> Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the case that overturned Chevron, repeatedly cites Marbury v. Madison, the case where the Supreme Court vastly expanded its own power by, in part, giving itself the extra-constitutional power to declare things unconstitutional.
If you're claiming Marbury v. Madison to be wrong... well, that was an unexpected twist and I must say I've totally misread your comment.
I thought the main thrust of the argument in Loper was s706 of the Administrative Procedure Act though.
> If you're claiming Marbury v. Madison to be wrong... well, that was an unexpected twist and I must say I've totally misread your comment.
It's not so much that Marbury v. Madison is wrong, though I do believe that. It's more that it began the transformation of the Supreme Court into being the go-to way of amending the Constitution. It's just that this particular Court is unusually shameless about it. And their decisions are removing rights, as opposed to decisions like Miranda v. Arizona, or Gideon v. Wainwright.
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Judicial Review for Constitutionality has no bearing in the Constitution. And while it can be argued that it's mentioned within the Federalist Papers, those are not law. The Declaration of Independence is also an extremely important document in US history, but that doesn't grant a legal right to secede, much to Texas' chagrin.
The Constitution says shockingly little about the judiciary in general. Using the National Constitution Centre, Article 3 has 377 words, whereas Article 2 (executive) has 1025 words, and Article 1 (Congress) has 2297 words. And since the Constitution was written to only grant as much power as was considered necessary, unless those 377 words grant carte blanche to the judiciary (they don't), then one might expect the judiciary to be the most restrained branch of the three; its enumerated powers are very few indeed.
Instead, the Supreme Court has arguably become the most powerful branch of government due to its self-proclaimed stewardship of the Constitution. What can the other branches do to reign the Supreme Court in? And I mean in real-terms, not theoretical ability with a politically-harmonious Congress. The honest answer is little to nothing, that the only real solution is a Constitutional Convention, which is unprecedented as none of the 27 (or 18 depending on how you choose to count) Amendments were passed that way.
If the Supreme Court never came to believe that they were stewards of the Constitution, this decision would've never happened. Firstly because there'd be little point or interest in making political appointments to a Court with comparatively little power, so you wouldn't have a bunch of Federalist Society minions on the bench. But secondly, such a Court would feel extremely uneasy about overturning Chevron exactly because it upends the legal framework that Congress and the executive have been willingly operating under for the past several decades.
If you’re opposed to the fundamental function of the USSC to the point that you’re unhappy with Marbury v Madison, then there’s not a whole lot of common ground to discuss the Chevron case and it’s overturn.
Don’t get me wrong, I honestly have no stake in the discussion since i’m not an American, and I’m well aware of the controversies in Marbury v Madison, I’m just trying to point out that while your objection to USSC’s fundamental role is well taken, the Loper case is more of an administrative law issue regarding the proper application of Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which reads:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. [……]
The ideal constitutional function of the USSC seems tangential to Chevron and Loper, AFAICT
You have very much drunk the koolaid if you believe that Judicial Review for Constitutionality is a "fundamental function" of the Supreme Court. Perhaps it's radical of me, but I generally prefer that government institutions act within the law; and there's nothing in the law that gives them that power.
What I was saying, and have attempted to clarify multiple times now, is that Marbury v. Madison [and the other cases that have expanded the Supreme Court's power] has set a culture. You said it yourself: "then reversing the restraint just means that at worst the SC is (ab)using its constitutional powers 'without restraint' to interpret laws". Them discarding judicial restraint is a consequence of such a culture.
I feel like I've emphasised this point enough and it doesn't need further clarification. Cya, I guess.
If you're claiming Marbury v. Madison to be wrong... well, that was an unexpected twist and I must say I've totally misread your comment.
I thought the main thrust of the argument in Loper was s706 of the Administrative Procedure Act though.