Hacker News new | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submit login

Thanks for this comment. I guess, along with jgrahamc's sibling comment, you have to make a routing decision based on (source, port) at most if you have a fixed IP, since HTTPS ports are stupidly fixed. That is 32+16 bits of info at most, so an ethernet MACs worth. So now I can clarify my question as follows: with X bits of data, what is the present state-of-the-art latency wrt to routing T Gbps of traffic. And it's not just that, you have to have good latency for updating that routing table.

Any research on the real entropy of (source,port) entropy on the Internet? The are also real issues like the distribution of (source, port) is hardly uniform, and is especially nasty when undergoing an attack, i.e. you want to manage latency based the both the distribution and authenticity of traffic.

This is a very interesting mathematical problem. I have to work on expressing it a bit better before I can hope of formulating a solution, but yes I can totally see now how leveraging BGP, anycast, and DNS TTL are all knobs to heuristically solve this problem, instead of a some crazy genius way of making use of router TCAM silicon.




As a further observation, it makes the GitHub attack an interesting case study. You now have to further route on the GET target, and if traffic is encrypted, the routing decision is moved to a later stage.

In order to protect latency to other GET targets, you're going to have to start doing interesting things.

One future solution I can see is multipath-tcp the anomalous traffic, and closing the original connection. But at that point you have to refilter based on genuine vs malicious traffic, and then there's the encrypted state you have to share for the proper stream handover. Ooof... what a nightmare.

At least it's an interesting one. :)




Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: