basis of all motivation of action and for the actuality
of that which leads man to seek God, viz., the desire, knowledge, and fearful concern that
impel man to seek the locus of his ultimate well-being, as also He furnishes the material
evidence that will lead to the knowledge thus sought and the possibility of understanding
them.” Frank, Fundamental Assumptions 13.
186 Ibid., 13.

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the creation of incentives to do good. This is called luṭf, hidāya, ʿiṣma or taysīr
in different contexts. In the context of the point in question, Ibn al-Wazīr calls
it taysīr in the sense that God makes the righteous path easier by providing
motives. The strength of the motives He creates, or whether He omits to guide
in particular cases, is determined by God’s wise, yet unknown purposes.187
The discussion of an action’s motive is yet another point for Ibn al-Wazīr to
argue for harmonization, and one where Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school again
proves conducive to the task. Abū l-Ḥusayn held that there is no action with-
out a motive and that the preponderant motive is a necessitating cause of the
action—a concept that was adopted by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, as discussed above
in the case of divine will.188 However, for Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī the preponder-
ant motive is caused by God. Accordingly, he deployed the concept as a means
to prove determinism.189 In contrast, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī used the concept
to prove that man is truly responsible for his actions. He argued that man’s
actions are known to be his by necessity (ḍarūratan). According to him, it is
self-evident to man that his own actions occur according to his motives. Fur-
thermore, all compos mentis know intuitively that it is good to praise one who
does good or reprimand an evildoer. Or if one asks another to do something, he
knows by necessity that the other is the producer (muḥdith) of the respective
action.190
This necessity by which the ascription of the action to the agent and the
resulting responsibility is known suits Ibn al-Wazīr’s initial statement that the
point of agreement—human responsibility—is evident. For Ibn al-Wazīr, this
is the general tenet that is known in the natural human disposition ( fiṭra).
Although Ibn al-Wazīr affirms that God has an influence on human motiva-

187 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāsim vi, 116–117.

188 Madelung takes this information on Abū l-Ḥusayn’s position from Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Abū
l-Ḥusayn not only holds that the action occurs according to a motive, as the Bahshamiyya
do; according to him, the motive necessitates the action and there is no action without a
motive. Ibn al-Malāḥimī apparently somewhat mitigated this strict stance to a very high
probability; cf. Madelung, Late Muʿtazila 249–250. This is confirmed by Ibn al-Wazīr’s ren-
dering of Abū l-Ḥusayn; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf 368; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ
al-bāsim 363.
189 For Ashʿaris like Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, God’s responsibility for causing a preponderator was
so clear that “denying that acts require a preponderator is tantamount to denying the Cre-
ator,” as Hoover put it; cf. Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy 144.
190 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 81b. Ibn al-Wazīr argues that the Muʿta-
zila and the Ashʿariyya all agree on the coexistence of necessitating motive (talāzum
al-dāʿī fī-l-afʿāl) and free choice (ikhtiyār); cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vii, 78–79. Again
Ibn al-Wazīr claims that Abū l-Ḥusayn ascribes the creation of motive to God, without
negating free choice (ikhtiyār); cf. ibid., vi, 120.

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tion, the self-evidence of human responsibility for human action takes center
stage as compared to the more elusive divine influence on the preponderant
motive in the choice of particular action.191
Summing up this discussion, the human part does not pertain to the essence
of the action. But it is this human part which belongs to the “clear side” rather
than the “hidden side” that causes the conflict and mutual charge of unbe-
lief. This focus on the clear side, where the ascription of actions to human
choice and performance is obvious, leaves the hidden side in the realm of the
ambiguous. Focussing on the clear side means focussing on the agreement,
whereas requiring detailed understanding of the hidden side may result in
mutual charges of unbelief. And the clear side suffices to absolve God of the
false suspicion of injustice. This suits Ibn al-Wazīr’s rejection of probing into
matters beyond the reach of human understanding. Rather, what needs to be
known can be known by the fiṭra that all human beings have in common.192
On the hidden side, the modes of origination are less clear and less agreed
upon because they are beyond what can be said with certainty.193 Therefore the
opinions concerning them cannot be an issue of mutual takfīr. It is impossible
to verify their exact nature, as they belong to the realm of things deferred to
God’s knowledge and purposes.194 What is important and also agreed upon, is
the fact that God does play a part. Yet, the part that He plays consists neither
in the sinfulness of a given act, nor in any kind of coercion exercised on the
human being against his will. As a crucial consequence, nothing intrinsically
evil can be ascribed to God.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s own understanding of God’s part in the occurrence of human
action attests to the epistemology of ambiguity he is known for. The term in
question is khalq (creation): “The conviction that they [human actions] are
created (makhlūqa) in the sense that they are foreordained (muqaddara) is suf-
ficient. And it is considered sound by all.”195
A little earlier in Īthār al-ḥaqq, while expounding on the divine name “the
Afflictor” (al-Ḍārr), Ibn al-Wazīr explains what he means by foreordainment
and correlates it with divine wisdom: “However, what concerns God’s fore-

191 In response to the question of how God would invalidate the excuse of sinners if He was
the one to create motives, Ibn al-Wazīr replies: “If the argument is grounded on the proof
of God, His justice and His wisdom, there is no further need to remove any of the futile
excuses that they insist on.” Cf. ibid, 116–136, quote 122.
192 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 323.
193 Cf. Hajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 356.
194 The minor importance ascribed to understanding this hidden side is also said to be the
reason why the salaf did not mention this side; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 281.
195 Ibid., 324.

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ordainment of it [the evil action] according to human choice out of a wise

purpose, this is like His foreknowledge (sābiq al-ʿilm) of it.”196
But how could God permit a sinner to sin eventually and thereby violate
His will, unless He could not keep the disobedient from sinning? Or could the
sinner do nothing but sin, and has God commanded something impossible?
This issue of taklīf mā lā yuṭāq requires explanation with regard to the role of
divine guidance in human action. For Muʿtazilis, it is one of God’s duties to pro-
vide right guidance (luṭf ) wherever it is possible. Given that the sinner does
not accept guidance, it must be concluded that God could not have given him
guidance. For Ashʿaris, it would be inconceivable that the sinner could refuse
something that God wanted executed (i.e. guidance). Hence, God must have
wanted to the sinner to go astray.
For Ibn al-Wazīr, God’s wisdom again serves as a means to defer understand-
ing of the inexplicable element of the idea, with the purpose of maintaining
harmony with His other names and attributes as well as upholding the har-
monization of different doctrines. The only way in which Ibn al-Wazīr would
concede to calling God the creator (khāliq) of human actions is in the sense
of foreordainment (taqdīr) and prescience (sābiq al-ʿilm).197 In this sense, God
could have brought forth the neutral part of the human action that He knew
the human being would choose and appropriate, and then choose His own
action according to some wise, often hidden, purpose that takes into consid-
eration what He knew of the human being’s choice. But this is not predictable
by human beings in particular cases and goes beyond the requirements of jus-
tice. In al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr concludes a section on the foreordainment of
evil actions with the following statement:

We conclude all this with a subtle point, which is the secret of all this
speech and its core: Punishment merely because of merit takes the rank
of the indifferent (mubāḥ), which really means futility where God, the
Exalted, is concerned, because it does not become preponderant [on
either side] except out of a desire or whim. It cannot occur on God’s
part unless in reference to a wise purpose. Hence, one must say that the
punishment that certainly happens to the unbelievers is preponderant
because of a wise purpose other than sin.198

196 Ibid., 174.

197 Cf. ibid., 311. The concept of taqdīr as foreknowledge or even as will or a synonym of cre-
ation (khalq) is not new to the Muʿtazila; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
fs. 86b–87b.
198 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim vi, 151.

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Foreordainment of evil actions and punishment is thus taken beyond justice.

Thereby, Ibn al-Wazīr can go beyond the certainty that dictates knowledge of
divine actions determined by the requirements of divine justice.
This would provide an answer to the great mystery of the creation of unbe-
lievers. Accordingly, God could have created people of whom He knew that they
would choose disobedience, and foreordain this disobedience by bringing into
existence the action that they would choose in a manner rendering it disobe-
dience. Though playing a part in the occurrence of the sinful action, God is not
the agent. His creative task consists in establishing what He knew would occur.
Establishing this occurrence instead of preventing it aims at a good end and
happens out of a wise purpose. His foreordainment of what would effectively
be a sin on the part of the disobedient human being is not aimed at the sin for
its own sake.
The above mentioned story of Abū Lahab is an example.199 God commanded
something relatively—not absolutely—impossible when He commanded Abū
Lahab to do something He knew Abū Lahab would not do (i.e. to believe, in
accordance with Islam), and that He knew Abū Lahab would be punished for.
He could have forestalled His own judgment by giving him more guidance. Yet
He did not, because of a wise and just purpose unknown to human beings.
In the section above on Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of wisdom, I referred to Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s position on the inexplicability of God’s decision not to give
the sinner a constitution (binya) receptive to divine guidance. Abū l-Ḥusayn
and his followers apparently agreed that an unknown purpose may be the rea-
son why God did not give a different constitution to one He knew would sin.
Although this does not conform to Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of the human
fiṭra—which is always receptive to guidance in its original state—it leaves the
aspect of God’s reasons for lack of guidance among His hidden purposes and
hence beyond the realm of human understanding.
In conclusion, Ibn al-Wazīr can claim agreement on the question of human
responsibility which concerned theologians of all different schools. The uncer-
tainty about God’s own part in the account, deferred to divine wise purposes,
forestalls a mutual charge of unbelief for representatives of different opin-
ions.200 What Ibn al-Wazīr achieves by all this is that, on the one hand, God’s
actions and will is not beyond human assessment in a general way—God does
not do anything evil in itself—yet they are beyond assessment in many partic-
ular cases on the other: if a certain action appears evil, this is because human
beings do not know what good lies behind it. This is true for God’s own actions

199 See 212–213 above.

200 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 376.

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as well as for the influence He has on the actions of human beings. And if a par-
ticular interpretation of the hidden side appears to result in a conclusion not
accepted by one school or scholar, the impossibility of certainty in this ques-
tion must be invoked.
Once again, it is the Muʿtazili school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that is con-
ducive to finding common ground between the theological schools that vie for
influence in the Yemeni Zaydiyya of Ibn al-Wazīr’s day. And once again it is the
positions of this theological school among the Muʿtazila that come closest to
Ibn al-Wazīr’s own concepts.

4.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Human Actions

Al-Kamālī states that Ibn al-Murtaḍā paid more attention to the question of
human actions than to any other theological issue.201 And indeed, if under-
stood in the wider context of human responsibility, the question receives con-
siderable attention in Kitāb al-Qalāʾid and its commentary al-Durar al-farāʾid
due to its close link to the concept of divine justice. For Ibn al-Murtaḍā, human
actions are clearly brought into existence (iḥdāth) by human beings. God can-
not will evil actions, neither His own nor those of human beings.202 Even less
could He be the creator of them. Like the famous leader of the Bahshami
Muʿtazila, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā argues that human actions must be
ascribed to human agents because they happen according to their motives.203
In contrast, God, being just and wise, cannot have a motive to do evil. Human
free will is expressed in the choice between various motives. Praise and blame
follow according to this choice. Indeed, that is how one knows that human
actions originate from them.204 Motives do play a role and God does have
an influence on them; however, the role of motives is merely a relative one
(iʿtibārī).205 Acts do not necessarily occur according to a preponderant motive
in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking. Thus God cannot be said to determine actions
through the creation of motives.206

201 Al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 287.

202 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 59–60; al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid
f. 78b. For an in-depth discussion of causality in the Yemeni Zaydiyya prior to Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, see Thiele, Theologie in der jemenitischen Zaydiyya 59–116.
203 On the defense of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s concept of human actions against the charge of deter-
minism based on the relationship between action and motive, see Madelung, Late Muʿta-
zila 245–248.
204 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 61.
205 Cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 81a–b.
206 Cf. Ibid., fs. 81a–b. This again agrees with ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s reasoning; cf. Madelung, Late
Muʿtazila 247–248.

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In line with Bahshami teaching, Ibn al-Murtaḍā considers capacity (qudra)

as the necessary element for an action’s occurrence.207 It is in this regard that
God plays a part in human actions, because it is God who creates the power
that the human being needs in order to perform an act. Yet it also illustrates the
Muʿtazili idea of the autonomy of the human agent, since God’s act is restricted
to creating a neutral power of which the human being can dispose according
to his choice.208 The verb aqdara is used to describe God “caus[ing] man to
have a capacity.”209 As a vital constituent of this concept of capacity, it always
relates to an action and its contrary, and thus leaves the possibility of either
action or non-action. Hence, the existence of capacity does not necessitate the
occurrence of the act (al-qudra mūjiba lil-maqdūr) as it does in the teachings
of what Ibn al-Murtaḍā calls “the later generations of Ashʿaris.”210
Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not explicitly state that acts in their neutral form exist
in non-existence in any of the consulted material on the question of human
actions. However, a number of points indicate that he follows Bahshami teach-
ing on this question. For one thing, his view on the intellect’s ability to dis-
cern good and evil independently shows that he considers the aspect that
implies either blame or praise to be merely an attribute or accident of the
act.211 According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, as conveyed by al-Ḥayyī, an act is evil
because of “its occurrence in a certain manner” (li-wuqūʿihi ʿalā wajh).212 Thus,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā fits into Ibn al-Wazīr’s general tenet of the “not independent”
responsibility of the human being. Nevertheless, his support of the akwān-
theory discussed above clearly bespeaks the fact that accidents are real entities
in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking, which human beings would bring into existence,
thus becoming the autonomous agents and creators of their acts. Accordingly,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, along with the Bahshami Muʿtazila, insists that human beings
are truly the agents who bring actions into existence (iḥdāth, ījād). God is not
connected to human acts themselves by an act of creation (khalq). Although

207 Cf. Frank, Fundamental Assumptions 10.

208 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afhām 125.
209 For this translation of aqdara, see Abrahamov, A Re-Examination 210.
210 According to al-Ḥayyī, Ibn al-Murtaḍā admits that al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn
al-Rāzī concede an effect to human capacity. However, they deny that the deployment of
that capacity is truly at the disposal of human beings’ will and free choice; cf. al-Ḥayyī,
al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs. 81a–b. What Ibn al-Murtaḍā ascribed to these later
Ashʿaris was already part of the teaching of al-Ashʿarī himself; cf. Frank, The Structure
of Created Causality 30. According to Abrahamov, al-Ashʿarī never explicitly denied that
qudra has effective influence on actions, cf. Abrahamov, A Re-Examination 212.
211 Cf. al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 311.
212 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 59; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 67b.

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He admittedly has power over all objects of power, this does not extend to all
particular actions (ʿalā aʿyānihā).213 As a logical consequence, Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
supposedly along with the Muʿtazila and the Zaydiyya, rejects the ideas of maq-
dūr bayna qādirayn and kasb outright.214 Maqdūr bayna qādirayn is inconceiv-
able to him, because one object of power cannot be related to two powers,
as the object of power in question (the action) could possibly exist and not-
exist (mawjūdan maʿdūman) at the same time. This is so because according to
Bahshami teaching, only one agent can be the cause of an event.215 Further-
more, an action is performed according to the will of the agent. Thus, of two
agents (qādirān) one may will the action while the other may not will it.216
Kasb is similarly inconceivable to Ibn al-Murtaḍā.217 The theory of kasb pre-
supposes another concept of power. According to this concept, the power to
act is created by God and appropriated after the choice and in the moment of
action. After the creation of the power, the human being has no further oppor-
tunity to act otherwise. Opponents of kasb like Ibn al-Murtaḍā claim that such
a human being could not be described as ‘able’ at all, since ableness (qādiriyya)
correlates with an act as well as its opposite, and an act must be ascribed to
someone who has the ability to perform it.218 Accordingly, a human being thus
described could not be held responsible.219 Ibn al-Murtaḍā holds this view even
against those of the Ashʿariyya whose position he considers closest to his own,
in that they concede an effective causality (taʿthīr) to power or capacity. Again,
he takes issue with their claim that this effective causality renders the occur-
rence of the action inevitable.220
But beyond such ontological consideration of maqdūr bayna qādirayn and
kasb, Ibn al-Murtaḍā is more concerned with the ethical implication of both

213 In Riyāḍat al-afhām, Ibn al-Murtaḍā writes that “the Eternal is capable of all kinds of
objects of power, every kind and at all times without end. Yet, it is not said ‘[capable]
of them [objects of power] in their particular occurrences,’ because of the impossibility
of ‘one object of power for two wielders of power’.” According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, there are
ten kinds of objects that are within human power and thirteen kinds that are exclusively
within God’s power; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Riyāḍat al-afḥam 126–127.
214 Cf. al-Hayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 83b.
215 Cf. Frank, Structure of Created Causality 25.
216 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 59; al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 84a.
217 Ibid., f. 84b.
218 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Qalāʾid 59–60; al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 80b.
219 Ibid., f. 84a.
220 Apparently, Ibn al-Murtaḍā also discusses other concepts of kasb even more inconceivable
to him, as for example that of al-Ashʿarī; cf. al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid fs.
84a–86b; al-Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī; on the later Ashʿari theory referred to above, see
al-Ḥayyī, al-Muntazaʿ min al-Durar al-farāʾid f. 85b.

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concepts. He rejects them because, to him, they imply divine responsibility for
evil human actions. Neither the idea of maqdūr bayna qādirayn nor of kasb
could be maintained without jeopardizing God’s justice. Both concepts are part
of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s theory of God’s justice in general and of man’s indepen-
dent rational discernment (taḥsīn wa-taqbīḥ) which we identified as a major
key to the understanding of different concepts of divine justice and wisdom.
In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought, justice must always be comprehensible. Hence
God’s actions and human actions must be explicable and manifestly distinct
from one another in order to discern good and evil in them.

4.3 Conclusion
In sum, for Ibn al-Murtaḍā it is crucial to determine God’s involvement in the
act exactly in line with the typical Muʿtazili agenda of championing God’s
justice. The principle of God’s just purposes is the end and goal of the argu-
ment. Ibn al-Murtaḍā aims to prove that God is just and can therefore not be
attributed with any part in the evil acts of human beings. Justice and wisdom,
or rather God as being just and wise, is almost always mentioned in the same
breath and used to argue for the certainty of the results of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
reasoning.
This stands in contrast to Ibn al-Wazīr, who uses the concept of God’s wis-
dom in order to keep God’s particular actions outside the realm of certain
human knowledge. Besides leaving God’s exact role on the ontological level
of the action unexplained, Ibn al-Wazīr defers God’s particular decisions as to
when and how He influences a human agent to God’s wisdom and His wise pur-
poses. Justice is not the final end. Yet, since independent rational discernment
is maintained as a vital part of the concept of wisdom, God’s goodness is pre-
served without violating the human ability to discern the moral value of God’s
or man’s actions per se.
The fact that Ibn al-Murtaḍā restricts the divine part to a creating capacity
indicates two things: firstly, God’s part is more clear than in Ibn al-Wazīr’s the-
ory of human actions; and secondly, God’s part is more restricted than in Ibn
al-Wazīr’s thinking (as it must conform to the conditions of human knowledge
and principles of good and evil). For Ibn al-Murtaḍā, knowing precisely what
role God plays is not as unimportant as Ibn al-Wazīr would have it. After all, it
has a considerable effect on defining God’s justice. The fact that God’s part is
restricted to creating the human being’s power is something every individual
must know ( farḍ ʿayn).221

221 Cf. ibid., f. 83a.

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This alone would be a case in point for the thesis that Ibn al-Wazīr attempts
to restrict the realm of certainty, namely of theology, and extend the realm of
the probable, namely law. To him, it suffices to know that human beings are
responsible for their actions. He sees no need to speculate about what God
does, with the result that they stand in opposition to one another on these
points.

5 Conclusion

According to Frank, the systems of the central figures of the Basran Muʿtazila
and Ashʿariyya, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, are too distinct
for dialogue, because neither conceded validity to the fundamental assump-
tions of the other.222 Ibn al-Wazīr, in contrast, seeks to demonstrate precisely
the opposite, namely that they—or at least their later adherents—do agree in
their most basic assumptions. What belongs to these assumptions and what
does not—that is, what unites the Muslim community and what separates
them—occupied much of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking and writing. Ḥajar, in his
analysis of Ibn al-Wazīr’s theology, was convinced that Ibn al-Wazīr was right
to assume agreement.223
As a final comment on Ibn al-Wazīr’s theology, a reference back to al-Ṣubḥī’s
statement about Ibn al-Wazīr’s unique role in the theological discourse is due.
Al-Ṣubḥī writes that Ibn al-Wazīr’s contribution to kalām consisted in its eleva-
tion from a polemic to the nature of a religious science (ʿilm dīnī). A major fea-
ture of the way Ibn al-Wazīr practiced this “religious science” is the harmoniza-
tion of apparently conflicting concepts in order to arrive at general doctrines
agreed upon by all. Much of this harmonization and broadening was made pos-
sible by Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of God’s wisdom. It is then really Ibn al-Wazīr’s
concept of God’s wise purposefulness filling the gap left open by the superiority
of God’s knowledge that effected the shift from a polemic to a religious science.
The superiority of this knowledge is kept in the realm of human understand-
ing by asserting a general morality shared by God and human beings. God’s
purposes do not need to be known in order to assert the wisdom and goodness
behind them.
Ormsby, in analyzing al-Ghazālī’s concept of “the best possible world,” sug-
gests that the Muʿtazili doctrine of optimistic purposefulness (al-aṣlaḥ) may

222 Frank, Structure of Created Causality 75.

223 Hajar, Ibn al-Wazīr wa-manhajuhu 395–396.

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have been a major reason for the initial rift between the Muʿtazila and the
Ashʿariyya.224 Ibn al-Wazīr’s doctrine of divine purposefulness again represents
a middle way. In line with Muʿtazili thinking, human beings can expect every
divine act or command to have a purpose that would ultimately have to be
called good in itself according to human standards of good. Yet, this purpose
is usually beyond human knowledge or understanding in its particular occur-
rence. In conclusion, it appears that Ibn al-Wazīr constructed his theological
views around his concept of God’s wise purposefulness in order to arrive at a
doctrine supposedly acceptable by Muʿtazilis, Ashʿaris and really all who are
endowed with the original disposition ( fiṭra) given by God.
The concept of ḥikma allows Ibn al-Wazīr to leave a considerable part of doc-
trine in the realm of ambiguity. This is highly expressive of his own view of God
beyond mere harmonization. He counteracts systematization as well as mutual
charges of unbelief by referring the particular implications and effects of gen-
eral doctrines and theological tenets to divine wisdom. Indeed, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
theology culminates in the concept of the hiddenness of God’s wise purposes as
the end of the theological endeavor. The goodness of God’s purposes behind His
actions and the human inability to know more than their goodness expresses
the difference between the perfection of divine knowledge and the limitedness
of human knowledge.
The juxtaposition of Ibn al-Wazīr’s theological thought with that of Ibn al-
Murtaḍā—and therefore that of the Bashamiyya—has revealed a considerable
difference between their concepts of divine wisdom. Although the concept
is present throughout the whole theological reasoning in both cases, it per-
forms a different function in each. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s concept of divine wisdom
is tantamount to his concept of divine justice. Thus it is used to prove the
correctness of his Zaydi-Muʿtazili doctrine in great detail. In contrast, for Ibn
al-Wazīr the concept is linked to God’s superior knowledge and the inability
of human beings to penetrate it in great detail. It is the variable that “inter-
prets the ambiguous” (taʾwīl al-mutashābihāt), as he states repeatedly. Thus
it is used to incorporate a great number of different doctrines into one gen-
eral tenet. Whereas the Muʿtazili concept of wisdom brings greater theological
certainty, Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of wisdom preserves theological ambiguity.
Whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s concept paints a detailed picture of a just God, Ibn al-
Wazīr’s concept paints a vague picture of a good God. Whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
concept can be employed to exclude many theological schools and trends from

224 Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Thought 21–22.

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central concepts of ibn al-wazīr’s theological thought 259

the correct doctrine, Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept can be employed to include many
theological schools and trends into one correct doctrine.
Furthermore, the thought of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was the teaching most
conducive to harmonization from among the Muʿtazila. Ibn al-Wazīr often
referred to it in order to argue for essential agreement. Examples are Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s equation of will and preponderant motive, his notion of
motive as a determining force for action, of the possibility that one action
be ascribed to two agents or of the necessary nature of the knowledge that
man is responsible for his actions. With Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī as a support for
his own thinking, Ibn al-Wazīr could not be blamed as easily for abandoning
the Muʿtazila-dominated realm of Zaydi theology entirely. He seems to have
represented a current within the Zaydiyya that favored the Muʿtazili school
of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī over the prevalent Bahshami Muʿtazila which had
great influence on contemporaries like Ibn al-Murtaḍā. This does not mean
that Ibn al-Wazīr should be considered either a Zaydi or a Muʿtazili, but rather
that he made use of a school of thought that seemed conducive to harmoniza-
tion with other schools, yet was also acceptable to his contemporaries in light
of the Zaydi entrenchment in Muʿtazili teaching. In contrast, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
endorsed the Bahshami focus on the human ability to have certain knowledge
not only of generalities but also of details of the nature and moral value of
things and actions, along with the ensuing expectation to define the truth of
doctrines in all its intricacies. Inferring from God’s justice a non-negotiable
understanding of God’s role in human action is only one example. In this case,
the detailed reach of human knowledge forestalls divine wisdom from going
beyond what the human intellect knows to be just. And with divine justice as
a central feature of the theological system, it would be hard to imagine how
a different understanding of God’s role in human action could coexist. Thus,
amplifying the role of particular theological doctrines in defining the Zaydi
identity and hierarchically relating them to different versions of these doc-
trines naturally works towards an increased distance between the Zaydiyya and
other theological as well as legal schools that increasingly shared their regional,
political and intellectual horizon.

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 chapter 5

The Structure of Legal Authority in Ibn al-Wazīr’s

Thought

Ibn al-Wazīr maintains that he was initially prompted to conduct extensive

studies across schools by two doctrines prevalent in the Zaydi and Muʿtazili
teachings he grew up with. According to those two doctrines, emulation was
prohibited in doctrinal matters (lā taqlīd fī-l-uṣūl) as well as for persons capa-
ble of legal interpretation, because “every mujtahid is correct” (kull mujtahid
muṣīb) in legal matters.1 While the first doctrine played a central role in his
investigation of the theological teachings and sources of his contemporaries
and led him to claim that the coexistence of different interpretations of a num-
ber of merely probable secondary doctrines was a given, his understanding of
the second doctrine allowed him to widen the scope of probability in Islamic
law.

1 The Theory of Infallibilism and the Probability of Ijtihād

The probable nature of the results of a mujtahid’s endeavor is at the root of

both the theory and the practice of ijtihād. The interpretation of legal indi-
cators leads a mujtahid to a conclusion about rules for cases not explicitly
stipulated by the source texts. The conclusion the mujtahid arrives at is what
he has to adopt and apply, as it is built on what seems to him to comprise
the highest probability of being correct. Applying that which is conjectural
is the mujtahid’s certain duty.2 Scholars or schools like the Twelver-Shiʿa and
the Ẓāhiriyya who have rejected the aspect of probability in Islamic law at one
point or another have consequently also rejected ijtihād in the process of the
interpretation and application of law.3 Where probability is admitted, other

1 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 93a.

2 In fact, as Ibn al-Wazīr puts it in al-ʿAwāṣim, “All the deeds of rational people are built on
suppositions and the weighing out of those that contradict each other.” Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-
ʿAwāṣim iii, 397.
3 Cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty. This is also illustrated in a number of dissertations. See for
example Osman, The History and Doctrine of the Ẓāhirī Madhhab; Tobgui, The Epistemology
of Qiyās and Taʿlīl.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 261

issues arise. While one scholar arrives at a ruling based on the interpretation
of the conjectural signs that seem most probable to him, other scholars come
to different conclusions. But those different rulings are likewise based on con-
clusions from indicators that seem most likely to them. A number of questions
have arisen early in the history of Islamic law as a result of this theory: How shall
the underlying concept be interpreted? And how shall the process and result
of the scholars’ endeavors be evaluated from an epistemological viewpoint?
Two major trends have prevailed throughout the centuries, one assuming that
“every mujtahid is correct” (kull mujtahid muṣīb) and the other that only one
mujtahid finds the truth (al-ḥaqq maʿa wāḥid). The theory of ijtihād became
so central in Muslim legal theory that al-Ghazālī went so far as to say that
one who did not hold to a particular theory of ijtihad—that of infallibility in
his case—was no mujtahid at all.4 Far from being cohesive groups, the repre-
sentatives of the first theory are called infallibilists (muṣawwiba), and those
of the second are termed fallibilists (mukhaṭṭiʾa). Bernand, referring to ʿAbd
al-Jabbār and al-Shāfiʿī, names the Muʿtazila-affine ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-
ʿAnbarī (d. 168/785) from Basra as being the first to formulate the principle of
infallibilism.5 Names of early Muʿtazili representatives of fallibilism frequently
mentioned in the sources are Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm (d. 201–202/816–7),6 Ismāʿīl
b. ʿUlayya (d. 218/833–834)7 and Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833–834).8
The most extensive analysis of the theories on fallibility or infallibility of ijti-
hād in the context of epistemology has been undertaken by Zysow.9 Bernand’s
helpful discussion treats the different theories in relation to a particular con-

4 Likewise al-Bāqillānī; cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty 276.

5 Ibn al-Wazīr mentions him only once, and in the context of using another scholar’s books if
the handwriting is ascertained; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 345. Ibn al-Murtaḍā quotes al-
ʿAnbarī as one who claimed that even in the rational questions every mujtahid is correct; cf.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl 194. On al-ʿAnbarī in the context of ijtihād, see also Zysow,
Economy of Certainty 263; Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 281, 289; Bernand, L’Ashbah 154–
155. Ibn Taymiyya rejects the claim that al-ʿAnbarī supported infallibility in the uṣūl; cf. Ibn
Taymiyya, Fatāwā xviii, 138; similarly the editor of Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 377, foot-
note 1.
6 On al-Aṣamm, see Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm 42–43; Aḥmad b. Yaḥya b. al-
Murtaḍā, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila i, 76–77. Ibn al-Murtaḍā mentions 225/840 as the date of his
death.
7 On Ibn ʿUlayya see Zysow, Economy of Certainty 26, 246.
8 Cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty 265; Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 377; Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
Minhāj al-wuṣūl 766–767; Bernand, L’Ashbah 158. On al-Marīsī see Zysow, Economy of Cer-
tainty 265.
9 Zysow, Economy of Certainty 463–492.

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cept penetrating those theories, namely that of verisimilitude (al-ashbah).10

The significance for the present question pertains to the consequences of the
different theories for the system of legal schools. Zysow has claimed that sup-
porting the theory of infallibilism threatened the institutionalized legal schools
because it individualized the legal process. This is so, because infallibilism
necessitates that each scholar who performs ijtihād and applies the results of
this ijtihād is correct by means of his performance. The correctness is based on
the compliance with the certain duty of ijtihād. For lack of independent objec-
tive standards to evaluate the result, the only measurement for the correctness
of his ruling is the quality of his performance of ijtihād. His ijtihād is valid if it
complies with the rules of analogy. This is because the interpretative process
of the theory of infallibilism in its classical form is brought into the realm of
certainty—and therefore stability—by the mujtahid’s application of the rules
of analogy in his ijtihād.11 As Zysow puts it: “When it comes to extending the
law, the only rule that is certain is the obligation of analogy. By applying this
rule, the jurist can be certain that his result is valid.”12 The correctness of the
ruling itself cannot be known. Yet, the ruling is to be followed by the mujtahid
himself and by those emulating him. The absence of an outward standard is
counterbalanced by the inner standard of the mujtahid: he must follow what
seems most probable to him.
Infallibilism was introduced to and adopted in Zaydi legal methodology
under the influence of al-Mahdī Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Dāʿī (d. 360/970). In the
Caspian Zaydiyya, the followers of Imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/
860) and Imam al-Nāṣir b. Utrush (d. 304/917) had developed into two groups
of legal schools that were divided by legal differences. Because of those differ-

10 Verisimilitude is defined as something that has ‘the quality of seeming real;’ cf. “verisimil-
itude,” Merriam-Webster.com. In this context, it should be described as something that has
most similarity to the truth. To my knowledge, it was first introduced to the discussion of
al-ashbah by Bernand; cf. Bernand, L’Ashbah 151. Bernand’s discussion contains an aspect
of al-ashbah not mentioned by Zysow, namely in terms of analogy between different exist-
ing rulings where al-ashbah is equated with “the most likely evidence.” Bernand, L’Ashbah
167–170; cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty 267–269.
11 This is not so for al-Bāqillānī in his radical infallibilism (al-muʾammima fī l-taswīb), who
maintained that there is no special method of identifying the cause and that “the relation
between any evidence and the subjective probability of the jurist was purely fortuitous.”
Cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty 261.
12 For the most helpful explanation of ijtihād and its former equation with qiyās, see Zysow,
Economy of Certainty 260–261. Scholars who widely reject analogy usually reject the the-
ory of infallibilism as a consequence. An example in our context would be the Yemeni
scholar al-Shawkānī; cf. Haykel, Dissolving the Madhāhib 350.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 263

ences they condemned each other ( yukhṭiʾū baʿḍuhum baʿḍan). Al-Mahdī Abū
ʿAbdallāh al-Dāʿī succeeded in uniting the two groups by introducing the prin-
ciple that the scholars of both groups were correct.13 A similar effort is ascribed
to an imam of the Yemeni Zaydiyya, namely al-Mutawakkil ʿalā llāh Aḥmad b.
Sulaymān (d. 566/1170). Imam al-Mutawakkil was active not only in the the-
ological exchange between the Caspian and the Yemeni Zaydiyya, but also in
the spread of the idea that correctness was not restricted to the Hādawiyya, i.e.
the school of the founder of the Yemeni Zaydiyya, al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq Yaḥyā b.
al-Ḥusayn.14 Consequently, Yemeni mujtahids acknowledged imams and muj-
tahids of the Caspian Zaydiyya. Subsequently and only with rare exceptions, the
doctrine of kull mujtahid muṣīb has theoretically been supported by all scholars
of Zaydi legal methodology.

1.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Infallibilism and al-Ashbah

The most explicit discussion of infallibilism in the writings of Ibn al-Wazīr
is found in al-ʿAwāṣim. But throughout all of his writings Ibn al-Wazīr leaves
no doubt that the infallibility of ijtihād is among the central doctrines of his
thought. Ibn al-Wazīr’s name became so closely linked with the doctrine of kull
mujtahid muṣīb that al-Iryānī claims Ibn al-Wazīr to be its only defender in his
time.15 For example, Ibn al-Wazīr insists that the mujtahid’s duty is to follow his
own ijtihād based on his own conjecture wherever he defends the prohibition
that one mujtahid practice emulation (taqlīd) of another. Acting according to
the most probable conjecture is considered good by reason, where no apodictic
certainty can be attained.16 Most often the infallibility of conclusions based on
conjectural proofs is brought forth to counter his opponents’ tendency to shift
to the realm of certainty (qatʿ) what is really a matter of probability (ẓann).
Whereas disagreement in the former results in mutual accusation of unbelief
and division, differences in the latter are natural and intended by God because
of the way he made the world. Ibn al-Wazīr illustrates this point in Īthār al-
ḥaqq:

[Concerning] the furūʿ-books where every mujtahid is correct or re-

warded, and the books of Arabic linguistics and the like: [In those] it
is impossible to remove the differences about issues similar to those on

13 Madelung, Zaydiyya; al-Akwaʿ, al-Zaydiyya 40; Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 283; Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-milal wa-l-niḥal 40.
14 Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 283; see also introduction.
15 Cf. al-Iryānī (intr.), al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 5.
16 “Al-ʿamal bi-l-ẓann ḥasan ʿaqlan.” See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 403.

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which Moses and al-Khiḍr were in disagreement, or Solomon and David,

and concerning which the heavenly hosts argued, because it is what God
intends.17

The elevation of those sciences (ʿulūm) in which rational evidence allows for
only one truth, and the obligation to attain those proofs, not only causes con-
fusion for the little experienced; even more so, it causes the community to fall
apart. On the other hand, the occasions for applying the maxim that “action
according to conjecture is good” (al-ʿamal bi-l-ẓann ḥasan ʿaqlan) are quite
extensive. On all levels of legal activity, the legally responsible subject is bound
to seek merely what seems most probable to him. He must then act in accor-
dance with it, irrespective of whether or not others come to the same conclu-
sion. Thus, Ibn al-Wazīr explains in al-ʿAwāṣim:

This does not contradict the doctrine of the ‘correctness of all of the muj-
tahidūn.’ This is so because it is said that it pertains to what God requires
of them, since God, the Exalted, requires them to expend their highest
efforts in the quest for what is correct (ṭalab al-ṣawāb), not in the meet-
ing of the same (iṣābatihi).18

After comparing the mujtahid to a rifleman, Ibn al-Wazīr explains that God
could not expect either mujtahid or rifleman to hit their goal with certainty,
because that lies outside their abilities.

Yet, they have met the goal of God which is the expending of the high-
est effort in the quest to hit [the goal]. They have not hit the goal that
they sought for, which is the hitting [itself]. The one who inquires after
the qibla is like the one who shoots at the unbelievers in strife [for God’s
cause] ( jihād), he hits and he misses. In both, his hitting and his missing,
he meets what God intends by seeking the correct.19

This is the point at which Ibn al-Wazīr locates two things to be sought, and to
be potentially hit or missed: One is what God requests, the other one is what
the mujtahid searches for. God wants the mujtahid to attempt to find the truth
(ṭalab al-iṣāba lil-ḥaqq lā sawāʾ), the mujtahid wants to hit the very truth itself,

17 Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 35.

18 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 401.
19 Ibid.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 265

the thing that he is commissioned to search for. The commonly used exam-
ple of the Kaʿba and the recess for prayer (qibla) helps to explain this idea.
Whereas God wants the mujtahid to search for the direction in which the Kaʿba
lies rather than the Kaʿba itself, the mujtahid searches for the Kaʿba itself.20
Thus, it becomes evident that Ibn al-Wazīr belongs to the infallibilists, like the
majority of his fellow Zaydi scholars. What God commissioned the scholar to
do is the practice of ijtihād. The scholar has lived up to this commission once
he has expended great efforts to reach an opinion concerning a particular ques-
tion of law. Although the result of his ijtihād is conjectural, the performance of
his duty renders him correct in the compliance with the commission. That is
the reason for the correctness of every mujtahid who performs his duty of ijti-
hād. He is obliged to reach an opinion by the most probable interpretation of
the indicators (amārāt). And he is obliged to follow through with this opinion,
because it is built on the highest likelihood as it appears to him.
The correct performance of ijtihād is what renders the mujtahid certainly
correct. This, however, does not say anything about the likelihood of the opin-
ion itself. Ibn al-Wazīr does not explicitly mention the term al-ashbah, which is
used for the ruling that most resembles the decree that would have been sent
down by God, had he chosen to do so. Yet, the wording that he uses indicates
that he did support the idea of the one correct rule pre-existent with God, even
though the mujtahid could not be expected to discover it or to know whether
he has discovered it. He can only try:

But to say that there is no particularly appointed object of research (lā

maṭlūb muʿayyan) is inconceivable because the search needs an object to
be sought for that precedes the searching and with which conjecture is
connected, like the Kaʿba in the investigation of the qibla.21

Although Ibn al-Wazīr declares that he has not elsewhere come across the short
explanation he himself gave for the issue,22 his wording very much resembles
the phrasing used by al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza to present the opin-
ion of the supporters of the idea of al-ashbah:

20 Ibid., iii, 402.

21 Ibid., iii, 402.
22 Ibn al-Wazīr finally found the same thought expressed in the same concise way in Ibn
Baṭṭāl’s Sharḥ ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Khalaf b. Baṭṭāl alias Ibn al-Lajjām
(d. 449/1057) was a Maliki scholar in Cordoba and among the first to write a commentary
of al-Bukhārī’s hadith compilation; cf. al-Dhahabī, Siyār aʿlām xviii, 47.

