> Each company sets up a "safe-deposit" server for delivering specific one-off subsets of subpoena'd data, and the company's engineers deliver data to that server upon demand.
But when it's been shown that a single subpoena can be "all phone data for three months for every customer", then describing that as "direct access" doesn't seem completely unreasonable to me.
It's clear that there are crucial and important technical details missing. But it's also clear that the NSA has much more fluid access than one-user-per-approved-subpoena-at-one-point-in-time. Depending upon the target audience of the leaked PRISM slides, the description "direct access" may be quite prudent.
In general the stuff coming out of PRISM seemed to me to just be the general name for how the NSA hands out the NSLs(which are awful in their own right) to all these comapnies. A good side-effect of all this hype is people are looking at those. But PRISM doesn't seem to bring anything "new" to the table. Correct me if I'm wrong
I know the phone data isn't part of PRISM, but everything that has come out seems deeply connected by section 215 of the Patriot act. Which is supposedly what's "justifying" all this data gathering.
But when it's been shown that a single subpoena can be "all phone data for three months for every customer", then describing that as "direct access" doesn't seem completely unreasonable to me.
It's clear that there are crucial and important technical details missing. But it's also clear that the NSA has much more fluid access than one-user-per-approved-subpoena-at-one-point-in-time. Depending upon the target audience of the leaked PRISM slides, the description "direct access" may be quite prudent.