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Chapter 9: battle of Shiloh. March and April, 1862.
In the middle of February, 1862,
Major-General Halleck commanded all the armies in the
valley of the Mississippi, from his headquarters in
St. Louis.
These were, the Army of the Ohio,
Major-General Buell, in
Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee,
Major-General Grant, at
Forts Henry and
Donelson; and
General S. R. Curtis, in
Southern Missouri.
He posted his chief of staff,
General Cullum, at
Cairo, and me at
Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate tile important operations then in progress up the
Tennessee and
Cumberland Rivers.
Fort Donelson surrendered to
General Grant on the 16th of February, and there must have been a good deal of confusion resulting from the necessary care of the wounded, and disposition of prisoners, common to all such occasions, and there was a real difficulty in communicating between
St. Louis and
Fort Donelson.
General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had retreated hastily from
Bowling Green to and through
Nashville, a city of so much importance to the
South, that it was at one time proposed as its capital.
Both
Generals Grant and
Buell looked to its capture as an event of great importance.
On the 21st
General Grant sent
General Smith with his division to
Clarksville, fifty miles above
Donelson, toward
Nashville, and on the 27th went himself to
Nashville to meet and confer with
General Buell, but returned to
Donelson the next day.
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Meantime,
General Halleck at
St. Louis must have felt that his armies were getting away from him, and began to send dispatches to me at
Paducah, to be forwarded by boat, or by a rickety telegraph-line up to
Fort Henry, which lay entirely in a hostile country, and was consequently always out of repair.
On the 1st of March I received the following dispatch, and forwarded it to
General Grant, both by the telegraph and boat:
Transports will be sent you as soon as possible, to move your column up the
Tennessee River.
The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad-bridge over
Bear Creek, near
Eastport, Mississippi; and also the railroad connections at
Corinth,
Jackson, and
Humboldt.
It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named.
Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river, without any serious opposition.
Avoid any general engagements with strong forces.
It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle.
This should be strongly impressed on the officers sent with expeditions from the river.
General C. F. Smith or some very discreet officer should be selected for such commands.
Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to
Danville, and move on
Paris.
Perhaps the troops sent to
Jackson and
Humboldt can reach
Paris by land as easily as to return to the transports.
This must depend on the character of the roads and the position of the enemy.
All telegraphic lines which can be reached must be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their protection.
Any loyal Tennesseeans who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms.
Competent officers should be left to command
Forts Henry and
Donelson in your absence.
I have indicated in general terms the object of this.
Again on the 2d:
General Halleck, February 25th, telegraphs me: β
General Grant will send no more forces to
Clarksville.
General Smith's division will come to
Fort Henry, or a point higher up on the
Tennessee River; transports will also be collected at
Paducah.
Two gunboats in
Tennessee River with
Grant.
General Grant will immediately have small garrisons detailed for
Forts Henry and
Donelson, and all other forces made ready for the fieldβ
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From your letter of the 28th, I learn you were at
Fort Donelson, and
General Smith at
Nashville, from which I infer you could not have received orders.
Halleck's telegram of last night says: βWho sent
Smith's division to
Nashville?
I ordered it across to the
Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately.
Order them back.
Send all spare transports up
Tennessee to
General Grant.β
Evidently the general supposes you to be on the
Tennessee.
I am sending all the transports I can find for you, reporting to
General Sherman for orders to go up the
Cumberland for you, or, if you march across to
Fort Henry, then to send them up the
Tennessee.
On the 4th came this dispatch:
You will place
Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at
Fort Henry.
Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?
Halleck was evidently working himself into a passion, but he was too far from the seat of war to make due allowance for the actual state of facts.
General Grant had done so much, that
General Halleck should have been patient.
Meantime, at
Paducah, I was busy sending boats in every direction β some under the orders of
General Halleck, others of
General Cullum; others for
General Grant, and still others for
General Buell at
Nashville and at the same time I was organizing out of the new troops that were arriving at
Paducah a division for myself when allowed to take the field, which I had been promised by
General Halleek.
His purpose was evidently to operate up the
Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek Bridge and the railroad communications between the
Mississippi and
Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt lie was provoked that
Generals Grant and
Smith had turned aside to
Nashville.
In the mean time several of the gunboats, under
Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the
Tennessee as far as
Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union feeling among the people along the river.
On the 10th of March, having received the necessary orders from
General Halleck, I embarked my division at
Paducah.
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It was composed of four brigades.
The First, commanded by
Colonel S. G. Hicks, was composed of the Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, and
Morton's Indiana Battery, on the boats
Sallie List,
Golden Gate,
J. B. Adams, and
Lancaster.
The Second Brigade,
Colonel D. Stuart, was composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Seventy-first Ohio, and Fifty-fourth Ohio; embarked on the
Hannibal, Universe,
Hazel Dell,
Cheeseman, and Prairie Rose.
The Third Brigade,
Colonel Hildebrand, was composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Fifty-seventh Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio; embarked on the Poland, Anglo-
Saxon,
Ohio No. Three, and Continental.