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266 chapter 5

Those holding to the first opinion [that of the existence of al-ashbah]

argue that the mukallaf is a seeker. There must inevitably be a particu-
lar object of pursuit for the seeker. Hence, the search for a thing that is
not specifically designated is inconceivable. Accordingly, we know that
the inquirer into the direction of the qibla necessarily needs a direction
which, if he finds it, he has found the truth, yet is excused if he misses it.23

The key idea is the pre-existence of the object of seeking (maṭlūb). Ibn al-Wazīr
acknowledges that hitting the goal is beyond the capability of mujtahids (lā
ṭarīq lahum wā-lā ṭāqa), but the goal must exist by all means, so as not to render
the search devoid of meaning. This is similar to the argument of those who hold
to the theory of verisimilitude. Here, the “most similar” is sometimes called
al-ashbah or al-aṣwab with respect to God (ʿinda llāh), which may be hit or
missed.24
Elsewhere, we find further indication that Ibn al-Wazīr was not as thorough
in the idea of the true correctness of all mujtahids as he cared to explain. On
one occasion, he compares the kind of correctness attributed to consensus, on
the one hand, with that ascribed to the mujtahid, on the other. Ibn al-Wazīr
shows that the correctness of a mujtahid does not go beyond being infallible
in the performance of the task given by God. By means of the application of
the rules of ijtihād he is incapable of committing an obvious (ẓāhir) error. Yet,
this does not render him exempt from the possibility of falling into a hidden
error. That is why his opinion is not authoritative (ḥujja) in the way that con-
sensus is. The mujtahid does what God wants from him in his ijtihād. Whether
he hits the goal and finds the correct ruling is beyond his influence. This does
not preclude the possibility of God revealing to someone else something—the
content of a ruling—that is hidden to the first mujtahid. From this, one can
deduce that there is a truth that is revealed to some but not to others through
no fault of their own. Ultimately, the true knowledge can only be bestowed by
God in the manner of necessary knowledge. All mujtahids are correct. One of
them can only be more correct than the other because of what God reveals.

23 ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār 370.

24 Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 283. Different definitions of the term are mentioned by
Bernand, Zysow and others: ‘that for which the signs are the strongest,’ ‘the one that has
most reward,’ ‘the ruling that comes closest to the one God would have sent down had
he done so,’ ‘that which can be described by nothing but the most similar (al-ashbah);’
cf. Zysow, Economy of Certainty 267–269; Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 283; Bernand,
L’Ashbah 169.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 267

Further support for this understanding of muṣīb comes from Ibn al-Wazīr’s
interpretation of Q 21:79, which reads {And [We] made Solomon understand
the case [better]; though We gave sound judgment and knowledge to both of
them. We made the mountains and birds celebrate Our praises with David—
We did all these things.} Here, the difference of opinion is linked to the dif-
ferent degrees of understanding given to both Solomon and his father David.
Although both are prophets, commended by God and correct in what they stip-
ulate, the correctness of their understanding differs. But Ibn al-Wazīr does not
go so far as to call either of the two mujtahids or of the two prophets wrong.25
He did not make his point very strongly, although he must have known that this
very Quranic verse was one much used to argue for the “one true ruling” theory
of fallibilism. In this case, God is said to acknowledge the one that has “hit” the
correct goal, namely Solomon.
However, the position Ibn al-Wazīr takes on al-ashbah does not effect his
stance towards the legal schools. It only illustrates once more how Ibn al-Wazīr
located the main scope of human intellectual activity in the realm of conjec-
ture, while at the same time affirming the absolute truth of the revelational
ideal. The knowledge of the one correct ruling is beyond human access, beyond
the access of every single mujtahid. God alone knows the truth, but this truth
exists. Whether or not God bestows it on one of the mujtahids, and if so, then on
which, is likewise beyond human knowledge. No mujtahid is more likely than
another to hit the one correct goal based on any merit of his own.

1.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Infallibilism and al-Ashbah

Ibn al-Murtaḍā dedicated ten pages of one of his most important works on
legal theory, Minhāj al-wuṣūl, to the question of infallibility. He leaves no doubt
that the doctrine of infallibility is central to his legal thinking. However, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā does not agree with the above explanation of Q 21:79, neither in
support of fallibilism nor of the common take on the theory of al-ashbah.
Verisimilitude in the form of al-ashbah was an answer that could not be
endorsed by many Muʿtazilis like Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī or ʿAbd al-Jabbār.26
It was argued that, according to the theory of verisimilitude, God has com-
manded the mujtahids to find something for which He had not given clear
signs. This would be tantamount to a Muʿtazili anathema, namely that God
commanded the impossible (taklīf mā lā yutāq) in violation of His justice. If,

25 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 217–218, 244.

26 Former leaders of the Bahshami branch of the Muʿtazili school like Abū Hāshim and Abū
ʿAlī al-Jubbāʿī, having a different understanding of al-ashbah, apparently endorsed it; cf.
Bernand, L’Ashbah 167.

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however, signs were given and the scholar who failed to make correct conclu-
sions on their basis was excused, God’s justice would likewise be infringed.27
Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not fail to treat the challenge to the theory of infalli-
bilism, mentioned by Ibn al-Wazīr and al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza,
according to which the object of seeking had to exist for any search to be valid.
However, for Ibn al-Murtaḍā the idea of al-ashbah needed only little atten-
tion as an argument against infallibility.28 It was in another context that Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of the term stands out. In his reply to the challenge
that some of the companions insisted that any mistake in interpretation would
be ascribed to them whereas the correct conclusion would be ascribed to God,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā argues:

It is possible that ʿAlī [b. Abī Ṭālib], Peace be upon him, when he said that
‘they have made a mistake’ meant that they had missed the strong indica-
tor (al-amāra al-qawiyya) because of distraction and negligence in their
investigation. Undoubtedly, there are strong and weak signs in the process
of evidencing. And if the mujtahid is led to the weak [sign] by his ijtihād
without being deliberately negligent in the searching, then he hits upon
that which God wanted, which is that he acts according to his conjecture
after he has arrived there by his searching.29

A little later in this argumentation, Ibn al-Murtaḍā refers to Abū l-Ḥusayn

al-Baṣrī. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was one of those infallibilists who strongly
opposed the notion of a pre-existing ruling abiding with God. Consequently,
he must have been opposed to the notion of an external standard in approxi-
mation or resemblance to which the correctness of a particular ijtihād could be
evaluated (al-ashbah).30 To preserve some kind of a benchmark for evaluating
ijtihād nevertheless, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī redefined the idea of verisimilitude
and the meaning of al-ashbah. According to him, al-ashbah was that which
is most likely (ghālib al-ẓann) to be the strongest evidence in the mind of the
respective mujtahid. The mujtahid is required to find what is most probably the

27 Ibn al-Murtaḍā says that the scholars could not have failed to see the signs most similar
to the truth, had they not erred or failed in the performance of ijtihād; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
Minhāj al-wuṣūl 768–770.
28 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 774–775.
29 Ibn al-Murtaḍā first mitigates the argument by saying that the reports about it are not
mutawātir and therefore only probable evidence, unable to have an effect on principles of
legal methodology like the question of infallibilism; cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl
776.
30 Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad ii, 298–299, 396.

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reason that dictated the ruling of an original case on the basis of the strongest
evidence, so that he can draw his conclusions for a present case. The “most
probable” comes to signify the most probable or strongest sign (ashbah al-
amārāt), rather than the most probable or strongest result. It is important to
note that the mujtahid is only obligated to find what is the most probable and
strongest evidence in his mind, not to find evidence that necessitates the same
result for all similar rulings. This latter would be certain evidence, which applies
only in the realm of doctrine.31 Hereby the focus on the process rather than
the result in evaluating the mujtahid’s endeavor—so central to the doctrine of
infallibilism—can be preserved. The meaning of al-ashbah is transferred from
signifying ‘the result most similar to the objectively correct result which can-
not be known but is present with God’ (al-ashbah ʿinda llāh), to signifying ‘the
process most similar to the ideal process somewhat present in the mujtahid.’32
From the above-mentioned argument used by Ibn al-Murtaḍā it becomes
clear that he adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn’s idea that the following of the strongest
signs becomes the basis of evaluating the mujtahid’s efforts (and results). Ibn
al-Murtaḍā supports this idea also when he responds to what he considers the
strongest argument against infallibilism. He follows up with Abū l-Ḥusayn’s
idea of the stronger and weaker evidence as a standard when he defines the
term mistake (khaṭaʾ). A mistake, according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, means failing
to hit the stronger evidence due to negligence. In this case, the discernment
of the weaker and stronger signs requires thorough and serious ijtihād so as
to avoid negligence and hence a less probable result. But as there is no objec-
tive standard for evaluating the result, the likelihood of the accurateness of the
mujtahid’s ruling depends on his capabilities in performing ijtihād. Beyond this
general level of discussing the standard for evaluating a scholar’s ijtihād, Ibn al-
Murtaḍā brings another element into the debate:

It is possible that [Muḥammad], peace be upon him and upon his family,
when he said ‘If he fails, he will have one reward,’ meant that if he [the
judge] unwittingly ruled in disagreement with his school, he then has the
reward of having settled the dispute without getting the reward of having
hit the goal of his school. And if he hits upon it, he has two rewards, one
for settling [the dispute] and one for meeting the ruling of his school.33

31 Ibid., ii, 371, 373, 395.

32 Bernand also shows how Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī took over this notion; cf. Bernand, L’Ashbah
168.
33 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 776.

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It should be noted that the evaluation of the result of the scholar’s ijtihād
could be provided by the framework of a school of law according to this rea-
soning. Hence, the lack of stability resulting from the subjective nature of the
infallibilists’ notion of ijtihād would be counterbalanced by a new standard
of evaluation: the school’s doctrine and set of principles. It can be imagined
that the framework of a school with its doctrines, principles and existing rul-
ings could substantiate a standard for evaluating the subjective enterprise of
the mujtahid. Then, beyond the mujtahid’s knowledge of the rules of inter-
preting revelation, it would be his knowledge of the rules and doctrines of
the school by which the likelihood of the accurateness of his ijtihād could be
evaluated. The theory of verisimilitude provides a theoretical frame for this
evaluation.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s identification of al-ashbah with ghālib al-ẓann speaks in
favor of the notion that there is a difference in the strength of indicators that
goes beyond what seems most likely in the individual scholar’s mind. External
factors like the school’s principles and doctrines could be the ideal in approx-
imation to which the strength and probability of a scholar’s signs could be
measured. As Ibn al-Murtaḍā suggests when he writes about the two rewards:
‘hitting’ the correct ruling is tantamount to arriving at a conclusion in line with
the doctrine of the legal school. Consequently, a scholar would not be required
to arrive at the ruling that is as close as possible to the one that ‘is present with
God.’ Rather, he would be required to arrive at a ruling as close as possible to
the one that is present within the principles and rulings of his school.
In conclusion, the differences between Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
understanding of the principle that ‘every mujtahid is correct’ are not signif-
icant at first sight. Both defend the doctrine of infallibilism. That is also why
both are confronted with the results that the doctrine has on the system of
the legal schools. But while Ibn al-Murtaḍā attempts to counterbalance the
disseminating effect of the doctrine by a narrowing and consolidating of the
legal identity of the Zaydiyya, Ibn al-Wazīr strives to open up the field of legal
interpretation to a wider circle in order to transcend the school boundaries. Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s explanation of the possibility of “hitting” and the two rewards, as
well as his interpretation of al-ashbah, can be seen as the theoretical frame-
work for the narrowing down of the scope of legal interpretation. It shows how
an external standard can be introduced into the realm of equally probable rul-
ings by means of a legal school. For Ibn al-Wazīr, the probable nature implied in
the doctrine of infallibilism does not allow for qualification by an external stan-
dard. Although some results of ijtihād may be closer to the truth than others,
this truly remains beyond human grasp—in terms of knowledge as well as in
terms of obligation. Hence we can affirm that epistemological considerations

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concerning the extent and source of knowledge are manifest in the background
of each scholar’s response to the problem of infallibilism.

2 The Possibility of Ijtihād and the Existence of Mujtahids

Two questions of significance for the existence and structure of legal schools
have long occupied Muslim authors on legal theory, as well as subsequent
western researchers. The first question, discussed by Muslim scholars since
the 5th/11th century, was whether there could be an age without mujtahids.
Secondly, the distinct question of whether “the gate of ijtihād” was closed
became prominent from the 10th/16th century onwards. Among western schol-
ars, Schacht and Hallaq were the most prolific of those working on these ques-
tions. However, they, like Muslim scholars throughout history, took opposing
sides.34
The discussion of the second question as to whether or not “the gate of ijti-
hād” was closed in the course of the development of Islamic law is largely deter-
mined by the respective definitions of the term ijtihād. The debate between
Schacht and Hallaq suggests that the gate was closed in one sense, but not in
another. If one speaks of an ijtihād that draws exclusively and directly from the
texts of revelation by means set down in the classical manuals of uṣūl al-fiqh,
the gate appears to have been more or less shut since the mid-4th/10th century.
However, if the term is understood to mean any kind of interpretative activity
of religious texts including legal opinions of earlier scholars, the gate can hardly
said to be closed. Calder agrees with Schacht that the gate was closed around
the end of the 3rd/beginning of the 10th century in that the Muslim commu-
nity embraced the principle of school affiliation about that time. He writes that
“Hallaq will be correct in asserting that the gate of ijtihād did not close, if he
distinguishes clearly the two types of ijtihād—independent and affiliated.”35
What this effectively means is that all the interpretative activity henceforth
took place within the confines of the legal school and refers to the texts and
principles supposedly laid down by the founding imam. According to Calder,
subsequent works on the hermeneutical structure of legal reasoning were writ-
ten to justify and consolidate the structure of the legal school based on the
authority of the founding mujtahid. They were not, for the most part, hand-
books on how to arrive at independent judgements in supposedly new cases.36

34 See especially Hallaq, On the Origins; Schacht, An Introduction.

35 Calder, Al-Nawawī’s Typology 157.
36 Ibid., 158.

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To my knowledge, none of the debates around this question in modern west-

ern research includes the Zaydiyya. An important Zaydi doctrine says that no
time can be without a mujtahid from among the ahl al-bayt.37 According to
al-Akwaʿ the Zaydi madhhab distinguishes itself from the Sunni legal schools
by “opening the gate of ijtihād.” Interestingly, he does not merely use the term
Zaydiyya in this context, but rather speaks of the “Zaydi-Hādawī madhhab”
referring to Imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq.38 This raises the question: To what kind
of ijtihād was the gate opened—independent or affiliated? Al-Kibsī claims that
the generations following the early imams were absolute mujtahids who merely
agreed on the principles of their predecessors.39 Zysow and Haykel show how
the structure of the Zaydiyya provided that its authority was not officially based
on the legal rulings of one single founder, in contrast to the Sunni schools.
Rather, it was the principles (qawāʿid) which guided the legal interpretations
of a number of early imams of ahl al-bayt to which later Zaydi scholars owed
their authority.40 Consequently, later scholars could produce a legal opinion
that was not directly based on an existing opinion. Rather, it was based on prin-
ciples that a particular set of later scholars (muḥassilūn) had recognized in the
background of a multitude of opinions of preceding imams. Another version of
school identity locates it in the affiliation with the theological doctrines of the
early Zaydi imams.41 In either case, the claim to the continuance of ijtihād can-
not justifiably be said to refer to absolute and independent ijtihād.42 It should
be remembered how the infallibilism theory was introduced into the Caspian
as well as the Yemeni Zaydiyya, as touched upon above. In both cases there were
currents within the Zaydiyya that associated themselves with different schol-
ars based on the latters’ legal doctrine. An independent or absolute mujtahid is
unlikely to do either, associating himself with a particular school or a particu-
lar set of legal principles. Consequently, the answer to the question whether or
not ijtihād exists is largely determined by the concept of ijtihād that is held by
a particular school or scholar.

37 ʿAbd al-Allāh b. Ḥamza, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār 377; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 120; Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Intiqād; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār xvi, 92.
38 Al-Akwaʿ, al-Zaydiyya 40.
39 Al-Kibsī, al-Furūq al-wāḍiḥa 84.
40 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 338. The imams usually meant in this con-
text are al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī (d. 246/860), his son Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim (d. 2),
his grandson al-Hādī ilā l-Ḥaqq Yaḥya b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911) and the latter’s two sons
Muḥammad (d. 310/922) and Aḥmad (d. between 315/927 and 322/934).
41 Haykel and Zysow trace this idea of school identity back to Imam al-Manṣūr ʿAbdallāh b.
Ḥamza in his Kitāb al-Shāfī; cf. ibid., 335–336.
42 Strothmann, Staatsrecht 70.

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2.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Position on the Existence of Ijtihād

Ibn al-Wazīr’s main argument for the existence of ijtihād is that ijtihād is a col-
lective duty which has to be performed at all times. If Muslims were no longer
able to do so they would be charged with the impossible (taklīf mā la yutāq).
Next to the explicit duty of ijtihad, Ibn al-Wazīr’s views are driven by the iden-
tification of knowledge with the science of the religious law. Fiqh is knowledge
(ʿilm) even though the results of ijtihād belong into the realm of the conjec-
tural (ẓannī). Hence it is what Ibn al-Wazīr calls conjectural knowledge which
can be called knowledge in some respects, as explained above. In the pream-
ble of his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid as well as in several instances in al-Rawḍ al-bāsim
and Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr connects the absence of mujtahids with a well
known tradition according to which the demise of knowledge occurs only in
connection with the disappearance of scholars.43 The feared demise of knowl-
edge is clearly identified with the demise of ijtihād. The duty to know can thus
be identified with the duty to practice ijtihād. Accordingly, legal opinions not
proceeding from ijtihād are equivalent to fatwās not based on knowledge ( yuftī
man laysa bi-ʿilm).44
Hallaq suggests that the question of whether there could be an age with-
out a mujtahid is mainly determined by eschatological discussions around the
approaching of the end of times. In his view, the discussion was mainly the-
ological and only received attention in law as a consequence.45 To my mind,
the reasoning in this question seems rather to reveal whether theology or law
should be the main field of human activity in a scholar’s thinking. Johansen
describes the increasing distance between fiqh scholars and theologians from
the 4th/10th century onwards as a correlation of the different practical func-
tions that the respective groups had in the Muslim community. Whereas theol-
ogy is occupied with the rational justification of religious truths, with possible
implications for political legitimacy, “fiqh serves as a normative reference for

43 The tradition reads as follows: “Verily, God does not remove knowledge entirely, but he
takes away knowledge along with the scholars. So that, when no scholar remains, people
will take ignorant men as leaders who will then give legal opinions without knowledge,
thereby falling in error and leading others astray.” Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 64. For
other instances where Ibn al-Wazīr connects the idea of the absence of ijtihād with the
demise of knowledge in the sense of the prophetic traditions, see for example ibid., 77;
Ibn al-Wazīr, Īthār al-ḥaqq 141–142; Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 62b. The preamble of
one copy of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim also refers to traditions in connection with the demise of ijti-
ḥād. However, the preamble is not quoted here because I did not obtain the copy which
contained it.
44 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 121.
45 Hallaq, On the Origins 140–141.

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a universally valid system of justice.”46 Whereas theologians argue for the gen-
eral authority of their doctrines based on the concept of the conclusive power
of human reason’s demonstrative proofs, legal interpretation merely claims to
find probable translations of religious truth into the particular cases of indi-
viduals. Locating the reasoning with regard to the question of the existence of
mujtahids therefore indicates which field is considered the most appropriate
for human intellectual activity.
Among the Zaydiyya, the question of the existence of mujtahids is typically
discussed in the context of the theory of the imamate, one of the principle
Zaydi theological tenets. Accordingly, there must be a candidate who qualifies
for the position at all times, and ijtihād is a major requirement for qualifica-
tion.47 Explanations according to which ijtihād may cease to exist “because
God takes away knowledge along with the scholars at the end of times” are
refuted by the belief that one group in the Muslim community will preserve
the truth until the day of judgment.48 Ibn al-Wazīr refers to this Zaydi belief
as well. Acquiring legal knowledge cannot be impossible, because knowledge
cannot be taken away until the day of judgement.49 Yet, for Ibn al-Wazīr, this
is not tied to the imamate or the ijtihād of an imam, but rather to the practice
of ijtihād per se. Consequently, the conclusions he draws from the decrease of
knowledge is neither the concession to a wide permissibility of taqlīd of earlier
imams or contemporary scholars who judge according to their principles, nor
to doctrinal and political affiliation.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s contemporary and teacher in his early years, ʿAlī b. Muḥam-
mad b. Abī l-Qāsim, seems to have denied the possibility of ijtihād altogether.
Unfortunately, his letter that provoked Ibn al-Wazīr’s most extensive defense
of ijtihād is lost. Therefore Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s views can only be reconstructed
tentatively from the quotes and insinuations of his opponent Ibn al-Wazīr.50
Apparently, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim thought ijtihād to be exceedingly difficult (taʿadhd-
hara, taʿassara) in his day. So difficult, indeed, that it could no longer be per-
formed. To him, the taqlīd of the early imams was the only remaining chance

46 Johansen, Contingency 26.

47 Cf. Abū Zahra, al-Imām Zayd 331; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār xvi, 92; i, 110; al-
Kamālī, al-Imām al-Mahdī 453–459; Madelung, Imam al-Qāsim 141; Strothmann, Staat-
srecht 4, 70.
48 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Intiqād. This explanation was part of the well received legal
methodology of the Maliki Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1248–1249).
49 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 118–119.
50 Sometimes Ibn al-Wazīr quotes from his former teacher’s letter. At other times, he takes
the position of his opponent for granted and then draws conclusions from it that his oppo-
nent cannot agree with in the typical ilzām style.

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to preserve legal knowledge and be rightly guided.51 Although it is not certain

exactly how Ibn Abī l-Qāsim understood the terms taʿadhdhara and taʿassara,
he obviously concluded the necessity of emulating the dead scholars (taqlīd
al-amwāt).52 In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr’s conclusion from the decrease of knowl-
edge is the necessity to strive for individual ijtihād:

He [Ibn Abī l-Qāsim] says that it [ijtihād] is exceedingly difficult and

impossible. That implies that he believes that there are no mujtahids in
this time, because if there was a mujtahid in this time, its [ijtihād] impos-
sibility would no longer be in question and the ability [to perform ijtihād]
would have to be confirmed with certainty. His—may God strengthen
him [Ibn Abī l-Qāsim]—words indicate that the time is without muj-
tahids. But he—may God strengthen him—disregards what follows from
this. What follows is that striving for ijtihād is an individual duty upon
him and upon us together, because that is the rule if a collective duty is
not performed.53

The apprehension toward the decrease of knowledge in the Muslim commu-

nity is faced in two different ways: On the one hand, Ibn al-Wazīr’s contempo-
raries refer to the doctrine of the imamate and affiliation with the doctrines
and principles of the founding imams to preserve knowledge. Ibn al-Wazīr, on
the other hand, intends to achieve that goal by expanding the activity of legal
interpretation.
Notably, Ibn al-Wazīr frequently asks Ibn Abī l-Qāsim why he does not think
the common believer or scholar is capable of arriving at conjectural knowl-
edge in legal interpretation, while requiring him to arrive at a detailed and
certain knowledge of God, his attributes and many other doctrinal questions
without taqlīd.54 Although we do not know what Ibn Abī l-Qāsim would have
replied, the answer to that question lies at the heart of the epistemological dif-
ference between Ibn al-Wazīr and his Zaydi-Muʿtazili contemporaries: Whereas
Ibn al-Wazīr’s Zaydi-Muʿtazili contemporaries locate the most important area
of human intellectual activity in the realm of what they consider objective

51 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 345–346.

52 See Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i–iii, for example i, 346; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 73.
Ibn al-Wazīr discusses what the term taʿadhdhara may imply. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan b. Yaḥyā
l-Qāsimī (d. 1375/1955), in his later refutation of al-Rawḍ al-bāsim and defense of Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim, insists that the latter does not mean utter impossibility (muhāl).
53 This is only one of many instances in which Ibn al-Wazīr adduces this argument; cf. Ibn
al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 263.
54 Ibid., i, 271–272; 276.

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certainty, Ibn al-Wazīr locates it in the realm of individual conjecture. It will

be remembered that he divides knowledge into the necessary and the conjec-
tural. Legal knowledge to him is no less significant than doctrinal knowledge
arrived at by inference. Consequently, the affiliation with the doctrines of the
early Zaydi imams could be of no greater importance than any ijtihād per se.
Loyalty to those doctrines and principles would not secure more knowledge or
higher epistemic value than individual ijtihād based on methods accepted by
the whole of the Muslim community. As became clear in preceeding chapters,
Ibn al-Wazīr warns against spending extensive efforts in the attempt to acquire
certain and detailed knowledge of what cannot be known in the realm of doc-
trine and theology. To him, the realm where knowledge should be acquired
is the realm of law, where probability is all that can be achieved. Once again,
the space he leaves for the individual to acquire knowledge, albeit conjectural
knowledge, is greater than what his contemporaries in their focus on doctrine
allow for.

2.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of the Existence of Ijtihād

Ibn al-Murtaḍā is a known defender of ijtihād. While this topic is singled
out in some sources as one on which Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā were
united against Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, others portray them as opponents even in this
respect.55 Yet a brief look at Ibn al-Murtaḍā shows that even his defense of ijti-
hād was limited and thus differs from Ibn al-Wazīr’s position.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā claims in his al-Munya wa-l-amal that in contradistinction
to adherents of the Sunni legal schools, the Zaydis do not draw their affilia-
tion to the Zaydiyya from following in the furūʿ. Rather, it is supposed to be the
commitment to the legal and theological doctrine of the early imams which
constitutes the Zaydi identity.56 On the other hand, there is a statement in
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s major work on uṣūl al-fiqh, Minhāj al-wuṣūl, that the “Zay-
diyya applies the sayings of their imams” like the Shafiʿiyya and other Sunni
schools apply (taʿmal bi-) the opinions of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfa etc. According
to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, “the schools have been established” so that no one issues

55 According to Ibn Abī l-Rijāl in Maṭlaʿ al-budur iv, 148–149, the dispute of the two schol-
ars evolved around theological matters, whereas they agreed concerning ijtihād; similarly
Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 33. In contrast, al-Iryānī in his introduction to
al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ renders the practice of ijtihād as the only distinctive feature between
the two scholars, Ibn al-Wazīr being the one practicing and promoting it, unlike Ibn al-
Murtaḍā; cf. al-Iryānī (intr.), al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 7.
56 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Munya wa-l-amal 96; see also Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Mad-
hhab? 336.

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opinions based on original inference (istinbāṭ) from the evidence in the reve-
lational sources anymore. Yet that does not mean that ijtihād is entirely impos-
sible (taʿadhdhara bi-l-marra). It only means that it is largely not needful in its
independent form.57 It is likely that Ibn al-Murtaḍā expresses a common opin-
ion of his time, confirming what Calder says about the function of writings
on the basic hermeneutical instruments. After all, Ibn al-Murtaḍā authored
what remains to this day one of the greatest one of the greatest compendia of
Hādawī-Zaydi fiqh. Similarly, Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī insists on the Zaydi
norm of knowing the imam of the time, with ijtihād as requirement of the ima-
mate. Yet he praises the early ahl al-bayt, notably al-Hādī ilā l-Ḥaqq, and insists
on the adherence to their school to a degree that renders the possible ijtihād of
a contemporary mujtahid of little weight. Indeed, the ijtihād of a contemporary
mujtahid is valid only as far as it agrees with the opinions of Imam al-Hādī ilā
l-ḥaqq and other ahl al-bayt:

If a mujtahid who is not from among them, agrees with one of their muj-
tahids in his ijtihād, there is no obstacle to having recourse to him in this
question, because he in his ruling is like one referring back to them, board-
ing the ship58 and not leaving it. If someone does not agree with them, he
opposes the command to resort back to the agreement with them and to
walk in their path (al-sulūk fī madhhabihim) in accordance with what has
been shown above: their consensus is authoritative, must be followed and
must not be opposed.59

Ibn Abī l-Qāsim seems to have gone yet further. Unlike Ibn al-Murtaḍā and
al-Hādī, he does not refer to the sufficiency or the excellence of what legal
interpretation already exists. Rather, to him the lack of independent ijtihād
was caused by the supposed incapability of acquiring sufficient information
about the sources so as to judge on their reliability and applicability in a given
question. Throughout the first three volumes of al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr exerts
himself to refute his former teacher’s claims. Ibn Abī l-Qāsim apparently holds
that neither the legal verses of the Quran (āyāt al-aḥkām), the traditions (aḥā-
dīth), the truthfulness of transmitters, nor the Arabic language along with other
required source material can be known any longer to a sufficient degree for
the performance of ijtihād. Such thinking is rationalized by general legal max-

57 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 797.

58 The whole of ahl al-bayt was often depicted as a ship that ensures safe travels across the
water.
59 Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāghibīn 94.

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ims (qawāʿid) of the Zaydiyya such as one listed in the commentary on Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s fiqh compendium Kitāb al-Azhār by Aḥmad b. Ṣalāḥ al-Sharafī,
“When ijtihād is exceedingly difficult, taqlīd is permissible (idhā taʿadhdhara
l-ijtihād jāza l-taqlīd).”60
It is quite evident that Ibn al-Wazīr’s contemporaries do not mean the inde-
pendent ijtihād when they use the term for the contemporary activity. Yet, they
do not distinguish the one from the other with different terms. Ibn al-Wazīr
does not use any distinctive terms either. But he apparently considers all kinds
of ijtihād possible. Yet the main point of controversy is the independent ijtihād.
The challenges expressed by Ibn Abī l-Qāsim and the replies of Ibn al-Wazīr
focus on the legal verses, prophetic traditions and the Arabic language. Many
passages begin with such phrases as:

“The sayyid [Ibn Abī l-Qāsim]—may God strengthen him—mentioned

that ijtihād is built on the knowledge of the required exegesis of the Quran
and he states that this is exceedingly difficult (…).” “Then, he [Ibn Abī l-
Qāsim] renders the knowledge of the traditions exceedingly difficult for
the mujtahid (…).” “Then, he doubted in the knowledge of linguistics and
of Arabic, which are the foundation of the exegesis of Quran and Sunna.”61

The two scholars do not primarily discuss whether the opinions of earlier
imams can be understood or whether the principles behind their opinions can
be known.62 These latter questions would have to be at issue if Ibn al-Wazīr
and his teacher were concerned with the affiliated ijtihād. However, Ibn al-
Wazīr and his teacher discuss the requirements for independent ijtihād. Ibn
al-Wazīr insists that everything that is needed for ijtihād on every level is avail-
able and employable. Indeed, the access and employment of the sources and
instruments for ijtihād on the highest, the independent level are the basis for
ijtihād on the lower, the affiliated level as well as for taqlīd. For Ibn al-Wazīr,
ijtihād is possible and mujtahids must always exist.

60 Cf. al-Kibsī, al-Furūq al-wāḍiḥa 62.

61 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 276, 300; Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 62–63. For similar
examples see Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 150; iii, 88–89.
62 The practice of extrapolating the legal principles called takhrīj is a major task of affiliated
mujtahids as well as the basis for subsequent affiliated ijtihad, as shall be discussed in ch.
5 sec. 6 below.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 279

3 Taqlīd and Concepts of Following

The term taqlīd is often translated as “following” or “emulation.” An early defini-

tion of the term was coined by ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025) but may have existed
before. He defined taqlīd as “the acceptance of the saying of another without
evidence” (qubūl qawl al-ghayr min ghayr ḥujja),63 a definition that prevailed
in the literature on theology and legal theory beyond the Muʿtazila.64
In the broadest sense, the term refers to a so-called muqallid who follows a
scholar in rational conclusions, or interpretation of the source texts to render
a judgement on a given question. In the legal context, taqlīd is an essential ele-
ment of the system of law schools as the counterpart to ijtihād. Accordingly, a
legal school is structured by the interpretation of one or a few scholars and the
following of many laymen.
The correlation of the consolidation of the madhhab-system and the preva-
lence of taqlīd is commonly agreed upon in modern research.65 The different
uses of the concept of ijtihād, the diachronic development of the concept
and the different ranks of the mujtahids in relation to the school system have
received considerable attention—less so the different nuances of the concept
of taqlīd.66

3.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Taqlīd and Following

It became clear that Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā both assert the infallibility
doctrine as well as the existence of mujtahidūn, albeit with different meanings.
Starting with Ibn al-Wazīr’s notion of taqlīd, a considerable part of al-ʿAwāṣim
as well as al-Rawḍ al-bāsim is devoted to the discussion of ijtihād and taqlīd.

63 Cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad 25.

64 For the same definition used by other scholars, see for example Weiss, Search for God’s
Law 717, which investigates the legal methodology of the Shafiʿi Sayf al-Dīn al-al-Āmidī
(d. 631/1233). Al-Āmidī adds “compelling” (mulzima) to the “evidence.” According to
Calder, the term was initially defined by the Ashʿari theologian and Shafiʿi jurist Abū Isḥāq
al-Shirāzī (d. 476/1083); cf. Calder, Taqlīd. See also Wiederhold, Legal Doctrines in Conflict
243. However, Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141) attests the above definition already for ʿAbd
al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025). It is likely to have been in use beforehand because emulation in
doctrinal matters (uṣūl al-dīn) was already discussed before the 5th/11th century. See for
example Omari on Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī’s (d. 319/931) acceptance of taqlīd in doctrinal
issues; Omari, The Theology of Abū l-Qāsim 170.
65 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution; Hallaq (ed.), The Formation of Islamic Law; Hallaq,
Authority, Continuity and Change; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories; Melchert,
The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law; Jackson, Islamic Law and the State; Fadel, The
Social Logic of Taqlīd; Aghnides, Mohammedan Theories.
66 See footnote above and Calder, al-Nawawī’s Typology of Muftīs 137–164.

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The focus is especially on whether or not ijtihād is possible. A more distinct

picture of the different nuances of taqlīd presents itself in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Kitāb
al-Qawāʿid, in which the reader learns that Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between
prohibited and permitted kinds of taqlīd.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking is determined by two duties. First, the duty to attain
knowledge and second, the duty to follow the Prophet. For the first duty, it
needs to be remembered that Ibn al-Wazīr equated knowledge with ijtihād. This
is not an unusual equation. Sunni scholars like al-Shāfiʿī or Imām al-Ḥaramayn
al-Juwaynī equated ʿilm (knowledge in general) with fiqh (knowledge of the
religious law). In the first two centuries of the history of Islam, knowledge was
often identified with tradition (ḥadīth) and transmission. It only gained entry
into the prolegomena of religious writings as a means of distinguishing reli-
gious information in the 3rd/9th century, and in the sense of philosophical
or theological knowledge only in the 4th/10th century.67 But, as we have seen
in the section on epistemology, Ibn al-Wazīr backs his equation of knowledge
and the performance of ijtihād with a philosophical distinction between neces-
sary knowledge on the one hand, and knowledge tantamount to preponderant
conjecture on the other. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the realm of the prepon-
derant conjecture applies in secondary matters of theology as well as in law. In
matters of theological doctrine, taqlīd is not permitted by the great majority of
schools. Most scholars exclude information based on taqlīd from the definition
of knowledge, even if the content corresponds to reality. Ibn al-Wazīr extends
this definition of knowledge to the legal realm of probability, as we have seen
above. Although he does not explicitly reject the permissibility of uninformed
taqlīd for the utter layman that Ibn al-Murtaḍā permitted, he does so implicitly
in that he insists on every mukallaf ’s ability to discern between scholars and
gain a basic understanding of their rulings. After all, “taqlīd without weighing
the evidence is impermissible.”68 This is because the duty to know, as well as the
duty to act upon conjecture, applies to all believers. Taqlīd in the strict sense of
uninformed emulation precludes the performance of this duty on every level—
the level of apodictic knowledge as well as of conjectural knowledge—because
taqlīd in the strict and prohibited sense assumes ignorance of evidence.69
The second duty that determines Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking is the duty to follow
the Prophet. The charge that seems to have been frequently brought against Ibn
al-Wazīr was that he forsook the school of ahl al-bayt and therefore, according

67 Cf. Hallaq, Origins of the Controversy 130–131; Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant 72–96,
210.
68 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 94a.
69 Cf. ibid., f. 71a.

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to Zaydi thinking, the command of the Prophet Muḥammad to adhere to ahl

al-bayt. A major incentive in writing the Kitāb al-Qawāʿid was to show that he
did not violate this Zaydi doctrine.70 A three-fold division in the introduction
is supposed to illuminate the true sense of following (ittibāʿ, iqtidāʾ) as grounds
for understanding Ibn al-Wazīr’s rejection of taqlīd. One human being can fol-
low another a) in form ( fī l-ṣūra), b) in meaning ( fī l-maʿnā), or c) in form and
meaning ( fī l-ṣūra wa-l-maʿnā).71 Whereas the latter two correspond to the true
sense of following, a mere formal adherence in the sense of outward emulation
does not comply with the true sense of following:

Following the example means that you do something the way your model
has done it. That is why the uṣūlīs require that agreement exists even in
the intention. If the Prophet prayed two rakʿas with the intention of com-
plying with a duty, and we prayed the two [rakʿas] with the intention of a
supererogatory performance, we would not be taking him as an example.
There is a subtle point here, which is that ‘taking as an example’ is unlike
taqlīd. (…) Even if we supposed that ahl al-bayt permitted the taqlīd of
the dead and someone complied with it [the permission], he would not
be taking them as an example, because they never emulated the dead nor
promoted it [emulation of the dead].72

Thus, outward compliance with the sayings and rulings of ahl al-bayt tanta-
mount to emulation of the dead would actually be the very opposite of follow-
ing the ahl al-bayt. Accordingly, striving for the performance of ijtihād in order
to gain knowledge accords not only with the duty of ijtihād itself, but also with
the Zaydi claim to adherence to the Prophet’s progeny. Therefore, emulation
could never be seen as a valid form of complying with the duty to follow in Ibn
al-Wazīr’s view.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr distinguishes between the permissibility and
impermissibility of taqlīd based on three elements involved in the practice: the
process of taqlīd itself, the emulator (muqallid); and the one emulated (muqal-
lad).
Firstly and in line with the above-mentioned definition, the prohibition of
taqlīd applies when someone accepts the judgement of another without asking
for proofs. The permitted kind of taqlīd, on the other hand, occurs when some-
one accepts the judgement of another after having received and understood

70 See for example ibid., f. 62b.

71 Ibid., f. 64b.
72 Ibid., fs. 72a–b.

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the indicators for the judgment. This refers to the judgement itself as well as to
the muqallid’s choice of a mujtahid to follow. The decision concerning which
mujtahid to follow must be based on the strongest indicators leading to the
highest probability. Strictly speaking, this may not be termed taqlīd because
indicators are provided.73 Effectively, however, it is used that way neverthe-
less. In his attempt to strengthen the legal subject’s identity beyond madhhab
boundaries, Ibn al-Wazīr is therefore majorly concerned with the first kind of
taqlīd. Indeed, he often refers to the second kind of taqlīd as a kind of ijtihād
in defending the possibility of interpreting sources and weighing indicators in
general, and of switching from the compliance with the fatwā of one mujtahid
to that of another in particular. As Weiss points out when discussing Sayf al-Dīn
al-Āmidī’s (d. 631/1233) al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, emulation in the prohibited
sense is unlike the consultation of a jurisconsult (istiftāʾ).74 Accordingly, Ibn al-
Wazīr admits a distinction between qualified mujtahids and laymen. An utter
layman (ʿāmmī) may have to consult a mujtahid in a legal issue and then fol-
low his opinion. But he must build his decision to comply with the fatwā of
a scholar on indicators that speak in favor of the aptness of scholar as well as
of the soundness of the fatwā. He may not merely follow a mujtahid unques-
tioningly on the grounds that he belongs to a particular legal school. Rather,
he must search out the indicator for each scholar’s judgement, both in cases
of disagreement between scholars and concerning the abilities of the different
scholars.75 Ibn al-Wazīr concedes a degree of understanding and of the ability
to weigh indicators and determine preponderance (tarjīḥ) to every believer.76
He does not seem to allow the prohibited kind of taqlīd to even the plainest of
compos mentis. This becomes sufficiently clear in his lamentations at the out-
set of his Kitāb al-Qawāʿ id. Although the five “menaces” (āfāt) that hinder the
understanding of indicators and arguments are not primarily aimed at utter
laymen, the claim Ibn al-Wazīr puts on all believers is evident:

The second calamity is represented by a contemplator who is convinced

of his own insufficiency and goes beyond the limit in belittling his own
ability. When he hears the correct proof to which his reason leads him

73 Ibn al-Malāḥimī points this out in his definition of taqlīd; cf. Ibn al-Malaḥimī, Kitāb al-
Muʿtamad 25.
74 Weiss, Search for God’s Law 717–718.
75 For the weighing that needs to be performed by the muqallid in case of disagreement, cf.
Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 125, 137, 140. For the search of indicators (ṭalab amarāt) for the
scholars’ ability to perform ijtihād; cf. ibid., iii, 128.
76 Weiss’s translation of tarjīḥ as “determination of preponderance” expresses the concept
most accurately; cf. Weiss, The Search for God’s Law 730.

