After the return of the Army of Northern Virginia from
Gettysburg, it took position south of the
Rapidan River, in the vicinity of
Orange Court House, to recuperate from the losses and fatigue of the campaign.
We settled ourselves in comfortable camps among the wooded hills, enjoyed better rations than we ever got again, gradually collected horses, recruits, conscripts, and returning sick and wounded, and altogether we felt about as well satisfied with the situation and prospect as we had ever done before.
The enjoyment of our pleasant camps and still pleasanter rest was suddenly broken, on September 9th, by orders for
Hood's and
McLaws's divisions of
Longstreet's corps, about 11,000 strong, with my battalion of artillery, 23 guns, to go under the personal command of
General Longstreet to reenforce
Bragg in
Georgia.
It was clear that our now, however, adversary, the Army of the Potomac, could not resume the offensive for some months, and there would be ample time to send this force out to enable
Bragg to crush
Rosecrans, and bring it back to
Virginia before it would be needed there.
It was the only
[
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occasion during the war, I believe, when the
Confederates availed themselves of the possession of the interior and shorter lines, and transferred a force of any magnitude rapidly from the eastern to the western army to meet an emergency, and then to return.
The orders were received September 9th, and the troops were put in motion immediately for
Petersburg, whence we were to have railroad transportation to the vicinity of
Chattanooga via
Wilmington, N. C., and
Augusta and
Atlanta, Ga. This line at the time was the only one open from
Virginia to
Georgia, the
East Tennessee line, the only other then existing, being held by the enemy at
Knoxville.
Consequently it was taxed with the entire business of the
Confederacy between those States, and that it managed to do it at all has always seemed to me a feat in railroad management deserving great praise.
The roads had had but a small business before the war, and their equipment and motive power were light even for those days.
The gauges were not uniform, and often the tracks of connecting roads were joined through the cities only by lines of drays, and there was no interchange of cars.
There was no manufactory of locomotives in the
South, and but one small rolling-mill, at
Atlanta, that could make a rail.
Yet, in spite of all these drawbacks and the enormous business suddenly thrown upon them, and frequent raids by the enemy, destroying bridges, tearing up tracks, burning ties, and bending and twisting rails, the railroads always came up again smiling, and stuck to the contest as faithfully as did the army.
My battalion brought up the rear, leaving
Petersburg September 17th, and arriving at
Ringgold, the railroad terminus near
Chickamauga, on the 25th.
Our artillery was distributed about our lines, the station of my own battalion being on
Lookout Mountain, whence we threw shells over the enemy's territory, and fought daily with a vicious little battery in Moccasin Bend, almost directly under us. This battery had nearly buried itself in the ground under high parapets, and fired up at us like a man shooting at a squirrel in a tree.
We propped our trails high up in the air to depress the muzzles, and tried to mash our opponents into the earth with solid shot and percussion-shells; but we never hurt them much, and when we left the mountain they were still as lively as ever.
It was at last decided by
General Bragg not to attempt to manoeuvre
Rosecrans out of
Chattanooga, but to detach
Longstreet and send him up to try to capture
Burnside, who was at
Knoxville with a force of about 12,000 effective men. On the night of November 4th we withdrew from
Lookout Mountain, and the next day marched to
Tyner's Station, whence, with
Longstreet's two divisions of infantry,
Hood's (under
Jenkins) and
McLaws's, about 10,000 infantry,
1 we were to be taken by rail as far as
Sweetwater.
The infantry were sent in advance, and the railroad was so taxed to do this that we were detained at
Tyner's until the 10th, and meanwhile nearly starved, as rations had been provided for only half that time.
At length, about noon on the 10th, a train of fiat cars came for us and the guns and men were loaded, the horses being sent afoot.
It was a cold and windy night, and we suffered a great deal on the open cars.
There was a very insufficient water and wood supply on the road, and the troops had to bail water and chop up fence rails for the engine.
The journey of only sixty miles occupied the whole afternoon and night.
On the 13th we moved from
Sweetwater with the infantry and a pontoon-train, and our artillery was reenforced by
Leyden's battalion of 12 guns, giving us in all 35.
Owing to the scarcity of horses we were compelled to use oxen to haul the caissons.