The Fourth Brigade,
Colonel Buckland, was composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Seventieth Ohio; embarked on the
Empress, Baltic, Shenango, and
Marengo.
We steamed up to
Fort Henry, the river being high and in splendid order.
There I reported in person to
General C. F. Smith, and by him was ordered a few miles above, to the remains of the burned railroad bridge, to await the rendezvous of the rest of his army.
I had my headquarters on the
Continental.
Among my colonels I had a strange character
Thomas Worthington, colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio.
He was a graduate of
West Point, of the class of 1827; was, therefore, older than
General Halleck,
General Grant, or myself, and claimed to know more of war than all of us put together.
In ascending the river he did not keep his place in the column, but pushed on and reached
Savannah a day before the rest of my division.
When I reached that place, I found that
Worthington had landed his regiment, and was flying about giving orders, as though he were commander-in-chief.
I made him get back to his boat, and gave him to understand that he must thereafter keep his place.
General C. F. Smith arrived about the 13th of March, with a large fleet of boats, containing
Hurlbut's division,
Lew. Wallae's division, and that of himself, then commanded by
Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace.
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General Smith sent for me to meet him on his boat, and ordered me to push on under escort of the two gunboats,
Lexington and
Tyler, commanded by
Captains Gwin and
Shirk, United States Navy.
I was to land at some point below
Eastport, and make a break of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, between
Tuscumbia and
Corinth.
General Smith was quite unwell, and was suffering from his leg, which was swollen and very sore, from a mere abrasion in stepping into a small-boat.
This actually mortified, and resulted in his death about a month after, viz., April 25, 1862.
He was adjutant of the Military Academy during the early part of my career there, and afterward commandant of cadets.
He was a very handsome and soldierly man, of great experience, and at
Donelson had acted with so much personal bravery that to him many attributed the success of the assault.
I immediately steamed up the
Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in passing
Pittsburg Landing, was told by
Captain Gwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place for the people about
Corinth, distant thirty miles. I sent word back to
General Smith that, if we were detained up the river, he ought to post some troops at
Pittsburg Landing.
We went on up the river cautiously, till we saw
Eastport and
Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebel force of infantry.
We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of
Yellow River, a few miles below, whence led a road to
Burnsville, a place on the
Memphis & Charleston road, where were the company's repair-shops.
We at once commenced disembarking the command: first the cavalry, which started at once for
Burnsville, with orders to tear up the railroad-track, and burn the depots, shops, etc; and I followed with the infantry and artillery as fast as they were disembarked.
It was raining very hard at the time.
Daylight found us about six miles out, where we met the cavalry returning.
They had made numerous attempts to cross the streams, which had become so swollen that mere brooks covered the whole bottom; and my aide-de-camp,
Sanger, whom I had
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dispatched with the cavalry, reported the loss, by drowning, of several of the men. The rain was pouring in torrents, and reports from the rear came that the river was rising very fast, and that, unless we got back to our boats soon, the bottom would be simply impassable.
There was no alternative but to regain our boats; and even this was so difficult, that we had to unharness the artillery-horses, and drag the guns under water through the bayous, to reach the bank of the river.
Once more embarked, I concluded to drop down to
Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there.
During the night of the 14th, we dropped down to
Pittsburg Landing, where I found
Hurlbut's division in boats.
Leaving my command there, I steamed down to
Savannah, and reported to
General Smith in person, who saw in the flooded
Tennessee the full truth of my report; and he then instructed me to disembark my own division, and that of
General Hurlbut, at
Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by
General Halleck's orders.
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of
General C. F. Smith's, or rather
General Halleck's, staff, returned with me, and on tile 16th of March we disembarked and marched out about ten miles toward
Corinth, to a place called
Monterey or
Pea Ridge, where the rebels had a cavalry regiment, which of course decamped on our approach, but from the people we learned that trains were bringing large masses of men from every direction into
Corinth.
McPherson and I reconnoitred the ground well, and then returned to our boats.
On the 18th,
Hurlbut disembarked his division and took post about a mile and a half out, near where the roads branched, one leading to
Corinth and the other toward
Hamburg.
On the 19th I disembarked my division, and took post about three miles back, three of the brigades covering the roads to
Purdy and
Corinth, and the other brigade (
Stuart's) temporarily at a place on the
Hamburg Road, near
Lick Creek Ford, where the Bark
Road came into the
Hamburg Road.
Within a few days,
Prentiss's division arrived
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and camped on my left, and afterward
McClernand's and
W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear.
Lew Wallace's division remained on the north side of
Snake Creek, on a road leading from
Savannah or Crump's Landing to
Purdy.
General C. F. Smith remained back at
Savannah, in chief command, and I was only responsible for my own division.
I kept pickets well out on the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside and outside my lines.
My personal staff was composed of
Captain J. H. Hammond,
assistant adjutant-general;
Surgeons Hartshorn and
L'Hommedieu;
Lieutenant Colonels Hascall and
Sanger,
inspector-generals;
Lieutenants McCoy and
John Taylor,
aides-de-camp.
