> We then calculate the demand-side value based on a replacement value for each firm that uses the software and would need to build it internally if OSS did not exist. We estimate ... that the demand-side value is much larger at $8.8 trillion
But details like a 1000x change in estimate aside, saying it couldn't be done is not quantifiable. At least a dollar figure can be reasoned about.
Saying it can’t be done is still an actionable guide to policy. If it can’t be done any other way, and it has massive benefit, then policymakers ought to be careful to avoid actions that harm it.
For example, tax law changes requiring multi-year depreciation of engineering labor probably have an extremely detrimental effect to small open source projects with commercial potential.
The policy effectively significantly raises working capital requirements for an early stage OSS company that might be focused on services revenue instead of licensing fees.
We're missing the forest for the trees - the estimate was large ($5T), and the estimate is indeed a lower bound, and it seems like pretty damn important to save F/OSS.
> We then calculate the demand-side value based on a replacement value for each firm that uses the software and would need to build it internally if OSS did not exist. We estimate ... that the demand-side value is much larger at $8.8 trillion
But details like a 1000x change in estimate aside, saying it couldn't be done is not quantifiable. At least a dollar figure can be reasoned about.