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as well, and his heart is compelled to know (…) because of the puniness
of his knowledge and the weakness of his understanding, he is convinced
that, if the emulated imam were alive, he would have given him an answer.
That is a great error which befalls muqallids in particular. If they contem-
plated, they would know that if their reason had reached this degree of
inability in discerning, then taklīf would no longer apply to them. They
would be neither obliged to practice ijtihād nor taqlīd. If that were not so,
what security would a muqallid have when he with all the smallness of
his knowledge and weakness of understanding chooses the madhhab of
his imam.77

It is very likely that whenever Ibn al-Wazīr speaks of the kind of taqlīd permit-
ted to the laymen, he speaks of that kind which includes the acquaintance with
the mujtahid’s arguments or has substantiated reasons for complying with the
ruling of a particular mujtahid. Although Ibn al-Wazīr concedes that a certain
kind of taqlīd is permissible for laymen, he does make it sufficiently clear that
this permissibility is merely an exception from an otherwise general prohibi-
tion of taqlīd.

The generals (ʿumūmāt) prohibit taqlīd entirely. There is for example the
divine saying [Q 2:166] {when those who have been followed disown their
followers}. This is a general verse. (…) These generals can only be par-
ticularized by a revelational text or consensus, but there is no text that
particularizes it. (…) That consensus is concluded from the action of some
of them and the silence of the rest. And it is a consensus on the taqlīd of
the living in the practical questions of the furūʿ. Accordingly taqlīd must
be permitted in those things only.78

Ibn al-Wazīr’s reasoning is based on the assumption that taqlīd does not con-
stitute knowledge. According to Zaydi-Muʿtazili doctrine, taqlīd would have to
be prohibited wherever the attainment of knowledge is commanded. Ibn al-

77 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 63b.

78 Ibid., fs. 65a–b. A practical as well as a tacit consensus merely results in probable partic-
ularization. That is why the general impermissibility expressed in the clear Quranic texts
remains valid. Ibn al-Wazīr generally rejects tacit consensus. According to him, there are
many reasons for a mujtahid to be silent other than that he agrees. The absence of evi-
dence for his disagreement is not proof of his agreement. This is another example of Ibn
al-Wazir’s rejection of the “argument from the absence of evidence;” cf. ibid., fs. 76a–b. For
the connection between tacit consensus and a corollary of the argument from the absence
of evidence, the “argumentum e silentio,” see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre 376.

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Wazīr refers to the Quranic verse often used to argue in favor of taqlīd, namely
Q 16:43 which reads: {[Prophet], all the messengers We sent before you were
simply men to whom We had given the Revelation: you [people] can ask those
who have knowledge if you do not know.}:

From the word of the Exalted {if you do not know} it must be understood
that the wise purpose in asking them [those who have knowledge] is to
leave ignorance behind and enter into knowledge. That is why one cannot
use it to argue for taqlīd. Firstly, because that [leaving ignorance behind]
is the understanding that comes to mind most readily to everyone, which
no one denies except for lack of tasting the sound. If someone said ‘Drink,
if you are thirsty!’ it would be understood that the intention is to drink
water that quenches thirst. (…) Secondly, taqlīd does not make one leave
ignorance and enter into knowledge. That is why taqlīd is prohibited in
questions that require the acquisition of knowledge.79

It must be borne in mind that Ibn al-Wazīr considers legal knowledge to be a

kind of knowledge and ijtihād the preservation of knowledge.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s second distinction within the term taqlīd refers to the emula-
tor himself. Whereas a kind of taqlīd is permitted to the utter layman, it ceases
to be so once a believer has attained the ability to practice a basic ijtihād in one
or more questions or disciplines.

They did not conclude a consensus that taqlīd is permitted to the dis-
cerning student who is occupied with seeking knowledge and capable of
searching the indicators. That is why al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh stipulated in the
Ziyādāt that the discerning one must investigate and research the indica-
tors until he has arrived at preponderant probability concerning what he
must do.80

The case of a student who is able to investigate and discern an issue’s evidence
necessitates a distinction. Both titles rendered to such a one by Ibn al-Wazīr
indicate a high level of activity: “discerning student” (ṭālib al-ʿilm al-mumayyiz)
or “one aspiring to ijtihād” (mutaḥarrī l-ijtihād).81 The distinction thus made
is between a layman, on the one hand, who is not occupied with the search
for knowledge at all and is therefore permitted to inquire of a scholar, and on

79 Ibid., f. 71a.
80 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitab al-Qawāʿid f. 70b.
81 See for example ibid., fs. 70b, 74b.

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the other hand, a layman who is occupied with the memorization of Quran
and Sunna as well the analysis of the contained meanings and proofs. Beyond
mere acknowledgement, the latter scrutinizes legal opinion of the mujtahids
as to their proofs until his supposition (ẓann) concerning the soundness of an
argument reaches overwhelming probability (rujḥān). He thereby reaches the
rank of a mujtahid in a particular question and later in a whole discipline. He
remains a student in other areas until the rank of a mujtahid is attained in all
disciplines.82
Ibn al-Wazīr bases this distinction between the two kinds of laymen on the
permissibility of taqlīd under certain conditions. The permissibility of emula-
tion applies to laymen of the first kind. The general impermissibility of taqlīd
mentioned in the first distinction, i.e. between the informed and the unin-
formed process of taqlīd, encompasses all other cases and hence prohibits
taqlīd to laymen and students who have advanced beyond the capabilities of
an uneducated layperson.
Ibn al-Wazīr, who knows himself to have the qualities of the “discerning stu-
dent,” is not permitted to practice taqlīd at all. In turn, the differentiation within
the “discerning student” between being a muqallid in some and a mujtahid in
other areas exposes two possibilities: initially there is the following of a scholar
by way of taqlīd followed by the information about the evidence and indica-
tors; secondly the student investigates the sources and the contained indicators
himself and reaches a judgement.
The third distinction within taqlīd refers to the one emulated (muqallad).
The point at issue is whether the emulated mujtahid is alive. Ibn al-Wazīr com-
mits the major part of his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid to demonstrating that the emulation
of dead scholars (taqlīd al-amwāt) is prohibited. Besides arguments from the
revelational texts and opinions of scholars,83 Ibn al-Wazīr provides a conse-
quentialist argument: Emulation of the dead has detrimental effects on the
performance of the duty of ijtihād in the present times and on the incentive
to attain the rank of a mujtahid. However, the performance of ijtihād is incum-
bent on the Islamic community at large.

82 See for example ibid., fs. 72b, 74a, 84b. The importance this distinction has in Ibn al-Wazīr’s
thinking becomes obvious from the frequency with which it is iterated.
83 Ibn al-Wazīr repeatedly refers to Zaydi scholars like the Caspian imam Abū Ṭālib al-
Hārūnī, the Yemeni imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza or the faqīh ʿAbdallāh b. Zayd al-ʿAnsī. See
for example ibid., fs. 64b or 65b. Ibn al-Wazīr is to date the only known reference for al-
ʿAnsī’s work on Zaydi legal theory, called al-Durar al-manẓūma fī uṣūl al-fiqh, cf. Ansari
and Schmidtke (eds., intr.), Zaydī Theology in the 7th/13th Century Yemen 11.

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In the taqlīd of the dead, there is a great cause of corruption because it is

thereby made easy for the mukallafūn to omit a certain duty agreed upon
to be a duty. This [duty] is ijtihād at all times. And there is no doubt that
the taqlīd of the previous generations is among the strongest reasons for
the omission of this duty and the greatest agents of the abolishment of
the religious law. (…) If students (ṭalabat al-ʿilm) are allowed to practice
taqlīd, it will be a factor for them to leave ijtihād. (…) When seekers of
knowledge resort to taqlīd, ijtihād will be omitted and the knowledge of
the religious law will dwindle away.84

Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr warns that the emulation of dead scholars often
leads to the contradiction of prophetic traditions, based on the unquestioning
adherence to their sayings:

You find that every group (ṭāʾifa) prefers an opinion to the clear text in
some issues. They imagine that this text is weak or that it needs to be inter-
preted. (…) The reason is their partisanship for the saying of the dead. If
that dead [person] were alive, he would reject what they are doing and
prefer the tradition to his [own] opinion. An example [for this] is the
preference the Malikiyya gives to feeding a slave as an atonement for sex-
ual intercourse during Ramaḍān in spite of what God’s Prophet stipulated
and what has been affirmed as sound.85

The mere fact that Ibn al-Wazīr spent such a great effort (40 of 75 folios in his
Kitāb al-Qawāʿid) on demonstrating the impermissibility of this kind of emu-
lation reveals his attitude toward the school system most clearly. As has been
made sufficiently clear in research, the formation and consolidation of, as well
as affiliation with, a legal school hinges precisely on some manner of emulation
of the founders. A scholar’s authority as an influential part of a legal school
is derived from his reference to the person and application of the rulings of
the dead eponym.86 Most instances in which this issue is discussed refer to
the structure of legal authority. Must someone who issues legal opinions (i.e. a
mufti) be a mujtahid, or can he be a muqallid issuing rulings based on the opin-

84 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid fs. 72b–73a.

85 Ibid., f. 70a.
86 Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change 24–120; Fadel, The Social Logic of Taqlīd 193–
233; Jackson, Islamic Law and the State, especially introduction and 69–83; Jackson, Legal
Scaffolding 165–192.

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ions of dead scholars? Ibn al-Wazīr clearly rejects the latter idea.87 Although
Ibn al-Wazīr claims wide agreement on the impermissibility of taqlīd al-mayyit,
support for his prohibition does not seem to abound.
It is evident in Ibn al-Wazīr’s threefold distinction within the notion of taqlīd
that he does not altogether ignore the fact that legally responsible individu-
als are at different levels of legal knowledge or have different abilities of legal
interpretation requiring them to seek legal consultation in some but not in all
matters. However, such consultation should happen irrespective of legal affil-
iation. It involves knowledge of the textual sources and an increase of such
knowledge on every level. It follows that religious law is the field of intellec-
tual activity of every legally responsible individual.

3.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Taqlīd and Following

Concerning Ibn al-Wazīr’s first distinction (i.e. the process of taqlīd), it is evi-
dent that Ibn al-Murtaḍā is less confident of the layman’s ability to evaluate
a mujtahid or understand the indicators he provides. Although the one seek-
ing legal advice must inquire into the condition of the mujtahids and choose
an imam to follow, Ibn al-Murtaḍā nevertheless does not think that a muqallid
needs to or even can understand the arguments for a mujtahid’s opinion. One
argument provided by the Baghdadī Muʿtazila for the prohibition of unques-
tioning taqlīd refers to the duty to gain knowledge. Ibn al-Murtaḍā responds to
this as follows:

They say: ‘The layman is capable of knowledge, therefore he is commis-

sioned with it like the scholar, as is the case with doctrine.’ We say: ‘As
the mujtahid knows that his way is ijtihād, likewise the layman knows for
certain that his way is to refer back to the scholar.’88

Hence, for Ibn al-Murtaḍā the duty to know does not refer to the knowledge
item—the legal ruling—but rather to the duty itself. As became clear in the
chapter on epistemology above, Ibn al-Murtaḍā defends every believer’s duty
to gain certain knowledge in doctrinal matters. To him, the exclusion of taqlīd
is a vital part of the very definition of knowledge—the knowledge of the
indicators and evidence as much as the knowledge that results from these.
Taqlīd is not permitted in any of these fields of knowledge. It is interesting
that Ibn al-Murtaḍā should have denied the common believer the ability to

87 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid fs. 67a–69a.

88 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 781.

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know the indicators and evidence in the legal realm. This position is expli-
cable by the need for certain knowledge. Ibn al-Murtaḍā stipulates that the
layman knows his duty by apodictic proof (ʿilm qāṭiʿ). The knowledge that
Ibn al-Wazīr would require the layman to arrive at by understanding his muj-
tahid’s arguments would merely be conjectural knowledge because it refers to
the judgement itself, which always remains in the realm of the probable. In
contrast, the emphasis on the duty to follow without understanding the proof
leaves the layman in the realm of the certain. But it also keeps him within
the limits of his school because an advancement of his own understanding
and striving for independent interpretation of the sources is constrained by
the duty to follow. He must follow by implementing a ruling he himself has
not investigated at all. In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr concedes a greater ability to
the common believer in the realm of the probable. The kind of taqlīd that Ibn
al-Wazīr permits is one that leaves room for the development of the layman’s
ability to discern for himself instead of consolidating the structure of the legal
school.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s stance towards the second distinction (i.e. the emulator) is
tantamount to his stance towards the discerning student (al-ṭālib al-mumayyiz)
discussed below. Therefore, that discussion will merely be anticipated here by
stating that Ibn al-Murtaḍā, like Ibn al-Wazīr, requires the mujtahid to act upon
his ijithād once reached, but has less confidence in the ability of the discerning
student to do so.
As to Ibn al-Wazīr’s third distinction (i.e. the emulated), Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
position marks the strongest contrast. He concedes that the emulation of a liv-
ing scholar is preferable to the emulation of a dead scholar. Nevertheless, he
permits taqlīd al-mayyit and even endorses it as a common practice:

We know of a consensus among the Muslims of today that taqlīd of the

dead scholar is not denied and that it is permitted to emulate him in all
of the Muslim regions without pretense or hesitation.89

The notion that taqlīd of the living is merely preferable to taqlīd of the dead was
apparently widespread among the Zaydiyya of his time. Ibn al-Wazīr mentions
this as a particularly erroneous defense of taqlīd al-mayyit, as it rests on the
idea that dead scholars need to be emulated because of the absence of quali-
fied living mujtahids.90 Ibn al-Murtaḍā explains that original derivation of legal

89 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 797–798, quote 798.

90 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 72b.

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rulings (istinbāṭ) tantamount to original ijtihād no longer takes place. The ijti-
hād that occurs in his time is rather

an agreement with the ijtihād of his imam in [the way that] he establishes
the questions and indicators. (…) The mujtahid of a later generation is no
muqallid, rather his ijtihād agrees with the one whose madhhab he has
taken hold of, like al-Shāfiʿī.91

Ibn al-Murtaḍā argues for the permissibility of taqlīd al-mayyit with the unre-
stricted consensus of Muslims at large. As referred to above, ijtihād is no longer
to be understood in the independent but only in the restricted sense, namely
within the legal school. The parallel drawn between the Zaydiyya and the estab-
lished Sunni legal schools is telling. In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr in his consequen-
tialist line of argumentation considers the threat of the absence of mujtahid
as all the more reason to leave taqlīd and strive for ijtihād in order to fulfill the
collective duty. He refutes the consensus argument based on its composition.
The consensus Ibn al-Murtaḍā speaks of apparently consists of the agreement
of common people, many of whom are muqallids themselves. But according to
Ibn al-Wazīr, such a consensus is not valid in matters that belong to the princi-
ples (uṣūl) of legal theory, like the question of the permissibility of taqlīd.92
It stands to reason that the attitude taken towards the emulation of dead
scholars had a central function in each scholar’s vision of the structure of the
legal enterprise. Where the ijtihādāt of early mujtahids and founding imams are
prioritized and taqlīd of them permitted, the school structure is consolidated
and the impetus for ijtihād diminished. Where legal interpretation is informed
by the sources, even if it be along with proofs and arguments advanced by other
scholars, the interpreter is not confined to a particular school.
To conclude, it must be said that Ibn al-Wazīr’s claim that the eponyms of
a particular legal school insisted that their rulings not be followed or even
recorded is not unique. Traditionists like Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) are not
the only ones said to have rejected taqlīd. But this does not alter the effect of
claims such as Ibn al-Wazīr’s on a legal school and the system of schools as a
whole. It would seem extremely difficult to determine what the intentions were
behind sayings of early ahl al-bayt, and therefore what following in meaning
would signify in each particular case. There is much less certainty, and toler-
ating ambiguity seems inevitable. This is true at least on an objective level,

91 Ibid., f. 72b.
92 Ibid., f. 66a.

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especially since Ibn al-Wazīr discourages the use of mechanisms for the extrap-
olation of such meanings (takhrīj) as we shall see below. In contrast, taqlīd of
the dead as well as unquestioning taqlīd in general, both endorsed by Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, render it much easier to find a common application of the sayings of
the early imams. This would be an application the adherents of a school could
emulate in order to fulfill their duty of following.

4 The Requirements (shurūṭ) for Ijtihād

The changes in what is required of a scholar issuing legal opinions (i.e. a mufti)
in Sunni legal theory have been considerable.93 Hallaq has identified four posi-
tions that emerged more or less subsequently one after the other. The first
position, represented by scholars of the 2nd/8th–5th/11th centuries, holds that
a mufti has to have an encompassing knowledge of the Quran, prophetic Sunna,
Arabic language, questions of consensus and qiyās. Qiyās was later included in
the requirement of mastery of legal methodology in general. These were also
the requirements a mujtahid had to fulfill. In fact, no explicit distinction was
made between a mufti and a mujtahid. This resulted in the conviction that a
mufti had to be a mujtahid capable of deriving principles from the main sources
and of manifesting them in rulings in new cases. Authors of foundational works
on legal theory like the Muʿtazili Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) and the
Ashʿari Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), whose theories served as
standards for later scholarship throughout the different schools, clearly pro-
moted this view: A mufti was to follow his own opinion arrived at by his own
legal reasoning and no muqallid was allowed to issue legal opinions.94 The
second position, according to Hallaq, resulted from a change in the 6th/12th
century. This position claims to concede to the exigencies of reality, namely that
non-mujtahids do issue, and have indeed issued fatwas, without being prohib-
ited from doing so. Accordingly, a restricted ijtihād is allowed for scholars who
use the texts and principles of their legal school as sources. The agent of such a
practice is called a mujtahid, among other things, within the legal schools (muj-
tahid fī l-madhhab).95 The two other positions emerged from the mid-8th/14th

93 Hallaq, Iftāʾ and Ijtihād 332.

94 Examples of this first position begin with the definition of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and
are also documented for al-Shirāzī (d. 476/1083), al-Bāqillānī (d. 402/1013) and al-Ghazālī
(d. 505/1111).
95 Hallaq, Iftāʾ and Ijtihād 36, 41. Examples for this position are numerous. Prominent among
them are al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233), Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1248–1249) and Ibn al-Ṣalāh al-

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century and either allowed for a muqallid to issue fatwas, if there was no muj-
tahid present, or accepted iftāʾ by a muqallid without restriction.96
Parallel to these positions, a categorization of the ranks of mujtahids devel-
oped. Whereas throughout the first two and a half centuries of Islamic history
(i.e. 1st/7th to mid-3rd/9th century) no scholar seems to have been deprived of
the right to conclude legal positions, two to seven different ranks of mujtahids
were apparently recognized from the 5th/11th century onward.97 The need for
these categorizations was at least partly caused by the tension between the
high standard of what was required of a mujtahid on the one hand, and the
continuous request for legal opinions with which unqualified jurists effectively
complied on the other hand.

4.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concepts of the Requirements

for Ijtihād
The first comprehensive list of such requirements was set down in Abū l-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh and, with minor changes, adopted
by most scholars of legal methodology afterwards.98 From the writings of Ibn
al-Wazīr as well as of Ibn al-Murtaḍā it is obvious that they were both well aware
of the debate preceding them. However, neither explicitly adopts any of the
previous categorizations of different ranks of mujtahids. Ibn al-Wazīr alludes to
the existence of the different ranks (marātib) without further specification in
his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid.99 The kind of categorization used in the Zaydiyya was still
another, with less explicit steps.100 Yet classical positions as that of al-Ghazālī,
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Imām al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī are often quoted for the
support of an argument. The widespread notion of a differentiation between
an independent mujtahid and one practicing ijtihād within the scope of other
scholars’ legal opinions was an intrinsic part of the discussion.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s lists of requirements read as follows:

Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245), Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 660/1261), Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1369).
Ibn al-Ḥājib is of special interest as he was the model upon which Ibn al-Murtaḍā admit-
tedly fashioned much of his own legal theory.
96 Hallaq, Iftāʾ and Ijtihād 41.
97 Cf. Hallaq, Was the Gate Closed? 18; 84; Kamali, Principles 333. Al-Ghazālī is said to have
been the first to divide ijtihād into two kinds: that which refers directly to the sources on
the one hand, and that which elaborates and implements the law developed within the
context of the school on the other.
98 Hallaq, Was the Gate Closed? 5; Kamali, Principles 322.
99 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 84b.
100 Cf. Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 340–341.

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Ibn al-Wazīr mentions in his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid: theology (ʿilm al-kalām/uṣūl

al-dīn), knowledge of the Quran, knowledge of prophetic traditions (ḥadīth),
Arabic linguistics (al-ʿarabiyya), knowledge of legal methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh)
and stylistics and imagery (ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān).
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s list of requirements in the introduction (Muqaddima) to
his Kitāb al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār is as follows: legally relevant Quranic verses,
prophetic traditions (ḥadīth), consensus (ijmāʾ), legal methodology (uṣūl al-
fiqh), theology (kalām/uṣūl al-dīn).101 In the introduction to his Kitāb al-Azhār,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā furthermore considers explicit and implicit rectitude (ʿadl taṣ-
rīḥ wa-taʾwīl) as an indispensable requirement of a mujtahid. In Minhāj al-
wuṣūl, he determines three sciences as the bases of the mujtahid’s activity,
namely theology (ʿilm al-kalām), Arabic linguistics (ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya) and
knowledge of the laws (ʿilm al-aḥkām).102
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s lists in Kitāb al-Azhār, the introduction to Kitāb al-Baḥr al-
zakhkhār and in Minhāj al-wuṣūl differ. The commentary (sharḥ) of the Kitāb
al-Azhār written by the second generation student of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, ʿAbdallāh
b. Abī l-Qāsim b. Miftāḥ (d. 877/1472), provides a digest of the different lists with
subsequent elaboration. Ibn Miftāḥ divides Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requirements into
two types: Firstly, a mujtahid needs to be able to derive the legal rulings from
their sources and proofs. In order to be capable of this, he needs to have
proficiency in Arabic linguistics (lugha), legally relevant Quranic verses (āyāt
al-aḥkām), prophetic traditions (ḥadīth), cases of consensus (ijmāʾ) and legal
methodology (uṣūl al-fiqh). Secondly, the mujtahid needs to have an untainted
rectitude (ʿadāla).103
The first set of requirements, i.e. Quran, prophetic traditions, legal method-
ology, consensus, Arabic linguistics and stylistics and imagery, is generally less
controversial than the requirements of theology and rectitude. There is lit-
tle to no disagreement, neither between Ibn al-Wazīr and his contemporaries
nor between Islamic scholars in general, about the centrality of the Quran in
legal reasoning. Most scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh agree that a mujtahid needs to
know those verses of the Quran from which legal rulings are derived (āyāt
al-aḥkām).104 This is likely to be the reason why Ibn al-Wazīr spends so lit-
tle time on the issue. However, other issues like the number of āyāt al-aḥkām

101 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 30–31. In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s own words, all the above-men-
tioned sciences are provided in the books contained in the Muqaddima as a basis for
understanding the subsequent legal compendium al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār.
102 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 213.
103 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 7–11.
104 Pakatchi and Harris, Āyāt al-aḥkām.

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and how thoroughly a scholars needs to know them were answered differ-
ently. The majority of scholars take those āyāt al-aḥkām to number 500.105
Ibn al-Wazīr would only grant that number if the counting involved every
“saying” (kalām) in accordance with the custom of the grammarians to call
individual verses as well as sentences kalām. If verses are meant in the strict
sense, Ibn al-Wazīr counts only around 200 verses.106 This reduces what is
expected of a mujtahid considerably. And those verses do not even need to
be known by heart (ḥifẓ ghayb). What is required is the ability to know their
place in the text in order to refer back to them with ease when necessary. Fur-
ther, one needs to know how they came to be in the place where they are
(asbāb al-nuzūl). Considering Ibn al-Wazīr’s strong emphasis on the authori-
tative texts, it is striking that he should require of a jurist so little knowledge of
the Quran.107
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, in the introduction to al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, requires a little
more. There are 500 verses relevant for legal issues. Yet, of these, only their place
in the text needs to be known.108 In his Kitāb al-Intiqād lil-āyāt al-muʿtabara
lil-ijtihād, it becomes clear, however, that Ibn al-Murtaḍā also allowed for the
number of 500 only if what was meant by verse (āya) was one phrase, or
two phrases connected by a conjunction and expressing one meaning.109 Con-
cerning the requirements of knowledge of the Quran, therefore, the difference
between the two scholars is not wide.
The requirement of prophetic traditions shows a slightly larger degree of
variation. Just as the Quran contains parables and narratives without imme-
diate connection to legal rulings, the prophetic Sunna comprises reports about

105 According to Abū l-Ḥusayn, the scholar must have a full grasp of the āyāt al-aḥkām includ-
ing knowledge of their interpretation (tafāsīr). Ibn ʿArabī, al-Ghazālī and others agree that
it must be 500 verses; cf. Kamali, Principles, 251, 321; al-Ghazālī, Mustaṣfā ii, 102; Ṣārim al-
Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 372.
106 Al-Shawkānī agrees with him in challenging the number of 500. Interestingly, however,
Shawkānī does not restrict the number further, as Ibn al-Wazīr does, and so lowers the
requirements of ijtihād. Al-Shawkānī, in Irshād al-fuḥūl, even widens the scope by saying
that a scholar can also derive rules from the parables and narratives contained in the larger
part of the Quran; cf. al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuḥūl 250–251.
107 This is indeed also what his brother al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr remarks about him, as quoted in
Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr. Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr cites: “In spite of all the intense study (of
the book) he only read a fourth of it and did not add to it, so that he was very familiar with
the verses of the rules (āyāt al-aḥkām), the reasons for revelation, what was abrogated and
what was not, the repeated and the unrepeated (…).” Aḥmad al-Wazīr, Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr
28.
108 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 30.
109 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Intiqād 476.

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the Prophet Muḥammad or other prophets’ biographies, about Quranic exe-

gesis or details of heaven and hell, etc. Not all of these are relevant for legal
reasoning and therefore not all need to be known.110 Ibn al-Wazīr contents him-
self with a compilation like al-Tirmidhī’s (d. 279/892) Jāmiʿ or Abū Dāwūd’s
(d. 275/889) Sunna. Most importantly, a mujtahid must be firm in those legally
relevant traditions (aḥādīth al-aḥkām) which distinguish the sound from the
weak and the authentic from the spurious.111
Seen in the wider context of Islamic scholars, the difference of opinion
in the case of prophetic traditions is greater than concerning the Quranic
verses. Al-Ghazālī and most legal theorists, like Ibn al-Wazīr, restricted the
required amount to one of the dominant collections. Yet, there were others like
Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), who according to al-Shawkānī, required a thor-
ough acquaintance with 500,000 traditions.112 Ibn al-Wazīr was content with
less:

I mentioned these books as a guide and support, not as an obligation.

After all, to occupy oneself with the chanting of the Quran, the refin-
ing and examination of the soul, with restraining oneself from evil, from
sophism and inquisitiveness without much occupation with hadiths is
better than high regard of hadiths while transgressing in respect to what
is precedent to all these things and what bears more resemblance to the
example of the companions and followers.113

Merely as a piece of advice, Ibn al-Wazīr suggests to the more eager student
commentaries on the hadith books or discussions of the legally relevant tradi-
tions. But again his strong emphasis on the low benchmark of requirements is
made in reference to the early generations. To require comprehensive knowl-
edge of numerous prophetic traditions could not be shaped on the practice of
the forefathers, as they modeled an ijtihād that could draw on only a few tra-
ditions in contrast to what was written down later. To underline this point, Ibn
al-Wazīr recounts the reluctance of a number of very knowledgable compan-
ions and anṣār to transmit sayings of the Prophet. Ibn al-Wazīr not only infers
that few hadiths are prerequisites for ijtihād, he also finds that the practice and

110 There is little disagreement among scholars of legal reasoning concerning this issue; see
for example al-Ghazālī, Mustaṣfā ii, 101.
111 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 95a.
112 Al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuḥūl ii, 208. However, al-Shawkānī and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal did not
require that the traditions be known by heart.
113 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 95 a.

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attitude of the early generations in respect to transmission speaks for a greater

emphasis on acts of piety and soul-searching (muḥāsabat al-nafs). The little sig-
nificance Ibn al-Wazīr appears to concede to prophetic traditions here appears
striking, but his emphasis on piety and mysticism is clear. In contrast to a laudi-
ble occupation with prophetic traditions, he laments the existence of a quest
for reports (ṭalab al-ḥadīth) more occupied with the accumulation of names
and titles than with the essential meaning (māhiyya) of the traditions. Hence,
the quantity of memorized hadiths does not determine the status of a mujtahid,
nor the piety of a believer. The model of the early generations emphasizes this
point.114
For Ibn al-Murtaḍā, the required knowledge of prophetic traditions is little
specified. Of course the traditions that refer to legal issues are of utmost impor-
tance: those that contain reference to duty and recommendation, permission,
reprehensibility and prohibition. Similar to Ibn al-Wazīr, he contents himself
with one of the hadith compilations like the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd or al-Amīr
al-Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn’s (d. 662/1264) Shifāʾ al-uwām for the Zaydi madhhab.
According to Ibn Miftāḥ, it suffices for Ibn al-Murtaḍā to have received the
license for the respective compilation through one way of transmission.115 Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s mention of one of the Six Sunni hadith compilations, i.e. Abū
Dawūd’s Sunan, bespeaks the inclusion of some non-Zaydi sources on the basic
level. However, unlike Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn al-Murtaḍā mentions these elements in
addition to Zaydi sources.
The requirement of a thorough knowledge of legal methodology for ijtihād
need hardly be mentioned. Ibn al-Wazīr does not offer an exception to the gen-
eral notion that uṣūl al-fiqh is the science at the heart of ijtihād. Suffice it to
quote his wording that finds its equivalent in most other treatises discussing
the indispensable requirements for ijtihād:

Uṣūl al-fiqh is its [ijtihād’s] stem and its head, its root and its foundation so
that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī mentioned that all requirements for ijtihād are
unequal to this one. This is so, because the uṣūlīs have taken everything
or most of what the mujtahid needs from the other disciplines [and made
it available to them], so that some scholars of stylistics and imagery (ʿilm
al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān) complain that the uṣūlīs have stolen their art from

114 Ibid., f. 95a.

115 The strongest of the four ways of receiving the authority to transmit a certain writing is
if the teacher reads to his student or vice versa, followed by the assertion of the teacher
that he has either heard his student read the book or that he has made him hear it; cf. Ibn
Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 9.

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them. Likewise they have transmitted what issues the mujtahid needs [to
know] from the Arabic language.116

This is to show what a central role the science of uṣūl al-fiqh occupied in the
interplay of different arts. Ibn al-Wazīr, like many scholars, was aware of it, and,
as can be seen throughout his writings, made ample use of it outside the strictly
legal framework. Ibn al-Wazīr does not specify what exactly he includes in the
requirement of uṣūl al-fiqh. Other scholars of legal methodology of the Zay-
diyya and other schools of law have listed qiyās and abrogation as separate
items. It is very likely that Ibn al-Wazīr gives them as high a priority as he gives
the knowledge of legal methodology.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not differ much from him in this regard. He mentions
the whole of the characteristics of consensus, the conditions of qiyās and the
rules of abrogation as indispensable parts of uṣūl al-fiqh, without the knowl-
edge of which ijtihād is impossible. Furthermore, uṣūl al-fiqh comprises what
needs to be known of the general and the particular, the comprehensive and
the explicit (al-mujmal wa-l-mubayyan), what results from command and pro-
hibition as to incumbency, repetition, immediacy of performance as well as
the rules and validity of various instances of consensus and analogy.117 Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl forms that part of the Muqaddima of al-Baḥr al-
zakhkhār that is devoted to this requirement for ijtihād.118
According to Ibn Miftāḥ’s reading of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, proficiency in legal
methodology is the second skill that renders ijtihād immensely difficult.119 In
the introduction to Kitāb al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā states:

The fourth [discipline]: Legal methodology and the investigation of the

questions of its different sections. It is a matter of consensus that these
things must be considered [as required part of ijtihād], and there is no
disagreement that the deterioration of these would mean the distortion
of the greater ijtihād.120

What is interesting in this brief statement is that Ibn al-Murtaḍā links the lack
of knowledge of uṣūl al-fiqh to the distortion of the “greater ijtihād.” “Greater ijti-
hād” can be understood as absolute ijtihād, allowing the possibility of another

116 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿ id f. 96b.

117 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 212.
118 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl 159–204.
119 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 10.
120 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 31.

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kind, a ‘lesser’ ijtihād or an ijtihād within the madhhab that is possible without
scholarship in legal methodology, as we shall discuss below. In comparison to
Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn al-Murtaḍā puts a higher emphasis on the difficulty of uṣūl
al-fiqh and consequently of attaining the rank of a proper mujtahid.
In the preceding four issues, the differences between Ibn al-Wazīr’s and
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requirements of a mujtahid are not significant, although they
already indicate different emphases. However, the differences become more
evident where Arabic linguistics and theology are concerned.
All the sources for legal reasoning are written in the Arabic language. It is
therefore not surprising that familiarity with Arabic linguistics (maʿrifat al-
ʿarabiyya/al-lugha) is a commonly agreed upon prerequisite for ijtihād. How-
ever, the required degrees of understanding vary. Ṣārim al-Dīn al-Wazīr (d. 914/
1508) in al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya, writing a century after Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-
Murtaḍā, is very unspecific on this issue. He only states that to derive rulings
from the sources, a scholar needs to be firm in the different fields of linguis-
tics.121
As can be expected, Ibn al-Wazīr is among those scholars who require little
knowledge of Arabic linguistics. But what does that little knowledge include?
And how does Ibn al-Wazīr explain why so little is required, given that all the
sources are composed in Arabic? Ibn al-Ḥājib’s Muqaddima is a book Ibn al-
Wazīr suggests as a sufficient source for the study of Arabic. According to Ibn
al-Wazīr, what needs to be known is that which is vital to grasp the meaning
of a word or phrase. Ibn al-Wazīr concludes from the common experience of
Arabic speakers that most do not know, for example, why the agent in a sen-
tence is expressed in the nominative (limā irtafaʿa l-fāʿil). Yet Arabic speakers
do understand the meaning of the sentence without desinential inflection.
However, some rules must be known: Arabic grammar determines that the rela-
tionship between the exception (istithnāʾ) and that from which it is excepted
can be direct (muttaṣil) or indirect (munqaṭaʿ). This is indispensable in order
to understand the purport of the statement. Understanding the purport does
not, however, depend on knowing which final vowel (iʿrāb) the exception car-
ries. Ibn al-Wazīr supports this argument based on common experience with
a prophetic tradition. The Prophet is reported to have said that “one does not
need to know that [the term] ‘actions’ is in the nominative in order to know
what is meant by the phrase ‘actions are based on intentions’.”122

121 Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 373.

122 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 96a.

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Furthermore, the respective understanding of the language of the sources

is of interest here. Ibn al-Wazīr considers only the Quran to leave room for
multiple meanings, whereas the prophetic Sunna is supposedly clear (ẓāhir or
jalī) in almost everything it conveys. A layman can read and understand the
prophetic traditions without a thorough study of grammatical rules. He should
be able to read and understand a mufti’s legal ruling in a similar way. The dan-
ger of misunderstanding, though it exists, is but negligible. For one thing, it
rarely occurs because the meaning is not contained in grammatical subtleties.
If the meaning is clearly conveyed, there is no danger of misreading. But if there
should be ambiguity (ishkāl), the layman turns to a specialist of language to
be informed about what rules he needs to know for a correct understanding.
Thereby his own understanding is enhanced.
This example can be understood in almost direct parallel to the progress a
mujtahid makes in understanding and interpreting the textual sources. The cor-
respondence with the doctrine of divisibility of ijtihād, to be discussed below,
is obvious. A mujtahid must master Arabic only to the degree that enables him
to inquire into the evidence in a given field or question. The common knowl-
edge accessible to all is sufficient as a basis for understanding. In the process of
inquiring into a question and acquiring the needed knowledge, he widens the
range of fields in which he is entitled to practice ijtihād. An independent muj-
tahid of all fields (mujtahid muṭlaq) would have to know Arabic grammar in its
entirety. However, because every mujtahid starts as a student or a layman, and
because the major sources do not require much for basic understanding, mas-
tery is not necessary.123 Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding can be comprehended
more easily if contrasted with the reasoning of supporters of the indivisibil-
ity of ijtihād: It rests on the common notion that ijtihād means formulating a
particular supposition (ẓann) concerning a legal question. Those who oppose
divisibility start from the premise that only a mujtahid has the intellectual
capability to formulate that kind of supposition. This capability grants him the
confidence he needs to be sought as a mujtahid. To form an opinion in a particu-
lar case involves reaching overwhelming conjecture on the evidence and being
able to ascertain that no conflicting evidence exists. This, it is thought, is the
case because all the sciences and legal issues are interrelated.124 For scholars

123 Ibid., f. 96a.

124 The science of inheritance (ʿilm al-farāʾiḍ) is taken to be independent from the other sci-
ences. Some opponents of the divisibility of ijtihād allow for an exception in this case.
Accordingly, there may be scholars that practice ijtihād exclusively in the science of inher-
itance.

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who hold to the indivisibility of ijtihād, thorough mastery of Arabic linguis-

tics would therefore be a necessity from the outset of any legal investiga-
tion.
Although Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not support the indivisibility of ijtihād, as
we shall see, the degree of grasp a mujtahid should have of Arabic linguistics
reveals the different standard both scholars set for a mujtahid. Ibn al-Murtaḍā
is most likely one of the Zaydi contemporaries to whom Ibn al-Wazīr refers
in his criticism of the central position that Arabic linguistics occupy in the
requirements for ijtihād.125 First of all, Ibn al-Murtaḍā was widely known for his
profound linguistic skill and literary productivity. Additionally, Ibn al-Murtaḍā
does not even consider the mastery of Arabic linguistics as a separate require-
ment in his al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, because of the obviousness of the matter. Mas-
tery of Arabic linguistics is not listed there explicitly, because it is a precondi-
tion even to the requirements for ijtihād. Twice in his introduction—before and
after he lists the sciences required for ijtihād—Ibn al-Murtaḍā insists that these
sciences are only worth considering “after the mastery of the arts ( funūn) of the
Arabic language.”126 According to Ibn Miftāḥ, proficiency in the different sub-
disciplines of Arabic linguistics (ʿilm al-ʿarabiyya), syntax (naḥw), morphology
(taṣrīf ), lexicography (lugha) as well as stylistics and imagery (ʿilm al-maʿānī
wa-l-bayān) is required explicitly. A little later he adds: “The hardest of them
[the five prerequisite sciences for ijtihād] are Arabic linguistics, because one
cannot reach the degree of precision except after much time and devotion.”127
Designating Arabic linguistics as one of the three sources of the practice of a
mujtahid in Minhāj al-wuṣūl leaves little doubt of the central position that the
discipline occupied in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s concept of the requirements for ijti-
hād.128
Ibn al-Wazīr, in turn, questions this requirement. Ijtihād, he argues, pertains
only to those questions that are neither necessary nor obvious. Accordingly,
the result does not go beyond probable knowledge. He argues that questions of
necessary knowledge that every believer needs to know from revelation include
the promise and the threat, the imamate, the caliphate, stipulations of the
state of a human being as an unbeliever (takfīr) or grave sinner (tafsīq). Some
of these the Zaydiyya takes to be concluded from the hidden meaning of the
texts (khafī), as for example the imamate of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib. The hidden mean-

125 Ibid., f. 96a.

126 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 30–31.
127 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 10.
128 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 213.

