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This book is a valuable contribution to the renaissance in civil-military rela-
tions scholarship. Baciu takes her place among a new generation of special-
ists who are refining the concepts and expanding the empirical ___domain that
undergird our understanding of what makes for effective civilian control.
She shows that traditional approaches to security sector reform by outsid-
ers like the EU have had mixed results in Pakistan and suggests that an
approach more focused on civilian development and empowerment might
work better.
— Peter D. Feaver (PhD, Harvard, 1990)
Professor of Political Science and Public Policy,
Duke University, North Carolina, USA
Director of the Duke Program in American Grand Strategy
Civil-Military Relations and Global
Security Governance

This book investigates the relationship between international security gov-

ernance, democratic civil-military relations and the relevance of strategy, as
well as of absolute and relative gains, in norms formation in hybrid orders.
Highlighting caveats of the legacy of Huntington’s paradigm of military
professionalism, the book applies a robust methodology and data collected
in four sample regions in Pakistan. It gauges the effects of international and
local actors’ support in the Security Sector Reform ___domain and examines
instances of civil-military interactions and military transition. The book
also analyses determinants and strategies that can influence them to demon-
strate the impact of global governance in norms diffusion, as well as of ab-
solute and relative utility gains and incentives in normative change. The
author generates a new theory pertaining to international organisations and
actors as determinants of transformation processes and consequently sheds
new light on the issue of global security governance, especially its impact on
civil-military relations and democratisation in hybrid orders.
The book will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in the field of
global governance, civil-military relations, grand strategy and foreign pol-
icy as well as Asian politics, South Asian studies, peace, security and stra-
tegic studies, International Relations and political science in more general.

Cornelia Baciu is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Foreign Policy Institute

at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, USA, where she was a 2019–
2020 DAAD Fellow in the programme ‘United States, Europe, and World
Order’. She is the co-editor, with John Doyle, of Peace, Security and Defence
Cooperation in Post-Brexit Europe (2019) and the Director of the Research
Network ‘European Security and Strategy’.
Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies
Edited by Subrata K. Mitra, Heidelberg University,
Germany and Rani Mullen
College of William and Mary, USA

South Asia, with its burgeoning, ethnically diverse population, soaring

economies, and nuclear weapons, is an increasingly important region in the
global context. The series, which builds on this complex, dynamic and vola-
tile area, features innovative and original research on the region as a whole
or on the countries. Its scope extends to scholarly works drawing on his-
tory, politics, development studies, sociology and economics of individual
countries from the region as well those that take an interdisciplinary and
comparative approach to the area as a whole or to a comparison of two or
more countries from this region. In terms of theory and method, rather than
basing itself on any one orthodoxy, the series draws broadly on the insights
germane to area studies, as well as the tool kit of the social sciences in gen-
eral, emphasizing comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes,
and the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. The series
welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from
young authors who have recently completed their doctoral dissertations.
URL: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Advances-in-South-Asian-
Studies/book-series/RASAS

40 The History of British Diplomacy in Pakistan

Ian Talbot

41 Civil-Military Relations and Global Security Governance

Strategy, Hybrid Orders and the Case of Pakistan
Cornelia Baciu

For a full list of titles, please see: https://www.routledge.com/asianstudies/

series/RASAS
Civil-Military Relations and
Global Security Governance
Strategy, Hybrid Orders and the
Case of Pakistan

Cornelia Baciu
First published 2021
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2021 Cornelia Baciu
The right of Cornelia Baciu to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of
the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,
or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record has been requested for this book

ISBN: 978-0-367-64758-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-12903-5 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra
For Daniel
Contents

List of figures xi
List of tables xiii
List of abbreviations xv
Foreword xvii
Preface and Acknowledgements xix

1 Introduction 1

2 Global security governance, multi-track diplomacy and

democratic change 11

3 Civil-military relations and military change 30

4 Mechanisms of democratic control in hybrid orders 43

5 Methodology and research design 51

6 Military change, democratisation and non-linear

transformation 66

7 The impact of non-state actors on security sector

reforms and democratic oversight 100

8 Key determinants of civil-military relations 131

9 Conclusion: towards a theory of civil-military relations

and international security governance 153

Annex 1. Anonymised list of interviews 175

Annex 2. Inter-coder reliability test 179
Annex 3. Standardised survey questions 181
Index 193
Figures

6.1 Preferences for National Security 67

6.2 Comparative Preferences for Peace and Security 69
6.3 Actors Who Should Participate in Security-Related Activities 71
6.4 Estimation of the Perceived Change in Civil-Military
Relations from t1 to t2 75
6.5 Type of NGO-Military Interaction 76
6.6 Estimation of the Civil-Military Balance of Power 86
6.7 Estimated Level of Civilian Control of the Military 88
6.8 Corruption, Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness in
Pakistan (1996–2017) 89
7.1 Non-Governmental Actors’ Perceived Impact on Peace and
Security 101
7.2 Distribution of Non-Governmental Organisations’ Area of
Operation 103
8.1 Net Official Development Assistance and GDP Per Capita
(1990–2015) 141
9.1 Elements of a Theory of Civil-Military Relations and
International Security Governance 155
Tables

3.1 Military and Non-State Actors Complementarity

and Functions 36
5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Data Used for the
Empirical Analysis 52
5.2 Pakistan as Insecure and Fragile State 58
8.1 NGO-Military Interaction and Strategy 132
8.2 NGO-Military Interaction and Vision towards Institutional
Change 137
Abbreviations

CBM Confidence-Building Measures

CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
CMCoord Civil-Military Coordination
COAS Chief of Army Staff
COIN Counter Insurgency
CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSO Civil Society Organisations
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
EUGS EU Global Strategy
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FIR First Information Report
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO International Organisation
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISPR Inter-Services Public Relations
JuD Jamaat-ud-Da’wah
KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba
NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority
NAP National Action Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NOC No Objection Certificate
NUST National University of Sciences and Technology
SSR Security Sector Reform
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Foreword

Cornelia Baciu has written an important book on how the states with partial
or tenuous democratic institutions adapt to democratic security processes.
Her work speaks to a growing literature that explores how norms are social-
ised to military actors, especially those that provide for civilian control and
prevent military involvement in politics. Scholars have proposed numerous
possible mechanisms in this respect, debating whether professionalism ei-
ther encourages or propels military involvement in politics. Other recent
studies explore (and cast doubt about) whether factors such as foreign mil-
itary education, security force assistance, joint training or other means of
exposure to foreign, democratic militaries can successfully promote a nor-
mative change of this kind. These studies tend to focus on top-down mech-
anisms, or military to military interaction and socialisation.
Baciu’s book suggests a new and exciting alternative mechanism: that it is
the low-level, regular interactions between non-governmental organisations
and international organisations that produce a change in cultural concep-
tions about the military’s role in society. The military then adapts and re-
sponds. She therefore describes how a normative change in militaries occurs
differently than previously understood. Militaries adapt their practices as a
result of broader features of global governance and the actors engaged in it.
Beyond these important contributions, Baciu offers an empirical one. She
deftly discusses the different actors involved in promoting democratic prac-
tices and enhanced security governance. The book also includes an impor-
tant new source material based on her interviews and surveys of Pakistani
military officials. That Baciu was able to complete these interviews is
impressive and a major contribution in its own right.
In sum, with this book, Baciu advances the study of security force as-
sistance, global governance and civil-military relations. She also offers
practical insights and ideas for actors seeking to strengthen the security
governance in fragile or hybrid settings. Her core insight is illuminating and
xviii Foreword
important: a military change occurs through larger social processes and the
impact of societal and international actors.

