Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

[268] was soon explained, and Carr also was ordered to pursue as rapidly as possible to Black river, and cross it if he could. Osterhaus was to follow Carr. Some of McPherson's troops had already got into the road in advance, but, having marched and engaged the enemy all day, they were fatigued, and gave way to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark.

While the day had been so obstinately contested on the right, Grant, as has been seen, repeatedly sent orders to McClernand to push the divisions of Carr and Osterhaus into the fight, and to communicate similar orders to Blair and A. J. Smith. These four divisions were admirably situated for attack, and, by ten o'clock, were so close as to have their skirmishers engaged. Ransom's brigade of McArthur's division had also arrived, and moved to their support; but, notwithstanding all this, and Grant's urgent and repeated orders, they were not so directed as to take any important part in the action; indeed, their influence was altogether inadequate to their strength or opportunities. Had McClernand caused them to act with any degree of vigor, to do only half so much as Hovey and McPherson performed, it is difficult to perceive how any portion of the rebel army could have been withdrawn as an organized force. At half-past 3 or four o'clock, the enemy was broken and flying from the field, but a vigorous effort on the part of McClernand would have accomplished the defeat by noon. The rebel right might have been destroyed, and the massing on their left prevented; or, later in the fight, Logan could have been kept in their rear, if McClernand had come up in time; and, with all retreat cut off, the enemy might have been forced to surrender on the field, in mass.