We were all conscious that the enemy was collecting at
Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th of March,
General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the
Tennessee River, by reason of
General Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to
General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after
Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at
Savannah, but frequently visited our camps.
I always acted on the supposition that we were an invading army; that our purpose was to move forward in force, make a lodgment on the
Memphis & Charleston road, and thus repeat the grand tactics of
Fort Donelson, by separating the rebels in the interior from those at
Memphis and on the
Mississippi River.
We did not fortify our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such a course would have made our raw men timid.
The position was naturally strong, with
Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold stream, with a confluent (
Owl Creek) to our right front; and
Lick Creek, with a similar confluent, on our left, thus narrowing the space over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles.
At a later period of the war, we could have rendered this position impregnable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and it may be it is well we did not. From about the 1st of April we were conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder and more saucy; and on Friday, the 4th of
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April, it dashed down and carried off one of our picket guards, composed of an officer and seven men, posted a couple of miles out on the
Corinth road.
Colonel Buckland sent a company to its relief, then followed himself with a regiment, and, fearing lest he might be worsted, I called out his whole brigade and followed some four or five miles, when the cavalry in advance encountered artillery.
I then, after dark, drew back to our lines, and reported the fact by letter to
General Grant, at
Savannah; but thus far we had not positively detected the presence of infantry, for cavalry regiments generally had a couple of guns along, and I supposed the guns that opened on us on the evening of Friday, April 4th, belonged to the cavalry that was hovering along our whole front.
Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event, the weather being wet and mild, and the roads back to the steamboat-landing being heavy with mud; but on Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out along my lines, and, about four hundred yards to the front of
Appler's regiment, received from some bushes in a ravine to the left front a volley which killed my orderly,
Holliday.
About the same time I saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach.
All my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us. I gave the necessary orders to the battery (
Waterhouse's) attached to
Hildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire till the rebels had crossed the ravine of
Owl Creek, and had begun the ascent; also, sent staff-officers to notify
Generals McClernand and
Prentiss of the coming blow.
Indeed,
McClernand had already sent three regiments to the support of my left flank, and they were in position when the onset came.
In a few minutes the
battle of Shiloh began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. Its history has been well given, and it has been made the subject of a great deal of controversy.
Hildebrand's brigade was soon knocked to pieces, but
Buckland's and
McDowell's kept their organization throughout.
Stuart's was driven back to the river, and did not join me in person till
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the second cay of the battle.
I think my several reports of that battle are condensed and good, made on the spot, when all the names and facts were fresh in my memory, and are herewith given entire:
sir: Last night I dispatched a party of cavalry, at 6 P. M., under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, Fifth Ohio Cavalry, for a strong reconnoissance, if possible, to be converted into an attack upon the
Memphis road.
The command got off punctually, followed at twelve o'clock at night by the First Brigade of my division, commanded by
Colonel McDowell, the other brigades to follow in order.
About one at night the cavalry returned, reporting the road occupied in force by the enemy, with whose advance-guard they skirmished, driving them back about a mile, taking two prisoners, and having their chief guide,
Thomas Maxwell,
Esq., and three men of the Fourth Illinois wounded.
Inclosed please find the report of
Lieutenant-Colonel Heath; also a copy of his instructions, and the order of march.
As soon as the cavalry returned, I saw that an attempt on the road was frustrated, and accordingly have placed
McDowell's brigade to our right front, guarding the pass of
Snake Creek;
Stuart's brigade to the left front, to watch the pass of
Lick Creek; and I shall this morning move directly out on the
Corinth road, about eight miles to or toward
Pea Ridge, which is a key-point to the southwest.
General Hurlbut's division will be landed to-day, and the artillery and infantry disposed so as to defend
Pittsburg, leaving my division entire for any movement by land or water.
As near as I can learn, there are five regiments of rebel infantry at
Purdy; at
Corinth, and distributed along the railroad to Iuca, are probably thirty thousand men; but my information from prisoners is very indistinct.
Every road and path is occupied by the enemy's cavalry, whose orders seem to be, to fire a volley, retire, again fire and retire.
The force on the
Purdy road attacked and driven by
Major Bowman yesterday, was about sixty strong.
That encountered last night on the
Corinth road was about five companies of
Tennessee cavalry, sent from
Purdy about 2 P. M. yesterday.
I hear there is a force of two regiments on
Pea Ridge, at the point where the
Purdy and Corinth roads come together.
I am satisfied we cannot reach the
Memphis & Charleston road without a considerable engagement, which is prohibited by
General Halleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by your orders of yesterday,
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to occupy
Pittsburg strongly, extend the pickets so as to include a semicircle of three miles, and push a strong reconnoissance as far out as
Lick Creek and
Pea Ridge.
I will send down a good many boats to-day, to be employed as you may direct; and would be obliged if you would send a couple of thousand sacks of corn, as much hay as you an possibly spare, and, if possible, a barge of coal.