Risa Brooks, PhD

Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette
University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute, West Point, New York
Non-resident Senior Associate in the International Security Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC
Preface and Acknowledgements

This book was finalised during my DAAD Postdoctoral Fellowship at Paul

H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins
University, during a ‘working from home’ regime amid the COVID-19 pan-
demic, in my apartment in Washington, DC, only a few blocks away from
the White House. The final thoughts occurred in the context of heightened
civil-military relations in the United States, as the Pentagon distanced itself
from the Trump administration’s decision to deploy troops to the nation’s
capital to end protests that turned violent in the aftermath of the death of
George Floyd. Within days, the protests escalated, with extensive looting
and property destruction in downtown DC. In this context, approximately
1,600 active-duty troops were deployed to the DC area. It was unsettling
during my usual walks at the National Mall to observe dozens of troops
armed with semi-automatic weapons patrolling World War II Memorial and
proximities. The dystopian image of the DC national guards standing on
the stairs of the Lincoln Memorial was so suggestive of the developments –
this picture received global attention and outrage. Active-duty troops and
armoured vehicles patrolled on Pennsylvania Avenue, National Mall Park
and surroundings for days. The most prominent thought in my mind at that
time was: “So much military on the streets I have seen only in Pakistan!”.
Also, during the curfew that was issued for three consecutive days for Wash-
ington, DC, I had to recall the curfews I experienced during the field re-
search in conflict zones. But wait, the things here were yet different! Only
days after Trump’s bizarre photo op at St. John’s Episcopal Church near
Lafayette Square, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark
Milley apologised, and the Secretary of Defense Mark Esper declared that
he had not been informed about the photo op – both later testified on the
military’s role in civilian law enforcement before the US House Commit-
tee on Armed Services. It followed several days of op-eds and video mes-
sages by active and retired military generals, including by General Milley,
and letters issued by the Department of the Navy of the United States Na-
val Forces Europe-Africa, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
National Guard Bureau, inter alia. Those letters, op-eds and such a pro-
active military surprised many. In a revealing example of what we can call
xx Preface and Acknowledgements
a ‘paradox’ of military professionalism, the military’s message was all the
same: Americans have the freedom of peaceful assembly; the military is
committed to civilian oversight as per Constitution, but better do keep us
out from these protests, as military operations are not appropriate response
tools, and instead the root causes of the riots need to be addressed – “The
catalyst for the current situation may have been the death of Mr. George
Floyd, but we should all understand that the outrage sparked by his death
goes much deeper across many communities in our great Nation. (…) Bias,
prejudice and intolerance have no place on our team” (Department of the
Navy, 3 June 2020). It became quickly clear that, while there were many par-
allels, civil-military relations in a democracy were so much different than in
hybrid orders. And this was reinforcing exactly the argument made in this
book, which puts the base for a new theory of civil-military relations, and
which I am delighted to present to you.
The author is tremendously thankful to all civilian and military
representatives who agreed to be interviewed for this research, and whose
participation in this research was under strict anonymity and under the
auspices of the ethical approval obtained prior to the field research. With-
out their inputs, this work would not have been possible. The author
would like to acknowledge the funding by the Irish Research Council,
ZEIT-Stiftung Hamburg and YERUN Brussels for research relevant for
this book. I am sincerely grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for
their substantive engagement with this manuscript and extremely helpful
comments.
Special thanks to Professor Risa Brooks, Marquette University, and Pro-
fessor Peter Feaver, Duke University, for writing, respectively, the Foreword
and the endorsement for this volume. Their seminal scholarship has been
pivotal for advancing security studies and civil-military relations theories,
and was sine qua non for this book. Enormous thanks to my supervisors
in the research programme ‘United States, Europe and World Order’ at
Johns Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze SAIS, Professor Kristina Spohr
and Professor Daniel Hamilton, who have been extremely accommodating
of my research schedule and always responsive to my requests, with saga-
cious and wise pieces of advice. I am also profoundly appreciative of the
preeminent comments provided to the previous versions of this work by
Professor John Doyle, Dean and Director of the ‘Institute for International
Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction’ at Dublin City University, a pres-
cient scholar in peace and security studies, and to Associate Professor Walt
Kilroy for relentless exceptional advice and help with my scholarly work and
field research. Immense thanks go also to Emeritus Professor Subrata Mitra
of Heidelberg University and Dr. Jivanta Schöttli, Dublin City University.
I am also profoundly indebted to my lovely colleagues at the Foreign Policy
Institute and Kissinger Center for Global Affairs, Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity SAIS, Washington, DC, as well as to my former colleagues and peers
at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, and at the
 Preface and Acknowledgements xxi
University of Konstanz, who have been always supportive and understand-
able of my literally continuous working, sometimes until midnight, at the
weekends and on holidays – “When I come to the office you are here, when
I leave the office you are here, do you ever go home?” was a question that
I heard so many times in Dublin, Washington, DC, and Konstanz. And
finally, I am profoundly appreciative to my family in Iasi, Romania, and my
family in Emmendingen, Germany. Without my family in Romania, none
of this would have been possible. I wholeheartedly thank my mom, dad,
grandmother, sister, uncle and aunt, who have been always supportive of my
endeavours and sometimes seemingly unattainably high levels of ambition.
I was lucky to have studied and lived in seven countries on three continents.
Coming along has not always been easy. I understood immediately the cause
of the protests in Washington, DC, and the message of the Black Lives Mat-
ter movement. I dedicate this book to reaching more democratic, tolerant,
just and peaceful societies in the United States, Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Middle East and elsewhere in this great world.
1 Introduction

Approximately 12.4% of the global GDP was the estimated cost of conflict
and violence in 2017, while the development aid supplied by OECD coun-
tries was only 1.8% of that amount (OECD 2018; Institute for Economics
and Peace 2018a: 4). Under its global strategy and in conjunction with other
global governance actors such as the UN, 95% of the EU development aid
for conflict, peace and security was allocated to civilian peacebuilding,
conflict prevention and resolution, and security sector management and re-
form (European Parliament 2018: 6). Contrasting these efforts, the economic
impact of violence in insecure and transitional countries affected by mul-
tiple conflicts and complex sources of violence increased by 20% between
2007 and 2017 (Institute for Economics and Peace 2018a: 21); for example,
Pakistan was in the top five of the worst affected countries by terrorism and
conflict in the world during the same period (Institute for Economics and
Peace 2018b). The question why these imbalances still persist requires closer
scholarly inquiry. Putting together the pieces of this puzzle, the problem
that the book addresses is that of the impact of reforms promoted by global
actors, such as the EU, UN or the United States, on processes of democratic
institutional change in insecure and transitional states. It does so by inves-
tigating estimated changes in civil-military relations during periods of tran-
sition and how civil society organisations (CSOs) that many international
organisations (IOs) and actors support as avenues of democratisation can
contribute to a sustainable improvement of democratic security governance.
Existing donor approaches and strategies attempting to democratise
security governance via local actors are largely based on understandings
of multi-agency peace and security governance underpinned by classical
theories of civil-military relations and civilian oversight (Huntington 1957;
Pion-Berlin 1992). While much of the literature on civil-military relations
and the roles of non-state actors has focused on the conditions and deter-
minants of democratic civilian control in consolidated democracies, more
research is needed to adequately understand the conditions under which
democratic civil-military relations can occur in insecure, fragile or otherwise
transitional states in which democratic institutions are not fully established
and democratic and non-democratic types of actors co-exist – generically
2 Introduction
referred to as ‘hybrid orders’ throughout this book. To address this crucial
research gap, the book studies instances of civil-military interactions in a
post-military, hybrid context.
I argue that theories of civil-military relations and integrated, multi-agency
security do not provide sufficient propositions to allow for an elaborated
understanding of democratic oversight in insecure states in transition. Policy
approaches and strategies of international organisations and actors, includ-
ing those of the EU or the United States, to democratise security governance
using peace and security philosophies based on traditional theoretical un-
derstandings of democratic oversight of civil-military relations are not only a
mismatch with the reality on the ground, but attempts to pursue this type of
oversight as a goal are likely to be inefficient or even counterproductive. As I
emphasise in the middle-range theory proposed in this book and discussed in
detail in Chapter 9, in order to work and effectively democratise insecure and
hybrid environments, international security governance strategies need to
dedicate special attention to some crucial dimensions: (1) processes of check-
ing power and a system of checks and balances, given that powerful actors
can find innovative ways to perpetuate their power while co-existing with
other actors in a plural environment, and (2) avoiding the antagonistic effects
for democratic security processes by the interactions or actions of the actors
involved. In hybrid or fragile societies, formal processes of democratic civil-
ian oversight are difficult to expect. Especially countries that experienced
military coups d’état and have been exposed to multiple insecurities and
sources of threat require a strong defence agency. The argument developed in
this book is that IOs’ or actors’ attempts to democratise security governance
in hybrid orders, inter alia, via local actors such as CSOs or think tanks could
be associated with a transition of the military institution. Exposure to demo-
cratic norms diffusing from international actors and non-state organisations
is expected to stimulate and foster processes of change in the political culture
of the society, which becomes less inclined to accept a formal role in govern-
ment of the military or non-democratic forces. In response to changes, but
also to avail of important utility gains from international actors, the military
is found to undergo processes of adaptation and adopt new strategies to re-
main relevant. Thus, while civilian actors do not formally exert oversight,
they can yield some influence on the military to change and adapt.
Highlighting key strategies and determinants of civil-military interactions
and the role of internationally funded organisations in establishing demo-
cratic oversight in hybrid orders (i.e. fragile and insecure states in transi-
tion), this book proposes a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation
and military change. The book applies a case study design and a method-
ology based on primary data – 40 survey responses and 53 semi-structured
interviews – conducted by the author with senior representatives of the
military, civil society, government, media and academia. Ethical approval
was obtained prior to the field research from the Dublin City University Eth-
ics Committee. The research methodology employs a triangulation approach
 Introduction 3
encompassing process tracing and content analysis, as well as the use of com-
puter software NVivo and Stata. Based on the results, the book proposes
some key elements for a middle-range theory of civil-military adaptation in
insecure environments in transition. The findings are relevant for IOs and
actors such as the EU, UN or the United States, and inform their foreign
policy strategies about integrated peace and security mechanisms promoting
security sector transformation and societal resilience in hybrid orders.