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ing of the text would require a deeper understanding of the Arabic language.
However, this deeper understanding of the Arabic language is no obligation
for every mukallif, even though every mukallif is obliged to support ʿAlī b. Abī
Ṭālib’s imamate according to Zaydi teaching.129 How then, Ibn al-Wazīr asks,
would the thorough comprehension of the rules of language be required of
one who is only commissioned to reach probable knowledge in particular legal
questions?130
A comparison of the two scholars on the question of language shows that Ibn
al-Wazīr’s method of calling for ijtihād is manifest not only in the low degree of
requirements for an ijtihād based on a direct investigation of the main sources,
but also in his challenge of the unevenness between supposed abilities of every
common believer in the realm of certain knowledge (in doctrine) compared to
his abilities in the realm of conjecture (in law). At the outset of the legal enter-
prise, Ibn al-Wazīr requires hardly more of the Arabic language than what is
common knowledge. Furthermore, the high degree of probability in the whole
enterprise of ijtihād renders those fields in which the high requirements were
fixed questionable to him. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, in turn, requires a high degree of
knowledge (Arabic in this case), much beyond what was required of a common
Muslim, for the production of only probable, legal opinions.
Ibn al-Wazīr mentions as a separate requirement a discipline that is sub-
sumed by most other scholars under Arabic linguistics, namely stylistics and
imagery (ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān). As in the case of Arabic linguistics, schol-
ars disagree concerning the degree of mastery required of a mujtahid. The muj-
tahid, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, does need ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān in some
questions and therefore should have a basic knowledge of it. But if little is
required, and it is generally part of Arabic linguistics anyway, why does Ibn al-
Wazīr mention it as a separate requirement at all?
To understand this, one must keep in mind Ibn al-Wazīr’s constant ambi-
tion to emphasize the unifying and simplifying concepts of Islamic law and
doctrine. According to him, the scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh have listed most of the
things that are required. The requirements they have mentioned differ. How-
ever, this is apparently only the case because of the variety of expressions that
are used. Ibn al-Wazīr indicates that to know the real meaning of a number of
different statements, it is necessary to understand how things can be expressed
in different ways. Otherwise one is led to see contradictions where none exist.
Knowledge of imagery and stylistics are therefore required insofar as they are

129 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 96a.

130 Ibid., f. 96a.

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needed to illuminate the real meaning of what is postulated by scholars.131 For

Ibn al-Murtaḍā, stylistics and imagery belong to Arabic linguistics and need not
be discussed separately.
Let us turn to the question of theology as a requirement for ijtihād. The
first requirement Ibn al-Wazīr discusses in his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid concerns the
question of whether a mujtahid must be educated in theology, the order of the
premises of evidence (tartīb al-adilla, or tartīb al-muqaddimāt) and the analy-
sis of what he calls the science of the Greek. All of the potential requirements
are subsumed under ʿuṣūl al-dīn or ʿilm al-kalām in this context. Although this
question is treated in the context of legal reasoning, it goes to the very heart of
the controversy about what knowledge is required for a person to be qualified
as a believer. Furthermore, the status that theology is given among the require-
ments of a mujtahid indicates the relationship between the possibilities of a
layman and those of a mujtahid.
As was discussed in chapter 3 sections 2.1. and 2.2., not all Muʿtazilis condi-
tioned the state of a believer on the duty of speculation. Yet with the duty of
naẓar as a prominent doctrine among Zaydi scholars who, like Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
favor Bahshami-Muʿtazili doctrine, it is understandable why ʿilm uṣūl al-dīn fig-
ures first in the discussion of requirements and why Ibn al-Wazīr asserts his
deep and lasting occupation with the issue.132 Ibn al-Wazīr obviously disagrees
with Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s notion of the first duty of every believer, let alone of a
mujtahid. Stating his position about the requirement of ʿilm al-kalām in his
Kitāb al-Qawāʿid, Ibn al-Wazīr writes:

They [his detractors] made ʿilm al-kalām a requirement, but the scholars
established that it is no condition of ijtihād. Rather, those who say that
[it is a requirement of ijtihād] condition upon it the correctness of doc-
trine. The truth is that this is meaningless, because the first generation
relied upon before there was literature and teaching or even classifica-
tion and foundational work, did practice ijtihād. In the rational nature
(gharāʾiz al-ʿuqūl) there is that which is sufficient for the later generations
as it was sufficient for the earlier generations. (…) How can it be sound
to say that whoever is like the first generation in that he does not know

131 Ibid., f. 96b.

132 Ibn al-Wazīr “disputed with the mutakallimūn” on this issue and came to a conclusion
which yet again reveals his constant effort to harmonize. He concluded that the source
of this indeed extremely reprehensible innovation was not to be sought among the
mutakallimūn themselves, but resulted from the intrigues of the heretics; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr,
Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 95a.

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kalām, the ordering of the premises of evidence (tartīb muqaddimāt al-

burhān) and how to investigate the subtleties of sciences of the Greek, is
an unbeliever?133

Although Ibn al-Wazīr does not explicitly mention his definition of a believer
in the Kitāb al-Qawāʿid, he refers to an early Muʿtazili authority, namely Shaykh
Mukhtār, who required only the two testimonies (shahāda) for a person to be
considered a Muslim.134 Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 5 sections 2 and
3, Ibn al-Wazīr considers it every believer’s duty to perform a degree of ijtihād.
Ijtihād belongs to the realm of probability, whereas philosophical speculation
is supposed to inform certain knowledge. This supports Ibn al-Wazīr’s refusal
to require that a mujtahid be educated in the art of speculation and the order of
principles of proofs. For Ibn al-Wazīr, it is the common experience of having a
rational nature (gharāʾiz al-ʿuqūl) and sound understanding (ṣiḥḥat al-afhām)
which makes it possible for all generations to draw conclusions from evidence.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s use of gharāʾiz al-ʿuqūl indicates synonymity with the fiṭra or
fiṭar al-ʿuqūl we encountered in a more strictly theological context in preceding
chapters. He argues that the principles of speculation and evidencing were not
known to the first generations of scholars either. But those were the scholars
who lay down the foundations for legal reasoning. Having the same raw mate-
rial to draw from as later generations valorizes the effort and achievement of
the early generations.
Interestingly, in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s earlier Kitāb al-Azhār neither speculative
theology nor al-uṣūl al-dīn is explicitly mentioned as a requirement. However,
as we shall see below, theological doctrine forms a rather important albeit
implicit requirement even in Kitāb al-Azhār.135 In his list of what is required
of a mujtahid in the introduction to al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā men-

133 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 94b.

134 However, Ibn al-Wazīr does say that although this is the opinion of the mutakallimūn, it
only concerns the status in this world. If the “two testimonies” are sufficient, the judge-
ment in the Hereafter remains a point of disagreement. Yet, according to Ibn al-Wazīr, this
should be left to God; ibid., f. 94b.
135 This has led at least one commentator to drop the importance of the knowledge of uṣūl
al-dīn in the context of ijtihād for Ibn al-Murtaḍā altogether. In al-ʿAnsī’s Tāj al-mudhhab,
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s opinion of the importance of uṣūl al-dīn is not mentioned. Of course,
al-ʿAnsī’s is a much later commentary and one of his aims, as he states explicitly, is to ren-
der the Kitāb al-Azhār easier to understand in comparison to Ibn Miftāḥ’s Sharḥ al-Azhār.
Nevertheless, al-ʿAnsī neglected a vital point of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thinking by omitting this
requirement, because he neglected an important element of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Muʿtazili
thinking; cf. al-ʿAnsī, al-Tāj al-mudhhab 4, 7–8.

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tions theology (ʿilm al-uṣūl al-dīn) as number five of the five fields of knowl-
edge (ʿulūm) a mujtahid has to master. Although it is not first on the list, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā does say that the knowledge of uṣūl al-dīn is among the most impor-
tant skills, because “the correctness of the deduction of evidence from revela-
tion is dependent on its [uṣūl al-dīn’s] implementation.”136 By this he means
that correct inference from revelation for the formulation of rulings can only
be realized if a scholar knows the ways evidence is to be established in gen-
eral. Beyond the initial list, more than a third of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Muqaddima
is devoted to theological matters, which speaks clearly of the importance theol-
ogy has for a mujtahid according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā. After all, the Muqaddima is
supposed to provide systematically and comprehensively (intiẓām shāfin) what
the mujtahid needs for his endeavor.137 Furthermore, Ibn al-Murtaḍā makes
ʿilm al-kalām in Minhāj al-wuṣūl a condition for the practice of a mujtahid
because of the supposed interdependence between legal proofs and princi-
ples and, for example, the knowledge of God.138 The controversial nature of
the knowledge of God and the way it was arrived at were shown in chapter
2 sections 3 and 2 above. Accordingly, restricting valid ijtihād to those who
practice ʿilm al-kalām would restrict the number of acceptable mujtahids con-
siderably.
Hence, the comparison between the doctrinal foundations and ways of
deriving them required by each of the two scholars shows a considerable degree
of deviation. Ibn al-Wazīr expects much less of a full-fledged mujtahid than
does Ibn al-Murtaḍā. Even if professional occupation with theology was not
explicitly required by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, as the Kitāb al-Azhār seems to indicate,
the mere rational nature common to all Muslims was not enough to know
how to derive rulings from the sources, nor for proper understanding of those
derivations. That Ibn al-Murtaḍā, at least at a later stage, did require a thorough
knowledge of uṣūl al-dīn for the qualification of a mujtahid further confirms
the difference in the expectations the two scholars had of a jurisconsult. For
Ibn al-Wazīr, however, the general rational nature and sound understanding of
a human being is sufficient, not only to practice ijtihād, but also to reconstruct
the ways an inference from revelation was conducted.
As concluded by Ibn Miftāḥ, Ibn Murtaḍā’s requirements of one who can be
emulated is two-tiered. While the first tier is concerned with the ability to draw
conclusions from the sources, the second is concerned with the scholar’s recti-

136 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Muqaddima 31.

137 Ibid.
138 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 213.

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tude (ʿadāla). The issue of a mujtahid’s rectitude is not explicitly raised by Ibn
al-Wazīr in his list of requirements. However, throughout his magnum opus and
most comprehensive presentation of his thinking, i.e. al-ʿAwāṣim, the issue of
a scholar’s standing in relation to his rectitude has a rather potent role in the
argumentation. But the discussion includes all kinds of scholars, not only the
mujtahids, and is indeed mostly occupied with the transmitter’s integrity. But
since the train of thought is the same—the mujtahid’s and the transmitter’s
rectitude rather being two aspects of the same idea—it seems reasonable to
let the quantity of questions dedicated to this topic speak for the importance
that Ibn al-Wazīr attaches to a mujtahid’s rectitude. Additionally, Ibn al-Wazīr
himself compares the two—mujtahids and transmitters. In the wider context
of the argument for the acceptance of a transmitter whose doctrinal integrity
is impaired (kāfir or fāsiq taʾwīl, ahl al-taʾwīl), Ibn al-Wazīr argues that such
a one is accepted generally and by Zaydi scholars in particular. With support
from a number of traditions and opinions (anẓār) he establishes the following
concept of the rectitude of scholars:

They perform the five pillars of Islam and avoid grave sins and those iniq-
uities that are a sign of vileness. They elevate the sanctity of Islam and do
not take liberty with God by lying intentionally. (…) The occupation with
[their] discipline is evident in them. For even if the traditionist makes a
mistake in Arabic or the jurist with hadith, that does not concern us in
[the question of] acceptance. Rather, what we mean is that the tradition-
ist is accepted based on his discipline, and that he outwardly appears not
to err in it or be mistaken. These things are the indicators of rectitude.139

In a quotation from al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār,

it becomes clear that Ibn al-Wazīr (like al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza
here) considers rectitude as being determined by moral and religious integrity
and most of all by professional skill rather than supposedly certain theologi-
cal matters. According to al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, the conditions
for issuing legal opinions rests solely on one idea, namely, the most probable
assumption of the seeker of legal advice ( yaghlib ẓann al-mustaftī) that the
one he addresses is from among the scholars and mujtahids. This assumption
is reached when the layman in need of a legal opinion is almost certain that the
appointed mufti is a pious man capable of ijtihād.140 In other words, the out-

139 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 315.

140 Ibid., i, 316; al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār 381–382. Ibn al-Wazīr

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ward appearance of the general Muslim faith and the skill of a scholar—what
Johansen calls the forum externum141—is sufficient to evaluate his rectitude.
Ibn al-Wazīr states frequently that it is impossible to know what is in the heart
of a scholar (or anyone else).142
Another example is given in al-ʿAwāṣim. The companion Abū Hurayra is con-
sidered to be one of the ahl al-taʾwīl by the Muʿtazila and Shiʿa because of his
position as governor in Medina in the days of Muʿāwiya. In spite of this, Ibn al-
Wazīr does not see his authority impaired, because of the effectiveness of his
pious conduct.

Because the man was religious (mutadayyin) and assiduous (mutaḥarrī)

he did not intend to perpetrate the forbidden. The most that can be said
is that he [Abū Hurayra] sinned on the basis of wrong interpretation. But
this neither invalidates his transmission nor his ijtihād according to what
I will elucidate in its proper place, God willing. Anyway, it [his sinning by
interpretation] does not degrade his religiosity or his reign for a number
of reasons.143

As stated above, opinions on what the mujtahid must be known for besides the
professional qualities come within the wider discussion of a scholar’s rectitude
in general. Ibn al-Wazīr argues that what must be known of a scholar in order
to be accepted as a transmitter, mufti, grammarian or indeed anyone bearing
any kind of knowledge (ḥāmil al-ʿilm), is his professionalism in his discipline. To
this is added the outer appearance of a pious and religious life which is taken as
rectitude until evidence to the contrary should appear.144 This principle is com-
monly known in the science of transmitter criticism. But Ibn al-Wazīr elevates it

refers to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī to the same effect; cf. Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Muʿtamad
ii, 363–364.
141 “The forum internum is the instance of the religious conscience, the seat of the relation
between God and the individual, of veracity and of absolute identity between truth on the
one hand, rights and obligations on the other. The forum externum is an instance of con-
tingent decisions which are legally valid and whose assertions about the facts of the cases
are probable. (…) The tragical conflicts which may arise from this necessary and unbridge-
able hiatus between the forum externum which has to rely on probable enunciations and
the forum internum which combines a sure knowledge of facts and motivations with the
absolute ethical obligation to follow truth engage the individiuals ethical responsibility.”
Johansen, Contingency 36–37.
142 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim viii, 322; Ibn al-Wazīr, Qubūl al-bushra 335.
143 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 77.
144 To support this point of view, Ibn al-Wazīr invokes influential witness from among the
Zaydiyya like Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh in Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn, ʿAbdallāh b. Zayd in

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to a general principle. Thereby he can argue that a mujtahid’s rectitude consists

in outward appearance of religiosity and skill without referring to soundness of
belief or any other criteria beyond the forum externum and within the realm
of certainty to which the human being has no access. The implications for the
structure of legal authority are evident: The one seeking legal advice can go
to whoever seems most knowledgable in his trade irrespective of doctrinal, let
alone legal affiliation, as long as he displays the basic sign of Islamic religios-
ity.145
Ibn al-Murtaḍā defines more closely in which sense rectitude is expected
of a mujtahid. This second tier of requirements for ijtihād is to him of no
less importance than the first tier, which discussed the details of professional
requirements. In Sharh al-Azhār, Ibn al-Miftāḥ defines Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s and the
supposedly widespread notion of rectitude as religious modesty, piety, manli-
ness, freedom from innovation, eschewing grave sins and not holding on to any
kind of rebelliousness.146 Ibn al-Murtaḍā goes beyond this in that he requires
the upright scholar not to commit any of the lesser sins and even abstain from
some of what is indifferent (baʿḍ al-mubāḥāt).147 Visible evidence of moral and
religious integrity is a common requirement to be deemed worthy of iftāʾ, not
only for mujtahids.148 However, what differs between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-
Murtaḍā is the measure of visible sinlessness required, as well as the degree to
which the layman is obliged to investigate a scholar’s rectitude. Whereas Ibn
al-Wazīr’s stance as to objective signs of integrity does not go beyond outer
appearance, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s expectation reflects the claim, widespread in the
Zaydiyya, that moral and religious integrity in terms of practical piety and doc-
trine is indeed attainable. This reflects the idea that the forum internum is an
integral part of the legal realm. An illustration of this conviction is the doctrine
of the immaculacy of ahl al-bayt. According to Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī
b. Ibrāhīm for example, the ahl al-bayt are the ones most worthy of taqlīd for
the very reason that they are deemed impeccable in conduct, piety and doc-

al-Durar al-manzūma, Abū Ṭālib al-Hārūnī in Jawāmiʿ al-adilla fī l-uṣūl and al-Mujzī
among others; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 308.
145 The implications for the acceptance of transmitters and traditions are also considerable
and of great importance in the thought of Ibn al-Wazīr. But a study of the science of hadīth
goes beyond the scope of this study.
146 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 12.
147 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Bahr al-zakhkhār xvi, 94.
148 See for example the discussion of the rectitude of witnesses, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s chapter
“Kitāb al-Shihādāt” in al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār xiii, 13, 97; and of transmitters, Ibn al-Wazīr,
al-ʿAwāṣim i, 280–281, 325–326; Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 218–219.

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trine.149 It is hence easy to pursue this train of thought to the higher standard
of morality and doctrine represented in Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s expectations of a muj-
tahid.
For Ibn al-Wazīr, it is purely an assumption that not following the scholar
deemed trustworthy would lead to harm ( fī mukhālafatihi muḍirra maẓnūna).
Ibn al-Wazīr often refers to the human reality that no legal opinion or trans-
mission could be accepted if one awaited proof of flawless conduct or absolute
congruence of doctrine.150 Ibn al-Wazīr is aware that a degree of probabil-
ity is always retained. He counterbalances this with a professionalism in the
mujtahids’ and each scholar’s respective field of study. In contrast to that, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā seeks to counterbalance the probability with affiliation. In quoting
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ibn Miftāḥ writes:

What concerns those great sins that are not explicitly called great sins in
the Book of God, or Sunna of His Prophet or the consensus relied upon,
yet upon which there is no disagreement as to its meaning but that it is
interpreted as unbelief or great sin because of what necessarily follows
from it: whoever does such is called an unbeliever by interpretation (kāfir
taʾwīl) like a determinist, or a grave sinner ( fāsiq taʾwīl) by interpretation
like the ones who strove against ʿAlī. Upon those our judgement is like that
upon the explicit sinners in that it is forbidden to emulate them. This is
what we meant to point out by our statement ‘explicitly and implicitly
upright,’ meaning that rectitude pertains to both.151

In Kitāb al-Azhār, Ibn al-Murtaḍā merely mentioned that the mujtahid needs to
be ‘implicitly and explicitly upright.’ One reason why he considered ahl al-bayt
most worthy of being emulated was the assurance that their doctrine was free
of such things as “the vision [of God]” (al-ruʾya), which means that they were
not guilty of sin by wrong interpretation (taʾwīl).152 Accordingly, it does not suf-
fice to gather evidence on the mujtahid’s qualification by the outward signs of
his religiosity, and the fact that he occupies the position of a mufti effectively.
To remain with the common example of the traveling layman: According to Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, evidence of the mujtahid’s doctrinal rectitude must be given by a
trustworthy witness which can be a righteous imam or other authority in the

149 Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, Nihāyat al-tanwīh 224–269.

150 See for example Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim i, 383.
151 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 12.
152 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Azhār i, 1.

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respective country, as long as they do not permit that a fāsiq taʾwīl may be the
object of emulation. Another way of justifying emulation of an unknown muj-
tahid would be to refer to some who “count as more than one in the justification
[of scholars],” referring to imams of the Prophet’s progeny.153 If these things are
not given, taqlīd is not permissible. The restriction this places on the scope of
scholars from which to accept opinions is obvious.
It is not assumed here that either Ibn al-Wazīr or the earlier Zaydi scholars he
refers to did not care about a mujtahid’s uprightness.154 But a number of schol-
ars who list requirements for ijtihād at least do not discuss rectitude in terms of
doctrinal affiliation as a precondition, even if ahl al-bayt are considered most
deserving of taqlīd as, for example, in Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s thinking.155 Draw-
ing a conclusion to the effect that those earlier scholars were indifferent to the
doctrinal affiliation of a scholar would be premature. After all, those scholars
clearly counted themselves as belonging to the Zaydi madhhab and upheld the
notion of the central role of the ahl al-bayt and Zaydi imams. But as far as those
among them who merely prefer the taqlīd of the living without prohibiting
taqlīd al-mayyit are concerned, it is not clear whether they would have permit-
ted a layman to ask a mujtahid for a legal opinion—say on a journey—without
being certain that the said scholar was of sound doctrine, or in the event that
he belonged to another school of law. At least the question of rectitude in terms
of a mujtahid’s soundness of doctrine has not reached the importance that it
seems to have held for Ibn al-Murtaḍā. After all, Ibn al-Murtaḍā considered doc-
trinal rectitude and the need of the mustaftī to know about it important enough
to constitute the second tier of his two-tier categorization of requirements. The
increasing importance of this criteria should be seen as another indication for
a stronger inroad of theology on law and the subsequent and intended con-
solidation of the Zaydiyya as a legal school on theological foundations, to the
exclusion of mujtahids of other schools.
Most likely, the requirement of doctrinal soundness is only a consequence
of requiring the aspiring mujtahid to master the art of theology. Gimaret has

153 Ibn Miftāḥ’s example of someone like that is al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq; cf. Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-
Azhār i, 13.
154 The notion that ijtihād as a divine commission can only be entrusted to the upright is a
general one. See for example al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā ii, 101; al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuḥūl
252.
155 See for example al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, who only mentions professional
skills as requirements and supports the above-mentioned way for a layman to discern the
qualification of a scholar for ijtihād or iftāʾ; cf. ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār i,
381–382; ii, 357–359. See also Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, Kitāb al-Intisar i, 198–199.

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pointed out that the study of uṣūl al-dīn does not merely designate the study
of the sources of religion or the sources of theological judgments, as the term
might indicate. Rather, uṣūl al-dīn focuses on the judgements—hence the
doctrines—themselves.156 Assuming the validity of Gimaret’s position, it must
be concluded that the requirement of a mastery of uṣūl al-dīn is equal to requir-
ing the belief in a particular set of theological doctrines. This confirms our con-
clusions from what Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requires of a mujtahid. In writings where
Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not explicitly mention it as a required discipline, he does
determine it at a stage that is much closer to the person of the mujtahid, namely,
at the stage of his personal rectitude. Before the ijtihād of a mujtahid can be
accepted, it must be ascertained that the mujtahid is not one of the fussāq or
kuffār taʾ wīl. Being considered a fāsiq or kāfir taʾwīl effectively means holding
different beliefs in one or more of the theological questions that belong to the
realm of certain yet acquired knowledge.
In contrast to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s reference to correct, i.e. Zaydi-Muʿtazili, the-
ology as the standard for the person of the mujtahid, Ibn al-Wazīr’s frame of
reference is a time before the existence of theological and legal schools. At the
very beginning of the fourth principle in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Kitāb al-Qawāʿid, called
“the requirements for ijtihād,” two guiding notions are given as the platform for
subsequent categorization.157 First, he advocates the superiority of the early
generations. Secondly, he insists on the capability of later generations to per-
form ijtihād with a relatively low degree of difficulty. The two notions are linked
in that the former facilitates the latter. It was the scholars of the early gener-
ations (salaf ) who travelled to numerous scholars of hadith even before the
Prophet’s traditions were written down. For the rules of Arabic needed for inter-
pretation they sought out the masters of language, i.e. Beduin, in their widely
scattered wadis. The science of speculation (ʿilm al-naẓar) was not yet elabo-
rated so as to impose guidelines in the method of conclusion and inference.
Their efforts then resulted in the elaboration of methods, systemization and
authoring of sources. The early scholars’ achievements are what makes it pos-
sible for later scholars to perform their duty of ijtihād. Their capability of per-
forming it rests not on a higher degree of education or higher intelligence, but
on the efforts of their predecessors and the human nature (gharīza) or original
disposition ( fiṭra) that all share. Acknowledging this is equal to acknowledging
God’s grace in enabling his subjects and in rendering the performance of their
duty easy to them (rafʿ al-ḥaraj, literally “removal of hardship”).158 It is from

156 Gimaret, Uṣūl al-Dīn.

157 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid fs. 94a–b.
158 Ibid., f. 94a.

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general values like rafʿ al-ḥaraj and the “right kind of following” (i.e. fī l-maʿnā)
that Ibn al-Wazīr sought to establish guidelines for the legal interpretation of
revelation. Thus, he retained a level of subjectivity of the scholar’s opinion and
probability in the interpretation not conducive to stability in institutionalized
law.
The rectitude of mujtahids bears on three issues which are important for
the present question: First, the moral standing of a mujtahid has an effect on
how high the benchmark for mujtahids is set. Secondly, the determining fac-
tors for the required moral standing also determine what doctrinal orientation
a mujtahids represents, as rectitude is not exclusively concerned with practi-
cal moral piety and integrity but also with doctrinal purity. Lastly, the concern
with rectitude is again an indication for questions regarding the major realm
of human activity. In explaining the gap between jurists and theologians with
regard to the role contingency plays for them, Johansen shows how the field
of activity for fiqh scholars is what he called the forum externum. The forum
externum is concerned with the actions of an individual. Thus, a jurist would
judge an individual’s outward conduct in terms of legal norms of a probable
epistemological nature. Theologians, on the other hand, are concerned with
the forum internum “that decides conflicts in the light of the absolute criteria
which govern the relationship between the individual and God.”159 This inner
forum of belief and conscience, concerned with questions of absolute truth,
would be a realm which the jurist would not dare to judge, since this realm can
only be truly known to God and remains within the responsibility of the ethi-
cal conscience of the individual. Coming to legal decisions and interpretations
based on doctrinal convictions would mean penetrating the forum internum
which is supposedly beyond the realm of human assessability. Consequently,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s positions in the issue of rectitude yet again
reveal the comparative levels of certainty that each scholar considered attain-
able.
The differences between Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requirements
seem to be most apparent in the uṣūl al-dīn as well as in Arabic linguistics,
with repercussions in what is required in the field of legal methodology. The
emphasis on both speculative theology and Arabic linguistics is widespread
in Muʿtazili circles. Ultimately, it is not general negation of attainability that
provides the grounds for contrasting Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s thought with that of Ibn
al-Wazīr. That would be the case with Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent in al-ʿAwāṣim
and al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim. The open question between Ibn al-

159 Johansen, Contingency 36.

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Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā seems rather to be to what group of people ijtihād is
restricted and how large the group may be.
To sum up: the probable nature of the interpretative process and outcome
of Islamic law was especially salient in the notion of the infallibility of all muj-
tahidūn. This rendered a high degree of instability to the legal institutions and
institutionalization of law in legal schools (madhāhib). Restricting the scope
of those capable of legal interpretation to a group with a certain set of skills
restores stability, as the scope of possible results is likewise restricted. Addi-
tionally, the kind of restriction is of interest: those fit to be mujtahids must have
a firm grasp of theology. Hence more stability is gained for Ibn al-Murtaḍā—
and many other Zaydis—by restricting ijtihād and its outcome to those strongly
influenced by a particular theological outlook on law. This buttresses the ten-
dency Zysow has indicated, namely that a shift to those sciences where cer-
tainty was available was made by many scholars who were occupied with the
interpretation of divine law. To my mind, the consolidation of the Zaydi mad-
hhab was Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s strategy on the level of law. And he represented a
view supported by many Zaydis during his time and after.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s reaction to the probable nature of Islamic law was different.
He argued for a low standard in the set of requirements. Not much is needed
that is not required of any Muslim, rendering ijtihād within reach for many if
not all legal subjects to one degree or another. For Ibn al-Wazīr, the require-
ments for ijtihād had little to do with the certain knowledge of doctrine beyond
what is commonly known by all Muslims’ fiṭra. This is uniquely manifest in
the position Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā take towards rectitude as a sep-
arate requirement. The aspect of the exigencies of rectitude alone would not
suffice to argue for a step in the process of consolidation of the Zaydi mad-
hhab. But as part of a whole, it points to a delimitation of school identity which
provided Zaydi-Muʿtazilis with grounds for rejecting elements of other schools
(opinions or mujtahids) on the basis of affiliation, as well as for defining the
relationship between the schools in a hierarchical manner. In this regard, a
scholar like Ibn al-Wazīr struggled against the effects of three things: first of
all, the stringent requirements confronting every scholar aspiring to ijtihād;
secondly, the ease with which laymen and scholars could refer to existing prod-
ucts of legal inference from the sources; and thirdly, the narrowing down of the
scope of scholars from whom to receive legal knowledge to only those within
certain limits of doctrinal affinity. We encounter this latter issue also in the dis-
cussion of the acceptance of transmitters. Here as there, Ibn al-Wazīr insists
on outward criteria of professionalism rather than affiliation with a school
or a set of doctrines that draws from the forum internum. The infallibility of
ijtihād had a destabilizing effect on the theory of the institutionalization of

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legal schools. As Zysow suggested, the centrality of law was replaced by the-
ology, by means of which other groups in the legal arena could be excluded,
defined as inferior or marginalized. Given the correctness of all jurists, this
was impossible on the basis of their legal rulings per se. However, it was not
impossible on the basis of their doctrinal or methodological affiliation (theol-
ogy and uṣūl al-fiqh), because certainty was required in these issues. The more
certainty is required, the more grounds for excluding the other and elevating
one’s own school are retained. Ibn al-Wazīr’s set of requirements for ijtihād
theoretically set the Zaydi mujtahids on a par with scholars of other schools,
thereby delineating a syncretistic model of the structure of legal authority
reinforced by referring to a supposed original state before the emergence of
schools. All this once again substantiates Ibn al-Wazīr’s high tolerance of ambi-
guity.

5 Divisibility (tajazzuʾ) of Ijtihād and the Discerning Student

(al-ṭālib al-mumayyiz)

The debate around the requirements for ijtihād indicates that different scholars
expected qualifications in different disciplines, as well as different levels of eru-
dition in these disciplines. Similarly, scholars differed as to the scope in which
ijtihād was possible as a consequence of such qualification. Whereas some
thought that the qualification for ijtihād was comprehensive once reached,
others held that ijtihād could be divided according to qualification and disci-
pline. Kamali states that indivisibility was the majority opinion among Mus-
lim scholars.160 However, this was not the case among the Zaydi scholars and
those scholars from other schools from which Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā
drew.161 Ibn al-Murtaḍā does speak of the majority of scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh
in his argument for divisibility (tajazzuʾ). Yet he claims that Imam al-Manṣūr

160 He names Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and al-
Shawkānī beside “some Maliki, Hanbali and Ẓāhirī ulema” as exceptions to the doctrine
of indivisibility; cf. Kamali, Principles 326.
161 Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā defend the divisibility of ijtihād as the opinion of the
majority of scholars of legal theory in general, and the Zaydiyya in particular; cf. Ibn al-
Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 93a. According to Ṣārim al-Dīn, the doctrine of divisibility was
supported by a number of Zaydi authorities like al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, al-
Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza, next to al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and others;
cf. Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 279. It is important to him to point out that the one
practicing partial ijtihād is restricted to those issues on which opinions already exist. He
is not entitled to come to an independent opinion.

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bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza was one example among a number of Zaydi schol-
ars who rejected the notion.162 Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr’s defense against his
critic in Kitāb al-Qawāʿid shows that divisibility was rejected among a number
of his Zaydi contemporaries.163 But what does the doctrine of the divisibility of
ijtihād entail? And how does it affect the matter of school identity?
The editor of al-ʿAwāṣim, al-Arnaʾūṭ, conforms with what al-Shawkānī and
also later scholarship say, namely that the indivisibility of ijtihād is a doctrine
of a minority.164 The argument that al-Shawkānī refers to for those who sup-
port divisibility is much the same as that which Ibn al-Murtaḍā uses, as we
shall see. However, al-Shawkānī provides some insight on the argumentation
of those negating it:

They say: (…) but most of the sciences of ijtihād are interdependent and
have a claim on one another ( yaʾkhudh baʿḍuhā bi-ḥujza baʿḍ). Especially
in respect to what is established of the sciences [of ijithād] originating in
the endowment (al-malaka) [of ijtihād].165

It is known that a scholar is not allowed to perform ijtihād on the basis of

evidence, unless he is assumed to have reached the degree of preponderant
probability that he has acquired all that is required, and that nothing has inhib-
ited him (ʿadam al-māniʿ) from finding the relevant evidence. According to
the deniers of divisibility, this assumption can only be reached by one hold-
ing the abilities of an absolute mujtahid.166 The interdependence argument
suggests that whoever claims to know everything that is necessary in one ques-
tion regardless of other questions cannot have reached the necessary degree of
probability. It is still possible that someone could inform him of something he
did not know. The wording used by al-Shawkānī to portray the opinion of the
deniers of divisibility sounds very much like what al-Arnaʾūṭ ascribed to Abū

162 Ibn al-Murtaḍā claims that Imam al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza rejected the divis-
ibility of ijtihād, because of the interdependence between the different legal issues; cf. Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 763.
163 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 84b.
164 Of all the Sunni, Muʿtazili and Imami scholars, it is said only of Abū Ḥanīfa that he prohib-
ited partial ijtihad. The reason for ascribing this position to Abū Ḥanīfa may be a rooted
in a mere difference in wording, as the prohibition was concluded by Abū Ḥanīfa’s trans-
mitters from Abū Ḥanīfa’s definition of a faqīh as “one who is gifted with the ability of
deriving (a rule—instinbāṭ) in everything.” Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 30, footnote 2. See
also al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā ii, 354–453; Abū l-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad ii, 929.
165 Al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuḥūl ii, 217.
166 Ibid.

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Ḥanīfa.167 In both cases it is an endowment (malaka) of practicing ijtihād that

characterizes the mujtahid.

5.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Position on the Divisibility of Ijtihād

In al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-Wazīr mentions divisibility once. The context is that of
the fighters (mujāhidūn) among the companions who were called scholars
(mutafaqqihūn). They were allowed to give legal opinions in questions where
they have heard or seen the Prophet do or say something. However, as Ibn al-
Wazīr reasons, “they were no mujtahids in issues that they neither saw nor
heard. (…) This is one of the proofs for the divisibility of ijtihād.”168
The commonly accepted rule says that a mujtahid must act according to
his ijtihād. The question that arises is: when is the conclusion arrived at to be
considered ijtihād? The reference to the Prophetic traditions at a time when
the Prophet and his companions were still alive suggests a very basic level.
This is echoed in Ibn al-Wazīr’s al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr in which he defends the
legitimacy of al-Manṣūr’s imamate. His legitimacy was doubted because of his
supposed deficiency in the professional abilities needed for ijtihād.169 Ibn al-
Wazīr repudiates this charge by arguing that the imam does indeed possess
what knowledge and capability is required for partial ijtihād:

When methods began to differ and creatures started feuding with each
other, those who were occupied with kinds of knowledge (ʿulūm) other
than that of the forefathers (salaf ) deemed those who were [occupied
with it] to be void of knowledge. Just as those engaged with the knowl-
edge of the forefathers knew those ignorant of it to be void of the true
knowledge. Thus, the ignorant ones identified the vilest [kind of] igno-
rance with the highest levels of knowledge. How terribly strange is the way
they consider knowledge what really is ignorance, and they discredit our
Lord, Commander of the Faithful, peace be upon him, for not being occu-
pied with what they consider knowledge. The truthful answer to those
who speak such evil things has a number of aspects. First of all, their cer-
tainty about the non-existence of his [capability of] ijtihād is merely a

167 See al-Arnaʾūṭ (intr., ed.), al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 30, footnote 2.

168 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 30.
169 In al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr, Ibn al-Wazīr’s major argument does not evolve around ijtihād,
but rather around the question of whether or not ijtihād is the most important function
of an imam. He argues that whereas the sources mention the necessity of a just imam
repeatedly, little is said about the necessity of being the most learned imam; cf. Ibn al-
Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr fs. 111a–112b.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 315

false accusation since the least [form of] ijtihād is a hidden thing about
the interpretation, easiness or difficulty of which there is severe disagree-
ment between the scholars of Islam. It is not something that can be per-
ceived by the senses, nor does it belong to those things that are known in
the intellect by necessity or by analogous inference.170

In this passage, Ibn al-Wazīr indicates only what he considers the most impor-
tant aspect of ijtihād, namely the knowledge of that which the salaf knew. It
is obvious from the emphasis put on Imam al-Manṣūr’s mastery of Quran and
the prophetic Sunna throughout the writing that this “knowledge of the salaf ”
means the texts of revelation.171 In this context, Ibn al-Wazīr lists the variety of
definitions of ijtihād, including smaller and greater ijtihād as well as partial and
absolute ijtihād.172 According to him, the lowest form of ijtihād is possible on
the basis of the mastery of the texts of Quran and Sunna. Accordingly, Imam
al-Manṣūr does qualify as a scholar and mujtahid, although he is a muqallid in
many areas.
The case of Imam al-Manṣūr is a very vivid manifestation of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
understanding not only of ijtihād, but also of what is to be considered knowl-
edge, as discussed in chapter 3. Ibn al-Wazīr emphasizes the ambiguity as to
the starting point from which the legal interpretation can be called ijtihād.
Elaborating on the question of when probable conclusions on legal questions
can be considered ijtihād suggested itself to Ibn al-Wazīr as part of his rebut-
tal of the idea that it is permissible to emulate dead scholars. The distinction
between the layman and the discerning student (al-ṭālib al-mumayyiz) was a
crucial element in the distinction between the permitted and the prohibited
kind of taqlīd in terms of the emulator. Ibn al-Wazīr knows himself to have the
qualities of the discerning student who is not permitted to practice taqlīd. This
last point seems to be aimed primarily at defending Ibn al-Wazīr against the
often repeated accusation that he is not following the early Zaydi imams. The
true meaning of following, i.e. following in meaning (al-ittibāʿ fī l-maʿnā), taken
together with the impermissibility of taqlīd for the distinguishing student, ren-

170 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr f. 103b.

171 Elsewhere in the work Ibn al-Wazīr asks how, after considering the concession to the ijti-
hād of muqallids by a number of Zaydi scholars, it is possible that some claim consensus
to the effect that people like Imam al-Manṣūr are neither mujtahids nor scholars in spite
of their profound studies of the knowledge of divine law in Quran and Sunna; cf. ibid.,
f. 104a.
172 The full list of what the term ijtihād comprises is given in ibid., f. 103b. As Zysow remarked,
it is difficult to frame a satisfactory definition of ijtihād in the juridical sense; cf. Zysow,
Economy of Certainty 260.

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der the study of indicators and subsequent independent judgement incumbent

on him. The doctrine of divisibility provides an explanation and a solution to
the tension in which scholars like Ibn al-Wazīr found themselves.173 In turn, the
differentiation within the discerning student between being a muqallid in some
and a mujtahid in other areas exposes two possibilities: initially, there is the fol-
lowing of a scholar by way of taqlīd succeeded by attaining information about
the evidence and indicators; secondly, the student investigates the sources and
the contained indicators himself and reaches an independent judgement.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr responds to the interdependence-argument. His
answer runs as follows: Different books treat different disciplines. Besides that,
books are divided into chapters in which each chapter treats a question along
with the related evidence separately. Accordingly, one can rationally grasp and
become professional in a certain field, like Arabic grammar, without having to
know everything pertaining to, for example, the theological question of pre-
destination. Yet, in a linguistic question, the word of a grammarian is more
heeded than what great imams of ijtihād hold true. To become informed in
another field, a man turns to scholars of that field for information without los-
ing his status as a scholar of his own field. If he could not rationally grasp one
field because of its interdependence with another, teaching and learning would
be pointless. Neither does his turning to another scholar for information make
him a muqallid, because it would then not be knowledge which he attains. This
is because a muqallid is defined by the lack of knowledge of and evidence for an
issue. What guides the process of ijtihād is the conclusion on the basis of what
seems most probable to the scholar after he has studied the evidence of a spe-
cific question—be he an absolute mujtahid or a discerning student practicing
ijtihād in a particular field.174
In al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, Ibn al-Wazīr describes the context in which the doc-
trine of indivisibility becomes manifest:

But now to our question concerning one who follows the opinions of the
majority and considers it sound: If, after extensive study of the writings
of the scholars that contain the indicators according to topics and that
mention disagreements and arguments fairly and completely, some opin-
ions seem to him more likely because they comply with the sound texts
(li-muwāfaqat al-nuṣūṣ al-ṣaḥīḥa), [and if] he fears to have become a muj-
tahid in that question even if he is no mujtahid but a muqallid practicing

173 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 93a.

