Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 6.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[596] lightning. Companies and regiments melted away, yet still they came. Berry and Birney advanced to meet them. They were terrible shocks. The living waves rolled against each other as you have seen the billows on a stormy sea. The enemy, as if maddened by the obstinacy of these handfuls of men, rushed up to the muzzles of the cannon only to be swept back, leaving long lines of dead where the grape swept through. The rebel commanders pushed on their men to the sacrifice, carrying out the one all-animating idea of this rebellion, to win at whatever cost.

Sickles sent for reenforcements. Hooker, instead of sending them down the road, ordered French and Hancock, of Couch's corps, to advance past Meade and attack the enemy in flank. Couch was in the centre of the V. Instead of going down to the point they marched through into the west, came with great force upon the divisions which Jackson had thrown down toward Meade. It was about seven o'clock, and in a half-hour's time they put the enemy to flight.

But Sickles could not hold out against the tremendous odds. Gradually he was driven in.

Up to this time Hooker had remained at the Chancellor House, directing the movements. The left leg of the V was breaking. Should he order up Couch? Would it be safe to bring Geary across from the other leg of the V, and leave only Howard to hold that line toward Fredericksburgh? But Howard's men had recovered from their fright. Now they burned to be in the thickest of the fight — to wipe out the stain upon their honor. They were heroes now, every one of them. Ought he not to bring Meade and Reynolds up, to swing them round upon Jackson's flank, as if the V were hinged at the Chancellor House? Decisions must be made at once. He preferred, instead, to make the V smaller and thicker, to make it compact enough to resist the blow. Keeping Reynolds and Meade in their positions, he took Sickles and Slocum back toward Couch and formed a new line, still in the form of a V — shorter, blunter, thicker, stouter; such as a job printer might select from fancy type.

The fight of the morning ended at eleven. Jackson in the afternoon came on to make a second attack, still at the apex. The attack now instead of being against the side of the ridge was upon its point. Again, as in the morning, the artillery was massed. Exultingly the foe came on, yet not so determinedly as in the morning. He had lost life, blood, and energy. Yet it was a vigorous attack. Again the artillery did its fearful work.

Every attempt to move this second line failed. That apex of men and artillery was immovable. Long before night the enemy retired, foiled in all his efforts to break the line. He had pushed back the pyramid, had gained ground, and that was all. At Fredericksburgh he had lost ground. Sedgwick had carried the heights and was well advanced toward Hooker. In men he was twenty thousand poorer. His whole army had suffered.

How was it with Hooker? Reynold's, Meade's, Howard's, nearly all of Couch's, and half of Slocum's corps were fresh. The enemy had gained ground because Hooker had planned and had fought a defensive battle, but the enemy on Sunday night had the worst of it. Virtually he was defeated. Hooker's loss was but five thousand, not including Sedgwick's.

The time had arrived, as we look at it now, for carrying out of the second part of the plan — the advance upon the enemy. Having received the blow, having exhausted the foe, it was time to hurl a thunderbolt, to fall upon Jackson with a fury of a tornado — on Sunday night or on Monday morning. Up to this moment I see but one impolitic movement — Sedgwick's attack. The heights of Fredericksburgh were of no account to Hooker. Sedgwick had twenty thousand men to carry them. It was bravely, gallantly done. He captured guns and prisoners, but lost five thousand men. A demonstration with a portion of the force would have given Hooker additional power to crush Jackson. I have no information as to whether Sedgwick acted strictly according to orders or not.

Monday came. Lee sent an overwhelming force against Sedgwick while Jackson rested, and all that had been gained, save cannon and prisoners, was lost.

Stoneman had been heard from, and Hooker delayed to strike. To annihilate the rebel army, it was of the utmost importance that Stoneman should do his part of the work. Wanting that information, he waited. Candid minds will duly consider the circumstances before condemning the delay.

Sedgwick driven back, Lee was emboldened and strengthened. There was rain up in the mountains. The Rappahannock began to rise. The rain was falling fast; could he maintain his position? Would it be safe to stay? Had he a right to imperil the army? Tuesday, and still no certain news from Stoneman. Averill, who had dashed toward Gordonsville, was in with intelligence of the destruction of the Virginia Central road in that direction ; but that was of no consequence if the Fredericksburgh road was intact. The rain was pouring. He counselled with his officers, and the decision was to recross the Rappahannock. Had Hooker known on Monday what the Richmond papers had of Stoneman's operations, not thus would the affairs have ended. It was not so to be. He who guides the stars controlled also this event.

Another such success to the rebels would be a terrible disaster. They cannot long stand such an expenditure of blood. When the history of the war is written it would not be strange if the battle of Chancellorsville was reckoned about the most damaging blow thus far given to the Confederacy.

Hooker recrossed the Rappahannock noiselessly, bringing back one more cannon than was taken over. The morale of his army is excellent. The fact that five divisions withstood the onset of all Jackson's forces and two divisions of Longstreet's, as we are informed by Richmond papers, has inspired the men. Perhaps the question may be asked, why Hooker did not bring in more troops — why he did not bring up Meade, Reynolds,