We encamped near
Sweetwater for two days, while secret reconnoissances were made of the enemy's position across the
Tennessee River at
Loudon, and commissary,
quartermaster, and ordnance trains were organized and equipped.
On the 13th, Friday, we marched to Huff's Ferry, about two miles by land below
Loudon, which point had been selected for our crossing.
Everything was kept out of sight of the enemy, and soon after dark some pontoons were carried by hand to the river, a half mile below the ferry, and a party of infantry ferried over, to try to surround and capture the
Federal picket which was posted on their side.
This part of the programme, however, failed, from the vigilance of the
Federal sentries.
They all escaped, and probably carried the news to
Burnside that we were crossing in force, for early next morning a strong reconnoissance was pushed onus by the enemy as the last of our troops were crossing the pontoon which had been constructed during the night.
We drove it back, and organizing a strong advance-guard under
Lieutenant-Colonel (afterward General)
T. M. Logan, of
Hampton's Legion, with
Parker's battery of my battalion, we pushed forward vigorously in the effort to bring
Burnside to bay and defeat him before he could get back and concentrate behind the fortifications about
Knoxville.
This he had set out to do as soon as he appreciated the situation, sending his trains ahead and covering them with his whole force.
For three days there ensued a sort of running skirmish covering the whole distance to
Knoxville, about thirty miles. It was not rapid progress, but the days were short, the roads axle-deep in mud, and a strong rear-guard of the enemy skirmished with us for every hill and wood and stream on the road.
Twice — at
Lenoir's the first afternoon, the 15th, and at
Campbell's Station the next — we seemed to have brought him to bay, and behind our advance-guard our whole force was brought up and formed for attack.
But the approach of night prevented an action on both occasions,
[
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 |
|
The North-Western bastion of Fort Sanders, showing the ground over which the Confederates charged.
From a photograph. |
though on the latter we got in a sharp and pretty artillery duel over some nice open ground unusually favorable for it, during which one of our guns, a 20-pounder
Parrott, exploded, but fortunately without killing any one.
Here we found out that we had opposite to us an old friend, Benjamin's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts, which had been our vis-a-vis at
Fredericksburg, where it had pounded us from “Mary Scott's Hill.”
The night of the third day, the 17th,
Burnside was safe in
Knoxville, and we encamped at
Hazen's, a short distance off. The next day we began reconnoitering for the best place to assault.
A Federal cavalry brigade, under
General W. P. Sanders, held a line of rail breastworks on a hill near the
Armstrong house, and interfered seriously with our freedom of motion.
Our skirmishers having vainly tried to move them, and artillery ammunition being too scarce for much of a cannonade on a minor point, we got up two of
Taylor's Napoleons, so they could not be seen, behind a house which stood about 250 yards from the enemy's line, and asked for two regiments of infantry to charge it as soon as we made an impression.
All being ready, the guns were run out from behind the house and opened vigorously with solid shot, being helped also by
Moody's 24-pounder howitzers with shrapnel, a short distance to the left.
At the close range
Taylor made the rails fly at every shot, and the enemy began to desert them rapidly and run back over the hill.
Then the 2d and 3d South Carolina regiments of
Kershaw's brigade rose from their cover and dashed at them.
Sanders and his officers rallied their men gallantly and brought most of them back to the line, and poured a heavy fire upon the Carolinians.
The latter advanced rapidly without returning it until they reached two cedar-trees within thirty yards of the enemy, when they halted, lay down, and opened fire.
This was from a misapprehension of their orders, which were not to go farther forward than the enemy's line near the cedar-trees.
In three minutes, however, the mistake was appreciated, and, rising with a yell, they dashed upon and carried the rail breastwork, killing and capturing quite a number of the enemy.
2
On the 19th, the enemy being now pretty closely confined to the town, we began preparations to assault him. It was first necessary to study his lines and find the most favorable point.
The town had been partly fortified a year before by the
Confederates, and the topography being generally favorable to defense, it was not easy to find a weak spot, especially as we were all unfamiliar with the locality, and without even maps of the city.
It soon appeared that there was but one point of the lines which it was possible to assault with any hope of success.
That was a fort which had been started by the
Confederates under the name
[
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of Fort London, and had been finished by the
Federals and by them called
Fort Sanders.
It was upon a hill that fell off to the north-west, so that a large force could be marched under cover and approach within two hundred yards of the fort without being exposed to view or to fire either from the fort or the adjacent lines on either side, which here made an obtuse angle.