174 Ibid., fs. 84b–93a, 85b.

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tarjīḥ without there being in his mind the slightest partisanship (dukhān
al-ʿaṣabiyya) which would lead him to follow the less excellent and to act
according to the less likely (al-marjūḥ), [about such a one] there is dis-
agreement as to his duty [to follow his conclusions], not as to whether or
not this is permitted or desirable.175

Ibn al-Wazīr points to the probable nature of ijtihād in the defense of its divis-
ibility. Ijtihād itself is not abolished because of the possibility of its indicators
being out-weighted (marjūḥ) in any given matter, as long as there are no con-
crete indicators that are indeed stronger than those that led to a given judgment
initially. Ijtihād is based on conjecture (ẓann)—the scholar is driven by the
evidence to assume a particular conclusion. This is as true for the muqallid prac-
ticing ijtihād in particular areas as it is for the mujtahid of all disciplines.176 But
the context manifest in the question at hand indicates that those who prohibit
the divisibility of ijtihād would also be wary of allowing a muqallid to search
out the indicators and arguments and to come to his own conclusion instead
of following an imam, mujtahid or school irrespective of indicators. However,
the major disagreement exists in the question as to whether this practice of
looking for indicators is a duty, rather than whether or not it is permissible.
Ibn al-Wazīr says that “concerning those who hold to divisibility, it is obvious.”
By “obvious” he means that among supporters of divisibility, unlike those who
reject divisibility, the duty of the muqallid to act according to what he assumes
to be the correct position irrespective of who expressed that opinion is taken
for granted.177

5.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Position on the Divisibility of Ijtihād

Ibn al-Murtaḍā was likewise a supporter of the doctrine of divisibility. However,
he spent much less effort on the defense of his views. His appellation of some-
one practicing partial ijtihād has nothing of the active connotation found in
Ibn al-Wazīr’s elaboration. In his words, partial ijtihād sounds rather unlike an
active part of the interpretative legal process: namely “one (yet) unable to reach
the stage of ijtihād (al-qāṣir ʿan rutbat al-ijtihād).”178 In Minhāj al-wuṣūl, Ibn al-
Murtaḍā’s definition of the general and the particular ijtihād at the beginning
of the chapter on ijtihād is directly followed by a discussion of its divisibility.

175 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, 217.

176 Ibid., 216; similarly al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā ii, 353.
177 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 217. The wider context of the above quote involves the pos-
sibility of ijtihād during the lifetime of the Prophet.
178 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 763.

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According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, ijtihād in a certain discipline or question is just

as possible to someone yet incapable of absolute ijtihād as it is to the absolute
(kāmil) mujtahid, in as far as both are confined to a given question that is not
dependent on another question or discipline. Both equally have to investigate
all the indicators (amārāt) that pertain to that particular question according
to their understanding. Since the restricted one (qāṣir) is limited in his inves-
tigation to what a mujtahid provides for him in terms of proofs and signs, both
start from the same premises. Responding to a critic who rejects the divisibil-
ity of ijtihād, claiming that the restricted scholar might not know all the signs
relevant to his question, Ibn al-Murtaḍā writes:

If absolute ijtihād in all disciplines were a requirement—meaning that

the mujtahid would not be ignorant of a single source of any question—it
would necessarily follow that he [such a mujtahid] would not be ignorant
of anything pertaining to all the questions of ijtihād, because of his com-
plete cognizance of the source (maʾkhadh) of every single question. If not,
he would be a restricted one (qāṣir).179

In short, the absolute mujtahid does not have complete knowledge of all the
sources and indicators. An unfinished mujtahid is allowed to practice ijtihād
in his limited field because the absolute mujtahid does likewise. An absolute
mujtahid does not become restricted because of ignorance in certain ques-
tions. This is demonstrated by a tradition about Mālik b. Anas. When Mālik
is asked forty questions, he can only answer four and says of the remaining
ones that he does not know the answer. Where Mālik is concerned, apparently
no one questions his rank of an absolute mujtahid, nor did anyone dispute his
ability to give answers to the said four questions.180 If it was possible in these
questions that their indicators did not relate to the questions of which he did
not know the answer, this would likewise be possible in the case of a muqallid
who is a mujtahid only in some respects (here called qāṣir). Hence, the qāṣir is
guided and restricted by the same principles as the mujtahid. He is to act on the
assumption gained by the indicators he knows to be independent of indicators
unknown to him. If the restricted one were not allowed to practice his partial
ijtihād:

179 Ibid., 763.

180 The example of Mālik b. Anas was commonly used in support of divisibility. See for exam-
ple Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr f. 103b; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār ii, 292;
al-Shawkānī, Irshād al-fuḥūl 255; cf. Kamali, Principles 326.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 319

It would contradict duty. The duty is to acquire all indicators that he

assumes to pertain to that question—either by adopting from a mujtahid
or after the imams have established the indicators and categorized them
according to classes. If that is so, the possibilities mentioned by you do not
invalidate the conjecture about the ruling. Hence, he has to act according
to it.181

According to this reasoning, the only, yet very significant, difference between
the restricted and the absolute mujtahid is that the former refers to and is lim-
ited by the evidence provided by a mujtahid or the early imams, whereas the
latter refers to and is limited by the revelational sources.
In comparison, Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā both support the divisibility
of ijtihād based on the principle common to all kinds of ijtihād, namely prepon-
derant conjecture (ghālib al-ẓann). However, there is a difference in what they
allow as source material for the qāṣir in the production of ijtihād-decisions. The
source material determines the scope within which the scholar is allowed to
issue his rulings; perhaps that of a particular discipline or science. In this case
the qāṣir would not be restricted to drawing from the texts and proofs of his
own school, although that could be the first stage. Rather, a discerning student
could directly draw from the source texts that are concerned with this question,
informed about the methodology of inference and reasoning from his studies.
He would hence be a student and muqallid in numerous areas of law, but a muj-
tahid in one field. Another possibility would be that a muqallid practices legal
interpretation of the existing texts of his school or imams in certain fields. He
would then be a mujtahid within the school of law (mujtahid fī l-madhhab) in
the sense of affiliation.
The implications are obvious: If, on the one hand, partial ijtihād is to mean
that the texts of the school can be interpreted, then the concept of partial ijti-
hād supports the idea of narrowing down the scope within which a scholar
can act in his interpretation of the sources. The school identity is more con-
solidated and the relationship to other interpretations and schools defined. If,
on the other hand, partial ijtihād is to mean that the aspiring mujtahid is fit to
consult the original sources and produce opinions in particular fields, the case
lies differently. This by no means narrows down the scope the scholar has for
legal reasoning, but rather leaves open the possibility of extension and growth

181 Ibn al-Murtaḍa, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 763. Parts of the quote are taken from the glosses of Ibn
al-Murtaḍā’s Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl, of which Minhāj al-wuṣūl is a commentary.

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with the aim of achieving complete and independent ijtihād. The boundaries
between schools are given little significance, if any at all.
In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s partial ijtihād, the student weighs the sources provided
within the realm of the school. In contrast, partial or restricted ijtihād in Ibn
al-Wazīr’s defense of Imam al-Manṣūr does not mean that ijtihād is to be prac-
ticed within the confinements of the school’s texts. It rather means that ijtihād
is possible from the moment of access to the revealed sources. This echoes the
example Ibn al-Wazīr gave in al-ʿAwāṣim of the ijtihād of some of the com-
panions. There the initial moment for the process of interpreting law was the
unmediated access to one of the sources of law, a deed or saying of the Prophet.
There was no justification for actively drawing conclusions from that which
the respective companion had not witnessed. But the lack of access to some
sources—sayings or actions of Muḥammad—did not necessitate the obstruc-
tion of ijtihād in other cases.182
This idea of the divisibility of ijtihād goes considerably beyond what seems
to have been the prevalent notion a century after Ibn al-Wazīr (and most likely
also earlier). Ṣārim al-Dīn, in his systematic exposition of the legal method-
ology of the Prophet’s progeny, states about the restricted mujtahid: “He is a
mujtahid in those things in which disagreement exists. It is not permissible for
him to reach an independent opinion in any question in contradistinction to
the absolute mujtahid.”183 Although Ibn al-Wazīr does not exclude such cases,
he does not restrict partial ijtihād to them. Of course, no discourse preceded the
alleged ijtihād of the companions. But they could have consulted each other.
Both assertions of divisibility, i.e. that of Ibn al-Wazīr as well Ibn al-Mur-
taḍā’s, argue with ghālib al-ẓann. On the one hand, the conjecture upon which
the partial mujtahid is to act according to Ibn al-Murtaḍā (and most other Zay-
dis of temporal proximity) is framed by the conjecture of the absolute mujtahid
or else the mujtahids the qāṣir learns from. The mujtahid provides the probable
evidence from among which the qāṣir can choose. In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
understanding of partial ijtihād is determined by the probable nature of prob-
ability itself. Since it is only probability that needs to be reached, anyone at any
stage is able to do just that, irrespective of other positions. His reference point
are the texts of revelation. This is illustrated in Kitāb al-Qawāʿid:

Ijtihād has different stages. We do not say that he [the aspiring mujtahid]
has reached the most elevated one, but we say that he has reached ijti-
hād in some of its aspects. He has come to have tranquility of the soul

182 Cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 30.

183 Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 279.

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(sukūn al-nafs). [Even] in the matters of certainty the Bahshamiyya has

only made tranquility of the soul incumbent, not that the result is nec-
essary (ḍarūra). They allowed for doubt and uncertainty concerning con-
clusive evidence. Likewise, conjecture (ẓann) does not cease only because
of doubts. Even if the great mujtahid should argue with him [the aspir-
ing mujtahid], he will not change his assumption. His assumption only
changes by way of contextual evidence that outweighs what he himself
holds.184

Ibn al-Wazīr makes the tranquility of the soul a criteria of ijtihād. It will be
remembered that for Bahshami Muʿtazilis like ʿAbd al-Jabbār and with him Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, the tranquility of the soul was the single most important criteria for
certain knowledge. But Ibn al-Wazīr applies it here to conjecture. If one’s soul
has reached the state of tranquility as to the highest likelihood of the result of
one’s own legal interpretation, the practice is performed and one needs to hold
on to the result. For many Muʿtazila, and Ibn al-Murtaḍā as a Zaydi represen-
tative, the main importance of sukūn al-nafs referred to acquired knowledge.
According to them, this distinguished it from taqlīd in doctrinal questions. But
Ibn al-Wazīr did not consider acquired knowledge to be certain knowledge in
the strict sense. In the criteria of tranquility of the soul for the completion
of ijtihād it becomes evident once again that Ibn al-Wazīr identified the most
probable conjecture in the field of legal theory with the secondary theological
positions based on so-called acquired knowledge. In both cases, the position
of the individual is determined by what seems most probable, even if this posi-
tion contrasts with that of other potentially more erudite scholars or mujtahids
in a broader spectrum of disciplines. His own informed assumption in a partic-
ular matter instead of that of a higher ranking mujtahid is standard because
he himself is able to discern the sources in this particular matter. Both opin-
ions, i.e. that of the discerning student as well as that of an absolute mujtahid,
are equally based on the subjective standard of the most probable interpreta-
tion of the textual sources. This leaves little room for hierarchical definitions of
relationships within or between schools even on these lower levels of partial
ijtihād. The contrasting position that locates partial ijtihād within the school
system thereby consolidates school identity and relates to other schools in a
hierarchical manner. The meaning and impact of such partial ijtihad is best
illustrated by the practice of takhrīj, or extrapolation of principles.

184 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 85b. For a discussion of the circumstantial evidence
(qarāʾin), see Hallaq, Notes on the Term qarīna 475–478.

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6 Extrapolation of Principles (takhrīj)

Takhrīj means inferring legal principles (qawāʿid, uṣūl, ḍawābiṭ) from a scholar’s
judgements in particular cases. Individual rulings of an earlier authority are put
in relation to the supposedly underlying principles. Thereby the guiding prin-
ciples for the madhhab of the early authority are established. These principles
are then applied in cases where no explicit ruling of the scholar exists.185
Hallaq laments that the practice and its significant role in the shaping of
the schools of law has been neglected in western scholarship.186 Although he
says this in the context of the formation of the Sunni schools of law, it is even
more true in respect to the development of the Zaydiyya as a legal school. Hal-
laq excludes Jackson’s analysis of the role of the Malikī legal theorist Shihāb
al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) who advanced the idea of a corporate status of
the madhhab in the time of the then well established “regime of taqlīd.”187 In
the Zaydi context, one has to exclude from this lack of investigation the trea-
tise of Haykel and Zysow concerning the identity of the Zaydi madhhab.188
Hallaq relates the practice of takhrīj to the establishment of the doctrine of
a school associated with an eponym.189 Ijtihādāt of scholars that came after
the schools’ eponyms needed to be related to the supposed founders in order
to bear authority—hence the ascription of principles to the founders, which
would then be applied to later scholars’ legal interpretations.190 Jackson shows
how takhrīj was crucial in a schools’ transition from loose association with
a broad set of principles to adherence to a fixed body of positive rules. He
describes the state of affairs in Ayyūbid-Mamlūk Cairo of the late 7th/13th cen-
tury where Shafiʿi scholars widely dominated the four schools: Being affiliated
with one of the schools and adhering to its legal doctrine was more important
than the content of the respective doctrine. It was a means to preserve school
identity.191 The growing attitude that a school’s doctrine or the supposed doc-

185 Takhrīj in the context of legal methodology and the development of a school doctrine is
not to be confused with its namesake in the science of hadith. Takhrīj or istikhrāj in the
science of hadith signifies the tracking back of a particular tradition to its origin, some-
times through an isnād other than what is recorded in one of the tradition compilations.
Ibn al-Wazīr addresses this kind of takhrīj in his Tanqīḥ al-anzār 40.
186 Hallaq, Early Ijtihād 336. Aḥmad in his doctoral thesis affirms this state of affairs; cf.
Aḥmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice 18, 24.
187 Jackson, Islamic Law and the State 57.
188 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 332–371.
189 Hallaq, Early Ijtihād, 336.
190 Hallaq, Takhrīj 320, 333.
191 Jackson, Islamic Law and State 225–229.

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trines of the eponym should not be violated is manifest in the development

of the so called qawāʿid genre. Qawāʿid works are collections of legal precepts
that delineate a school’s body of subject matter. Jackson locates the beginning
of that genre, and hence the tightening of a scholar’s range of legal reasoning,
somewhere in the 7th/13th century.192
Although Zaydi scholars evidently practiced a form of takhrīj—those schol-
ars are often called muḥaṣṣilūn (i.e. those who infer [a principle]) in the Zaydi
context193—as early as the 5th/11th century, a list of principles reflecting the
previous endeavors is known to have been set down in Ibn Miftāḥ’s Sharḥ al-
Azhār, written in the 9th/15th century.194 Ibn Miftāḥ’s commentary addresses
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s own commentary on his famous fiqh work Kitāb al-Azhār,
which has thenceforward served as a major source for Zaydi fiqh. Haykel and
Zysow, following al-Sayāghī, count Ibn al-Murtaḍā among the first and most
important of the so-called mudhākirūn. The term mudhākirūn describes schol-
ars after the period of the muḥaṣṣilūn, who further established their school’s
principles and collated them with the opinions of former imams as well as new
cases on the basis of the principles they extracted from Quran and Sunna. Both
studies locate the beginning of period of the muḥaṣṣilūn with the two Caspian
Zaydi imams and brothers, Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Hārūnī (d. 411/1020) and al-
Nāṭiq Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Hārūnī (d. 424/1032).195 The last Zaydi
imam to practice takhrīj was probably al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza
(d. 640/1217).196

192 Ibid., 94. According to Hajjī Khalīfa, the first one to write a qawāʿid work was a certain
Shafiʿi Muʿīn al-dīn Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Jajīrmī (d. 613/1216). However,
al-Mikhlāfī locates the origin of the occupation with principles in the Hanafiyya. Yet the
first one to discuss the principles in technical terms is said to have been the Shafiʿi Ibn ʿAbd
al-Salām al-Sulamī (d. 660/1262). Al-Mikhlāfī’s study, like Jackson’s, shows that the Shafiʿi
school of law was most active in the field of qawāʿid; cf. al-Mikhlāfī, al-Wajīz fī-l-qawāʿid
18–19.
193 Al-Siyāghī also calls the muḥaṣṣilūn “mujtahidū l-madhhab;” cf. al-Siyāghī, Uṣūl al-madh-
hab 13–16, 14.
194 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharh al-Azhār i, 46–48.
195 See also al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāghibīn i, 343–344. Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr especially
mentions them as having established (taqrīr) the madhhab of al-Hādī ilā al-ḥaqq, the
eponym of the Hādawiyya.
196 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 10. Al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza,
however, does not discuss the term takhrīj in his major work on legal methodology, Ṣafwat
al-ikhtiyār. What he does mention is the method of ascribing an opinion to a scholar in
terms of drawing an analogy. Al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s context is the differ-
ence of opinion among the mujtahids and the infallibility of ijtihād; cf.ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza,
Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār 364–365.

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According to al-Sayāghī, scholars began to establish the principles of the

Zaydi imams when the name Zaydiyya started to signify a legal school, between
the early 4th/10th and late 5th/11th century.197 Interestingly, this period coin-
cides with dates given by other researchers for the establishment of the princi-
ples of the four Sunni schools of law. This time of “the formation of a madhhab”
in the Sunni schools was succeeded by a greater confinement of a scholar’s ijti-
hād to the borders of his own madhhab. This is manifest in a development of
the meaning of ijtihād (and mujtahid) from the absolute to the affiliated, as well
as in an increase in the importance of taqlīd.198

6.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Takhrīj

In Kitāb al-Qawāʿid, Ibn al-Wazīr addresses takhrīj as part of the first princi-
ple because it was employed to justify emulating dead scholars.199 Ibn al-Wazīr
is accused of inhibiting students of law and religion from practicing taqlīd
based on his alleged contempt for the early imams and righteous forefathers.
In response, Ibn al-Wazīr scrutinizes the practice of takhrīj and concludes that
it does not represent the following of the forefathers, in contrast to what is
claimed. According to him, the way takhrīj is practiced is to be eyed with cau-
tion, as it is often substantiated with wrong assumptions and practiced without
knowledge of the criteria of takhrīj. The wrong assumption based on which
takhrīj is justified is its supposed equivalence to analogical reasoning from the
Prophet’s sayings (naẓīr al-qiyās). This is manifest, for example, in the parallel
between the activity of the absolute and that of the restricted mujtahid (qāṣir)
as drawn by Ibn al-Murtaḍā above: The absolute mujtahid infers his rulings
from the texts of revelation—Quran and Sunna—and performs his ijtihād by
drawing analogies from them. The restricted mujtahid performs his (restricted)
ijtihād by drawing analogies from the texts of absolute mujtahids.200 However,
for Ibn al-Wazīr, there is a major difference between the justification for qiysā
and the justification for takhrīj:

The permissibility [of qiyās] is neither derived from an analogy which says
that the basis of qiyās should be the Prophet’s sayings, nor do we ascribe
to the Prophet that on which the analogy is based and then say he allowed
a certain thing or prohibited it.201

197 Al-Siyāghī, Uṣūl al-madhhab 14–15.

198 Jackson, Islamic Law and the State 91, 227; Hallaq, Early Ijtihād 334–344.
199 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 83a.
200 On the similarities and differences between inferring rulings from the texts of revelation
and the sayings of absolute mujtahids, see Weiss, Search for God’s Law 709–710.
201 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 74b. These words are quoted from Imam Abū Ṭālib’s al-

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In other words, there is an explicit command to draw analogies from proph-

etic traditions. Ibn al-Wazīr contrasts this with the reference to earlier scholars.
To use their sayings as a basis for analogy, i.e. takhrīj, in terms of extrapolating
the principle behind their judgement as a counterpart of a effective cause (ʿilla)
is neither explicitly commanded nor explicitly permitted.

Analogical reasoning (qiyās) on the basis of words of the scholars is not

permissible, because we were not commanded to do so. It is not our duty
to do so, in fact we are not empowered to do so and it is not permitted.202

In short, an explicit command exists and is the foundation of qiyās from

prophetic traditions. This contrasts with the extraction of principles from the
sayings of earlier scholars in order to issue judgements accordingly. In this lat-
ter case, the permissibility is only based on vague similarities between it and
analogical reasoning on the basis of the Prophet’s stipulations. Even if the sim-
ilarities between the two practices were enough to justify takhrīj by analogy to
the Prophet’s sayings, it would remain probable knowledge and could not be
translated into permissibility as a general rule, in contradistiction to qiyās.
Imam Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā l-Hārūnī (d. 424/1033) in his Mujzī fī uṣūl al-fiqh lists
three conditions that render takhrīj permissible in a particular case. The first
group of permissible sources for takhrīj are those in which the original case
is identical, in its apparent form, to the new issue. No possible ambiguity is
allowed, as for example in the case of a male slave who is informed of his free-
dom and then actually set free and a female slave who is equally informed of her
freedom. The two cases are identical. She likewise should be set free.203 Both
Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā support this criterion. Ibn al-Murtaḍā refers
to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who mentioned the case “of a clear text of which the
corresponding cases are exact equivalents.”204 Other cases where takhrīj is per-
missible are those where the text of the scholar represents a general statement,
the rule of which pertains to all the particulars included in it. In all the new par-
ticular cases, the ruling of that general statement can be applied in reference
to the principles of the late scholar. Hence, if a scholar says that all kinds of
intoxicating liquids are prohibited, it can be concluded that he considers for

Mujzī. Ibn al-Wazīr extensively quotes from him in this section. In some points he agrees
with him, in others not.
202 Ibid., f. 74b.
203 This example is not given by Imam Abū Ṭālib. Ibn al-Wazīr refers to an undefined group
of scholars of uṣūl.
204 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 801.

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example muthallath (boiled grape juice) prohibited.205 In al-ʿAwāṣim, Ibn al-

Wazīr considers this the highest and soundest form of takhrīj.206 A third group
of cases in which Imam Abū Ṭālib permits takhrīj is rejected by Ibn al-Wazīr
but endorsed by Ibn al-Murtaḍā: If a scholar mentions an effective cause and
is not among those who practice the particularization of the ʿilla (takhṣīṣ al-
ʿilla), it is permissible to apply that ruling to a new case with an identical ʿilla.
If, for example, a scholar has stipulated that quantitive disparity is prohibited
in the sale of wheat in exchange for wheat because of the congruence in kind
and value, and it is moreover known that his opinion is likewise where barley
is concerned, it is correct to infer his position (madhhab) from either case.207
There are a number of reasons why Ibn al-Wazīr does not consider the third
condition a valid ground for takhrij. Firstly, the mentioned ʿilla might be con-
sidered an ʿilla that pertains only to certain cases, like the reason for shortening
the prayer during a journey (ʿilla qāṣira).208 Furthermore, there might be con-
tradicting or equally valid ʿilal in other rulings of the said scholar. The scholar
might have made a general statement or specific stipulation that invalidates
the analogy drawn from this singular case. Hence, no general principle of his
madhhab can be inferred from a singular case. It is impossible to reach that
level of certainty about the scholar’s madhhab that is required for general prin-
ciples and rules. To this Ibn al-Wazīr adds that this third group of cases cannot
function as the grounds for takhrīj, since all scholars of early generations appar-
ently considered takhṣīṣ al-ʿilla permissible. Accordingly, every ʿilla mentioned
by said scholars may have been such a case of particularization, rendering it
impossible to use it in another case.209
Though Ibn al-Wazīr concedes a limited space for takhrīj, the warning
against it is not grounded in contempt for the early scholars and ahl al-bayt. Ibn
al-Wazīr claims that neither they nor other early Zaydi authorities practiced
that kind of inference in actual fact. The ahl al-bayt, for example, apparently

205 This example is taken from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī as quoted by Ibn al-Murtaḍā. Abū l-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī mentions this type of inference of a scholar’s madhhab as the second,
after the clear textual stipulation (naṣṣ ṣarīḥ): cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 801. For
muthallath see Wensinck, Khamr.
206 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 130.
207 This example is likewise taken from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, as quoted in Ibn al-Murtaḍā,
Minhāj al-wuṣūl 801.
208 The restricted ʿilla is theoretically not equal to the particularization of the ʿilla. Whereas
in the latter case, a generally applicable ʿilla might not pertain to a number of particular
cases, a restricted ʿilla pertains only in a few cases without being related to a general rule.
In effect, the difference is negligible.
209 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 74b.

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did not practice takhrīj from the stipulations of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in spite of the
high standing he had among them.210 This means that they were neither his
muqallids nor mujtahids within his madhhab. Although takhrīj can be consid-
ered permissible in a few particular cases, this permissibility is not based on
following the early generations in the true meaning of the word, namely true
to the intention of what they said, did and stipulated.
According to Ibn al-Wazīr, the limited understanding of when takhrīj is per-
mitted and how it is to be performed produces weak results of takhrīj. These—
Ibn al-Wazīr again agrees with Imam Abū Ṭālib here—have been and are often
the cause for reprehensible innovation (bidʿa). These innovations are then jus-
tified by the back-projection to a school’s eponym or the early generations.
An example of a supposedly weak result of takhrīj is found in Ibn al-Wazīr’s
al-ʿAwāṣim. In a discussion about the acceptance or rejection of mutaʾawwilūn,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent Ibn Abī l-Qāsim argues that the principle (aṣl) of the
early imams al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq and al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm was to reject them. This
principle was ascribed to the two imams by Abū Jaʿfar al-Daylamī.211 The coun-
terargument is supported by a transmission of Qadi Abū Muḍar (d. 5th/11th
c.),212 according to whom both imams would have accepted mutaʾawwilūn.213
But Ibn Abī l-Qāsim does not explain the origin of this takhrīj and expects that
its authority should be convincing. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, such an approach
to takhrīj is reminiscent of the prohibited kind of taqlīd. It is impossible to
know whether the three requirements of Imam Abū Ṭālib (or the two that Ibn
al-Wazīr accepts) apply here, because Ibn Abī l-Qāsim does not specify how
takhrīj was effectuated in this case. Whereas Ibn Abī l-Qāsim does not explain
how the process and result of his alleged takhrīj came about, Ibn al-Wazīr lists
two proofs for a takhrīj of Imam Abū Ṭālib which conform with the transmis-

210 Ibid., f. 75a.

211 On Abū Jaʿfar b. ʿAlī al-Daylamī, see al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 285. Al-Muʾayyidī mentions Abū Jaʿfar
as a transmitter of al-Muḥsin b. Karrāma (al-Ḥākim) al-Jishumī; cf. al-Muʾayyidī, Lawāmiʿ
al-anwār ii, 14–15.
212 Qadi Abū Muḍar was also known as “the commentator (sharrīḥ) of al-Muʾayyad,” referring
to his famous commentaries on the books of the Caspian imam al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh al-
Hārūnī (d. 411/1020), like the Sharḥ al-Ziyādāt to which Ibn al-Wazīr refers in his reasoning.
Abū Muḍar’s father was a judge at the court of al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh. He played a significant
role in consolidating the Zaydi madhhab by establishing its legal principles. In turn, his
commentaries became the object of super-commentaries once they reached Yemen; cf.
Ibrāhīm b. al-Qāsim, Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya i, 485–486; al-Wajīh, Aʿlām 478–479. Abū Muḍar
himself was a teacher of Qadi Jaʿfar b. ʿAbd al-Salām, who played a crucial role in the spread
of the Bahshami teaching among Yemeni Zaydis. However, apparently Qadi Jaʿfar was not
an immediate student of Abū Muḍar; cf. al-Muʾayyidī, Lawāmiʿ al-anwār ii, 28.
213 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 147; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 96b.

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sion of Abū Muḍar as well as the required criteria of takhrīj. Although Ibn al-
Wazīr does refer to takhrīj and explains its process in detail (what principle was
extrapolated from which sayings), he qualifies the significance of the takhrīj
by juxtaposing the alleged takhrīj with the transmission of Abū Muḍar.214 The
argument of Abū Muḍar in favor of acceptance of mutaʾawwilūn is not based
on takhrīj but on transmission, which has precedence over takhrīj. Abū Muḍar’s
credibility as a transmitter is uncontested. The opposing Ibn Abī l-Qāsim would
need an uninterrupted isnād for his takhrīj of Abū Jaʿfar, much as Abū Muḍar
does for his transmission, so both could be weighed against each other.215
The supposedly wrong understanding of takhrīj, ascribed here to Ibn Abī l-
Qāsim by Ibn al-Wazīr, leads to other aberrations with a similar tendency: an
unquestioning adoption of principles supposedly ascribed to authorities of the
school. In the same way that opinions are taken over by way of unquestioning
taqlīd, principles are ascribed to authorities without the elucidation of the pro-
cess of extrapolation. Ibn al-Wazīr seeks to counterbalance this by elevating the
direct consultation of the primary sources. This, of course, would challenge the
school structure which is rendered relatively stable by reference to its authori-
ties’ opinions and alleged principles.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponent in his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid also argues for the permissi-
bility of emulating the dead (taqlīd al-mayyit) by referring to takhrīj. Although
Ibn al-Wazīr allows for takhrīj under particular conditions, he leaves no room
for justification of taqlīd al-mayyit on its basis. Earlier scholars of yet later gen-
erations than the eponyms, such as Imam Abū Ṭālib, were much occupied with
the study of the rulings of the school’s authorities and the discernment of the
respective ʿilla (i.e. taʿlīl). They were indeed occupied with defining the mad-
hhab itself. Yet Ibn al-Wazīr claims that they did not practice taqlīd of the given
scholar in the process. Imam Abū Ṭālib, as demonstrated repeatedly in Kitāb
al-Qawāʿid, was himself a staunch assailant of taqlīd al-mayyit. The fact that he
nevertheless practiced takhrīj especially from the opinions of Imam al-Hādī ilā
l-ḥaqq is for Ibn al-Wazīr argument enough to show that the two—taqlīd al-
mayyit and takhrīj—cannot be equated. The study of previous scholars’ opin-
ions had other reasons. They were studied in order to understand their opinions
and derive principles from them (istinbāṭ minhum). Yet those principles had to
be elaborated and should not be the object of the kind of taqlīd that adopts

214 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 149.

215 Ibn al-Wazīr also argues based on consensus: What if two results of takhrīj are equal in
their trustworthiness yet contradictory, one negating acceptance of kuffār taʾwīl and one
affirming it? The acceptance has precedence because a group of Zaydi imams says that
there is consensus about it. Such a consensus would have to include al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm
and al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq.

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principles unquestioningly. Additionally, a scholar investigating consensuses

and disagreements could extend his understanding of such only if he knew the
opinions of the earlier scholars.216
As a result of the former, Ibn al-Wazīr does not ascribe to takhrīj the persua-
siveness of a general rule that it has for others. Significantly, he rejects takhrīj in
terms of qiyās even where the reason for the initial ruling is stated in the source
text of the authoritative scholar. This restricts the scope of takhrīj considerably,
since principles arrived at by qiyās constitute a great part of the legal doctrine
ascribed to early authorities.217
The example of Ibn Abī l-Qāsim indicates that he used takhrīj in a manner
similar to taqlīd, where it did not seem necessary to give evidence for the pro-
cess and result of the extrapolation. Similarly, the opponent’s line of argumen-
tation in Ibn al-Wazīr’s Kitāb al-Qawāʿid: takhrīj is compared to taqlīd al-mayyit
and used as its justification. Ibn al-Wazīr counters that with transmission as the
more accountable method: transmission from the Prophet irrespective of what,
for example, Imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq says; or transmission from Imam al-Hādī
ilā l-ḥaqq so that one knows what he stipulated in a particular case (not his
alleged principles) and can weigh the evidence employed by him.218

6.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Takhrīj

The question of the legal opinion of people other than mujtahids was of much
interest in the literature of legal methodology in the early 9th/15th century.
Two positions already existed in the Zaydi context: On the one hand, there
were those who permitted the reproduction of a mujtahid’s position unrestrict-
edly (iftāʾ al-muqallid bi-madhhab imāmihi muṭlaqan), even without a thorough
investigation of the origin of the mujtahid’s ruling (maʾkhadh), the knowledge
of the rules of takhrīj or how to weigh rulings and their ʿilal against each other.
Reproduction of a position would be transmission, just as one transmits a
prophetic tradition.219 On the other hand, there were those who did not permit

216 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitab al-Qawāʿid f. 82b.

217 Jackson describes how the relationship of the mukharrij to the texts of his imam is ana-
loguous to the relationship of the imam to the texts of divine revelation. The mukharrij
must be thoroughly familiar with uṣūl al-fiqh in order to apply it to the rulings of his imam;
cf. Jackson, Islamic Law and the State 94–95.
218 Ibn al-Wazīr’s position here is echoed, for example, in what the much later al-Qāsim b.
Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620) demanded: Unclear questions and opinions should be put in
relation to the primary sources; cf. Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 17–18; al-
Qāsim b. Muhammad, al-Irshād 105.
219 In Hallaq’s Continuity and Change, it becomes evident that this discussion had already
existed for some time. It is uncertain, so far, when it was introduced to the Zaydiyya.

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takhrīj at all. Anyone who is capable of ijtihād must stipulate his own judge-
ments. He himself is a scholar and need not extract another scholar’s principles
let alone transmit the position of another.220 Ibn al-Murtaḍā agrees with nei-
ther position. By his time, consensual practice of scholars of all schools—Sunni
and Zaydi—had already established the distinction between what utter lay-
men reproduce of their mujtahids, and what rulings full-blown mujtahids issue
on their own accord.221 In other words, takhrīj was a prevalent practice. Ibn al-
Murtaḍā briefly discusses takhrīj in the chapter on ijtihād and taqlīd in his Min-
hāj al-wuṣūl. The background question is: Can a layman issue a legal opinion on
the basis of the principles he derives from rulings of a mujtahid or his imam?
According to Ibn al-Murtaḍā, takhrīj is permissible when the following
requirements are fulfilled: the man in question must be able to investigate
the sources (maʾkhadh); he must be conversant with the evidences of speech
(dalālat al-khiṭāb), what of it is dropped (al-sāqiṭ ʿanhu) and what of it is used
(al-maʿmūl bihi); furthermore he must know how to trace a judgement back
to a principle; what the ways of the ʿilla are and what to do if two ʿillas contra-
dict each other, as well as how they are measured out against each other. This is
because takhrīj is based exclusively on the implicit meaning of speech (mafhūm
al-khiṭāb) and on analogy. It is possible, says Ibn al-Murtaḍā, that the agent of
this takhrīj be someone other than a mujtahid, if he has already become a stu-
dent of the sources and is qualified for reasoning (ahlan lil-naẓar).222
Further material indicative of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s stance towards takhrīj can be
found in the chapter on “the mufti and the mustaftī” in his Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl.223
On what basis, the question goes, is one entitled to ascribe an opinion to a par-
ticular scholar?

The opinion (madhhab) of a scholar can be known either from his explicit
text (bi-naṣṣihi l-ṣarīḥ), from a comprehensive general statement (ʿumūm
shāmil), a text that resembles the present case or from another text of his
where he reasoned on the basis of an explicit ʿilla, even if he is one who
supports the particularization of the ʿilla.224

The first three of these four scenarios are congruent with what Ibn al-Wazīr
holds. When discussing the necessary features of a scholarly position from

220 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 795.

221 Ibid., 795.
222 Ibid., 794–795.
223 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl 197.
224 Ibid., 197.

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which to infer a legal principle in Minhāj al-wuṣūl,225 Ibn al-Murtaḍā elaborates

his stance in the last scenario: takhrīj based on the analogical application of an
ʿilla. The background for his argumentation is qiyās on the basis of legal state-
ments in Quran and Sunna. If the mujtahid has explicitly determined an ʿilla
in a certain text, that ʿilla can be considered effective in all cases in which that
ʿilla occurs. Consequently, the rulings effected by the ʿilla can be understood as
the mujtahid’s opinions by way of takhrīj. A reference to the comparison with
analogical deduction from rulings in Quran and Sunna is not missing. Where
these contain rulings with an ʿilla that is only implicitly indicated (nabbaha),
this ʿilla can still be effective in an analogy. If a scholar only hints at his ʿilla,
on the other hand, it cannot be indisputably concluded that he would have
ruled based on the same ʿilla in a parallel case: his madhhab for the new case
cannot be inferred. Analogy does not apply in the same way here, because of
the possibility of error on one side (that of the scholar in his reasoning) and
the impossibility of it on the other (God and the Prophet in their decreeing).
Where the ʿilla of the scholar is explicitly stated, however, it is similar enough
to the reasoning in the Quran and Sunna. Hence the scholar’s ʿilla in a stipu-
lated case is effectively attributed to him as his ʿilla in all cases where it occurs,
analogously to an ʿilla in Quran or Sunna.226
Ibn al-Murtaḍā explains why particularization of the effective cause does
not impair the analogical application of the explicit ʿilla, even if the scholar
in question supports the practice. Unless the scholar positively designates the
ʿilla of the ruling in question to be one special case, it can be taken as gener-
ally applicable. The case is different in Quran and Sunna. In these two sources,
almost all generals are particularized somewhere. Hence a scholar cannot
achieve highest probability unless he has scrutinized the sources extensively
for particularizations. However, in the case of a scholar Ibn al-Murtaḍā writes:

We speak about his research in a question in which he pronounces a gen-

eral statement. It is most probable that he would only have pronounced
that general statement after ijtihād has fully discharged of its duty in the
investigation of the regular forms of the question, not finding any causes
for particularization (mukhaṣṣiṣ) in Quran, Sunna, consensus, analogy or
reason. If he has found none, the case could be called general without
restriction.227

225 Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 801.

226 Ibid., 801.
227 Ibid., 802.

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Using the opinions of scholars who allowed for particularization of the ʿilla
as a source of analogy thus widens the scope of sources for takhrīj even further.
That takhrīj was a common practice in the Zaydiyya at the beginning of the
9th/15th is evident. Ibn al-Murtaḍā consolidates the idea of a madhhab with
a somewhat more fixed body of rulings expressing the manifestation of what
principles his predecessors, i.e. the muḥaṣṣilūn, extrapolated from the found-
ing imams. This notion is further supported by his own introduction to al-Baḥr
al-zakhkhār, a work that is still considered one of the major fiqh-works of the
Yemeni Zaydiyya today. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s explanation of the abbreviations used
by him show that the results of takhrīj from the opinion of particular scholars
are considered important enough to deserve a whole category of specific sym-
bols. Thereby the body of rulings produced indirectly through takhrīj is added
to the corpus of what rulings already exist, expanding it considerably. Hardly
a century later, Ṣārim al-Dīn al-Wazīr does not even mention that there is dis-
agreement as to the acceptance of takhrīj in general, although he is known for
having created “an encyclopedia compiling the opinions of the scholars from
different schools and directions.”228
What Ṣārim al-Dīn does mention is the disagreement concerning what part
of the speech should be used as the source for takhrīj: can anything be deduced
from the implicit meaning (mafhūm) of the text or can only the explicit mean-
ing (lafẓ al-khiṭāb) function as source? Ibn al-Murtaḍā did not leave any doubt
that takhrīj could be based on the implicit meaning (mafhūm al-khitāb). Ibn al-
Wazīr’s insistence on the explicit texts (al-naṣṣ al-ṣarīḥ) shows that he rejected
the implicit as a source. But according to Ṣārim al-Dīn, most Zaydi scholars,
including himself and Ibn al-Murtaḍā, allow the result of takhrīj from the
implicit meaning of a scholar’s ruling to be ascribed to him. The distinction
from his own explicit statements has to be made clear, however, by reference
to takhrīj.229
In his list of requirements for takhrīj, Ṣārim al-Dīn calls a person who is enti-
tled to practice takhrīj a mujtahid muqayyad, i.e. restricted mujtahid. This is
tantamount to what was called a mujtahid fī l-madhhab above, locating the
focus of the legal enterprise clearly within the legal school. Ibn al-Wazīr, in con-
trast, focuses on the conditions that make a case or statement fit for takhrīj.
In the sources investigated for this study, al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm does not discuss
the concept of takhrīj explicitly. However, in his Nihāyat al-tanwīh, praise of
the whole of the Prophet’s progeny and especially of Imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq is

228 Editor-comment, Muhammad ʿIzzān in: Ṣārim al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 64.
229 Ibid., 392.

