George H. Gordon, From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain

“‘ [317] of the regiment, and will do no good!’ Major Perkins (who was an educated soldier) made no reply, but shrugged his shoulders in a significant manner. Determined not to subject the regiment to such wanton destruction if I could avoid it, I reported to you, and you told me I need not obey the order. I met Major Perkins a day or two after, and he said to me he supposed that I blamed him very much for bringing me such an order, but it was sent by signal, and, he had since found, under a misapprehension,¹ it having been forgotten that the regiment had been sent to the right instead of the centre, as first ordered.”

It is somewhat of an explanation that Major Perkins, while on the extreme right of our line of battle, in giving an order to one of my regiments that he did not communicate through me, imparted in an automatic way what was received by signal; but as an explanation it is wholly inadequate to clear up why Major Perkins did not himself discover the error, and not put upon me the responsibility. Perkins knew not only that Colonel Andrews could not have made that movement without my orders, but that such a movement would have resulted in most direful disaster; he knew, moreover, that Banks did not know where we were.

Most important is it here to consider whether Banks sent me the order imputed to him. I do not think it admits of doubt. Who would have taken such responsibility? Not the officer who brought it: I charged him with this presumption in the presence and hearing of Banks a few days after, and he strongly and indignantly reiterated that he received the order from General Banks! And Banks made no reply.

If we seek for an explanation of our defeat in some of the