[See p. 739.]
All of our artillery, thirty-four guns, was posted in the most available positions to fire upon this fort and enfilade the adjacent lines, except four howitzers, which were rigged as mortars to drop shells behind the parapets and to search out spaces sheltered from direct fire.
To accomplish this, skids were prepared inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees, one end resting on the ground and the other on a horizontal pole supported about six feet from the ground by forked posts.
The axle of the howitzer was run up on these skids, raising the wheels in the air on each side of the skids, and leaving the trail on the ground between them, until the piece had an elevation of about sixty degrees.
I had experimented with the arrangement in
Virginia, and also at
Chattanooga, and found it to work nicely and to give very fair mortar practice.
Of course the range was regulated by the charge of powder used.
We also rigged up an old fiat-boat and made a ferry with some telegraph wire, by which we carried
Parker's rifle-guns to the south side of the river and established a battery on a commanding hill, from which we could enfilade the western front of the fort at a range of 2600 yards. All of our guns were protected by earth-works.
These arrangements occupied us closely until Tuesday, the 24th.
The attack was ordered to begin at sunrise on the 25th, and was to be made as follows: First, the mortars were to open and get the range by slow and deliberate practice.
Next, the direct-fire guns were to do the same.
Next, a strong line of sharp-shooters was to capture and occupy the enemy's line of rifle-pits in which their pickets were posted, and from these pits, an average distance of 200 yards, maintain a concentrated fire upon the parapet and embrasures of the fort.
Next, all thirty of the guns and mortars were to pour a rapid fire into the fort for about a half hour, to dismount its guns and demoralize its garrison, and under cover of this fire and the sharp-shooters the storming column, previously massed under shelter, was to advance.
As it approached, the guns would shift their fire to the right and left, and the mortars would resume their natural functions as howitzers and limber up and follow the storming column.
On the night of the 24th we learned that
Bushrod Johnson's and
Gracie's brigades, about 2600 men, were on their way to reinforce us, and would arrive the next night.
The attack was accordingly postponed to await their arrival.
With them came
General Leadbetter,
chief engineer to
Bragg, who had been stationed at
Knoxville and was familiar with its fortifications.
Under his advice
Longstreet again postponed the attack, and the next day went in person with him to look at the enemy's lines above the town, with a view to making the attack there.
On their return Thursday night I was ordered to withdraw our guns from the south side of the river, as it was intended to move up above the town and make the assault on
Mabry's Hill.
On Friday I accompanied
Generals Longstreet,
Leadbetter, and others on a careful reconnoissance of this locality with a force of cavalry under
General Wheeler, who drove in the enemy's pickets.
This reconnoissance convinced every one that an attack in that quarter was impossible.
The hill was strongly fortified, the approaches inundated, and there was no cover within a mile for the formation and advance of an assaulting column.
It was unanimously decided to go back to the plan of assaulting
Fort Sanders, and I was ordered to get the guns back upon the hills across the river early Saturday morning. This was done, but the day turned out rainy and the assault was again postponed until Sunday, the 28th.
So
General Leadbetter's advent cost us three as valuable days as the sun ever shone upon.
Meanwhile a rumor reached us that
Bragg had had a severe
battle at Chattanooga, and had been defeated and driven back to
Dalton.
Late on Saturday afternoon
General Longstreet suddenly changed the plan of attack (I believe under advice of
General Leadbetter) and ordered that instead of beginning at sunrise, and being preceded by a crushing fire of artillery concentrated on the fort and covered by an enveloping swarm of sharp-shooters, a surprise should be attempted just before dawn by the infantry alone.
This was a bitter disappointment to the artillery, after so many days spent in preparation.
We believe that in daylight, with our aid, the result would have been different.
About 11 o'clock that night our infantry skirmishers were ordered to move forward and capture the enemy's pickets, which was successfully accomplished with a little firing, and our sharpshooters established themselves in the enemy's line of rifle-pits within 150 yards of the fort.
But it put the enemy on the alert, and during the rest of the night they fired occasional rounds of canister over our ground.
The troops were brought up as soon as the rifle-pits were taken and formed in the sheltered ground in the rear.