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ample. Many chapter headings attest to al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr’s attempt to demon-

strate the superiority of the Zaydiyya above other schools.230 Although al-Hādī,
like Ibn al-Murtaḍā, concedes that taqlīd of a living imam is preferable to taqlīd
of a dead imam, one gets the impression that a contemporary imam would,
in al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm’s view, hardly carry enough authority and knowledge to
stand a chance against Imam al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq’s views. After all, his arrival in
Yemen and his crucial role in bringing justice had, according to al-Hādī b. al-
Wazīr, been especially prophesied by Muḥammad and ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.231 In
fact, later mujtahids may only be emulated by virtue of the congruity between
their and the early imam’s ruling. In other words, the authority of later scholars
feeds on their relation to the eponym:

Our imams of the later generations have chosen the madhhab of [Imam]
al-Hādī, they have established it, relied upon it, refined it and built it up.
This [al-Hādī’s madhhab] was what the scholars of Yemen and the knights
of duty and Sunna executed.232

Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr’s choice of words to describe the role of the later Zaydi
scholars hardly allows for any other interpretation than the thorough endorse-
ment of takhrīj. This is confirmed by his above-quoted statement in Hidāyat
al-rāghibīn where the criteria of following anyone apart from the members of
the Prophet’s family is that his ijtihād agree (wāfaqa) with theirs.233 In effect,
and although al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr theoretically affirms that taqlīd of the living is
preferable to taqlīd of the dead, he considers the opinions of ahl al-bayt to be
the highest authority. Consequently, taqlīd as well as takhrīj of their opinions
is preferable to any other frame of reference. This corresponds to what Haykel
and Zysow suggest, namely that al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr seeks to establish al-Hādī
ilā l-ḥaqq’s authority over the authority of later imams.234
This brief survey of the opinions of Ibn al-Wazīr and two of his contempo-
raries, Ibn al-Murtaḍā and al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, indicates that takhrīj had already
become a common practice in the early 9th/15th century. However, the degree
of discussion only anticipated the debate around takhrīj that would emerge

230 The chapters carry titles such as “The Preponderance of the Madhhab of the Imams,
Peace Be Upon Them, Over Others,” “The Preponderance of the Madhhab of the Prophet’s
Progeny Based on Theoretical Proof,” “Some Excellent Qualities of al-Hādī [ilā l-ḥaqq].” Cf.
al-Hādī b. Ibrāhịm, Nihāyat al-tanwīh 237, 262, 268.
231 Ibid., 268–271.
232 Ibid., 276.
233 See 277 above.
234 Haykel and Zysow, What Makes a Madhhab? 338.

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two centuries later, as Haykel and Zysow’s article illustrates.235 Yet the tension
between those who practiced and endorsed takhrīj like Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Hādī
b. al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Wazīr’s opponents, as mentioned in Kitab al-Qawāʿid and
al-ʿAwāṣim, on the one hand, and those wary of it like Ibn al-Wazīr on the other
hand, is clearly palpable. It is as conspicuous as the connection between the
first position and the consolidation of the madhhab on the one hand, and the
second position and the more subjective, revelatory text-based legal reasoning
on the other hand. Where takhrīj constitutes the main source for the body of
rulings as well as for the authority of rulings produced by active subjects in
the legal interpretation subsequent to the founding imams, the main focus of
activity is within the legal school. In contrast, where takhrīj is only permitted,
yet not limited to a particular authority, it is not the underlying principles of
the founding imams, but rather those of the revelational texts that function as
the benchmark for later rulings.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā concedes a much wider scope of application to takhrīj than
Ibn al-Wazīr. This is especially evident where the sources for takhrīj are dis-
cussed. Whereas Ibn al-Wazīr does not allow for takhrīj based on the ʿilla of
a scholar’s ruling, Ibn al-Murtaḍā considers this the most important source
for takhrīj. Moreover, Ibn al-Murtaḍā permits the employment of the implicit
meaning of a scholar’s text or of the ʿilla of a scholar known to have supported
the particularization of the ʿilla. The way takhrīj is practiced, however, is clearly
the activity of a restricted mujtahid, or a qāṣir. In consequence, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
wide acceptance of takhrīj and application of the resulting madhhab princi-
ples had a consolidating impact on the legal identity of the Zaydiyya—unlike
Ibn al-Wazīr, whose wariness of takhrīj left the mujtahid’s interpretation largely
independent of school principles.
In the legal interpretation described by Ibn al-Wazīr, ijtihād in terms of the
consultation of the revelational sources still forms the main part of the activity
of the legal interpreter. And even where he consults the texts of earlier scholars
or foundational imams, it is by collation with the texts of revelation that rulings
are weighed and applied. The activity of takhrīj itself cannot be equated with
taqlīd. Yet, the way such results of takhrīj are apparently accepted resembles
the impermissible taqlīd of mere opinions of earlier scholars. Thus the signif-
icance of takhrīj furthermore represents a concession to the practice of taqlīd
in Ibn al-Wazīr’s context.
Takhrīj has the potential to complicate and widen the activity of a mujtahid
within the madhhab considerably, as well as to render the task of such a one by

235 Ibid., 347.

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no means inferior in interpretative skill to complete ijtihād. In a way, it gives

him more freedom in his interpretation than the mere weighing out of the
evidence provided by mujtahids of a higher rank. The interpretative freedom
within the school increases. At the same time, takhrīj as a well defined practice
has the potential to fix the school’s teaching and extend its scope of influence
to a degree that mere weighing out of existent opinions does not have.236 This is
because, if the alleged principles of the school’s founders are established, the
opinions inferred from the principles have the ability to reach posthumously
into all questions and realms of law that might emerge in the future. Those
alleged opinions then have an authority beyond any opinion a later mujtahid
may conclude from the sources independently. The body of subject matter to
which the members of a school are liable would thus be considerably more
extensive, yet would be more restricted by its reference to the authority of the
founding figures. The delimitation of school identity by principles of founding
figures and their superiority above interpretations that draw directly from the
texts of revelation counterbalances the instability that follows from the infalli-
bility doctrine. In contrast, retaining the texts that all schools share as the major
source of legal interpretation theoretically emphasizes the common legal iden-
tity and practically preserves the conjecture of the individual mujtahid as the
decisive factor for legal practice.

7 The Muqallid’s Commitment to a Legal School (iltizām)

Ramifications of the theory of infallibility are also tangible in the realm of

affiliation and adherence. As the mujtahid cannot be certain that his ruling is
correct, neither can the layman be entirely sure that he chose the correct muj-
tahid or legal ruling. If every mujtahid is correct in the way he interprets the
probable evidence of scripture, whom then should a layman refer to? What are
the criteria for adherence? And what is its scope? And if there is no such thing
as a correct or a wrong ruling, on what basis should he choose a mujtahid, and
why should he abide by his choice and commit (iltazama) himself exclusively
to one mujtahid or school?237

236 In that case, opinions independent of the school would still have to be arrived at in all
new cases.
237 Iltizām—which shall here be translated as commitment, exclusive commitment and
adherence to the school of a mujtahid—has no technical connection to either iltizām in
literary theory (lazam mā lā yalzam), or iltizām in the context of the Ottoman and Egyp-
tian tax-reform. Ṣārim al-Dīn defines iltizām as “the acceptance of the saying of another

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It is clear from Ibn al-Wazīr’s as well as Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s writings that Zaydi
scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh were by no means ignorant of the issue of adherence
and the destabilizing consequences that infallibility could have on that very
issue. In writings on legal theory, this topic is usually discussed in the chapter
on the mufti and the mustaftī.

7.1 Ibn al-Wazīr’s Concept of Iltizām

Ibn al-Wazīr’s major concern in the question of adherence is that the muqal-
lid should choose the mujtahid based on his professional skill evident in the
products of his legal interpretation. Consequently, Ibn al-Wazīr does not agree
with the above-mentioned analogy between the mujtahid’s choice of a partic-
ular ruling based on the textual indicators on the one hand, and the muqallid’s
choice of mujtahid based on his person on the other. The major task of the
mujtahid is to deduce a ruling for a new case from the textual sources, which
may lead to an independent unprecedented opinion. The muqallid, on the
other hand, determines preponderance (tarjīḥ) from between existing rulings
or between the mujtahids that already have an opinion. Indeed, both are com-
manded to act according to what seems most probable in their mind, and thus
to apply the most probable evidence. Yet, whereas the mujtahid’s effort mani-
fests something new, the muqallid’s effort does not.238 Hence Ibn al-Wazīr, like
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, urges the search for the most probable and prohibits turning
to what is unlikely. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, adherence to the opinion of the
chosen mujtahid is incumbent if it appears to the muqallid that his chosen muj-
tahid is most likely to be the one most learned. But if the scholar whose opinion
was chosen in one case does not produce an opinion that appears very likely
in another, the muqallid has to look elsewhere. Every case requires a renewed
choice.239
For Ibn al-Wazīr, the principle of seeking and following the strongest con-
jecture (ṭālib ghālib al-ẓann) carries the strength of argument against the pref-
erence of a particular person. Apparently not wanting to disqualify al-Manṣūr
bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza as a point of reference, Ibn al-Wazīr argues that al-
Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s position implicates the principle of ghālib

without asking for its proofs. If that applies to all the issues [treated by the other] it is called
iltizām, otherwise it is not. Hence, every multazim is a muqallid but not the reverse.” Ṣārim
al-Dīn, al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 289. The discussion shows that iltizām was also used in the
context of one single question. In such cases, the question was whether or not a muqallid
must adhere to the answer he got from a mujtahid in response to his own question.
238 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 228.
239 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim iii, 128–129.

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al-ẓann. In the attempt to invalidate Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s claim that al-Manṣūr bi-
llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza prohibited the transfer from one mujtahid to another
(tanaqqul), Ibn al-Wazīr identifies Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s underlying assumptions
as erroneous:

The first view: He [Ibn Abī l-Qāsim] forbade the muqallid to practice tar-
jīḥ in every question. He assumes that al-Manṣūr [bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b.
Ḥamza] and Shaykh al-Ḥasan [al-Raṣṣāṣ] prohibited that because they
made it incumbent to adhere to the madhhab of a particular imam. But
it is not as the sayyid [Ibn Abī l-Qāsim] erroneously imagined. There is
an obvious difference between the two questions because al-Manṣūr [bi-
llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza] made it incumbent to adhere to the opinion
of the most learned and excellent for the reason that conjecture about
the soundness of his saying is strongest. Al-Manṣūr [bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b.
Ḥamza] said verbatim “Whenever the learned and the mujtahids agree
on a legal ruling, the mustaftī has to accept it without contradiction. If
they disagree, we oblige him to practice ijtihād of the most learned and
the most pious among them. And he has to search for evidence on that
because he is able to do it and thereby strengthens his conjecture.”240

Ibn Abī l-Qāsim in his concentration on exclusive commitment supposedly

overlooked the fact that al-Manṣūr obliged the muqallid to adhere to his muj-
tahid only after he has practiced his own form of restricted ijtihād. According to
Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s position is tantamount to following al-Manṣūr
bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s opinion in its literal form, or simply “in form” ( fī
l-ṣūra). This stands in contrast to following “in meaning” ( fī l-maʿnā), as Ibn
al-Wazīr claims himself to practice vis-à-vis al-Manṣūr bi-llāh b. Ḥamza. This
contrastive pair of following “in form” or “in meaning” is a way of working with
the general and the particular here, closely related to the practice of takhrīj. In
Ibn Abī l-Qāsim’s conclusion, following “in form” arises from inferring a gen-
eral rule out of a particular statement of al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza.
This is equal to a form of takhrīj which was labelled invalid by Ibn al-Wazīr,
where the possibility of particularizing the effective cause (ʿilla) is not heeded.
Furthermore, the prevalence of the ruling taken from a general statement is
neglected. Ibn al-Wazīr, in contrast, insists that he agrees with al-Manṣūr bi-
llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza in meaning; namely he agrees with a principle that
al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza expressed in a general statement, accord-

240 Ibid., iii, 128.

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ing to which “it is incumbent to act according to the preponderant conjecture

and it is forbidden to act according to the weakest conjecture.”241
For Ibn al-Wazīr, it is important that a scholar is followed because of the
high probability of the correctness of his ruling. This conjecture is informed
by the evidence the scholar provides as well as by his occupation with a cer-
tain topic, or skill in a certain discipline. Doctrine, school affiliation or inherent
personal qualities should have no effect on the degree of probability of the out-
come. After all, “determination of preponderance is unlike preference because
of superiority ( fa-l-tarjīḥ ghayr al-tafḍīl).”242 Determination of preponderance
(tarjīḥ) is thus not to be confused with preference (tafḍīl), and neither should
it be substituted by it. Whereas the former pertains to indications of skill, the
latter pertains to excellence in other disciplines than the legal one in general,
or than the one at question in particular.243 Ibn al-Wazīr juxtaposes tarjīḥ and
tafḍīl throughout his writings. Thus he challenges the justification of the struc-
ture of the Zaydi-Hādawī legal school in particular.
As mentioned above, Ibn al-Wazīr also endorses inquiry into the evidence
before the transfer from one scholar to another. Yet he does not consider the
degree of certainty that is needed for the transfer unattainable. On the con-
trary, in Kitāb al-Qawāʿid, he explains that weighing up the indicators is the very
thing that makes a certain kind of taqlīd permissible; taqlīd without it is imper-
missible (al-taqlīd min ghayr tarjīḥ lā yajūz).244 In Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking, the
mujtahid’s person is not insignificant in terms of outward appearance of profi-
ciency and piety, but doctrinal affiliation is of no interest whatsoever. In Kitāb
al-Qawāʿid, he laments that some people adhere exclusively to one school, even
though it is possibly weak.245 Similarly, he writes in Qubūl al-bushrā:

It is strange beyond measure that when one of the jurists who practice
taqlīd comes across the weakness of his imam’s sources and is unable
to rebut the weakness, he still emulates [the imam] in the issue and
ignores the witnesses in Quran and Sunna. He is so fixed on emulating
the madhhab of his imam that he concocts invalidations of the apparent

241 Ibid., iii, 130.

242 Ibid., ii, 417.
243 Ibid., ii, 418. In the passage discussed, Ibn al-Wazīr is occupied with the defense of the
reports of an innovator over those of a sound Muslim. But, as is his habit, he extends
the principle and also mentions taqlīd of a mujtahid’s opinion along with acceptance of a
report.
244 Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 94a.
245 Ibid., f. 94a.

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meanings of [the texts of] Quran and Sunna and exchanges them with far-
fetched and futile interpretations in defense of the one he emulates.246
We have seen them gathered in their circles. If one of them remarks some-
thing of his own conjecture, they are utterly bewildered. They do not even
take a breath to look at the evidence because of what is written down of
the madhhab of their imam, thinking that this alone is where truth can
be found. If they reflected upon the issue, they would first of all be bewil-
dered concerning the madhhab of their imam. With people like them,
discussion is a lost matter which leads to the breaking of relationships and
opposition without benefit. I have not seen one who withdrew from the
opinion of his imam when truth was presented to him from elsewhere.
Rather, he would insist on the said opinion in spite of his knowledge of
its weakness and remoteness (buʿduhu). It is better to stop the discussion
with those who say, if they cannot comprehend the madhhab of his imam,
‘Maybe my imam found a proof that I did not find.’247

In other words, evidence is not being weighed in each question before deciding
whom to follow, because the muqallid considers that to be beyond his abilities.
In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr grants the intellectual interpretative endeavor of the
individual on every level ample space in the conjectural realm.

7.2 Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s Concept of Iltizām

In Minhāj al-wuṣūl, Ibn al-Murtaḍā explicitly treats the tension between exclu-
sive commitment (iltizām) and the doctrine of the correctness of all mujtahids.
He first presents the other extreme: transfer without renewed weighing of evi-
dence. Those who endorse this argue as follows:

They said: We say that every mujtahid is correct. Revelation forbids us only
to transfer from the correct (ṣawāb) to the wrong (khaṭaʾ), rather than
from the correct to the correct. Likewise the muqallid, if he emulates a
mujtahid and then turns to follow another mujtahid, is like one who starts
out with one kind of atonement and then prefers to practice a second kind
of it. As he is not prohibited to do so, neither is the muqallid if he goes
over [to another mujtahid]. This is only prohibited, if one holds that truth
is only with one [mujtahid] and that the one disagreeing is in error. They
say: As the muqallid is allowed to choose whatever madhhab he wants at

246 Apparently, this is attributed to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām al-Sulamī (d. 660/1262) and his Qawāʿid
al-aḥkām, as is some of what follows; cf. al-Yāfiʿī, al-Tamadhhub 131.
247 Ibn al-Wazir, Qubūl al-bushrā 315–316.

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the beginning—without this being disagreed upon—because of the cor-

rectness of the mujtahids, [accordingly] we hold on to the initial status as
long as there is no new command (istiṣḥabnā al-ḥāl) after his taqlīd of one
of them [the scholars], because no new stipulation prohibits him [from
doing] this.248

In Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s quote, those permitting transfer (tanaqqul) do not draw the
common analogy between the muqallid’s and the mujtahid’s choice, whereas
Ibn al-Murtaḍā considers it definitive and indeed a certain one (qiyās qatʿī).249
In support of his position, Ibn al-Murtaḍā quotes al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b.
Ḥamza along with al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ as the strongest Zaydi supporters of the
impermissibility of transferring from taqlīd of one imām to that of another.
Their argument is built on the comparison between the layman’s choice of
a mujtahid based on the most persuasive sign (arjaḥ al-amārāt) on the one
hand, and the mujtahid’s choice in his reliance on the most persuasive signs
for his ruling on the other. In the muqallid’s decision the mujtahid becomes
equal to the strongest evidence in the mujtahid’s decision, and the results of
that mujtahid’s ijtihād become tantamount to a single ruling of the mujtahid.
As the mujtahid is not allowed to turn away from the evidence that he con-
siders strongest, the muqallid is not permitted to turn away from his imam,
once chosen.250 It should be noted that, as to the muqallid’s choice, this anal-
ogy hinges on the person of the mujtahid, rather than on the individual rul-
ings.
Interestingly, Ibn al-Murtaḍā mentions Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, next to Abū Muḍar
and Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, as among those who permit transfer of follow-
ing. Throughout al-ʿAwāṣim and al-Rawḍ al-bāsim—both said to be written in
response to Ibn Abī l-Qāsim—one gets a very different impression of Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim’s position. In the two writings, Ibn al-Wazīr defends the legal opin-
ions and even more prominently the transmissions of scholars not belonging
to those in complete compliance with Zaydi doctrines. It is in this context that
the adherence to one scholar is discussed. Therefore, it is likely that Ibn Abī
l-Qāsim, as Ibn al-Murtaḍā indicates, allowed for the “unqualified transfer” of
taqlīd among the mujtahids of ahl al-bayt only.251 This observation, far from

248 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 803.

249 Ibid., 803. For the acceptance of the analogy, see Weiss, The Search for God’s Law 703. Ibn
al-Wazīr’s opponents in al-ʿAwāṣim, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim as well as in Kitāb al-Qawāʿid draw
it as well.
250 Ibid., 807.
251 “Unqualified transfer” here signifies a transfer of taqlīd without preceding investigation

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complicating the matter, rather speaks in favor of the thesis that Ibn al-Wazīr
attempts to open up legal interpretation beyond the schools while his contem-
poraries strove to consolidate the legal identity of the Zaydiyya. Accordingly,
Ibn Abī l-Qāsim did not oppose transfer of commitment to a different scholar’s
opinion as such and for the sake of the correctness of the opinion itself. He
rather opposed some kind of transfer of commitment to a different scholar,
because he wanted to preserve the commitment to the scholar’s person and
affiliation. Investigation of the evidence for the different scholars’ rulings was
not needed. Indeed, it could not have a place in the decision because Ibn Abī l-
Qāsim, more so even than Ibn al-Murtaḍā, considered it beyond the abilities of
a layman to weigh the evidence and determine preponderance. Tarjīḥ, accord-
ing to him, was a characteristic and requirement of a mujtahid.252 As long as
the transfer happened within the group of the ahl al-bayt, no doctrinal sound-
ness was threatened and no evidence needed to be weighed because the rulings
were all equally correct.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā and Ibn Abī l-Qāsim both concluded from the words of al-
Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza and al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ that their command
to adhere to the madhhab of a certain mujtahid necessitated the prohibition of
reconsidering and weighing the evidence anew in every question. To my mind,
this interpretation of the statement of al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza
is based on the elevation of the authority of the person above the authority
of the indicators.253 The likelihood is determined by who the person is, rather
than what skills he has. In the Zaydiyya, this takes the shape of preferring the
rulings of ahl al-bayt qua ahl al-bayt over the rulings of other mujtahids because
of a certain superiority ( faḍl) that was ascribed to them.254

of the evidence up to the point of preponderance. This indeed could result in a more or
less arbitrary and inconsistent following, irrespective and unheeding of any kind of evi-
dence other than the unfounded belief in the correctness of the mujtahids of ahl al-bayt.
Such decisions based on the originator rather than the content of legal opinions, or any
productivity in the realm of law and religion for that matter, is the very thing Ibn al-Wazīr
intends to caution believers against. “The experts recognize men by the truth, rather than
the truth by the men.” Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 63a.
252 Ibn al-Wazīr, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 228.
253 Weiss discusses the different levels on which authority operates: on the level of indica-
tors, of the texts, of methodologies for deriving the rules from the texts, of applying rules
to concrete situations and finally of the mujtahids themselves; cf. Weiss, Search for God’s
Law 700–701.
254 The corresponding preference (tafḍīl) may be put more suggestively here as ‘considering
as superior.’ Both terms are regularly used to refer exclusively to the Prophet’s progeny.

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Al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza’s argument for exclusive commit-

ment, as quoted by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, identifies a conclusion concerning the
probability of one individual ruling of a scholar with a conclusion concern-
ing the probability of all his rulings. Accordingly, al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh
b. Ḥamza assumes that the complete program of legal interpretation of a muj-
tahid (maslak al-ijtihād) is represented in a single ruling. Ibn al-Murtaḍā quotes
him:

It is impermissible for one who requests a legal opinion in a certain case

from a scholar to act according to the opinion of another in another case,
even if the opinion of that other scholar is more cautious (aḥwaṭ) than the
opinion of his imam. The ‘more cautious’ has no meaning for one who is
certain about the correctness of the mujtahids.255

Accordingly, no new investigation into a scholar’s opinions on other questions,

let alone issues of other disciplines, would be necessary or even allowed. Once
the conclusion is reached concerning a scholar’s method of interpretation,
along with the decision to adhere to that scholar or school, no further inves-
tigation is necessary. The link to a strong school affiliation and even more so to
an affiliation with the Zaydiyya, because of the status of the Zaydi imams from
among the Prophet’s progeny, is not far fetched. As part of the doctrine of the
Zaydiyya, the imams of the ahl al-bayt are attributed with particular inherent
qualities and, of course, sound doctrine. A quote from Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother
al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr duly illustrates the understanding of superiority common
among Zaydis of Ibn al-Wazīr’s time and beyond:

Truly, the one who knows what we know concerning the superiority
( faḍl) of the ahl al-bayt, and if his mind is aware of what we have men-
tioned about their knowledge, their asceticism and their piety, about the
special status they have through their noble prerogatives and outstand-
ing ranks, about their doctrinal soundness in the articles of faith, their
distinct position concerning the correctness (iṣāba) in the way they pro-
ceed in matters of opinion, [knows that] this is a noble particularity none
of the other Muslim groups has. This has been indicated by Imam Yaḥyā
b. Ḥamza, peace be upon him, as we have mentioned in the transmission
of him. These particularities number ten in total. We will conclude our

255 Ibn al-Murtadha does not specify from which writing of al-Mansur bi-llāh he quotes; cf.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 807.

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words about their [the ahl al-bayt’s] superiority and the preponderance
of their madhhab with [mentioning] them.256

Tellingly, the first particularity of the ahl al-bayt mentioned subsequently by

al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr is their doctrinal soundness in the articles of faith. This doc-
trinal soundness finds expression in the idea of a personal rectitude (ʿadāla).
Next to abstention from sins and obedient performance of duties, this per-
sonal rectitude is defined, according to al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, by what beliefs they
hold.257 Ibn al-Murtaḍā argues similarly in the introduction of Kitāb al-Azhār.
According to him there are two reasons why the ahl al-bayt are yet the prefer-
able mujtahids to be followed:

The famous ones among the ahl al-bayt, peace be upon them, are more
worthy [of being emulated] because the soundness of their beliefs and
their freedom from wrong doctrines is tawātur.258

In Sharḥ al-Azhār this is explained further:

(…) because there is no tawātur report about any of the famous among
them according to which he has committed the wrong of predetermin-
ism or anthropomorphism or any such error in doctrine. By that and by
their texts also we know that their faith comprises [divine] justice and
unicity in its complete form.259

Hence, a reason to prefer the mujtahids of ahl al-bayt is the certainty one can
have about the soundness of their doctrine and belief, free of doctrinal errors—
unlike the eponyms of the four other schools, for example.
Ibn al-Murtaḍā is not as staunch an opponent of the transfer of one’s legal
loyalty as he understands al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza and al-Ḥasan
al-Raṣṣāṣ to be. Although he admits to being impressed by their above-cited
argument and does not refute it, neither does he impose exclusive commit-
ment to the madhhab of one scholar without exception. Should the muqallid
discover that the mujtahid he follows is deficient in his uprightness (ʿadāla), he

256 Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāghibīn 373. Interestingly, this is the same scholar, namely
Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza, that Ibn al-Wazīr quotes in the context of his distinction between
weighing up (tarjīḥ) and preference (tafḍīl); cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, al-ʿAwāṣim ii, 418.
257 Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr, Hidāyat al-rāghibīn 374.
258 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Azhār i, 1.
259 Ibn Miftāḥ, Sharḥ al-Azhār i, 15.

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is allowed to transfer to one who is more complete (al-akmal). As we have seen

above, rectitude of a particular, i.e. Zaydi, molding is widely considered to be a
requirement for ijtihād. If this rectitude is infringed, the muqallid must transfer
his taqlīd to another opinion, even if the legal opinion of his initial imam was
correct.260

Among the things because of which relocation of one’s following is expe-

dient, for example, [becomes clear in the case of] a muqallid of al-Shāfiʿī.
If he continues to follow him, then he adheres to a false doctrine like
determinism and anthropomorphism. Yet, if he goes over to following
someone else he transfers to justice and unicity (tawḥīd). In this case, the
mujtahid of the ʿAdliyya is permitted to command him [the muqallid] to
transfer. He can issue a legal opinion to that effect because of the religious
benefit.261

In a number of cases, the weighing of the indicators can lead the layman to
transfer to another scholar. But this weighing of indicators means tracing all the
signs and proofs that led the scholar to the very ruling (istīfāʾ ṭuruq al-ḥukm).
Arriving at that point is a highly uncertain matter, and necessitates that the
layman be capable of philosophical speculation (ahl al-naẓar) and know the
rulings of the other scholars as well:

Among them [the conditions for transfer] is that the muqallid knows the
arguments of the different scholars on the case, and he must be from
among the ahl al-naẓar. (…) Furthermore, among them [the conditions
for transfer] is that he [the muqallid] discovers a deficiency in his imam’s
rectitude or his ijtihād.262

After commitment (iltizām), transfer (intiqāl) from whom he has commit-

ted himself to is forbidden, unless he himself determines preponderance
(tarjīḥ nafsihi) after exhaustive treatment of all the ways of the ruling that
he inquires into.263

260 Cf. ibid., i, 20.

261 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 806. The term ʿAdliyya refers to those who defend God’s
justice, i.e. the Muʿtazila.
262 Ibid., 805–806.
263 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb al-Azhār i, 2.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 345

As we have seen in chapter 5 section 5 on the divisibility of ijtihād, Ibn al-

Murtaḍā is wary of conceding the ability of determining preponderance to
laymen. Hence, shifting from one mujtahid to another would occur rather sel-
dom. Ibn al-Murtaḍā considers taqlīd by a muqallid the strongest of all kinds
of ijtihād (ka-ijtihād aqwā min ijtihād). Ijtihād, of course, must here be under-
stood in the wider sense of great effort expended in reaching a conclusion. Ibn
al-Murtaḍā thought of it in the context of a muqallid weighing up the indica-
tors for the probability of a scholar’s or his ruling’s correctness. To him, this
weighing—and especially for a second time—is a task almost too difficult for
the muqallid. It would be of little religious benefit (maṣlaḥa dīniyya) to him.264
Consequently, Ibn al-Murtaḍā considered transfer of a muqallid’s adherence
only of religious benefit when done on the grounds of the mujtahid’s doctrine.
In the cases of Ibn al-Murtaḍā, al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr and Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, tar-
jīḥ based on case-specific evidence is substituted (or circumvented) by tafḍīl
based on doctrine, affiliation or inherent qualities. Again we see how the realm
of certain knowledge in the form of the mujtahid’s doctrine bears heavily on the
realm of probable knowledge, i.e. of indicators and preponderance. Further-
more, it is a case in point of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s desire to maintain the cohesion
of the madhhab, whereas Ibn al-Wazīr transgresses its boundaries.

8 Conclusion

The question of exclusive commitment to one school or imam (iltizām) reveals

once again what had already become evident in the discussions around taqlīd
and the concepts of following, the requirements (shurūṭ) of ijtihād, the divis-
ibility (tajazzuʾ) of ijtihād and the extrapolation of principles (takhrīj): The
stability that had been lost due to the theory of infallibilism was regained by
shifting to the realm of certainty, namely theological doctrine. Unrestricted
transfer of commitment and following as a consequence of infallibilism was
tempered by elevating a specific theological doctrine as the main criteria for
the permissibility of that transfer. One of the Zaydiyya’s major doctrines is the

264 However, Ibn al-Murtaḍā considers the adherence to a ruling or school of much religious
benefit, even if it went contrary to one’s own immediate benefit, because it was equal
to the battle against one’s own soul. He discusses the case of changing one’s madhhab
because of a thrice uttered repudiation and the subsequent regret of the change, and con-
cludes by saying: “This [the change of madhhab] is not permissible where I am concerned.
Rather, it is imposed upon him to battle with his soul for the sake of the improvement of
its religion (mujāhadat nafsihi fī ṣalāh dīnihā).” Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 806.

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superiority ( faḍl) of ahl al-bayt. But since it could hardly be upheld for its own
sake in the legal realm of probability, another factor was needed—beyond the
probability in the legal realm, yet with an effect on that very probability.
The certainty to be attained in doctrinal issues was also introduced into the
question of iltizām in another way. Ibn Abī l-Qāsim allowed unqualified trans-
fer of taqlīd within the group of the ahl al-bayt in matters of disagreement. Ibn
al-Murtaḍā required sound theological doctrine, certainly present with the ahl
al-bayt. Al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr allowed transfer to anyone outside of that group
as long as he agreed with the whole of the ahl al-bayt. Some Zaydis applied the
prophetic report on the “clasping” (tamassuk) to the individual ijtihādāt of each
member of the ahl al-bayt in general, and thereby interpreted it as the duty to
emulate them. Ibn al-Wazīr argues that this report pertains to the consensus,
not to ijtihādāt of the ahl al-bayt.265 According to him, the choice of mujtahid
was independent of the mujtahid’s legal or theological affiliation. Rather, it was
based on preponderant conjecture (ghālib al-ẓann) concerning the soundness
of a particular ruling provided by a mujtahid, said ruling being informed by the
underlying scriptural indicators and arguments in line with the permitted kind
of taqlīd. In this sense, every legally responsible person is capable of a kind
of ijtihād, supported by the notion of the divisibility of ijtihād. Being able to
discern what mujtahid, ruling, argument or textual indicator is most probably
preponderant (tarjīḥ) in any given question, and on any level of legal interpre-
tation, enforces the duty to act upon such conjecture irrespective of the origin
of the mujtahid, ruling, argument or textual indicator (as to who provided it).
Zysow writes that while “infallibilism precluded a direct attack on a legal
school at the level of its rules of law, this was not true for methodology.”266 Even
though Zysow speaks of uṣūl al-fiqh here, while Zaydi contemporaries of Ibn al-
Wazīr like Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Ibn Abī l-Qāsim and al-Hādī b. al-Wazīr argue on the
level of theological beliefs, the discussion yet remains in the realm of uṣūl al-
fiqh. This is because doctrinal and theological matters enter into the realm of
uṣūl al-fiqh in the form of requirements for ijtihād. We can see a clear tendency
toward what Zysow called “the elevation of those sciences where one truth was
available.”267

265 He mentions this in the context of taqlīd of the dead, where unqualified and uninvesti-
gated adherence is a similar issue; cf. Ibn al-Wazīr, Kitāb al-Qawāʿid f. 72a. Ibn al-Wazīr
strengthens this argument by pointing out that the Caspian imam Abū Ṭālib did not men-
tion the report in the context of taqlīd.
266 Zysow, Economy of Certainty 482.
267 Ibid., 481.

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The doctrine of infallibilism also had a challenging effect on the Zaydi

aggrandizement of the ahl al-bayt. If the soundness of their legal opinions
could not be distinguished from that of others’ by evaluating the legal opin-
ions themselves, then other reasons had to be found to justify the relationship
between the Zaydis and their dead imams. Thus the uncertainty about the ahl
al-bayt’s distinct correctness in probable matters of fiqh was counterbalanced
by the certainty about their alleged soundness in the certain matters of theol-
ogy.
The investigation of Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s position concerning iltizām to one
scholar introduces an aspect that is neither inherent in the process nor the
result of ijtihād. Yet, it is said to bear on the probability of both. There is some-
thing in the person of the mujtahid that enhances the probability of the sound-
ness of both the process and the result of ijtihād. The muqallid, in his choice
of an imam, is to follow his conjecture. He is—like the mujtahid—obliged to
act according to what seems most probable to him. That is what God wants
of him, and this is what he will be held responsible for—not the result or the
correctness of his mujtahid’s ruling. But Ibn al-Murtaḍā feared deterioration
(tahawwur) and ensuing instability.268 The stabilizing aspect introduced into
the system by him, his Zaydi contemporaries and predecessors does not result
from, but bears on, the result and process of ijtihad, i.e. the person of the muj-
tahid. The independent standard included in the evaluation is informed by
sciences in which truth can be determined with certainty: doctrine and the-
ology. It can indeed be easily explained by the theory of the imamate and the
importance that Zaydis generally render to the Prophet’s family. Without going
into these theories in detail, their subtle ramifications must be pointed out: Ibn
al-Murtaḍā is a staunch defender of infallibilism. He explained it by the notion
of ghālib al-ẓann, which is informed by the quest for the strongest indicators
(aqwā l-amārāt). But additionally, there is an element of doctrinal soundness
inherent in one certain group more than in others. The notion of school doc-
trine influences ghālib al-ẓann in the case of the mujtahid, as we have seen
above. This is even more so in the case of a muqallid, where the school affil-
iation and doctrinal soundness are a better measure of probability than the
indicators pertaining to a particular case. It is easier for the layman to reach
the point of overwhelming probability based on the certainty of the doctrine
held by the mujtahid, than based on the merely probable evidence that leads
to a particular ruling.

268 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Minhāj al-wuṣūl 804.

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Ibn al-Wazīr also supports ghālib al-ẓann as the basis for the choice of muj-
tahid, as well as for the successful performance of what the muqallid is com-
missioned with. However, for Ibn al-Wazīr, reaching overwhelming probabil-
ity primarily consists in two characteristics which Ibn al-Murtaḍā does not
emphasize: First, ghālib al-ẓann is arrived at exclusively by investigating the
indicators and tracing the process that led to a ruling. The person of the muj-
tahid is only of interest in terms of his skill and experience in the discipline in
question. Secondly, it is quite possible for the layman to arrive at that degree of
probability that allows him to make a decision, renew it or change it.
Interestingly, this difference in the abilities conceded to a layman is similar
to that noted by Weiss between the orthodox view and that of “some Baghdadī
Muʿtazilis.” The orthodox view, represented by the Shafiʿi al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233),
held that all commoners are obliged to consult a legal interpreter because of the
laymen’s lack of understanding. In contrast, the Baghdadī Muʿtazila ascribed
to the commoner the ability and even the duty to inquire into the ijtihādāt
of a mujtahid before they adopt his opinion.269 In both cases, where laymen
are not thought capable of much, they are to base their choice of mujtahid on
the authority of the person: in the case of Sunni orthodoxy on his prestige and
influence, and in the case of Zaydis on his doctrinal affiliation or family.
The significance of this for the present study’s thesis is clear: If the theo-
logical standing of a mujtahid bears on the probability of the otherwise equal
correctness of all mujtahids, it is the theological standing that will in the end
determine to which mujtahid (or group of mujtahids) a muqallid turns. This is
because the muqallid still has the duty to act according to what seems most
probable to him. Of course in this case, the probability is not exclusively deter-
mined by what lies in the realm of probability itself—the results or process of
ijtihād. The difficulty of discerning the correct ruling or opinion from within
the legal system is mitigated by reference to an independent factor where cer-
tainty is available. Doctrinal affiliation as the determinant for initial as well as
permanent legal affiliation could function as a counterbalance to the restricted
abilities of laymen, as well as the instability of the legal system wrought by the
doctrine of infallibilism.
Ibn al-Wazīr’s reaction to the consequences which the theory of infallibility
imposes on the legal system does not seem to be one of counterbalancing at all,

269 Weiss, The Search for God’s Law 221–222. Weiss discusses this issue in the context of legal
consultation (istiftāʾ). For al-Āmidī, all laymen irrespective of the knowledge they have
in different areas are obliged to consult their superiors in rank (mujtahidūn) in all legal
issues. According to him, the impermissible kind of taqlīd refers only to consultation of a
peer, be it layman by layman or mujtahid by mujtahid.

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the structure of legal authority in ibn al-wazīr’s thought 349

as he considers conjecture independent of all but each particular set of indica-

tors to be the basis of all action. For him, the attainment of this conjecture is
within the abilities and even within the responsibility of laymen at large. The
legal realm in which probability reigns is the main field of activity of individuals
on all levels of learning—inquiring muqallid as much as full-fledged mujtahid.
The barely restricted reign of probability allows for pluralism in legal interpre-
tation and little room for organization into schools. In contrast, an inroad of
the theological realm of certainty into the legal realm restricts that pluralism
and consolidates the structure of the authority of schools.

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 chapter 6

Conclusion

The primary goal of the present study was to shed light on the role played by
the Yemeni scholar Muḥammad b. al-Wazīr (d. 840/1438) in a development that
has been called the “Sunnisation of the Zaydism”1 by Cook, Haykel, Schwarb,
Schmidtke and others who have investigated the developments of the Yemeni
Zaydiyya. Most studies refer to Ibn al-Wazīr as the first Yemeni traditionist and
initiator of a “Sunnisation” that climaxed in Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī
(d. 1250/1834) and has a strong bearing on the identity of Zaydi Yemenis even
today. We investigated Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought in the intellectual milieu in which
it developed, in order to determine the factors that shaped his thought as well
as expose the fundamental conceptional differences between his own and his
Zaydi contemporaries’ approach to questions of theological and legal diver-
sity and affiliation. The resulting image of the fundamental concepts of Ibn
al-Wazīr’s thought provides a means for comparison of Ibn al-Wazīr’s influence
on the “Sunnisation of Zaydism” with that of later scholars associated with this
process, in order to advance our understanding of the process itself.
In the introduction, I explained that Ibn al-Wazīr lived in the intellectual
environment of the 8th/14th–9th/15th century Yemeni Zaydiyya, which became
increasingly exposed to a variety of theological and legal alternatives on the
level of textual sources as well as teacher-student relationships and scholarly
exchange within and outside the Zaydi community. From within the Zaydi
community, several Muʿtazili schools had vied with one another for prevalence
in Zaydi theology from the time of its inception. At the time of Ibn al-Wazīr
there were two surviving Muʿtazili schools: the predominant Bahshamiyya and
the less prominent school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044). Ashʿari texts
had been studied by Zaydi theologians for at least one and a half centuries
before Ibn al-Wazīr. At the end of the 8th/14th century, the use of the Sunni
hadith compilations was promoted by Zaydi imams in order to bolster Zaydi
positions in theology and law. Similarly, the first Zaydi-Sufi school was founded
in the late 8th/14th century. Outside the Zaydi community, Ashʿarism was thriv-
ing among the Zaydis’ Rasulid neighbors, who also endorsed the spread of

1 Initially coined by Cook in reference to the development of the duty to command right and
forbid wrong in the Zaydi context, the term “Sunnisation of Zaydism” was subsequently used
to refer to the Zaydi accommodation to Sunni texts and doctrines in general; cf. Cook, Com-
manding Right 247–251.

