> The fact that sensory information is limited, does not make it wrong.

If you reread the comment you are responding to, it says raw sensory input is the only thing that is not wrong, not that it is wrong.

> For instance, we know that a stick isn't actually bent when it goes into water, even if it looks like it is.

We don't even know that there is a stick, even if it looks like there is, but we do know the sensory data itself. In fact, there very idea of “a stick” (or discrete objects more generally) is a useful, but still wrong, model.

> More generally, we have no practical problem dealing with reality using the information given by our senses.

We have lots of practical problems dealing with that, and lots of practices adopted specifically to mitigate those problems. The historically recent invention of the modern scientific method is itself a (far from entirely successful) method of mitigating a very broad and impactful class of pervasive practical problems with that.

> Sorry for busting up the "deny knowledge to make room for faith" parade.

Faith, where it concerns the material universe at all, is still a method of selectig models subject to the “all models are wrong, some are useful” rule, it's just a method of model selection that isn't focussed on predictive utility, so, insofar as prediction is your key metric for utility, it's inferior to the scientific method which is narrowly focussed on predictive utility.

Pointing out that all knowledge of the material universe beyond the facts of raw sensory data is models that are at best useful but always in some respects wrong is certainly denying lots that is commonly claimed as knowledge, but it absolutely isn't clearing the field for faith by so doing.

One of the ways philosophy goes wrong is by using trivial problems as examples. "Where is the stick", or "is this really a table in front of me" are the Hello World of epistemology. Just like you can't figure out which programming language is better than another by looking at Hello World, you can't evaluate a philosophy by its answer to where the stick is. You need to look at answers to hard problems, like "what should I do with my life?"

> If you reread the comment you are responding to, it says raw sensory input is the only thing that is not wrong, not that it is wrong.

My view is that raw sensory input is just information, so it's not wrong, and so we are in agreement there. Further, I am saying that knowledge can be derived from that sensory input, which is where we disagree.

I see what you are saying, I failed to clearly distinguish these two cases when I used the term "sensory information."

> We don't even know that there is a stick

Yes we do. But to "know that there is a stick" is subject to certain caveats. It's not an absolute, like being omniscient. For example, if something is a stick, it's still a stick, even if we actually live in the Matrix, or in the dream of an alien being. Because to be a stick is just a mental classification (i.e., concept) that we have created for a certain kind of thing evidenced to us by our sense data and by the use of reason.

> is a useful, but still wrong, model

A model can be correct as long as it doesn't overstate its own power of generalization. There is a sibling discussion going that covers the fact that Newton's Laws are correct as long as they are understood to describe phenomena (i.e. evidence) actually observed by Newton, and then only to a certain level of fidelity; but not "correct" if you hold them to the standard of explaining everything.

> Faith, where it concerns the material universe at all, is still a method of selecting models subject to the “all models are wrong, some are useful” rule,

Faith doesn't select a model. A model is based on evidence of the senses. Faith dispenses with models entirely and just makes stuff up out of whole cloth. I see your point there, I just think you're using the word "model" too loosely and in a way that gives faith too much credit.

> Faith doesn't select a model.

Yes, it does.

> A model is based on evidence of the senses.

No, a model is an abstraction by which one conceptualizes phenomena, regardless of the basis. It seems true that a model not based on structured application of sensory observation is likely to be a poor model if you judge quality by how well it lines up with future sensory observations, but a model is not necessarily a good model.

Faith, also, does not dispense with evidence of the senses, it just applied it differently.

“I perceived X describing Y as true”, where X is a (natural or supernatural) authority figure is sensory data, as are positive sensations associated with a particular belief. Now, they aren't sense data that empiricism would treat as relative to the truth of the belief at issue, but that's a different issue.

You're just arguing that a "model" based on make believe is still a type of model. I don't find that compelling.

It's like saying a scientific theory not based on empirical information is still a scientific theory.

I don't see why that point is worth defending. Except perhaps as a way to give bad ideas higher stature by lumping them in with good ideas.

> Faith, also, does not dispense with evidence of the senses, it just applied it differently.

No idea what you are talking about here. For instance, the only sense-based evidence I know of for Christianity or Islam is the historical record, and that isn't reliable enough to establish these beliefs as anything more than make believe. In other words, we can't see Jesus work miracles, which would constitute partial evidence for Christianity; the only evidence we have is that someone said they did a long, long time ago. I'm also not aware of evidence for Zeus or Thor or Brahma.

> as are positive sensations associated with a particular belief

Emotions do not constitute evidence for religion.

Your last long doesn't follow, as far as I can tell, from the rest.

The first part of your argument reminds me of Searle's that a belief shared, external reality is implicit in every statement of faxt, e.g. it no sense to say that "there is snow and ice at the top of Mt. Everest, AND there is no shared, external reality."

The last line is a reference to Kant, who made an argument roughly along the same lines as dragonwriter, and said he wanted to deny knowledge to make room for faith. He wanted to preserve religion in the face of the Enlightenment. So far, he has succeeded.

Sure, but how of what is this reference apropos?