Why this book matters

This book matters for four reasons. First, the insights presented increase our
understanding of the impact of IO reforms on civil-military relations and
democratic security governance. The book proposes a conceptual frame-
work of analysis linking global governance with theories of civil-military
relations and military change, which has not been done before. I argue that
militaries in hybrid orders do also undergo processes of change and this
book will explore whether such change is occurring, drawing on expert
perceptions. Based on the empirical findings, the book seeks to develop a
theory which can explain change and strategic adaptation in hybrid orders.
In the light of integrated, multi-agency security and counterterrorism
approaches, it is important to understand the relationship between the state,
market and society in providing democratic security. Integrated approaches
to security such as security sector reform (SSR) or comprehensive security
governance models “lack a consistent conceptualization” (Bruneau and
Matei 2008: 914; see also Bruneau 2015) in relation to crucial notions such
as legitimacy, accountability, sovereignty and leadership. Existing studies on
interactions between internationally funded local actors and military actors
focused exclusively on humanitarian action in the framework of civil-military
cooperation (CIMIC), civil-military interaction (CMI) and civil-military
coordination (CMCoord) approaches implemented by IOs in zones of war
or complex security crises. This book investigates interactions between ci-
vilians and the military in hybrid orders. To this end, using primary data,
the book examines interactions occurring at both ‘operational’ level (Green-
wood and Balachandran 2014: 17) (Track 2 and Track 3) and higher political
level (Track 1.5). The book explores the strategic choices of local actors such
as non-governmental organisations (NGOs)1 to engage in security-related
work (or not) and, when they do, it explores their perceptions of how the
military has reacted. Do different strategies result in different institutional
responses? How do non-state actors and others perceive it as having had any
impact of their work on the democratisation of security governance, and in
particular, do they perceive it has had any impact on civil-military relations
in general? In addition, the book identifies the factors that could influence
NGO-military relations and helps to explain which determinants can foster
relations and which determinants can hinder them. While many IOs (EU,
UN, NATO and OSCE) and actors (the United States2) fund and implement
4 Introduction
projects in fragile states with limited institutional capacity and do this by
utilising integrated security approaches, these yield for a more critical the-
oretical assessment. Most of these approaches advocate a notion of civilian
control based on a narrow institutionalist approach, which is less likely to be
present in fragile, insecure countries and can be conceptually incompatible
with multi-agency approaches of security advocating strategic interdepend-
ence. This book seeks to elaborate key concepts for better understanding
civil-military relations in post-modern peacebuilding and security govern-
ance approaches. The findings will inform EU, UN and US grand strategies
about how to bring instances of SSR and civilian control and inclusive and
accountable governance in a coherent relationship.
First, the book is beneficial to address some crucial shortcomings in
global governance approaches: existing IOs’ and foreign actors’ approaches
and strategies attempting to democratise security governance via local
actors are largely based on understandings of peace and security under-
pinned by classical theories of civil-military relations and civilian oversight
(Huntington 1957; Pion-Berlin 1992), which largely trace their conclusions
from evidence in established democracies. Much of the existing literature on
civil-military relations and the roles of non-state actors has focused on the
conditions and determinants of democratic civilian control in consolidated
democracies; hence, more research is needed to adequately understand the
conditions under which democratic civil-military relations can occur in
hybrid orders. To address this crucial research gap, this book studies in-
stances of civil-military interactions in contested hybrid orders exposed to
a complex constellation of security threats, using interviews and surveys
conducted in four sample regions in Pakistan. By applying a mixed-method
approach and data triangulation, and presenting numerous examples from
other hybrid orders, the book sets a solid base for conceptualising the role
of international reforms in achieving democratic oversight and cooperative
civil-military relations in insecure orders of limited statehood exposed to
complex insecurities and risks. Applying a systematised and highly robust
research methodology, the book proposes some key elements for a theory of
civil-military adaptation generalisable to the population of hybrid orders –
i.e. fragile and insecure states in transition.
Second, the findings make a contribution to theories of civil-military
relations and civilian control. Currently, “much of the existing debate uses a
narrowly defined institutionalist approach, in the sense that it focuses on the
formal political and legal mechanisms through which the civilian sector con-
trols the military” (Cottey et al. 2002: 40). However, fragile and developing
countries are likely to lack highly institutionalised forms of governance and
rule of law. While existing civil-military theories make predictions about the
impact of structural factors on civil-military relations, there is currently no
coherent theory explaining the role of ‘agency’ in form of “strategic inter-
actions between civilian and military actors” (Croissant et al. 2013: 43; see
also Croissant and Kuehn 2011: 213) in countries in transition. Particularly
 Introduction 5
because of the “interplay between agency and the environment” (Croissant
et al. 2013: 43), it is important to understand what conditions facilitate and
what conditions hinder democratic control of armed forces in asymmetric
environments. By exploring internal and external intervening factors in
the relationship between military and civilians, the book seeks to develop
a middle-range theory that is able to better explain the behaviour of state
institutions and policy development in the context of perceived internal
and external threats and identify the conditions for effective civil-military
collaboration. The need for “a clearer sense of what factors encourage or in-
hibit smooth civil-military coordination” (Staniland 2008: 362) or a theory
of civilian control that addresses “the conditions under which delegation
happens and identify hypotheses about factors that shape the delegation
in observable ways” (Feaver 1996: 169) is clearly underlined in the litera-
ture. Existing empirical evidence (Croissant et al. 2013) shows that factors
conceptualised by previous theories, such as professionalisation of armed
forces (Huntington 1957, 1962), fail to provide sufficient explanation for
the mechanisms of democratic control. By “transcend[ing] the concept of
professionalization” (Feaver 1996: 169), a new middle-range theory, gener-
alisable to the population of insecure, hybrid orders, can facilitate a better
understanding of the interactions between perceived threats and domestic
politics (Staniland 2008: 362). The book draws on military and civilian per-
ceptions of engagement, continuity or change. If a pattern of behaviour and
a pattern of perceptions of behaviour on civil-military interactions can be
identified and systematised, this can provide a new source of empirical in-
formation by which to judge a possible change in the military posture. This,
in turn, can allow us to draw some tentative conclusions as to whether non-
state actors perceive that their engagement with the military has tended to
strengthen or weaken democratic influence or the military. Ultimately, in
the absence of democratic control, do such interactions build gradual re-
straints on the freedom of action enjoyed by the military in Pakistan and
other hybrid orders, or at least raise the perceived costs of any attempt to
further strengthen military power over civilian competencies?
Third, this book fills a critical gap in the field of military change. The book
aims at complementing the literature on military institutional change, dem-
ocratic innovation and transformation by exploring the process of transfor-
mation in hybrid orders. “[M]ilitary transformation has become one of the
permanent activities of the most developed countries since the end of the
Cold War” (Prezelj et al. 2016), with much of the literature in this ___domain
exploring predominantly units from Western or developed countries (Colom
Piella 2016; Coticchia 2016; Edmunds et al. 2016; Fevolden and Tvetbråten
2016; Norheim-Martinsen 2016). Many studies analyse the process of military
transformation from the perspective of military capabilities and technologi-
cal modernisation (Knox and Murray 2001; Jasper 2009; Cohen 2010; Farrell
et al. 2010), but there is a research gap related to the processes of change
pertaining to military doctrine, strategy and culture and how (and if) armed
6 Introduction
forces interaction with civil society is an opportunity to gain some insights
into the relatively closed world of military doctrine in partly democratic so-
cieties and hybrid orders. I argue that militaries in countries with traditional
societies do also undergo processes of change and this book explores whether
the military and civilians interviewed perceive that such change is occurring.
Based on the empirical findings, the book seeks to develop a conceptual
framework to study change and strategic adaptation in hybrid orders.
Fourth, the book seeks to make an empirical contribution. The findings
are informed by original data and a data triangulation methodology, being
associated with increased validity. In hybrid orders imperilled by multidi-
mensional security threats, the maximisation of knowledge and harness of
data can help international global governance actors to make better eval-
uations and assessments. The study of integrated security and democratic
change in insecure, hybrid orders requires a complex research design, able
to capture the multitude of relationships, interactions and transfers of
knowledge, agency and power. I propose a methodology encompassing con-
tent analysis and process tracing for studying perceptions related to military
change and hybrid peace and security. Research on civil-military relations
based on primary data is much needed. Less than 15% of the literature in
Armed Forces and Society is relying on interviews, targeted or mass surveys
and questionnaires, with 73% tracing conclusions from secondary sources
(Olmeda 2015: 71). Explaining military doctrine and change in hybrid orders
might be challenging. It is almost impossible to know what the military is
thinking; thus, a content analysis of key strategic documents would most
likely not be an accurate measure of the variables of interest. The estima-
tion of perceptions via interviews and survey responses in sample regions
can have a methodological value added in studying changes in civil-military
relations in fragile, insecure states. The book provides a comprehensive da-
taset comprising observations from more than 90 data points (53 interviews
and 40 survey answers) related to civil-military relations. This dataset
will be particularly valuable for future empirical research, considering the
sparse availability of data from middle- and micro-level from countries
facing conflicts, insecurity and violence.