I will send a steamboat under care of the gunboat, to collect corn from cribs on the river-bank
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
sir: The division surgeon having placed some one hundred or more sick on board the
Fanny Bullitt, I have permitted her to take them to
Savannah.
There is neither house nor building of any kind that can be used for a hospital here.
I hope to receive an order to establish floating hospitals, but in the mean time, by the advice of the surgeon, allow these sick men to leave.
Let me hope that it will meet your approbation.
The order for debarkation came while
General Sherman was absent with three brigades, and no men are left to move the effects of these brigades.
The landing, too, is small, with scarcely any chance to increase it; therefore there is a great accumulation of boats.
Colonel McArthur has arrived, and is now cutting a landing for himself.
General Sherman will return this evening.
I am obliged to transgress, and write myself in the mean time,
Respectfully your obedient servant,
P. S.--4 P. M.--Just back; have been half-way to
Corinth and to
Purdy.
All right.
Have just read this letter, and approve all but floating hospitals;
regimental surgeons can take care of all sick, except chronic cases, which can always be sent down to
Paducah.
Magnificent plain for camping and drilling, and a military point of great strength.
The enemy has felt us twice, at great loss and demoralization; will report at length this evening; am now much worn out.
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Sir: I have just returned from an extensive reconnoissance toward
Corinth and
Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the importance of this position, both for its land advantages and its strategic position.
The ground itself admits of easy defense by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for a hundred thousand men. I will as soon as possible make or cause to be made a topographical sketch of the position.
The only drawback is that, at this stage of water, the space for landing is contracted too much for the immense fleet now here discharging.
I will push the loading and unloading of boats, but suggest that you send at once (
Captain Dodd, if possible) the best quartermaster you can, that he may control and organize this whole matter.
I have a good commissary, and will keep as few provisions afloat as possible.
Yours, etc.,
Sir: In obedience to
General Grant's instructions of March 31st, with one section of
Captain Muench's Minnesota Battery, two twelve-pound howitzers, a detachment of Fifth Ohio Cavalry of one hundred and fifty men, under
Major Ricker, and two battalions of infantry from the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Ohio, under the command of
Colonels Ilildebrand and
Mungen, I marched to the river, and embarked on the steamers
Empress and
Tecumseh.
The gunboat
Cairo did not arrive at
Pittsburg, until after midnight, and at 6 A. M.
Captain Bryant, commanding the gunboat, notified me that he was ready to proceed up the river.
I followed, keeping the transports within about three hundred yards of the gunboat.
About 1 P. M., the
Cairo commenced shelling the battery above the mouth of
Indian Creek, but elicited no reply.
She proceeded up the river steadily and cautiously, followed close by the
Tyler and
Lexington, all throwing shells at the points where, on former visits of the gunboats, enemy's batteries were found.
In this order all followed, till it was demonstrated that all the enemy's batteries, including that at
Chickasaw, were abandoned.
I ordered the battalion of infantry under
Colonel Ilildebrand to disembark at
Eastport, and with the other battalion proceeded to
Chickasaw and landed.
The battery at this point had evidently been abandoned some time, and consisted of the remains of an old Indian mound, partly washed away by the river, which had been fashioned into a two-gun battery, with a small magazine.
The ground to its rear had evidently been overflowed
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during the late freshet, and led to the removal of the guns to
Eastport, where the batteries were on high, elevated ground, accessible at all seasons from the country to the rear.
Upon personal inspection, I attach little importance to
Chickasaw as a military position.
The people, who had fled during the approach of the gunboats, returned to the village, and said the place had been occupied by one
Tennessee regiment and a battery of artillery from
Pensacola.
After remaining at
Chickasaw some hours, all the boats dropped back to
Eastport, not more than a mile below, and landed there.
Eastport Landing during the late freshet must have been about twelve feet under water, but at the present stage the landing is the best I have seen on the
Tennessee River.
The levee is clear of trees or snags, and a hundred boats could land there without confusion.
The soil is of sand and gravel, and very firm.
The road back is hard, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from the water begin the gravel hills of the country.
The infantry scouts sent out by
Colonel Hildebrand found the enemy's cavalry mounted, and watching the Iuca road, about two miles back of
Eastport.
The distance to Iuca is only eight miles, and Iuca is the nearest point and has the best road by which the Charleston & Memphis Railroad can be reached.
I could obtain no certain information as to the strength of the enemy there, but am satisfied that it would have been folly to have attempted it with my command.
Our object being to dislodge the enemy from the batteries recently erected near
Eastport, and this being attained, I have returned, and report the river to be clear to and beyond
Chickasaw.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
headquarters Fifth division, camp Shiloh, April 5, 1862.
Captain J. A. Rawlins,
Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Western Tennessee.
Sir: I have the honor to report that yesterday, about 3 P. M., the
lieutenant commanding and seven men of the advance pickets imprudently advanced from their posts and were captured.
