Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts’s analysis identifies the circumstances under which an incumbent may be tempted to “pander” - implementing the policy preferred by the voters even though her private information suggests that it will not serve their interests. In their basic model, pandering occurs when the probability is not too high that the inferiority of the voters’ preferred policy will be revealed before the next election (and if the expected quality of a prospective challenger is strong enough that the incumbent has to worry about her public standing at election time).
This model essentially glosses over the phenomenona of policies sold to voters as fixes for their problems by dishonest media.
It also assumes that politicians essentially only want one term and would be perfectly content to be destroyed electorally in their third term if they can win their second term.
No, it assumes amnesia on the part of the voters. There is an abundance of evidence backing up the assumption of amnesia. Study after study shows that voters are only paying attention for the 6 months before an election. Even where 80% of the voters follow events and are well informed, the election is determined by the 20% who are poorly informed. There is a fix for this, discussed here:
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By Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels
Page 110-111
Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts’s analysis identifies the circumstances under which an incumbent may be tempted to “pander” - implementing the policy preferred by the voters even though her private information suggests that it will not serve their interests. In their basic model, pandering occurs when the probability is not too high that the inferiority of the voters’ preferred policy will be revealed before the next election (and if the expected quality of a prospective challenger is strong enough that the incumbent has to worry about her public standing at election time).