Those assigned to the storming of the fort were
Humphreys's Mississippi brigade, and
Bryan's and
Wofford's Georgia brigades (the latter under
Colonel Ruff), all of
McLaws's division.
Anderson's Georgia brigade, of
Jenkins's division, was to support their left flank.
The brigades averaged about one thousand men each.
The night was wretched, the temperature freezing, and a fine mist falling.
The troops lay upon their arms without fires and suffered greatly.
At the earliest indication of dawn three signalguns were fired in rapid succession from different batteries.
Their shells were visible like meteors in the air and they exploded over the fort.
Instantly the recumbent ranks of gray sprang to their feet and formed for a charge, not so famous in history as
Pickett's charge at
Gettysburg, and not so inspiriting a sight to see, for only the flashes of guns were visible in the dim light, but a charge that illustrated as well as
Pickett's or any other ever made those splendid qualities of
Longstreet's infantry
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which made them at once an admiration and a delight to their comrades in the artillery.
For a few minutes about a dozen guns poured a hot fire into the angle of the lines back of the fort, and the success with which they threw their shells about it, even in the dim light, made it all the harder to bear that the plan of attack had been changed and the artillery was not allowed to try its full strength.
Then we ceased firing to leave a clear field for the storming column, except a few shots from a battery that could reach the ground in rear of the fort.
Meanwhile the assaulting column formed, advanced to the line of rifle-pits, and then swarmed over them and rushed for the fort.
Almost immediately they found themselves in an entanglement of telegraph wires stretched a few inches above the ground and fastened to stumps and stakes.
This, however, was quickly broken up, and the men pressed forward rapidly to the ditch around the fort, receiving a severe musketry fire from its parapet and two or three discharges of canister from guns which were able to reach a part of the ground traversed.
It was impossible, however, to maintain ranks in this rapid advance, in darkness, over unknown ground with such obstacles, and under so close a fire.
It resulted that the three brigades converged in a mass and without order around the north-west bastion.
It was here that the ditch was supposed to be easily passable.
On the western face, indeed, it proved to be only about four-and-a-half feet deep, and ordinarily a ditch
of that depth would not be a serious obstacle.
But that morning the ground was frozen and very slippery, and, in addition,
Colonel O. M. Poe,
General Burnside's chief engineer, anticipating an assault, had made a very important variation in the ordinary profile of the ditch and parapet.
Ordinarily there is left a space of about a foot between the edge of the ditch and the foot of the parapet, which space is called the “berme.”
[See cut, p. 750.]
It will be readily seen that to a man attempting to scale the parapet the berme is a great assistance, giving a foothold whence it is easy to rush up the exterior slope, which cannot be made steeper than forty-five degrees.
Here the berme had been entirely cut away.
To the right and left of the western face of the bastion the ditch grew deeper until it reached ten feet in places, and the parapet was raised in places by cotton bales.
The advance was, of course, checked by the ditch, and the men generally swarmed along the edge, uncertain what to do, and firing into the embrasures and at such of the enemy as ventured to show their heads over the parapet.
This soon silenced the direct fire upon them from the parapet, except an occasional musket raised overhead to the level of the interior crest and fired without aim. The fort was so nearly silenced that looking on from the guns we thought it had surrendered, though some fire continued to come from the left.
Meanwhile many of the officers, color-bearers, and men jumped into the ditch and attempted to scale the parapet.
The slippery slopes and the absence of a berme prevented their success in such numbers as to accomplish any result, and the gallant fellows going up one by one were shot down from the inside as fast as they crowned the parapet.
Nowhere in the war was individual example more splendidly illustrated than on that fatal slope and in that bloody ditch.
Some of the battle-flags were planted on the exterior crest and maintained there for some time by a succession of color-bearers.
3 For fully twenty minutes the men stood around the ditch unable to get at their adversaries, but unwilling to retreat.
Lieutenant Benjamin, commanding the artillery within the fort, made hand-grenades of his shells and exploded several within the ditch.
Longstreet, seeing the flash of their explosions, and thinking them to be our own shells falling short, ordered the cessation of the slight artillery fire which we had continued to throw on the flanks and beyond the fort.
[See note, p. 744.] At last, daylight having succeeded dawn, and further effort being plainly hopeless, the men sulkily withdrew.
