I've gotten into arguments about this before, but I still fully believe that any long-term security measure requiring secrecy is bound to fail and/or be ineffective.

It's another step of security theatre; they need to look like they're doing something otherwise if something happens they're afraid of looking like idiots (despite their measures being completely and utterly useless).

Well especially when the secrets are revealed to anyone stood on the street looking / taking photos...

Agree with the sentiment, especially when applied to computers, though i'm not sure how it applies to non-IT based security, because I just don't know enough about the subject.

> It's another step of security theatre; they need to look like they're doing something otherwise if something happens they're afraid of looking like idiots (despite their measures being completely and utterly useless).

Agreed. On a slight tangent, base jumpers are more than able to gain illegal access to tall buildings in the city, with all their secretive security measures. There are a couple of documentaries out there on this, one I'm confident was shot post 9/11.

My greatest concern when reading about or watching these incidents is the poor treatment of those non-violent citizens taking the photos. Ok, you have to do your job and check their photos, but why not crack a joke, apologise for the inconvenience, and check the photos quickly as possible.

Why do they have to check their photos? That's private property.

In the UK and US at least, you do not need to show your photos to a person that tries to detain you, and you do not need to delete any photos. If you are arrested and charged with a crime, then they can inspect the photos as evidence, but not before. They still are not permitted to delete any.

Also, in the UK if someone who is not a police office tries to detain you (and this includes security guards and PCSOs), then they must be relying on the law of citizen's arrest, which means that they must have seen you in the act of committing an offense that could be tried at a crown court - in other words, something worthy of half a year or more in prison. If they have not, then they are liable to prosecution for false imprisonment and may have to compensate you.

Not a lawyer, by the way.

My understanding is different for the UK. If you refuse to show a police officer the photos, they have the right to take you to a station, where they will examine the photos. Like you, i'm not a lawyer.

>Also, in the UK if someone who is not a police office tries to detain you (and this includes security guards and PCSOs), then they must be relying on the law of citizen's arrest, which means that they must have seen you in the act of committing an offense that could be tried at a crown court - in other words, something worthy of half a year or more in prison.

What you say is true about the citizens arrest, but as was mentioned in the article, my understanding was that they are able to call the police because you've been acting suspiciously, and that they have that 'right' to call the police if you are seen taking photos. They can't hold you, but then most people stay, because leaving is seen as an admission of guilt/being a terrorist. Would be nice if this was tested in a court of law, or to hear from someone who knows if it has. Even then i'm not convinced a Judge won't just say "Well, in this post 9/11 time, people should be expected to be stopped if they take photos of high value targets."

EDIT: Taking photos of a building == Acting suspiciously. Not what I believe, just what I understand is argued, often, when security guards call the police because you've been seen taking photos of their building.

It doesn't say so there, but other advice I've seen the Met. issue explicitly states that taking pictures of a building in and of itself isn't sufficient for a police officer to 'reasonably suspect' a person to be a terrorist, and taking pictures of the police definitely isn't.

The Met. keep publishing advice telling their army of goons to leave photographers alone, while at the same time winding up said army to catch terrorists. It's a farce.

Notice the weasel words on the page you linked, which states "The power to stop and search someone under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 no longer exists" - not mentioning that it was not merely repealed, but found to be an illegal violation of human rights.

OTOH, if taking a picture of the outside of your building gives away secrets, you should probably rethink your threat model.

A security system needs to be effective against attack. That's simple and obvious. But beyond that I think there's a very big difference between 'requiring secrecy' for the effectiveness of a system and wanting to keep something as secret as reasonably possible. Hypothetically, it could be that people attacking a system would harm civilians while capturing attackers in their planning stage (eg while they're investigating the system) would prevent danger to the public. If that was the case then keeping the system secret might well be worthwhile.

You shouldn't immediately assume that an attempt to keep something secret is 'security through obscurity'. It might be obscurity with no regard to increasing security.

I suspect this is also true for the FVEY dragnet surveillance.

Those terrorists who are vulnerable to such surveillance are unfit and will quickly be removed from the population, perhaps before having the opportunity to reproduce their broken tradecraft. The population of terrorists who remain adapts to evade the surveillance measures (for anecdotal data, see [1]). The result is the dragnet primarily entraps average, everyday citizens, and not terrorists.

[1]: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/us-reconnaissan...

EDIT: I'd like to clarify that this is purely speculation. Also, even assuming my thesis is correct, this does not mean these surveillance measures are useless; on the contrary, such surveillance can push their communications to other surveillable channels (e.g. tactical radio that can be picked up by NRO sats), or simply deny terrorists the "cyber"/electromagentic ___domain, which impedes their reaction speed and effectiveness.

So I would argue that it's not really a tough choice in many cases. Don't, in the name of terrorism deterrence, harass people for doing things that don't impact the odds of a terrorist attack being carried out. All you end up doing is highlighting to the public the downside of terrorism defense, which ultimately probably lowers its approval of those defensive measures general in the long run.

Terrorism is an enduring threat, and to defend against it in the long run to the extent that is even possible, authorities need the public on their side. Hurting public sentiment for terrorism defensive measures increases the odds of the success of future terrorist plots. It's important only to do so when you get enough return in terms of lowering the probability of the success of future terrorist plots to compensate for the cost.

And this doesn't even take into account other factors outside of terrorism defense. Single factor cost benefit analysis should be enough to dissuade anyone who actually cares about deterring future terrorist attacks from frivolously harassing the public in the name of terrorism deterrence.

There's the thing. We're really inconveniencing and harassing actual people based on a unproven, half-baked "what-if".

What I'm saying is, no matter how many cameras you install, a random guy with a backpack full of explosives or poison gas or whatever won't be detected by it.

google maps makes a mockery of their photography paranoia.

"Ok, you have to do your job and check their photos, but why not crack a joke, apologise for the inconvenience, and check the photos quickly as possible."