> I'd go so far as to say that our plurality system all but guarantees bad candidates--it's not the fittest that survive the primary election process, it's the most memorable, the one who we feel will best appeal to our neighbors.
Another thing that I've noticed is that it also optimizes for moderates/centrists, since that's where the Nash Equilibrium is[1].
With the growing polarization in our politics, I think that the political spectrum in the U.S. now looks less like a Gaussian distribution and more like a bimodal distribution. At this point the median voter is becoming a smaller and smaller plurality, and the equilibrium is becoming unappealing to more and more people.
The idea that plurality optimized for centrists is unsupported by empirical evidence and is based on abstract theory that ignored the role of base mobilization, public communication, and imperfect information. It's basically a naïve application of rational choice theory.
Also, that's precious little evidence that the US political spectrum has ever looked anything like a Gaussian distribution.
Another thing that I've noticed is that it also optimizes for moderates/centrists, since that's where the Nash Equilibrium is[1].
With the growing polarization in our politics, I think that the political spectrum in the U.S. now looks less like a Gaussian distribution and more like a bimodal distribution. At this point the median voter is becoming a smaller and smaller plurality, and the equilibrium is becoming unappealing to more and more people.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_voter_theorem