As the main force fell back
Anderson's brigade of
Jenkins's division, which was to take up the
[
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attack upon the left of the assaulting column only in case of its success, unwilling to see the assault fail without trying it themselves, rushed forward to the ditch.
Longstreet endeavored to have them stopped, but was too late.
They repeated the scenes of the first attack, and after losing nearly two hundred men they likewise withdrew.
The ranks were re-formed, however, close behind the line of the
enemy's rifle-pits, which our sharp-shooters still occupied.
It had been a bloody repulse, though occupying but about forty minutes.
4
Soon after the repulse I heard, with great delight, that
Jenkins had asked and obtained permission to make a fresh attempt, for I felt the utmost confidence that a concentrated fire by daylight from our 34 guns and mortars, with 1000 sharp-shooters whom we could shelter within close range, could silence the fort entirely, enabling a storming column to plant ladders, fill the ditch with fascines, and cut footholds in the scarp, so that an overwhelming force might reach the interior.
But before arrangements could be made
Longstreet received official intelligence of
Bragg's disaster and an order to abandon the siege of
Knoxville and to move promptly to join
Bragg.
A renewal of the attack was, therefore, thought inexpedient, and orders were at once given to move all trains to the rear, in preparation for a retreat southward that night.
Under cover of night it was intended that we should abandon the siege and get a good start on our march to join
Bragg, but before nightfall we got news from
Bragg himself that a large force under
Sherman was being moved to intercept us, and that an early junction with him was impossible.
Under these circumstances it was finally decided to remain and threaten
Knoxville as long as possible, and draw
Sherman off from the pursuit of
Bragg, and then to retreat northward into
east Tennessee.
We remained before
Knoxville until the night of December 4th.
About noon the next day we encamped at
Blain's Cross-roads, having made eighteen miles; that was, I think, about the very worst night march I ever went through.
The roads were in fearful condition, and in the inky darkness and pouring rain neither men nor animals could see. Frequently guns or wagons would be mired so that the column behind would be blocked in the mud until extra teams and men at the wheels could set the column going for a few minutes.
Strict orders had been given that the men should not use fence rails for fuel, but that night they were ignored, and miles of fence were fired merely to light up the road.
I recall some incidents illustrating how poorly our army was provided with even prime necessaries, although we were in our own country.
We were so badly off for
horse-shoes that on the advance to
Knoxville we stripped the shoes from all the dead horses, and we killed for the purpose all the wounded and broken-down animals, both our own and those left behind by the enemy.
During the siege the river brought down to us a number of dead horses and mules, thrown in within the town.
We watched for them, took them out, and got the shoes and nails from their feet.
Our men were nearly as badly off as the animals — perhaps worse, as they did not have hoofs.
I have myself seen bloody stains on frozen ground, left by the barefooted where our infantry had passed.
We of the artillery took the shoes off the drivers and gave them to the cannoneers who had to march.
Early in the advance
Longstreet gave permission to the men to “swap” shoes with the prisoners whenever any were taken, but each man was strictly required to have something to “swap,” and not leave the prisoner barefoot.
It was quite an amusing sight (to us) to see a ragged rebel with his feet tied up in a sort of raw beef-hide moccasin, which the men learned to make, come up to a squad of prisoners, inspect their feet, and select the one he would “swap” with.
Generally, however, the prisoners took it all very good-humoredly, guyed one another, and swapped jokes also with the swappers.
It looked a little rough, but, as one of the victims said, “When a man is captured, his shoes are captured too.”
On Sunday the 6th we marched fifteen miles farther, to
Rutledge; on the 8th seventeen more, to Mooresburg; and on the 9th nine more, in the direction of
Rogersville.
Here we remained until the 14th, when we marched back, hoping to be able to surprise and capture a small force of the enemy that had followed us to
Bean's Station and had become separated from its support.
5
We spent the winter between
Russellville and
Greenville, living off the country, having occasional
[
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expeditions, and alarms enough to destroy most of the comfort of winter-quarters.
6
In the latter part of March we moved back to
Bristol, and in April
General Lee sent for us to rejoin him by rail.. Reaching
Gordonsville on the 22d of April, we were once more with the Army of Northern Virginia, just twelve days before it entered the
Wilderness and began the death-grapple that was only to end, after eleven months of daily fighting, at
Appomattox.
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|
Knoxville in 1870.
from a water-color Sketoh. |