Book structure
The book is organised as follows: the next two chapters (Chapters 2 and
3) elucidate how normative power, global security governance and civil-
military relations are linked, focusing in particular on conceptual issues
related to sovereignty, legitimacy, power, security and democracy but also
on the tensions between different sites of agency and ‘knowledge production’
(Richmond 2017). The fourth chapter discusses the research gap addressed
and the contribution of this book, dedicating specific attention to mecha-
nisms of democratic control during periods of transition and the role that
local actors – funded by IOs or foreign actors such as the EU, UN, OSCE
or the United States – could play. The fifth chapter presents some crucial
 Introduction 7
methodological considerations explaining how the conclusions of this book
are reached. The sixth, seventh and eighth chapters present the findings of
the empirical analysis and discuss processes of military change, the impact of
local actors on democratisation processes and security governance-related
dynamics, as well as the major factors influencing civil-military interac-
tions. The last chapter summarises the results and outlines the elements of a
theory of civil-military adaptation, while also highlighting the implications
of the findings for policy and further research. In the following, I discuss the
structure of each chapter in detail.
Chapters 2 and 3 define the key concepts that inform the analysis and
findings of this book. The analytical framework is at the intersection of
approaches of global security governance – which seek to link domestic
and liberal (international) orders (Mac Ginty 2011; Schroeder et al. 2014;
Richmond 2016) and on which international actors’ (the EU, United States,
UN, OSCE, NATO) strategies are based – and theories of civil-military re-
lations and military change. These two conceptual clusters are beneficial for
studying processes of change and adaptation of security and defence institu-
tions in hybrid orders because they are underpinned by logics of pluralism,
everyday life, change and friction, which are predominant in transitional
environments. These chapters elaborate on the different aspects of power,
legitimacy, sovereignty and tensions between various normative orders.
Chapter 4 discusses the research gap that this book addresses and the con-
tribution that the book makes. Civilian oversight and democratic security
governance constitute key elements for building resilience and empowering
societies in fragile states, a goal that is normatively envisioned by the EU
global strategy for security and foreign policy. The book examines demo-
cratic oversight and the democratisation of security governance, as well as
the role of local actors funded by IOs such as the EU/European countries or
the United States. Local actors, such as NGOs and think tanks, become rele-
vant given that they are, to a significant extent, responsible for designing and
implementing democracy promotion activities of normative powers such as
the European Union or the United States. The major research gap addressed
in this book is the lack of a coherent set of theoretical propositions in relation
to the link between effective mechanisms to strengthen democratic civilian
control in hybrid orders located in difficult security and geopolitical envi-
ronments, on one side, and the role of local actors, funded by IOs, in democ-
ratisation processes, on the other side. The major contribution of the book
consists of developing and proposing some key elements of a middle-range
theory of civil-military adaptation and global governance in hybrid contexts.
Chapter 5 presents the methodological considerations and the analytical
approach employed and explains how the conclusions of this book are reached.
The findings of this book are informed by primary empirical evidence in form
of key informants’ perceptions, i.e. survey responses and semi-structured
interviews. These were conducted by the author with senior representatives
of NGOs, media, academia, military (mainly retired) and government on
the state of civil-military relations and the role of (internationally funded)
8 Introduction
non-governmental actors. Process tracing and content analysis are applied
as research methods. The mixed methodological approach (two different
types of data and two analysis methods) was chosen to deal with the problem
of information volatility in fragile environments. The chapter also describes
how the data were coded using NVivo and justifies the case selection.
Chapters 6–8 present and critically discuss the results of this book. Chapter
6 estimates the level of perceived military change based on the respondents’
opinions, which is a first step in assessing the impact of international ac-
tors and reforms in hybrid orders. The results show that while there is some
visible change in military’s strategic preferences for peace and security and
overall improvement in civil-military relations, the processes of military
transformation are rather asymmetric and incomplete, and the military
continues to maintain the upper hand in politics. Weak government capac-
ity generates a power vacuum that enables the armed forces to interfere and
perpetuate asymmetric power relations. Chapter 7 discusses whether and
how local actors supported by IOs and donor governments can contribute to
the democratisation of security governance and security institutions, includ-
ing the military, in an insecure and fragile context. Four different functions
of local actors in stimulating democratic reforms of security and defence
institutions and governance are evaluated: input legitimacy, output legiti-
macy, diagonal accountability and civilian oversight, and ‘elite pacting’, i.e.
facilitating the process of transfer of power from old to new nomenclatures
(see Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). The results suggest that local actors
have limited capacity and possibility to increase direct diagonal accounta-
bility and civilian oversight, output legitimacy or elite pacting. Nonetheless,
they can be impactful in stimulating citizens’ development and participa-
tion, i.e. input legitimacy and indirect diagonal accountability, and aware-
ness building. Awareness building can overall improve the political culture
of both citizens and institutions. Chapter 8 assesses the major determinants
that can influence the nature and circumstances of civil-military relations
and NGO-military relations in particular. It is found that the typologies
of strategy used by non-state actors can influence civil-military coopera-
tive outcomes. Organisations having clear strategies in place to co-opt
the military in their activities are more likely to interact with the military
and engage in synergies or even partnerships. The vision and strategy with
regard to institutional change, i.e. how an organisation attempts to democ-
ratise and change the political culture and security institutions, was also
found to be a determinant of civil-military relations. The military can be
more reluctant and even conflictual towards organisations adopting more
radical approaches of change and transformation. The findings suggest that
democratic security change might be more likely to occur via actors that do
not have explicit objectives to change things, but work on social and politi-
cal development and empowerment instead. Foreign funding can be both an
impediment and a facilitator of NGO-military cooperation. Weak institu-
tional and implementation capacity, political parties and media were found
 Introduction 9
to be further significant determinants in processes of change of security in-
stitutions and governance.
Chapter 9 concludes this book by discussing the substantive implications
of the findings and proposing some key elements for a middle-range theory
of civil-military adaptation and global governance in hybrid orders. As this
concluding chapter highlights, transparency and mechanisms of ‘checking
power’ – facilitated, inter alia, through incentives and support from IOs –
but also effective local actors’ contributions to ‘building power’ and will for
democratic change constitute some key dimensions of a middle-range theory
of civil-military relations and global security governance in hybrid orders.