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different Sufi orders in lower Yemen. The formerly Zaydi sharifs of Mecca had
turned to Sunnism, yet Mecca continued to be sought out for religious studies
and scholarly exchange by Yemeni Zaydis.
As seen above in the biographical chapter, Ibn al-Wazīr acknowledged the
increasingly multilayered intellectual and religious landscape in a way the
scholarly elite of his time did not. After initial confusion in the face of the
diversity, Ibn al-Wazīr took an epistemological approach that allowed for the
inclusion of most theological and legal schools into the Muslim community
without conceding exclusive correctness to any of them. However, his biogra-
phy does not show a significant difference to those of his contemporaries, such
as Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā who represented the predominant current of
Zaydi-Muʿtazili doctrine. Ibn al-Wazīr spent a significant time during his early
years with Zaydi scholars who promoted the use of the Sunni hadith collec-
tions or who showed strong affinities to Sufism. But so did Ibn al-Murtaḍā. Later
Ibn al-Wazīr intensified his knowledge of Sunni hadith with Sunni teachers in
lower Yemen and Mecca. Although Ibn al-Murtaḍā apparently never travelled
to Mecca, he did have exposure to Sunni thought and texts in lower Yemen as
well. Similarly, Ibn al-Wazīr’s brother al-Hādī shared Ibn al-Wazīr’s experience
to a large degree, yet he was a champion of Muʿtazili Zaydism and the Zaydi-
Hādawī school of law.
Ibn al-Wazīr acknowledged the theological and legal diversity that en-
croached on the Zaydi community in Yemen, incorporated it into his thinking
and reacted by formulating an integrative epistemological approach to theol-
ogy and law that took a basic understanding of the Quran and the prophetic
Sunna as its common source, but provided little fixed structure beyond that.
Contemporaries like Ibn al-Murtaḍā acknowledged the diversity as well, and
likewise drew their conclusions. However, these conclusions led Ibn al-Mur-
taḍā to confirm and consolidate the Zaydiyya as a superior theological and
legal entity, which is as evident in his extensive textual heritage as it is in the
reception of his works by his students. The consequences of the two different
approaches were already manifest during the lifetime of these two scholars.
Political choices relating to the imamate made early on in their relationship
foreshadowed a long intellectual controversy which revealed profound episte-
mological differences and their ramifications in various religious disciplines.
While Ibn al-Wazīr endeavored to establish common ground by defining com-
mon sources that had validity for Zaydis as well as other theological and legal
schools, he was criticized for his disregard for supposedly uniquely Zaydi doc-
trines and often retreated from the public sphere to the more individualistic
religiosity of Sufism. In contrast, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, after his political career had
ended, became an important link in a chain of scholars who shaped the iden-

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tity of the Zaydiyya as a legal and a theological school. While research on the
following centuries shows that the practical consequences Ibn al-Wazīr drew
from the theological and legal diversity would gain momentum and only indi-
rectly forward the so-called Sunnisation, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s immediate influence
on his students and the identity of the Yemeni Zaydiyya is more dominant.
Although a degree of inclusion of Sunni texts cannot be denied, it is limited
to the hermeneutical inclusivism which, according to Grünschloss, is almost
inevitable whenever the determination of one’s own position in a religiously
pluralistic environment is required.2
In the chapter on Ibn al-Wazīr’s works (ch. 2), Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemolog-
ical approach is apparent in his early al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ, where he proved the
sufficiency of the knowledge of God gained from the primary sources Quran
and Sunna, as well as general knowledge common to all believers (al-ʿilm al-
ḍarūrī l-ʿādī). The same concern is also evident in his brief Masāʾil shāfiyāt.
Along these lines, Ibn al-Wazīr defended the imamate of Imam al-Manṣūr bi-
llāh ʿAlī b. Ṣalāh al-Dīn (d. 840/1436) against charges of insufficient erudition,
based on the imam’s profound familiarity with the tawātur knowledge of scrip-
tural revelation, in his al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr.
In Ibn al-Wazīr’s most famous reaction to the criticism of one of his teach-
ers, al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim and its later abridgment al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, Ibn
al-Wazīr defended the doctrine of many Sunni theologians and traditionists in
order to vindicate the validity of their contribution to the transmission of the
prophetic Sunna. Here and in his last known work, Īthār al-ḥaqq, Ibn al-Wazīr
claimed to have revealed an essential harmony between contending theolog-
ical schools, employing scholars from both Muʿtazila and Ashʿariyya to prove
his point. The attempt to illustrate an essential harmony and its delimitation
in commonly accepted general tenets ( jumal) is also evident in shorter theo-
logical treatises such as Masʾalat al-ikhtilāf, Taḥrīr al-kalām and expositions of
Quranic verses like his al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt.
Moreover, Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān was written as a defense of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
epistemological choices. One main goal was to disclose and invalidate those
theological proofs and epistemological modes of reasoning which are not
based on the unifying sources, and which therefore result in recriminations
between schools of thought. Similar to the discussion of the general tenets in
other theological writings, Ibn al-Wazīr employed positions of Muʿtazili schol-
ars to show his contemporaries that he could claim positions from among their
own group to support his views. More than any other writing, Ibn al-Wazīr’s col-

2 Grünschloss, Der eigene und der fremde Glaube 313.

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lection of panegyrical poems Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq is replete with poetical attes-

tations to Ibn al-Wazīr’s Sufi leanings and his reliance on theological concepts
like tawakkul (perfect trust in God’s plan) and ḥusn al-ẓann (thinking well of
God) which focus on the believer’s individual relationship to God rather than
his duty towards a particular set of school doctrines. Records of dreams and
visions contained in this collection attest to Ibn al-Wazīr’s application of such
Sufi concepts. Similarly, his al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla discusses the benefits of retreat
and focus on individual spirituality instead of involvement in the contentious
debates of contemporary scholarship. The poems contained in Muthīr al-aḥzān
treat the emotional occupation of the individual with the ritual practices dur-
ing the month of fasting.
However, Ibn al-Wazīr’s magnum opus, al-ʿAwāṣim along with its later abridg-
ment al-Rawḍ al-bāsim, not only argued for essential harmony between theo-
logical schools but also stand out as multi-genre works in which Ibn al-Wazīr
argued for the almost unrestricted validity and applicability of ijtihād by refer-
ring to well-known principles and early authorities that supposedly all legal
schools have in common. In these two works as well as in his Kitāb al-Qawāʿid,
referring to the principles of ijtihād, and the shorter treatise Masāʾil arbaʿa, Ibn
al-Wazīr’s emphatic rejection of taqlīd obviously reveals the attempt to erad-
icate the phenomenon of dividing the Muslim community into several legal
schools. Ibn al-Wazīr again referred extensively to the textual sources and early
authorities that all schools have in common, bolstering his positions with the
opinions of scholars from several legal schools. Of Ibn al-Wazīr’s works on legal
theory, his Manẓūma shiʿriyya is the only one that treats the classical topics of
legal theory apart from the structure of legal authority in a systematic (albeit
brief) form. Ibn al-Wazīr’s Qubūl al-bushrā is essentially an argument for the
leniency of Islamic law and the divine intention to render it easy for human
beings, as well as an argument for claiming the misrepresentation of the law of
the founder of the Yemeni Zaydiyya resulting from taqlīd.
Ibn al-Wazīr is not known to have written a large number of legal opinions
( fatāwā). However, those he did issue feature proofs from the main sources, the
Quran and Sunna, and also refer to a variety of scholarly opinions in line with
Ibn al-Wazīr’s promotion of individual ijtihād. For example in al-Istiẓhār, it was
Ibn al-Wazīr’s expressed goal to enable the legal inquirer to form his own opin-
ion rather than emulate Ibn al-Wazīr or the decision of any other scholar or
school. Even though Ibn al-Wazīr also emphasized this goal in Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-
jumʿa concerning the Friday noon prayer and provided proofs accordingly, his
own conclusions from the sources would have set him at odds with many of his
Zaydi contemporaries, who would hardly welcome the Friday prayer without a
righteous, i.e. Zaydi, imam.

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Ibn al-Wazīr’s works on the science of traditions, Tanqīḥ al-anẓār and Mukh-
taṣar mufīd fī ʿulūm al-ḥadīth, combine terms and principles in the Zaydi as well
as the Sunni science of traditions.
These and other works mentioned in chapter 2 bespeak a coherent, yet not
systematically presented construct of thoughts, linked together by epistemo-
logical principles that restrict cognitive certainty to a minimum and champion
the acceptance ambiguity in many respects. In chapter 3, on epistemology, it
was shown how Ibn al-Wazīr’s principles contrast with the principles underly-
ing the dominant doctrine among contemporary Zaydis, who did not seek such
an integrative approach. Central in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking is that he restricts
what can properly be called certain knowledge to what occurs necessarily in
the original human disposition ( fiṭra) of every legally responsible subject. Such
necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī) comprises a priori knowledge, sense percep-
tion, experience and, importantly, information that meets the conditions of a
tawātur like the Quran, the prophetic Sunna or other information that is based
on a high number of sources. According to Ibn al-Wazīr, this kind of knowl-
edge comprises the central tenets of Islam in their most general form ( jumal).
The second category of certain knowledge determined by most speculative the-
ologians is that of acquired or inferred knowledge (muktasab, istidlālī) which
is arrived at by philosophical speculation (naẓar). Ibn al-Wazīr rejected this
category and equated it with conjectural knowledge. This equation allowed
him to deplete a great many secondary or detailed theological doctrines that
had resulted from inference of their binding force, thus rendering the diver-
gence between different schools of thought less significant. In contrast, Ibn
al-Wazīr’s colleague and representative of Bahshami-Muʿtazili theology, Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, endorsed the classical division into necessary and acquired knowl-
edge and claimed certainty for many of the prevalent doctrines of his school
that were generated by inference according to a particular order of premises
(tartīb al-muqaddimāt). This notion of naẓar was seen as a major means of pos-
sessing knowledge in speculative theology. For Ibn al-Wazīr, naẓar was mainly
a means of contemplating what was known already by necessity, rather than
a conscious inference from a particular order of premises. According to him,
the occurrence of knowledge may correlate with the practice of naẓar, but cor-
rect naẓar does not generate (tawallud) certain knowledge and therefore could
not be used to argue for the exclusive validity of a particular set of secondary
doctrines. Ibn al-Wazīr could refer to a later follower of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,
Shaykh Mukhtār b. Maḥmūd (d. 658/1260) to ensure support for his notion of
naẓar from the Muʿtazili camp. In effect, Ibn al-Wazīr declared the insistence
on naẓar among speculative theologians like Ibn al-Murtaḍā to be the cause of
division and mutual charge of unbelief (takfīr) between contending theolog-

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ical schools. For him, the means of possessing knowledge was the God-given
original disposition ( fiṭra) that all human beings share. The common aspect
of this fiṭra ensured that knowledge about the necessary aspects of God and
religion would not be reserved to a particular school or conditioned by a par-
ticular rational exercise like naẓar. Hence, commonality effectively became an
essential, though not exclusive, criterion for certain knowledge.
In many respects, Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of fiṭra resembles the concept of
the human intellect (ʿaql) among speculative theologians of the Muʿtazila.
Both concepts represent the place where knowledge occurs and in both con-
cepts, necessary knowledge constitutes the initial body of knowledge. However,
while fiṭra in Ibn al-Wazīr’s thinking embodies the disposition to possess nec-
essary knowledge, ʿaql to Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s and other Muʿtazilis’ minds already
comprises necessary knowledge. Moreover, whereas fiṭra needs revelation and
tawātur information to extend its knowledge and particularize what it knows
in general according to Ibn al-Wazīr, ʿaql comprises the knowledge of the duty
and the ability of naẓar to generate more and detailed knowledge according to
Ibn al-Murtaḍā.
This difference becomes apparent in the proof of God’s existence. In this
regard, Ibn al-Wazīr persistently contrasts two lines of argument that had
become the epitomes of the rift between the Bahshami Muʿtazila and Abū l-
Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school. The akwān-proof of the Bahshamiyya, echoed by Ibn
al-Murtaḍā, argues for God’s existence on the basis of a multi-tiered line of
inferences starting from the temporality of the entitative accidents (aʿrāḍ) of
bodies. The starting point of such naẓar is the state of not knowing of God’s
existence, rendering naẓar a kind of speculation. Because the existence of God
must ultimately be known by every believer, such speculation was made incum-
bent on every believer by Muʿtazili theologians like Ibn al-Murtaḍā. The aḥwāl-
proof coined by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī considers such accidents (aʿrāḍ) mere
adjectives or states of the bodies they characterize. For him, the general knowl-
edge of God occurs by necessity and needs no multi-tiered line of inferences.
Ibn al-Wazīr applies the aḥwāl-proof to the states and circumstances of cre-
ation as well as to the lives of the prophets in a generalizing manner. Dispensing
with the speculation and multi-tiered inferences which signify the naẓar of
speculative theologians, pondering the states and circumstances of creation
and revelation commonly coincides with the necessary knowledge of God in
the human fiṭra according to Ibn al-Wazīr. Yet it is neither a necessary con-
dition for such knowledge nor does it generate knowledge. It is obvious that
such concepts of fiṭra and naẓar allowed Ibn al-Wazīr to render differences
in (secondary) doctrines less significant, as well as to devalue speculative the-
ology that required every believer to concern himself with the subtleties of

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derived knowledge. To Ibn al-Wazīr, naẓar in the speculative sense was not a
duty because every believer would know of God’s existence and none need get
involved in the controversies about detailed inferences that separate the vari-
ous schools of thought and that are little more than conjectural doctrines.
How profoundly Ibn al-Wazīr’s acceptance of ambiguity in secondary the-
ological issues differed from the approach of his Muʿtazili contemporaries is
manifest in an underlying principle of reasoning, i.e. the argument from the
absence of evidence (al-istidlāl bi-l-ʿadam). This argument was applied in the
Bahshami Muʿtazila as well as by the earlier representatives of Abū l-Ḥusayn
al-Baṣrī’s school. It was also used by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, although he does not
make it a separate topic of discussion. This argumentative principle purports
that whatever fact or entity cannot be proved decisively must be denied, as
for example attributes of God beyond those demonstrated in most treatises
on systematic theology. However, Ibn al-Wazīr argues, along with some later
representatives of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s school and in line with his attitude
towards ambiguity in secondary matters, that absence of decisive conclusions
results in deferment of judgement rather than in certain negation of the issue.
Hence, many things about God and the unseen world are yet unknown and
uncertain and remain possibly existent until positive evidence becomes effec-
tive.
Returning to Ibn al-Wazīr’s context of theological and legal diversity, the
underlying principles of what I term his epistemology of ambiguity fulfill their
purpose in the harmonization of different theological schools. In chapter 4, it
was demonstrated how Ibn al-Wazīr’s understanding of necessary knowledge
occurring in the human fiṭra enabled him to argue for essential agreement
among Islamic schools of thought concerning the major Islamic tenets in their
general form, and ambiguity concerning a great number of details. The school
that the contemporary Zaydiyya, with their predominantly Bahshami theology,
grappled with was increasingly the Ashʿariyya. Hence, Ibn al-Wazīr’s attempt
to reveal essential agreement was focused on those theological aspects that
seemed like an unbridgeable divide between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya.
His own key to harmonization was his concept of God’s wisdom (ḥikma),
which defined the uniqueness of God by His superior knowledge of the hidden
purposes of all His commands and actions. Human beings could only know of
God’s actions and their purposes in a general form, and realize only their essen-
tial goodness. This idea of Ibn al-Wazīr’s went beyond the Muʿtazili equation
of ḥikma with God’s justice, and took up all forms of causality, instrumental-
ity or motive present in Ashʿari thought in order to argue for agreement on
the general tenet of God’s wisdom. Whereas Ibn al-Murtaḍā clearly echoes
the Bahshami doctrine that God’s justice must gear His actions to the utmost

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human benefit (al-aṣlaḥ) in a comprehensible way, Ibn al-Wazīr referred to

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s followers to convince his contemporaries that some
Muʿtazilis left God’s purposes in the realm of ambiguity like he himself did.
Similarly, the details of God’s names and attributes beyond the general affir-
mation (ithbāt) of what the human fiṭra knows from revelation was said to
belong to the ambiguous matters (mutashābihāt) of which God’s wisdom was
the interpretation. To Ibn al-Wazīr, the difference between descriptions of
God and descriptions of human beings was so self-evident to the fiṭra that
the absence of detailed knowledge need not lead to fear of an illicit equa-
tion between the two (tamāthul), neither does it require metaphorical inter-
pretation (taʾwīl) as occurred in both Muʿtazili and Ashʿari theology. Ibn al-
Wazīr held that, contrary to common opinion, only the extremists of both
groups denied God’s attributes altogether (taʿṭīl) or literarily equated them
with human attributes (tashbīh). Ibn al-Wazīr’s reference to God’s wisdom as
the interpretation of ambiguous descriptions of God, as well as of conflicting
implications from different names and attributes, allowed the inclusion of mul-
tiple, albeit only conjectural doctrines and again served his aim to harmonize
various schools of thought. By contrast, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s expositions of God’s
attributes required a particular understanding of many detailed issues, invali-
dating conclusions that did not agree with his own school’s system of certain
doctrines.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr’s concept of ḥikma allowed him to define a gen-
eral tenet of God’s will (irāda) that affirms different statements in revelation
and incorporates Muʿtazili as well as Ashʿari concerns. According to Ibn al-
Wazīr, the general tenet conceived by the human fiṭra purports that no human
action can contravene God’s will, yet God’s justice in what He wills, does and
commands is never impaired. Whenever God expresses His will or a command
that appears unjust or evil, this must be understood as a relative instrument
to something ultimately good. However, where this ultimate good is beyond
human understanding or conflicts with the human conception of good and
evil, Ibn al-Wazīr refers it to God’s knowledge of the good end. Whereas God
wills or commands an apparent evil for the sake of a hidden good, He wills
and loves the ultimate good for its own sake. Referring to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī
for Muʿtazili support, Ibn al-Wazīr employs his concept of ḥikma to establish
a general doctrine of God’s will in another way: ḥikma signifies God’s knowl-
edge of the good but often hidden end of an action or a command, which then
determines what He wills. This is similar to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s equation
of God’s will with His motive, which did not clearly delineate what determines
this motive, other than God’s knowledge of the outcome. According to Ibn al-
Wazīr, the eternity of God’s knowledge thus corresponds to the eternity of God’s

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will in Ashʿari thinking. In contrast, Ibn al-Murtaḍā, as a typical Bahshami the-

ologian, insists that God wills according to a comprehensible standard of right
and wrong. This standard is manifest in God’s obligation to act for the highest
benefit of human beings (al-aṣlaḥ) which must be determined in a way that
is comprehensible to human understanding in general, but also in particular
cases.
In the closely related question of human actions, Ibn al-Wazīr established
the general tenet of a choosing, yet not independently acting human agent,
which is again evident to the human fiṭra. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s doctrine
of the states (aḥwāl) supports this understanding in that it provides that the
moral aspect of an action for which human beings are responsible, and on
the grounds of which they are judged, is not a separate entity that the human
being brings into existence independently. Human beings have the capacity to
effect this aspect according to the choice they make out of a particular motive.
Thus the human responsibility is self-evident. In line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s con-
cept of ḥikma, God’s intervention into the act and the motive accords with His
knowledge of the ends, which is often unknown to the human being beyond its
ultimate goodness. This differs from Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s view that human beings
have indeed the power to bring actions into existence and are alone responsible
for their choice. Far from being satisfied with a self-evident general responsibil-
ity, human beings must be able to argue along these lines to preserve a detailed
understanding of God’s justice.
In chapter 5, we discussed how Ibn al-Wazīr’s discouragement of preoc-
cupation with theology beyond the self-evident general tenets of the Islamic
religion is balanced by his encouragement of broad participation in legal inter-
pretation. Revealing the essential agreements of theological schools in matters
of certainty, as well as the merely probable nature of matters of disagree-
ment, achieved an important goal for Ibn al-Wazīr: traditionalists of theological
schools whose transmissions had heretofore been rejected on the grounds of
theological error could now be vindicated. As a matter of course, this allowed
for a new and different approach to their transmissions, namely the Sunni
hadith compilations. Although Sunni hadith compilations had been used as a
basis for consolidating Zaydi doctrine from the 6th/12th century onwards, his-
toriography reports an increased endorsement of Sunni hadith in Ibn al-Wazīr’s
and shortly before. Ibn al-Wazīr’s justification of their use as equal or superior
in value to genuinely Zaydi sources was new, and had the potential to change
the legal landscape entirely. Since the theological doctrine of the transmitters
became an insignificant criteria for him, their professional skill could occupy
centre stage. An extension of the range of textual sources meant that the results
of interpreting these sources would be extended as well.

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The transformative potential of Ibn al-Wazīr’s justification of the Sunni

hadith compilations was amplified by the theory of infallibilism. This theory
provided that the ruling of every legal interpreter (mujtahid) would be consid-
ered correct as long as it was arrived at by a designated process of ijtihād in light
of the probable nature of all results of ijtihād. The theory of the infallibility of
all mujtahids had been a vital part of Zaydi legal doctrine since the 6th/12th
century. With regard to the increasing level of legal diversity in the context of
the 8th/14th and 9th/15th century Zaydiyya, a consistent application of the doc-
trine would have required that Zaydis be allowed to resort to scholars of other
schools for legal advice. Ibn al-Wazīr followed through with the theory and con-
cerned himself with the sources, arguments and legal rulings of all schools of
Islamic law. The parallel trend in the contemporary Zaydiyya counteracted the
ramifications of the theory of infallibilism in a legally and theologically diverse
landscape by consolidating the legal identity of the Zaidiyya. This consolida-
tion was based not on legal decisions per se, but on an inroad of theology into
the structure of legal authority and therefore legal interpretation. This inroad
meant that theological matters of supposed certainty were introduced into the
legal realm of probability. Its effects can be traced in various questions of the
structure of legal authority.
Concerning the theory of infallibilism itself, a comparison between Ibn al-
Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā reveals that, although both endorsed this theory,
the scope of ambiguity they allowed with regard to the various rulings dif-
fered. Ibn al-Wazīr held that, while there may be one ruling among many that
bears verisimilitude (al-ashbah) to a singular correct ruling that God envisions,
human beings have no possible way of knowing which one it is. Every scholar
must adhere to what seems most probable to him (ghālib al-ẓann). Although
the concept of ghālib al-ẓann likewise runs through Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s argumen-
tation, his notion that school doctrine could be the benchmark for the most
probable ruling or the evidence “verisimilar” (al-ashbah) to the most probable
evidence put a restriction on the range of probable results of ijtihād.
As to the possibility of ijtihād and the existence of mujtahids, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
position contrasts most with that of his teacher Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, who appar-
ently held that ijtihād was no longer possible, wherefore scholars and lay-
men had to resort to the early imams of the Zaydiyya. Ibn al-Murtaḍā, for his
part, was a defender of the possibility of ijtihād, yet he effectively referred to
an ijtihād within the legal school (ijtihād fī l-madhhab) that used the exist-
ing rules of the founding imams along with their principles as a source for
legal interpretation. According to him, there was no need for original infer-
ence of rulings (istinbāṭ) from the revelational sources after the establish-
ment of the schools, including the Zaydiyya. The extrapolation of the found-

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ing imams’ principles (takhrīj) and their subsequent application to new cases,
though a highly sophisticated activity, did not provide for legal interpretation
beyond the realm of the Zaydi school. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s affirmative attitude
is manifest in his foundational legal compendia Kitāb al-Azhār and al-Baḥr
al-zakhkhār, which would be major sources for Zaydi fiqh for centuries to
come. In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr largely rejected the practice of takhrīj. The
insistence on the duty of ijtihād beyond school affiliation became a distinc-
tive mark of his concept of legal interpretation, and the supposed absence of
scholars capable of ijtihād all the more cause to encourage the practice of ijti-
hād.
The counterpart of the insistence on ijtihād was Ibn al-Wazīr’s prohibition
of emulation (taqlīd). In his three-tiered analysis of the practice of emulation,
the emulator and the emulated scholar, Ibn al-Wazīr distinguished a permitted
from a prohibited kind of following. Taqlīd of the prohibited kind is identified
with an unquestioning adoption of a ruling without understanding the argu-
ments and textual indicators that led to it. For his part, Ibn al-Wazīr grants the
laymen the ability to comprehend and weigh arguments and indicators and to
subsequently act according to what seems most probable, similar to the trigger-
ing factor of the mujtahid’s decision. This freedom of action in the realm of the
probable allows for the choice of any mujtahid as well as any ruling to follow,
along with a subsequent transfer (intiqāl) to another mujtahid according to the
state of evidence. By implication, in Ibn al-Wazīr’s view, the active participa-
tion in the legal enterprise is relatively broad on all levels of legal responsibility:
layman, discerning student (al-ṭālib al-mumayyiz) and mujtahid. The doctrine
of the divisibility of ijtihād (tajazzuʾ) as understood by Ibn al-Wazīr further
enhances this participation. According to this view the legal subject can aspire
to a form of ijtihād not only on the level of different disciplines, but also on the
level of individual questions.
As compared to Ibn al-Wazīr, Ibn al-Murtaḍā is more hesitant to grant lay-
men the ability to weigh evidence and determine preponderance (tarjīḥ). For
him, the choice of a mujtahid is largely determined by the person of the muj-
tahid and the soundness of his beliefs, and less by the evidence for the rulings.
Accordingly, commitment (iltizām) to an authority, be it a mujtahid or a school,
is understood to be stable, and transfer is mainly justified on the grounds of
the authority’s rectitude and doctrinal soundness. This restricted confidence in
the layman’s participation in interpretative activity correlates with a practice
that formed the strongest contrast between Ibn al-Wazīr and many of his con-
temporary Zaydis, namely the emulation of dead scholars (taqlīd al-amwāt).
Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s endorsement of the practice of emulating the founding Zaydi
imams and ahl al-bayt would have had a strong effect on the restriction of

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legal activity to the confinements of the Zaydiyya as a legal school. The cer-
tainty about the soundness of the ahl al-bayt’s theological doctrine rendered
the results of their ijtihād most worthy to be followed. The same criteria became
the distinctive mark between Ibn al-Wazīr’s and Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requirements
(shurūṭ) of a mujtahid. Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s requirements with regard to scientific
disciplines were slightly higher in general, and in the field of Arabic linguistics
(lugha) in particular. However, the decisive difference was that Ibn al-Murtaḍā
conditioned the qualification for being emulated on theological doctrine, both
in terms of the practice of theology (uṣūl al-dīn or ʿilm al-kalām) as a discipline
and in terms of the profession of certain Zaydi-Muʿtazili beliefs as a vital part
of the mujtahid’s personal rectitude (ʿadāla). Consequently, Ibn al-Murtaḍā’s
position would restrict legal inquiry to Zaydi mujtahid’s with Muʿtazili lean-
ings. In contrast, Ibn al-Wazīr’s requirements were restricted to professional
skill and disregarded doctrine beyond belief in the general tenets ( jumal).
Consequently, any legally responsible person could seek advice from any muj-
tahid irrespective of legal or doctrinal affiliation, as long as the mujtahid’s
outward appearance testified to his Islamic faith and his arguments were con-
vincing.
For Ibn al-Wazīr, the only kind of following (ittibāʿ) of the (dead) founding
Zaydi imams and the ahl al-bayt was what he termed “following in meaning”
( fī l-maʿnā). To him, this kind of following was central and the reference to the
first few generations of Islamic history, the salaf, highly recurrent. However, this
kind of following pertained to the intentions that the first generations had in
their general approach to Islamic law and the structure of legal authority, and
therefore remained rather vague.
The image of Ibn al-Wazīr that presents itself on the basis of his life and
thought is that of a man who sought to acknowledge the different theological
and legal currents that existed in his social context without committing him-
self to any single one thereof. Starting from the genuinely Zaydi basis of the
theory of infallibilism and the prohibition of emulation in doctrinal matters,
Ibn al-Wazīr followed through with what other Zaydi scholars had started—
the Sufism of his teacher Ibn Abī l-Khayr and Ibrāhīm al-Kaynaʿī, the dissem-
ination of Sunni hadith compilations by Imam al-Nāṣir and his son Imam al-
Manṣūr, and the endorsement of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Muʿtazili school by
Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217). Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr incorporated
the Sunni law and Ashʿari theology that was present in his wider non-Zaydi
context in lower Yemen and the Hejaz. Ibn al-Wazīr’s original contribution to
these ongoing developments was his formulation of a consistently integrative
approach to theological and legal diversity. This approach was based on an
epistemology that claimed cognitive certainty only for agreed upon theological

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tenets, and relegated intellectual disagreements and the main realm of reli-
gious activity to fields in which conjecture was a central systematic feature,
namely positive law, or that were not concerned with rationally demonstrable
knowledge, like Sufism. These latter fields were only touched upon here and
await further research, the main focus in the present work having been on how
Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemological approach shaped his theology and determined
his outlook on law with regard to the structure of legal authority. Similarly,
Ibn al-Wazīr’s intellectual productivity was focused on theology and the struc-
ture of legal authority as this was where he perceived the greatest need for
rectification, so that individual activity could shift to the realms of law and
Sufism.
The thesis of an “epistemology of ambiguity” may appear to contradict Ibn
al-Wazīr’s own quest for certainty, which was only satisfied when he acknowl-
edged the authoritativeness of the Sunni hadith compilations. Moreover, this
quest for certainty and its attainment in the Sunni hadith compilations has
been pointed out as a distinctive feature of the Yemeni traditionists and patron-
izers of the “Sunnisation” process.3 While this indeed holds true for Ibn al-Wazīr
as well, it does so only with regard to the scope of the sources. Although Haykel’s
identification of epistemology at the heart of traditionism and the process of
“Sunnisation” is plausible, and the quest for a higher degree of certainty did
determine the choice of sources, this did not lead to a higher degree of certainty
in the application of theological doctrine and legal interpretation in the case of
Ibn al-Wazīr. In the interpretation and actual application of the sources in the
context of the Islamic community, Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought is dominated by con-
cepts of conjecture and ambiguity in that multiple interpretations coexist, and
the highest probability (ghālib al-ẓann) that the individual can arrive at deter-
mines the way he relates to those who support other interpretations as well as
his own action. Compared to his contemporaries, Ibn al-Wazīr’s certainty was
greater because of the objective standard that went along with the commonal-
ity of knowledge as to the core of his religion. Yet, he was satisfied with ambigu-
ity in a large number of matters which he located in the realm of subjective and
individual interpretation. His certainty even about the sources of revelation did
not spring from rational proof his individual mind could produce—indeed, this
would have invalidated his doubt in reason’s reliability—but from the certainty
that allegedly occurred in the minds of all Muslims without much effort. Fur-
thermore, Ibn al-Wazīr was not primarily occupied with the inner state of the
knowing person, in the manner of scholars like al-Ghazālī in his study of the

3 Cf. Haykel, Revival and Reform 10.

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different degrees of certainty in terms of yaqīn, but rather with the scope of
items of certain knowledge.
At the same time, the choice of sources does have an effect on the theolog-
ical and legal interpretations of a scholar. Hence Ibn al-Wazīr’s vindication of
the Sunni hadith compilations is correctly identified as a decisive element in
the process of the “Sunnisation” of the Zaydiyya. However, the present study
showed that Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology provided a basis for accrediting all
schools with validity—including the Hādawī-Zaydi school, albeit not to the
exclusion of other schools and not by virtue of its authority as a school. The
same was true for the Sunni schools of law, even though Ibn al-Wazīr’s own
legal interpretations led to results that differed from those of his Zaydi con-
temporaries and at times were more in line with Sunni rulings. This is why he
was often thought to be a Sunni. However, with regard to how he arrived at
his interpretations, Ibn al-Wazīr indeed seems well described by the words of
his contemporary Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Azraqī (d. around 850/1446), who,
when asked which school Ibn al-Wazīr follows, apparently said “[he follows]
the evidence (warāʾ al-dalīl).”4 This is true regarding both theological and legal
affiliation.
Although Ibn al-Wazīr played a decisive role in the “Sunnisation of Zaydism,”
Sunnisation should not be seen as an inevitable result of Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought.
To my mind, Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemological approach to theology and legal the-
ory might just as well have been employed for a “Sufisation” of the Zaydiyya,
had socio-political developments within and outside Yemen been different.
Why Zaydi theological and legal doctrine were less receptive to, and the pol-
itics in the Zaydi imamate less open for, a “Sufisation” than they were for a
“Sunnisation” is a question for further study.5 What Ibn al-Wazīr’s approach cer-
tainly encouraged was a devaluation of the Hādawī-Zaydi identity, because he
discouraged “madhhabisation” in theological as well as in legal terms and val-
orized the intellectual effort and the religious experience of the individual in
a universalistic manner. Although at the core of religion the commonality of
the religious experience largely determined and defined its epistemic value as
absolutely certain, this core was rather restricted. Hence, Ibn al-Wazīr’s episte-
mology of ambiguity encouraged an individualization of the religious experi-

4 Quoted in Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Maṭlaʿ al-budūr iv, 145.

5 Throughout the greater part of its history, the Yemeni Zaydi imamate was hostile to Sufism.
Interestingly, the anti-Sufi polemics reached one of its peaks during the reign of the first
imam of the Qāsimī dynasty (11th/17th–14th/20th century) and persisted throughout the later
Qāsimī rule that was greatly influenced by al-Shawkānī’s teachings; cf. Madelung, Zaydī Atti-
tudes 138–139; Madelung, Introduction. Part VI: Theology 457.

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ence, as well as interpretation with a minimum set of certain doctrine to unite

individuals into the same religion, and thus resembles a rather modern feature
of religiosity.
Furthermore, Ibn al-Wazīr’s approach discouraged the Bahshami-Muʿtazili
epistemology of contemporaries like Ibn al-Murtaḍā who participated actively
in the consolidation of the theological and legal identity of the Zaydiyya. Ibn
al-Wazīr did so because this epistemology interfered with Islamic universal-
ism as he saw it. In this context, the sources chosen by Ibn al-Wazīr to support
his harmonization between theological schools are of particular interest. In a
number of theological questions, Ibn al-Wazīr resorted to epistemological and
ontological concepts shaped by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī or his followers in order
to strengthen his own position as well as his claim of an essential agreement
between the Muʿtazila and the Ashʿariyya. In other theological questions, like
the existence of miracles, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s doctrine may also have been more
in line with Ibn al-Wazīr’s doctrine than the Bahshami counterparts, but Ibn
al-Wazīr did not explicitly mention him in that context. Even though Ibn al-
Wazīr should not be seen as a follower of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī as long as other
central aspects of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s thought have not been compared with Ibn
Wazīr’s notions, Abū l-Ḥusayn’s doctrine could evidently be used to harmonize
Muʿtazili and Ashʿarī doctrine and, having thus played an important role in the
“Sunnisation of Zaydism,” should be the object of further study in this context.6
Likewise, more research has to be done on Ibn al-Wazīr’s positions on other
aspects of legal theory, positive law, Sufism and method of hadith criticism in
his religious and socio-political context. But while such research would pro-
vide much needed insight, on the one hand, into the relationship between the
9th/15th century Zaydiyya and other schools and trends in Islam and increase
the points of comparison with later (or earlier) actors in the process of “Sunni-
sation” like al-Shawkānī, I expect that it would, on the other hand, only confirm
my findings as to Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology of ambiguity and its focus on
commonality as an essential criterion for certain knowledge in a minimal set
of core doctrines, as well as on the intellectual and spiritual activity of the
individual in secondary matters. Take, for example, the case of Ibn al-Wazīr’s
Qubūl al-bushrā, which is concerned with legal principles (qawāʿid fiqhiyya) at
the intersection of legal theory and positive law. Qubūl al-bushrā is devoted to
demonstrating that opting for the lenient ruling (rukhṣā) is preferable in many

6 A comprehensive comparison between the thought of Ibn al-Wazīr and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-
Baṣrī would have to include an investigation of Imam Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza’s teaching as well as
an investigation of the difference between Ibn al-Wazīr and Ibn al-Murtaḍā in their use of
Abū l-Ḥusayn’s teachings in the realm of legal theory.

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cases of textual ambiguity (mutashabihāt). The counterposition defended by

followers of the Hādawī-Zaydi school systematically insists on the severe rul-
ing (ʿaẓīma) based on the notion that it represents the most prudent choice
(al-aḥwaṭ) in cases of ambiguity. In contrast to his stance on ambiguity in the-
ological matters, where the interpretation of ambiguous texts or statements is
left to God’s wisdom, Ibn al-Wazīr holds that cases of legal ambiguity must be
decided by each individual scholar and may vary according to the mujtahid’s
understanding of the indicators and the state of the one that asks for the legal
ruling.
This study was primarily concerned with the thought of Ibn al-Wazīr and
not with any other of the Yemeni traditionists. Whether or not what was argued
with regard to Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought vis-á-vis the “Sunnisation” of the Zaydiyya
also applies to other contemporaries or later traditionists is a question that
only further study can answer. Although al-Shawkānī, for example, identifies
with Ibn al-Wazīr, his epistemological approach to theological and legal diver-
sity is likely to differ considerably from that of Ibn al-Wazīr. A first indication of
this is the fact that al-Shawkānī vehemently rejected the theory of infallibilism,
which was a major component of Ibn al-Wazīr’s notion of the structure of legal
authority.7
Besides contrasting Ibn al-Wazīr’s concepts with those of other Yemeni tra-
ditionists and patronizers of the “Sunnisation” process like al-Shawkānī, com-
paring Ibn al-Wazīr’s thought with that of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya promises to be most insightful. Parallels between them were already
noted throughout chapter 4 on central concepts of Ibn al-Wazīr’s theological
thought. But what is more important, Ibn Taymiyya and to a lesser degree Ibn
Qayyim al-Jawziyya were monopolized by a variety of intellectual and spiritual
trends, just as might be the case for Ibn al-Wazīr as well, because his thought
incorporates Zaydi, Sufi, traditionist, Sunni and Salafi elements.
A Salafi claim, broad and diverse as the term Salafi is, to Ibn al-Wazīr is well
worth considering, given the frequency with which Ibn al-Wazīr refers to the
salaf and the authoritativeness of prophetic traditions in contradistinction to
school doctrines, beside other similarities between them such as the rejection
of taqlīd and the easy attainability of legal knowledge for the individual. In con-
trast, the Salafi emphasis on theological issues where only one understanding
is correct, along with the related notions of takfīr and the only victorious group
saved in the Hereafter ( firqa najiyya)—ideas that Ibn al-Wazīr’s epistemology
left no room for—should induce a circumspect comparison.8

7 Cf. Haykel, Revival and Reform 96.

8 Cf. Brown, Canonization 314, who ascribes a “Salafi spirit” to Ibn al-Wazīr. For an illustration

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As a consequence of all this, one could challenge the view that the ongo-
ing struggle that Ibn al-Wazīr is identified with, regarding the identity of the
Yemeni Zaydiyya, is best described by the term “Sunnisation.” Bonnefoy has
recently called this term into question in the modern context of the strug-
gle between Shiʿi Zaydism and Sunni Shafiʿism, which, according to him, has
resulted in the polarization of identities on the one hand, and individualiza-
tion of the religious experience and practice on the other hand, rather than
in a “Sunnisation” of Zaydism in particular and of Islam in Yemen in general.9
Though one must keep in mind that almost 600 years of history have passed
since the time of Ibn al-Wazīr, the reactions to the tension that accompanies
theological and legal diversity may yet be similar. In this sense, Ibn al-Wazīr’s
“epistemology of ambiguity,” which considers a minimal body of fixed cer-
tain doctrine and leaves ample room for multiple interpretations, provides an
answer to the challenge of theological and legal diversity that is even more
compelling today than it was at Ibn al-Wazīr’s lifetime.

of the unifying and dividing elements of different Salafi currents, see Haykel, Nature of Salafī
Thought. Haykel refers to Ibn al-Wazīr via al-Shawkānī in the explanation of the Salafi rejec-
tion of legal schools and thus confirms the Salafi claim on Ibn al-Wazīr; cf. ibid., 44.
9 Bonnefoy, Les identités religieuses 207, 213.