I ordered
Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed rapidly to the picket-station, ascertain the truth, and act according to circumstances.
He reached the station, found the pickets had been captured as reported, and that a company of infantry sent by the brigade commander had gone forward in pursuit of some cavalry.
He rapidly advanced some two miles, and found them engaged, charged the enemy, and drove them along the
Ridge road, till he
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met and received three discharges of artillery, when he very properly wheeled under cover, and returned till he met me.
As soon as I heard artillery, I advanced with two regiments of infantry, and took position, and remained until the scattered companies of infantry and cavalry had returned.
This was after night.
I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at
Pea Ridge, that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery of field-artillery, to the ridge on which the
Corinth road lies.
They halted the infantry and artillery at a point about five miles in my front, sent a detachment to the lane of
General Meaks, on the north of
Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward our camp.
This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets, and afterward engaged the two companies of
Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by him in his report herewith inclosed.
Our cavalry drove them back upon their artillery and Infantry, killing many, and bringing off ten prisoners, all of the First Alabama Cavalry, whom I send to you.
We lost of the pickets one
first-lieutenant and seven men of the Ohio Seventieth Infantry (list inclosed); one major, one lieutenant, and one private of the Seventy-second Ohio, taken prisoners; eight privates wounded (names in full, embraced in report of
Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith).
We took ten prisoners, and left two rebels wounded and many killed on the field.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Sir: I had the honor to report that, on Friday the 4th inst., the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and a half in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road, capturing one
first-lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, and killing many.
On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe they designed any thing but a strong demonstration.
On Sunday morning early, the 6th inst., the enemy drove our advance-guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to
General McClernand, asking him to support my left; to
General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to
General Hurlbut, asking him to support
General Prentiss.
At that time--7 A. M.--my division was arranged as follows:
First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa,
Colonel J. A. McDowell;
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Fortieth Illinois,
Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio,
Colonel Worthington; and the
Morton battery,
Captain Behr, on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the
Purdy road over
Owl Creek.
Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois,
Colonel D. Stuart; the Fifty-fourth Ohio,
Colonel T. Kilby Smith; and the Seventy-first Ohio,
Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding the ford over
Lick Creek.
Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio,
Colonel Hildebrand; the Fifty-third Ohio,
Colonel Appler; and the Fifty-seventh Ohio,
Colonel Mungen, on the left of the
Corinth road, its right resting on
Shiloh meeting-house.
Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio,
Colonel Buckland; the Forty-eighth Ohio,
Colonel Sullivan; and the Seventieth Ohio,
Colonel Cockerill, on the right of the
Corinth road, its left resting on
Shiloh meeting-house.
Two batteries of artillery β
Taylor's and
Waterhouse's β were posted, the former at
Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the left, with a front-fire over open ground between
Mungen's and
Appler's regiments.
The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois, under
Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the left and rear of
Shiloh meeting-house, which I regarded as the centre of my position.
Shortly after 7 A. M., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in the open field before
Appler's regiment, the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire upon my party, killing my orderly,
Thomas D. Holliday, of Company Hi, Second Illinois Cavalry.
The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of
Appler's camp, and flows to the north along my whole front.
This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side.
About 8 A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp.
All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at their proper posts.
I rode to
Colonel Appler, and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good battery on his right, and strong support to his rear.
General McClernand had promptly and energetically responded to my request, and had sent me three regiments which were posted to protect
Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line.
The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to our front, throwing shells into our camp.
Taylor's and
Waterhouse's batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalions of infantry
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passing obliquely to the left, across the open field in
Appler's front; also, other columns advancing directly upon my division.
Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle became general.
Other heavy masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to our left, and directing their course on
General Prentiss.
I saw at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall upon
Generals McClernand and
Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with the
Tennessee River, and about two miles back from it. Very soon the sound of artillery and musketry announced that
General Prentiss was engaged; and about 9 A. M. I judged that he was falling back.
About this time
Appler's regiment broke in disorder, followed by
Mungen's regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on
Waterhouse's battery thereby exposed.
The three
Illinois regiments in immediate support of this battery stood for some time; but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, and the fire so severe, that when
Colonel Raith, of the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound and fell from his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy got possession of three guns of this (
Waterhouse's) battery.
Although our left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our whole line, I deemed
Shiloh so important, that I remained by it and renewed my orders to
Colonels McDowell and
Buckland to hold their ground; and we did hold these positions until about 10 A. M., when the enemy had got his artillery to the rear of our left flank and some change became absolutely necessary.
Two regiments of
Hildebrand's brigade β
Appler's and
Mungen's β had already disappeared to the rear, and
Ilildebrand's own regiment was in disorder.
I therefore gave orders for
Taylor's battery β still at
Shiloh β to fall back as far as the
Purdy and
Hamburg road, and for
McDowell and
Buckland to adopt that road as their new line.
I rode across the angle and met
Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to come into battery, action right.
Captain Behr gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from his horse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons, and abandoning five out of six guns, without firing a shot.
The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were again forced to choose a new line of defense.