Notes
1 Throughout this book, local actors, non-governmental organisations, civil
society organisations, civil society actors and non-state actors are used inter-
mittently. They refer to actors formally registered as NGOs.
2 China also implements substantial projects in fragile or transitional states; how-
ever, these are to a lesser extent underpinned by integrated security approaches,
and are instead based on financial loans.

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2 Global security governance,
multi-track diplomacy and
democratic change

Multi-agency peace and security approaches of the EU,

NATO, OSCE and the United States
A new political and security order dominated by permanently evolving se-
curity risks and system instability emerged post-Cold War and particularly
after 2000. This stimulated international organisations (IOs) (EU, UN,
OSCE, NATO) and global powers, such as the United States, to adopt
pluralistic policy models, based on institutional cooperation, multilateral
decision-making, inclusiveness, interdependence and power-sharing mech-
anisms (Linklater 2016: 77). A multipolar architecture of the international
system complemented by multilateralism was believed to ensure greater
stability and system resilience, after the ‘failure’ of the bipolar balance of
power in 1989, which constituted a key momentum for democratic change
across the world. In an increasingly globalised, interdependent and plural-
istic world order, authority was distributed among multiple actors such as
IOs – e.g. European Union, United Nations, OSCE, NATO – civil society
groups such as NGOs and think tanks, private actors and other stakehold-
ers. With the hope of working on changing state preferences of going to
war (Mearsheimer 1994/5: 7) and bringing democracy from below (Schirch
2010), i.e. bottom-up, non-state actors gained a prominent role in the crea-
tion of normative spaces and assistance to nation-states in key areas such as
development, democratisation and security. Responsibilities and functions
performed traditionally by the state in sectors such as development, secu-
rity, education and poverty reduction have started to be taken, though in
a temporally uneven process1, by non-state actors (Mathews 1997). Mostly
with funding from IOs, notably the EU, UN or the World Bank’s Interna-
tional Development Association, and foreign governments, e.g. the United
States, Germany, Japan or Norway, NGOs specialised in specific thematic
areas started to capacitate states in hybrid orders. In this context, models
of hybrid (pluralistic) security envisaging objectives of strategic integration
and inclusion began to be promoted. Aimed at overcoming shortcomings of
zero-sum, bipolar conceptions of reality, these models promote the simulta-
neous existence of a plurality of identities, processes and actors with diverse
ideological and organisational structures. Such multi-agency systems allow
12 Global security governance
a plurality of centres of power and a subsequent concept of sovereignty
shared between several authorities or alternating between different actors
to exist.
Some of the most prominent policy instruments encompassing multi-
agency models of security are: security sector reform (SSR) (Brzoska 2003;
Edmunds 2004, 2008; Fluri and Hadžić 2004); the counterinsurgency
(COIN) model (Kilcullen 2006, 2010), comprehensive security (Schmid 2007;
Drent 2011; Ehrhart 2011; Wittkowsky 2012; Council of the European Un-
ion 2013; NATO 2018) and whole-of-government approaches (OECD 2006;
Christensen and Lægreid 2007). The main attributes of multi-agency security
approaches are “integration, cooperation, inclusivity, and cohesion” as well
as hybrid processes aimed at “dissolv[ing] boundaries” and stimulating the
emergence of “shared interests and values” (Duffield 2001; Goodhand 2013:
287). ‘Friction’ “between the exporters and importers” of these approaches
(Goodhand 2013: 288; Millar et al. 2013) is anticipated to occur, particularly
between actors with different ideological and organisational structures, such
as military and civilian actors, including NGOs. Processes of friction, often
in the form of resistance, disagreement and sometimes conflict, emphasise
the normative imperative for strategic integration of the plurality of aims
and organisational structures as well as the challenges thereafter.
The SSR (Brzoska 2003; Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder 2004; Edmunds
2004, 2008; United Nations 2008, 2012, 2014; Schnabel and Born 2011;
European Commission, High Representative of the Union for the Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy 2016) was designed by the international commu-
nity to reflect the changes in the understanding of security post-Cold War.
SSR and the enhancement of “partners’ capacities to deliver security within
the rule of law” are clear objectives of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) on
security and foreign policy of 2016 (European Union 2016: 26). With a focus
on “democratisation, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention, and
post-conflict reconstruction” (Bruneau 2011: 42), SSR refers to “the pro-
cess through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organ-
izational demands of transformation” (Edmunds 2007: 25), in other words,
the reform of security governance in hybrid orders. Reforms and sustainable
processes of transformation in the SSR framework aim at advancing good
governance, the rule of law, civilian oversight of the security and defence
sector, the justice sector as well as the disarmament, demobilisation and re-
integration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Cottey et al. 2002; Ball 2005; Ghebalia
and Lambert 2007; US Agency for International Development et al. 2009: 2;
Bleiker and Krupanski 2012; UN 2012). SSR’s structural focus is centred on
two axes: (1) building power (instruments) and (2) checking power (accounta-
bility) (van Veen and van den Boogaard 2016: 307). The reinforcing objectives
of ensuring both democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the security
sector (OECD 2000) might overcome the classic dilemma of democratic ci-
vilian control, i.e. how much control should be exerted over the armed forces
in order to maintain both democratic institutions and military effectiveness.
 Global security governance 13
Thus, SSR marks a sustainable transition from a Clausewitzian understand-
ing of war and peace, in which the means of security and defence resided
exclusively with the state, towards a more inclusive and less lethal model.
Sustainable security and peace are exogenous to the success of cooperation
“among a wider array of military and civilian institutions” (Fluri and Hadžić
2004; Bruneau and Matei 2008: 913; Council of the European Union 2016),
inter alia, armed forces, intelligence agencies, political institutions, civilian
defence institutions (e.g. police) and civil society (NGO, mass media, aca-
demia, think tanks). This interdependent model prevents the accumulation
of power by distributing it among several actors and fostering checks-and-
balances among them. Multiple links and interdependence increase system
stability, resilience and efficiency by decreasing transaction costs as well as
the risk of defection or non-compliance and by enhancing innovation.
COIN represents another major policy instrument – developed by the
United States as part of its foreign security policy, most particularly in
Afghanistan, Iraq and parts of Pakistan (particularly in the FATA region)
(Khan 2012). COIN should not be confused with SSR, as the two approaches
are very different. Goodhand (2013: 291) argues that COIN “can be under-
stood as competition for governance, with the ultimate goal being less about
killing the enemy than about ‘out-governing’ them”, while Kilcullen (2006:
4) claims that COIN aims simultaneously at promoting both ‘effectiveness’
and ‘legitimacy’. Nonetheless, COIN, and here is a major distinction from
SSR, has been designed for post-intervention environments in order to
more effectively defeat insurgency rather than build sustainable long-term
security. It has also been highly militarised in its practical application in
Afghanistan and Iraq, with the military taking over development functions
rather than building civil-military relations. Given COIN’s less efficient per-
formance on the ground, especially in the context of Afghanistan, this book
embraces a more SSR-focused approach.
The comprehensive security and whole-of-government approach adopted
by the European Union and NATO (Drent 2011; Council of the European
Union 2016; NATO 2016) represents a further policy instrument epitomis-
ing pluralistic designs of peace and security and hybrid interactions. The
comprehensive model is based on concepts of shared responsibility and
networked security (Jaberg 2009; Gareis 2010; Borchert and Thiele 2012;
Wittkowsky 2012) and entails a mix of civilian and military actors and in-
struments (Ehrhart 2011: 66). Depending on the conflict potential and stage,
networked security can take the form of information exchange, coordina-
tion, cooperation and integrated action (‘integriertes Handeln’) (Wittkowsky
2012: 1). The EUGS on Foreign and Security Policy 2016 reiterated the prin-
ciple of “practical and principled way in peacebuilding” and comprehensive
security involving the whole society and state institutions, as well the synergy
between “soft and hard power” (European Union 2016: 4, 9).
The novelty of these hybrid policy models, despite their different em-
phases, lies in their inclusive character, advocating the involvement of
14 Global security governance
a plurality of actors, and ontological foundation on the development-
democracy-security nexus. SSR and comprehensive security aim, at least
theoretically, at fostering system resilience and effectiveness by promoting
human development and inclusive security ‘from the ground up’ (Leder-
ach 1997; Paris et al. 2009; Schirch 2010; Schroeder et al. 2014) and preven-
tive approaches to eliminate terrorism, militancy and insurgency such as
countering violent extremism (CVE) by preventing radicalisation. Human
development through combating poverty and education as well as good gov-
ernance represent necessary conditions of sustainable peace models (Lipset
1959; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009). Thus,
integrated security paradigms encompass “aid, political, military, security,
rule of law and governance interventions under one overarching political
objective” (Metcalfe et al. 2012: 6). Eliminating threats to internal security
(US Department of Defense 2010: 75) or international security (OECD 2008:
185, 199), promoting universally recognised values such as human rights,
sustainable peace, rule of law, good governance and democratic principles
(NATO 2018) and supplying political coherence to social, economic and
political spheres (OECD 2005/2008; OECD 2011) constitute overarching
objectives of integrated security approaches. Particularly in hybrid orders
affected by armed conflict, insurgency and terrorism, which lack political
and institutional capacity to deal with these security risks in a sustainable
and democratic manner, multi-agency security models can provide a nor-
mative framework for democratising security.
Most of the global security approaches are conceptually underpinned by
theories of multi-agency peace and security, which replaced IR approaches
of liberal peace. The following sub-section critically highlights these key
conceptual assumptions.