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Index of Pre-modern Authors

ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī 3n15, 13n, 24, al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 33,
27, 47, 51n196, 52, 53, 96n222, 115n338, 265n22
118n354, 145, 152, 159n30, 162, 171n86,
172, 173n94, 175n104, 177, 204n24, al-Fāsī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 16, 34,
210n45, 220n80, 244n163, 245n168, 40n125, 129n423
248n181, 248n183, 248n185, 253, 261,
267, 279, 321 al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad 4, 13n,
Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī 30n76, 211n47, 222n87, 79n106, 95, 161n38, 168, 201n14, 204n25,
230n113, 257, 27n26 211, 221–222, 254n210, 257, 261, 290–291,
Abū Bakr b. al-ʿArabī 19n23, 151n2 293–294, 308n154, 312n160, 312n161,
Abū Dāwūd 294, 295 313n164, 317n176, 362
Abū Ḥāshim al-Jubbāʾī 4, 5n22, 30, 171
Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī 5, 7, 11, 12n55, 13n, al-Hādī b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr 15–23, 25, 32–
29, 109n303, 110n317, 111n320, 118– 33, 37–38, 40, 42n137, 45, 110n314, 136–
119, 175n104, 177–178, 179n121, 181–183, 137, 148, 150, 277, 293n107, 306–307,
185n143, 187n151, 190, 196, 204–206, 323n195, 332–334, 342–343, 345–346,
221n81, 223–224, 234–241, 246–249, 351
252–253, 259, 267–269, 290–291, al-Hādī ilā l-ḥaqq Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn 4, 5,
293n105, 295, 305, 312n160, 313n164, 34–35, 51, 54n213, 59, 127, 188, 263, 272,
325–326, 350, 354–358, 361, 364 277, 308, 323n195, 327–329, 332–333
Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī 65n25, 90n165, al-Ḥākim al-Jishumī 51–52, 96n224, 144,
93n189, 113n329, 152n7, 235n129, 327n211
244n163, 279n64 Ḥanash, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 27, 53
Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Wazīr 16 al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Murtaḍā 44,
Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal 67, 131n435, 289, 294 53
Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā b. Zayd b. ʿAlī 24n53, 27, al-Ḥayyī, Dāwūd b. Aḥmad 50n182, 177, 220,
145n519 238n145, 254
Aḥmad b. Sulaymān b. Muḥammad b. al- al-Ḥillī, al-Ḥasan b. Yūsuf 82n124
Muṭahhar 27 Ḥumaydān b. Yaḥyā 5, 24, 26, 134n455
al-Āmidī, Sayf al-Dīn 279n64, 282, 290n95, al-Ḥumaydī, Muḥammad b. Abī Naṣr 33
348
al-Amīr ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn 22n39, 46n155 Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd 93n189, 147,
al-Amīr al-Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn 87, 295 181
al-Anbarī, ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan 261 Ibn Abī Ḥafsa, Marwān b. Sulaymān 150
al-ʿAnsī, ʿAbdallāh b. Zayd 7n35, 103n255, Ibn Abī l-Khayr, ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh 23–26, 28–
285n83, 302n135 30, 47, 113n328, 136, 361
al-Aṣamm, Abū Bakr 261 Ibn Abī l-Qāsim, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad 31–32,
al-Ashʿarī, Abū l-Ḥasan 6, 95n207, 211n47, 35–38, 42, 56–57, 63, 70, 129, 131–133,
222n87, 246n171, 254n210, 255n220, 135, 196, 274–278, 310, 327–329, 337,
257 340–341, 345–346, 359
Ibn Abī l-Rijāl, Aḥmad b. Ṣāliḥ 16, 18–19,
al-Baqillānī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad 119, 22n37, 30–31, 36, 42n137, 57, 61n6,
185n142, 187n149, 261n4, 262n11, 290n94 63n16, 72, 76, 87n148, 103–105, 121n364,
Bishr al-Marīsī 261 123n371, 124, 126, 129, 141, 143, 148,
al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl 25, 47, 276n55
66, 132, 141, 167n67, 265n22 Ibn Afkānī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm 90

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Ibn al-Amīr, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl 1, 105, al-Mahallā, al-Nāṣir b. ʿAbd al-Ḥāfiẓ 143
109, 141, 150n561 al-Mahdī Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Dāʿī 262–263
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥyī al-Dīn 6, 91n171, 109 al-Mahdī l-Husayn b. al-Qāsim al-ʿIyānī 134
Ibn al-Athīr, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad 33 al-Mahdī Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar 27
Ibn Baṭṭāl, ʿAlī b. Khalāf 265n22 Mālik b. Anas 67, 318
Ibn Fanad 47n169 al-Manakdim, Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn 47, 53,
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī 16n6, 20, 64n17, 123– 118
124 al-Manṣūr bi-llāh ʿAbdallāh b. Ḥamza 5,
Ibn al-Ḥājib, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh 25, 17n10, 25, 68, 110n316, 113n328, 124,
31, 47, 79n106, 83n124, 95n207, 119n358, 139n489, 265, 268, 272n41, 304,
149, 205n30, 274n48, 290n95, 291n95, 305n144, 308n155, 312–313, 323, 336–
297 337, 340–343, 352
Ibn Ḥazm, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad 33, 155n18 al-Maqbalī, Ṣāliḥ b. al-Mahdī 1n2, 62n8
Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad al-Mizzī, Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 33
5n23, 29, 151n5, 152n7, 162n42, 165– al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. Ḥamza 5,
166, 170, 172n90, 177–178, 181–182, 187, 46n155, 68, 78n106, 113n329, 124,
189n158, 190–191, 196, 230n113, 234– 139n489, 145, 181, 182n128, 188, 190–
235, 237–239, 246, 248n181, 249n188, 191, 196, 246–247, 285n83, 308, 312n161,
279n64, 282n73 340, 342, 343n256, 361, 364n6
Ibn Mattawayh 27, 47, 181, 190n164, 191 al-Muʾayyad bi-llāh Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-
Ibn Miftāḥ, ʿAbdallāh b. Abī l-Qāsim 48, Ḥārūnī 46n155, 83n124, 90n164, 92n178,
292, 295–296, 299, 302n135, 303, 306– 115n338, 129n489, 145, 159n30, 165, 284,
307, 308n153, 323 327n212
Ibn al-Qāsim, Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn 22, 23n43, al-Muḥallī, al-Qāsim b. Aḥmad 47
41n133, 46, 76–77 Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hādī al-Wazīr
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya 149, 185, 198n1, 15, 25, 42
201n14, 211, 213n57, 217–219, 312, 365 Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-ʿAfīf al-Wazīr
Ibn Sīnā, Abū ʿAlī l-Husayn 109 17, 110
Ibn Taymiyya 68, 129, 149, 170n80, 185, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAlawī al-Ḥasanī 24,
198n1, 201n14, 202n19, 204n23, 204n27, 144
205, 207n38, 211, 213–215, 217, 226n102, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Qāsim 75
232, 243, 261n5, 312n160, 365 Mukhtār b. Maḥmūd 96n224, 145–147,
Ibn Ẓahīra, Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh 19, 165–166, 170, 181–182, 187–188, 194, 196,
34–35, 108, 129 213n54, 223, 242n154, 146, 174, 302, 354
Ismāʿīl b. ʿUlayya 261 al-Murādī, Muḥammad b. Manṣūr 24,
93n189, 97n226, 144
Jaʿfar b. ʿAbd al-Salām 28, 80, 327n212 al-Mutanabbī, Abū Ṭayyib 108, 109n303
al-Jāḥiẓ, Abū ʿUthmān 92n178, 152n8, al-Mutawakkil ʿalā llāh Aḥmad b. Sulaymān
156n23, 165–167, 180n124, 183–184, 220, 4, 263, 28n71
235n129
al-Jalāl, al-Ḥasan 1n2 Nafīs al-Dīn al-ʿAlawī 19, 32–33, 47
al-Juwaynī, ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAbdallāh 13n, al-Najrī, ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad 48
111, 119, 153n9, 179n106, 187, 254n210, al-Najrī, ʿAlī b. Muḥammad 48
280, 291, 300 al-Nāsir lil-ḥaqq al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Utrush
86n137, 262
al-Kaynaʿī, Ibrāhīm b. Aḥmad 25n59, al-Nāṭiq bi-l-ḥaqq Abū Ṭālib al-Ḥarūnī 25,
25n60, 28n72, 30n78, 361 110n316, 115n338, 145, 285n83, 306n144,
323, 324n201, 325n203, 326–328,
al-Maʿarrī, Abū l-ʿAlāʾ 125–126 346n265

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al-Naẓẓām, Abū Isḥāq 79, 220, 235n129 19n24, 22n37, 27n67, 40, 42n137
al-Shahrastānī, Muḥammd b. ʿAbd al-Karīm
al-Qarāfī, Shihāb al-Dīn 322 50n181, 136–137, 233n120
al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm al-Rassī 34, 68, 180, al-Shahrazūrī, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ 290n95
262, 272n40, 327, 328n215 al-Shawkānī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī 1, 3, 9,
16, 19n27, 22n39, 24, 42n139, 44n145,
al-Raṣṣāṣ, Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan 19n23, 22n39, 44n146, 61, 64, 77, 88, 140, 143, 293n106,
24, 27, 46, 53, 118, 171n86 294, 312n160, 313, 350, 363n5, 364–365,
al-Raṣṣāṣ, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad 22n39, 24, 366n8
47, 50, 53, 113n328 al-Shirāzī, Abū Isḥāq 279n64, 290n94
al-Raṣṣāṣ, al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad 5n23, al-Subkī, Tāj al-Dīn 291n95
28n71, 113n328, 124, 337, 340–341,
343 al-Tirmidhī, Muḥammad b. ʿIsā 151n2, 294
al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn 5n22, 13n, 77–79, 95,
118–119, 149, 151, 187–188, 190–191, 204– al-ʿUjālī, Taqī l-Dīn 178n116, 181, 187, 189, 196,
206, 222n87, 239–240, 249, 254n210, 235n130
269n32, 291, 312n161
Yaḥyā b. Manṣūr b. al-ʿAfīf b. Mufaḍḍal 25,
al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 68n45
16, 18n12 Yūsuf b. Aḥmad b. ʿUthmān 46, 55
Ṣārim al-Dīn b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr 110n316,
297, 312n161, 320, 332, 335n237 al-Zamakhsharī, Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd 109
al-Shahārī, Ibrāhīm b. al-Qāsim 16, 18n15, Zayd b. ʿAlī 27–28, 98, 115n338, 145n519

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Index of Geographical Names

Alhān Ans 44 Nuqum 39

Bayt Baws 45 Saʿda 7n, 18, 21–23, 30n78, 45, 81

Sanaa 6, 18, 22–23, 27, 30–31, 39, 41n131, 42–
Dhamar 41, 44–45 45, 59, 61, 76, 81n116, 89, 98–99, 104,
105n273, 120, 131, 143
Ḥajja 46, 54
Hejaz 6, 16, 20, 58–59, 361 Taʿizz 19, 32–33, 42, 47
Thulāʾ 41n131, 45, 53–56
Ibb 39
Yarīm 39n119
Jabal Miswar 46, 53–54, 56
Jabal Saḥammur 39n119 Ẓafīr 46, 54
Ẓahrawayn 17, 21
Kawkabān 41

Mecca 6, 16, 19–20, 23, 32–34, 38, 39n122,

40, 59, 122–123, 153, 351

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Al-ʿAḍb al-ṣārim 130 Fatḥ al-khāliq 105

Al-ʿAlam al-shāmikh 62n8 al-Fuṣūl al-luʾluʾiyya 110n316, 297
Amālī 24n53, 27
al-Amr bi-l-ʿuzla 38, 39n118, 41, 61–63, 353 Ghāyat al-afkār 50n182, 53
al-ʿAqīda al-wāsiṭiyya 213n57 Ghāyat al-amānī 22, 81
al-Arbaʿīn 77, 78n101, 151 al-Ghiyāṣa sharḥ al-Khulāṣa 27, 53
al-ʿAwāṣim wa-l-qawāṣim 8, 24, 31, 32n91, al-Ghurar wa-l-ḥujūl 47
35, 37–38, 40–41, 54–56, 60, 63–72, 77,
81, 88, 103n257, 106, 116, 127, 129–132, Ḥadī l-arwāḥ 149
141–144, 149, 163, 168–169, 188, 190, 196, Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn 305n144
201–202, 211, 216–217, 223, 242, 245– Hidāyat al-rāghibīn 19n23, 323n195, 333
246, 251, 260n2, 263–264, 277, 279, al-Ḥusām al-mashhūr 32, 41n133, 80–84,
304–305, 310, 313–314, 320, 326–327, 156, 158, 314, 352
340, 352–353
Āyāt al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya 74–76 al-ʿIbar wa-l-iʿtibār 165, 184
al-Āyāt al-mubīnāt 60, 72–74, 120n362, al-Iḥkām 282
121n365, 229, 248, 352 al-Ijāda fī l-irāda 149, 200, 227, 229
Kitāb al-Azhār 48–51, 53, 54, 174, 278, 292, Iklīl al-tāj 54
302–303, 307, 323, 343, 360 al-ʿIlm al-wāṣim 130
K. al-Intiqād 293
al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ 16 K. al-Intiṣār 46n155
al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār 48–54, 292–293, 299, al-ʿIqd al-thamīn 16, 34n97, 34n100, 40n125,
302, 306n148, 332, 360 129n423
Bayān al-ḥikma fī l-ʿadhāb al-akhrawī 149 Irshād al-fuḥūl 293
al-Burhān al-qāṭiʿ 32–33, 54, 76–80, 151, 154, Irshād al-qāṣid 90n169
159, 174, 178, 276 Irshād al-sālikīn 32n88
al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh 13n al-Istibṣār 46n155
al-Istiẓhār 84–87, 353
K. al-Dalīl al-kabīr 180n124 Īthār al-ḥaqq 21, 40–41, 64, 87–98, 103, 106,
K. al-Dalīl al-ṣaghīr 180n124 149, 151, 168–169, 198, 200–201, 211, 213,
Dāmigh al-awhām 50, 53 216–217, 225, 229, 244n163, 247, 250,
al-Ḍawʾ al-lāmiʿ 16 263, 273, 352
Dīwān shiʿr 39, 88n150, 104–110, 150, 165,
210, 219 (see also Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq) Jamʿ bayn al-Ṣaḥīḥayn 33
al-Durar al-farāʾid 49n179, 50, 53–54, Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ 158
164, 166, 188, 195, 220, 227, 237–238, al-Jāmiʿ al-kāfī 24n53, 25, 144
253 Jawāb Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm ʿalā fuqahāʾ
al-Durar al-kāmina 16n6 150
al-Durar al-manẓūma 103n255, 306n155, Jawāb al-nāṭiq 38n113
285n83 Jawāmiʿ al-adilla 110n316, 306n144
al-Durr al-kāmin 16n6, 16n7 Jawharat al-uṣūl 22n39, 24, 47, 50, 53
Jumal al-islām 68n45
Fāʾiqat al-uṣūl 50, 53 al-Jumla wa-l-ulfa 24n53, 97n226, 144
K. al-Fāʾiq fī uṣūl al-dīn 165n57, 172n90, 177,
223 K. al-Kāmil fī l-istiqṣāʾ 181n126
Fatḥ al-bārī 64 Kanz al-ḥukamāʾ 44, 52, 53

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al-Kashshāf 47 Nihāyat al-tanwīh 19n23, 332, 333n230

al-Kawkab al-ẓāhir 52 Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl 118, 191n167
al-Khulāṣa al-nāfiʿa 19n23, 22n39, 24, 27, Nukhbat al-fikr 123
46, 53, 118 Nuṣrat al-aʿyān 125–126
al-Lumaʿ fī fiqh ahl al-bayt 22n39, 46n155
K. al-Qalāʾid 49–50, 52–54, 176, 188, 237,
al-Maḥṣūl 13n 253
Majmaʿ al-ḥaqāʾiq 104–109, 352 al-Qamar al-nawwār 52, 54, 56, 127
Majmūʿ Zayd b. ʿAlī 27 al-Qāmūs al-fāʾiḍ 54
Manẓūma shiʿriyya 109–112, 353 K. al-Qawāʿid 24, 61, 98–103, 127, 237,
Masāʾil arbaʿa 100, 112–116, 353 280–282, 285–286, 291–292, 301–
Masāʾil mustakhrajāt 120 302, 309, 313, 320, 324, 328–329, 334,
Masāʾil shāfiyāt 120–122, 123n378, 352 338, 340n249, 342n251, 346n265,
Masāʾil sharīfa 122–123 353
Masʾalat ikhtilāf al-Muʿtazila wa-l-Ashʿariyya Qawāʿid al-aḥkām 339n246
116–119, 240, 242, 352 al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm 54
al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliyya 204n24 Qubūl al-bushrā 57, 99, 100, 126–129, 338,
Maṭlaʿ al-budūr 16, 20n32, 27, 121n364, 125, 353, 364
276n55
al-Minhāj al-jalī 28 K. al-Radd ʿalā ṣāḥib al-Nihāya wa-l-Maḥṣūl
Minhāj al-wuṣūl 11, 47, 50, 53, 267, 276, 148–149
292, 299, 303, 317, 319n181, 330–331, al-Rawḍ al-bāsim 35, 37–38, 64, 73, 121n365,
339 129–135, 244n166, 273, 275n52, 279, 310,
Mirqāt al-anẓār 48n173 316, 340, 352, 353
Mishkāt anwār al-ʿuqūl 25 Risāla jalīla 149
Miʿyār al-ʿuqūl 50, 53, 296, 319n181, 330 Risāla fī zakāt al-fiṭr 149
al-Milal wa-l-niḥal 51 Riyāḍat al-afhām 50, 54, 152n7, 156n23,
al-Muḥīṭ 47 163n46, 166n63, 170, 172n90, 176, 182,
K. al-Mujtabā 96n224, 145, 147, 165, 181n126, 188, 205n28, 237–238, 255n213
188, 194, 213n54, 246
al-Mujzī 25, 110n316, 306n144, 324n201, Ṣafwat al-ikhtiyār 25, 110n316, 304, 308n155,
325 323n196
Mukhtaṣar fī ʿilm al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān 150 Sharḥ al-Azhār 48, 53, 302n135, 306, 323,
Mukhtaṣar mufīd fī ʿulūm al-ḥadīth 121, 123– 343
124, 140n496, 354 Sharḥ al-Najrī 48
Mukhtaṣar Muntahā l-suʾl 25, 83n124 Sharḥ Nukat al-ʿibādāt 28
Muntahā l-marām 75 Sharḥ al-Nukhba 64n17
al-Munya wa-l-amal 51, 276 Sharḥ al-Qalāʾid al-muntazaʿ min al-Durar
Muqaddimat al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār 48–49, al-farāʾid 48, 50n182, 119n358, 177n112,
50n182, 51, 292, 296, 303 251n197, 254n210
al-Mustaṣfā 13n Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-khamsa 24, 27, 46, 53
K. al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn 28n73, 152n7, Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-masāʾil 51, 96n224, 144
162n42, 166, 177, 178n115, 182n130, Sharḥ al-Ziyādāt 327n212
234n126, 235n134, 237n139 al-Sirāj al-wahhāj 28
K. al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-fiqh 12n55, 13n,
29n73, 47, 291, 305n140 Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazila 52
Muthīr al-aḥzān 124–125, 353 Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyya 16, 27, 47
Nahj al-balāgha 144, 147n538, 181 Tadhhīb Tahdhīb al-kamāl 33
Nihāyat al-aqdām 136–137 al-Taʾdīb al-malakūtī 135–136

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al-Tadhkira 27, 47, 181, 190n164 Tarjīḥ asālīb al-Qurʾān 39–40, 54, 75, 88,
Taḥrīr al-kalām 136–138, 352 142–148, 168–169, 174–175, 180, 183, 190,
K. fī l-tafsīr 103 196, 352
Tahdhīb al-kamāl 33 Taṣaffuḥ al-adilla 187, 190n161
al-Tāj al-mudhhab 302n135 Tawḍīḥ al-afkār 141
Tāj ʿulūm al-adab 54 Taysīr al-ʿibādāt 129
Tajrīd al-Kashshāf 31n84 Thabat Banī l-Wazīr 15n1, 18n15, 20n31
Takhṣīṣ āyāt al-jumʿa 138–140, 353 Thamarāt al-akmām 52
Talkhīṣ al-ḥabīr 64 al-Tuḥfa al-ṣafiyya 148
K. al-Tamhīd 145, 188, 196n179, 204n24
Tanqīḥ al-anẓār 38, 140–142, 322n185, 354 ʿUlūm Āl Muḥammad 24
Taʾrīkh Banī l-Wazīr 15, 16n2, 18n15, 18n19, K. al-ʿUmad 13n
19n22, 20n31, 20n32, 34n99, 38, 39n122, ʿUqūd al-ʿuqyān 27
42n139, 56n221, 57, 110n314, 129, Usūl al-aḥkām 27
293n107
Tarjamat Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Wazīr Wāḍiḥat al-manāhij 80–81
15n1, 16, 56n221, 129n425
al-Ziyādāt 46n155, 83n124, 90n164, 284

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2 (Baqara) 75 17 (Isrāʾ)
2:7 73 17:38 232
2:30 208n39
2:144 122 21 (Anbiyāʾ)
2:166 283 21:79 267
2:230 87
30 (Rūm)
3 (Āl ʿImrān) 30:30 167
3:7 147
39 (Zumar)
4 (Nisāʾ) 39:57–59 74
4:94 118
4:95 63n15 41 (Fuṣṣilat)
41:17 74
5 (Māʾida)
5:3 118 49 (Ḥujurāt)
49:17 118
6 (Anʿām)
6:125 232 60 (Mumtaḥina)
60:10 158
7 (Aʿrāf)
7:143 137 62 (Jumʿa)
62:9 139
9 (Tawba)
9:36 63 72 (Jinn)
9:41 63 72:26–27 123
9:91 63
9:106 231 92 (Layl)
92:7 126
11 (Hūd)
11:6 122 100 (ʿĀdiyyāt)
100:11 74
13 (Raʿd)
13:9 120 108 (Kawthar) 75

14 (Ibrāhīm) 111 (Masad)

14:4 72n71, 73 111:1–5 212

16 (Naḥl)
16:43 284
16:93 72–73, 229

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Index of Arabic Terms

ʿadāla 78, 132, 142, 292, 304, 343, 361 bayyān 222
ʿadam 169, 185n143, 190, 245n167, 313, 356 bidʿa (pl. bidaʿ) 85–86, 327
ʿadiyyāt 79 bi-lā kayf 68, 190, 226
ʿadl 94, 98n1, 220, 292 binya 233n122, 236, 240, 252
ʿAdliyya 344 burhān (pl. barāhīn) 106, 302
afʿāl (sg. fiʿl) 94, 198, 224, 241–242, 249n190
ʿafw 96, 107, 212, 233 dāʿī 70, 202–203, 204n25, 205, 221, 234, 236,
aḥad (pl. āḥād) 79, 124, 154 238, 243, 249n190
aḥkām (sg. ḥukm) 128, 178, 201n14, 247, 292, ḍaʿīf 141
344 dalāla 91, 147, 185, 187, 330
aḥādīth al-aḥkām 294 dalīl (pl. adilla) 111, 115, 161–163, 170, 173, 177,
āyāt al-aḥkām 75–76, 277, 292–293 188, 190–191, 301, 363
ahl al-bayt 19–20, 35–36, 46, 59, 65–68, 71, dalīl al-āfāq 147, 167
83, 95, 97n226, 98, 101, 114–115, 145, 247, dalīl al-anfus 147, 167
272, 277, 280–281, 289, 306–308 dalīl al-mawāniʿ 188n155, 189
ahl al-ḥadīth 67 (see also muḥaddithūn) ḍarūrā 119, 178, 249, 321
ahl al-maʿārif 152n8, 165–166, 183–184 ḍarūrī 78, 90, 97, 152, 155, 160, 198, 352, 354
ahl al-sunna 94, 96, 236 dhāt (pl. dhawāt) 78, 93, 212, 246
aḥwāl (sg. ḥāl) 78, 80, 122, 147, 175, 177–182,
244, 246–247, 355, 358 faḍl 134, 341–342, 346
aḥwaṭ 102, 127–128, 342, 365 (see also farʿ (pl. furūʿ) 48, 111, 126, 263, 276, 283
iḥtiyāṭ) farḍ (pl. furūḍ) 31, 222, 256
ajsām (sg. jism) 190, 246 fāsiq taʾwīl (pl. fussāq taʾwīl) 66, 102, 135,
ʿajz 179 304, 307–309
akwān 146–147, 174–177, 178n115, 180–181, fiqh 7, 21–22, 24–25, 27–28, 32n88, 34,
254, 355 42n137, 49–51, 53–54, 127, 139, 273, 277–
ʿālimiyya 228 278, 280, 310, 323, 332, 347, 360
amāra (pl. amārāt) 265, 268–269, 282n75, firqa nājiyya 365
318, 340, 347 fisq 93, 97
ʿāmm (pl. ʿumūm) 65, 111, 282–283, 330 fiṭrā (pl. fiṭar) 12, 89, 90, 96, 148, 167–174,
ʿaql (pl. ʿuqūl) 12, 69, 78, 94–95, 149, 153, 180, 183–184, 198, 203, 208, 233, 247,
165, 167, 169–174, 193, 196, 203, 206– 249–250, 252, 258, 302, 309, 311, 354–
207, 210, 221, 244, 263n16, 264, 301–302, 358
355
aʿrāḍ 146, 175–177, 355 gharaḍ 202, 205, 210–211
asbāb al-nuzūl 293 gharāʾiz (sg. gharīza) 301–302, 309
ashbah 262–270, 359 ghayr 101, 194, 212, 245–246, 279, 338
aṣlaḥ 213, 221, 222n87, 222n88, 240, 257,
357–358 Hādawiyya 54, 87, 263, 323n195
asmāʾ 90, 198, 224 ḥadd (pl. ḥudūd) 98, 116
aṣwab 266 ḥakīm 73, 193, 202–203, 224n96
ʿayn (pl. aʿyān) 222, 244, 255–256 ḥaqīqa 111, 226, 228, 242
azal 191, 245 ḥaqīqī 243
hayʾa 244
badīhī 153 ḥaẓar wa-ibāḥa 111
barāʾa 96 hidāya 249

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ḥikma (pl. ḥikam) 94, 107, 193, 200–202, ʿiṣma 67, 249
205, 211, 216, 223, 233, 235, 258, 356–358 isnād 142, 322n185, 328
ḥissī 78, 153 istidlāl 175
ḥudūth 177 istidlāl bi-l-ʿadam 185, 356
ḥujja 266, 279 istidlālī 119, 152, 155, 176, 354 (see also
ḥaqq (pl. ḥuqūq) 82, 114, 261 muktasab)
ḥusn 119, 245n169 istiḥsān 223
istiḥqāq 73
iʿāna 242 istinbāṭ 277, 289, 328, 359
iḍlāl 234, 248 istiqbāḥ 223
iḥdāth 253–254 istiṣḥāb 86, 111, 340
iḥkām 146, 193, 202 ithbāt 91, 174, 188, 225, 357
iḥtiyāṭ 102, 114, 128 iʿtibār 165–166, 239, 243–244, 253
ʿijāz 68 iʿtiqād (pl. iʿtiqādāt) 31, 121, 152, 156, 201
ijāza 22–23, 25–29, 31, 33, 41, 46n155, iṭmiʾnān 121
47n168, 48, 83, 124 ʿitra 106
ijmāʿ 111, 114–115, 117, 292 ittibāʿ 101, 115, 281, 361
ijmāl 91, 236 ittibāʿ fī l-maʿnā 101, 281, 310, 315, 337, 361
ijtihād (pl. ijtihādāt) 5, 9n42, 13, 30, 35–36, ittibāʿ fī l-ṣūra 101, 281, 337
57, 61, 65–66, 82–84, 101–102, 111–112, Ittiḥādiyya 91
114–115, 132–133, 140, 142, 157, 260–263,
265–266, 268–287, 289–291, 293–306, jabr 68, 70, 94, 119, 133–134, 242, 248
308–309, 311–324, 330–331, 333–335, Jabriyya 94, 117–118, 241n154
337, 340, 342, 344–348, 353, 359, 360– jahl 90, 111, 159, 163
361 Jahmiyya 241n154
ikhtiyār 69, 117, 241, 247, 249n190 jāʾir 83, 139
ilāhiyya (pl. ilāhiyyāt) 105, 109 jalī 216, 242, 298
ʿilla (pl. ʿilal) 192n171, 214, 325–326, 328–332, jarḥ 124
334, 337 jazm 151–152, 163
ʿilm (pl. ʿulūm) 3–4, 60, 82, 90–92, 111, 151, jiha 242, 244, 246
152n7, 157, 160, 199, 200n11, 201n14, 202, jihād 63, 264
234n125, 257, 264, 303, 314 jismiyya 190, 246
al-ʿilm al-ḍarūrī al-ʿadī 151, 155, 160, 198, jumal (sg. jumla) 65, 68–69, 95, 147, 160–
352 161, 165–166, 169–170, 180, 198, 202, 216,
ʿilm al-ghayb 209 236, 244n163
al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm 147 ahl-jumal 67, 168
sābiq al-ʿilm 251 iktifāʾ bi-l-jumal 72, 168
ṭālib al-ʿilm (pl. ṭalaba) 284, 286 kifāyat al-jumal 145, 216
iltizām 113–114, 116, 335–337, 339, 344–347, jumlī 201–202, 217
360
ilzām 64, 131, 274n50 kāfir (pl. kuffār)
Imāmiyya 86–87, 145 kāfir taʾwīl (pl. kuffār taʾwīl) 66, 97, 102,
intifāʾ 163n46 135, 304, 307, 309, 328n215
intiqāl 344, 360 kāfir ṣarīḥ 97
irāda 69, 94, 198, 224, 229, 231, 232n118, 234, kalām 18, 21–22, 25n57, 26, 28–29, 32, 34, 46,
237, 239 (see also mashīʾa) 48–49, 52–53, 58, 64, 67, 69, 71, 72n74,
irjāʾ 69–70, 96, 133–134 80n115, 89–90, 93n189, 102, 111, 133–135,
iṣāba 264, 342, 200 145, 166, 172, 179, 181, 188–189, 199–201,
ishkāl 298 227n107, 257, 292–293, 301–303, 361

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kāmil 214, 318 matn 142

karāha 231, 239 mithl 225 (see also mumāthala)
karāmāt 38, 39n122 muʿaddilūn 133
kasb 70, 243, 245–247, 255–256 muʿjizāt 78
khabīr 74 muʿassirūn 65
khafī 83, 211, 213, 223, 242, 299 muʾawwal 111
khalaf 140 mubayyan 111, 296
khalq 122, 146, 243, 245n170, 250, 251n197, mubham 92–93
254 mubtadiʿūn 105
khāṣṣ 65n24, 111 mudhākirūn 323, 46n155
khāṭir 172, 248n185 muḥaddithūn 1, 67 (see also ahl al-hadīth)
khiṭāb 330, 332 muḥāl 212, 275n52
khulf 212 muḥaṣṣilūn 115n340, 272, 323, 332
khurūj 84, 139 muḥdith 177, 249
kufr 69, 93, 97, 134–135, 218 muḥkam (pl. muḥkamāt) 92, 148
muḥkim 193, 203
lafẓ 117, 332 muḥtamal 208
lugha 21, 34, 138, 292, 297, 299, 361 mujāhidūn 314
luṭf 74n81, 176, 223, 233, 249, 251 mūjib 158, 214, 254
mūjid 205
madhhab (pl. madhāhib) 34, 43, 51, 54, 100, mujmal 111, 183, 296
102, 106, 112n325, 115, 272, 277, 279, 282– mujtahid 7, 35n102, 36, 43, 45, 66, 82–83,
283, 289–290, 295, 297, 308, 311, 319, 97, 112–113, 260–279, 282–312, 323n196,
322–324, 326–334, 337–339, 341, 343, 324n200, 327, 329–331, 333–349, 359–
345, 359, 363 361, 365
madlūl 70, 161 mujtahid fī-l-madhhab 290, 319, 323n193,
mafāsid 62 332
mafhūm 330, 332 mujtahid muṭlaq 298
maḥabba 232 mukallaf (pl. mukallafūn) 62, 84, 154, 164,
māhiyya 238, 295 166, 170, 176, 222, 266, 280, 286
majāz 71, 111 mukhaṣṣiṣ 331
maʿjūz 179 mukhaṭṭiʾa 261
majhūl 102, 124, 132 mukhtār 242n154, 246
maʾkhadh 318, 329, 330 muktasab 152, 354 (see also istidlālī)
makhlūq (pl. makhlūqāt) 114, 146, 250 mulāzama 137, 234n125
makrūh 128 mumāthala 92, 225 (see also mithl)
malaka 313–314 mumtaniʿ 212
maʿnā (pl. maʿānī) 175n104, 177n112, 178, muqaddar 250
226, 246 muqallad 112, 281, 285 (see also mujtahid)
al-maʿānī wa-l-bayān 21, 34, 102, 292, muqallid 84, 112, 114, 116, 128, 279, 281–
295, 299–300 283, 285–287, 289–291, 315–319, 327,
maqdūr (pl. maqdūrāt) 203, 220–221, 228, 329, 335–337, 339–340, 343–345, 347–
254 349
maqdūr bayna qādirayn 245–246, 255– muqarribāt 106
256 murād 94, 233
maqṣad 63 murajjiḥ 204–205, 234n124, 236
marjūḥ 158, 317 murīdiyya 238
mashīʾa 69, 94 (see also irāda) Murjiʾa 69, 96, 135
maṣlaḥa (pl. maṣāliḥ) 62, 157, 213, 345 mursal 102, 124, 132

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index of arabic terms 395

muṣaḥḥiḥūn 115–116 qaṭʿ 71, 97, 163, 263

muṣawwiba 261 qaṭʿī 114, 156, 340
muṣīb 267 qāṭiʿ (pl. qawāṭiʿ) 97, 127, 162, 288
kull mujtahid muṣīb 4, 260–263 qawāʿid 127, 177, 272, 278, 322–323, 364
mustaftī 111–112, 304, 308, 330, 336–337 qawwām 118
mustaḥabb 128 qiyās 111, 205, 262n12, 290, 296, 324–325,
mustaḥīl 137 329, 331, 340
mustaqill 242 qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿalā l-shāhid 176, 238
mutaʾawwilūn 97, 102, 134, 327–328 (see also qudra 119, 227–228, 243, 245n169, 254
ahl al-taʾwīl) quwwa 173 (see also qudra)
mutābaʿa 101 (see also ittibāʿ)
muṭābaqa fī l-khārij 151, 156, 163 rafʿ al-ḥaraj 309–310
mutakallimūn 188, 301n132, 302n134 rajāʾ 69, 71, 96, 106–107, 210n44
mutashābih (pl. mutashābihāt) 71, 92, 128, rājiḥ 62–63, 133, 157–158, 213, 234
144, 147–148, 209–210, 218, 258, 357, riḍā 107, 238
365 riwāya 93, 135
mutawātir 97, 124, 161n38, 171n85 rubūbiyya 91, 144
muṭlaq 86, 329 rujḥān 155, 285 (see also tarjīḥ)
muyassirūn 65 rukhṣa 128, 364
ruʾya 68, 136, 138
nafy 137–138, 185, 188, 191
nafra 239 al-sabr wa-l-taqsīm 138
nafs 193–194, 295, 345n264 ṣaḥīḥ 84n128, 133, 141, 316
sukụn al-nafs 100, 151n5, 152, 156, 163, salaf 68, 94–95, 97n226, 116, 140, 145,
321 250n194, 309, 314–315, 361, 365
nahy 111 ṣawāb 264, 339
naqṣ 92–93, 169 shahwa 239
Nāṣiriyya 86–87 shakk 111, 114, 162
naskh 111 sharʿī 138, 232n118
naṣṣ (pl. nuṣūṣ) 92, 111, 140, 316, 326n205, sharṭ (pl. shurūṭ) 102, 165–166, 290, 345,
330, 332 361
naẓar 12, 63, 66, 80, 89–90, 113, 115, 145, 154– shayʾ 192, 225
155, 161–167, 172–174, 176, 178–179, 182, ṣifa (pl. ṣifāt) 182, 198, 224, 244–245
184, 186, 189, 195–196, 198, 248n185, 301, shukr 107
309, 330, 344, 354–356 sukhṭ 232

qabḥ 119, 243, 245n169 taʿadhdhara 274–275, 277–278

qadar 69, 234 taʿassara 274–275 (see also taʿadhdhara)
Qadariyya 242n154 taḍarruʿ 107
qadīm 191 taʿdīl 124
qādir 160, 245–246, 255–256 tafḍīl 338, 341n254, 343n256, 345
qadīr 166 tafṣīl 92–93, 198
qādiriyya 188, 227–228, 255 tafsīq 114, 299
qidam 234, 245n167 tafsīr (pl. tafāsīr) 21, 34, 93, 103, 293n105
qalb 165 tafwīḍ 40, 107
qarīna (pl. qarāʾin) 65, 78–79, 115, 154, taḥsīn 149
321n184 al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ 69, 94–96, 149, 153,
qaṣd 79 193, 206–208, 210, 221, 256
qāṣir 317–320, 324, 326, 334 tajazzuʾ 101, 312, 345, 360

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396 index of arabic terms

taʿjīz 202 tawallud 162, 165, 354

tajrīd 165 tawaqquf 186
tajsīm 67, 70, 190 tawātur 78–79, 97–98, 153–154, 157–158,
tajwīz 186 161n38, 171, 183, 195
takfīr 65, 68–69, 93, 96–97, 114 tawḥīd 91, 144, 344
takhrīj 278n62, 290, 321–335, 337, 345, 360 taʾwīl 71, 147–148, 193, 210, 224, 226n102,
taḳhṣīṣ 111, 326 258
taklīf 84, 95, 166, 170–171, 173, 176, 184, 206, ahl al-taʾwīl 66–68, 97, 102n255, 304–
208, 212–213, 217, 219, 283 305 (see also mutaʾawwilūn)
taklīf mā lā yuṭāq 70, 95, 97, 134, 212–213, taʿyīn 182, 242
251, 267, 273 taysīr 230, 249
takyīf 226n102 thabāt ʿinda l-tashkīk 151, 161, 163
ṭālib mumayyiz 101, 284, 288, 312, 315, 360 thubūt 90, 185n143
tamadhhub 92
tamassuk 346 ʿudhr 63
tamāthul 191, 228, 245, 357 ʿurf 138
tamkīn 222 uṣūl 53, 173, 260, 261n5, 289, 322, 325n203
tanaqqul 100, 114, 337, 340 (see also intiqāl) uṣūl al-dīn 21, 36, 55, 93n189, 175,
tanzīh 225 279n64, 292, 301–303, 309–310, 361
taqbīḥ 212 (see also al-taḥsīn wa-l-taqbīḥ) uṣūl al-fiqh 21–22, 25, 28–29, 34, 46–47,
taqdīr 94, 122, 251 49, 58, 111–113, 142, 205n30, 271, 276,
taqlīd 13, 25n56, 34, 36, 66, 72, 82–83, 292, 295–297, 300, 312, 329n217, 336,
84n128, 85, 90, 100–101, 111, 113–114, 346
116, 126, 132–133, 152, 163, 176, 201, 260, uṣūlān 21, 24, 29, 31
263, 274–275, 278–290, 308, 315–316, ʿuzla 38, 61–62
322, 324, 327–330, 333–334, 338, 340,
344–346, 348n269, 353, 360, 365 al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd 70–71, 93, 96
taqlīd al-mayyit (pl. al-amwāt) 101, 275, Waʿīdiyya 96
285, 287–289, 308, 328–329, 360 wājib 185, 222, 240
tarjīḥ 85, 115, 133, 140, 282, 317, 336–338, 341, wajh (pl. wujūh) 244, 245n169, 254
343n256, 344–346, 360 walāya 96
tarkīb 147, 180 wijāda 141
tartīb al-adilla 111, 301 wujūd 190, 245, 247
tartīb al-muqaddimāt 162n42, 164–166, 182, wuqūʿ 254
301–302, 354
taṣarruf 93 yaqīn 3–4, 90, 154, 363
taṣawwuf 25, 61
taṣdīq 121 ẓāhir (pl. ẓawāhir) 85–86, 92, 97, 111, 144,
tashābuh 2 228, 298
tashbīh 67, 225, 226n102, 357 Ẓāhiriyya 86–87, 202, 260
taṣḥīḥ 141 ẓann 92, 97, 111, 115, 152n7, 155–157, 159
tashkīk 151, 161, 163 ghālib al-ẓann 159, 268, 270, 304, 319–
taskīn 156 320, 336–337, 346–348, 359, 362
taṣwīb 262n11 ḥusn al-ẓann 96, 100, 106–108, 210, 353
taʿṭīl 225, 226n102, 357 ziyāda (pl. ziyādāt) 92–93, 169
tawakkul 40, 106–108, 353

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