The reason why I find this logic faulty is that none of the "known defects" were sufficient to shut down the plant. It's not a question of bureaucracy -- rather, the bureaucrats are on the other side. To cover their asses, they issue constant statements of imminent danger, and since those dangers never manifest, nobody believes them anymore.
If anyone took the warnings seriously the plant would have been shut down ages ago. And that's the problem with tail disasters -- they happen so infrequently that the system is assumed to be redundant to all of them, so even a "failure" as predicted would be met by a failsafe.
That's why I personally have turned against nuclear power. It's too complicated and the risks live out on the tail, and they are large (though not "fat" in the Taleb sense -- they're still bounded geographically).
If anyone took the warnings seriously the plant would have been shut down ages ago. And that's the problem with tail disasters -- they happen so infrequently that the system is assumed to be redundant to all of them, so even a "failure" as predicted would be met by a failsafe.
That's why I personally have turned against nuclear power. It's too complicated and the risks live out on the tail, and they are large (though not "fat" in the Taleb sense -- they're still bounded geographically).