there's more than the context of merely being an ally, it's being a "close" ally in the region; one with a history of direct and indirect conflict.
nobody knows if saudi was involved, and i'm not saying they definitely were, but it seems rather unlikely that there was no assistance at least with regard to intelligence and other ancillary-ish things.
even so, the notion of "retaliation" in the scope of clandestine conflict and power struggle is very nebulous, as geopolitics has many layers. if nothing else, saudi is almost certainly a much more ideal target of opportunity than the US due to it's being a nearby direct competitor for regional influence. and even if saudi really had zero involvement with stuxnet (seems unlikely to me), they've definitely had allied involvement with other activities that worked against iran or it's interests.
So that’s a lot of hypothesizing going on with no evidence. But all of this begs the question, why is it strange that stuxnet wasn’t mentioned in the article? Still seems to me you haven’t answered that. If you want to extend into hypothetical land, then all kinds of attacks on industrial controls and breakins should be mentioned. But they’re not, because the article is more focused on the individual event.
nobody knows if saudi was involved, and i'm not saying they definitely were, but it seems rather unlikely that there was no assistance at least with regard to intelligence and other ancillary-ish things.
even so, the notion of "retaliation" in the scope of clandestine conflict and power struggle is very nebulous, as geopolitics has many layers. if nothing else, saudi is almost certainly a much more ideal target of opportunity than the US due to it's being a nearby direct competitor for regional influence. and even if saudi really had zero involvement with stuxnet (seems unlikely to me), they've definitely had allied involvement with other activities that worked against iran or it's interests.