Post-Westphalian security governance and multi-agency peace

Approaches of multi-agency, hybrid, post-Westphalian peace and security
governance emerged to reflect the changes in the nature of security in the
21st century and have developed in reaction to the failure of models based
on ‘liberal peace’. Liberal peace rests on conceptual foundations of the
democratic peace theory and preceded multi-agency security approaches.
Democratic or liberal peace theory argues that the way to achieve ‘eternal
peace’ (Kant 1795) is a liberal and democratic system of governance, based
on market economy and democratic values (Schumpeter 1955; Doyle 1986;
Kurtenbach 2010). The logic of liberal peacebuilding is that democracies
and liberal states based on “individual rights as equality before the law, free
speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representa-
tion” (Doyle 1986: 1151) are peaceful and would not fight wars against each
other due to their commitment to peaceful values as well as due to rational-
istic accounts such as the costs of aggression. This hypothesis was provided
confirmatory support by several empirical studies which found a correlation
 Global security governance 15
between democracy and peace (Haas 1974; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Bremer
1992; Ray 1993; Rummel 2016). However, the liberal (democratic) peace the-
ory as well as the policy models based on it (and discussed in the upcoming
sub-section) had come under intense critique after the US interventions in
Afghanistan and Iraq (inter alia), which increased reluctance in top-down
approaches. Assessments of the role and impact of IOs, donors and for-
eign governments in promoting peace by top-down regulatory governance
have suggested a partial failure of the initial post-Cold War institutionalist
‘statebuilding project’ (Richmond 2014, 2016). Institutionalist theories are
argued to be inherently flawed (because they fail to integrate relative gains)
(Mearsheimer 1994/5: 19), and can thus have only a limited impact on chang-
ing political preferences or behaviour, e.g. of going to war. This has led to a
paradigmatic shift in the understanding of security and the actors involved
in providing it. The logic of the new, post-liberal peace and security par-
adigm reflected by multi-agency approaches post-2000 was to (1) promote
democratic change, transformation and inclusive models of security govern-
ance that would enable the sustainable emergence of peace from below, i.e.
bottom-up, and (2) empower local communities and disadvantaged groups.
Post-liberal peace advocates that in order to be just and sustainable, peace
and security need to ‘form’ from below and ‘engage with the local’ (Rich-
mond 2014: 195). Drawing on post-Clausewitzian understandings of (post)
modern wars, which claim more ‘dovish’ instead of ‘hawkish’ approaches to
peace, post-Westphalian concepts of peace and security claim that sustain-
able peace and stability requires multilateral and negotiated efforts that can
result in inclusive and genuine approaches to security, owned by all relevant
actors, beyond nation-states. This is understood as pluralist, networked en-
vironments of daily practice, interaction and decision-making, entailing a
mix of actors with different views and continuous processes of negotiation
and contestation. Multi-agency peace and security paradigms became es-
sential part of IOs’ and US approaches in their strategies to democratise
security governance in fragile, transitional orders.
The post-liberal framework is essentially a revised version of the liberal
peacebuilding theory, while it “still remain[s] cognizant of the liberal peace
and its norms, technologies, capacities and advantages” (Visoka 2015: 543).
The main development consists in the replacement of the exclusively top-
down (liberal) approaches with a hybrid model of governance (Mac Ginty
2011; Luckham and Kirk 2013; Bagayoko et al. 2016), underpinned by ‘nor-
mative pluralism’ (Riches 2017). This is operationalised as bottom-up and
multidimensional processes involving a multitude of interdependent actors,
mechanisms, dynamics and relationships, and formal and informal types
of interactions between them. These hybrid interactions are assumed to
take place between “rational actors motivated by claims to power, justice,
entitlements and welfare”, and to result in “dynamic change and transfor-
mation” (Visoka 2017: 308, 319). The outcomes of these interactions are
strongly influenced by “contextual dynamics of negotiation, co-optation,
16 Global security governance
domination, resistance, assimilation and coexistence” as well as “everyday
practice” (Visoka 2017: 308). Given the complexity of “lineages, assem-
blages and figuration processes” (Visoka 2017: 319) that occur in hybrid pro-
cesses, the outcomes are non-linear and influenced by a non-exhaustive set
of determinants.
Beyond the theoretical debate, it is worth exploring the approaches of
multi-agency (multi-track) peace and security employed at policy level, by
IOs, Unites States and donors in their strategies to democratise security
governance in fragile states affected by complex insecurities.