Hildebrand's brigade had substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself bravely remained.
McDowell's and
Buckland's brigades maintained their organizations, and were conducted by my aides, so as to join on
General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original camps and line.
This was about 10 1/2 A. M., at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on
General McClernand's whole front.
He struggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed, I moved
McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover β trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right.
We held this position for four long hours, sometimes
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gaining and at others losing ground;
General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert, and struggling to maintain this line.
While we were so hard pressed, two
Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and
General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 3 P. M.; but about 4 P. M. it was evident that
Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river; and knowing that
General Lew Wallace was coming with reinforcements from Crump's Landing,
General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge by which
General Wallace had to approach.
We fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line.
During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were handsomely repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment.
The Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service in holding the enemy in check for some time, and
Major Taylor also came up with another battery and got into position, just in time to get a good flank-fire upon the enemy's column, as he pressed on
General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when
General McClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right.
I had a clear field, about two hundred yards wide, in my immediate front, and contented myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance during the rest of the day. In this position we rested for the night.
My command had become decidedly of a mixed character.
Buckland's brigade was the only one that retained its organization.
Colonel Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not.
Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall off his horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were not in line.
The Thirteenth Missouri,
Colonel Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining its regimental organization; and it formed a part of my line during Sunday night and all Monday.
Other fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle.
Generals Grant and
Buell visited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned the situation of Affairs on other parts of the field.
General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark, and formed his line to my right rear.
It rained hard during the night, but our men were in good spirits, lay on their arms, being satisfied with such bread and meat as could be gathered at the neighboring camps, and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday.
At daylight of Monday I received
General Grant's orders to advance and recapture our original camps.
I dispatched several members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find, especially the brigade of
Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from the division all the day before; and at the appointed time the division, or rather what remained of it, with the
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Thirteenth Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of
General McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery located near
Colonel McDowell's former headquarters.
Here I remained, patiently waiting for the sound of
General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 A. M. the heavy firing in that direction, and its steady approach, satisfied me; and
General Wallace being on our right flank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to
General McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with
Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and
Stuart's brigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily and slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery.
Taylor had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into position, to advance by hand firing.
These guns belonged to Company A,
Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by
Lieutenant P. P. Wood, and did most excellent service.
Under cover of their fire, we advanced till we reached the point where the
Corinth road crosses the line of
McClernand's camp, and here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of
General Buell's
Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined men. Here I saw
Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style.
Then arose the severest musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back.
This green point of timber is about five hundred yards east of
Shiloh meeting-house, and it was evident here was to be the struggle.
The enemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south.
General McClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three guns of
Wood's battery, with which he speedily drove them back, and, seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to bring them forward, when, by almost providential decree, they proved to be two twenty-four-pound howitzers belonging to McAlister's battery, and served as well as guns ever could be.
This was about 2 P. M. The enemy had one battery close by
Shiloh, and another near the
Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister upon any column of troops that advanced upon the green point of water-oaks.
Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of
McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, and entered this dreaded wood.
I ordered my second brigade (then commanded by
Colonel T. Kilby Smith,
Colonel Stuart being wounded) to form on its right, and my fourth brigade,
Colonel Buckland, on its right; all to advance abreast with this
Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterward found to be
Rousseau's brigade of
McCook's division.
I gave personal direction to the twenty-four-pounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh meeting-house.
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Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping every thing before it, and at 4 P. M. we stood upon the ground of our original front line; and the enemy was in full retreat.
I directed my several brigades to resume at once their original camps.
Several times during the battle, cartridges gave out; but
General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear.
When I appealed to regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges, I did so because, to re tire a regiment for any cause, has a bad effect on others.
I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although their cartridge-boxes were empty.
I am ordered by
General Grant to give personal credit where I think it is due, and censure where I think it merited.
I concede that
General McCook's splendid division from
Kentucky drove back the enemy along the
Corinth road, which was the great centre of this field of battle, where
Beauregard commanded in person, supported by
Bragg's,
Polk's, and
Breckenridge's divisions.
I think
Johnston was killed by exposing himself in front of his troops, at the time of their attack on
Buckland's brigade on Sunday morning; although in this I may be mistaken.
My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all having received their muskets for the first time at
Paducah.
None of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday.
To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong.
They knew not the value of combination and organization.
When individual fears seized them, the first impulse was to get away.
My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning.
Colonel Ilildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment with individual exceptions in hand, an hour after
Appler's and
Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action.
Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well.
I commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander.
His subordinates,
Colonels Sullivan and
Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry; the former receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, until his right arm was broken by a shot.
Colonel Cockerill held a larger proportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from first to last.
Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his ground on Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle; and when ordered, he conducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style.
In falling back to the next position, he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His
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subordinates,
Colonels Hicks and
Worthington, displayed great persona.
courage.
Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound, which it is feared may prove mortal.
He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country.
Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since.
My second brigade,
Colonel Stuart, was detached nearly two miles from my headquarters.
