> Here, we conservatively use the term “unresponsiveness” instead of “unconsciousness” to allow for the possibility that covert or disconnected consciousness could occur in the absence of behavioral response.
Conservatism is very wise! Given what they say in that quote, I'm very confused why they think it's justified in the intro to suggest they've identified 2 systems responsible for consciousness. Shouldn't they replace every use of the word "consciousness" with "responsiveness"? They're relying on a purely behavioral understanding of consciousness
Descartes famously thought that consciousness lived in the pineal gland, and similar arguments has tended to generate some well deserved criticism from philosophers of mind. Pointing at a physical thing and saying it's the source of conscious experience should come with pretty extraordinary evidence.
>They're relying on a purely behavioral understanding of consciousness
They're relying on the fact that consciousness has physical manifestations in behavior. The alternative is epiphenomenalism. While it may be a philosophically interesting position, its useless scientifically and so its fair to assume consciousness has some physical artifacts in a scientific context.
I don't think we're forced to choose between behaviorism and epiphenomenalism.
But my point is more internal to the paper. They make claims about the physical basis for consciousness and seem to believe they've generated evidence for it, but they also explicitly say they've only gathered evidence about responsiveness.
EDIT: To be clear I'm objecting to the semantics (which I consider important), not the potential value of the research.
Conservatism is very wise! Given what they say in that quote, I'm very confused why they think it's justified in the intro to suggest they've identified 2 systems responsible for consciousness. Shouldn't they replace every use of the word "consciousness" with "responsiveness"? They're relying on a purely behavioral understanding of consciousness
Descartes famously thought that consciousness lived in the pineal gland, and similar arguments has tended to generate some well deserved criticism from philosophers of mind. Pointing at a physical thing and saying it's the source of conscious experience should come with pretty extraordinary evidence.