Multi-track diplomacy in security governance

Non-state organisations and local actors, such as NGOs and think tanks,
can be part of the so-called alternative tracks of diplomacy, i.e. unofficial
channels of diplomacy which can feed into and complement Track 1 dip-
lomatic actions (Chataway 1998). While, traditionally, Track 1 diplomacy
is assumed to be most efficient, recent findings (Böhmelt 2010) reveal that
‘multi-track diplomacy’, understood as interaction between several track
activities and combined efforts (Montville 1991; Diamond and McDonald
1996; Mapendere 2000; D’Estrée et al. 2001), can be more effective than
Track 1 efforts alone, particularly in cases of third-party interventions and
mediation (Böhmelt 2010: 175). In this book, the role of non-state actors and
local actors in multi-track diplomacy in security governance is conceptually
replicated based on Lederach’s (1997) multi-track conflict resolution ap-
proach implying the involvement of multiple actors and types of interactions.
Following a similar logic, I argue that, multi-track security governance is
underpinned by an understanding of ‘positive peace’ (Galtung 1967), and in-
volves actors ranging from IOs to local actors such as NGOs, academia and
think tanks, and the interaction between them. In this setting, non-state and
local actors foster civic and political participation and democratic change
(Edwards and Foley 2001: 6) at grassroots (Track 3) or middle level (Track 2)
and/or transfer the preferences of specific social groups, e.g. women, ethnic
groups, people from rural areas or different zones of conflict, at institu-
tional level (Track 1.5).
Overall, non-state actors can trigger institutional change and transforma-
tion by providing: input legitimacy, output legitimacy, diagonal accounta-
bility or ‘elite pacting’ (bridging function) (see also Baciu 2019).
First, civil society organisations can play a role in the democratisation of
security governance by increasing input legitimacy, i.e. citizens’ participa-
tion (Scharpf 1997; Zürn 2000: 183–4). Civil society and non-profit groups
could act as communication networks, which through their work in one of
three broad categories of action, service delivery, advocacy or education
(Goel 2004: 29) can aggregate the needs and interests of the community at
institutional level, exerting thus “representative or contestatory functions
of social organizations outside the state” (Edwards and Foley 2001: 6).
 Global security governance 17
Particularly in countries in which democratic mechanisms are not well
established, non-state actors animating citizen involvement can democ-
ratise public decision-making by enabling participation. In this case, the
institutionalisation of the democratic change – which is sine qua non for the
sustainable consolidation of democratic structures – is likely to depend on
the local actors’ performance and “ability to build networks and alliances
that include reformers inside government” (Shankland 2006: 3). In par-
ticular NGOs doing advocacy work are expected to have greater interest
in communicating, transferring or integrating their preferences at policy
level. By articulating the preferences of local communities, NGOs can
foster an inclusive and democratic system, in opposition to a democracy
“depend[ing] almost exclusively on elite interactions” (Mainwaring 1989: 11).
This type of role is potentially crucial in societies like Pakistan, where the
formal role of elected institutions in providing oversight of the military is
almost meaningless, and seeking to empirically measure the actual impact
of international reforms in democratising civil-military relations is there-
fore important.
Second, non-state organisations, particularly those specialised in certain
thematic areas, can increase system effectiveness or output legitimacy,
i.e. the amount of ‘beneficial consequences’ or citizens’ ‘utility gains’ by
promoting the ‘welfare of the constituency in question’ (Sternberg 2015: 615;
see also Scharpf 1997). Academic scholars as well as research-oriented or-
ganisations can play a role in initiating or animating public policy debates
and reforming the security sector by shifting the normative focus (Cawthra
and Luckham 2003: 309) to human security and more sustainable inclusivist
security approaches, while highlighting the shortcomings and side-effects of
purely militaristic strategies in efficiently eliminating security risks, as evi-
dence from South Africa demonstrated (Cawthra 2003: 41). An active CSO
role in democratisation by providing output legitimacy transcends a purely
proceduralist understanding of democracy, in which decisions are taken
based on democratic principles, i.e. “everyone affected by a decision should
have a chance to participate”, “regardless of the content of the decision”
(Zürn 2000: 186), and it adds conditions that can enhance the quality of
outcomes and increase the effectiveness of the “solutions provided to soci-
etal problems” (Bernauer et al. 2016). This post-national, post-Westphalian
understanding of democracy integrates the logic of consequentialism and
value added to the sustainable advancement of the state and society. For
example, a preference might be democratic in the sense that it was based on
the choice of the majority of the people, but might be non-compliant with
democratic content, e.g. human rights, based on “values of rationality and
impartiality” (Zürn 2000: 186). A comprehensive understanding of strate-
gic democracy, encompassing both input and output legitimacy, enables to
transcend the (potential) zero-sum relationship between efficiency and de-
mocracy (Dahl 1994) into a trade-up. It follows that ‘democratic legitimacy’,
which is based on inclusive models and can maximise citizens’ welfare,
18 Global security governance
encompasses both input and output elements, and “can only be achieved
by a mixed constitution comprising majority procedures and negotiated
mechanisms” (Zürn 2000: 183). It is thus the process of negotiation in which
local actors can play a crucial role in fragile systems by facilitating social
learning processes and information exchange between different stakehold-
ers and levels of governance.
Third, non-state actors can play a role in democratisation of the security
and defence sector by strengthening accountability. In a post-Westphalian
understanding of democracy, authority is shared among multiple centres
of power (Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2014; Slaughter 2004) such as IOs,
e.g. UN, EU, NATO, civil society groups like NGOs and think tanks, but
also academia, private actors and other domestic or international stake-
holders, e.g. media. Consequently, accountability has shifted its meaning
from mechanisms “by which individuals and organizations report to rec-
ognized authority or authorities and are held responsible for their actions”
(Edwards and Hulme 1995: 9) to a broader concept. It is rather “a reciprocal
process” that “does not just mean reporting”, but “it is a process of infor-
mation exchange, consultation and joint decision-making” (Biswas 2009: 4).
Diagonal or societal accountability (via civil society) is a major com-
ponent of multi-track and comprehensive security approaches. Diagonal
accountability encompasses “hybrid combinations of vertical and horizon-
tal oversight, involving direct citizen engagement within state institutions”
(Fox 2015: 347; see also Goetz and Jenkins 2001). These ‘hybrid’ forms of
accountability can thus take the form of ‘state-society synergies’ (Evans
1996: 1119), ‘co-governance’ (Ackerman 2004: 447) in the case of official
bodies, or ‘state-society power-sharing’ mechanisms (Fox 2015: 347) in the
case of less institutionalised forms of hybridity. The presence of these con-
cepts in everyday life and specific illustrations of how multi-track peace and
security looks like in practice are provided in the empirical chapters of this
book (Chapters 6–8). Diagonal accountability has a distinct relevance for
achieving civilian control, and NGOs can play a role in the institutional-
isation of civilian oversight by increasing awareness and empowering the
existing monitoring and oversight bodies (horizontal accountability). More-
over, through processes of social learning and participation, local actors
can empower citizens to exert their monitoring, oversight and ‘sanctioning’
functions such as ‘sanctioning the incumbent’ (Przeworski 1991), enabling
thus dynamics of vertical accountability. In hybrid environments such as
Pakistan, “voters have incomplete information” and might not be able to
fully exert their ‘sanctioning’ function (vertical accountability). Through
mechanisms of collective action, shaping the ‘public narrative’ and other
forms of participatory (informal) governance, CSOs can contribute to en-
hancing accountability through participation and social learning processes
(Odugbemi and Lee 2011). To summarise, non-state actors can foster diag-
onal accountability through (1) “empowering public oversight institutions
to act” (Fox 2015: 348) (horizontal accountability) and/or (2) empowering
 Global security governance 19
citizens to act (vertical accountability). I argue that in particular in hybrid
orders, with poor rule of law and weak political/institutional leadership,
non-state actors, e.g. NGOs, think tanks, academia or media, have a
significant potential to contribute to processes of social, security and polit-
ical development and this book explores what impact are those involved in
peacebuilding perceived to have.
Fourth, in hybrid orders, non-state actors are anticipated to play a role in
‘elite pacting’ processes, i.e. the controlled transfer of power and authority
as well as agreement about the new model of governance between the old and
new nomenclatures (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). A ‘strong civil soci-
ety’ and actors from the international community can play a significant role
in facilitating dialogue, capacity and negotiation between the two ‘orders’
(Cawthra 2003: 35; Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 309). NGOs are anticipated
to play a role in ‘elite pacting’ by establishing a liaison, through formal and
informal connections, between the two political orders – military and civil-
ian. Interactions and contact are central premises to establish confidence
and trust and to enter dialogue and negotiation processes. Interaction at
institutional or personal level and addressing issues related to human rights
and legacies of the past (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 312) can transform
relationships by reducing the potential for prejudice and increasing trust
(Allport 1979). This amplifies the likelihood of dialogue, partnership and
collaboration and can contribute to developing ‘a common understand-
ing’ or consensus about the design of ‘democratic institutions and politics’
(Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 312). As Adam Przeworski (1991: 80) puts
it, “democracy cannot be dictated” and transition to democracy emerges
from negotiations with representatives from the old nomenclature and the
new, ‘pro-democratic forces’. Thus, civil-military interaction can be seen as
forms of ‘bargaining’, in which civil groups and other non-state actors epit-
omise ‘pro-democratic forces’ and the military represents the ‘old regime’
(Przeworski 1991: 80). Evidence from countries that experienced transition
from military to democratic regime suggests that civil society groups can
play a role in mobilising dialogue and helping “articulate a democratic se-
curity strategy” based on an “adequate understanding of (…) specific prob-
lems and needs, as well as on building national consensus on political and
military reform” (Cawthra and Luckham 2003: 315). Through interaction,
civil society actors can play an active role for change at personal, societal
and political-institutional level (Goel 2004).

