> The answer is that we erroneously conclude that the facts we perceive are first-person, but this perception is a sensory trick, similar to an optical illusion.
I'm extremely skeptical of answers that involve labeling difficult challenges to a theory as "illusions."
> I'm extremely skeptical of answers that involve labeling difficult challenges to a theory as "illusions."
So calling [1] an optical illusion warrants skepticism because it's attempting to dismiss the challenge of having to explain how water can physically break and magically reconstitute pencils? Don't you see the problem with this sort of argument?
The point is that integrating all of our knowledge leaves no room for first person facts. Additionally, every time we've tried to ascribe some unique or magical property to humans or life (like vitalism), we've been flat out wrong. No doubt there are plenty of challenges left to resolve in neuroscience, and no one is claiming that a materialist account of qualia is unnecessary.
> So calling [1] an optical illusion warrants skepticism because it's attempting to dismiss the challenge of having to explain how water can physically break and magically reconstitute pencils? Don't you see the problem with this sort of argument?
Yeah, but that's a bit of a straw man.
The kinds of claims-of-illusion that warrant particular skepticism are the ones that deny fundamental observations in defense of some particular (usually sectarian, for lack of a better word) philosophical perspective.
I'm extremely skeptical of answers that involve labeling difficult challenges to a theory as "illusions."