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This story could make a good anecdote to remember when considering human factors, user interface, and checklist design.

> Investigators said that because the pilots flew the second circuit at 1500ft, the Electronic Centralised Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) had not reset on the second approach and it did not display a landing memo at 950ft.

“The absence of the landing memo should have prompted the flight crew to perform the items of the landing checklist as a ‘read-and-do’ checklist,” it said.

Like the lock icon in a browser’s address bar, it is not effective to rely on the user to notice the absence of an indicator.




Airbus already covered this with "master warning message triggered at about 700 ft".


This part looked odd indeed.

I'd expect that the aviation industry be very much aware that relying on people noticing that something is NOT there is error-prone. But they did have several backup options, so even if the crew inadvertently managed to work around the first one, the second one (700ft warning) worked as expected.


Procedures are designed to do things always at the same time, triggered by something else. The human brain is great at making those connections.

For example, on takeoff the pilot monitoring watches the instruments and reports "positive rate" (means "we're climbing from the runway in a stable manner"), as pilot flying you always command "gear up" at that point. It is quite common in simulator practice to get an engine failure right after takeoff, and the most made mistake is forgetting to command gear up, because you're handling the emergency right at the moment you would normally do it.

Luckily (as described in the article) you would normally run a checklist after any of these events, and usually that makes you catch the mistake.




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