Power-sharing, EU strategy of resilience

and civil society actors
The role of non-state actors has intensified dramatically in the 21st century,
as a result of globalisation dynamics and a subsequent redistribution of
power among states, markets and civil society in the form of power-sharing
models of democratic governance (Mathews 1997). Working closely with
20 Global security governance
civil society as part of integrated security approaches to support good gov-
ernance and accountable institutions represents a stated principle of the EU
strategy of building resilience of fragile states (see the EU Global Strategy
2016). Within the space comprised between the state and the market, inter-
actions can occur between stakeholders and actors with different ideologi-
cal backgrounds and strategies. In particular in transitional SSR regimes,
interactions are anticipated to take the form of cooperation (informal
agreement), coordination (formal agreement) and collaboration (formal and
informal agreement) (Schroeder et al. 2014: 214; see also McNamara 2008).
Cooperation is based on informal agreements and channels of information
sharing, while coordination happens on the basis of ‘formalized agree-
ments’ and channels of interaction (McNamara 2008: 392). Collaboration
allows for joint engagement based on both formal and informal agreements
(McNamara 2008: 392). Unlike coordination and cooperation, collabora-
tion requires integration with collective instead of individual goals and re-
lies on trust relations (McNamara 2008: 392).
Collaboration seems to be more suitable to integrated multi-actor security
approaches, which require long-term approaches and permanent dynam-
ics of negotiations, than cooperation or even coordination. Yalçinkaya
(2012: 495) argues that collaboration is the “most suitable mechanism for
NGO-military relations” in volatile and difficult environments, as coordina-
tion and cooperation can have ‘side effects’ that can compromise standards
of action, such as NGOs’ principle of independence or impartiality. Thus,
cooperation and coordination govern civil-military relations mainly during
crises and complex emergencies in humanitarian contexts, which in princi-
ple have short-term objectives, as highlighted by policy models such as Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) or Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord).
In insecure environments, military and civilian actors, e.g. NGOs, might be
seen as having ‘divergent aims and principles’ (Tauxe 2000). Armed forces
are responsible for the enforcement of peace agreements and security, while
actors such as NGOs are mainly responsible to provide civilians with hu-
manitarian assistance. However, from a human security perspective – which
is pivotal to multi-track peace approaches – security and development are
interrelated, making it thus necessary to converge military’s and NGOs’
apparent ‘divergent’ aims and objectives.
Another possibility to converge civil and military objective is complemen-
tarity, which can be another type of interaction, in addition to coordination,
cooperation and collaboration, that deserves distinct analytical attention.
Complementarity is closely linked to collaboration, “which presupposes a
desire to integrate approaches to achieve a common goal” (Lilly 2002: 2).
Complementarity involves ‘distinct actions’ (Jenny 2001: 23) or “working in
parallel as separate/autonomous entities within the same system” (Barnes
2006: 99). Thus, complementarity is conditioned by strategic interactions be-
tween actors operating within a system in order to preserve their autonomy,
while helping to foster coherence and avoiding duplication. Complementary
 Global security governance 21
approaches are indispensable for the interdependent comprehensive types
of peace approaches underpinned by multi-track security paradigms. Par-
ticularly in identity-based conflicts, ‘use of force’ promotes peace only if “it
is closely linked to the diplomatic process, kept to a minimum and coupled
with use of security and trust-building measures” (Jakobsen 2000: 45; see
also Stedman and Rothchild 1996). Complementarity is particularly nec-
essary in theatres in which actors with different operational priorities and
mandates – such as military and civilians – (Grünewald and Geoffroy 2002:
462) operate.
Interactions between actors operating in hybrid orders are significant
because “if an important institution undergoes changes, other institutions
are subject to realignment”, “adjustment”, “adaption” or “integration”
(Redmond 2005: 501–3). Institutional change in a complex, multi-layered
system is important because changes in one layer, e.g. political culture, will
result in changes in other layers, e.g. policymaking.
While many scholars argue that non-government organisations can
strengthen state capacity by fulfilling public and non-public functions
discussed earlier, another strand of literature argues that NGOs might
undermine and decline the authority of the state. By overtaking responsi-
bilities and functions that are traditionally implemented by the state, NGOs
can “weaken and delegitimize the state” (Goel 2004: 31). Donor-funded
organisations in particular might induce a “so-called democratic defi-
cit” (Mathews 1997: 65), because of the top-down direction of the funded
projects. External interventions leading to institutional transformation and
change are assumed to be following donors’ objectives. However, donors’
objectives are not necessarily conflicting with the domestic priorities; au
contraire, they might actually reinforce and strengthen them. For example,
one of the stated objectives of the EUGS is “state and societal resilience to
our East and South” (European Union 2016: 9, 23–8). Societal resilience
is certainly a prerequisite for countries in the East and South to achieve
their security objectives. Therefore, what at a first sight appears to be a de-
cline in state power may actually strengthen the national system (Mathews
1997: 65), by increasing both input legitimacy and diagonal accountability.
Empirically testing these rival possibilities is important to our understand-
ing of the underlying dynamics of change.
Transition to democracy is not expected to result in a full democracy in
one move, but it may lead to an intermediary form of democracy: repre-
sentative democracy, “formal democracy, pseudo-democracy, weak democ-
racy, partial democracy, delegative democracy [or] low-intensity democracy”
(original emphasis, Serra 2010 8–9; see also O’Donnell 1994). Rustow (1970)
distinguishes between three intermediary stages of transition to democ-
racy: (a) ‘preparatory’, i.e. “one of struggle and conflict over power be-
tween different social forces”; (b) ‘decision-making’, i.e. “an act of explicit
consensus in which (…) political leaders accept the existence of diversity
in unity and, to that end, agree to institutionalize some crucial aspects of
22 Global security governance
democratic procedures”; and (c) ‘habituation’, in which “politicians and cit-
izens alike apply the new rules to other issues and adjust to the new demo-
cratic structure” (Serra 2008: 10). Civil-military interaction, including with
NGOs, can be thus conceptualised as ‘negotiated bargains’ (Wood 1996: 188)
between actors displaying various interests, which, in turn, is anticipated to
trigger processes of democratic change. These mechanisms of institutional
change and transformation are key to our understanding of the processes
of change and democratisation of security institutions and governance in
hybrid orders.
One key dimension in the implementation of these approaches is the
mechanism of institutional change and how democratic change can occur,
which is discussed in the following.

Institutional change and transformation

Change is conditioned by the transformation of institutional and social or-
ders, both in terms of principles and personal systems of values and beliefs,
in a society (Goel 2004: 10–1). Social change requires the adoption of “an in-
tegrated approach that looks for positive synergies between different bases
of change and different systems of power” (Goel 2004: 13). Via processes of
interaction between military and civil society actors in the framework of
multi-track security approaches, institutional change and norm diffusion is
anticipated to take place in fragile, post-military states. It is distinguished
between four types of institutional change: ‘displacement’, ‘layering’, ‘drift’
or ‘conversion’ (based on Mahoney and Thelen 2009: 15–6). Displacement
involves the removal of old rules and the introduction of new ones. Layering
refers to the introduction of new rules. Drift implies neglecting old rules and
the changed impact (‘strategic redeployment’) of old rules. Conversion is
defined as the changed impact or the changed enactment of old rules.
The institutional and financial support provided by IOs and actors in
insecure states with limited institutional capacity, inter alia via local actors,
is expected to result in one of these four modalities of institutional change,
or possibly in a mixed form, encompassing parts from more than a single
type of change. Theoretically, the magnitude of institutional change can
vary in function of the veto ability of the ‘targeted institutions’ to ‘block’
change, political context and ‘type of change agents’ (Mahoney and Thelen
2009: 18–23, 27, 31). Considering the powerful position of the military in
the case under investigation in this book and its expected ability to ‘block’
change, it is anticipated that actors adopting ‘rapid’ displacement strate-
gies are likely to have less interaction with the military. Endogenous type of
change and transformation is an interesting type of change, which argues
that ‘institutional change’ does not “emerge from actors with transforma-
tional motives”, but it is “an unintended by-product that grows out of dis-
tributional struggles in which no party explicitly sought the changes that
eventually occurred” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009: 22–3).
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