's papers are certain memoranda, intended as the basis of his reply to an inquiry instituted by the Confederate Congress as to why he did not inaugurate an offensive campaign.
Though applying to his conduct at a later period, they contain substantially his reasons for the adoption and maintenance of the defensive line established by him. With the explanations already given, these ought to settle the question:
Memorandum.
I took command at
Bowling Green on the 28th day of October, 1861, the force being nearly 12,000 men. From the best information we could get, the forces of the enemy were estimated at nearly twice the number of our own when I assumed command.
There were many reasons why
Bowling Green was held and fortified.
It was a good base of military operations; was a proper depot for supplies; was capable, if fortified, of being held against largely superior numbers.
If the army should be such that a forward movement was practicable, it could be held by a garrison, and our effective force be left free to operate against an enemy in the field.
It was in supporting distance of
Tennessee, from and through which reinforcements and munitions must come, if the people of
Kentucky should be either hostile or neutral.
My force was too weak and too illy appointed to advance against greatly superior numbers, perfectly equipped and provided, and being much more rapidly reinforced than my own. Our advance into
Kentucky had not been met by the enthusiastic uprising of friends, which we, and many in and out of that State, had believed would take place.
Arms were scarce, and we had none to give them.
No prudent commander would thus hazard the fate of an entire army, so much weaker than the enemy, and dependent upon support not certain to come, and wanting in arms and discipline if it should.
Muldrough's Hill possessed no strategic importance, was worthless as a base of operations, and I had ordered
General Buckner, in the first place, not to advance to that position, because the
Green River, flowing directly across the line between
Bowling Green and Muldrough's Hill, and being navigable, gave the enemy every desirable facility to cut the line in two in the rear of any force at Muldrough's Hill.
Buckner's force was small, was illy armed, had no transportation except by rail, was deficient in many necessary appointments for making a campaign, and many of his men were fresh from home and wholly undisciplined.
The enemy's forces increased much more rapidly than
Buckner's; and the ratio of increase was fully preserved after I took command.
