I read the analysis. I think he's being far too dismissive of the doctrinal considerations in his analysis. Frankly, he is also not an expert on modern warfare in any way, too.
There is a good book called "eating soup with a knife" (and the author has given talks on this) that talks about the importance of doctrine and culture in constructing a fighting force (in this case, the book is mostly about counterinsurgency doctrine and how the American and British militaries are uniquely unsuited to it). An American-style doctrine simply does not work in Russia, even given unlimited resources, because of how the culture and the military work. The weapons are then built to fit the doctrine, not the other way around.
In other words, the "static system" actually is the way to get the Russian military (and the Ukrainian military) to work. That difference in doctrine, by the way, caused a lot of headaches because US weapons are not made for it.
> the "static system" actually is the way to get the Russian military (and the Ukrainian military) to work
Well, yes. They've been unable to launch combined-arms maneouvres. They failed to establish even air supremacy against decades-old NATO air defence kit. Russia has to fight the way it does because it's unable to fight more effectively.
The author's core point stands: we didn't outlaw chemical weapons because of any moral reasons, we outlawed them because the world's leading militaries don't need them. In cases where they have tactical value, lo and behold, they get used.
On that point we agree, that the world's leading militaries don't need them. However, they are a tool that increases the effectiveness of other militaries.
I disagree with him that the specific combined arms shock doctrine is what make those militaries the world's leading ones. Those militaries are leading because they have the best people, weapons, and training, and a combined arms shock doctrine fits with their culture.
> they are a tool that increases the effectiveness of other militaries
Sure. Which is why the world's leading militaries banned them. OP said we banned chemical weapons "to avoid escalating to more dangerous chemical agents." There is simply no evidence we were that high minded.
There is a good book called "eating soup with a knife" (and the author has given talks on this) that talks about the importance of doctrine and culture in constructing a fighting force (in this case, the book is mostly about counterinsurgency doctrine and how the American and British militaries are uniquely unsuited to it). An American-style doctrine simply does not work in Russia, even given unlimited resources, because of how the culture and the military work. The weapons are then built to fit the doctrine, not the other way around.
In other words, the "static system" actually is the way to get the Russian military (and the Ukrainian military) to work. That difference in doctrine, by the way, caused a lot of headaches because US weapons are not made for it.