"...There was no consistent pattern indicating that the key to success in target
outcomes was the use of either guided or unguided munitions. On average,
targets where objectives were successfully achieved received more guided
and fewer unguided munitions than targets where objectives were not
determined to have been fully achieved. But in several target categories,
the reverse was true. Nor were there major differences in the apparent
effect of platform type on strike performance. When attacking the same
targets with LGBs, the F-111Fs reported achieving only a slightly greater
target hit rate than the F-117s. Similarly, there was little difference in the
rates of success achieved by F/A-18s and F-16s when delivering the MK-84
unguided munition...
...The results of our analyses did not support the claim for LGB effectiveness
summarized by “one target, one bomb.” Moreover, planners apparently
ordered restrikes either because BDA revealed that one bomb did not
achieve target objectives or they did not believe that “one target, one
bomb” was being achieved.
...
Desert Storm data also do not clearly support a number of major DOD
claims for the F-117. For example, according to some, the accuracy of the
F-117 in combat may have been unprecedented; our estimates of the bomb
hit rate for the F-117 show that it was between 55 and 80 percent. Of equal
importance, the rate of weapon release for the F-117 during Desert Storm
was only 75 percent—largely because of a weather abort rate far higher
than for other strike aircraft. Thus, the effectiveness of scheduled F-117
strikes was between 41 and 60 percent.
And the accuracy and effectiveness of the TLAM was less than generally perceived.
Our analysis of manufacturers’ claims revealed the same pattern of
overstatement. All the manufacturers whose weapon systems we reviewed
made public statements about the performance of their products in Desert
Storm that the data do not fully support. And while the manufacturers’
claims were often inaccurate, their assertions were not significantly
different from, nor appreciably less accurate than, many of the statements
of DOD officials and DOD reports about the same systems’ performance in
Desert Storm..."
...The results of our analyses did not support the claim for LGB effectiveness summarized by “one target, one bomb.” Moreover, planners apparently ordered restrikes either because BDA revealed that one bomb did not achieve target objectives or they did not believe that “one target, one bomb” was being achieved. ... Desert Storm data also do not clearly support a number of major DOD claims for the F-117. For example, according to some, the accuracy of the F-117 in combat may have been unprecedented; our estimates of the bomb hit rate for the F-117 show that it was between 55 and 80 percent. Of equal importance, the rate of weapon release for the F-117 during Desert Storm was only 75 percent—largely because of a weather abort rate far higher than for other strike aircraft. Thus, the effectiveness of scheduled F-117 strikes was between 41 and 60 percent.
And the accuracy and effectiveness of the TLAM was less than generally perceived. Our analysis of manufacturers’ claims revealed the same pattern of overstatement. All the manufacturers whose weapon systems we reviewed made public statements about the performance of their products in Desert Storm that the data do not fully support. And while the manufacturers’ claims were often inaccurate, their assertions were not significantly different from, nor appreciably less accurate than, many of the statements of DOD officials and DOD reports about the same systems’ performance in Desert Storm..."