He had to fight his own battle on Sunday, against superior numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and
General Prentiss early in the day.
Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command devolved on
Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely.
I have not yet received
Colonel Stuart's report of the operations of his brigade during the time he was detached, and must therefore forbear to mention names.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regiment itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with the brigade when it joined the division on Monday morning. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments who kept in the advance.
I observed and noticed them, but until the brigadiers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our front line, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the steamboat-landing.
I will also send a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing, by name, rank, company, and regiment.
At present I submit the result in figures:
| regiments, etc. | killed. | wounded. | Missing. |
| Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. |
| Sixth Iowa | 2 | 49 | 3 | 117 | Β | 39 |
| Fortieth Illinois | 1 | 42 | 7 | 148 | Β | 2 |
| Forty-sixth Ohio | 2 | 32 | 3 | 147 | Β | 52 |
| Fifty-fifth Illinois | 1 | 45 | 8 | 183 | Β | 41 |
| Fifty-fourth Ohio | 2 | 22 | 5 | 128 | Β | 32 |
| Seventy-first Ohio | 1 | 12 | Β | 52 | 1 | 45 |
| Seventy-seventh Ohio | 1 | 48 | 7 | 107 | 3 | 53 |
| Fifty-seventh Ohio | 2 | 7 | Β | 82 | Β | 33 |
| Fifty-third Ohio | Β | 7 | Β | 39 | Β | 5 |
| Seventy-second Ohio | 2 | 13 | 5 | 85 | Β | 49 |
| Forty-eighth Ohio | 1 | 13 | 3 | 70 | 1 | 45 |
| Seventieth Ohio | Β | 9 | 1 | 53 | 1 | 39 |
| Taylor's battery, no report | Β | Β | Β | Β | Β | Β |
| Behr's | 1 | Β | Β | Β | Β | Β |
| Barrett's | Β | 1 | Β | 5 | Β | Β |
| Waterhouse's | Β | 1 | 3 | 14 | Β | Β |
| Orderly Holliday | Β | 1 | Β | Β | Β | Β |
| Total | 16 | 302 | 45 | 1,230 | 6 | 435 |
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| recapitulation. |
| Officers killed | 16 |
| Officers wounded | 45 |
| Officers missing | 6 |
| Soldiers killed | 302 |
| Soldiers wounded | 1,230 |
| Soldiers missing | 435 |
| Β | |
| Aggregate loss in the division | 2,034 |
The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we recovered seven; not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in number to balance the account.
At the time of recovering our camps our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating masses of the enemy; but on the following day I followed up with
Buckland's and
Hildebrand's brigade for six miles, the result of which I have already reported.
Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks.
I think they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls and bullets as must satisfy their ambition.
Captain Hammond, my chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active in rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and aiding to form the lines of defense and attack.
I recommend him to your notice.
Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapid execution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringing into line the batteries that cooperated so efficiently in our movements.
Captains McCoy and
Dayton,
aides-de-camp, were with me all the time, carrying orders, and acting with coolness, spirit, and courage.
To
Surgeon Hartshorne and
Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds of wounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatment received on the field of battle and in the various temporary hospitals created along the line of our operations.
They worked day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own troops as well as of the enemy were in safe and comfortable shelter.
To
Major Taylor,
chief of artillery, I feel under deep obligations, for his good sense and judgment in managing the batteries, on which so much depended.
I inclose his report and indorse his recommendations.
The cavalry of my command kept to the rear, and took little part in the action; but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which we were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 A. M. till Monday at 4 P. M.
Captain Kossack, of the engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great assistance.
I inclose his sketch of the battle-field, which is the best I have seen, and which will enable you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as of the others that participated in the battle.
I will also send in, during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels, and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper.
I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,
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headquarters Fifth division, Tuesday, April 8, 1862.
Sir: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades of my fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the
Corinth road.
One after another of the abandoned camps of the enemy lined the roads, with hospital-flags for their protection; at all we found more or less wounded and dead men. At the forks of the road I found the head of
General T. J. Wood's division of
Buell's Army.
I ordered cavalry to examine both roads leading toward
Corinth, and found the enemy on both.
Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, asking for reenforcements, I ordered
General Wood to advance the head of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while I conducted the head of the third brigade of my division up the right-hand road.
About half a mile from the forks was a clear field, through which the road passed, and, immediately beyond, a space of some two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that an extensive rebel camp.
The enemy's cavalry could be seen in this camp; after reconnoissance, I ordered the two advance companies of the Ohio Seventy-seventh,
Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward as skirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with an interval of one hundred yards. In this order we advanced cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged.
Taking it for granted this disposition would clear the camp, I held
Colonel Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge.
The enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by
General Forrest in person, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment of infantry, without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and fled.
The ground was admirably adapted for a defense of infantry against cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber.
As the regiment of infantry broke,
Dickey's Cavalry began to discharge their carbines, and fell into disorder.
I instantly sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle, which was promptly executed.
