I think you're mischaracterizing the relationship between science and philosophy. The philosophy of science is philosophy, and science is more like the applied philosophy of empiricism. God, so far, is not a subject for empirical debate.
I am also not sure that your dismissal of the argument as "run-of-the-mill anti-theist cosmology". This seems like a discussion of cosmology from an empirical perspective, and I can't see how theism is particularly useful there. If you'll pardon me for a blunt characterization, you seem to have an axe to grind about theism. I'm not sure that is either warranted or particularly topical. Parfit may be "dead wrong" but suggesting that this has anything to do with your personal religious beliefs rather detracts from your argument, in my opinion.
> I am also not sure that your dismissal of the argument as "run-of-the-mill anti-theist cosmology".
I didn't mean to be dismissive, just to point out that the article is old (1998) and that most of HN's more learned readers would've already seen these arguments in one form or another.
> If you'll pardon me for a blunt characterization, you seem to have an axe to grind about theism.
Parfit's agenda is pretty clearly anti-theist, I think I'm pretty on-topic. If anything, I have an axe to grind with philosophy of science.
Why is God not a subject for empirical debate? If the miracles described in Bible happened regularly I would consider that as strong empirical evidence for God. Given that no such miracles are forthcoming it reduces the likelihood that God exists.
Because there's no evidence either way. It's valid philosophically to consider the unknown or unprovable statement to be false, but the philosophers of science have pretty soundly rejected logical positivism[0]
Generally speaking the problem is that we can't treat empirical truths as some sort of strictly binary, completely true or completely false statements. Error is inherent to observation, so every scientific truth is a little bit false (or at least potentially so). The less rational part of me does consider that chocolate tapdancing unicorns are unlikely enough to be entirely discounted, but as a general philosophical rule it's more consistent to be a little more humble about what is known and can be known.
I am also not sure that your dismissal of the argument as "run-of-the-mill anti-theist cosmology". This seems like a discussion of cosmology from an empirical perspective, and I can't see how theism is particularly useful there. If you'll pardon me for a blunt characterization, you seem to have an axe to grind about theism. I'm not sure that is either warranted or particularly topical. Parfit may be "dead wrong" but suggesting that this has anything to do with your personal religious beliefs rather detracts from your argument, in my opinion.