The broken infantry and cavalry rallied on this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it, our cavalry in turn charged and drove them from the field.
I advanced the entire brigade over the same ground and sent
Colonel Dickey's cavalry a mile farther on the road.
On examining the ground which had been occupied by the Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our men dead and about twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons and had all the wounded carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried, also the whole rebel camp to be destroyed.
Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about two hundred and eighty Confederate wounded, and about fifty of our own wounded men. Not having the means of bringing them off,
Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by the
medical director (
Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and a pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also a pledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, and surrendered
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to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out. I inclose this written document, and request that you cause wagons or ambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and that wagons be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us which are pitched along the road for four miles out. I did not destroy them, because I knew the enemy could not move them.
The roads are very bad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and limber-boxes.
The enemy has succeeded in-carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes of at least twenty caissons.
I am satisfied the enemy's infantry and artillery passed
Lick Creek this morning, traveling all of last night, and that he left to his rear all his cavalry, which has protected his retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark the whole road.
The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were provided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged out by three days hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I ordered them back to their camps, where they now are.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
General Grant did not make an official report of the
battle of Shiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by the reports of division commanders and subordinates.
Probably no single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports.
It was publicly asserted at the
North that our army was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that
General Grant was drunk; that
Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in a measure sustained by the published opinions of
Generals Buell,
Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed and beaten.
Personally I saw
General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately engaged.
But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy, and then held our ground.
This gave h-m great satisfaction, an(d he told me that things did not look as well over on the left.
lie also told me that on his way up from
Savannah that morning he
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had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered
Lew Wallace's division to cross over
Lick Creek, so as to come up on my right, telling me to look out for him. He again came to me just before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery collected under
Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had observed at
Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win.
General Grant also explained to me that
General Buell had reached the bank of the
Tennessee River opposite
Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.
About half an hour afterward
General Buell himself rode up to where I was, accompanied by
Colonels Fry,
Michler, and others of his staff.
I was dismounted at the time, and
General Buell made of me a good many significant inquiries about matters and things generally.
By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained to him that my right then covered the bridge over
Lick Creek by which we had all day been expecting
Lew Wallace; that
McClernand was on my left,
Hurlbut on his left, and so on. But
Buell said he had come up from the landing, and had not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt.
I insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and thought that
McClernand had as many more, and that with what was left of
Hurlbut's,
W. H. L. Wallace's, and
Prentiss's divisions, we ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle.
I reckoned that ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and that the enemy's loss could not be much less.
Buell said that
Nelson's,
McCook's, and
Crittenden's divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle.
I argued that with these reinforcements we
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could sweep the field.
Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing, and I really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster.
He did not, of course, understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my map, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. He handed it to
Major Michler to have it copied, and the original returned to me, which
Michler did two or three days after the battle.
Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle decisively.
Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of
General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence.
After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and sanitary commission agents, men and women, came up the
Tennessee to bring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for whom we had imperfect means of shelter and care.
These people caught up the camp-stories, which on their return home they retailed through their local papers, usually elevating their own neighbors into heroes, but decrying all others.
Among them was
Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of
Ohio, who published in Belfontaine, Ohio, a most abusive article about
General Grant and his subordinate generals.
As
General Grant did not and would not take up the cudgels, I did so. My letter in reply to
Stanton, dated June 10, 1862, was published in the
Cincinnati Commercial soon after its date.
To this
Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied, and I further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862.
These letters are too personal to be revived.
By this time the good people of the
North had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in the field more faith and support.
Stanton was never again elected to any public office, and was commonly spoken of as βthe late
Mr. Stanton.β
He is now dead, and I doubt not in life he often regretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame by abusing the army-leaders, then as now an easy and favorite mode of gaining notoriety, if not popularity.
Of course, subsequent events gave General
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Grant and most of the other actors in that battle their appropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden popular clamors is well illustrated by this case.
Tho
battle of Shiloh, or
Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of
McClernand,
Prentiss,
Hurlbut,
W. H. L. Wallace, and
Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men. We had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as
Buell arrived we would march to
Corinth to attack the enemy.
The rebel army, commanded by
General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousand strong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question fought skillfully from early morning till about 2 P. M., when their commander-in-chief was killed by a Minie β ball in the calf of his leg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery.
There was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to dark.
Early at night the division of
Lew Wallace arrived from the other side of
Snake Creek, not having fired a shot.
A very small part of
General Buell's army was on our side of the
Tennessee River that evening, and their loss was trivial.
During that night, the three divisions of
McCook,
Nelson, and
Crittenden, were ferried across the
Tennessee, and fought with us the next day (7th). During that night, also, the two wooden gunboats,
Tyler, commanded by
Lieutenant Gwin, and
Lexington,
Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to be thrown toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupied by the enemy.
Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine.
Our aggregate loss, made up from official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven thousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand and twenty-two prisoners; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen, of which twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in
Buell's army, leaving for that of
Grant ten thousand and fifty.
This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by each army.
